Nuclear Waste: Comprehensive Review of the Disposal Program Is Needed
(Letter Report, 09/27/94, GAO/RCED-94-299).
Recognizing that problems exist with its program to permanently dispose
of highly radioactive waste, the Energy Department (DOE) recently
undertook several review initiatives, including a review of past
criticisms of the program, a financial and management evaluation of the
repository project, and a public inquiry into the continued storage of
waste by utilities at their nuclear power reactors after January 1988.
Taken together, these efforts are too narrow in scope and are not
objective enough to provide the thoughtful and thorough program
evaluation that is needed. Many Members have called for a broad-based
independent review of nuclear waste management, including the management
of highly radioactive waste from civilian nuclear power reactors. This
report discusses why GAO continues to believe that a comprehensive
independent review of the disposal program and basic policies guiding
the program is needed. Without a comprehensive independent review of the
disposal program and its policies, millions--if not billions--of dollars
could be wasted in implementing the program over the next several
decades.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-94-299
TITLE: Nuclear Waste: Comprehensive Review of the Disposal Program
Is Needed
DATE: 09/27/94
SUBJECT: Nuclear waste disposal
Nuclear facilities
Nuclear waste storage
Site selection
Investigations by federal agencies
Nuclear waste management
Safety standards
Radioactive wastes
IDENTIFIER: DOE Yucca Mountain Project (NV)
Yucca Mountain (NV)
Second Generation Nuclear Waste Act
DOE High Level Nuclear Waste Disposal Program
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Congress
September 1994
NUCLEAR WASTE - COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEW OF THE DISPOSAL PROGRAM IS
NEEDED
GAO/RCED-94-299
Comprehensive Review of Disposal Program
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOE - Department of Energy
GAO - General Accounting Office
NWTRB - Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board
OCG - Office of the Comptroller General
OTA - Office of Technology Assessment
RCED - Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-246458
September 27, 1994
To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 created the Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management within the Department of Energy (DOE)
and tasked it with developing a repository to permanently dispose of
highly radioactive waste. The estimated cost of disposing of such
waste increased from $20 billion to $30 billion over the program's
first 10 years despite significant reductions in the program's scope.
During recent congressional hearings, Members of Congress and the
public have raised many concerns about the pace and direction of the
disposal program. Those concerns have focused on such issues as the
storage of waste until a repository is operational, funding, the
program's organization and management, and alternative approaches to
regulating the development of a repository.
This report fulfills the requirement in the 1982 act, as amended,
that we audit DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
and report our findings. It discusses why we continue to believe
that a comprehensive independent review of the disposal program and
fundamental policies guiding the program is needed. Early next year,
we also plan to provide the Congress with a report framing key issues
in the nuclear waste debate that the Congress may wish to examine as
it considers the future direction of nuclear waste policy.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
Recognizing that problems existed in the disposal program, the
Secretary of Energy recently undertook several review initiatives.
These review initiatives are separate from changes that DOE is
implementing in the program to improve its funding and management.
The initiatives include a review of past criticisms of the program, a
financial and management evaluation of the repository project, and a
public inquiry into the continued storage of waste by utilities at
their nuclear power reactors after January 1998. Taken together,
these initiatives are too narrow in scope and lack sufficient
objectivity to provide the thoughtful and thorough evaluation of the
program that is needed.
Congressional committees and individual Members of Congress have
recognized, in growing numbers, that changes are needed in the
disposal program to ensure that the funds appropriated for it are
spent wisely. Many Members have called for a broad-based independent
review of nuclear waste management, including the management of
highly radioactive waste from civilian nuclear power reactors.
Without a comprehensive independent review of the disposal program
and its policies, millions--if not billions--of dollars could be
wasted in implementing the program over the next several decades.
A review conducted by an entity completely independent of DOE with
requisite expertise in public policy and administration and in
nuclear waste issues could help ensure that the program is
implemented as efficiently and effectively as possible. Analyzing
the key issues and options related to waste storage and disposal in a
comprehensive manner could ensure that the Congress has the best
possible information as a basis for evaluating the performance of
DOE's program, making future funding decisions, and making any
necessary changes to the program. Such a review could be conducted
simultaneously with investigation activities at Yucca Mountain,
Nevada, that are critical to determining whether that site is
suitable for use as a repository.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
In May 1993, we raised concerns about the slow pace and fragmented
direction of the disposal program that were caused, at least in part,
by the disparity between the program policies DOE has been pursuing
and the relatively low budget priority assigned to the
program--especially to the scientific and technical activities
necessary to determine whether Yucca Mountain is a suitable site for
a nuclear waste repository.\1 Because the Secretary of Energy was
then new to the position, we recommended that DOE review the
program's goals and objectives in the context of the program's low
funding priority, the sufficiency of the program's emphasis on the
scientific investigation of Yucca Mountain, and the ways that the
investigation project could be conducted more efficiently without
sacrificing its technical quality. We also called for an independent
review of the program that would be performed concurrently with the
investigation at Yucca Mountain, such as the review recommended by
the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. In March 1993, the Board
had recommended an independent review of the disposal program because
it was concerned about unrealistic deadlines driving the program,
significant gaps in DOE's plans for managing nuclear waste, and the
diffuse organizational structure of the program.\2 Finally, we
recommended that the Congress defer consideration of legislation that
would have changed the method of funding and increased the funding
for the disposal program until the Secretary of Energy had completed
the reviews that we had recommended DOE conduct; an independent
review of the program, such as that recommended by the Board, had
been completed; and appropriate legislative, policy, and/or
programmatic changes had been implemented.
In July 1993 testimony before two House subcommittees, in response to
questions on how an independent review of the disposal program might
be done, we suggested that such a review would need to be chartered
at a high level in order to ensure the necessary independence and
objectivity.\3 In addition, we suggested several possible entities
for conducting such a review, including a specially constituted
congressional committee, a presidential commission, and/or the
National Academy of Public Administration.
As noted in our May 1993 report, one of our primary concerns about
the disposal program has been DOE's adherence to schedules for
beginning to operate a repository and accept utilities' waste that
were unrealistic for both funding and technical reasons. We pointed
out that, at the pace at which DOE was then proceeding, it was
unlikely that the Department could begin disposing of waste before
2015, 5 years later than its target date of 2010. Also, in 1991 we
had concluded that it was unlikely DOE would be able to develop by
1998, as it planned, a facility for accepting and temporarily storing
utilities' waste.\4 Despite these findings and similar conclusions
drawn by others, such as the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board,
DOE has continued to pursue these milestones for developing a
repository and accepting utilities' waste.
Also, in our May 1993 report we pointed out that an underlying reason
for the program's slow progress and escalating cost is that DOE has
been spending a relatively small percentage of the program's
appropriations directly on scientific investigations of Yucca
Mountain. Instead, as DOE acknowledges, it has used about one-half
of the project's funds to maintain a supporting structure of
contractors and facilities commensurate with the planned level of
scientific and technical activities rather than reducing its
expenditures for the support structure to correspond with actual
budget requests and appropriations that were much lower than planned.
When annual budget requests and appropriations for the program fell
short of the project managers' expectations, relatively few funds
were available for conducting scientific and technical
investigations.
--------------------
\1 Nuclear Waste: Yucca Mountain Project Behind Schedule and Facing
Major Scientific Uncertainties (GAO/RCED-93-124, May 21, 1993).
\2 NWTRB Special Report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy,
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (Mar. 1993).
\3 Nuclear Waste: Yucca Mountain Project Management and Funding
Issues (GAO/T-RCED-93-58, July 1, 1993), before the Subcommittee on
Energy and Power, Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the
Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, Committee on Natural
Resources, House of Representatives.
\4 Nuclear Waste: Operation of Monitored Retrievable Storage
Facility Is Unlikely by 1998 (GAO/RCED-91-194, Sept. 24, 1991).
SECRETARY'S INITIATIVES LACK
SUFFICIENT SCOPE, DEPTH, AND
INDEPENDENCE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
In 1993 and 1994, the Secretary of Energy began several initiatives
to review the disposal program. The initiatives include a
consultant's review of criticisms of the program, an evaluation of
the project to investigate Yucca Mountain, and a Notice of Inquiry to
solicit the views of affected parties on the continued storage of
waste by utilities at their nuclear power reactors after January
1998. These initiatives are to be used by the Secretary to address
the program's problems and improve DOE's performance. Although the
initiatives could provide useful information, they are likely to fall
short of the independent review we previously called for because they
are narrow in scope. As a result, taken together, these efforts lack
the necessary breadth and depth of analysis.
REVIEW OF HISTORICAL
CRITICISMS HAS LIMITED SCOPE
AND LACKS DEPTH OF ANALYSIS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
The Secretary's review of the historical criticisms of the disposal
program resulted in a report issued on March 1, 1994.\5 The primary
purpose of this review was to provide a synopsis of published
documents and major written correspondence on the disposal program
for the period from January 1, 1989, to December 31, 1993. The
report summarizes criticisms in seven major categories: program
progress and costs, repository development strategy, repository site
selection and Yucca Mountain site suitability, public trust and
confidence, waste acceptance, interim (predisposal) storage, and
program management.
The consultant's review is essentially a catalogue of criticisms of
the program spanning 5 of the 11 years that the program has been in
existence. As a result, it does not provide the analytical basis or
broad perspective needed to view current options for the program in
the context of the program's historical development. For example,
the report does not contain information on three hallmark studies
issued from 1982 through 1985 that deal with the fundamental problems
and policy issues that must be considered, even today, in structuring
a successful waste management program.\6 These reports discuss and
provide recommendations on the characteristics necessary for an
organization with a very technical and scientific, but well-defined,
mission--such as envisioned in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982--to ensure that the intent of the Congress is carried out most
effectively and efficiently.
--------------------
\5 Dr. James A. Thurber, Report on Selected Published Works and
Written Comments Regarding the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management Program, 1989-1993, Center for Congressional and
Presidential Studies, School of Public Affairs, The American
University (Mar. 1, 1994).
\6 See two studies by the Office of Technology Assessment, Managing
Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste (OTA-0-172, Apr. 1982) and
Managing the Nation's Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste
(OTA-0-171, Mar. 1985), as well as a study by the Secretary of
Energy's Advisory Panel on Alternative Means of Financing and
Managing Radioactive Waste Facilities, Managing Nuclear Waste--A
Better Idea (Dec. 15, 1984).
NARROW SCOPE LIMITS
POTENTIAL VALUE OF YUCCA
MOUNTAIN EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
The Secretary of Energy has chartered a financial and management
evaluation of the Yucca Mountain project that is to be managed by
persons selected by the Governor of Nevada and the Secretary. On the
basis of our review of a statement of work for the evaluation, we
believe that the evaluation could help to improve the program by
identifying opportunities for more effectively managing the
project.\7
However, the scope of the evaluation is limited to selected aspects
of the Yucca Mountain project. For example, the evaluation is
designed to focus on the project's schedules and funding rather than
on the larger issues of whether the overall disposal program is
organized, managed, and funded appropriately to facilitate the
accomplishment of its mission.
--------------------
\7 Independent Evaluation (GAO/RCED-94-258R, July 27, 1994) provides
our comments on the initial draft statement of work for the
evaluation, chartered by the Secretary, of the Yucca Mountain
project. On July 29, 1994, in separate letters to members of the
review team for the project, we provided our views on a revised
version of the work statement dated July 8, 1994.
NARROW SCOPE AND DOE'S
BUDGET ACTIONS LIMIT
POTENTIAL USEFULNESS OF
NOTICE OF INQUIRY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3
DOE issued a Notice of Inquiry in the Federal Register on May 25,
1994, to address the concerns of affected parties on the continued
storage of spent nuclear fuel by utilities at their nuclear reactor
sites beyond January 1998.\8
Under the act, DOE was required to enter into contracts with
utilities that provided that (1) after the repository begins
operation, the Secretary will take title to utilities' high-level
waste or spent fuel as soon as possible upon the request of the
generator or the owner of the waste or spent fuel and (2) in return
for the payment of established fees, the Secretary, beginning not
later than January 31, 1998, will dispose of the high-level waste or
spent fuel. DOE's Standard Contract for Disposal meshes these two
requirements and provides as follows: "The services to be provided
by DOE . . . shall begin, after commencement of facility
operations, not later than January 31, 1998. . . ."
DOE states in the notice that the efforts of neither the Department
nor the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator have achieved the
level of success needed to locate and develop a facility for storing
waste.\9 The notice also states DOE's preliminary legal view that, in
the absence of an operational repository or other facility (such as a
monitored retrievable storage facility), the Department has no
statutory obligation to accept waste beginning in 1998.
Nevertheless, the notice goes on to state that the Department may
have created an expectation, through its contracts with utilities,
that it would begin accepting waste in 1998. Accordingly, the
Secretary has indicated DOE's intent to explore with affected parties
various options and methods for sharing costs associated with storing
waste after January 1998. In view of this premise, the notice seeks
comments on (1) the Department's preliminary legal view; (2) the need
for an interim, away-from-reactor storage facility; and (3) options
for cost-sharing with the utilities. Finally, DOE stated that while
seeking comments, the Department is committed to pursuing the
permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and developing a strategy on
the interim storage of waste.
The notice partially responds to our 1991 recommendation that DOE
develop plans for the possibility that it cannot begin to accept
waste in 1998.\10 Our recommendation was based on our conclusion that
DOE was unlikely to have a facility operating by 1998 for the
monitored retrievable storage of waste. However, the notice may not
generate a full range of potential interim storage options for DOE to
consider. For example, the notice does not specifically request
comments on waste storage options that do not involve cost-sharing.
Hence, we believe the scope of the notice is too narrow. In our
view, comments should be sought on the full range of potential
interim storage options, including potential options with no cost
obligation to the government, and on each option's strengths and
weaknesses.
Furthermore, budget actions taken by the Department before issuing
the notice may also have compromised the usefulness of the inquiry
process. Prior to issuing the Notice of Inquiry in May 1994, the
Secretary of Energy made a policy decision to proceed with plans for
developing by 1998 a system of waste containers, called multipurpose
containers, that would be used initially to store and/or transport
waste, and later to permanently dispose of (meaning emplace in a
repository with no foreseeable intent to recover) the waste.
According to DOE, $36 million of the fiscal year 1995 budget request
is for multipurpose container activities. DOE anticipates that it
will spend about $254 million more in the ensuing 4 years to develop
the new container system. However, the Notice of Inquiry states that
the Department is not predisposed to any particular form of
cost-sharing but goes on to indicate that multipurpose containers
should be strongly considered to address both schedule and cost
concerns. The cost concerns raised by utilities and other parties
relate to when utilities' obligations to store waste--and to bear the
costs of waste storage--end and when the government's obligation
begins. The notice states that the Secretary has directed that the
options to be explored by the Department should include, to the
maximum extent possible, the provision and use of multipurpose
containers to address both schedule and cost concerns arising from
the possibility that a repository or Monitored Retrievable Storage
facility may not be available in 1998.
Developing the proposed system now to assist utilities in storing
their waste beginning in 1998 poses economic and safety risks for
disposing of the waste when a repository becomes available in 2010 or
thereafter. Additional investigation of the Yucca Mountain site is
required before a disposal container can be developed with reasonable
assurance that the waste will be safely disposed of. The Nuclear
Waste Technical Review Board and others have repeatedly pointed out,
and DOE program managers have acknowledged, that more information
about the potential repository site and the potential effects of the
heat from the waste on the repository will be needed before a
disposal package with a high degree of safety assurance can be
developed. Thus, if DOE develops the multipurpose container system
as planned, at least one part of the system--the disposal
component--may not be acceptable for its intended purpose. As a
result, DOE may have to spend more money to rework the container
system to be compatible with the actual repository environment,
develop and engineer a barrier system within the repository that
would solve the problem, or accept certain safety risks.
--------------------
\8 The actions of affected parties demonstrate the level of concern
over this issue. In June 1994, a number of utilities, as well as
states and state utility commissions, filed two separate suits in
federal court asserting that DOE has not complied with the
waste-acceptance provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,
as amended. The parties seek, among other things, a declarative
ruling that the act imposes on DOE an unconditional obligation to
begin accepting radioactive waste by January 31, 1998, in return for
the payment of fees and that DOE's decision not to begin accepting
waste by that date was not in accord with the law.
\9 In 1987, the Congress established the independent position of
nuclear waste negotiator to work out the terms and conditions under
which a state or Indian tribe would agree to host a repository or a
facility for the monitored retrievable storage of waste. To become
effective, any agreement reached between the negotiator and a state
or tribe must be enacted into federal law.
\10 (GAO/RCED-91-194, Sept. 24, 1991).
AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW IS NEEDED
NOW MORE THAN EVER
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
In February 1994, 27 Members of the House of Representatives wrote to
the President and urged him to appoint a presidential commission to
conduct a comprehensive review of the nation's needs, policies, and
programs in the area of nuclear waste management. Similarly, in
March 1994, four Senators introduced Senate bill S. 1928, entitled
the "Second Generation Nuclear Waste Act," to, among other things,
ensure adequate nuclear waste disposal capacity. Also, 12 Senators
proposed, in a letter to the President, an independent review by a
presidential commission of all nuclear waste programs and policies.
Notably, these proposals point out that to enjoy greater credibility,
such a review should be conducted by a body that is truly independent
of DOE and operates in full public view. Others have called for
similar independent reviews.
Building key characteristics, such as independence from DOE, into a
review of the disposal program would go a long way toward
strengthening the credibility of such a review. Other important
characteristics include requisite expertise in such areas as nuclear
waste and public policy and administration, clear access to DOE's
records concerning the program's performance, and a mechanism to
provide public access to the review body's findings and
recommendations. For such a review to be most useful, it may need to
be chartered at a very high level, perhaps by the Congress.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Director of DOE's Office
of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management said he does not support an
independent review, but if such a review is to be done, it should be
done by the Congress because the viability of significant changes in
policy will be heavily dependent upon the prospects for congressional
authorization and funding. The issues involved, he added, are policy
issues, some of which will likely be addressed by the Congress next
year. In an August 1994 hearing, the Director told the Subcommittee
on Energy and Power, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, that DOE
could not act alone to define the strategy that should be taken to
solve the near-term waste storage problem. He further stated that
although there is a growing awareness that policy decisions must be
made, there is less consensus on what can and should be done. In his
testimony, the Director called for legislation on the program's
funding and said that DOE was evaluating, through its Notice of
Inquiry, the need for and content of legislation on the interim
storage of waste.
The House Committee on Appropriations, in the report accompanying its
bill making appropriations for energy and water development for
fiscal year 1995, cited the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board's
recommendation for an independent review of the management and
organizational structure of DOE's civilian radioactive waste
management program. The report said that the Committee had
repeatedly expressed concern about the lack of progress in
characterizing the Yucca Mountain site. The Committee called
progress on site characterization "dismal at best." Noting that the
Department was proposing to respond more aggressively to criticisms
of its program, the Committee recommended making available about $434
million, or about $99 million less than DOE had requested but about
$54 million more than it had received in fiscal year 1994. In the
face of testimony by DOE that it could not begin to operate a
repository by 2010 unless it received significant increases in the
program's funding, the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended
making available the full amount requested by DOE, or about $533
million. Subsequently, the conference committee bill recommended and
the Congress provided about $523 million, or about $143 million more
than was appropriated for the program in fiscal year 1994. On August
26, 1994, the President signed the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1995 (P.L. 103-316), providing
about $523 million for the program for fiscal year 1995.\11
While recognizing the need to complete the scientific investigation
of Yucca Mountain expeditiously, the Congress is aware, as its budget
decisions have shown, that changes are needed to ensure that the
funds appropriated for the investigation are spent effectively and
efficiently. We share these concerns. For example, for fiscal years
1991 through 1994, only about 65 percent of the appropriations for
the disposal program has been committed to the Yucca Mountain project
and, as discussed earlier, a relatively small percentage of the
program's funds, in recent years, has been spent directly on the
scientific and technical investigations at Yucca Mountain. Instead,
DOE has used about one-half of the project's funds to maintain a
support structure of contractors and facilities commensurate with the
planned level of scientific and technical activities. DOE has not
reduced the expenditures for support to correspond with the actual
budget requests and appropriations for the project, which were much
lower than planned. DOE has acknowledged these high infrastructure
costs and has maintained that they occurred, in part, because it
could not predict future appropriations with certainty when it was
planning future work. However, as we reported in May 1993,\12 DOE
typically planned the repository project around a level of funding
that was much higher than its budget requests and subsequent
allotments of appropriations. Until DOE brings the project's plans
into alignment with realistic funding projections, inefficiencies in
the allocation of resources will likely continue.
DOE has developed an approach intended to align the planned
activities at Yucca Mountain with funding expectations and estimates
of the project's schedules and costs. Through this proposed
approach, DOE would accomplish its goals, in large part, by deferring
some originally planned but relatively lower priority
site-investigation work until after a repository's construction was
authorized.
The Department's proposed approach for aligning the project's
activities and expectations has raised questions about how to strike
a balance among the cost, schedule, and public health and safety
aspects of developing a repository. For example, both the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board
have concluded, on the basis of limited available information, that
DOE's proposed approach would increase the technical and scientific
uncertainties inherent in determining whether the site is suitable
and can be licensed for use as a repository.
According to the Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management, DOE is also improving the management of the program and
the repository project. Actions taken or in progress include
reorganizing the federal staff at the project to define clear lines
of responsibility and accountability for accomplishing the project's
goals, restructuring the contractor establishment to reflect the same
philosophy, and realigning the program's headquarters staff with an
emphasis on integrating the program's activities. In commenting on a
draft of our report, the Director acknowledged that the management
problems at Yucca Mountain are deep, long-standing problems that
cannot be fixed easily or this year. We agree that the project's
management problems are difficult to solve, and we believe that it is
important for DOE to continue working to improve the program's
management. However, an independent review could address whether
more fundamental changes are needed to ensure the effective and
efficient management of nuclear waste.
In view of the potential increases in funding for the program over
the next several years and of growing congressional and public
concern about the program's pace and direction, a comprehensive
review of key policy issues is more critical now than before. Key
issues identified in this report include the storage of waste until a
repository is operational, funding, the program's organization and
management, and the regulation of a repository's development. These
issues have been discussed in recent appropriation and oversight
hearings in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Several
options discussed at these hearings, if implemented, would require
changes to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended.
The Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
did not support an independent review of DOE's disposal program and
policies because, in his view, the program--especially the repository
project--would be effectively relegated to caretaker status during
the review. According to the Director, because the review might
recommend a major redirection of the project, it would almost
certainly put the project at a serious disadvantage in maintaining
progress and competing for funds with other federal programs. The
Director strongly emphasized that if an independent review is
performed, it should not affect the site-investigation work at Yucca
Mountain.
Because an independent review of key nuclear waste issues would be
focused at a policy level, we see no reason why such a review and
site-investigation activities critical to making a site-suitability
determination could not proceed in parallel and in a timely manner.
The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board has concluded that an
independent review can be performed concurrently with
site-characterization activities at Yucca Mountain. We recognize the
potential for such a review to affect the project's funding, as the
Director pointed out. However, he also told us that next year the
Congress may address, possibly through legislation, options for
storing the waste and funding the program. In addition, he told us
that proposals now before the Congress for storing the waste are
unsatisfactory. According to the Director, balance, sophistication,
and objectivity are needed in presenting these issues.
Because the issues that need to be resolved are fundamental and need
to be addressed objectively, the benefits that an independent review
could bring to the Congress may be worth the risk that the Yucca
Mountain project may be assigned a lower budget priority during the
review. This is an example of the difficult choices decisionmakers
are faced with in weighing and deciding on the most efficient and
effective way to proceed with the program.
--------------------
\11 Three elements make up the $523 million provided to DOE for the
disposal program: about $392.8 million appropriated from the Nuclear
Waste Fund; about $129.4 appropriated for Defense Nuclear Waste
Disposal; and about $0.7 million made available for Civilian Waste
Research and Development.
\12 (GAO/RCED-93-124, May 21, 1993).
CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
Mounting congressional and public concern about the pace and
direction of the disposal program, along with potential increases in
funding for the program over the next several years, add urgency to
the need to conduct an independent review of the program and related
policies. Such a review should include a review of key issues, such
as the interim storage of waste, the adequacy of the program's
funding, the management and organization of the program and
repository project, and the approach to regulating the program.
Although recent initiatives by the Secretary of Energy to review the
Yucca Mountain project could make a significant contribution to the
program, the initiatives lack the breadth and depth of analysis
needed to adequately address the larger program issues.
DOE's recent initiatives to restructure the management organization
at Yucca Mountain to make more effective use of human resources are
an important step toward improving the performance of the existing
Yucca Mountain project team. However, an independent review could
potentially determine that more fundamental changes are needed. In
addition, DOE's proposed approach to the repository project is still
in its formative stages and adds uncertainties and risks to the
repository siting and development process.
An independent review of the disposal program could ensure that the
Congress has the best possible information as a basis for evaluating
the performance of DOE's program, making future funding decisions,
and making any necessary changes to the program. Important
characteristics that an independent review body should have include
requisite expertise in such areas as nuclear waste and public policy
and administration, clear access to DOE's records of the program's
performance, and a mechanism to provide public access to the review
body's findings and recommendations.
Such a review could be most effective if the review body was truly
independent of DOE. Given the limitations of the Secretary's review
initiatives, the review may need to be chartered at a very high
level, perhaps by the Congress. Appropriate entities that might be
considered to perform such a review could include a specially
constituted congressional committee, a presidential commission,
and/or the National Academy of Public Administration.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
We provided a draft of this report to the Director of the Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management and met with him to obtain his
comments. The Director stated that the draft report did not
recognize other steps that DOE has taken under the current
administration to address problems in the program. We added
information to recognize changes that DOE is making in an effort to
improve aspects of the program's funding and management. The
Director also said that he does not support an independent review of
the program because such a review would almost certainly put the
repository project at a serious disadvantage in maintaining progress
and competing for funds. We recognize this possibility, but we also
believe that the benefits of an independent review may be worth the
risk that the program may be assigned a lower budget priority during
the review. We incorporated the Director's comments on the draft
report and our evaluations of these comments throughout the report
where appropriate.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
During our study, we relied primarily on our past reviews of the
disposal program (listed in app. I with other studies) and our
ongoing review of emerging issues that affect the program. We also
monitored the program's current activities, attended professional
meetings on nuclear waste issues, and met with the individuals
appointed to manage the evaluation, chartered by the Secretary of
Energy, of the Yucca Mountain project.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1
We are sending copies of this report to the congressional committees
that oversee the Department's activities, the Secretary of Energy,
the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Governor of
Nevada, and other interested parties. Copies are also available to
others upon request.
This work was prepared under the direction of Victor S. Rezendes,
Director, Energy and Science Issues, who can be reached on (202)
512-3841 if you or your staff have any questions. Major contributors
to this report are listed in appendix II.
Charles A. Bowsher
Comptroller General
of the United States
RELATED STUDIES
=========================================================== Appendix I
GAO PRODUCTS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
Independent Evaluation (GAO/RCED-94-258R, July 27, 1994).
Nuclear Waste: Yucca Mountain Project Management and Funding Issues
(GAO/T-RCED-93-58, July 1, 1993).
Nuclear Waste: Yucca Mountain Project Behind Schedule and Facing
Major Scientific Uncertainties (GAO/RCED-93-124, May 21, 1993).
Energy Issues: Transition Series (GAO/OCG-93-13TR, Dec. 1992).
Nuclear Waste: Status of Actions to Improve DOE User-Fee Assessments
(GAO/RCED-92-165, June 10, 1992).
Nuclear Waste: DOE's Repository Site Investigations, a Long and
Difficult Task (GAO/RCED-92-73, May 27, 1992).
Nuclear Waste: Development of Casks for Transporting Spent Fuel
Needs Modification (GAO/RCED-92-56, Mar. 13, 1992).
Nuclear Waste: Operation of Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility
Is Unlikely by 1998 (GAO/RCED-91-194, Sept. 24, 1991).
Nuclear Waste: Changes Needed in DOE User-Fee Assessments
(GAO/T-RCED-91-52, May 8, 1991).
Nuclear Waste: DOE Expenditures on the Yucca Mountain Project
(GAO/T-RCED-91-37, Apr. 18, 1991).
Nuclear Waste: Changes Needed in DOE User-Fee Assessments to Avoid
Funding Shortfall (GAO/RCED-90-65, June 7, 1990).
Nuclear Waste: DOE Should Base Disposal Fee Assessment on Realistic
Inflation Rate (GAO/RCED-88-129, July 22, 1988).
Key Elements of Effective Independent Oversight of DOE's Nuclear
Facilities (GAO/T-RCED-88-6, Oct. 22, 1987).
OTHER PRODUCTS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board Report to the U.S. Congress and
the Secretary of Energy, January to December 1993 (May 1994).
Thurber, James A. Report on Selected Published Works and Written
Comments Regarding the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management Program, 1989-1993. Center for Congressional and
Presidential Studies, School of Public Affairs, The American
University (Mar. 1, 1994).
Letter Report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy. Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board (Feb. 1994).
Underground Exploration and Testing at Yucca Mountain: A Report to
Congress and the Secretary of Energy. Nuclear Waste Technical Review
Board (Oct. 1993).
NWTRB Special Report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy.
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (Mar. 1993).
Sixth Report to the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Secretary of Energy.
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (Dec. 1992).
Report on the Eighth Review of the Yucca Mountain Project, U.S.
Department of Energy. Edison Electric Institute (Nov. 1992).
Fifth Report to the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Secretary of Energy.
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (June 3, 1992).
Nuclear Waste: Is There a Need for Federal Interim Storage?
Monitored Retrievable Storage Review Commission (Nov. 1, 1989).
Managing the Nation's Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste.
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA-0-171, Mar. 1985).
Managing Nuclear Waste--A Better Idea. Secretary of Energy's
Advisory Panel on Alternative Means of Financing and Managing
Radioactive Waste Facilities (Dec. 15, 1984).
Managing Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste. Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA-0-172, Apr. 1982).
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II
RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Jim Wells, Associate Director
Dwayne E. Weigel, Assistant Director
Michael E. Gilbert, Evaluator-in-Charge
Mindi G. Weisenbloom, Senior Attorney