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MAINTAINING THE HIGH GROUND



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
The Profession and Ethic in
Large-Scale Combat Operations

Edited by C. Anthony Pfaff and Keith R. Beurskens

MAINTAINING THE HIGH GROUND: THE PROFESSION AND ETHIC IN LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS



LARGE-SCALE COMBAT
OPERATIONS SERIES
Army University Press



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Original paper texture: Created by Freepik, [freepik.com](https://www.freepik.com)

Art and composite cover design: Dale E. Cordes, Army University Press

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Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Bringing Order to Chaos: Historical Case Studies of Combined Arms Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires in Large-Scale Combat Operations

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Maintaining the High Ground: The Profession and Ethic in Large-Scale Combat Operations

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Edited by

C. Anthony Pfaff and Keith R. Beurskens



**Army University Press
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Pfaff, C. Anthony, editor. | Beurskens, Keith R., 1959- editor.
| Army University Press (U.S.), issuing body.

Title: Maintaining the high ground: the profession and ethic in
large-scale combat operations | edited by C. Anthony Pfaff and Keith R.
Beurskens.

Other titles: Profession and ethic in large-scale combat operations |
US Army large-scale combat operations series.

Description: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University Press,
2021 | Series: The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations Series |
Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2021022056 (print) | LCCN 2021022057 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781940804835 (paperback) | ISBN 9781940804835 (Adobe pdf).

Subjects: LCSH: United States. Army--Case studies. | Military ethics--
United States--Case studies. | Soldiers--Professional ethics--United
States--Case studies. | Operational art (Military science)--Case studies.

Classification: LCC U22 .M33186 2021 (print) | LCC U22 (ebook) |
DDC 172.42--dc23 | SUDOC D 110.20:ET 3.

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2021022056>. LC ebook
record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2021022057>.

June 2021



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Editor
Diane R. Walker

Foreword

Since the Soviet Union's fall in 1989, the specter of large-scale combat against a peer adversary was remote. During the years following, the US Army found itself increasingly called upon to lead multinational operations in the lower to middle tiers of the range of military operations and conflict continuum. The events of 11 September 2001 led to more than fifteen years of intense focus on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. An entire generation of Army leaders and soldiers was culturally imprinted by this experience. We emerged as an Army more capable in limited contingency operations than at any time in our nation's history, but the geopolitical landscape continues to shift and the risk of great power conflict is no longer a remote possibility.

While our Army focused on limited contingency operations in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, other regional and peer adversaries scrutinized US military processes and methods and adapted their own accordingly. As technology has proliferated and become accessible in even the most remote corners of the world, the US military's competitive advantage is being challenged across all of the warfighting domains. In the last decade, we have witnessed an emergent China, a revanchist and aggressive Russia, a menacing North Korea, and a cavalier Iranian regime. Each of these adversaries seeks to change the world order in their favor and contest US strategic interests abroad. The chance for war against a peer or regional near-peer adversary has increased exponentially, and we must rapidly shift our focus to successfully compete in all domains and across the full range of military operations.

Over the last two years, the US Army has rapidly shifted the focus of its doctrine, training, education, and leader development to increase readiness and capabilities to prevail in large-scale combat operations against peer and near-peer threats. Our new doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, dictates that the Army provide the joint force four unique strategic roles: shaping the security environment, preventing conflict, prevailing in large-scale combat operations, and consolidating gains to make temporary success permanent.

To enable this shift of focus, the Army is now attempting to change its culture shaped by more than fifteen years of persistent limited-contingency operations. Leaders must recognize that the hard-won wisdom of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is important to retain but does not fully square with

the exponential lethality, hyperactive chaos, and accelerated tempo of the multi-domain battlefield when facing a peer or near-peer adversary.

To emphasize the importance of the Army's continued preparation for large-scale combat operations, the US Army Combined Arms Center has published these volumes of *The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations Series* book set. The intent is to expand the knowledge and understanding of the contemporary issues the US Army faces by tapping our organizational memory to illuminate the future. The reader should reflect on these case studies to analyze each situation, identify the doctrines at play, evaluate leaders' actions, and determine what differentiated success from failure. Use them as a mechanism for discussion, debate, and intellectual examination of lessons of the past and their application to today's doctrine, organization, and training to best prepare the Army for large-scale combat. Relevant answers and tangible reminders of what makes us the world's greatest land power await in the stories of these volumes.

Prepared for War!

Michael D. Lundy
Lieutenant General, US Army
Commanding General
US Army Combined Arms Center
October 2018

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Preface: The Role of the Army’s Professional Military Ethics in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Historically, the US Army has only episodically studied itself as a military profession, often with those episodes being decades apart. So, why this book on the Army profession and its ethic, and why now?

The answer is the confluence of events in which the Army is now immersed. There are three influences that are most salient, influences which undergird the importance, and urgency, of this volume.

First, the Army is operating in a different set of threat circumstances at the strategic level than ever before. Throughout most of its history, the United States has faced one major adversary, or adversarial coalition, at a time. In all eras, there were lesser threats and contingencies for which to prepare, but the major focus was on one enemy. In his March 2021 “Interim National Security Strategy Guidance,” President Joseph R. Biden Jr. commented:

We must also contend with the reality that the distribution of power across the world is changing, creating new threats. China, in particular, has rapidly become more assertive. It is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system. Russia remains determined to enhance its global influence and play a disruptive role on the world stage. Both Beijing and Moscow have invested heavily in efforts meant to check US strengths and prevent us from defending our interests and allies around the world.¹

The Army’s response to this daunting situation of renewed great-power competition is a new operational doctrine for multi-domain operations (MDO). This doctrine envisions highly complex, layered operations simultaneously in all domains of war—land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace. Obviously, new demands on Army leaders at all levels are immense, as are new demands on their professional development.

Second, the Army adopted a renewed command and control philosophy—mission command—almost a decade ago in the latter stages of Middle East operations. This philosophy now applies throughout the Army, regardless of the type of operations being undertaken by various commands and units, including the new MDO. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command*, described “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within

the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations."² The intent is to empower subordinate decision-making and decentralized execution appropriate to the teams/units completing the mission in the battlespace. Effective execution requires high levels of trust between leaders and followers, and among the various levels of Army operations. Trust is the glue that creates cohesive teams and effective decentralized operations. Those unit climates have to be built and maintained by Army leaders, or they simply will not exist.

Of note to the content and timing of this volume, the Army is continuing to struggle to embed mission command. The Fiscal Year 2016 Center of Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) noted that a majority of respondents rated their immediate superior favorably across the six mission command behaviors—short of the preferred three-fourths favorable threshold.³ The lowest rating was for building effective teams, 67 percent.⁴ Obviously, Army leaders need to recognize and deal with this opportunity to improve.

Third, the Army's status as a profession is once again in serious jeopardy, as it was in the early 1970s. The Army has always been an institution of dual character, creating inherent tensions within its organizational culture. Organized as a governmental bureaucracy since 1775, it has been accorded the status of profession by its client—the American people—since roughly the 1880s. Leaders, both local and institutional, determine how Army commands and individual units behave each day—as a bureaucracy or a profession.

Since becoming a profession, the Army's degree of professionalization has ebbed and flowed; the most recent period of de-professionalization occurred during and right after the Vietnam War, resulting in immense loss of trust by the American people. Internal and external trust is the currency that establishes the legitimacy of all professions, and it is perishable. In Western democracies, the client—in this case the American people—determines if an institution is a venerated profession that merits the autonomy to do its expert work. Thus, when the American public lost trust in the Army near the end of the Vietnam War, the Army lost its status as a military profession and much of its autonomy.

The role that ethics plays for a profession cannot be overstated. The American people expect conflicts fought on their behalf to be both effective *and* ethical. Failure in either area means loss of trust and professional status for the Army, similar to the experience after Vietnam. Ethics establish a profession's moral dimensions and culture, such as the professional

standards and norms that the American people demand of their Army. Those standards and norms are grounded in specific moral principles that guide individual and institutional decisions and actions as the Army fulfills its purpose to defend the Republic and our way of life. That purpose is, after all, the only reason even to have a US Army.

The logic should now be clear as to why this volume is so important at this particular juncture in the Army's history. In great-power competitions against Russia and China, the Army faces daunting strategic challenges focused on returning to large-scale combat operations. The Army has responded with its new MDO operational doctrine executed by Army leaders at all decentralized levels of command. The execution of mission command doctrine, however, almost totally depends on Army leaders who can build and maintain climates of trust and lead as trustworthy soldiers themselves. And in this regard, its own research indicates the Army has much work to do.

In sum, a bureaucratic Army cannot build climates of trust; only a professional Army can do so, and then only through individual leaders at all levels building cohesive teams. Bureaucratic armies, such as the Iraqi Army in the First Gulf War, operate with transactional leadership and are seldom militarily effective; they rely on massed formations and fires rather than professional practice by smaller units. In contrast, the US Army was highly effective in large-scale combat operations during the first Gulf War—motivated and led by leaders deeply imbued with the Army Ethic.

The case studies in this volume highlight the ethical principles that are the foundation to develop Army professionals who will be both effective *and* ethical as the US Army re-enters an era of large-scale combat operations. The American people will continue to demand no less.

Col. (Retired) Don M. Snider
Professor Emeritus, West Point

Notes

1. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” March 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf>.
2. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: 2012), 1.
3. 2016 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) Military Leader Findings, August 2017, <https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cal/2016CASALMilitaryLeaderTechnicalReport.pdf>, 21.
4. 2016 CASAL Military Leader Findings, 21.

Introduction

C. Anthony Pfaff and Keith R. Beurskens

With the apparent return of “great power politics,” the US Army focuses its attention toward fighting and winning large-scale combat operations (LSCO). However, unlike in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, where the Army turned away from irregular conflict, the current movement seems to understand that LSCO does not represent a fundamentally *different* way of war. Rather, LSCO can incorporate a range of conflict, including irregular war, and what the new multi-domain operations (MDO) doctrine refers to as “competition below the threshold of war.”¹

This changing environment poses ethical challenges for the Army Profession. As the US Army transformed from citizen militias to an all-volunteer force, it undertook a range of insurgent, counterinsurgent, constabulary, and conventional missions. These operations demanded not just a larger army, but a more skilled one—a *professional* class of leaders and an ethic that went beyond that of civil society, much like the professions of law and medicine. The result was an expansion of professional military education (PME) after the American Civil War, culminating when Elihu Root established the US Army War College in 1901. By the end of World War I, the US Army met the standards of a profession: specialized expertise along with the jurisdiction and responsibility to employ and expand that expertise in service to some social good, in this case, security. As the proliferation of PME institutions since World War I has shown, that expertise continues to grow in depth and complexity.

Professions, when they are healthy and functional, exercise jurisdiction over a certain body of expert knowledge that they employ, as well as build on, to serve some social good. In doing so, they build trust not only among professionals but also with the client, creating the autonomy necessary to keep the profession effective. For the Army, that jurisdiction is the application of landpower and its client is the US government and the American public it serves.

Maintaining that trust requires adherence to a professional ethic that treats both the service the profession provides and the harms it should avoid as moral obligations. Moreover, this ethic should provide resources to help professionals face problems and dilemmas as well as make the trade-offs that those often-competing obligations require. In the Army context, the moral imperative of defense must connect with the just war tradition obligations associated with the justice of going to war (*jus ad*

bellum). *Jus ad bellum* includes the right reasons for fighting and the justice of fighting wars (*jus in bello*), which includes the rules for fighting morally well.

The US Army ethic, doctrinally, draws from three sources: the functional imperative of the profession, cultural norms, and law, which includes treaties and customary international law. Those sources, of course, have a long history. An ethic for declaring and waging war has featured in nearly every society and culture. Current norms associated with warfighting can be traced to ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, China, India, Greece, and the Roman Empire, among others. Early Christian thinkers, such as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas, formed the basis of the Western just war tradition. More recent just war scholars have incorporated additional categories such as justice after war (*jus post bellum*), which covers moral obligations of both sides after war's end, and justice below the threshold of war (*jus ad vim*), which governs the use of force below the threshold of war.

This professional ethic accounts for the soldier as a moral agent; the actions soldiers may take; and what the Army, as a collection of soldiers, should achieve. This ethic takes the form of ten principles that describe duties, outcomes, and character traits associated with good soldiering. As such, the Army Ethic is not a passive ethic. It is not sufficient to avoid wrong; the soldier must also proactively seek to do good.

Maintaining the High Ground focuses on the conduct of large-scale combat operations, which are primarily governed by *jus in bello*. These historical case studies draw from lessons over the past seventy-five years. Different from other books in *The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operation Series*, this work is organized into three sections representing characteristics of the Army Profession and ten principles of the Army's professional ethic. Each section and principle includes a brief introduction followed by case studies that demonstrate the ten Army Ethic principles. Readers are encouraged to reflect on these lessons learned for warfighting; analyze the cause, effect, and outcome of each situation; then apply these lessons to their own lives, times, and experiences.

Section I Honorable Service discusses how trust is the essence of honorable service. Through their professional altruism, Army professionals earn and must retain the trust of their superiors, subordinates, and peers—and the trust of the society they serve. Army Ethic Principle 1 focuses on the fact that Army professionals serve honorably, obeying the laws and reg-

ulations as well as rejecting and reporting illegal, unethical, or immoral orders or actions.

In Chapter 1, Chaplain (Maj.) Jonathan D. Bailey and Chaplain (Lt. Col.) John L. Morales explore honorable service examples from the Black Lives Matter movement to cultural missteps during the Vietnam War. They propose an integrated and interdisciplinary approach to moral reasoning, decision-making, and ethical action to help commanders and other soldiers do the right thing at the right place, at the right time, and most importantly, in the right way.

As noted in Army Ethic Principle 2, Army professionals act with integrity, demonstrating character in all aspects of their lives. In Chapter 2, C. Anthony Pfaff discusses the ethics of being, the ethics of knowing, and the ethics of doing. He argues that being a certain kind of person is just as important to moral leadership as knowing consequences, rules, and principles and applying them in ways that serve the profession and the Nation.

Army Ethic Principle 3 about respecting others is reinforced in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, Joel N. Brown reviews ethics related to civilians in warfare during World War II. Lessons drawn from firebombing raids show that apparent expedience can have high strategic, political, and, chiefly, ethical costs. In Chapter 4, Col. Paul E. Berg and Col. (Retired) Kenneth A. Hawley discuss the thousands of Iraqi soldiers who surrendered to American and Coalition troops during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. The surrenders without bloodshed were directly attributable to the US Army's international reputation for respecting prisoners of war and treating them with fairness.

Army Ethic Principle 4 reminds leaders that they must set an example for morale courage—doing what is right despite risk, uncertainty, and fear. In Chapter 5, Lt. Col. Matthew R. Thom examines a mass surrender of Chinese soldiers during the Korean War and how the US soldiers—outnumbered by the Chinese and despite heavy unit losses in prior battles—displayed morale courage by safely delivering their prisoners of war to a military police unit.

Section II addresses the concept of Army experts and the importance of their professional expertise to defend the American people. In keeping with that concept, Army Ethic Principle 5 stresses to put the needs of others above our own and accomplish the mission as a team. In Chapter 6, Col. Paul E. Berg and Lt. Col. (Retired) Robert J. Rielly use the My Lai massacre in Vietnam as a reminder that leaders must continually assess their

units and determine if intervention and/or training is needed to ensure the mission is accomplished in an ethical manner.

Army Ethic Principle 6 is about Army professionals courageously risking our lives and justly taking the lives of others. Capt. (Canadian Army) Arthur W. Gullachsen presents the only case study from an ally in Chapter 7. He recounts how Canadian soldiers during World War II did not retaliate against *Waffen-SS* prisoners of war (POWs) even though they were well aware that German soldiers had executed Canadian POWs. This humane treatment appeared to be a factor during later fighting near Falaise when large numbers of German soldiers surrendered. Also in keeping with Principle 6, Maj. (US Air Force) Daniel J. Sieben writes in Chapter 8 about ethical and moral injury risks prompted by new combat technologies such as remotely piloted aircraft used in Afghanistan. Though far from the combat zone, such work directly impacts the psychological and emotional state of operators and ground commanders, affecting the moral decision-making process.

Army Ethic Principle 7 reinforces the Army professional's need for life-long learning and continuing professional development. In Chapter 9, W. Sanders Marble discusses additional ethics challenges for Army physicians like Brig. Gen. Frederick A. Blesse, who must balance the individual patient's well-being with the military's need to keep soldiers healthy and return them to duty as soon as possible.

Section III addresses stewardship and how Army professionals are responsible to the society they serve. As noted in Army Ethic Principle 8, Army professionals are accountable to each other and the American people for their decisions and actions. In Chapter 10, *Corruption of Conscience: George Patton and the Biscari Massacres* by Maj. Mark J. Balboni examines a WWII ethical dilemma related to the Biscari Massacres and other crucial events. Examples of commanders and soldiers who failed to serve honorably are contrasted against courage demonstrated by others who stuck to their principles—all with potential far-reaching strategic consequences during large-scale combat operations.

As noted in Army Ethic Principle 9, Army professionals must wisely use resources entrusted to them and help strengthen the profession. In Chapter 12, Capt. (US Air Force Reserve) David F. Bonner recounts the work of the Monuments Men during and after WWII and their mission to locate, safeguard, and repatriate works of art that were stolen by the Third Reich. This is a unique example of the ethical importance of fostering a sense of goodwill in civil-military relations. Their mission helped estab-

lish the legitimacy of the Allied liberation of Europe and earn the trust of its people during the subsequent occupation and rebuilding efforts.

Army Ethic Principle 10 stresses the need for Army professionals to reinforce trust between each other and with the American people. In Chapter 13, Maj. Charles M. “Chase” Spears explores ethics through a professional lens, the history of military communications. Recent case studies demonstrate that military operations lose credibility and receive negative press coverage when they fail to communicate honestly during times of crisis.

Lt. Gen. James E. Rainey, the commander of the US Army Combined Arms Center, provides the book’s Conclusion. He discusses future ethical challenges and how Army professionals will need to adapt to and even shape that future. Soldiers must be vigilant to ensure that bureaucracy’s demands do not undermine the profession, its expert knowledge, or its ethical practices.

This book would not have been possible without the voluntary time and work of the authors; they are the experts. Several authors are current or past Army historians with significant expertise. Some are scholars who have devoted a lifetime to mastering sources, understanding context, pondering details, and developing a skill for narrative. The balance of the authors are experienced practitioners who have devised innovative solutions to the inevitable surprises that arise during the fog of war.

We also owe thanks to Army University Press for putting this book into physical and electronic form as part of *the Large-Scale Combat Operations Series* (available at <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Books/Large-Scale-Combat-Operations-Book-Set/>). Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, now retired, initiated the series in October 2018 to emphasize the importance of the Army’s continued preparation for large-scale combat operations. Special thanks to Donald P. Wright and Katharine S. Dahlstrand for production; Robin D. Kern and Dale E. Cordes for graphics; and Diane R. Walker for copy editing and layout. As the general editors of this project, we alone are responsible for the errors, omissions, or limitations of this work.

Notes

1. Andrew Feickert, “Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO),” Congressional Research Service, 16 January 2020, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11409.pdf>.

SECTION I
HONORABLE SERVICE

Honorable Service Introduction

C. Anthony Pfaff

War is a *moral* activity. Moreover, it has always been so. Aristotle, who first coined the term “just war,” at least in the Western tradition, insisted that fighting, at a minimum, served a greater good beyond greed. The Romans also had a strong sense of honor and even a collective process to ensure that a war was, in fact just, at least by their standards. Over time, institutions like the Catholic church, famously beginning with Augustine, sought to reconcile Christ’s pacifism with the demands of national security. In response to the endless fighting between rival fiefdoms and kingdoms during the Middle Ages, the church established a number of restraints on warfare that have endured today, particularly those associated with proportionality, discrimination, and prohibited means. With Grotius, these principles began to be secularized and applied as international law. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many of these sentiments became codified in international law and treaty.¹ Moreover, imposing such rules on warfare was not simply a uniquely Western phenomenon. In China, 700 years before Augustine, Confucian philosophers like Mencius were also advocating for just war notions such as just cause, legitimate authority, and noncombatant immunity.²

That evolution continues as the armies consider how to regulate new means and domains of warfighting. However, as warfighting became more destructive, norms protecting civilians and civilian property had to be strengthened to limit the horrors total war could now impose. Moreover, as warfare became more complex, it was also no longer practically or morally sensible to leave the fighting to amateurs, no matter how “elite.” Armies had to *professionalize* if they were to successfully defend their respective societies.

The modern US, if not Western, view of the military as a profession is heavily influenced by the views of political scientist Samuel Huntington. In *The Soldier and the State*, he argued that professions are characterized by three features: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. To be a professional in his view, one must first possess “specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor;” accept an obligation to apply that knowledge in service to society; and possess a sense of corporate identity that sets the professional apart from the non-professional.³ In the military context, Huntington characterized that expertise as the “management of violence,” which includes “(1) organizing, training, and

equipping the force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat.”⁴ Of course, “management of violence” may not be the only way to conceive of the Army’s role, even in the context of large-scale combat operations (LSCO). The “tool kit” for winning twenty-first century battles contains a number of non-lethal tools, such as cyber and information operations, that Army professionals will have to master to win.

Unlike professions such as medicine and law whose clients are typically individuals, the Army’s client is the state, to which it is responsible for providing expert advice regarding the application of landpower.⁵ In this view, society, as the client, gives the profession the *autonomy* to recruit and certify its members and regulate their professional activities by a code of ethics as well as, most importantly, a monopoly on how to apply their respective expert knowledge in the service of human progress.⁶

Because professionals possess expert knowledge not found outside the profession, competency is not judged by the client, but by other professionals. Thus, this autonomy gives the profession *jurisdiction* over the provision of a specific social good.⁷ This jurisdiction makes sense, as historian Alan R. Millett noted, because the “profession, serving the vital interests of man, considers its first ethical imperative to be altruistic service to the client.”⁸ As long as professionals retain that sense of professional altruism, they should have the trust of their superiors, subordinates, and peers and the profession should consequently have the trust of the society it serves.

Ensuring this trust is the essence of honorable service. However, as the following principles will illustrate, gaining and maintaining that trust is not merely a function of obedience or effectiveness. As mentioned in the introduction, the moral commitments of the Army professional extend beyond that of the Army’s functional imperative. Maintaining those commitments entails knowing when to dissent, when to say no to illegal and immoral orders, and how to treat all persons—even the enemy—with the kind of respect that recognizes the intrinsic dignity and worth of all human beings.

Notes

1. Brian Orend, *The Morality of War* (Petersborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2006), 9–27.
2. Ping-cheung Lo, “Varieties of Statecraft and Warfare Ethics in Early China,” in *Chinese Just War Ethics: Origin, Development, and Dissent*, ed. Ping-cheung Lo and Sumner B. Twiss (New York: Routledge, 2015), 115.
3. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 8–10.
4. Huntington, 11.
5. Huntington, 11–18.
6. Allan R. Millett, *Military Professionalism and Officership in America* (Columbus, OH: Mershon Center of the Ohio State University, 1979), 3.
7. Sir John Winthrop Hackett, “The Profession of Arms,” in *The 1962 Lees Knowles Lectures Given at Trinity College, Cambridge* (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 2007), 3, https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-18/cmhPub_70-18.pdf. Hackett saw the “function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem.”
8. Millett, *Military Professionalism and Officership in America*, 3.

Army Ethic Principle 1

C. Anthony Pfaff

*We serve honorably—according to the Army Ethic—under civilian authority while obeying the laws of the Nation and all legal orders; further, we reject and report illegal, unethical, or immoral orders or actions.*¹

This principle incorporates two related aspects of honorable service: subordination to civil authority and obedience to legal orders. Samuel Huntington argued that political and military professionals had their own “sphere” of responsibility and each should respect the others’; political leaders determine when to go to war and why and military leaders determine how best to fight. The justification for observing these boundaries was a judgment about expertise; in Huntington’s view, neither had the expertise to effectively evaluate (and thus intervene with) the judgments of the other.² Unfortunately, the actual practices of defense and politics make holding that line difficult, if not impossible, as the subject of the next chapter will illustrate.³

Recognizing the difficulty of maintaining separate spheres, sociologist Morris Janowitz argued for a more pragmatic approach, acknowledging that in some cases civilian leaders will have relevant military expertise and military leaders will have relevant political expertise. What is necessary, then, is a shared understanding of what works in the pursuit of national security objectives and a moral commitment on all parties to make decisions based on that understanding, rather than a parochial institution or political interests.⁴

That shared understanding and commitment, however, is often elusive. In fact, Eliot Cohen argued that civil-military relations are best facilitated by an “uneven dialogue” where both civilian and military leadership repeatedly exchange candid, blunt, and even offensive views regarding matters of national security.⁵ This dialogue is “unequal” because, in the end, the civilian leader is the final authority.⁶ What is important here, however, is not the shared understanding as much as it is the process for achieving it. Lt. Gen. (Retired) James Dubik put it this way:

The reality is that good-war waging decisions are most likely to emerge from a set of political and military leaders bluntly and continuously arguing with one another in an attempt to identify strategy, policy, campaign, and organizational solutions to the complex and dynamic problems they face.⁷

While Dubik's comment is undoubtedly right about the importance of such a dialogue, it does not help senior military leaders answer the question regarding what to do when the civilian leadership's decision is one they think is wrong. Under such contentious circumstances, how does one serve *honorably*?

This principle is not only about the appropriate submission to civil authority; it is also about the duty of Army professionals to reject illegal and immoral orders and actions. The Army professional ethic is not simply informed by the functional imperative of the profession. It is also informed by broader moral norms associated with serving a greater good. As such, military necessity is not the only consideration when determining a morally appropriate course of action; rather, Army professionals have to account for human dignity, rights, and well-being that are reflected, but not always fully articulated, in domestic or international norms and law.⁸ We will explore these concepts, and how they apply to the profession, throughout the following chapters.

In Chapter 1, Chaplain (Maj.) Jonathan D. Bailey and Chaplain (Lt. Col.) John L. Morales emphasize the importance of the ethical not only as a complement to the law but as a check on potential abuses the law may allow.

Notes

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3. Donald S. Travis, "Pursuing Civilian Control Over the Military," *Armed Forces and Society* 45, no. 3 (2019): 549.
4. Travis, 548–52.
5. Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 208–9.
6. Cohen, 208–9.
7. James M. Dubik, *Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2016), 91.
8. Anthony E. Hartle, *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*, 2nd ed. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 32–34.

Chapter 1

Beyond Legality: Ethics in the Profession of Arms

Chaplain (Maj.) Jonathan D. Bailey and

Chaplain (Lt. Col.) John L. Morales

This chapter explores the viability of shifting away from pure legal constructs for approaching sound ethical decision-making and moral action within the profession of arms. By analyzing legality and the tenuous nature of domestic and international law, especially concerning armed conflict, military decision-makers might leverage ethical and moral expertise already available to commanders and leaders at all levels. Such an interdisciplinary approach to ethical decision-making would be far more beneficial in the long run. By exploring variables that serve as barriers to moral action (both on and off the battlefield), leaders can enhance resident expertise, involve outside experts, encourage professional development, and develop historical and cultural understanding to help maintain the highest ethical standards across the profession of arms.

Addressing moral action through the lens of law and policy is woefully insufficient. Such an approach is morally hazardous, particularly as the Defense Department continues to struggle with the problem of moral injury. Without significant critical professional self-reflection, leaders cannot fully understand the moral decision-making and action obligations set down in the Army's profession of arms. As a profession, soldiers risk failing to address other vital ethical considerations as the profession limits itself to one mode of ethical reasoning and decision-making in isolation. Consequently, intentionally or unintentionally, leaders blind themselves toward other avenues to explore a broad range of ethical possibilities beyond the legal parameters for ethical decision-making and action. Leaders need tools for broader and deeper analysis of ethical challenges, and that provide thoughtful options to address complex ethical challenges.

Legality or Ethicality

While legal professionals assuredly do their best to ensure that commanders and leaders make sound legal decisions, as a profession there are temptations to reduce ethical decision-making and action to purely legal processes. Such reductionism can ultimately lead to tragic consequences for warfighters in complex military operations, and potentially affect strategic interests and partnerships. This is particularly true with the dispiriting increase in moral challenges facing warfighters across the globe. For

our profession, legality is an essential criterion for ethicality. However, fixating on laws or legality can obscure other approaches to ethical reasoning and activity.

At the heart of this criticism is the principle that the law provides constraints for military action, but it is not helpful to focus on legal opinion or precedent alone to identify good moral action. Brian Orend aptly stated, “Law merely stipulates, or declares, certain rules of conduct. The law simply declares the consensus agreement of what national state governments are willing to abide by and acknowledge.”¹¹ The law, in a sense, speaks to what is legally allowed when conducting military operations but rarely, if ever, describes or proffers what one ought to do. Furthermore, approaching military action primarily through the lens of legality changes the calculus of action. It can lead the actor to simply ask whether an action complies with the law rather than considering the ethical situation. What may be permissible by law may not be moral, and what may be moral may not be permitted by law. As noted in the Army ethic, certain moral values, virtues, and principles undergird and are inextricably linked to what is legal; members of our profession must access these as well. In doing so, the profession develops a greater capacity to adhere to the “spirit of the law” and not just the letter of the law, especially when the letter of the law may be inadequate for the task.²

Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAG Corps) officers across the profession of arms are some of our nation’s most exceptional attorneys. As staff officers, they deserve respect and gratitude for their work for the American people. They ensure that leaders receive crucial insight on how to apply governing laws, policies, and regulations as they make day-to-day decisions. The JAG Corps’ professional advice is shaped by an enduring respect for the rule of law.³ They offer it with openness, moral courage, and dedication. In instances when the law is silent, these officers enjoy the latitude to provide guidance so that Army leaders make informed decisions. Still, their voices should be part of a chorus that explores ethical possibilities and not the sole nor the designated ethics advisor.

Another complicating factor when discussing legality and ethicality is variations in legal theory and ethics. Neither method is uniform, and many different interpretive perspectives are possible, just as there are many different interpretive methods within any discipline of philosophy or theology. Understanding and applying religious texts is similar to understanding and applying legal documents. Some attorneys and ethicists lean on moral traditions (e.g., religious and philosophical teachings), while others favor an approach rooted in evolutionary psychology.⁴

Richard Posner, former US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit judge, argued that many essential rules of social cooperation are embodied in a society's moral code because those rules have proved useful over time as opposed to representing what some thinkers interpret as the good.⁵ For Posner and others who share his legal positivism, the law is not a monolithic reality that requires finding or identifying moral grounding to be legitimate. Rather, the law is a practical tool that continuously adapts to serve modern human communities better without the additional baggage of academic moralism.

German sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas did not share Posner's legal positivism, which followed the ideas of law identified by Max Weber; Weber was among the most important theorists on the development of modern Western society. In a sense, the utility of the law provides a mechanism to exert control over society and govern social interactions. As society changes, however, the law also changes. While Posner's claims may be helpful for legal professionals in the courtroom, an understanding of the law does not motivate the common person to be a better citizen, or more compliant for that matter. Legal positivism lacks the aspirational power to grasp, or live, the good life. The motivating power for changing laws typically begins with appealing to moral sensibilities that provide a framework for changing laws or legal constructs. Individuals who fail to understand these complex relationships between society, morality, and the law, risk delegitimizing the law. This is precisely why Habermas claimed:

Legitimacy is possible on the basis of legality insofar as the procedures for the production and application of legal norms are also conducted reasonably, in the moral-practical sense of procedural rationality. The legitimacy of legality is due to the interlocking of two types of procedures, namely, of legal processes with processes of moral argumentation that obey a procedural rationality of their own.⁶

Similar to Habermas, Russian novelist and historian Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn observed, in his commencement address to the Harvard class of 1978, that a society lacking objective legal standards will surely experience corrosion, but so will the society which claims nothing but a legal scale for guiding human behavior.⁷ While living in the former Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn observed that the use and abuse of the law stunted human decision-making and adversely affected human flourishing. This stultification of moral action comes when human laws set forth what some view as a minimally necessary set of codified boundaries which, like a

road, provides the only viable path for an activity to be deemed ethical or right. He further argued that a higher approach to moral action, authored in the human spirit, is required to foster coherence and stability. Such an approach stimulates moral and legal imagination and challenges laws and systems that fail to truly administer justice.

One example of a hybrid approach is the American Civil Rights Movement, which was both a moral and legal activity. The moral movement highlighted the immoral, unjust treatment of black Americans particularly in, but not isolated to, the American South. Segregation dehumanized black Americans and represented an affront to the equality enshrined in the US Constitution. The legal movement centered on voting rights—educating black Americans on their rights while challenging segregation laws inside and outside of the courts. The Civil Rights Movement embodied the kind of moral and legal imagination that makes laws more legitimate by grounding them in moral principles.

The approach taken in this paper is more similar to Habermas and Solzhenitsyn. As noted by Solzhenitsyn, “The letter of the law is too cold and formal to have a beneficial effect on society.”⁸ The law ought to provide boundaries for certain activities, but it should not prevent using moral imagination to come up with better solutions to complex human problems.

Laws and Codes of Ethics

The military profession must look beyond legal structures—whether US Constitutional Law, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the laws of armed conflict, or international law—to make better decisions about what actions ought to be deemed ethical and moral for military operations. The profession needs to develop and use moral and legal imagination to ensure sound ethical decision-making.

At critical points in our national and professional history, federal legislation and policy (e.g. Black Codes, Jim Crow Laws, anti-miscegenation laws, and laws allowing forced sterilization for mental illness or other offenses) birthed in dubious, but legal, reasoning led to moral misconduct from which the nation still reels even after the achievements of the Civil Rights Movement.⁹ This study of barriers to ethicality begins with legality as a critical barrier to a more nuanced understanding and application of ethical reasoning and moral decision-making. Legality has been a barrier to ethical awareness, and past actions need to be addressed at the forefront. A legalist approach has detrimental effects: the reduction of moral perception, a disastrous loss of moral language, and a reduction of human moral agency through overreliance on legal rulings as the law and lawmaker.¹⁰

Together, these effects lead to a significant loss of moral consciousness, which results in compliance absent moral reasoning, symbolized by the familiar “I was just following orders” excuse used in post-World War II criminal trials.

In *Blind Spots*, Max H. Bazerman and Ann E. Tenbrunsel identified how compliance-based laws and programs can increase unethical behaviors that such laws and programs were created to address. The authors described a study where businesses needed to use scrubbers to reduce emissions:

When no compliance system was in place, most saw the decision as an ethical one. In this case, individuals appeared to be searching for an answer to the question, “What is the right thing to do?” By contrast, when a compliance system was in place, most participants believed they were making a business decision. In this case, they appeared to ask themselves this question instead: “What is the likelihood I will get caught, and how much will it cost me?” The imposition of a compliance system led to ethical fading, such that participants were less likely to see the decision as an ethical one and therefore more likely to renege on the promise.¹¹

Beyond the Civil Rights Movement of the 50s and 60s, another way of understanding our premise is through an assessment of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) Movement. This chapter addresses BLM as a social justice movement rather than a political activity. As a watershed movement, BLM exemplified legal-moral conflict. At the risk of over-simplification, one discernible and key frustration which the BLM movement expressed was the failure of policing organizations to act morally while executing the laws of the land. Their leaders rightfully observed that while members of the policing profession acted according to the law, from a moral perspective some professionals violated the spirit of the law and abused the trust of their communities through excessive force. One often-repeated comment attributed to British novelist G. K. Chesterton is that having a right to do something is not the same as being right in doing it. While force may be necessary, not every event on the street or battlefield will require it. Moral reasoning, not just legal precedence, must accompany moral action.

The fact that blacks continue to have very different experiences of life from their white neighbors in America is indisputable. The American legal system is complicated by the way the law was written and how it has been enforced, historically disenfranchising black citizens.¹² Americans need to understand that the law has not been neutral with reference to black Americans, and historical criminalization of black citizens has coincided with the

desire and need for cheap labor.¹³ These issues were not resolved with passage of the Civil Rights Act and granting black citizens the right to vote—a right that can be taken away by felony conviction in most states. When the law is designed or used to oppress certain groups of people, it becomes a convenient tool for social control with little regard for the good.¹⁴

The profession of arms is a microcosm of society and, as such, is not impervious to societal travails. Breaking trust with the national community and allies can have lasting consequences which can thwart the mission, harm civilian-military relationships, and undermine the profession of arms. Civil rights icon Martin Luther King Jr. presented, in a time of racial and social upheaval, a philosophical ideal which he called “transformed nonconformity.” In a sermon titled “Transformed Nonconformist,” he articulated principles gleaned from the Christian tradition that still has relevance for military professionals and society writ large. He argued, “And so the Christian is called upon not to be like a thermometer conforming to the temperature of his society, but he must be like a thermostat serving to transform the temperature of his society.”¹⁵ King was keenly aware of how the power of conformity compels individual human beings and their institutions. He averred that “slavery, segregation, war, and economic exploitation have . . . too often conformed to the authority of the world.”¹⁶ How this works is crucial to this thesis, which is that while the law is necessary for constraining harmful human behavior and ordering certain interactions at various levels, it cannot serve as the only method for discerning moral action.

In many cases, conformity becomes a natural and, at the same time, seductive inclination. Human agents can behave in ways that run counter to the espoused norms of an institution, organization, or society itself. In this vein, French historian and philosopher Rene Girard discussed the idea of mimetic desire and mimetic violence. His idea of mimesis is that one has a significant desire to identify with another and model that person; when taken to certain extremes, this leads to the loss of moral safeguards, and ultimately, mimetic violence. This, he argued, becomes a moral contagion as the desire to identify with the role model—the desire to belong—leads to action that is negatively transformative for the individual, the organization, and ultimately, the profession of arms.¹⁷ What this means for the profession of arms is that laws in and of themselves are incapable of providing critical safeguards for human emotions and desires. When these safeguards are compromised or non-existent, the human agent will give into behaviors to satisfy the desire to belong or conform to the group identity. Initially, this desire will not be manifested in large moral acts, for good

or ill. Conformity begins in small acts, but left unchecked can increase in significance to broader and more catastrophic acts. For the profession of arms, the moral debacles of Abu Ghraib, Mahmudiyah and the Black Hearts incident, and the Kill Platoon quickly demonstrate the limitations of laws and the power of conformity in certain scenarios. These types of failures are linked to a culture's power and conformity, also attested to in the famed Stanford Prison experiment conducted by Philip Zimbardo.¹⁸ Here laws, regulations, and policies designed to enforce compliance failed to prevent unethical and illegal behavior.

Simply framed, one conforms to preexisting structures of power either out of a sense of opportunity to gain power and influence or because one fears punitive retribution for disobedience. However, compliance in certain circumstances destroys the human spirit and its attendant ability to reason correctly and morally. British author and theologian C. S. Lewis called this the urge of yearning for "the inner ring," meaning that the desire to belong becomes so great that one acts in a manner that is both counter to moral good and is in uncritical compliance with laws—whether written or unwritten. Both King and Lewis described an excessive desire that distorts good human beings and gives rise to immoral and unethical behavior.¹⁹ Professor Walter Earl Fluker wrote about King's transformed nonconformity: "The 'transformed nonconformist' refuses to cooperate with evil systems that exploit and destroy human personality, *and willingly suffers the penalty of law for nonconformity*. For the person who suffers redemptively for the sake of others . . . working for universal wholeness."²⁰

Rejecting the notions of nonconformity which revel in anarchy and chaos, King saw transformed nonconformity as an essential part of religion, but also of society, law, and democracy. King also knew there was no virtue in simply being a nonconformist. One had to be thoroughly transformed and wholly committed to embodying a new way of being that not only transformed the self but also transformed others. Fluker wrote:

Important for King was the pragmatic thrust of law as an active, dynamic article that is renewed through conflict and struggle, through negation, preservation, and transformation. Democracy at its best, for King, is a squabble, a contentious exchange of ideas, opinions, values, and practice within the context of civil relations.²¹

For King and those who acknowledged his principle, this realization was deeply connected to moral and theological tradition. Conceptually, this principle granted King access to moral language in the context of resisting oppressive power structures in a way that elucidated the immorality

of the system. Part of the problem with legalism is how easily it devolves to rigid compliance without transformation of the inner mechanism required for moral reasoning and inspired moral action.²² Thus, Habermas located the legitimacy of human law in the realm of cooperation between legal and moral reasoning. Rather than seeing legal opinions and analysis as ethical, such legal considerations must be used as part of a multidisciplinary approach to ethical and moral decision-making and action. Individuals also need to grow much more comfortable with questions when grappling with complex ethical challenges, and allow those questions to create an openness that leads to greater understanding and more flexible solutions. As writer and political activist Elie Wiesel commented: “I believe that evil may be found in answers, not in questions.”²³ A broad and multidisciplinary approach helps ensure a more reasoned and objective process for engaging challenging problems and dilemmas. It also allows members of the profession to live the Army ethic, which calls for a holistic approach to ethical and moral foundations. Such a multidisciplinary approach must include legal, theological, biological, psychological, and technical insights and principles when dealing with critical characteristics and complex problems of the human condition.

Leveraging Ethical Expertise

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, identified the moral-ethical field as a key element of military expertise. Army professionals are required to not only understand and live the Army ethic, but to apply ethical and moral reasoning to complex battlefield situations:

The moral-ethical field addresses the application of landpower as informed by the Army ethic and in compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. This field encompasses ethical reasoning in decisions and actions at all levels of leadership. Army professionals anticipate and address the implications of present and future ethical challenges resulting from cultural and social change, advancing technology, and changes in the cyberspace domain.²⁴

To assist in managing the complexities of this moral-ethical field, military scholar Jack Kem provided a helpful construct through his adaptation of scholar James H. Svava’s ethics triangle in “Ethical Decision Making: Using the ‘Ethical Triangle.’”²⁵ According to Kem, the ethical triangle represents three distinctive ethical perspectives—principles, virtues, and consequences—and is designed to address ethical dilemmas that arise from “competing virtues that we consider important but which we cannot simul-

taneously honor.”²⁶ The ethical triangle is a tool to help discern how best to process data pertaining to ethical challenges and, in processing this data, to develop reasoned and reasonable courses of action in order to act as a moral agent in a responsible manner. This is critical to ethical reasoning since no one perspective provides a singular set of data from which to adduce the good and righteous act. In theory, the ethical triangle aids individual recognition of various ethical interpretive perspectives for effectively responding to corresponding ethical dilemmas. Svava wrote: “The use of all three approaches also balances different ways of thinking about ethical issues. The virtue-based approach relies on feeling and reflection, the principle-based approach uses reason, and the consequentialist approach stresses analysis.”²⁷ By analyzing ethical problems through the various ethical reasoning lenses proffered by Kem, professionals in the profession of arms can potentially construct a more appropriate moral response to dilemmas by creating mental space for reflection and deliberation.

When creating such a space for ethical reflection, Svava’s ethics triangle can be quite useful; yet significant problems remain that must be considered. For example, one can easily overlook the associated complexities of the ethical triangle when it is utilized in isolation, either by the institution or the individual, from other resources. While the Army ethic posits to draw from legal and moral traditions, individuals tend to be much more informed by legal traditions because they are binding. They also tend to be more concerned with results since results often coincide with promotion in an up or out culture. Pressures to succeed in a complex environment can distort how individuals justify their actions, even unethical actions, using the ethical triangle. In the end, they often balance what they think might be achieved with the laws that govern activities in case calculations prove faulty.

Using the ethical triangle, however, is not sufficient to resolve an actual ethical dilemma. While bringing other perspectives to bear on a problem can be helpful, individuals often lack the tools to consider so many possibilities. They have unconscious processes and biases and thus tend to make assumptions about presenting problems and possible solutions. Individuals also see the world from their own moral traditions and can fail to recognize other competing moral traditions and lack the internal resources to address competing claims. While the ethical triangle can create space for ethical reflection, using it will not necessarily lead to more ethical outcomes, especially when one component has more concrete force than other components.

Leaders at all levels of the profession of arms need to be trained in moral reasoning, moral decision-making, and moral action. Further, they must have access to a multidisciplinary set of skilled advisors attuned to the differing lenses represented by the ethical triangle. Leaders also must be aware of the practical and moral environment with every ethical dilemma, as well as how individual lenses fragment as a result of a lack of experience or holistic understanding. Human beings come from varied backgrounds and have divergent histories, which poses significant challenges to ethical decision-making in general. Rather than relying on intuition, using an inclusive process will assist in assessing ethical challenges, developing moral courses of action, and executing the necessary moral act.

One of the challenges we face is defining what an ethical leader actually is. In *Ethical Leadership*, Fluker defined ethical leaders as “those whose characters have been shaped by the wisdom, habits, and practices of particular traditions—often more than one—yet they tend to be identified with a specific cultural ethos and narrative.”²⁸ In a sense, he asserted that ethical leaders need to possess authenticity that is inexorably linked to integrity. Fluker did not equate integrity with honesty; rather, he described it as “a sense of wholeness and self-worth” that accompanies leaders who critically examine their activities and their relations with others.²⁹ Ethical leaders understand that character is not fashioned in a vacuum but in community and lived out “at the intersections where worlds collide,” according to Fluker.³⁰ They are “apostles of sensitiveness, transfigured and transforming actors who present themselves to the world as symbols and for instances of what is possible and hopeful.”³¹ Through their character and dynamic engagement of lifeworlds and systemworlds, ethical leaders identify critical resources, practices, and communities to overcome ethical challenges.³²

Anticipating and addressing the ethical and moral challenges of military operations across the range of military operations is truly daunting. For an individual to be sufficiently self-aware and aware of the variables and numerous domains involved is never an individual problem. Powers of reflection are simply too limited, and individuals need assistance from a variety of voices. They must learn how to listen to others and utilize other perspectives to gain insight into unfamiliar areas. Younger service members may appreciate cyberspace and the technological world more than some older service members. Leaders in the profession of arms need to look to available resources to gain the robust analysis and feedback needed to make truly informed decisions.

Barriers to Ethical Activity

This is not to suggest or call for minimizing legal opinions when it comes to ethical decision-making and reasoning. On the contrary, leaders in the profession of arms have legal obligations. Yet, too much reliance on legal opinion at the expense of other disciplines can directly impact ethical actions. When any phase of warfighting is governed by law alone, critical components of fighting in the right way for the right reasons are not addressed. Leaders need crucial tools in their kit bag to address and shape moral and ethical challenges while reflecting American values and virtues.

As Sweeney and Hannah wrote, the Army leader must continue to hone and develop the full personal and professional repertoire.³³ Moral leaders create moral followers.³⁴ A legal approach in and of itself cannot create moral leaders and the trust that follows moral leadership. Girard noted that if a person desires to imitate someone in doing evil as a means to belong, then another person—with the right role model—will conversely imitate them for the good. Thus, the law shapes behaviors toward the good but never activates intrinsic motivation for pursuing the good. Organizations looking to be ethical and moral need something else.³⁵

A next step is to look at barriers to ethical activity that the law was not fully capable of preventing. In *The Fog of War*, former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara recounted an incident from his 1995 trip to Vietnam. While meeting with the former foreign minister of Vietnam, McNamara was rebuked for misunderstanding the situation in Vietnam:

Mr. McNamara, you must never have read a history book. If you had, you'd know we weren't pawns of the Chinese or the Russians. McNamara, didn't you know that? Don't you understand that we have been fighting the Chinese for 1,000 years? We were fighting for our independence. And we would fight to the last man. And we were determined to do so. And no amount of bombing, no amount of US pressure would ever have stopped us.³⁶

The first barrier was cultural understanding. Blinded by national interest or culturally inappropriate assumptions steeped in a Eurocentric worldview, McNamara and others failed to grasp the real issues. Engaging those issues would reveal deep historical challenges birthed from America's national narrative that would need to be confronted. They remained blissfully ignorant rather than confronting the demons of America's checkered past. Choosing to remain unaware of historical activities, attempting to discount involvement, or searching for some other "evil" (e.g., Communism) to justify unsavory actions are all forms of deflection. Actions and

operations will never be truly ethical until complex and complicated histories are addressed and acknowledged. As historians Will and Ariel Durant argued, “a little knowledge of history stresses the variability of moral codes, and concludes that they are negligible because they differ in time and place, and sometimes contradict each other.”³⁷ Each nation, and each epoch of national history, brings both sin and goodness; cultural and historical blindness creates moral superiority, radically altering moral reasoning to view oneself as a savior and the other as the devil.

Just as US leaders used the law to enslave and later subjugate black Americans, those in power can shape the law for nefarious purposes. Cultural competency and sensitivity allow practitioners to challenge injustice and expand legitimacy and influence, cultivating a deep humility that is open to outside perspectives and responsive to concerns and correction. As one international legal scholar questioned:

How can a developing state use international law to its advantage, considering that much of the rules of international law have been adopted, interpreted, and enforced for the benefit of advanced Western nations?³⁸

A second barrier to ethical reasoning and ethical action is bias of both individuals and organizations. While bias is not intrinsically bad, it can obscure or hide facts necessary for ethical reasoning and moral action. In these situations, bias often leads to negative actions; resultant second- and third-order effects can cripple military missions and the moral agents who act on those decisions. In a 2015 *NeuroLeadership Journal* article, Matthew D. Lieberman and fellow authors posited that so much discussion concerning bias has been on the individual. They wrote: “People are notoriously bad at knowing their thoughts, beliefs, interactions, judgments, and decisions are affected by unconscious drivers.”³⁹ To combat this problem, they proposed a model for organizations that guides movement from accepting bias to labeling bias, and then developing strategies to mitigate bias. Beyond accepting that humans have bias and are prone to take mental shortcuts, it’s important to understand that systems also have bias. Teams need to accept then label bias and create unique approaches to deal with it. In essence, the only way to actually address bias is by creating diverse, inclusive teams to address difficult problems.⁴⁰

Media, and particularly social media, complicates the nature of bias. They create space for people to voice opinions that may have previously been latent or unstated, but do not ensure accuracy or offer corrections. The rapid spread of misinformation creates a climate of mistrust, which is

a crucial barrier for professions rooted in the currency of trust. According to ADP 6-22:

Trust is the foundation of the Army's relationship with the American people, who rely on the Army to ethically, effectively, and efficiently serve the Nation. Within the Army profession, trust is shared confidence among commanders, subordinates, and partners in that all can be relied on and all are competent in performing their assigned tasks.⁴¹

Every Facebook or Twitter post poses some level of threat to individuals and organizations. In some cases, the threat is from the algorithm that highlights content that the reader is more likely to want based on previous activities; this can create an echo chamber where the individual only reads or hears stories that mirror existing perceptions of the world. Another reality is that social media sites are public; users are unaware of how much privacy they give up routinely on such sites that can be exploited by bad actors. Some sites and online communities have become bastions for up-and-coming hate groups and can make certain abhorrent behaviors and practices look attractive or normal to targeted users. For example, an Ohio National Guard member was recently removed from duty after posting white supremacist material.⁴² Using social media is not the problem, but it can create and pose unanticipated ethical challenges.

A third barrier is what Bazerman called motivated blindness: "the systematic failure to notice others' unethical behavior when it is not in our best interest to do so. Simply put, if you have an incentive to view someone positively, it will be difficult to accurately assess the ethicality of that person's behavior."⁴³ Human beings want to be liked, accepted, and feel good about the organizations of which they are a part. They are also motivated by very real fears of losing resources, being prosecuted for potential crimes, and facing public resentment or ridicule. Similarly, Lewis noted that desiring to belong to the inner ring can shape us to turn a blind eye to moral misconduct, or rationalize it as a consequence of war or some other human activity. Bazerman pointed to the reality that bad actors far too often go unnoticed because there are significant factors that play on whether someone sees—much less reports—inappropriate or illegal activity. This is a crucial component of the Blackhearts and Abu Ghraib debacles, as well as others. Many knew and yet failed to report, either out of fear or because they did not care how the mission was accomplished. Loyalty to the team outweighed loyalty to the nation or moral good. Bad traits unfortunately are learned from leaders, military and civilian, and—if we are

honest—the profession of arms because it emphasizes mission completion without equal emphasis on moral responsibility to complete it ethically.

The fourth barrier relates to questions—specifically asking the wrong questions. Questions are crucial for discerning context, ethical challenges, biases that individuals bring to the reasoning process, and, last but not least, the ultimate moral good being sought. In the current social and military environment, service members jokingly ask: “Will this decision land me in jail?” A better question might be, “Is this something I am willing to go to jail for?” However, as Fluker pointed out, the fundamental ethical question is perhaps “What’s going on?”⁴⁴

If, in response to situations that demand solutions, leaders are not aware of what is actually taking place, or what the end state should resemble, they should pack up and go home. The use of questions is not always an accepted practice. Many leaders do not accept questions, regardless of the reason. This not only creates a toxic environment; it undermines a climate for discerning and acting on the good. Furthermore, unwillingness to ask questions—of oneself, others, or of the mission—fosters bias, motivates blindness, and creates a leadership echo chamber in which only one way is considered. How many leaders in our profession have fallen because they would not allow themselves to be challenged or questioned? They shut down anyone who asked questions that made them uncomfortable, or their hubris became a barrier to ethical reasoning and action.

Questions force us to think about what we are undertaking and why. In addition, questions help us cut through the cacophonous demands for our attention so that we can use ethical reasoning, rightly and effectively. If trust is the bedrock of our profession, questions allow us to shape the moral battlefield—building and solidifying trust by engaging our moral imagination. Without trust, we fail our institution, the souls entrusted to her stewardship, and ultimately the American people. We will be unable to figure out what went wrong and why the goal seems so unachievable. However, when we begin with an understanding of what is actually taking place, we can ask pertinent questions about professional and moral challenges to be addressed or solved in the most ethical manner possible. Understanding what is going on also provides much-needed cultural context to develop partnerships that sustain ethical outcomes.

Recommendations

First, military organizations need to develop multidisciplinary ethics working groups to encourage thoughtful ethical analysis (not just legal) of complex situations. Such an approach to ethical reasoning and deci-

sion-making will provide leaders in the profession of arms with a more nuanced set of moral and ethical principles. Such groups will also encourage broader recognition of operational complexities that affect actions in moments of operational stress and conflict. A multidisciplinary approach, as opposed to a strict legalistic approach, supports the profession of arms in developing efficiently accessible principles to aid moral reasoning and moral decision-making. These should be diverse groups that include a wide array of counselors and advisors so military and civilian leaders can fully address ethical issues rather than relying on mental shortcuts to decide the best moral course of action; an ethical red team could be leveraged to prevent groupthink. These working groups should also use a model that helps identify, label, and effectively respond to biases. Leaders should encourage ethics education for service members in their organization. Organizations that take a multidisciplinary approach to ethics counseling and ethics education by utilizing tools like the ethical triangle will be much better equipped to handle complex ethical dilemmas.

The second recommendation concerns access to external resources for ethical reasoning and action, be they academic, religious, philosophical, or medical. The profession of arms and its leaders must access resources outside the profession because of their neutrality and expertise. Using external reviewers to provide insight and counsel can help institutions and organizations avoid reasoning pitfalls such as groupthink, motivated blindness, and bias confirmation. As a profession, military organizations rightly police themselves; however, these organizations should not scorn opportunities for other agencies or proper civilian institutions to help them gain better insight on issues that might be unaddressed or overlooked. Accountability reinforces trust. An organization that actively engages in healthy accountability practices will be more responsive and resilient—identifying areas that might be susceptible to exploitation and developing meaningful ways to address such concerns.

The third recommendation relates to ethical and moral leader development. Leaders exist at all levels, whether or not they are in official positions to lead; each one can direct human actions toward good or ill. Judging from the number of ethical lapses and sexual assault incidents within the profession of arms, commanders do not sufficiently emphasize moral leadership development programs. Military leaders must prioritize training and education on ethical reasoning and decision-making that aligns with the Army ethic, the Army as a profession, and moral good—not just legal compliance.

While moral leadership development is a commander's responsibility, commanders can only accomplish so much. They need to leverage staff officers to develop their subordinates. Each commander also has a personal staff officer with relevant expertise and training regarding moral leadership—the chaplain.

Chaplains often have significant experience in moral reasoning, a background in theological-philosophical studies, and the capacity to serve as the commander's lead program executor for moral leader development and education. As noted in Army Regulation (AR) 165-1, *Army Chaplain Corps Activities*, commanders should leverage their chaplains to proactively develop moral and ethical leaders across their organizations:

The chaplain, as the commander's advisor in matters of morals and morale as affected by religion, is the principal staff officer for [the moral leadership training (MLT)] program. In MLT, the chaplain and religious affairs specialist utilize values integral to the Profession of Arms, tools from a variety of human dimension disciplines, religious and spiritual factors related to ethical decision-making, and character development.⁴⁵

The final recommendation is that the profession of arms refocus on reinforcing historical and cultural understanding at every echelon of professional military education. This includes combat training centers, field training exercises, and small unit training events where historical-cultural understanding can be reinforced, particularly as it pertains to ethical world views, decision-making, and moral action in diverse settings. Tools to help better understand our world can be invaluable if used properly and reinforced regularly. Military leaders should not afford to be as uneducated or uninformed as Secretary McNamara regarding the historical situation of Vietnam. Members and leaders in the profession of arms owe it to the American people to be informed about the culture, as well as religious beliefs and practices, laws, and histories of the places where they deploy operationally. In this era of great power competition, all must learn and understand these rich pasts and prepare for critical reflection.

Conclusion

Service members are charged with the most moral of human activities, waging war. The profession of arms is entrusted to use violence to secure objectives and further national interests. The American people expect military professionals to demonstrate ethical understanding and exercise positive moral action in times of complexity and rapidly changing mores. Emphasizing and training moral and ethical reasoning is a must to ensure

moral and just military actions and prevent fissures in the trust bonds with the American people, within the profession of arms, and with allies and partner forces. Military professionals must see ethical challenges through a broader lens than national or international legal constructs. Laws are insufficient to orient human actions toward the good. While the law can coerce behavior if authorities have sufficient resources and power, such compliance may actually lead to more unethical behavior.

Furthermore, leaders need to recognize that many institutions lack a vocabulary for ethical decision-making, hence the profession of arms' reliance on the law. A moral vocabulary allows an organization to move beyond the law by providing a language that deepens moral awareness and a sense of moral responsibility. Without such language, an organization is bound to a legally based programmatic response to ethical problems. Responses to moral failure will continue to elicit policy changes and Universal Code of Military Justice action without necessarily affecting the prime motivators for moral action: the heart and mind. Ethical transformation will never be accomplished without transforming the heart and mind. A multidisciplinary approach is the best means to cultivate such transformative possibilities.

The profession of arms must acknowledge that sources of critical moral value often lie well outside the boundaries of traditional legal structures and, in some cases, actively oppose certain aspects of that very system. In a complex world, one particular ethical perspective is not sufficient to effectively lead to ethical outcomes. It is farcical to place too much trust in individual agents to act ethically in a variety of situations given what we know of bias and human self-interest. Members of the military need to see those on their left and right as critical resources to mitigate bias, and increase capacity for ethical reasoning and moral action. One strength of our organization is intellectual diversity embodied in our ranks; failing to leverage that diversity would be a tragic mistake, as evidenced by catastrophic moral failures over the last two decades. By incorporating varied voices with particular expertise, the profession of arms can increase ethicality and achieve more ethical outcomes in challenging environments.

Notes

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Army Ethic Principle 2

C. Anthony Pfaff

We take pride in honorably serving the Nation with integrity, demonstrating character in all aspects of our lives.¹

If the Army's professional status is contingent upon the trust of senior US civilian leaders, and by extension the American people they represent, then acting with integrity is the means to that end. Trust, in this context, of course, has multiple senses. First is the sense that one will tell the truth. Second, is that one is reliable. Integrity is putting that truth-telling and reliability into action.

Personal integrity demands one's public actions be consistent with one's inner beliefs. Achieving this consistency is easier said than done. The person's personal and professional commitments form a network of roles and promises held together by a "web" of values. Moreover, as J. Patrick Dobel observed in *Public Integrity*, those roles, promises, values, and the commitments they entail can come into tension that cannot be resolved simply by prioritizing them.²

Such tension is commonplace in Army life. Soldiers often must choose between what is necessary to fulfill professional duties and duties associated with other roles, such as spouse, parent, or friend. Saying one is more important than the other does not make such choices any easier or more moral. Sometimes an individual *should* prioritize being a parent over being a soldier. There is no one way to determine what those priorities should be or under what circumstances they should change. Still, at a minimum, integrity requires a certain transparency when Army professionals are forced to make the kind of tradeoffs that are an inherent part of national security.

In *Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession*, Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras described the damage that can be done when professionals disregard matters of integrity. To meet what they characterized as excessive training and certification demands, Army leaders reported certain requirements complete when they were not. Their rationale, generalized, was that completing all the requirements placed an undue and unnecessary burden on soldiers. Something had to give, and these leaders chose the well-being of their soldiers over meeting the requirements. While certainly a worthy cause, the lack of transparency over the

tradeoff had negative consequences for the profession. As Wong and Ger-
ras observed:

Tolerating a level of dishonesty in areas deemed trivial or unim-
portant also results in the degradation of the trust that is vital to the
military profession. Once the bar of ethical standards is lowered,
the malleability of those standards becomes a rationale for other
unethical decisions.³

This example highlights the risks of moral compromise in service to
necessity, whatever that necessity entails. German philosopher Immanuel
Kant held that lying was always wrong; if one justified lies and deception
by claiming necessity, then there would be no reason to believe anything
one said, especially in times of crisis where necessity was at its most ex-
treme and the demand for trust at its highest.⁴

Ultimately, however, there is no one way to resolve this tension; Army
professionals will continually find themselves in positions where they
must make tradeoffs not only with conflicting professional demands, but
personal ones as well. What matters is not just how the individual balances
their roles, values, and commitments but what that looks like in practice.
As Dobel further stated:

For a public official, these central values would include respect
for self and others, commitment to truthfulness and public good,
care, fairness, and honor. In maintaining integrity across their
lives, individuals use reflection, will, character, to assess their
various roles and commitments. Each role can be lived with
different amounts of empathy, conscientiousness, courage, opti-
mism, or respect.⁵

Being trustworthy and having integrity, then, is a matter of character.
Kant argued: “A liar is a coward; he is a man who has a recourse to ly-
ing because he is unable to help himself and gain his ends by any other
means.”⁶ Rather, a stout-hearted person loves truth and does not sacrifice
it for reasons of necessity. Kant saw good character as efficacious for good
behavior. Character traits are habits and by doing the “right thing” habit-
ually, an individual will take on the character (habits) of a “good” person
and do the right thing. Someone who habitually tells the truth and avoids
lying is, obviously, honest. In this view, the principles of the Army ethic
determine right action. Character is the motivation to uphold them.

This is not the only view on the relationship between principle and
character. The following chapter addresses dilemmas that can arise when
duties conflict and how character can help resolve them.

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Chapter 2

Officership: Character, Leadership, and Ethical Decision-Making

C. Anthony Pfaff

Gen. Sir John Winthrop Hackett once said, “What the bad man cannot be is a good sailor, or soldier, or airman.”¹ His comment underscored the danger of giving the right to kill to someone who might give little care to its cause or effects. What he did not address was what the good soldier would do when confronted with a situation where there is no apparent “good” way out.

In the fall of 2003, a great deal of controversy arose over whether to prosecute Lt. Col. Allen West, a 4th Infantry Division Battalion commander who—by his own admission—allowed his men to beat an Iraqi policeman they detained in order to obtain information about future attacks against his unit. When his men failed to obtain the information, he threatened to kill the Iraqi and fired shots around the Iraqi’s head. The policeman eventually gave them the needed information and lives reportedly were saved.² Though the Iraqi was not seriously harmed, beating a detainee and threatening him with death are violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), which West had an obligation to uphold. When the Army prosecuted him, however, a loud chorus that included congressional representatives arose claiming that the prosecution was immoral and that West had, in fact, done the *right* thing.³

Officership and Inspiration

Officership is about inspiration, but good officers do more than inspire subordinates to do extraordinary things. They also set goals and convince people to spend time, effort, and other resources to achieve them. Doing this well involves making practical as well as ethical decisions. Sometimes, situations will create a tension that is not easy to resolve. When tension arises, officers must attempt to balance the demands of morality with the demands of the profession; to do so, they must consider the consequences of their decisions and the rules and principles that govern the profession. These ethical considerations by themselves, however, do not

This is a revised version of C. Anthony Pfaff, “Officership: Character, Leadership, and Ethical Decision-Making,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 153–61.

provide a complete approach sufficient to answer all of the moral questions that officers may confront.

US Army doctrine defines the traits of good officership within the framework of “be, know, do,” which incorporates ethical as well as practical aspects.⁴ Because of this, we can discuss an ethics of being, an ethics of knowing, and an ethics of doing. This explains why approaches based on consequences and rules are inadequate: they focus on the ethics of knowing and doing but exclude the ethics of being. Yet, being a certain kind of person is just as important to moral leadership as knowing consequences, rules, and principles. Being able to apply them serves the profession and the nation. Still, consequences and rules can come into conflict. When conflict happens, ethical algorithms based on measuring consequences and applying rules will be insufficient to effectively guide action or resolve the tension between them in a morally appropriate way. In such instances, an officer’s character will help resolve conflicts in a consistent, coherent manner.⁵

Officership and Character

Colonel West had a choice, one that pitted two important obligations against each other. He could permit the beating and the threats to coerce the detainee into cooperating, or he could decide not to and leave his men at risk. Unfortunately, this decision is not a simple one. If he chose to threaten, much less torture the policeman, he would violate the law of war. If he chose to let his soldiers walk into an ambush, he would have contributed to their deaths. There is no clear way to choose one over the other. Preserving the lives of his men and accomplishing his mission were moral imperatives of considerable force. Resolving this problem did not depend on clever rationalizations or skillful manipulation of rules. Successfully resolving situations like this depends on the kind of person one is. To demonstrate the role character plays here, it is necessary to examine why appealing to consequences—like accomplishing missions and preserving lives—and simple conformity to principles and rules is inadequate to account for all moral considerations.

The ethics of consequences seek to determine whether a particular action maximizes some non-moral good, such as happiness or pleasure, or minimizes some non-moral harm, such as misery or pain. In the context of combat, the consequentialist imperative is expressed in terms of military necessity. The logic here is simple: if one is fighting for a just cause, then one maximizes the good by winning. Since maximizing the good—however one defines it—is obligated under utility theory, then those actions that maximize chances for winning are also morally obligated. Necessity

is not just about achieving military objectives; it also concerns itself with the expenditure of time, life, and money. Thus, something can only be necessary in relation to the available alternatives, including the alternative to do nothing.⁶ It is not enough that something works; it must work at the lowest cost.⁷

So while choosing any particular objective may not be in itself a moral choice, soldiers still have a *prima facie* moral obligation to accomplish their assigned missions. In fact, if military necessity were the only consideration, those missions—and any actions necessary to accomplish them—would be morally obligatory, regardless of what they entailed. If this were true, Army leaders would be free to disregard the laws of war as long as it was necessary to preserving the lives of one's personnel. In fact, one would never have to consider the laws of war in the first place. In this context, Colonel West's actions were not just permitted, but *required*.

Army leaders, however, are obligated to take such laws seriously. By virtue of the oath of office, they promise to abide by treaties to which the United States is a party; the United States does recognize international humanitarian law (IHL) as binding. Perhaps more to the point, Just War Theory provides a deontological, or principle-based, framework for most IHL requirements when it grants a right not to be harmed to noncombatants. Because of that right, IHL requires soldiers to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets, employ even legitimate force proportionally, and limit the harm they cause relative to the value of their intended military objective. Given this basis in human rights, the constraints can be thought of as moral, not just legal, obligations.⁸

To claim that in such situations a good officer always abides by IHL or other well-founded principles would be easy. Simply asserting this, however, will not help resolve moral difficulties that arise when military necessity and the laws of war come into conflict. There are a number of problems with any principle or rule-based approach to ethics, which we will discuss in the next section. Questioning why rules-following should take precedence over the lives of the personnel under one's charge is reasonable. It is reasonable for officers to ask if they want to be the kind of officer who allows people to die or to fail in their mission just to conform to a rule.⁹ Sometimes the answer to that question will be "yes," but not always. Deciding when that is the answer is one of the primary tasks of officership.

Character, Leadership, and Ethical Decision-Making

There is a gap between the kinds of ethical questions officers confront and the kinds of answers that consequence- and rule-based approaches

can give. When considerations of military necessity are insufficient and principle, laws, and rules fail, officers ultimately depend on their character. Thus, it is important to develop officers of character who understand what it means to be good officers—not just what it means to follow rules, perform duties, or reason well, although these are important to being ethical. If officers are to have the resources necessary to make ethically sound decisions, they need an approach to ethics that articulates what good character is and how it can be developed. Moral philosophers usually refer to the ethics of character as virtue ethics.

This approach to ethics seeks to determine systematically the traits that good people (or in this case, good Army leaders, which would include officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians) should possess, what it means to possess them, and how people can acquire them. In this context, virtues are the traits of good character. An officer of character is more concerned with being the kind of person who does the right thing, at the right time, in the right way, and is not as concerned with the act itself. The ethics of character avoids most dilemmas because the focus is no longer on deciding between two unfortunate outcomes or two conflicting rules but on being a certain kind of person. Virtuous officers do not assign values to outcomes or preferences to duties. Virtuous officers have habituated dispositions that make them the kind of people who do the right thing, even in the complicated and dynamic environment of modern military operations.

The Virtues of Good Officership

In virtue ethics, the virtues are determined by understanding the purpose something serves.¹⁰ Knowing something's purpose reveals if something is functioning well or poorly. For example, if the purpose of pack animals such as mules is to bear burdens, their actions reveal which mules do better and which do worse. Further, we can tell what qualities a mule must possess, such as strength, surefootedness, and endurance, to do its task well. The more a mule possesses these traits, the better the mule is.

A human being must also have certain characteristics to be a *good* human being. Aristotle claimed that the virtues of the excellent person included courage, temperance, liberality, proper pride, good temper, ready wit, modesty, and justice.¹¹ Plato listed prudence, courage, temperance, and justice.¹² Thomas Aquinas added faith, hope, and love.¹³ The philosopher Phillipa Foot, who famously brought virtue back into mainstream philosophical ethics, pointed out that whatever the full list of virtues may be, any particular virtue had to have three features: 1) be a disposition of the will; 2) be beneficial to others; and 3) correct a bad human disposi-

tion.¹⁴ Thus, persons must not only intend to do the right thing; they must intend to do the right thing for the right reasons, in the right way.

Because what it means to function well for a human is much more complex than what it means to function well for a mule, defining “functioning well” is difficult. Part of the problem is that functioning well for humans is determined by a complex combination of biology, environment, culture, and tradition. What this complex combination is and how its components relate to each other are not always well understood and, therefore, are subjects of much debate.

The function, environment, culture, and traditions of the Army, however, are well understood. Put simply, the Army’s function is to defend the nation. This function is itself a moral imperative of the State. Officers have the additional functions of setting goals and inspiring others to achieve them to serve this purpose. Not only does this function allow us to determine the virtues of the good military leader; it provides a way to morally justify them as well. Given this function, one can determine some of the virtues that are associated with officership, including prudence, selflessness, courage, caring, and integrity. If officers must establish goals and methods of defending the nation, they will need to be prudent and selfless.¹⁵ The former is necessary to discern the proper ends, and the latter is necessary to mediate when proper ends conflict with self-interest. Officers require courage, caring, and integrity to inspire and direct others to achieve these goals.

Having decided what the virtues of good officership are, it is necessary to discuss what it means to act virtuously. Virtues are excellences of character; that is, they are dispositions toward certain behaviors that result in habitual acts.¹⁶ Aristotle viewed each virtue as a mean between the two extremes (vices) of excess and deficiency in regard to certain human capacities. For example, with regard to feelings of fear, courage is the mean. A person can feel too much fear and be cowardly or feel too little fear and be foolhardy. A person who runs in the face of danger when the proper thing to do would be to stand his ground is a coward. But the person who does not comprehend the danger he is in is also not courageous.

This works the same way for other virtues as well. With regard to selflessness, one extreme is careerism, where officers are too concerned with personal advancement and fail to place the needs of the organization above their own. An officer can also be too selfless. Officers who never take care of personal interests might impede their ability to lead. For example, officers who deny themselves sleep, so as to demonstrate their commitment to the mission, quickly become incapable of making good decisions.¹⁷ Neither is

the mean an average. For instance, ten pounds of food might be too much, and two pounds might be too little, but this does not mean that the average of six pounds is the right amount. Instead, the mean is relative to our nature.

It is worth emphasizing that for Aristotle the mean is aimed at only because it is beneficial; the mean between two extremes enables the individual to live well. To discern the mean, an officer must develop the ability to reason well, which is itself a virtue that Aristotle called prudence or practical wisdom. This virtue is necessary to resolve the tension between the feelings that emerge from natural appetites, concerns of self-interest, and the requirements of virtue.¹⁸ The conflict between reason, feeling, and self-interest lies at the heart of the excellences or virtues. What drags us to extremes detrimental to our long-term happiness are passions and feelings, such as excessive (or defective) fear or excessive love of pleasure. Reason is required to control behavior, passions, and feelings. Excellences are applications of reason to behavior and emotion. These excellences can be developed with proper training.

Virtue ethics allows one to take into account consequences as well as obligations associated with rules, laws, and principles in a way that resolves the tension inherent among them. As in consequence-based ethical theories, one must be concerned with consequences of an action to determine its normative value. In virtue ethics, one must be sensitive to the conditions that frame moral choices. Acting on the principle of always telling the truth is good; however, ignoring how that truth might affect others risks doing moral harm. Caring spouses, for example, should bring to their partners' attention matters negatively affecting their health. Vicious (or at least stupid) spouses will simply announce that their partners are fat.

Determining how to embody a particular virtue requires an element of compassion. Failure to recognize this can result in disastrous consequences. Deontological, or duty-based, ethics evaluate actions in terms of how these actions correspond to certain principles or rules. In deontological ethics, one has an obligation to perform certain duties conscientiously. In virtue ethics, persons must habituate and virtue conscientiously—that is they must routinely perform acts that reflect the relevant virtue if they are to say they possess that virtue.¹⁹ As such, the habituation of virtue can take on the qualities of a duty. To develop integrity, for example, one must always tell the truth and always avoid lying.

Developing the Virtues of Good Character

A virtue ethics approach to officership can help resolve certain dilemmas that consequence and rule-based theories cannot. Instead of doing

good things, the virtuous person focuses on being good. One becomes good by acquiring certain virtues or character traits that lead to doing virtuous things. This is, however, where rule-based approaches can play a key role. Virtues do not develop overnight. One cannot wake up one day and decide to be courageous, for example, and immediately be so. Being virtuous means knowing the right time, place, circumstance, and manner in which to be courageous. One acquires these traits by habituation.

According to Aristotle, whose writings greatly influenced modern virtue theory, one becomes virtuous only by performing virtuous actions until doing so becomes habitual. In other words, experience is necessary. Aristotle made this point by contrasting virtues with natural capacities:

Of all the things that come to us by nature, we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g., men become builders by building and lyre players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.²⁰

Just as one becomes a good musician only by practicing an instrument, one becomes a good officer only by practicing the profession. But, how does one who has no experience in such matters develop experience? When we try to describe a virtue, we tend to list things we must do to instantiate the virtue. Listing these things is just like listing rules and principles. This is, in fact, one of the major critiques of the virtue approach. When we try to put rules and principles into practice, we end up with essentially a rule-based system. When this happens, the importance of character is not obvious.

To get a deeper understanding of what character is as well as how virtues are best cultivated, consider the following example. To shape his subordinates into caring officers, a brigade commander made the rule that officers should remain near the front of the mess line to ensure that their entire unit was fed; then they would eat last. When the commander found one lieutenant at the end of the line, he immediately corrected the situation.²¹ When the lieutenant moved to the head of a line, he was simply

following a rule. If rules were the sole determinants of right and wrong, then the lieutenant was doing what was right.

Directing the lieutenant to stand at the front of the line while his soldiers were fed was good, but this would not make him a better lieutenant. If he understood why he should stand at the front of the line—to better care for his soldiers—he would be more likely to become a more caring person. If he had the right disposition, he should begin to notice anything that was not being done correctly. For example, the cooks might be giving out unusually small portions, the food might not be cooked as well as it should or could be, or the food might lack variety from day to day. Nothing in the rule required him to do anything about these issues. His only requirements were to stand at the head of the line and make sure everyone was fed. But since he knew this rule was supposed to make him a more caring person, he should be motivated to act to correct any issues.

This example might seem simple and inconsequential; however, this same dynamic works in many situations. At first, junior officers are following rules; later, after following rules long enough with a properly critical and creative attitude, they transition and are actually disposed to be caring. Once this happens, they are no longer simply following rules. They have developed the capacity to make them, especially in response to novel situations. What motivates leaders to adopt this attitude is an understanding that it is not enough to do good; it is just as important to be good.

Aristotle also pointed out that one cannot develop virtue by accident or by doing the right thing for the wrong reasons. The lieutenant in the above example might have been motivated by self-interest because he knew the brigade commander would give him high marks for being so conscientious. This is why intent is important. One cannot become caring or wise or honest unless one is trying to become so. For an action to be truly virtuous, a person must be in the right state of mind. He must know that his action is virtuous, and he must decide on it for the sake of his soldiers. He must act in a caring manner because being caring is good, not because it will benefit his career.

The Role of Mentorship

If rules have a role in habituating virtue, the person making the rules must possess that virtue. In this way, the rules are not arbitrary but, instead, become a path to becoming a good officer. As noted earlier, Aristotle likened the acquiring of virtues to playing an instrument, which requires a teacher and habitual practice. Unless one is a savant, one does not pick up

an instrument and by fooling around with it, play it well. One might, after a fashion, be able to make pleasant sounds with it; but without someone to provide training, developing true proficiency will be a long and arduous process—fraught with mistakes and certainly not efficient. One might even pick up a book and learn the principles of good guitar playing. While that method might make them better to an extent, it takes a good teacher to really train them to achieve excellence.

For junior officers to become good officers, they must acquire the necessary virtues. Junior officers can learn from seeing how virtues are instantiated by those who are effective at moral officership. Only then can they instantiate virtues into their own lives. Virtues involve a delicate balance between general rules and an awareness of particulars. In this process, the perception of the particular takes priority, in the sense that a good principle or rule is a good summary of wise particular choices and not a court of last resort. The rules of ethics, like rules of medicine, should be open to modification in light of new circumstances. The good officer must cultivate the ability to perceive, then correctly and accurately describe his situation and include in this perceptual grasp even those features of the situation that are not covered under the existing rule. The virtues provide a framework around which officers might engage in this process.

Resolving the Conflict

In resolving problems like the ones that confronted Colonel West, we must understand that one cannot instantiate one virtue, such as caring, by failing to instantiate another virtue, such as integrity. In any situation, virtuous people act in such a way that they instantiate all relevant virtues. We could decide that Colonel West should save his men at the expense of fulfilling his duty to obey lawful orders, but he cannot be caring at the expense of his integrity.

Somehow, he must maintain or restore one or the other. To be fully virtuous whatever his choice, he must publicly take responsibility for his actions and the bad consequences those actions might have. To prevent or mitigate the bad consequences, he might turn himself over to his superiors or resign from his position. This would send the message to his subordinates that what he did might have been necessary, but it was not good. If he were only obligated to consider military necessity, he would be able to conclude that beating and threatening the detainee was a morally obligated act if he concluded that it maximized military necessity by limiting the risk to his men. Virtue ethics allows him to conclude that while this might not be the morally best course of action, the results of the action are morally

good. In fact, many of these considerations seemed to have influenced West's thinking, as he immediately turned himself in to his chain of command following the incident. In a CNN interview, West said:

But I think that as a commander, I had, as I felt, a moral obligation . . . and responsibility to the safety and welfare of my soldiers. . . . I can't, you know, recommend that decision to be made. That's something that each and every person has to do within their own selves and within their own heart. . . . Well, I think that there's honor and integrity in things that you do and also I understand that there are two parts to the Army. The Army as an institution has to have good order and discipline, and that needed to be evaluated, as to whether or not I stepped outside the lines and allowed my commanding officers to make a decision as far as what should be done with me.²²

In a separate CNN interview, West's attorney, Lt. Col. (Retired) Neal Puckett, summed up the issue this way:

A commander has many responsibilities. One of those is to follow rules and enforce rules himself. Another is to protect his men and women in combat. Those came into sharp contrast in this particular situation. Lieutenant Colonel West chose to err on the side of protecting his men, and assumed the risk that it would cause his career and has always been willing to stand up, accept responsibility for that, and whatever punishment the Army felt necessary.²³

Virtue ethics is inherently anti-careerist. Military professionals must accept that they may be placed in difficult circumstances where lives will be at stake and the morally appropriate way to resolve conflicts may not be obvious. This should not preclude action, but one must be prepared to accept the moral, as well as legal, consequences. Failure to recognize this represents the worst kind of careerism as it places one's career over the needs of the profession and the nation it serves.

Could Colonel West have been virtuous and left his men at risk? Only if there were a way to embody the virtue of caring—or at least be held accountable for it—if he did so. Even if he had chosen to conform to the law, it still may have made sense to resign his position if it was the only way he could restore his integrity after having failed in the commitments he made to his men. He could have also considered the harm he could cause to the detainee's family if the enemy discovered his cooperation or the increased resistance that may have arisen once word of his abuse of the detainee was

made public. While these were essentially consequentialist considerations, it would be impossible to calculate their relative worth.

What is left is to ask about the kinds of things good leaders consider and weigh. But what things an officer should consider and how he should consider them depend on the virtues relevant to the situation. If he were simply following the rules, he would conclude that leaving his men at risk was the right thing to do, regardless of extenuating circumstances.

Offering a definitive virtuous solution is difficult because there really is none, at least not in the same sense that consequence- or rule-based systems offer. Such approaches attempt to determine the right action in a particular situation. They are intended to be formulas that when all of the relevant variables are put into the equation, the right answer pops out. They are not always up to the challenge, however. While virtue ethics does not offer a formula, it offers a way of developing officers and subordinates in a manner that will provide the widest possible variety of resources to draw on to make the best ethical decisions in the moral crucible of the modern battlefield. Such a process may not yield a unique ethical solution; however, it can identify those solutions that optimize moral outcomes.

In identifying morally optimal outcomes, virtue ethics accepts the possibility of moral residue. West's dilemma, as described here, is what the philosopher Rosalind Hursthouse would describe as "tragic," where not only is there a conflict of norms, there is no possible action to avoid feelings of guilt or remorse. Those feelings, in fact, are signatures of virtuous persons. Leading a virtuous life does not preclude situations where no matter how one acts, there will be moral residue and injury.²⁴ What it does entail is that virtuous persons will be in the best position to realize the best (or at least better) outcome, however that outcome is measured. In this way, the virtuous agent can maintain the profession's commitment to the imperatives of necessity, noncombatant immunity, and force protection as well as the larger humanitarian commitments that inform these imperatives.

Conclusion: The Potential to Do Good or Evil

In the complex, dynamic, and dangerous environment of the modern battlefield, there is great potential to do evil and little time to apply rules or calculate consequences to avoid doing evil. Even if there were rules or calculations, one-dimensional approaches to ethics are not always up to the challenge. Rules, duties, and principles can conflict. Sincere, well-intentioned compliance can sometimes lead to the most disastrous outcomes. But acting in such situations does not necessarily make someone a bad

person. Actions might be evidence of the presence or the absence of virtue, but they are not in themselves virtuous. Acting virtuously might not spare one from the moral costs of leadership; however, doing so provides a framework in which one can maintain personal integrity as well as the integrity of the profession.

This is why developing the virtues of good officership is so important for the military officer. In situations where any action can lead to a morally impermissible outcome, officers of character will be best able to resolve the tension and maintain personal integrity and the integrity of the profession as well. Character is an essential part of an ethical framework for officership. When officers face the kind of situation the lieutenant did, their habituated character will guide their actions. This does not mean that virtuous officers never consider consequences or rules to determine where their duties lie. The point is that the virtuous officer has developed the disposition to know how and when to do so in the best way possible.

Notes

1. Gen. Sir John Winthrop Hackett, *The Military in the Service of the State* (US Air Force Academy, CO: Government Printing Office, 1970).
2. Dean Yates, "Emotional U.S. Officer Admits Wrongdoing in Iraq," *Reuters*, 19 November 2003.
3. Depending on the status one grants the detainee, an Iraqi policeman named Yahya Jhodri Hamoody, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949) or the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 August 1949) would apply. Numerous pundits and commentators argued that Lieutenant Colonel West should be rewarded for his actions. Notably, even some members of Congress joined the chorus. Tennessee Congressman John J. Duncan Jr. made this claim about West: "This is a man who has served honorably for almost twenty years in the United States Army. He should not be court martialed. He should be given a medal for saving American lives." <http://www.house.gov/duncan/2003/fs110703.htm>.
4. US Military Academy Circular 1-101, "Cadet Leadership Development System," June 2002, 1.
5. For a discussion on the importance of consistency and coherence in ethical decision-making, see Donald M. Snider, John A. Nagl, and Charles A. Pfaff, *The Army Profession: Officership and Ethics in the 21st Century* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999).
6. Christine Gray, *International Law and the Use of Force*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 150.
7. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 5th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 144.
8. International Committee of the Red Cross, "What is International Humanitarian Law," accessed 17 July 2020, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf.
9. Julius Moravcsik, "On What We Aim at and How We Live," in *The Greeks and the Good Life*, ed. David Depew (Fullerton, CA: California State University, 1980), 199.
10. Aristotle believed that a human being's function is to reason. Human beings who reason well will also live well because they are the best human beings they can be.
11. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin (Cambridge, UK: Hackett Publishing), Book IV.
12. Plato, "Laws," trans. A. E. Taylor and Paul Shorey, in *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*, eds., Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961).
13. Arthur F. Holmes, *Ethics: Approaching Moral Decisions* (Leicester: InterVarsity Press, n.d.), 119.
14. Phillipa Foot, "Virtue and Vices," in *Virtue and Vices and other Essays on Moral Philosophy* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 2–9.

15. The use of selflessness here is synonymous with the idea of public virtue. See Forrest McDonald, *Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 71. See also James M. Stockdale, *Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1995), 75. Distinguishing between what Plato and Aristotle referred to as practical wisdom (phronesis) and philosophical wisdom (sophia) is important. Practical wisdom expresses itself in the prudent conduct of one's public and private business. This virtue, also often called prudence, is distinguished from the theoretical wisdom of the philosopher. In the context of the discussion of leadership, Plato, in *Laws*, discusses what qualities a good legislator should possess and claims that a good legislator relies on prudence to determine what laws to enact. Since good laws achieve good ends, the good legislator must discern both the good end and the means to the good end.

16. Louis Pojman, *Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong* (Albany, NY: Wadsworth Publishing, 1999), 163.

17. Jonathan Shay, "The Invisible Gap: Ethical Standing for Commander Self-Care," (presentation, Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 30–31 January 1997.

18. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book II.

19. James Wallace, *Virtue and Vices* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 90.

20. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book II, 1103a27–1103b1.

21. Brig. Gen. (Retired) Ray Miller in discussion with the author, Palo Alto, CA, 1 November 1996.

22. Lt. Col. Allen West, "Military Career of Lt. Col. Allen West Coming to an End," interview by Anderson Cooper, *American Morning*, CNN, 23 December 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0312/23/lm.18.html>.

23. Lt. Col. (Retired) Neal Puckett, "Rules of War," interview by Soledad O'Brien, *American Morning*, 11 December 2003, <http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0312/11/lm.05.html>.

24. Rosalind Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 72–77.

Army Ethic Principle 3

C. Anthony Pfaff

*In war and peace, we recognize the intrinsic dignity and worth of all people, treating them with respect.*¹

Respect is a core feature of almost any ethics, professional or otherwise. German philosopher Immanuel Kant saw respect for the intrinsic dignity and worth of all people as a bright line for placing limits on how persons should treat each other. As he expressed it: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”² Treating someone as an end entails, among other things, caring about that person’s interests in the same way one cares about one’s own. Put another way, showing respect means helping others realize their potential, at least within the professional context, and not limiting the roles they can play for reasons not related to their professional status and capabilities.

Respect is a critical condition for building the kind of trust necessary for success in combat. Unfortunately, this is an area where soldiers and their leaders need to do better. In its fiscal year 2019 summary on sexual assault in the military, the Department of Defense indicated there were 7,825 sexual assault reports, representing a 3-percent increase from 2018.³ The summary also showed a 17-percent increase in restricted reports, suggesting a lack of faith in the chain of command to adequately investigate.⁴ These disturbing numbers suggest Army leaders at all levels need to do more to establish a climate of respect in their organizations. More to the point, Army leaders need to understand that sexual assault, harassment, and discrimination is a critical readiness issue that should be given the same priority as any critical shortcoming.

Respect, however, does not just apply to friends, but to the enemy—combatant and noncombatant—as well. Demonstrating respect requires keeping in mind that the purpose of war is to establish a better state of peace. In this context, such peace improves on relations between warring states from what they were before fighting broke out. If things simply returned to the *status quo*, the potential for conflict would still exist. Fulfilling that purpose means fighting in a way that avoids brutality and recognizes the humanity of those doing the fighting. As military historian B. H. Liddle-Hart observed: “The enemy of today is the customer of the morrow and the ally of the future.”⁵ Even in war, it’s critical to consider some type of future relationship and treat the enemy accordingly. At a minimum,

recognize the enemy's humanity by observing the law of armed conflict (LOAC), which requires soldiers to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants and avoid causing collateral harm that is disproportionate to the value of the military objective.⁶

American political theorist Michael Walzer believed almost all soldiers, in some sense, are coerced to fight and thus are *moral equals*. For soldiers defending against an act of aggression, the enemy coerces them to fight by attacking. However, even soldiers on the aggressor side can be coerced by fear of punishment if they refuse to participate or by government lies and deceit that motivate citizens to fight. Because they are moral equals, neither can be held accountable for the crime of war; moreover, the killing they do on either side, as long as it conforms to international law, is permissible.⁷

Not everyone is satisfied with this view. Some like American philosopher Jeff McMahan noted that if soldiers were moral equals, killing done by the aggressing side would be somehow *justified*. He argued, however, that it would make no sense to say, for example, that a German soldier *justifiably* killed a French soldier during the 1940 invasion of France. Rather, it would make more sense to say the German soldier participated in an act of aggression and murdered a French soldier. One might *excuse* the German soldier for the reasons Walzer cited; however, there is an intuitive judgment that for soldiering to be a moral enterprise, cause matters.⁸ More to the point, the principle of respect entails that Army professionals cannot easily disentangle the ends of war from the means. This fact places a burden, especially on senior Army leadership, not to commit US forces toward immoral ends.

The fact that soldiers may not be moral equals does not permit them to treat soldiers on the aggressing side as criminals. Any soldier can doubt or be uncertain regarding their cause and still feel compelled to fight. In a powerful expression of this compulsion, novelist Tim O'Brien explained why he answered the draft and fought in the Vietnam War, a war which he opposed:

I feared the war, yes, but I also feared exile. I was afraid of walking away from my own life, my friends and my family, my whole history, everything that mattered to me. I feared losing the respect of my parents. I feared the law. I feared ridicule and censure.⁹

The point here is not to evaluate the justice of the Vietnam War, or any war for that matter. Nor is it to suggest that each combatant's moral equality rests on a kind of tribalism; even if soldiers, in the end, are motivated simply by communal bonds, that does not diminish the justice or injustice

of the cause for which they fight. Rather, the point here is to suggest that community has a powerful effect on the choices that an individual makes. Thus, it makes sense to extend some empathy, and by extension, respect to all soldiers.

Regarding noncombatants, soldiers are not only obligated to avoid targeting them, they are also required to take extra measures to minimize harm to them, even if that means taking on some additional risks.¹⁰ By virtue of their equipment and training, soldiers are better able to handle the risks of war and, for that reason, are obligated to take on those risks rather than placing them on noncombatants. However, the imperative of winning and due care obligations toward soldiers limits that risk. Soldiers are not obligated to assume so much risk that an operation will fail or they will not be able, as a unit, to continue to prosecute the war effort.¹¹

In the following chapter, Col. Joel N. Brown analyzes what can happen when the principle of respect is forgotten, or at least subordinated, to military necessity. Brown details the history behind decisions to directly target Japanese civilians with incendiary bombs, which eventually gave way to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Brown's point is not to settle the question of whether these activities could be justified. Rather, he addresses whether the moral taint that arises from victories achieved at the expense of values is worth the cost. Thus, he leaves the reader to ask, was there a better way?

Balancing Brown's discussion of what happens when professionals ignore broader ethical obligations, Col. Paul E. Berg and Col. (Retired) Kenneth A. Hawley discuss in Chapter 4 about US Army operations during the 1991 Gulf War. The army's reputation as an *ethical* fighting force encouraged Iraqis to surrender in large numbers rather than fight, thus limiting the human cost of that war; as previously discussed, surrender can be a critical part of establishing a better state of peace.

Notes

1. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession* (Washington, DC: 2015), 2-6.
2. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. H. J. Patton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 96.
3. Caitlin M. Kenney, "Pentagon: Reports of Sexual Assault, Harassment in the Military Have Increased," *Stars and Stripes*, 30 April 2020, <https://www.stripes.com/news/us/pentagon-reports-of-sexual-assault-harassment-in-the-military-have-increased-1.627966>.
4. Kenney.
5. B. H. Liddle Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Meridian, 1991), 338.
6. International Committee of the Red Cross, "What is International Humanitarian Law?," Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, accessed 24 June 2020, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf.
7. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 5th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 34–41.
8. Jeff McMahan, *Killing in War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 131–54.
9. Tim O'Brien, *The Things They Carried* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 45.
10. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 156.
11. Walzer, 158.

Chapter 3

Lessons from the Firebombing in World War II's Pacific Theatre

Joel N. Brown

As the winds of war churned in the early 1940s, America looked to redeem promissory notes issued twenty years earlier by airpower theorists. These advocates held that airpower could decisively, more quickly, and more efficiently deliver victory by crippling a nation's morale and war-fighting capacity. Airpower occupied a different domain and these new instruments of war could forego tactical engagements—ensuring the war would be won through strategic bombardment, destroying a nation's ability and will to fight. Anxious to prove the thesis, its theorists began to devise a strategy featuring airpower. Orchestrated with aid from the newly formed Air War Plans Division, blueprints began to emerge which aimed to vindicate its visionaries' claims, blueprints that would cost thousands of innocent lives and flout accepted ethical boundaries.¹ The air campaign over Japan raised crucial questions while revealing perennial lessons for those intent on honoring ethical guidelines during war. It demanded that we remain aware of factors beyond national interests which drive operational decisions, that we affirm the due care civilians ought to be afforded during war, and that we commit to preserving our moral identity even during the grimmest of times.

The atomic weapons used in Japan eclipsed the strategic air campaign waged in the preceding months. But even before the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an estimated 500,000 civilians either suffocated or were burned to death when American B-29 Superfortresses firebombed sixty-seven Japanese cities. Searing flames consumed noncombatants, infants and aged, their homes and memories. The strategic and ethical arguments which allowed the campaign to unfold still persist in pockets of our nation and its military. To draw lessons from the incendiary bombing campaign, these arguments require scrutiny. Decades before becoming the Secretary of Defense, then-Lt. Col. Robert McNamara served as an operations research analyst for the Pacific Theatre bombing effort. Looking back on the campaign, McNamara raised a pointed question for future commanders to wrestle with: "In order to win a war, should you kill 100,000 people in one night, by firebombing or any other way?"² Curtis LeMay, the commander of the incendiary missions, addressed the question thirty years after the war by saying he probably would have been tried as a

war criminal if the Allies had lost. McNamara later asked another probing question: “LeMay recognized that what he was doing would be thought immoral if his side had lost. But what makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win?”³ Failing to grapple with the principle that noncombatants deserve special protection leaves them in the potential crosshairs of future campaigns. The firebombing raids over Japan offered a forum to face this issue head-on. Lessons learned there substantiate a continued deference afforded to the principle of civilian immunity.

Lesson 1: A Gory Campaign Left Planners Susceptible to Unethical Suggestion

Tens of thousands of Americans were dying in the World War II island-hopping campaign. In February 1945 alone, a month before the Tokyo firebombing, 6,000 American troops died on the island of Iwo Jima. Leapfrogging island-to-island to invade Japan would cost thousands of American lives. This prospect was not lost on Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay, head of the 21st Bomber Command headquartered in the Mariana Islands. It would be LeMay who ultimately decided to commence the firebombings. He eagerly considered how airpower could contribute to the war effort, hoping to avoid the need for a ground invasion. LeMay chose to depart from what aviation authority Barrett Tillman called the Army Air Force’s most cherished dogma—daylight, high-altitude, strategic bombing, but that departure would raise many professional, political, and ethical questions.⁴ Using bombers to destroy infrastructure from a high altitude proved only marginally successful, and attrition rates for the planes and their crews were high.

Overturing traditional dogmas opened a new menu to the quiet but ambitious young trailblazer. In his biography, LeMay recalled the prodding he received from his handlers in Washington. If he failed to find a solution to the impending Pacific carnage, he would not only be fired; he would also leave the promises of strategic airpower in default. The commanding general of Army Air Forces, Henry “Hap” Arnold, would watch LeMay’s every move, appointing his deputy chief, Brig. Gen. Laurus Norstad, to double as LeMay’s chief of staff in the Pacific. Like Arnold, Norstad was what historian Michael Sherry called an eager advocate of incendiaries.⁵ Arnold ensured his preferred course would be clearly imprinted on his distant commander. LeMay felt the weight; the possibility of an independent air force rested on his shoulders.⁶ Decades later, LeMay was asked about the pressure from Washington to prove airpower’s value. David Burchinal, one of his wing commanders also being interviewed, quickly jumped

in: “No,” he said. “The pressure wasn’t in Washington; it was right here [pointing to LeMay].”⁷ In reality, the pressure on the command had been mounting for some time. Three months earlier, Washington—likely originating with General Arnold himself—had directed LeMay’s predecessor to XXI Bomber Command, Haywood S. Hansell, to conduct incendiary attacks on Nagoya. Hansell protested directly to Arnold, but instead of using incendiaries, Hansell conducted a January 1945 attack against Nagoya with a conventional payload of bombs.⁸ That mission would be his last as the XXI’s commander. He was replaced. A month and a half later, LeMay would turn Tokyo into a cauldron. Still, another pressure loomed. Many analysts had calculated that an invasion of Japan would cost at least a half-million American lives and perhaps even more Japanese lives. If no other option presented itself and an invasion of the Japanese mainland occurred, many lives would inevitably be lost.

LeMay decided to commence a new kind of campaign, raining incendiaries over heavily populated areas. In his autobiographical account of the Tokyo firebombing, a stoic LeMay sounded dispassionate, even indifferent:

We scorched and boiled and baked to death more people on that night of March 9–10 than went up in the vapor at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. . . . [Even] if those bombs shortened the war only by days, they rendered an inestimable service.⁹

The choice to burn an entire city did not reveal itself to LeMay in a flash. Contrary to the long-standing belief that civilians ought to be afforded as much protection as possible during war, many theorists and a few practitioners preferred its opposite, a more morally repugnant route. The corrosion which leads to such breaches of ethical integrity often begins years before its collapse. In the decades prior to the incendiary 1945 campaign, pressure had been building for some time against the *in bello* levee, the principle that those not engaged in the war effort are not legitimate military targets.

LeMay’s plan drew from theory, and he gained inspiration from an array of experiences and hypotheses, from military strategists and popular trends as well as the latent ethical thought of its theorists. Theory is necessary. Constantly changing societal norms, different geography, new technology, and the persistent fog and friction of war all work to obscure the outcome of even the most tried and true checklists. Ever-changing circumstances push commanders to find new applications for long-held theoretical principles. For millennia, one hypothesis had become dogma in theory: the idea that degrading a military’s capability moves a side closer to

victory. But with the advent of airpower, another theory emerged—a novel and tempting hypothesis which begged for attention and action. Airpower shared its formative years with a young LeMay. Its technology offered an alluring path to attentive ears. Strategic airpower could hasten victory even without concentrating on an enemy’s military. How this would occur was less clear. Many auxiliary hypotheses were nominated. It might arise by destroying transportation networks, the military-industrial complex, or even government itself. But Italian airpower enthusiast Giulio Douhet proposed a grislier approach: targeting civilians. His ideas eventually found their way to the minds of Pacific Theater planners.

Douhet gave the first systematic treatment of airpower in his text, *Command of the Air*, published shortly after the conclusion of the first World War. His text was as prophetic as it was alarming: “We dare not wait for the enemy to use inhuman weapons banned by treaties before we feel justified in doing the same. . . . All contenders must use all means without hesitation.”¹⁰ Douhet, the former head of aviation for Mussolini, proposed inhumane means that involved gas and incendiary attacks on civilian centers. The tactics were intended to spread terror and cause a state to sue for peace. Perhaps he drew inspiration from H .G. Wells’s 1908 *The War in the Air*, in which New York City quickly capitulates after being terrorized from airship bombings; Douhet imagined that the combination of gassing cities and using incendiaries would make the ensuing fires impossible to fight.¹¹ He envisioned that such use of airpower on one city could be repeated to “ten, twenty, fifty cities.” But how would civilian deaths, terror, and panic lead to victory? Douhet might have assumed that leaders would prioritize their people’s well-being over all other concerns, as though ruthless attacks would compel a sovereign to concede to a brutal enemy.¹² The historic context casts doubt on this possibility. Douhet wrote *Command of the Air* the same year that Italy’s Fascist Party, not known for its compassion and benevolence, was in full bloom. For Douhet, widespread bombing would not lead to victory because of humanitarian considerations. Rather, he hypothesized that bombing cities would force leaders to concede the war in order to preserve their own power: “The people themselves, driven by the instinct of self-preservation, would rise up and demand an end to the war,” he wrote.¹³ Sovereigns would sue for peace out of fear of rather than love for the people. Douhet would not be the last one to express this logic.

Considered the champion of American airpower, Billy Mitchell studied Douhet’s theories with great interest, even traveling to Italy to gain an audience. Mitchell’s 1923 manual on bombardment repeated the idea

that bombing population centers might dissipate an enemy's war effort.¹⁴ Mitchell's report on the US strategy for a possible conflict against Japan reflected this as well. Decades before WWII, Mitchell wrote: "Japan offers an ideal target for air operations. Her towns are built of wood and paper."¹⁵ The aviator was not alone in perpetuating airpower's ability to win by attacking civilian centers. Britain's Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard, strategist B. H. Liddell Hart, and Italian aircraft builder Gianni Caproni were also part of the chorus. *Skyways*, Mitchell's 1930 book, kept the idea of gas attacks and incendiary bombing relevant for another generation of American airmen.¹⁶ Mitchell himself spent time building the curriculum and planning exercises for young lieutenants and captains at Army Air Corps training sites; he also trained young talent directly, talent like Major Carl Spaatz, who would later order preparations to indiscriminately bomb German cities.¹⁷ The consequences of these lingering ideas emerged in 1941 through the US Air Core Tactical School War Plan:

If the morale of the people is already low because of sustained suffering and deprivation and because the people are losing faith in the ability of the armed forces to win a favorable decision, then heavy and sustained bombing of cities may crush that morale entirely.¹⁸

Theory began to take shape in plans, but a popular appetite to conduct that kind of warfare remained in question.

That question received an answer in the early 1940s. Mitchell's acolyte, Alexander P. de Seversky, popularized long-range bombardment as a strategy to destroy Japan in his 1942 *New York Times* bestseller, *Victory Through Air Power*.¹⁹ But it was none other than Walt Disney who became the next disciple. His contribution pressed airpower's case to all corners of society. Disney saw the text as so important that, a year after releasing the movie "Bambi," he funded and rushed to produce an animated, orchestrated documentary movie mirroring de Seversky's book.²⁰ The film was dedicated to Billy Mitchell, referred to as the visionary who prophesied an entirely new way of defeating the enemy. With appearances by de Seversky, a narrator bluntly informed the audience that in the new age of airpower, "the distinction between soldiers and civilians will be erased."²¹ Douhet's ideas percolated. Airpower had gained the backing of Hollywood. The trusted figure who gave the world Dumbo had now given the masses Douhet.

Airpower theorists never proposed to exclusively target civilians or even say they would be the preferred target of bombardment. Recognition and respect for innocent civilian life were clearly present through-

out this period; planners consistently affirmed that bombing city centers would be an inferior alternative to destroy the industrial web. Without the industrial complex, war making could not persist. But this line would not prevail. Theoretical literature never fully disavowed the idea of creating a firestorm to encompass the civilian populace; as such, it persisted as a live, viable, and increasingly superior option for airpower's proponents in the Pacific Theater.

The crescendo of voices built until culminating a decade and a half later in LeMay's trial of airpower's central theses. Even if he alone made the decision to commence incendiary attacks, as he claimed, he was surrounded by a chorus of theorists suggesting a dreadful alternative.²² LeMay himself may have chosen the words printed on the leaflets dropped over Japan, but echoes of Douhet, Mitchell, and Spaatz could be heard in them. "We want you to see how powerless the military is to protect you," one shouted. "Systematic destruction of city after city will continue as long as you blindly follow your military leaders," read another.²³ The leaflets failed to achieve their objective. While they told Japanese citizens that the Allies valued innocent lives, actions would speak louder than words. By the time the incendiary campaign ended, allied airpower killed an estimated 900,000 Japanese civilians in more than sixty cities and damaged the homes of more than two million citizens.²⁴

Have the levees that hold back forces from targeting civilians been built any higher since the mid-1940s? Are today's leaders and planners as likely to follow in the footsteps of LeMay should the right circumstances emerge? Do we see the humanity, see something of ourselves, even in the fiercest adversary? Are there red lines painted as brightly as LeMay's shifting utilitarian calculus? In some respects, Douhet's impact on American airpower theory is unmistakable. In the nuclear age, it persists in deterrence theory's counter-value targeting doctrine. But much of Douhet's thesis appears to have been disproven. Evidence suggests that populations deepen their dependency on their governments when attacked; they do not overthrow the government.²⁵ They would sooner turn to a third-party, perhaps no ally to the attacking force, than to the one terrorizing them. What is more, US culture has come to expect, even demand, that its military go to great lengths to avoid civilian casualties. On the whole, the world has become more egalitarian, seeing all people as having some inherent dignity. But though deeply etched in US and global sentiment, this remains only theory. Until the fork in the road presents itself, taking one or one million civilian lives with a twitch of the finger remains a possibility. Until planners resolutely commit to proceed ethically before they become mired

in the thick of a campaign, has the possibility of again succumbing to unethical suggestion really been smothered?

Lesson 2: Ignoring Civilian Immunity Gives Up the Moral High Ground

The idea that there is a moral high ground may sound pompous, but noncombatant immunity springs from two basic and universally accepted moral intuitions. First, innocent people do not deserve punishment or harm.²⁶ If we discover an innocent person was declared guilty, we call it unjust. Innocents are released from prison and given financial compensation for their unlawful imprisonment. Innocents who are intentionally and violently pursued are called victims, and perpetrators are held blameworthy and culpable for their offenses.

This intuition, that innocent persons do not deserve to be harmed, holds in war as well. Targeting innocent parties unjustly subjects them to harm. They do not engage in conducting the war effort, do not assist combatants, do not give orders or influence those giving the orders, are not responsible for the war or how it is conducted. Why should they be intentionally subjected to its travesties? They are not guilty by association any more than a building's tenants are responsible for what goes on in an adjacent building.

Not everyone in the country is responsible for the conduct or commissioning of a war. Some groups of citizens disagree with or even actively resist their government's actions. During World War II, organized pockets of resistance existed in both Germany and Japan. Millions who were interned and executed did not support their governments' actions. These groups deserved different treatment. Ignoring the differences in a populace makes everyone equally guilty by virtue of their residency. But why should sharing a patch of land, heritage, or skin color pre-dispose someone to intentional harm? None of these factors are a suitable basis for the collective guilt of a country's citizens. If the status of enemy noncombatants does not pivotally change the decision calculus of military leaders, the moral high ground is relinquished.

A skeptic might retort here that because civilians of a warring country pay taxes, they support the war effort and are negligent too. They have a duty to stand against their government. The Declaration of Independence contains fragments of this thinking, as do the writings of renowned essayist Henry David Thoreau, who argued that citizens have a duty to actively resist unjust governments, and the flyers dropped over Japan.²⁷ "Warning,"

reads leaflet 150-J-1 dropped by LeMay's forces over Japanese cities; "it is your responsibility to overthrow the military government."²⁸ But are normal citizens ethically required to endanger themselves because others have done wrong? This line of thought fails to recognize the difference between actions which are ethically permissible and those which are ethically required, those which people have a positive responsibility to perform.²⁹ Yes, in some situations individuals are ethically *permitted* to resist the superior force of the government; however, the idea that everyone is *required* to voluntarily put themselves at risk because of another's unjust actions strains credulity. It does not follow that people who do not rise up against a government may be targeted by opposing forces.

A second intuition bolsters the idea of civilian immunity. Concisely stated, innocent persons should not be held hostage, used as leverage, or attacked to achieve some goal. Innocent persons are categorically different than material objectives. People have dignity; things do not. People should not be used as disposable pawns or hostages in a political chess match. This belief becomes stifled when civilians are thought of as collateral—things that have value *only* to their own governments, value that is always beneath the goals of the attacking force. A fragmented logic connects the prospect of an attack or even a threat of being attacked to a country's acquiescing to the demands of the attacking force. Why should a country comply with the demands of those attacking its citizens? The basis of this logic is found in comments of thinkers like Carl von Clausewitz, who called the will of the people a center of gravity and referred to population centers as military targets. Attacking a center of gravity might be viewed as hastening victory. Clausewitz's doctrines were prevalent, and prevailing military doctrine pushes planners to acquiesce to tactics like the World War II incendiary bombings over Japan and can silence ethical tenets which are otherwise resilient.

It is not the aim here to reopen Clausewitz's complex and in-depth theses. What can be observed is the tenuousness of the logic opposing non-combatant immunity; targeting civilians as collateral makes them morally irrelevant, dehumanizing them, and accepts that they are mere things—no different than supply lines, seaports, or soldiers. Even calling the population a center of gravity presents ethical problems about whether people are liable for their country's war effort and assumptions about how a government will respond to a populace being targeted. Austrian military strategist Stefan Possny observed that bombing a populace may very well lead to increased numbers of volunteers and strengthening of a nation's resolve and resistance, not a reduction of it.³⁰ Citizens are more apt to turn to their

own government when being bombed, not turn to the nation killing them. The highly debatable and often-cited thesis that the incendiary campaign may have saved hundreds of thousands of American lives will be dealt with below. The lesson emerging here is that when militaries attack innocent civilians, they replace solid moral convictions with questionable and often faulty assumptions designed to justify their baser actions.

Similar to clearly unethical terrorism practices, incendiary bombing gives up the moral high ground. In the epilogue to *Bombing the People*, Thomas Hippler suggested that some strategic concepts employed in aerial warfare looked strangely similar to these practices.³¹ The sentiment is easy to understand. Since Douhet, one goal of city center bombings has been to induce terror—a term that regularly shows up in early airpower theory. Drafting a World War II letter to Arthur Harris, head of Britain’s Bomber Command, Winston Churchill conceded that operations like his decision to firebomb Dresden were conducted “simply for the sake of increasing terror.”³² American political theorist Michael Walzer spoke of bombing civilian centers in equally stark terms. Terrorism, he pointed out, intentionally avoids engagement with the enemy army, instead carrying out a war by political means.³³

Beyond simply inducing terror, terrorists attempt to demonstrate that a government is unable to fulfill its principal function of providing security to its people, thereby implying that the governing structure is illegitimate. If the government cannot satisfy its end of a social contract, that contract is void. Indiscriminately bombing a population becomes a war by other means. It is telling the people, “Watch how powerless they are to protect you,” a message that LeMay had printed on leaflets released over Japan.³⁴ But the agents of such tactics are also known as war criminals. The firebombing raids over Japan, which required aircrews to incinerate city centers rather than targeting the industrial complex, did more than just drop the B-29s bomb-runs from an altitude of 23,000 feet to an incendiary-bombing altitude of 5,000 feet. They also dropped from the moral high ground by turning a blind eye to the ethical demands that exist during war.

Lesson 3: Neglecting Civilian Immunity Occurs in the Wake of a Conflicted Moral Identity

Airpower arrived at a moral crossroads in the early months of 1945. For some, the seemingly unending devastation of WWII shrouded the ethical path. A number of leaders wanted to explore options that might end the war without hundreds of thousands more Americans dying. That more sordid road could perhaps bypass a land invasion; for the champions

of airpower, the alternative might secure an independent air force in a quicker-victory proof of concept. The road would come with a heavy toll that many wanted to avoid. Opting against traditional warfare demanded bombing a populace. Noncombatant lives would be exchanged for the lives of American warfighters.

Evidence that moral fog had been rolling in for some time can be seen in the decision to sack Hansell in favor of LeMay, in the forced internment of thousands of Japanese-American citizens, and in dehumanizing portrayals of the Japanese in popular media. By the time the 38-year-old Major General LeMay was handed the reins of XXI Bomber Command in 1945, he was prepared to use hundreds of B-29s to incinerate Japan's industry, infrastructure, and population. Still, the ethical status of civilians in warfare was not completely lost on the young commander. His leaflets dropped over Japanese cities spoke of US humanitarian policies, repeatedly urged civilians to evacuate the cities, and told civilians that the US did not want to harm innocent people. Decision-makers knew of the demands of justice, and the language of justice had strategic value. Beyond mere messaging, weapons like mustard gas were never considered for use against civilians even if they were kept in the realm of possibilities for use against military strongholds.

LeMay's internal conflict served as a microcosm of the country's dilemma at large. While leaflets recognized innocent civilians, LeMay believed, "There are no innocent civilians," to which he would add, "It doesn't bother me much to be killing the so-called innocent bystanders."³⁵ LeMay repeated this apparent lack of empathy in his autobiographical account: "We just weren't bothered about the morality of the question;" worrying about the morality of razing Japan's cities would have been "nuts."³⁶ At other points, hints of moral awareness and even moral justifications emerged.

LeMay had his public relations officer refer to the rain of fire over Tokyo with the seemingly contradictory phrase, "pinpoint, incendiary, bombing"—depicting the intentional aim to produce widespread conflagration with more ethically acceptable language of precision bombing.³⁷ Years later, LeMay's ethical rationalizing became more apparent. He confessed his actions were those of a war criminal. He had lost the moral high ground. Still, LeMay justified them. In a lesson to Air Force Academy cadets, he declared: "All war is immoral, and if you let it bother you, you're not a good soldier."³⁸ But seconds later he walked this back: "Ethical problems weren't of primary concern to me, although I didn't discard them completely."³⁹ LeMay applied a broadly utilitarian approach. "Actually," he wrote, "I think it's more immoral to use *less* force than necessary, than

it is to use *more*.”⁴⁰ To his staff, he offered this justification for the imminent attack on Japanese population centers: “Do you want to kill Japanese, or would you rather have Americans killed?”⁴¹ Combatant or noncombatant apparently didn’t matter to LeMay. Japan’s atrocities and aggression evoked passion and patriotism. The importance of civilian immunity fell prey to the prolonged war, the devaluation of Japanese life, and the appeal of exonerating airpower itself.

The decision to torch cities scarred America’s moral fiber as well. Guilt and unease about past decisions registered in McNamara’s retrospective question about how it could be okay to kill 100,000 civilians in a single day in order to win a war. In the years following the war, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, who became chairman of the Joint Chiefs, summarized the ethical issue to a Congressional budget committee: “This country has to consider. I mean, are we for or against mass bombing of noncombatants? . . . The American people, if they were well informed on all factors, would consider such a war morally reprehensible.”⁴² But Radford seems to have overstated American convictions; value and counter-value nuclear warfare theory became the accepted staple of America’s National Security Strategy for decades after WWII. For a lesson to be learned, not just identified, there must be a clear change in policy, a definitive change in course. To think that America definitively renounced as immoral the thoughts that enabled the firebombing of Japan would be to go too far. Discussions continue about nuclear weapons. LeMay recognized the moral equivalency of firebombing and nuclear war:

Incidentally, everybody bemoans the fact that we dropped the atomic bomb and killed a lot of people at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I guess that is immoral; but nobody says anything about the incendiary attacks on every industrial city in Japan, and the first attack on Tokyo killed more people than the atomic bomb did. Apparently, that was all right.⁴³

The military conflict ended days after the atomic bombs were dropped, but the moral conflict endures. Signs that the conflict may be tipping in one direction provide hope. In a May 2016 speech in the city of Hiroshima, President Barack Obama spoke of a possible future, “a future in which Hiroshima and Nagasaki are known not as the dawn of atomic warfare but as the start of our own moral awakening.”⁴⁴ Acknowledging that US operations conducted in the Pacific Theatre were morally inferior was a first step. To rid itself of its conflicted past completely, future US leaders must continue to opt for a nobler ethical route in future conflicts.

Lesson 4: Bombs with Eyes Are Ethically Superior Weapons

After World War II, the Air Force became the independent branch it wanted to be, but its legitimacy and legacy had been tarnished. Justification for its independence rested on being more than long-range artillery for ground forces, so any claim that airpower brought about Japan's surrender disputed the legitimate provenance of the Air Force itself. While airpower played a role in Japan's surrender, other factors weighed heavily in Japan's defeat. The Soviet Union's entrance into the war, the naval blockade that jammed Japan's supply lines, and Germany's surrender played significant causal roles. Airpower could not be singularly credited with securing the victory. The director of the WWII Strategic Bombing Survey, Adm. Ralph A. Ofstie, summarized the report's findings: "The statistics contained in these reports clearly show that the strategic bombing campaign against essential war production did not have a decisive effect on the outcome of the war."⁴⁵ The incendiary campaign followed by the use of atomic weapons did not indisputably validate the thesis that airpower's bombing of city centers would shorten wars. The question remained: could the Allies have achieved victory without the firebombings?

Of the countless leaflets that fell over Japanese cities portending impending destruction, #2106 stood out. It declared that although America did not wish to injure innocent people, "unfortunately, bombs have no eyes." That is no longer the case. Smart weapons now allow precision attacks against war industries and specific military targets, opening a new chapter in airpower's history. Having bombs "with eyes," precision-guided weapons, has allowed the Air Force to achieve many promises of its original theorists and to begin removing the lingering tarnish from its moral identity.

Conclusion

The Army ethic aspires to progress beyond the mistakes of the twentieth century by learning from previous large-scale military operations. It captures the notion that the lives of others may only be taken when done so justly; taking innocent life is to be avoided. This may, it turns out, increase the risk to American soldiers. Competent professionals accept that risk and make every effort to avoid the pitfalls that ensnared previous generations. Studying the lessons of past operations teaches us that we are influenced by and can fall prey to pressures to preserve certain institutional dogmas or to fatigue that draws our minds into considering unethical modes of warfare. Unchecked, those pressures obscured the ethical judgment of

many in WWII's Pacific Theatre. Charting a different course begins with honestly assessing the ethical strengths and shortcomings of previous decision-makers. The crosshairs of tomorrow's fights begin to take aim when today's leaders grapple with the idea that innocent noncombatants deserve special protection.

Notes

1. Haywood Hansell, one of the chief architects of the World War II air planning efforts, chronicled the events and pressures which fueled these plans. See Haywood S. Hansell, *The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler* (Atlanta: Higgins-McArthur/Longino and Porter, 1972), 64ff; Haywood S. Hansell, *Strategic Air War against Japan* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Airpower Research Institute, Air War College, 1983), 19ff.
2. *The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara*, directed by Errol Morris (2003; USA: Sony Pictures, 2004), DVD.
3. *The Fog of War*.
4. Barrett Tillman, *LeMay* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 61.
5. Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 230.
6. Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 97.
7. Curtis E. LeMay, Richard H. Kohn, and Joseph P. Harahan, *Strategic Air Warfare: An Interview with Generals Curtis E. LeMay, Leon W. Johnson, David A. Burchinal, and Jack J. Catton* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, US Air Force, 1988), 65.
8. Haywood S. Hansell, *The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 217–24.
9. LeMay, *Mission*, 387–88.
10. Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, trans. Dino Ferrari (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2019), 189.
11. H. G. Wells, *The War in the Air and Other War Forebodings* (New York: Scribner, 1926).
12. Clodfelter suspected that strategic bombardment theory hadn't reached closure on the question of how bombing strategic targets caused the war to end. Mark Clodfelter, *Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations of American Air Power, 1917–1945* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 2010), 252.
13. Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, 58.
14. Alfred F. Hurley, *Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 81–82.
15. William Mitchell, "Report of Inspection of United States Possessions in the Pacific and Java, Singapore, India, Siam, China & Japan," 24 October 1923, 277, Air Corps Library Collection, RG 18.
16. William Mitchell, *Skyways: A Book on Modern Aeronautics* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1930), 263.
17. Clodfelter, *Beneficial Bombing*, 169.
18. Office of the Chief of the Army Air Forces, *AWPD-I: Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: US Air Force Historical Research Agency, 12 August 1941), 7, tab1.

19. Alexander P. de Seversky, *Victory Through Air Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942).
20. *Victory Through Air Power*, directed by James Algar, Clyde Geronimi, Jack Kinney, and H. C. Potter (1943; USA: United Artists, 2004), DVD.
21. *Victory Through Air Power*.
22. LeMay, *Mission*, 355.
23. LeMay, 375.
24. *United States Strategic Bombing Surveys: European War, Pacific War* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1987), 194.
25. Richard J. Overy, *The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War Over Europe 1940–1945* (New York: Viking, 2013), 309.
26. This idea was captured well in a section title of Hugo Grotius’s 1625 text: “One must take care, so far as it is possible, to prevent the death of innocent persons, even when done unintentionally.” Grotius, “On the Law of War and Peace,” in *The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings*, ed. Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 431.
27. Henry David Thoreau, *On the Duty of Civil Disobedience* (London: Housmans, 1963).
28. LeMay, *Mission*, 375.
29. LeMay, 375.
30. Stefan T. Possony, *Strategic Air Power, the Pattern of Dynamic Security* (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1949), 150, 154.
31. Thomas Hippler, *Bombing the People: Giulio Douhet and the Foundations of Air-Power Strategy, 1884–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 259.
32. Winston Churchill, “Two Drafts of a Letter from Churchill on Area Bombing, 28 March 1945 and 1 April 1945,” UK National Archives, accessed 26 March 2020, <https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/heroesvillains/gl/cs3/glcs3s3a.htm>.
33. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 197.
34. LeMay, *Mission*, 375.
35. Quoted in Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 287.
36. LeMay, *Mission*, 381.
37. St. Clair McKelway, “A Reporter with the B-29s: III—The Cigar, the Three Wings, and the Low-level Attacks,” *New Yorker* (23 June 1945): 35.
38. Alfred. F. Hurley and Robert. C. Ehrhart, eds., *Air Power and Warfare: The Proceedings of the 8th Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy 18–20 October 1978* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), 201.

39. Hurley and Ehrhart, 201.
40. LeMay, *Mission*, 382.
41. LeMay, 352.
42. *The National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services; House of Representatives, 81st Congress, First Session: October 1949* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), 103, 51.
43. Hurley and Ehrhart, *Air Power and Warfare*, 200.
44. Barack Obama, “Hiroshima” (speech, Hiroshima, Japan, 27 May 2016).
45. *The National Defense Program*, 185.

Chapter 4

The Success of World View Morality: Why So Many Iraqi Soldiers Deserted to the Coalition in 1990

Col. Paul E. Berg and Col. (Retired) Kenneth A. Hawley

The Army is a profession because it creates expert soldiers developed through specialty technical training, continuing professional military education, and experience. These professionals are proficient in defending our nation and protecting human rights. Military professional development through education and training results in a military culture that is applied through ethics, leadership, and loyalty to the nation. This development is reinforced through continuous training and education that every soldier must complete in preparation for combat. It is because of that professional development and ethical cultural development that the US Army has a positive reputation respected throughout the world.

During Operation Desert Storm, thousands of Iraqi soldiers surrendered to American and Coalition troops. Upon the sight of Coalition armor and mechanized troops, the Iraqi 51st Infantry Division, which was one of the better-equipped and -supplied divisions, surrendered in its entirety to Coalition troops.¹ As the war began in earnest, Iraqi soldiers chose a fate as a prisoner over certain death as they faced the Coalition onslaught. This was quite the opposite of what the Iraqi forces experienced in the Iran and Iraq war years prior.

Most Iraqi soldiers surrendered in droves to American and Coalition forces, expecting that they would be treated fairly and within the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Americans and their Coalition partners had many issues regarding enemy prisoners of war from previous wars and subsequent conflicts. The comprehensive war planning and preparation that went into the prisoner of war contingency guaranteed humane treatment of Iraqi enemy prisoners of war more so than any force it had fought against in the previous twenty years.

The US Army gained its professional reputation since World War I through the practical application of disciplined combat skills in hard-fought wars. Because of this reputation for being professionals, the Army's partners and adversaries—and Americans as a whole—recognize and trust the US Army will generally behave ethically. Every US soldier is entrusted with the ethical design, generation, support, and application of landpower and expected to defend not only the US Constitution and the rights and

interests of the American people but those of all nations.² One foundational aspect of being a professional is having an ethical framework that underpins the profession. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, defines the Army ethic as “the set of enduring moral principles, values, beliefs, and laws that guide the Army profession and create the culture of trust essential to Army professionals in the conduct of missions, performance of duty, and all aspects of life.”³ These principles, codified in the Army ethic, are based on the nation’s founding documents, laws, and signed treaties; they guide the American way of war.

Desert Storm Victory

On a Sunday morning, 3 March 1991, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf (the CENTCOM commander) and Lt. Gen. Prince Khalid of Saudi Arabia met with top Iraqi commanders to dictate the terms for a temporary ceasefire in Iraq after just 100 hours of ground combat. Schwarzkopf and Khalid then flew to Safwan, an airbase in Southern Iraq, to accept the ceasefire. The remains of the Iraqi Army military leadership—Lt. Gen. Mohammed Abdez Rahman al-Dagitistani, Lt. Gen. Sabin Abdel-Aziz al-Douri, and other senior Iraqi officers—arrived in vehicles with a strong US security escort.⁴ The two military leader groups met in a small tent to settle the terms for the final ceasefire and full Iraqi surrender. After the Iraqi generals agreed to Coalition demands concerning the time and rules of the ceasefire, the discussion turned to negotiating an enemy prisoner of war exchange. The senior Iraqi general informed Schwarzkopf that the Iraqi Army held forty-one US and Coalition prisoners and asked how many Iraqi prisoners were held by Coalition forces. Schwarzkopf conferred with an aide and responded that Coalition forces did not yet have a full accounting but estimated the total as 58,000 prisoners or more.⁵

The Iraqi generals negotiating the surrender were shocked by that number. They had not anticipated the Coalition’s complete and utter victory over their Iraqi Army, including the full liberation of Kuwait. The Coalition delivered one of the largest demonstrations of military power and technology in recent military history.⁶ The Coalition forces ultimately captured and cared for 86,743 Iraqi prisoners—a tremendous undertaking to account for, transport, feed, and secure so many prisoners.⁷ In those short 100 hours, all of the Iraqi prisoners were fully processed, fed with proper religious accommodations, provided proper and full medical care, and treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and international law. For the 69,822 prisoners captured and interned by US forces, this massive logistical job was done entirely by US Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve units.⁸

In the last 150 years, the treatment of enemy prisoners of war was an extremely sensitive subject because of past inhumane treatment of enemy prisoners of war—especially by Japan in World War II and the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War.⁹ Since the end of World War I, international agreements have established guidelines and rules to ensure the humane treatment of enemy prisoners of war. One of the most far-reaching and impactful treaties was the Geneva Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War signed in 1929.

Since the American Revolution, US strategic, political, and military leaders have generally been concerned with providing protection and humane treatment for enemy prisoners of war in our custody.¹⁰ Desert Storm was no different. Prior to and during Desert Storm, US and Coalition forces were responsible for enforcing the provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims.¹¹ The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War requires the capturing power to provide proper and humane treatment and accountability of all persons captured, interned, or otherwise held in custody from the initial moment of capture until final release or repatriation. Under the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, the capturing power is responsible to search for and collect enemy wounded and sick; protect them against pillage and ill-treatment; provide them adequate medical and dental care; and bury the dead, if applicable.¹² The other two Geneva Conventions afford similar rights to civilians found in the theater of war and enemy armed forces at sea.¹³

During World War II, the Allies generally treated Axis Power prisoners within 1929 Geneva Convention guidelines, with some notable exceptions. Allied prisoners, however, were not as fortunate; Japan and Germany did not comply as closely with the humane standards. In August 1949, the international community in Geneva adopted further requirements that mandated humane treatment and full accountability for all prisoners of war from the point of capture until release, repatriation, or death. During the Korean and Vietnam wars, American and Allied prisoners were severely mistreated by their captors, while the US Army abided in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. In contrast, Korean Communist prisoners of war were managed well by Coalition forces during the Korean War despite some issues with revolts by communist enemy prisoners of war. Prisoners captured by US forces during the Vietnam War were turned over to the Government of Vietnam.¹⁴ With this history in mind, the Coalition

forces planned for and executed the massive effort to deal with tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers who surrendered.

During the Desert Shield/Desert Storm time period, all US military specialized enemy prisoner of war capability existed in the Army National Guard and US Army Reserve due to their required skillsets and certifications.¹⁵ This decision was made by the Secretary of the Army, who was acting as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for administrating the Department of Defense Enemy Prisoner of War and Detainee Program and tasked those forces within the Department of the Army.¹⁶ These Reserve and National Guard military police units trained to accomplish their mission for multiple years throughout the 1980s. When war broke out in 1990, these units that had been properly trained and mostly consisted of civilian police and law enforcement personnel; they were more than ready to accomplish their mission with precision and professionalism despite the massive numbers of Iraqi enemy prisoners of war.

Desert Shield and Desert Storm 1990/1991

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and elements from three Iraqi Republican Guard divisions invaded the small southern border country of Kuwait. Four days later, the first US Army and Coalition soldiers arrived in Saudi Arabia to begin planning Operation Desert Shield to deter further Iraqi aggression beyond the Kuwaiti border, fully defend Saudi Arabia, enforce the approved United Nations (UN) sanctions, and develop a future offensive capability to liberate the country of Kuwait.¹⁷

Almost five months later, after numerous UN diplomatic envoy pleas for Saddam Hussein to peacefully withdraw from Kuwait and abide by UN Security Council's Resolutions without condition, the United States and its other thirty-five Arab and non-Arab Coalition allies attacked to liberate Kuwait.¹⁸

At 0230 Baghdad time on 17 January 1991, Coalition allies began Operation Desert Storm by conducting allied airstrikes on major enemy military targets in Iraq and Kuwait.¹⁹ Coalition air forces gained complete air supremacy then turned their attention to preparing the battlefield for the ground campaign. This preparation included attacking Iraqi ground forces established in prepared defenses, logistical assets, and any ground command and control assets identified by intelligence forces. While this air campaign continued, Coalition forces were postured to begin the Desert Storm ground campaign.²⁰ In thirty-nine days, thousands of allied and Coalition airstrikes overwhelmed the Iraqi air defense systems and pounded Iraqi airfields, command control centers, missile sites, and chemical stor-

age plants. Many of Saddam Hussein's key communication and economic systems were demolished.²¹

While these kinetic strikes continued, the Coalition forces launched significant psychological operations (PSYOP) led by the 8th Psychological Operations Task Force (POTF). The 8th POTF developed the "Burning Hawk" PSYOP campaign plan.²² Initial Desert Storm PSYOP products included air-dropped pamphlets with messages such as "peace not war," "time is running out," and even "Saddam has betrayed you." Following those initial efforts, the focus turned to enticing Iraqi forces to desert or defect. At the same time, deception efforts created the impression that the Coalition's main attack would come from the Gulf.²³

Meanwhile, the US and Coalition decisive strategic air campaign completely paralyzed the Iraqi Army by attacking targets that severed Saddam's control over his regime and all of his armed forces. Iraqi soldiers and leaders were encouraged to rebel against Saddam's regime and overthrow his dictatorship or completely surrender.²⁴ PSYOP efforts supported this campaign with continued leaflet and loudspeaker operations led by the 8th POTF.

Coalition airpower hammered Iraqi forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations from the beginning of the war, destroying whatever willingness Iraqi soldiers might have had to fight a ground battle with the kind of tenacity they had displayed during the Iran-Iraq War.²⁵ The combination of massive airpower, leaflets, and loudspeaker operations created a PSYOP environment that resulted in large numbers of Iraqi soldiers deserting and defecting before the beginning of the ground campaign, to include the capitulation of an entire battalion-sized unit before G-Day.²⁶

On 24 February 1991, US and Coalition land forces launched a 100-hour offensive that destroyed Iraqi Forces at every turn. The air war effectiveness substantially enhanced the success of the short-duration land campaign.²⁷ The 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions and the Arabic-Islamic Joint Forces Command attacked toward Kuwait City. Meanwhile, the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Armored Corps conducted a left hook deep into Iraqi territory to cut off and destroy Iraqi forces on the western flank as well as forces attempting to flee Kuwait. At 0800 on 28 February 1991, exactly 100 hours from the time the ground operations began and six weeks after the start of Operation Desert Storm, all US and Coalition forces suspended combat operations, bringing the war with Iraq to an end. During the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm, Coalition troops destroyed 3,700 Iraqi tanks, 2,600 artillery pieces, and 2,400 other armored vehicles.²⁸ The fourth-largest army in the world had been driven out of Kuwait and completely defeated.²⁹ Iraqi

divisions were either destroyed, captured, or rendered combat-ineffective; 69,822 enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), the largest number of prisoners taken and interned by the United States since World War II, were captured by US forces and turned over to Saudi control.³⁰

How the Americans Treated Iraqi Enemy Prisoners of War

The Coalition’s relentless air campaign was coupled with PSYOP leaflets and loudspeaker messages reinforcing that Iraqis would be treated humanely if they surrendered instead of fighting.³¹ In contrast, Iraqi military leaders formed discipline squads to kill any soldier who chose to desert as opposed to fighting.³² To reinforce the PSYOP messages, Coalition troops



Figure 4.1. This leaflet, which was part of the Coalition’s Desert Storm psychological operations campaign, shows the Joint Forces seal and twenty-seven Coalition flags with a drawing showing an Iraqi soldier thinking of himself dead on the battlefield with the message: “To stay here means death.” Created by US Central Command.

built model enemy prisoner of war camps to demonstrate that the Saudis planned to treat Iraqi soldiers as guests.³³

As noted previously, the Coalition captured more than 80,000 Iraqi soldiers within just 100 hours because of the combined efforts. Fortunately for the enemy prisoners of war, Coalition forces had planned and prepared for expeditious processing at facilities in the rear; Saudi troops were responsible for running and managing the camps. The Geneva Conventions require enemy prisoners of war to be housed in facilities similar to those provided to the capturing nation's soldiers; as a result, many Iraqis lived in better conditions while imprisoned than while serving in the Iraqi Army.³⁴ Even with the large volume of captured soldiers coupled with the speed of the advance, there were no reported or known instances of prisoner maltreatment or misconduct by Coalition forces.³⁵ The International Committee of the Red Cross noted in April 1991: "The treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war by US forces was the best compliance with the Geneva Convention by any nation in any conflict in history."³⁶ On more than one occasion, captured Iraqis were so eager to reach the holding facilities that they volunteered to drive, supporting the backhaul mission.³⁷




Figure 4.2. Map showing opening situation for G-Day, 24 February 1991. From Brig Gen. Robert Scales et al., *Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, 1993).

Conclusion

The mass Iraqi Army surrenders demonstrated that the US Army profession of 1990 was built on expertise, comprehensive training, continuous professional military education, and a professional ethic, underpinning the highly respected reputation that US soldiers enjoy today. That reputation from Operation Desert Storm was hard-won; the American soldier was expected to treat every enemy prisoner with dignity and respect. The CENT-COM planning coupled with whole of government agreements established with the Saudi Arabian government set the standard for the world on how to handle potential enemy prisoners of war.

The integrated campaign plan set the conditions for enemy prisoner of war procedures and infrastructure. While PSYOP efforts encouraged Iraqi soldiers to desert, the air campaign destroyed Iraqi forces, logistical support, and ultimately soldier morale. Iraqi soldiers surrendered in droves expecting that Coalition forces would treat them fairly and humanely—an expectation that was met from the time of capture to repatriation, which was completed on 23 August 1991. In the end, 13,418 of the 86,743 enemy prisoners of war refused repatriation; the Saudi government managed their and integration within other Arab nations.³⁸




Figure 4.3. This Desert Storm leaflet shows prisoners eating together after surrendering to Coalition troops. Printed in Arabic on the back was a message from the Commander, Joint Forces in the Theater of Operations: “You are invited to join the Joint Forces and enjoy full Arab hospitality, security, safety, and medical care. . . . My brother Iraqi soldier . . . this invitation is open to you and your comrade soldiers. We hope you will accept this invitation as soon as you have an opportunity.” From Center of Military History (CMH) Publication 70-30-1, *The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1995).

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38. Department of Defense, 587.

Army Ethic Principle 4

C. Anthony Pfaff

*We lead by example in being competent and demonstrating courage by doing what is right despite risk, uncertainty, and fear; we candidly express our professional judgment to subordinates, peers, and superiors.*¹

Army professionals always lead by example. That is why it is important for them to ensure their example is a good one. To lead by *good* example, they must maintain the personal attributes of physical, intellectual, and spiritual fitness requisite to the demands of the profession and which, when emulated, build trust in the organization. To understand what those attributes are and how they are acquired, one must start with the moral purpose that the profession serves.

The *kind* of professional who is best able to protect the Army's professional status is well expressed in the *Army Officer Manual of 1917*, written just as the Army was establishing its professional status. Under the heading of the "How to Make Yourself Useful," the manual characterized that an effective Army officer "through zeal, energy, enthusiasm, patience, and persistence, stamps everything he does with his personality, making it individual and distinct" and "is the one who, in the Army like in every other field of human endeavor, will succeed."²

As discussed, part of setting a good example as a professional is the candid expression of one's expert judgment, even when such comments are unwelcome. This obligation, however, cannot be satisfied by simply providing what one believes is the best advice. Because the stakes are high in war, professionalism also requires cultivating and maintaining trust relationships so that advice is at least taken seriously, if not heeded. Those trust relationships did not exist between the Johnson Administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) during the Vietnam War. Much of that mistrust developed because the JCS often could not, as a group, agree on courses of action. Even when they did agree, individuals often offered courses of action that were not politically acceptable, given international as well as domestic constraints.³ Managing civil-military relations is a critical skill for the professional more so than the civilian leadership, because civilian leadership is the client whom the military professional serves. Thus, blame for the failure of the civil-military dialogue lies just as much, if not more, with the JCS than the administration.

Of course, maintaining trust relationships is never as simple as having the good intention to serve. Military operations, even in peacetime, are often conducted in complex, competitive, and high-stake environments. Such environments give rise to uncertainty; superiors, subordinates, and peers will not always share the same professional judgments about what to do and how to act under particular circumstances. Making things more complicated, civilian leadership is not always receptive to the advice, as was the case for the Johnson Administration. Offering advice or making a decision under such circumstances can require a great deal of courage—both moral and physical—as well as expertise. Maintaining the Army’s jurisdiction—and the autonomy that goes with it—under such circumstances requires the kind of trust that enables the candid expression of professional judgment.

In Chapter 5, Lt. Col. Matthew R. Thom provides a portrayal of Col. David Hughes, who repeatedly led by example during combat operations in the Korean War. What makes Hughes’ story powerful, and instructive, is that he took command of a unit that previously suffered from poor management at the Army level, including an annual rotation policy that encouraged a reluctance to fight. How he overcame the dual challenges of poor readiness and bad policy is an apt example for today’s US Army, which also faces a number of difficult budget and other challenges that will impact its readiness to fight large-scale combat operations.

Notes

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Chapter 5

The Peak of Morality: Guiding Our Principles in Combat

Lt. Col. Matthew R. Thom

The Korean War was a large-scale combat operation that came on the heels of World War II—after the US Army had significantly reduced its combat force. Readiness and training were issues for Eighth Army troops who deployed from their mission in Japan to help the Koreans as they were being attacked by North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) and Chinese forces. Leaders straight out of school were sent to fill the gaps without the benefit of the follow-on training and education that molds young leaders into their military specialties. US forces suffered tremendous losses fighting in rugged terrain against a numerically superior enemy. Leaders at every level were put to the test physically, mentally, and morally. For example, David Hughes of Denver, Colorado, emerged as a leader who adopted, lived by, and upheld the moral principles of the Army ethic. The decisions he made while serving in Korea, and specifically while on Hill 347, were not only what produced the greatest good for the greatest number; he demonstrated courage by doing what was right despite risk, uncertainty, and fear. Oftentimes, the instances that make the headlines are the ones where leaders do not make the right decision. This operation was different and highlighted what right looks like morally and ethically.

Korean War and Readiness

In June 1950, the United States entered a war on the Korean Peninsula. The Korean War came less than five years after the end of World War II, and post-war demobilization had significant impacts on US Army training and readiness. The Army had reduced in size from more than eight million soldiers in 1945 to just over half a million by the start of the Korean War, half of them stationed overseas. US troops were focused primarily in Europe against the threat of Soviet Union expansion, with other troops postured in Asia to deter potential attacks on strategic strongpoints within Soviet Union reach. This put the already limited number of US forces further away from the Korean Peninsula. The National Security Act of 1947 dramatically changed the US Armed Forces, separating the Air Force from the Army, codifying the service chiefs as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and creating the position known as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹ By June 1950, the active Army had an authorized strength of 630,201, with an actual strength of about 591,000 and ten combat divisions.²

On 25 June 1950, without any warning, the NKPA attacked Republic of Korea (ROK) forces along the 38th Parallel. North Korea intended to seize Seoul, the capital of South Korea, as quickly as possible to capitalize on an ill-prepared South Korean defense. Responding to the sudden attack, the United Nations sent aid to the ROK Army, which was numerically inferior to the NKPA. While a significant number of United Nations countries participated, almost all the support came from US forces. Naval and air support were immediately shifted to provide aid, and by the end of June, US Eighth Army ground forces began arriving on the Korean Peninsula. The first division was the 24th Infantry Division followed shortly by the 1st Cavalry Division. As the initial division called upon to help, the 24th Infantry Division was augmented with 15 officers and 732 enlisted men from 1st Cavalry Division; this further reduced 1st Cavalry Division's total combat power, which was already a third understrength because they lacked third battalions in each of their infantry regiments and third batteries in their artillery battalions.³ By late 1950, Communist China entered the war to support the NKPA against US and United Nations forces on the ground.

The 1st Cavalry Division includes Custer's 7th US Cavalry Regiment "GARRYOWEN." The 7th US Cavalry Regiment suffered like many other units across the US Army during the post-World War II demobilization. They performed their post-war occupation duties effectively but had difficulty maintaining combat readiness and capability; in June 1950, they were thrown into South Korea as an American infantry unit to temporarily halt the Communist tide.⁴ A few months later, West Point graduate David Hughes joined the 7th Cavalry Regiment, beginning his career as an infantry officer . . . by fire.

Lieutenant Hughes and Company K, 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry

Col. David Hughes of Denver, Colorado, graduated from West Point as part of the class of 1950. Like many graduates from 1949 to 1951, he was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant infantry officer and immediately went to Korea to join the fight. The Korean terrain was an expanse of hills, streams, and mountains that restricted vehicles to roads and required boots on the ground, primarily infantrymen, for most of the fighting. Because of the need for infantry officers, Hughes did not have access to follow-on training available to many prior infantry officers, such as the Infantry Branch Basic Course, Airborne School, and specialty schools designed to help prepare them for combat overseas. When the Korean War broke out, the US Army was ill-prepared; West Point's 1950 graduates were called off their leave to join deploying units in Japan and South Korea without

the benefit of any additional schooling.⁵ In his legacy memoirs, Hughes wrote how he would “soak up” the valuable tactical lessons from his company commander in his early days in Korea and apply instruction from his West Point history courses in what became his “Real Infantry School.”⁶ One lesson was on marching fire, a technique in which volume of fire was more significant than accuracy; everyone fires in mass at the area where the enemy is likely to be, preventing them from returning well-aimed fire.⁷ This mass of fire suppresses the enemy, preventing them from having effective fire and allowing effective maneuver against them to seize terrain. Hughes’s remembered lessons on marching fire would certainly be used in future battles during the Korean conflict, accentuated by the terrain as well as the need to fight a dug-in enemy.

When he arrived in Korea, Hughes was assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Company K, which was the lead company during the breakout of the Pusan Perimeter.⁸ He filled an empty position as platoon leader. Hughes quickly became familiar with the platoon history and learned two things: his predecessor had been fired, and his platoon was not well-regarded. About half the members were “jailbirds,” soldiers who had been released from jails around Fort Benning, Georgia, if they agreed to deploy to Korea.⁹ Fresh out of West Point and in charge of the “Jailbird” platoon, Hughes leaned heavily on his knowledge and understanding of leadership as he developed in infantry combat. His leadership skills and morals would help him be successful during the campaign.

Hughes’s first real combat leadership test was in the early winter of 1951. North of Seoul, offensive operations were ongoing. Company K was charged with clearing ridgelines, pushing forward to determine what Chinese defenses looked like both in strength and location along the ridges. The platoons would move through each other along the ridges under the overwatch and mortar cover fire of the company headquarters. Hughes and his platoon passed through the 3rd Platoon and moved along the ridgeline as best they could, with steep slopes on both sides. Because of the steep slopes and heavy equipment each infantryman carried, formations usually traveled in a column, or single file. Movement was very slow, especially when passing through another unit. Soon after passing through, Hughes and his soldiers received fire from further up the ridgeline. He developed a plan to attack the position but immediately had problems because two of his squads were not firing and maneuvering on the enemy position. Hughes was frustrated because he couldn’t get his platoon to move and the Chinese could develop an advantage over them at any moment.¹⁰ Peter Kindsvatter, author of *American Soldier: Ground Combat in the World*

Wars, Korea, & Vietnam, noted that Korean War GIs saw personal survival as the only goal of any importance.¹¹ Soldiers in the Korean War, many of whom were fighting for the first time, had seen fellow soldiers severely wounded and killed in similar attacks. To help overcome their reluctance, Hughes personally charged up the hill under the cover of 3rd squad fire and neutralized the three-man Chinese machine gun position below a parapet; other enemy in the area ran away to the next ridge without firing back.¹² Hughes showed his platoon the type of leader he was and earned the respect of his company commander and first sergeant. He was later awarded a Silver Star for his actions on the ridge that day.



Figure 5.1. The Korean War, 24 January to 8 July 1951. From “The Korean War: Phase 4,” US Army Center of Military History.

Hughes led numerous more assaults over the next few months, continually building trust in his platoon and his leadership. His soldiers began seeing him as a leader who leads from the front and would not ask others to do anything he would not be willing to do himself. As platoon members gained confidence in their leader, the unit became much more cohesive in future assaults. Hughes suffered losses, and not all of his platoon's missions were successful. As with long conflicts, experienced officers were promoted and moved to positions of greater responsibility, and other soldiers and leaders rotated back stateside for a year. This caused some gaps with the amount of combat experience at any given time in the combat units; young leaders had to build trust with the men in their unit. When Hughes arrived as a brand-new platoon leader, he had no combat experience; in contrast, his platoon was already in country and had been in combat for some time. This was not dissimilar to when company commanders changed out in country. Through their time in combat under the same company commander, Hughes's platoon had become a cohesive unit, understanding how its leaders thought and fought. When a new 1st Cavalry assistant division commander arrived, Hughes was tapped to be his aide-de-camp; although Hughes had less than a year of commissioned service in the Army, he had gained a significant amount of combat experience.¹³ Hughes did not like being away from the line but did his job as an aide, helping to familiarize the brigadier general with the unit and what was going on in country. Hughes spent about a month as the aide then found his way back to the line.¹⁴

After less than a year in Korea and a few days rest and recuperation, Hughes returned to Company K, but this time as the company commander. He commanded up to 200 men, some with combat experience and others as new fillers.¹⁵ As commander, Hughes directed numerous combat operations prior to his and his company's biggest test, Hill 339.¹⁶ On 28 September 1951, Hughes's company was attacked by an enemy battalion. The enemy overran the company defensive position, severing all lines of communication and splitting the company into three groups, resulting in complete disruption.¹⁷ Hughes commanded through the night, reorganizing as necessary and leading small groups of men to attack enemy strongpoints and repel the enemy until daylight. As a result of his courageous actions, the company defensive perimeter was maintained. Lieutenant Hughes earned a second Silver Star for his gallantry.¹⁸

Hill 347 "Bloody Baldy"

Less than a week after the defense of Hill 339, with a company suffering from casualties, Hughes received orders to attack and seize Hill

347, named “Bloody Baldy.” This hill was the final objective of Objective Commando, planned by the Eighth Army; the efforts would complete a line of defense, push the Chinese armies back, and put pressure on the North Korean Truce delegation.¹⁹ Already short on manpower, Hughes and Company K made three attempts to take Hill 347 against a dug-in Chinese enemy, each time losing more soldiers and eventually all of his officers. Then Hughes recognized a flaw in their efforts: the men were not charging past the trenches then turning and working down from above; this allowed the enemy to fight from their four-foot trenches with what seemed to be an unlimited supply of grenades, while protected from the direct fire coming from below.²⁰ The men were becoming suppressed by the enemy direct fire, pinning them to the ground and preventing any sort of progress in assaulting up the hill. Not maneuvering was putting them at additional risk to indirect fire and grenades being thrown from the hill above resulting in more casualties.

In the fourth and final attempt, Hughes took the last of Company K and some attached South Korean soldiers, and assaulted the hill using the marching fire approach he had learned early on in his Korean War experience. On 7 October 1951, he ordered the remaining thirty-seven men to get above the trench lines by using marching fire—firing at everything that moved and throwing grenades into the tunnels and trenches.²¹ Hughes charged up the hill, advancing toward the enemy positions, firing his weapon until he was out of ammunition and then throwing grenades. Seeing the effectiveness of his assault and the effects it was having on the enemy, his men charged up the hill after him, engaging the enemy. Imbued with Hughes’s fearlessness, the friendly troops fought their way over the crest of the hill, inflicting heavy casualties on the foe and securing the objective.²² Hughes had no idea why his unit and the others before them had so much trouble seizing Hill 347 and why the Chinese had held out so long defending it. The reason: his troops had captured a Chinese division and regimental artillery headquarters, their supplies, and a reinforced battalion of Chinese defending it.²³ Hughes was later awarded a Distinguished Service Cross for his assault on Hill 347.

The psychological effect of the relentless attack by Hughes and the men of Company K eventually caused the Chinese fighters to surrender. When the fighting died down, one of Hughes’s soldiers who spoke some Chinese called for their surrender. The Chinese eventually came out of their tunnels and trenches; 192 enemy soldiers were squatting in a circle on the top of the hill, with only fifteen armed men from Company K left to guard them.²⁴ Emotions after the hard assault up the hill and the loss of

so many men started to take a toll on Hughes's soldiers. Some of the men were concerned as to how they could guard so many enemy troops. At one point a sergeant suggested they would be better off to just kill the Chinese prisoners than guard them for the long walk back down to the military police; soon after, one of Hughes's soldiers shouted, "Let's kill them all!"²⁵

Hughes, a leader with an embedded sense of right and wrong, admonished the sergeant and immediately told his men they would not shoot the prisoners. He did not say it was because of the Geneva Convention or because a manual told him not to; Hughes said shooting them would be wrong and went against what he believed morally and what he was entrusted to do by the commander in chief.²⁶ Hughes understood the moral rules to prevent physical harm and protect the vulnerable, do unto others what you would have done to you, and respect authority. Hughes and his meager troops successfully marched the 192 Chinese prisoners down that hill to waiting trucks that were two miles away. They walked in the dark, with no further incident, adhering to the other rules of being loyal and respecting sanctity. On the hill that day, Hughes displayed the moral principles expected of him as a leader. Despite all his unit had been through, Hughes had the courage and a strong enough moral compass to adhere to all five of the main moral rules laid out by US psychologist Jonathan Haidt:

- Prevent physical harm; we protect the vulnerable and restrain our violent impulses—and those of others.
- Do unto others what you would have done to you—the universal moral principle.
- Respect authority; we defer to those who hold social power—and protect those who depend on us.
- Be loyal, which leads us to protect the interests of our family or the groups we identify with most strongly.
- Respect sanctity; follow shared rituals and rules for living properly.²⁷

Moral Principles in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Army leaders serve as role models through strong intellect, physical presence, professional competence, and moral character.²⁸ Hughes was a role model on the hill that day by setting an example through his moral and ethical behavior. Had he allowed the sergeant to incite the unit to act on their emotions and kill the prisoners, Hughes could have set back the operation, potentially eliminating the unit's success by capturing the hill. In this type of large-scale combat operation, killing prisoners would create an anticipation regarding how Americans treat prisoners of war (POWs),

resulting in adverse effects in future conflicts as well as in the Korean War. Additionally, his small unit's actions would have resonated across the home front, creating a negative public opinion of the Army. In addition to setting an example for his US soldiers, Hughes demonstrated moral and ethical behavior to the South Korean soldiers with them on the hill that day.

As trusted Army professionals, soldiers must serve the nation honorably and with character. According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*: "In war and peace, we recognize the intrinsic dignity and worth of all people, treating them with respect."²⁹ Hughes recognized the value of ethical behavior and demonstrated consideration of all people. He did not tolerate the mistreatment of the prisoners. ADP 6-22 also explains that the Army ethic is the "Heart of the Army" and includes the moral principles that guide Army decisions and actions as soldiers support and defend the Constitution and the American way of life.³⁰

Across the conflict continuum from peace to war, military operations change to achieve or contribute to national objectives. Large-scale combat operations are major operations and campaigns aimed at defeating an enemy's armed forces and military capabilities in support of national objectives.³¹ During the period after World War II, operations changed from large-scale combat operations to more security cooperation and crisis response operations. With the onset of the Korean War, the United States once again found itself in another large-scale combat operation, but with significantly less boots on the ground. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, notes that Army forces must be organized, trained, and equipped to meet worldwide challenges against a full range of threats.³² The assault on Hill 347 was a huge undertaking; though Hughes's men may not have been the best organized, trained, or equipped, their fight was part of a larger campaign being executed. Hughes and his company had two large assaults within a week of each other in support of this campaign, resulting in massive attrition due to injuries and death. With the seizure of Hill 347, and the decision to prevent his men from killing the prisoners, Hughes had no negative impact on the Army's larger national objectives. The 7th Cavalry Division's campaign went on to be successful; one bad decision might have had a severe adverse effect on that end result.

Large-scale combat operations are complex, and future battlefields will be more complex than anything the United States has seen thus far. The flow of information during the Korean War was nothing compared to recent conflicts, and that challenge will only increase in conflicts to

come. In future large-scale combat operations across multiple domains, leader decisions will be judged in near real time. David D. Van Fleet and Gary A. Yukl, respected authors on leadership and management, summarized that leadership in the future battlefield “will not be the same as before, and the optimal pattern of behaviors and skills is likely to change to some extent.”³³ As noted in FM 3-0, Army operations take place in the most complex of environments; propaganda, deception, disinformation, and the ability of individuals and groups to influence disparate populations through social technologies reflect the increased speed of human interaction.³⁴ Technology reinforces the importance of moral and ethical principles. Today’s conflicts include social media, imbedded journalists, and unmanned autonomous systems. Future conflicts will be dominated in the cyber and space domains, with real-time recording and transmission of decisions that soldiers and leaders with boots on the ground are making. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, projects that the emerging operational environment will be a contested information environment in which US dominance is not assured.³⁵ Shots will be heard around the world as they happen.

Future large-scale combat operations across multiple domains will involve even more risk and uncertainty, and inherently more fear because of it. Technology and information flow will change over time—requiring Army leaders to develop knowledge, skills, and behaviors to adapt accordingly. Leaders of the future will be required to embrace and uphold the Army ethic, and the Army profession. By developing a strong moral foundation, leaders will drive the decisions they are faced with, regardless of how complex the future battlefield looks.

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SECTION II
ARMY EXPERTS

Army Experts Introduction

C. Anthony Pfaff

Effective warfare has always required skill. However, for much of the US Army's history, what mattered most was individual fighting skills. This point was true even for leaders, whose effectiveness was more often a matter of personality than specialized knowledge of tactics, operations, or strategy. As political scientist Samuel Huntington observed, it was not until the Napoleonic Wars that military leaders acquired a technique to distinguish themselves from laymen.¹ As a result, up until the Civil War, the US military saw little need for specialized military education beyond what was offered at West Point. In fact, the curriculum at West Point—which until the Naval Academy was founded in 1845 was the only professional military education institution in the United States—was dominated by civil engineering more than military science.²

Moreover, soldiers were expected—at least to some extent—to develop individual fighting skills on their own.³ Leadership, on the other hand, was typically restricted to members of a certain class. As discussed previously, the class preference has been increasingly less the case since Napoleon.⁴ This is not to say that individual military skills were not important or did not require significant commitment to master. However, as Europe learned from its seventeenth century reliance on mercenaries, effective warfighting requires more than just highly skilled fighters.⁵

As author Sarah Percy observed, the disconnect between military capability and political cause undermined civic unity even as it preserved the community. This disconnect arose for two reasons. First, profit motivated bad behavior, such as extortion and robbery; undermined trust; and built genuine resentment for the mercenary forces among those they were paid to defend. Second, their existence displaced citizen support for the state. Using mercenaries not only undermined the legitimacy of particular wars, it also undermined the legitimacy of the state that employed them.⁶

This does not mean that professional militaries should not rely on outside expertise when appropriate. However, professional militaries must maintain connection with the societies they defend. Otherwise, they will lack the moral legitimacy necessary to gain the social commitment necessary for successful warfighting. According to Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession*, professional expertise is “the ethical design, generation, support, and application of landpower, primari-

ly in unified land operations, and all supporting capabilities essential to accomplish the mission in defense of the American people.”⁷⁷ Thus, any outside expertise should complement, but not replace, that of professionals.

The inclusion of the word “ethical” here is important. In the “just war” tradition, military necessity is often treated as a practical matter that war-fighting norms are meant to restrain. As Walzer observed: “Belligerent armies are entitled to try to win their wars, but they are not entitled to do anything that is or seems to them necessary to win.”⁷⁸ Viewed this way, military necessity, as well as the underlying competency that gives rise to particular applications, is a permission, not an obligation. This view fails, however, to fully account for the fact that fighting for a just cause requires a moral imperative to defeat the enemy. This imperative morally compels military commanders to try *something*. They do not have the option of walking away because of the moral risk that warfare entails.

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Army Ethic Principle 5

C. Anthony Pfaff

*We do our duty, leading and following with discipline, sacrificing when necessary, striving for excellence, putting the needs of others above our own, and accomplishing the mission as a team.*¹

Duty is what persons have a right to expect from each other. Moreover, duties are universal: anyone in similar circumstances would have recognizable obligations, regardless of other considerations.² Of course, having a right to expect from another can stem from the roles the individuals choose to assume. For example, if a man or woman is drowning in dangerous waters, I am not expected to risk my life to save that person *unless* I had the requisite lifeguard training.³ I may try; however, that act would be supererogatory and not a matter of duty.

German philosopher Immanuel Kant identified two kinds of basic moral duties from which other obligations originate. The first is to promote, where possible, the happiness of others. The second is to cultivate personal capacities to better identify and act on one's obligations. These duties apply to all persons; however, as noted above, different contexts give rise to specific expressions. For the Army professional, the obligation to promote the happiness of others is expressed in the obligation to support and defend the Constitution, which includes an obligation to risk one's life and sacrifice well-being when necessary.⁴ Volunteering to be a soldier may be heroic; however, soldiers are expected to act in ways that would be heroic for most anyone outside the profession.

By cultivating warfighting competencies, soldiers fulfill a professional, if not moral, imperative. More to the point, Army leaders do this not just for themselves, but for the institution as well. These competencies involve balancing the imperative to accomplish the mission with the due care owed to noncombatants and fellow soldiers as well. Military necessity must not only be in service to a just cause; it also must be balanced against noncombatant immunity and force protection. More than simply defeating the enemy, a military action must conform to the principles of discrimination and proportionality, ensuring the lowest cost in blood and treasure. Lt. Gen. (Retired) James Dubik commented that commanders are "bound not to waste their [soldiers'] lives, that is not to persist in battles whose cost overwhelm their military values."⁵

Duty, however, should not be confused with obedience. In *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*, author Anthony E. Hartle referred to

this confusion as a “serious failing” for Army professionals. While their *prima facie* duty is to fulfill the functional imperative of the profession, as stated earlier, the soldier’s professional ethic is informed by more than just the requirements of military effectiveness. So when orders, whatever their source, conflict with those broader norms and values, the soldier is required to question them. As Hartle stated: “Such questioning is itself based on the requirements of the duty principle, because duty for the American military professional is not simply a commitment to subordinate personal and other interests to those of national security.”⁶ Rather, military professionals must maintain a particular value structure, as expressed in the Constitution, not just for the Army but for the society they serve.⁷

In Chapter 6, Col. Paul E. Berg and Lt. Col. (Retired) Robert J. Rielly analyze the “Peers Report,” which investigated the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War. The report reviewed whether soldiers fulfilled their duties and the conditions that facilitated this mass murder of unarmed children, women, and elderly men. Every leader is responsible to address similar conditions in their units; failure to do so entails complicity in any resulting crimes. More recent abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib and the killing of unarmed civilians at Haditha demonstrated that some Army leaders still fail to grasp this concept.

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Chapter 6

The Moral Courage Paradox: The Peers Report and My Lai

Col. Paul E. Berg and Lt. Col. (Retired) Robert J. Rielly

*The Army Profession is unique because of its responsibilities related to the ethical application of violence on a large scale on behalf of the Nation.*¹

According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, all members of the Army “aspire to achieve the Army Values professionally and personally . . . This is an enormous responsibility and the people of the United States require the Army to adhere to its values and represent their interests across the range of military operations.”² These values are embedded in the US Army’s oath of enlistment and oath of office for all soldiers who volunteer to support and defend the constitution of the United States of America. In today’s Army, leaders must study and reflect on inappropriate past actions in order to uphold their moral responsibility and be proactive to prevent atrocities and immoral violence against both the enemy and civilians.

War crimes are combat actions that violate international humanitarian laws (like the Geneva Convention) or known treaties—incurring individual criminal responsibility for actions against soldiers, detainees, or civilians. While commanders believe their organization could never be involved in a war crime, they would be wise to study the findings of one inquiry conducted more than fifty years ago into a regrettable and tragic event in American military history: The My Lai Massacre.³ The results of the Peers Report inquiry into My Lai are critically important to understand both combat today and in the future. The report offers commanders and leaders suggestions on how to monitor and assess units to identify potential for a future war crime.⁴ During World War II, the American public was aware that Japanese soldiers committed atrocities, as did German and Russian soldiers. US soldiers certainly have the potential to commit war crimes in future wars if preemptive measures are not taken to prevent such actions.⁵

My Lai Massacre Overview

On 16 March 1968, an American infantry platoon murdered more than 500 unarmed women, children, and old men.⁶ The Americal Division covered up the massacre and might have been successful hiding it from the American people had it not been for Chief Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, who first witnessed the actions while flying over My Lai, and

Specialist Ron Ridenhour, who heard details from friends who participated in the event.

The 16 March 1968 My Lai Massacre represents a professional and leadership failure. Fifty years later, this scar on the US Army's profession still requires examination. While multiple factors contributed to this mass murder, the most important factors were shortcomings in values, leadership, and unit cohesion. Most Army professional military education courses wrongly conclude that the fault belongs with the poor performance of a rogue platoon and, ultimately, the platoon leader, Lt. William Calley. That interpretation misses critical factors concerning the organization, its leadership, and the war—factors that require further review.

Thompson, the pilot of an OH-23 Raven helicopter that flew over My Lai, was the first officer to file a formal report on the day of the massacre. Thompson made several attempts to save unarmed villagers by landing his helicopter between the US soldiers and their captives.⁷ He coordinated several cargo helicopters to ferry villagers to safety. His report and the internal investigation results, however, never made it to the division commander or out of Vietnam; they did not come to light until two years after the event.⁸

Specialist Ridenhour, a helicopter crewman assigned to the brigade during My Lai, reported the events in letters to President Richard Nixon, US senators and representatives, and senior Pentagon officials—a year after the massacre and following his discharge from the Army.⁹ Though Ridenhour's letters prompted a short investigation almost a year after the massacre, there was little movement until *Life* and *Time* magazines published graphic color photographs in December 1969—catapulting the massacre to national attention.¹⁰

My Lai and C/1-20th Infantry

Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, was by all accounts a normal unit before the March 1968 My Lai incident. Formed in 1966 in Hawaii, the battalion trained for nine months before deploying to Vietnam. The soldiers had conducted jungle search and destroy combat operations against the Viet Cong's guerrilla warfare for three months prior to My Lai.¹¹ In January 1967, Charlie Company was selected as one of the best companies in the brigade and became part of an ad hoc battalion called Task Force Barker.¹² After their training in Hawaii and three months of successful combat missions, Charlie Company had become a cohesive unit.¹³

The company commander, Capt. Ernest Medina, was perceived as a strong, effective leader who took care of his men.¹⁴ A disciplinarian,

he was respected by his men and built his company into a disciplined, combat-effective, well-trained unit with the will to fight and withstand the stress of combat.¹⁵ Over their three months of jungle combat search and destroy missions before My Lai, the company's soldiers had become highly stressed and frustrated due to mounting casualties and an elusive enemy.

On 15 March, the day before My Lai, the company held a memorial service for a sergeant recently killed in action. Captain Medina provided a motivating pep talk to his troops regarding their mission the next day, telling the company they would have the chance to fight the enemy and avenge their lost friends. Intelligence reported a high concentration of enemy in the village, and the local area was heavily populated with Viet Cong.¹⁶ The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Frank Barker, ordered the company to attack My Lai; after a fifteen-minute artillery barrage, helicopters dropped Company C northwest of the village. The landing zone was "cold" and quiet, with no enemy fire. The village was filled with local villagers; no enemy was present.

Shortly after they arrived, the soldiers started shooting any villagers who fled then grouping others together. The first platoon leader, Lt. William Calley, gave an order for his men to shoot all the villagers; if they refused, Calley did it for them.¹⁷ The soldiers threw grenades into bunkers where villagers were hiding, set fire to huts, shot villagers as they tried to flee, killed any animals, and even raped women before killing them. Specialist Vernado Simpson reported: "From shooting them, to cutting their throats, to scalping them, to cutting off their hands and cutting out their tongues."¹⁸ The American public was horrified by the reported atrocities.

Sgt. Ron Haeberle, an Army reporter assigned to cover the My Lai operation for the division, used two cameras to document the deaths, a military-issued black and white camera and his personal camera to shoot color photos.¹⁹ Then a week before his tour ended, Haeberle turned in the Army-issued camera with all the film but did not divulge to his supervisors that he had taken photos with his personal camera. The black and white photos were never published, but his personal photographs were the ones featured in *Life* and *Time* magazines.

In the end, four US Army officers and nine enlisted men were charged for their participation in the My Lai massacre and twelve additional officers for covering up what happened. Of the twenty-five charged, only five were tried, and four were acquitted.²⁰ On 29 March 1971, Calley was convicted of the premeditated murder of twenty-two Vietnamese civilians and sentenced to life imprisonment. President Nixon later changed the sen-

tence from prison to house arrest; then in 1974, the Secretary of the Army pardoned Calley after he had served three-and-a-half years.²¹

The Peers Inquiry and the Legal Investigation

After the first photos hit the mainstream news, the Secretary of the Army launched a formal inquiry into the events of 16 March 1968. In addition to a criminal investigation, the Army investigated additional areas associated with the operations that day.²² In November 1969, Army Chief of Staff General William C. Westmoreland selected Lt. Gen. William Peers to conduct an inquiry into My Lai to determine: 1) what had gone wrong with the reporting system, 2) why the commander of US forces in Vietnam had not been fully informed when the events occurred, and 3) whether the operation had been investigated.²³ General Westmoreland selected Peers because he was the chief of the Office of Reserve Components, had a reputation for objectivity and fairness, and had served in Vietnam as the 4th Infantry Division commander and the I Field Force commander. Additionally, Peers did not graduate from West Point; Westmoreland recognized that no one could accuse Peers of loyalty or favoritism to fellow West Point graduates.²⁴

In what became known as the Peers Inquiry, the Army was essentially investigating itself, its leadership, and how it conducted the war. Army leaders were opening themselves up to severe criticism from the public if the investigation was not handled properly. Peers initially explained to the members of the inquiry board:

No matter what any of us might feel, it [is] our job only to ascertain and report the facts, to let the chips fall where they may. It [is] not our job to determine innocence or guilt of individuals, nor be concerned about what effects the inquiry might have on the Army's image, or about the press or public's reaction to our proceedings.²⁵

Their investigation was under an abbreviated timeline from the start; the team had to finish within four months because many of the military offenses had a two-year statute of limitations.²⁶ Under Peers's leadership, the inquiry board completed its investigation in just under fourteen weeks—interviewing more than 400 witnesses, many of whom had separated from the service.²⁷

In the final report, the team compiled a “list of thirty people who had known of the killing of noncombatants and other serious offenses committed during the My Lai operation but had not made official reports, had suppressed relevant information, had failed to order an investigation, or had not followed up on the investigations that were made.”²⁸ They also

determined that only three Viet Cong were killed by helicopter gunners as they fled the village early in the operation, the Americans were never fired on, and the only US casualty was a soldier who shot himself in the foot so he would be evacuated because he could not stand the killing.²⁹

As the report was being finalized and the conclusions became evident, Peers asked inquiry board members to draw some conclusions as to why My Lai occurred.³⁰ Peers believed it was critically important to include findings explaining why and how the combat operation developed into a massacre. Peers believed this assessment was needed “to not only highlight the deficiencies in the My Lai operation but also to indicate some of the differences between this operation and those of other units in South Vietnam.”³¹ Peers also wanted to “point out problems of command and control that existed within the Army’s Americal Division, problems that would require vigorous corrective action by the Army in order to prevent repetition of such an incident in the future.”³²

In the recommendations chapter of its March 1970 report, the inquiry board identified thirteen factors that contributed to My Lai. This list provides today’s Army with a tool to help commanders assess their organizations and determine if soldiers or small units in their command might be inclined to commit war crimes. Peers subsequently narrowed the list to nine factors in his 1979 book, *The My Lai Inquiry*: 1) lack of proper training, 2) attitude toward the Vietnamese, 3) permissive attitude, 4) psychological factors, 5) organizational problems, 6) nature of the enemy, 7) plans and orders, 8) attitude of government officials and leaders, and 9) leadership.³³ These nine elements are explained in detail here.

Regarding Factor #1, lack of proper training, the Peers inquiry determined that “neither units nor individual members of Task Force Barker and the 11th Brigade received the proper training in the Law of War, the safeguarding of noncombatants, or the rules of engagement.”³⁴ The team determined the lack of training was due to an accelerated movement schedule, large turnover of personnel prior to deployment, and the continual arrival of soldiers who were new to the unit.³⁵ According to the report, training was conducted in a “lackadaisical” manner; while higher headquarters passed out pocket cards and memoranda, they never explained or reinforced the information.³⁶ Peers stated: “Some panel members thought the MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) policy of requiring soldiers to carry a variety of cards was nothing short of ludicrous. They might have served as reminders, but they were no substitute for instruction.”³⁷ Personal classroom instruction regarding the rules of warfare and conduct in combat were noticeably absent.

The inquiry report also concluded the unit did not complete ethics and morality training; training that was done was not as frequent as it should have been. Senior Army officers indicated that most training time was devoted to “hands on training, such as vehicles, communications and weapons, and advised that little time remained to teach morality and ethics, so they were pieced in. . . . Peers advised that ethics and morality training be given a higher priority.”³⁸ Army leaders cannot assume that soldiers in small units will develop appropriate values, beliefs, attitudes, and norms without specific ethical and values training. While training time is similarly limited in today’s Army, commanders must consistently conduct, integrate, and reinforce values and ethics training; keeping such key lessons current for soldiers requires constant regeneration.³⁹

On Factor #2, attitude toward the Vietnamese, the Peers report indicated soldiers had a poor attitude toward the local population. During operations, commanders should take notice if soldiers make racial or derogatory comments toward the local population and seem to treat the locals and enemy combatants as lower human beings.⁴⁰ To prevent this type of behavior, commanders must assess their organization’s beliefs, attitudes, and operating norms toward the enemy and the local population and prevent junior leaders from condoning a negative attitude toward the local population.⁴¹

Regarding Factor #3, permissive attitude, the Peers report included this comment: “The Americal Division and the 11th Brigade had strong, well-designed policies covering the handling of prisoners, the treatment of Vietnamese civilians, and the protection of their property. However, it was clear that there had been breakdowns in communicating and enforcing those policies.”⁴² The inquiry concluded that mishandling and rough treatment of prisoners did not start at My Lai but were present for months prior to the operation. In addition, commanders either allowed the unlawful treatment of prisoners and local populace or failed to discover it was occurring in their units; therefore, they tacitly approved the actions by not stopping them. The result was that such behavior quickly became part of the way the units operated, like a standard operating procedure.⁴³ Commanders at all levels must role model and, most importantly, set the proper climate for the organization by constantly assessing how their units are treating detainees, prisoners, and unarmed innocent civilians. In addition, commanders and leaders at all levels must clearly articulate acceptable behavior and continually reinforce that guidance to subordinates on a daily basis.

In addressing Factor #4, psychological factors, the report indicated Charlie Company soldiers frequently used the words “fear,” “apprehen-

sion,” and “keyed up” to describe their emotions during the massacre.⁴⁴ In addition, they were frustrated by the number of deaths and injuries from mines and booby traps, as well as their inability to establish any contact with the enemy. Because of this mounting frustration, commanders pressured units to “be more aggressive and close rapidly with the enemy.”⁴⁵ In an attempt to vindicate the high number of casualties, they enabled aggressive action toward the populace that was against the code of warfare or American ethics. Leaders must set a command climate that promotes open communication and monitors soldier attitudes to identify unhealthy levels of pressure and frustration.

The Peers inquiry also identified Factor #5, organizational problems, “at every level, from company through task force and brigade up to the Americal Division headquarters;” these problems could be found in every major unit in Vietnam.⁴⁶ Task Force Barker was an ad hoc battalion organization consisting of one company from each of the battalions assigned to the brigade; however, none of the companies had ever trained together or with the commander. The task force commander was actually the 11th Brigade operations officer (S3), who took his staff “out of hide” by pulling a minimum number of personnel out of the brigade. Peers opined that although organizational problems contributed, they could not be “cited as the principal cause.”⁴⁷ To alleviate potential problems associated with an ad hoc organizational unit structure, commanders should assess the climate and culture of any newly assigned organization and inculcate them into the new climate and culture.⁴⁸

In the Vietnam War, it was always difficult to distinguish combatants from noncombatants, contributing to Factor #6, nature of the enemy. Peers stated: “It could be fairly well assumed that every male of military age was a VC [Viet Cong] of some form or another.”⁴⁹ In future combat, commanders must consider the nature of the enemy when assessing their unit’s combat actions; some enemies will not respect the Law of Land Warfare and will not conduct combat operations within “the rules.” They will constantly test and push a unit’s morality commitment to the limits, to where it becomes tempting for stressed troops to respond in kind. Commanders must acknowledge, assess, and appreciate the effect that enemy tactics are having on the organizations and continuously evaluate the strategic and tactical impact on a unit’s organizational climate and small-unit operating norms.⁵⁰

Regarding Factor #7, plans and orders, Peers discovered that “as Barker’s orders were passed down the chain of command, they were amplified and expanded upon, with the result that a large number of soldiers gained the impression that only the enemy would be left in My Lai and that ev-

everyone encountered was to be killed.”⁵¹ The command climate in Charlie Company exacerbated the problem because subordinates were afraid to question orders or to ask for clarification.⁵² To combat this, commanders should establish a command climate in which subordinates and others attached to their organization will feel comfortable approaching supervisors with any kind of issues or questions. In ambiguous, confusing, and fluid combat situations, leaders must issue clear and concise orders that units at all levels will understand.

Factor #8 in the My Lai assault was the attitude of government officials. Peers noted that local Vietnamese officials believed anyone living in the My Lai area was either Viet Cong or a Viet Cong sympathizer and viewed the area as a free-fire zone, automatically approving any request to fire in the area.⁵³ The attitude of these South Vietnamese officials rubbed off on some American soldiers, who soon began to view the population as expendable. Leaders in future combat operations could encounter local governments that do not value the lives of citizens. In such cases, US forces cannot fall into the trap of becoming nonchalant and careless about avoiding noncombatant casualties.⁵⁴

The Peers inquiry concluded that, above all, a lack of leadership was the main cause of the massacre—Factor #9.⁵⁵ The report cited that leaders failed to follow policies, did not enforce policies, failed to control the situation, failed to check, failed to conduct an investigation, and did not follow up. In addition, the panel members determined that although Lieutenant Colonel Barker used mission-type orders, he failed to check to determine if his subordinates carried out his orders properly and legally without violating any policy for preventing civilian deaths. In addition, the organization’s command climate did not foster open communication.⁵⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Barker did not have “a close working relationship with his subordinates;” therefore, no one believed they could question his orders.⁵⁷ It was much the same situation with the Charlie Company commander, Captain Medina. The inquiry concluded, “Nobody questioned his authority or his judgment.”⁵⁸ Finally, the Americal Division commander, Maj. Gen. Samuel Koster, had created a command climate in which his primary staff were afraid to approach him with any sort of bad news or a problem with the division.⁵⁹ Thus, when damaging information began to surface about the possible events during My Lai, not one division staff officer had the courage to relay details to the commanding general. Subsequently, the staff and entire chain of command made every effort to ignore the information.⁶⁰

The inquiry further concluded that Charlie Company platoon leaders identified more with their men than their commanders; the lieutenants wanted to fit in with the men of their platoons and be one of the boys. Also, because they were young and inexperienced, they did not take action to immediately correct wrongdoings.⁶¹

In terms of leadership, one major cause of My Lai was that according to the unit's values and norms, it was acceptable to commit war crimes. The members of Charlie Company were loyal to their fellow soldiers and the unit rather than to the Army and its chain of command; by failing to act, leaders condoned a climate that supported these actions and forced silence. In the case of My Lai, only individuals outside of Charlie Company and Task Force Barker had the moral courage to fully report what happened; absolutely no one in the unit would or did.⁶²

Peers Inquiry Conclusions

In his later book, Peers acknowledged that atrocities like My Lai could happen again.⁶³ He commented: "Lack of leadership at platoon and squad levels cannot be accepted as an excuse. Every other US Forces unit in South Vietnam had to make do with inexperienced junior officers and NCOs [noncommissioned officers], yet they did not engage in manifestly illegal operations."⁶⁴ Peers eluded that the leadership problems were much higher than platoon and company levels.

The inquiry concluded that although Captain Medina was a strong leader, his platoon leaders were not. As noted earlier, Medina failed to take immediate and corrective action against wrongdoings.⁶⁵ The result was a climate where subordinates couldn't address problems and Medina and his subordinate leaders did not recognize how the platoon's values were changing. One Charlie Company soldier commented:

When you are in an infantry company, in an isolated environment like this, the rules of that company are foremost. They are the things that really count. The laws back home do not make any difference. What people think of you does not matter. What matters is what people here and now think about what you are doing. What matters is how the people around you are going to see you. Killing a bunch of civilians in this way, babies, women, old men, people who were unarmed, helpless was wrong. Every American would know that. And yet this company, sitting out here isolated in this one place, did not see it that way. I am sure they did not. This group of people was all that mattered. It was the whole world. What they thought was right was right. And what

they thought was wrong was wrong. The definitions for things were turned around. Courage was seen as stupidity. Cowardice was cunning and wariness, and cruelty and brutality were seen sometimes as heroic. That is what it eventually turned into.⁶⁶

Building cohesive units is one of the most important things junior leaders do. Charlie Company exhibited a negative side of cohesion because the company developed beliefs, values, attitudes, and operating norms that were contrary to and conflicted with the ethical standards of other units and American society.⁶⁷ This explains how good, honest, and moral men can commit or condone war crimes without recognizing that their actions were wrong; in their minds, the Charlie Company soldiers were defending their unit and protecting their fellow soldiers.

Building a Values-Based Military

New Army recruits come with individual values and morals developed over time through personal experiences, as well as individual preferences or judgments.⁶⁸ Values form the moral groundwork for the individual's belief system and determine attitudes and behaviors toward another person, group, or thing.⁶⁹ A unit's behavioral norms are based on attitudes and beliefs that are rooted in the developed group values, and each platoon could possibly develop its own specific behavioral norms based on its specific group beliefs, attitudes, and values.⁷⁰ A commander's assumption and hope is that soldiers will fully embrace Army values so they can conform to the military ethos and act morally and ethically in combat operations.

While commanders understand that effective unit cohesion is the glue that strengthens the unit bond, they also must realize that certain cohesive traits can lead to negative and immoral unit actions. Unit cohesion is difficult to measure and assess—especially as companies and platoons become effective and strong in combat operations, developing norms for future combat behavior.⁷¹ Commanders and leaders should never assume that subordinate officers and soldiers will share Army values, attitudes, beliefs, and norms to the degree desired and expected under the Army ethos. Developing appropriate values requires continuous, recurring, and specific training. The company, platoon, or squad is that young soldier's family in combat and offers essential life-saving responsibilities, including unit security and personal survival. Soldiers fight for their buddies on their left and right who are fighting to keep them alive also. When faced with a moral or ethical choice, soldiers are more likely to remain loyal to their company, platoon, or squad above everything else.⁷²

Commanders and leaders have a critical responsibility to ensure that company or platoon norms and moral values are aligned with those of the Army, especially during combat operations.⁷³ If commanders fail to provide necessary guidance and set an appropriate example, the company or platoon will develop its own values and norms based on what it thinks will best align with higher headquarters values and norms.⁷⁴ For commanders to create a cohesive, combat-capable small unit that will perform in accordance with Army values, leaders must inculcate the desirable values and develop norms so soldiers adopt these values as their own. Commanders and leaders should never ignore or take this responsibility lightly; as military ethicist James Toner warned: “Good ethics must be taught by good leaders.”⁷⁵ Leaders at My Lai failed because they did not provide a role model for Army values. Commanders and leaders failed to ensure that every soldier in their unit, from the lowest private to the highest commander, understood regulations, policies, and expectations.⁷⁶ Every commander must ensure this is part of their command climate.

Setting a Positive Example

Chief Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson was one of the few American soldiers involved with the My Lai incident who acted with morality and compassion. Flying a reconnaissance helicopter over the village, he and his door gunners Specialists Glenn Andreotta and Lawrence Colburn saw the piles of dead bodies and soldiers killing unarmed villagers; they decided to do something about it. Thompson landed his helicopter between the villagers and Lieutenant Calley’s soldiers. Thompson asked Calley if he could help the villagers and Lieutenant Calley answered “with a grenade;” taking action, Thompson ordered Colburn to point his machine gun at the American soldiers.⁷⁷ Thompson then helped the villagers out of a bunker then ordered a larger helicopter to ferry the villagers to safety.

Immediately after the events of My Lai, Thompson reported the massacre to his aviation battalion chain of command who did assist in stopping the hostilities in My Lai.⁷⁸ The Task Force Barker chain of command and the Americal Division immediately tried to cover up the events. To keep Thompson quiet, they awarded him the Distinguished Flying Cross for his heroism; he threw away the award because it was a complete lie.⁷⁹ In late 1969, Thompson was called to Washington, DC, to appear before a closed hearing of the House Armed Services Committee.⁸⁰ Many congressmen were anxious to play down the massacre by American troops, including committee chairman Mendel Rivers (D-SC), who tried unsuccess-

cessfully to get Thompson court-martialed.⁸¹ Thompson testified about the My Lai events:

It was probably one of the saddest days of my life. I just could not believe that people could totally lose control and I've heard people say this happened all the time. I don't believe it. I'm not naïve to understand that innocent civilians did get killed in Vietnam. I truly pray to God that My Lai was not an everyday occurrence. I don't know anybody could keep their sanity if something like that happened all the time. I can see where four or five people get killed, something like that. But that was nothing like that, it was no accident whatsoever. Pure meditated murder. And we are trained better than that and it's not something you would like to do.⁸²

After his testimony, Thompson received hate mail, death threats, and mutilated animals on his doorstep. Following Vietnam, Thompson was assigned to Fort Rucker, Alabama, as an instructor pilot. He eventually finished his Army career at the rank of major and retired in 1983.

In 1998, almost thirty years after the massacre, Thompson, Andreotta, and Colburn were awarded the Soldier's Medal (Andreotta posthumously), which is the highest award for bravery not involving direct contact with the enemy. Major General Ackerman said in the presentation ceremony, "It was the ability to do the right thing even at the risk of their personal safety that guided these soldiers to do what they did."⁸³ Whenever Thompson lectured at service academies, his message was always clear: "Common people can act with uncommon courage when necessary, and doing so can make a difference in the lives of many."⁸⁴ A memorial erected at My Lai lists 504 total victims, including 182 women, of whom 17 were pregnant; 173 children, of whom 56 were infants; and 60 men who were more than 60 years old.⁸⁵ The total would have been even higher without the intervention by Thompson, Andreotta, and Colburn.

Implications for the Future

Commanders and leaders need to assess their organizations and build a command climate which supports open communication and where subordinates feel they can question ambiguous or unclear instructions and take bad news to higher headquarters. Most importantly, commanders must assess their company and platoon climates to recognize if values change due to significant combat or emotional events. They will also need to assess small unit cohesiveness to determine underlying values. Commanders should never assume that their units will forever retain good organizational values; even in combat, values need constant reinforcement to assure

they meet the standards of their institution.⁸⁶ The nine factors of the Peers Inquiry offer indicators for commanders to use in this assessment.

The most significant lesson from My Lai is that war crimes can still happen—even in a professional, disciplined military. Commanders must remain vigilant. Lt. Gen. William Peers and his commission did the nation and the Army a great service by identifying areas that military commanders should monitor and assess.⁸⁷ Army values are critically important, and every soldier should adhere to the ethos framework. Army leaders must deliberately build a command climate by serving as role models, teaching values, and enforcing them so every soldier will succeed and preserve honor.⁸⁸ To prevent another My Lai massacre, lessons of the past must be taught and inculcated into every soldier. My Lai should serve as a warning for all future Army leaders.⁸⁹

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Army Ethic Principle 6

C. Anthony Praff

We accomplish the mission and understand it may demand courageously risking our lives and justly taking the lives of others.¹

Risk-taking is the essence of the Army profession. Moreover, managing risk is essential to the Army ethic. As noted above, warfare is generally governed by three competing imperatives: (1) defeating the enemy, (2) avoiding harm to noncombatants and their property, and (3) protecting the force. These imperatives force trade-offs, because soldiers must decide where to place risk. Defeating the enemy puts both combatants and noncombatants at risk as soldiers must expose themselves to engage the enemy. They can reduce the personal risk by increasing the range and destructive capabilities of the weapons they use. However, this reduces their ability to discriminate, displacing the risk to noncombatants. Of course, combatants can avoid operations where noncombatants are likely to be harmed; however, such avoidance limits their ability to attack the enemy and impedes opportunities to defeat the enemy.² These trade-offs mean that sometimes leaders will have to risk soldiers, civilians, or the mission. Thus, a further challenge for leaders is knowing where, when, and how to accept or displace risk. Determining those risks as well as taking them demands courage.

Like respect, courage is a core virtue of the Army profession. Aristotle believed courage was found in the mean between extremes of fear. A person who experiences too much fear is a coward; if too little, then the individual is rash. Courage is recognizing the fear and acting anyway. To be courageous in the virtuous sense, Aristotle also felt that it mattered why a person acted. To risk one's life for trivial ends or to accrue personal reward is not praiseworthy. More to the point, ordering others to do so is blameworthy. The right amount of honor is found in setting worthwhile ends to serve a just cause. Thus, a courageous leader must not only overcome fear but overcome fear for the right reasons and then inspire others to do so as well.³

Aristotle's conception of courage explicitly applied to physical courage, specifically courage in battle. Moral courage is as important, if not more so, for the Army professional as physical courage. Moral courage is overcoming the fear of humiliation, shame, or loss of status (as opposed to physical harm) when confronting mistakes or wrongdoing by oneself or others.⁴ Understood this way, moral courage relates to integrity, which

requires discerning right acts from wrong ones and doing what is right, regardless of the cost. Conditions conducive to acts of physical courage can sometimes undermine conditions conducive to moral courage. When that reputational cost negatively affects membership in a highly cohesive group, many will perceive that cost as too high, especially if there is a sense that the group serves a moral purpose.⁵ Thus, unethical behavior in highly cohesive organizations is often a function of things going right; the cohesion that drives acts of physical bravery is often a barrier to moral bravery.

Further complicating views of moral and physical courage is the role that technology plays in re-distributing risk, or at least the experience of risk. Moreover, this redistribution will be complex. Artificial intelligence may allow soldiers to avoid physical risk, but still open the possibility of mental and moral injuries. This point suggests a third kind of courage that one might label “mental courage.” This courage applies to soldiers who fight remotely, utilizing unmanned vehicles as well as autonomous or semi-autonomous systems. While these soldiers do not put their bodies at risk, they put themselves at risk of mental trauma and moral injury given the demands of remote operations.⁶ Thus, how leaders manage the acquisition and employment of these technologies will have a profound impact not just on how soldiers experience courage but, by extension, on the soldier’s personal identity.

In Chapter 7, Capt. (Canadian Army) Arthur W. Gullachsen describes the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division and its experiences with intense combat against *Waffen* SS units. The SS units not only inflicted terrible casualties but were also known to execute captured soldiers. Despite cruelty by German units, the Canadians fought courageously throughout the war and maintained their integrity as individuals and as a fighting organization, though sometimes not without struggle. In short, this is a story of war’s brutalizing effects and the importance of leadership at every level to prevent atrocity.

Then in Chapter 8, Maj. (US Air Force) Daniel J. Sieben offers a compelling example of mental courage as his story encourages the reader to consider how the service should understand and reward the risks that soldiers take when they fight remotely.

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Chapter 7

Retaining the Moral High Ground: The Canadian Army and *Waffen*-SS Prisoners of War, Normandy, July 1944

Capt. (Canadian Army) Arthur W. Gullachsen

Of all the war crimes that emerged from the Second World War's Normandy Campaign of June–August 1944, the murder of Canadian prisoners of war (POWs) is one of the most well-known. This series of June 1944 murders was overseen by officers of the 12. *SS-Panzerdivision Hitlerjugend* (Hitler Youth); the unit was an armored division of the *Waffen*-SS, the military wing of the German Nazi Party. According to Canadian military historian Howard Margolian, the 12. *SS-Panzerdivision* murdered 156 Canadian prisoners.¹ The majority of these executions committed in the month of June were in cold blood; most of the prisoners were killed a significant period of time after their capture.²

Infantry officers, senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and battalion intelligence officers of the Canadian Army's 3rd Canadian Infantry Division successfully maintained a standard of discipline that resulted in humane treatment of German POWs in operations in early July 1944. This firm control of combined arms teams under their command prevented retaliatory measures on the part of Canadian troops. This accomplishment is noteworthy; by late June 1944, the 12. *SS-Panzerdivision*'s modus operandi was known to Canadian rank and file, and this formation was referred to as the "Murder Division."³ In response, Canadian infantry soldiers became determined to obliterate the *Waffen*-SS, fueled by outright hatred and a desire for revenge. The impact of the *Waffen*-SS murders of Canadian troops was such that by 1 August 1944, Canadian First Army commander Lt. Gen. H. D. G. Crerar issued a written order that revenge "must not under any circumstances take the form of retaliation in kind" but that "Canadian anger must be converted into a steel-hard determination to destroy in battle."⁴ While some treatment of captured *Waffen*-SS prisoners was very rough, none were killed or tortured in an organized manner. Despite roughly one in five Canadian battlefield deaths being a result of prisoner execution, Canadian leaders—put adherence to articles 5 and 6 of the 1929 Geneva Convention above their own desire for retribution. Instead, Canadian troops accomplished their military objectives as a team on the battlefield, partially destroying the 12. *SS-Panzerdivision* in early July 1944's operations Windsor and Charnwood and taking many prisoners in the process.⁵ Prisoners were routinely processed to the rear, where intelligence-hungry

groups of interrogators were waiting. These interrogations were the basis for the vast majority of regularly produced Canadian Army intelligence summaries. Whatever the front-line troops felt toward the enemy, the intelligence generating machine in the rear needed prisoners—alive. *Waffen-SS* prisoner interrogations were important because these enemy divisions were amongst the most effective ground forces of the *Wehrmacht*. Proper handling of prisoners was the result of military discipline instilled in the all-volunteer Canadian Army (Active Service Force) during its training in southern England in 1940 through 1944.⁶ This high level of discipline and training turned the ex-civilian volunteers into professional soldiers.

Canadian military historian Terry Copp asserted: “The reality is that there is no evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, pointing to the killing of (German) prisoners behind Allied lines in response to orders.”⁷ In doing so, the Canadian Army in North West Europe maintained its identity as a fighting force that observed the laws of armed conflict. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division’s response to enemy war crimes in the field provides a historical example of Army Ethic 5: “We do our duty, leading and following with discipline, sacrifice when necessary, striving for excellence, putting the needs of others above our own, and accomplishing the mission as a team.”⁸

Combat with the *Waffen-SS* after 7 June 1944

The Canadian Army was remarkably successful with its assault on Juno Beach in Normandy. The two assault brigades of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and supporting forces pushed roughly two kilometers deep in some places after clearing the linear beach defenses.⁹ The first well-equipped German armored division which the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division encountered in Normandy was the 12. *SS-Panzerdivision*. Most of its other ranks were *panzergrenadier* (mechanized infantry) combat elements comprised of youths born in 1926; by summer 1944, most averaged eighteen years old and were former members of the Nazi Party’s youth organization. The *Hitlerjugend* leadership had indoctrinated the youths from the age of ten with the Nazi philosophy that Germany must survive and all must sacrifice to attain this goal. This mentality was epitomized by their organizational motto: “*Blud und ehre*” (Blood and Honor). This philosophy further espoused the supremacy of the Aryan race, a need for ruthlessness in battle, and the *Hitlerjugend*’s premier role in the survival of the Third Reich.¹⁰ During the previous two years, the *Hitlerjugend* members had also observed firsthand the impact of the Allied Strategic Bombing Offensive in Germany as teenage helpers on *Luftwaffe* (German Air Force) searchlight and flak (anti-aircraft) crews. By spring 1944, these indoctrinated youths were extremely motivated to see combat.¹¹

Following the disastrous Battle of Stalingrad in February 1943, Nazi leaders adopted a total war footing, raising many new formations and totally devoting Germany's economy to war production.¹² The *Waffen-SS Panzergrenadier* Division *Leibstandarte* Adolf Hitler, which initially began as Adolf Hitler's personal body guard, was split in two; half its personnel were sent to Belgium to build a new formation. This new division eventually took the form of a full-fledged *panzer* (armored) division, one based on available *Hitlerjugend* personnel. The officer and senior NCO cadre within the division was entirely from the *Leibstandarte*; in the period 1941 to 1943, these soldiers had seen some of the most intense combat that the Eastern Front had to offer in the Ukraine. Hitler expressly ordered the German *Heer* (Army) and *Waffen-SS* to pursue a war of "annihilation" in the east, in which no quarter was to be given; as an example, the Commissar Order of 8 June 1941 decreed that all Red Army political commissars were to be shot on sight.¹³ This ruthlessness and barbarity was soon practiced by both sides, and little mercy was given or expected on the Steppes. It was under these veteran NCOs and officer cadre that the 12. *SS-Panzerdivision Hitlerjugend* trained in Belgium and France in the years 1943–44.

Canadian Prisoner of War Killings 7 June–3 July 1944

Following first contact with 12. *SS-Panzerdivision* forces on 7 June 1944, multiple battles occurred during which prisoners were taken by both sides. The fighting was ferocious; although Canadian forces successfully prevented German forces from eliminating the bridgehead, occasional reverses saw Canadian forces defeated. By 12 June, Canadian troops had prevented all of the *Waffen-SS* attempts and the Allied bridgehead was largely secure.¹⁴

While the Canadian soldiers stopped the German advance, they paid a high price for that success. Estimates vary for number of prisoners murdered by the 12. *SS-Panzerdivision Hitlerjugend* in the time period 7 June to 8 July 1944; the figure put forward by Margolian in his work *Conduct Unbecoming* and accepted by most scholars is 156.¹⁵ Taking the figure of 677 Canadian fatalities between 7 and 11 June 1944 the execution total equals roughly one in five Canadian battlefield deaths, the majority of the executions taking place in this period.¹⁶ This number illustrates the level of atrocity committed during a small period of time by groups of *Waffen-SS panzergrenadiers* and more prominently their officers, within multiple units of the division.¹⁷ The criminality was not limited to a specific group, unit or officer; it was spread out evenly within the division's combat elements. Some of the POWs were killed immediately after combat and others a significant amount of time after combat had ended, with the timing

based on the whim of the executioners. Most occurred 7–11 June 1944, during the time when the 12. SS-*Panzerdivision Hitlerjugend* attempted to rout Canadian forces and capture the battlefield initiative.

Why did the 12. SS-*Panzerdivision* personnel act this way? The answer to this most certainly lies with the level of criminality among the 12. SS-*Panzerdivision* officers and their inability to control their soldiers. Members of the veteran officer corps within the SS-*Panzergranadierregiments* were inured to murdering POWs due to their involvement in the 1941 to 1943 campaigns on the Eastern Front. They very likely committed, encouraged, witnessed, or turned a blind eye to the murder of POWs or civilians during or after combat engagements.¹⁸ Officers who failed to observe the 1929 Geneva Convention included *Hitlerjugend* battalion and regimental commanders SS-*Sturmabannführer* Gerd Bremer, SS-*Standartenführer* Kurt Meyer and SS-*Obersturmbannführer* Wilhelm Monke.¹⁹ In addition to these men, the worst *Leibstandarte* officers were taken from the Ukraine and training units to establish the new division in Belgium.

Carpiquet: Operation Windsor 4 July 1944

Early July 1944 saw the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division and the supporting armored and artillery forces resume large-scale offensive operations. During a relative period of static warfare that occurred 12 June–3 July 1944, reports of German atrocities against surrendered Canadian personnel began filtering through Canadian formations, and Canadian soldiers were cognizant of the crimes of the enemy.²⁰ Canadian Army mail censors were monitoring outgoing letters of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division troops in field for classified or unsuitable information. They detected frequent statements like this one from a wounded Canadian sergeant in hospital:

I am in bed next to a lad who was taken prisoner by the Germans and then shot. He told me all about it and it makes me wonder how our boys keep their heads when they get the Jerries as prisoners. This lad and his chum were taken prisoner when the Huns overran the forward positions. After the Germans had taken them 400 yards back, the officer in charge filled his chum with lead. Then he turned on this lad and shot him—luckily the first shot hit the lad in the leg and he went down. The officer fired several more shots but missed. The lad said the Jerries seemed all out of their minds and jumpy all the time.²¹

Following the 26–30 June 1944's Operation Epsom—the British 8th Corps offensive that pushed its way to the Odon River and destroyed parts of the 12. SS-*Panzerdivision*—Anglo-Canadian operations temporarily

halted. This battle, referred to by German military historians as the Third Battle of Caen, was intended to facilitate further attacks to the south and west, encircling Caen. In response to its early gains, the Germans launched the newly arrived II. SS-*Panzerkorps* and other formations at the British bulge's flanks. A massive British defensive effort repulsed multiple German panzer counterattacks, which delayed further exploitation operations that the British Second Army planned for the later stages of Epsom.²²

Originally one of these supporting exploitations operations for Epsom, early July's Canadian Operation Windsor called for an attack from Marcellet to clear the German-held village of Carpiquet and its now-abandoned *Luftwaffe* airbase nearby. This was to be accomplished by the reinforced 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade and attached supporting armored and artillery forces. Following an intense naval and field artillery bombardment, three Canadian infantry regiments with armored support attacked. The North Shore Regiment and Regiment de la Chaudiere attacked the northern and southern sections of the village and the Royal Winnipeg Rifles assaulted the southern hangars of the airfield. Following this phase of the assault, it was planned that the Queens Own Rifles of Canada would push through Carpiquet village to attack the airfield control buildings at the northern tip of the airfield.




Figure 7.1. The Attack on Carpiquet, 4 July 1944. Created by Army University Press.

The ferocity of the naval artillery fire neutralized and, in some cases, destroyed the *Waffen-SS zug* (platoon) positions of the remnants of I. Btl./SS-*Panzer grenadier regiment* 26, the *Hitler Jugend panzer grenadier* battalion that was charged with defending both the village and the airfield. Only an armored counterattack by German armor of the 12. SS-*Panzer division* and fire support from indirect artillery assets prevented all German infantry positions from being immediately overrun.

In Carpiquet itself, the 3. *Kompanie* of I. Btl./SS-*Panzer grenadier regiment* 26 was charged with the hopeless task of holding the village.²³ Squad leader SS-*Sturmann* (SS Corporal) Karl-Heinz Wambach of 3. *Kompanie* who had been directed to fire flares to summon direct mortar and artillery support if needed, had his position hit with intense artillery fire of all types. Then Sherman tanks of the Fort Garry Horse (10th Canadian Armored Regiment) rolled over his position and rotated on their tracks, partially burying Wambach alive and wounding him in the process. Wambach described being captured by accompanying infantry of the North Shore Regiment after a long period of time during which he could not free himself:

Suddenly, a voice yelled behind me “SS Bastard, Hands Up!” Two Canadians pulled me from my prison, tied my hands and then hit me in the face with full force. I could hardly move my legs since I was wounded in the back, but they drove me to the rear without any regard, hitting me with their rifle butts. Then, I was tied to a fence post in the immediate area of exploding 8.8 cm shells. I must have stood there for a good three hours before they brought me further to the rear.²⁴

This account, while ugly, reflects the true nature of infantry combat in Normandy during the summer of 1944. Treatment of prisoners in the combat zone was rough, and rifles were used to corral and move POWs. The war diary of the North Shore Regiment mentioned a mere four German POWs taken by the lead companies in the 4 July assault on the northern portion of Carpiquet.²⁵ It appears the artillery bombardment and accompanying tanks simply annihilated the remainder, as this Windsor objective was captured in a short period of time. The assaulting Regiment de la Chaudiere, after seizing its portion of the village, began to fortify its positions. A war diary entry recorded a large number of enemy dead in the area of the village due to the intensity of the artillery barrage.²⁶ The Royal Winnipeg Rifles, charged with attacking the southern hangars of the airfields, were driven back twice by stubborn defenders. No mention of POWs exists in either unit’s war diary entries for 4 July 1944.²⁷

The I. Btl./SS-*Panzergranadierregiment* 26 divisional history recorded 32 killed, 48 wounded, and 75 missing, for a total of 155 casualties in the 4 July 1944 fighting. The 12. SS-*Panzerdivision* divisional historian, Hubert Meyer, stated that most of the missing were killed by artillery or in the combat that followed in the village.²⁸ No post-war writing or firsthand accounts suggested that assaulting Canadian infantry killed surrendered or wounded *Waffen*-SS members.

Operation Charnwood: Authie, Buron and the Abbey Ardennes, 8 July 1944

In the Fourth Battle of Caen, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division attacked with overwhelming force against German defensive positions north of Caen on 8 July 1944. Part of the Anglo-Canadian Operation Charnwood assault to capture the city, the Canadian troops assaulted their way through successive German positions, throwing infantry regiment after infantry regiment into battle to capture successive objectives.

The assault on the remaining northern German salient north of Caen began on the night of 7–8 June 1944 with a massive preliminary bombardment from Allied naval vessels, field and medium artillery regiments, and a large force of four-engine strategic bombers operating in a tactical role. The British 3rd Infantry Division was to assault the eastern side of the German salient to the north of Caen; the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division was to overwhelm the northwestern portion. The northwestern front was defended by the weakened SS-*Panzergranadierregiment* 25, while the eastern and northeastern frontage was covered by the inexperienced and lower quality 16. *Luftwaffefeld* Division, a *Luftwaffe* infantry formation.

The *Hitlerjugend* positions that were the responsibility of assaulting Canadian forces had been fortified over the previous month and were centered around the villages of Authie, Buron, Gruchy, and Cussy as well as the Abbey D'Ardenne to the south. They were defended mainly by the III. Btl./SS-*Panzergranadierregiment* 25, independent regimental *companies*, and SS *flak* (anti-aircraft) units of the *Hitlerjugend*, backed up by the *panzer kompanies* of the SS-*Panzerregiment* 12.

In the first phase of the Operation Charnwood assault, the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade's infantry regiments, supported by armor and a massive artillery bombardment, succeeded in taking their objectives and capturing a significant number of prisoners. In the Highland Light Infantry's (HLI) attack on the village of Buron, the regiment's war diary entry recorded that the first two assaulting companies took twenty POWs and observed a large number of enemy killed in action (KIA) in the area after the

successful assault on the village.²⁹ Attacking alongside the HLI were the Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry Highlanders (SDGH) and attached forces; their objective was the village of Gruchy and the Chateau de St Louis, a large estate next to Buron. In this battle, twenty-five *Waffen-SS* POWs were taken near the village.³⁰ The SDGH war diary also mentioned large numbers of enemy troops being mowed down by supporting Sherbrooke Fusilier (SFR, 27th Canadian Armored Regiment) Sherman tanks; another twenty-five POWs, most of whom were *panzergrenadiers* aged seventeen to eighteen years old, surrendered to the assaulting A and B infantry companies later on the grounds of a nearby chateau.³¹

The second phase of Charnwood saw the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade's North Nova Scotia Highlanders (NNSH) assault Authie; some members of this regiment suffered cruel fates as POWs of the *Waffen-SS*. Many *SS-Panzergrenadierregiment 25* officers "fought to the last;" no mentions of POWs were recorded.³² It appears that the Canadian Army confronted and utterly destroyed an enemy that was determined to keep resisting.

The 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade's 1st Battalion, the Canadian Scottish Regiment (The Can Scots), assaulted Cussy on 8 July 1944 in the third phase of the division's assault. Their war diary records that thirty-seven POWs were taken, many of whom were wounded. The regimental stretcher bearers retrieved these wounded enemy POWs.³³ Attacking in the third phase, the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade's Regina Rifle Regiment took its objective, the Abbey D'Ardennes, after bitter resistance. The majority of the *Waffen-SS* defending this strongpoint had withdrawn by nightfall, but its war diary mentioned that D Company took three POWs late on 8 July.³⁴ According to its divisional history, the III. Btl/*SS-Panzergrenadierregiment 25*, the principal unit engaged in combat with the Canadian Army during Charnwood, recorded an estimated 76 killed, 100 wounded, and 90 missing.³⁵ Many of the missing were KIA as their positions were overrun. Though the combat endured by the 7th and 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade's had been intense, POWs were taken and no evidence exists of maltreatment or executions.

Following the successful first day of Charnwood and the hurried 8–9 July 1944 *Hitlerjugend* withdrawal south through Caen and over the Orne River, 9 July saw 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade units attack in a final effort to clear Carpiquet airfield. The Regiment de la Chaudiere completed the capture of the airfield's southern hangar complex with little contact from the enemy. Pushing farther south to Bretteville-sur-Odon to complete the seizure of all territory up to the Orne, the North Shore Regiment



Figure 7.3. Private Leopold Marcoux with German prisoner of war taken during battle for Carpiquet Airport, 4 July 1944. Source: Library and Archives Canada/ Department of National Defence fonds/a167303.

took the village to little or no resistance. The war diary mentioned no combat with the Germans north of the river or near the east-west rail line south of the village.³⁶ Few POWs were taken as the *Waffen-SS* troops were withdrawing at this stage over the Orne River.³⁷ Little combat or contact with the enemy occurred and as in other instances, there was no evidence of *Waffen-SS* POWs being mistreated during the last Canadian advances during Charnwood.

Canadian infantry regiments and their supporting armor attacked the enemy relentlessly 4–9 July 1944 and destroyed German defense lines northwest and west of Caen during operations Charnwood and Windsor. The combined-arms fighting force achieved the vast majority of their operational objectives using the most modern weapons systems pro-

vided by the British Empire and teamwork. By accepting the surrender of *Waffen-SS panzergrenadiers* who chose to surrender, the disciplined Canadian Army officers and senior NCOs adhered to the articles of the Geneva Convention—in sharp contrast to the *Waffen-SS* officer-run practice of murder. By taking these prisoners, the Canadian Army as a force observed the laws of armed conflict.

Conclusion

Based on primary documents, war diaries, and secondary sources researched for this chapter, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division forces and attached supporting units did not execute or maltreat *Waffen-SS* POWs they captured in early July 1944. Nor is there any conclusive evidence that *Waffen-SS* or other enemy combatants were routinely killed when a German defensive position fell and small numbers of POWs were taken.



Figure 7.4. Soldiers of the 12. SS-Panzerdivision in a temporary prisoner-of-war cage in Normandy, France, July 1944. Source: Library and Archives Canada/Department of National Defence fonds/a131397.

In the chaos of intense infantry combat, surrendering German personnel in Normandy were at times shot when it was unclear if combat had ended. This was an unfortunate characteristic of Second World War infantry combat, and occurred on all fronts. Such incidents were disproportionately few in comparison to the prodigious number of organized murders carried out by 12. SS-*Panzerdivision* personnel in June and July 1944. *Waffen*-SS prisoners taken during or immediately after combat were often bound, threatened, and hustled along to the rear with shoves, kicks, and rifle butts. Based on primary and secondary documents, the vast majority of *Waffen*-SS POWs taken to the rear of the immediate combat zone were treated humanely in accordance with the Geneva Convention.³⁸ They, of course, were much more willing to talk to interrogators if treated well; as a result, intelligence reports on *Waffen*-SS in Normandy were almost exclusively gathered from POWs who were captured or had deserted.³⁹

The humane treatment of *Waffen*-SS POWs by the Canadian Army during operations Charnwood and Windsor illustrated the high level of discipline and control instilled by officers, senior NCOs and battalion intelligence officers within Canadian infantry regiments; this allowed Canadian infantry to work as a team in processing POWs and rapidly transporting them to rear area POW cages to be interviewed by waiting military intelligence personnel.

For the most part, any Canadian “settling of accounts” occurred in combat, where the Canadian infantry’s main purpose was to kill, maim, or injure the *Waffen*-SS on the field of battle. That, of course, was the objective and remains the core mission of the Canadian Army’s Royal Canadian Infantry Corps: “To close with and destroy the enemy.”⁴⁰ Understanding that they would be treated humanely, later in the Normandy campaign many *Waffen*-SS *panzergrenadiers* surrendered rather than continue fighting and provided vital information on German strengths and unit dispositions to Allied military intelligence personnel.⁴¹ Killing, torturing, or seriously mistreating German POWs simply would not have made sense.

Notes

1. Harold Margolian, *Conduct Unbecoming: The Story of the Murder of Canadian Prisoners of War in Normandy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), Preface XI.

2. Margolian, Preface, X.

3. Robert Engen, *Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 148.

4. LAC, RG 24-C-3, vol. 15263, “South Saskatchewan Regiment War Diary,” 1 August 1944 entry. This written order was read to all Canadian combat arms units on 1 August 1944.

5. International Committee of the Red Cross, “Treaties, State Parties and Commentaries,” Articles 5 and 6 of the 1929 Geneva Convention, accessed 15 May 2020, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/305?OpenDocument>.

6. Ben Kite, *Stout Hearts: The British and Canadians in Normandy 1944* (Solihull: Helion and Company, 2014), 233. The procedure laid out by all Anglo-Canadian infantry battalion intelligence officers in Normandy regarding POW handing was “SSS: Separate (officers and NCOs), search, and send back quickly.”

7. Terry Copp, *Field of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy* (University of Toronto Press, 2003), 71.

8. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession* (Washington, DC: 2015), 2-6.

9. Marc Milner, *Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2014), 113; map of Canadian operations, 6–7 June 1944.

10. Margolian, *Conduct Unbecoming*, 11.

11. Margolian, 5.

12. Margolian, 5

13. Ben E. Shepherd, *Hitler's Soldiers: The Germany Army in the Third Reich* (London: Yale University Press, 2016), 125–30.

14. Copp, *Field of Fire*, 74.

15. Margolian, *Conduct Unbecoming*, 123.

16. Margolian, 123. This total represents fatal casualties suffered on 6 June 340. Combat with the 12. SS-Panzerdivision began on 7 June. Total fatal casualties for 6 to 11 June was 1,017.

17. Margolian, 123.

18. Axis History Forum, “SS-Panzerkorps Guilty of Massacre in Khar-kov,” accessed 31 March 2020, <https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=9417&sid=38dd4a5a7362654d99e5e80c1568e3a8https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=9417>.

19. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Chris M. V. Madsen, eds., *Kurt Meyer on Trial (A Documentary Record)* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007). This is an excellent record of the post-war proceedings against SS-Bri-gadenfuhrer Kurt Meyer and provides details on the 7–11 June 1944 war crimes.

20. Robert Engen, *Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943–1945* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 148.
21. Engen, 149; and Libraries and Archives Canada Microfilm reel T-17925, Canadian Field Censors (Home), Canadian Army Overseas—16–31 July 1944.
22. Hubert Meyer, *The History of the 12. SS-Panzerdivision Hitlerjugend* (Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 1994), 127–31. Further British advances in the wake of Epsom were derailed by German resistance.
23. Meyer, 136.
24. Meyer, 136.
25. LAC, RG 24-C-3, vol. 15127, 15128, “North Shore Regiment War Diary,” 4 July 1944 entry.
26. LAC, RG 24-C-3, vol. 15180, “Regiment de la Chaudiere War Diary,” 4 July 1944 entry.
27. LAC, RG 24, vol. 15233, “Royal Winnipeg Rifles War Diary,” 4 July 1944 entry.
28. Meyer, *The History of the 12. SS-Panzerdivision Hitlerjugend*, 136.
29. LAC, RG 24-C-3, vol. 15076, “1st Battalion, Highland Light Infantry of Canada War Diary,” 8 July 1944 entry.
30. Mark Zuehlke, *Breakout from Juno: First Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, July 4–August 21, 1944* (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 2011), 61.
31. LAC, RG 24-C-3, vol. 15270, 15271, “War Diary of the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders,” 8 July 1944 entry.
32. LAC, RG 24-C-3, vol. 15122, “North Nova Scotia Highlanders War Diary,” 8 July 1944 entry.
33. LAC, RG 24-C-3, vol. 15036, 15037, and 15039, “1st Battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regiment War Diary,” 8 July 1944 entry.
34. LAC, RG 24-C-3, vol. 15198, 15199, “Regina Rifle Regiment War Diary,” 8 July 1944 entry.
35. Meyer, *12. SS-Panzerdivision*, 150.
36. LAC, RG 24-C-3, vol. 15127, 15128, “North Shore Regiment War Diary,” 9 July 1944 entry.
37. LAC, RG 24-C-3, vol. 15168, 15169, “Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada War Diary,” 9 July 1944 entry.
38. International Committee of the Red Cross, “Treaties, State Parties and Commentaries.”
39. LAC, RG 24, vol. 10,685, File 215C1.98, 9th SS Panzer Division Intelligence Summary,” August 1944.
40. The Royal Canadian Infantry Corps webpage, accessed 21 May 2020, <https://army.ca/inf/>.
41. LAC, RG 24 vol. 13,645, “First Canadian Army General Intelligence War Diary.” This diary, as an example, chronicled the massive rear-area effort to gather military intelligence and the vital role that prisoners of war played in this process. *Waffen*-SS prisoner interrogations were important because these divisions were the most effective ground forces of the *Wehrmacht*.

Chapter 8

Shared Mission Goals: An Antidote to Combat Isolation

Maj. (US Air Force) Daniel J. Sieben

This story is based on actual events in the fall of 2012, with minor additions for coherence and context. The story engages with numerous ethical and decision-making elements. Command responsibility in the joint environment and justifiably taking life are prominently featured, as well as the unique relationships that exist between combat domains.

The aircraft I had been flying for eight years had a great camera. That was before the public knew it carried missiles, and watched it evolve into the lethal weapon of choice for ground commanders who needed air support during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. As its operational use dramatically increased, the focus became to integrate this new aircraft into the battlespace, without much thought about how it might change the operators who flew it. When I took over as a squadron commander, one of my new pilots, a captain, found himself in a moral dilemma that was unique to our aircraft.

This mission began like many others; the pilot was tasked to observe a person-of-interest called Objective Miami. He had been watching the target area for a few days; from his working altitude, the video mostly distinguished a sandlot on the north end of a small village. Playing there were a dozen or so boys around ten years old, give or take. The pilot would later relay to me that he saw much of his own childhood in the way they played together—inventing games, best friends pairing up, and the occasional pushing and finger-pointing when someone cheated. Reminiscing about his youth, the pilot commented that the only real difference he saw between himself and those boys was that he played on grass and they played on sand. Occasionally, the sensor operator sitting to his right would switch the camera to IR (infrared) and the children's heat signature would glow progressively brighter as they continued to play. But in the standard mode, the camera showed puffs of dust rising as the kids ran. Before long, a light sandy fog hovered over the field.

It was incredible that the pilot could watch these kids at all, considering he was sitting in Missouri and the children were playing in a sandlot in Afghanistan. The ground control station (GCS) where he worked was a metal shipping container that connected via satellite to an RPA, or remotely piloted aircraft, on the other side of the world. Inside, where he sat in the pilot seat, it was quiet, cold, and dark.

The sensor operator was around twenty-four years old, about ten years younger than his pilot. There wasn't much conversation; you can run out of stuff to talk about after years of flying with the same people for six to eight hours a day. So it was quiet, except for the low din of computer servers behind them and the air conditioner working hard to keep all the equipment from overheating. All that air conditioning made it very cold—always cold. In front of them were fourteen computer screens providing flight data, systems status, communications, mission information, and, of course, video. The smell of coffee always lingered inside, combined with whatever food the previous aircrew had packed in their lunch.

The pilot and his sensor operator were glad to be watching the boys on the screen in front of them. The scene provided an oasis of humanity in a routine of bearing witness to much inhumanity—beheadings, kidnappings, families being threatened and shot; while not a daily occurrence, these images tend to stick with you. And it was this kind of menace that brought their “unblinking eye” to this village where they spent days, and then weeks, watching these kids run around.

The sandlot was adjacent to the home of a bombmaker, and he was the real reason they were watching this particular village. Every day, Objective Miami would exit his home bordering the southern edge of the sandlot, load his motorcycle, and head to work. It was a short trip—north about two miles to the next village. Once there, he spent the day making IEDs, or improvised explosive devices, and other bombing components.

RPA operators spend weeks, and sometimes months, watching an individual's pattern of life, as the crew did with Miami. Sometimes a strange relationship developed with the targets. After twenty-three days of watching him, Miami's routine had revealed intimate details about both his home and work life. Some of these particularities were expected. For example, the lack of plumbing meant that restroom usage was outdoors and easily observable. It became obvious who was “regular” and who was not, how often they would go, and even when they were sick. The cycles of the women in the compound could be tracked as well, since they were expected to manage their hygiene needs at a distance from the home. Miami happened to be a harsh disciplinarian with his children, though never with his wife, at least from what the crew observed. The entire compound participated in the call to prayer and would immediately stop their activity to kneel. These elements were true for almost all objectives. The strange intimacy, however, developed because of the differences.

Though Miami tended to be harsh with his children, there were also affectionate moments when he played with and embraced his kids. They didn't seem wooden or fearful in his presence, and they eagerly helped out with chores like tending the animals and helping with food preparation. Some of these moments affronted expectations for a bombmaker, expectations that pilots developed after months and months of daily reconnaissance flights. Miami's wife would occasionally help load his motorcycle in the morning, and while he was gone all day, she would run the operations of the compound. Although less harsh than her husband, she ensured that the children understood her authority; she was unafraid to discipline them physically. After Miami returned in the evenings and the family ate dinner, he always spent about thirty minutes in the courtyard by himself, quietly and slowly pacing inside the walled compound.

Miami made an easy target since he was so predictable. His routine allowed the crew to brief their attack plan and position the aircraft early, before he emerged for his morning commute. Most Afghan villages were shrouded in trees, each an oasis dotting an otherwise desert landscape in the southern part of the country. But the unusually straight, barren stretch of road between his village and the one to the north provided an opening to strike Miami with a Hellfire missile. The team had been watching him for more than three weeks, setting up for the strike every morning and coordinating with the JTAC, or joint terminal attack controller.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, *Close Air Support*, describes a JTAC as a "qualified service member who . . . directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive air operations."¹ More simply, controllers coordinate the air domain of a ground commander's mission, which in this situation meant striking Objective Miami with a Hellfire as soon as possible. The crew had been watching Miami for weeks, and they would have struck him on the very first day—if it wasn't for one thing: he always brought one of those boys from the sandlot with him.

Miami knew a lot about bombs, but he also knew something about insurance. After loading his motorcycle each morning, he would walk to the playground and select one kid to ride with him on the back. They'd ride to the next village and a few moments later the boy would run down the open road to meet back up with his friends. Unfortunately, thick trees made it impossible to identify when Miami was returning home. With no visual identification and his inconsistent timing on the return leg, a strike was out of the question. So for twenty-three days, the RPA crew watched

his morning routine, prepared to shoot, but then aborted when he grabbed one of the kids.

Riding on Miami's motorcycle probably seemed like a thrill for those boys. They clearly didn't have much, though that never seemed to dampen their spirits. Usually, they played some variation of tag. There was one game involving a stick that seemed like Freeze Tag, where only the person holding the stick could "unfreeze" people who had been tagged. Or another that was essentially Ultimate Frisbee but, again, with a stick. The crew had conversations about the similarities between the boys and themselves. They talked about how kids who were unspoiled and familiar with hardship probably grew into stronger adults.

About a week into the mission, one of the boys brought a ball to the sandlot. The way the other kids crowded around him made it seem like it was his birthday. In any case, the ball appeared to be an incredible luxury. Another boy regularly spent most of his time standing on the side of the field listening to the others playing. He obviously couldn't see very well and may have been blind. The crew found it admirable how often the other kids would try to include him. One boy, probably his brother, led the visually impaired boy out to the playground and walked him back home each day. To pass the time, the pilot and sensor operator had come up with nicknames for the boys. There was Speedy Gonzales, who ran everywhere; Glasses, the blind kid; Charles, the kid who seemed "in charge" since he talked with his hands a lot and seemed to always tell the others what to do; and Tardy, the kid who always showed up last.

The RPA crew liked this mission, at least the time they spent watching kids play games. It provided entertainment in a typically rote routine, despite the daily stress of preparing to shoot a Hellfire. Obviously, the crew was far from the danger area; yet every time the JTAC passed them a nine-line, their nerves would tense and palms got sweaty. A nine-line was issued when the ground commander wanted to hit a target. These literally nine lines of information, described in the JP 3-09.3, authorized an airstrike. Once the crew verified the accuracy of those nine lines, they just had to call "in" and the JTAC would tell them they were "cleared hot," which was the final approval to release weapons. After the first few days watching Miami, they knew the abort call was inevitable. Nevertheless, each daily nine-line was still just as stressful as the first one the pilot ever received.

The pilot's first nine-line, only a few months earlier, had culminated in his first Hellfire strike. After swapping out with the previous crew, he had been tasked to follow a white four-door pickup driven by a "person of

interest.” So, the pilot and his sensor operator watched as the vehicle approached three men who appeared to be waiting for it. The truck stopped and the driver got out. All four men walked to the middle of a small grassy field and sat down; one of them was continually talking on his phone.

About ten minutes after the four men sat down, the RPA crew was instructed to call the JTAC via radio. The pilot tuned in the frequency, keyed the mic, checked in, and received a nine-line message from the JTAC. The JTAC sounded tense and hurried as he read off the information. The sensor operator, who had been in the Air Force about five years but was new to this job, looked at the pilot—confused. He wasn’t alone in his confusion. The four men didn’t seem to be doing anything nefarious; they were just sitting in a field. Near the end of the JTAC’s transmission, the crew heard what sounded like a loud explosion from the other end of the radio, and the JTAC’s voice quickly changed from calm professionalism to an impassioned plea to attack immediately. The man’s panic was palpable.

As the pilot ran the missile release checklist with his sensor operator, his heartrate quickened and his palms began to sweat. The crew was working quickly as they had been trained, but the urgency intensified upon learning the reality of the situation. Through a chat room on one of their computer screens, they saw a message that the JTAC located at a Coalition base, Camp Leatherneck, was under attack. The explosions they’d heard over the radio were mortar rounds impacting the base. And the four men sitting in the field, who were now under the pilot’s crosshairs? From their vantage point on a knoll north of Camp Leatherneck, these men were watching the mortars landing inside the base. The one on the phone was updating enemy mortar teams to correct their aim for better, and more deadly, accuracy. They were coordinating the attack.

During RPA training, the pilot and his sensor operator had repeated this quintessential strike scenario—a stationary enemy target that was actively attacking US and Coalition forces. The RPA team had no collateral damage concerns, were armed with a Hellfire, had a verified nine-line, and had completed their checklists.

After lining up the aircraft on a final attack course, the pilot keyed the radio and said, “In from the southeast.” The JTAC replied immediately, “Cleared hot!” The pilot lined up the crosshairs on the lower back of the man with the phone, squeezed the trigger, and simultaneously said “rifle” to advise his sensor operator that he had fired. The camera was briefly obscured by the missile’s rocket exhaust as it launched from under the aircraft wing. The crew felt and heard nothing but the still, quiet hum

inside the GCS. The four men on the screen remained perfectly still as trees swayed in the breeze, the wind making waves in the tall grass; they were entirely unaware that a rocket-powered missile was bearing down on them faster than the speed of sound. Suddenly, the screen erupted in a brilliant flash as the missile impacted. The massive heat signature obscured everything for a moment. Then as the plume began to fade, the screen slowly revealed the fury of the attack. The man with the crosshairs on his back had disappeared. The two men flanking him were slumped backward, motionless. The fourth man had been tossed about twenty feet into an irrigation ditch. Incredibly, he rose thirty seconds after missile impact and began stumbling until someone rushed up, heaved him onto their shoulder, and hurriedly carried him away.

Staring at the scene, the pilot felt numb. It wasn't shock or horror; he simply felt nothing. The lack of emotion perplexed him because, good or bad, he expected to feel something. Perhaps it was the sterility of it: no sound, no smell, no shockwave—nothing.

That's when the radio crackled, and the JTAC said it looked like a good hit and the mortar attack on the base had ceased. Noticing that the JTAC's voice was again calm, the pilot finally felt something—extraordinary relief. He hadn't screwed up but also because the enemy had stopped its attack against the JTAC and the base. The pilot would later relay that he felt his training had served him well in executing the strike. But soon after, the training felt inadequate; in the hours that followed the strike, the pilot didn't know what to do next. He did have something to do: write the AAR, or after-action report. But on the other hand, a statement by General James Mattis echoed in his mind: "The first time you blow someone away is not an insignificant event."² Simple, understated, but exactly right.

After completing the AAR and his shift, the pilot re-watched the video of that strike multiple times. Through the replays, and using a software tool to measure the distance, he learned that the man on the phone who "disappeared" had actually been thrown 130 feet. Morbid curiosity wasn't the reason for the replays. The pilot was in disbelief about what had happened, about what he had done. That day felt as routine as any other, yet the video showed otherwise. Then someone walked into the room and the pilot quickly closed the laptop, suddenly feeling guilty about watching the video so many times.

Perhaps that's why he enjoyed watching the kids in the sandlot. They represented the furthest thing from guilt: innocence. And as long as Miami kept up his routine, the crew could continue theirs. Miami would

leave home, conduct his deadly business, and go home to his family each night—same as the crew, really.

But, on the crew's twenty-third day of watching Miami and the sandlot boys, the JTAC sounded different, more serious. After stating that the aircraft was in position and the crew was ready for the nine-line as usual, the JTAC advised them to be ready for the strike today. The pilot wondered, "Why would he tell us to get ready after I just said that we were ready?" He looked at the sensor operator, whose face showed disbelief as well. The pilot pressed the radio button and replied, "Yeah, but you know he's going to grab a kid like he always does and we'll have to abort."

"Negative, we will not be aborting the strike today," the JTAC replied.

The RPA crew was stunned. Staring at the screens in front of them, where the kids were still running and playing, the pilot felt cold as he started to tremble. Time slowed as he quickly thought about options. Looking at the screen, he wondered which boy Miami would pick for his quick morning commute. The sensor operator interrupted his thoughts, "He can't be fuckin' serious." Feeling similarly, the pilot decided to ask the JTAC a few questions.

He picked up the secure phone between him and the sensor operator and called the JTAC directly. "We're going to strike Miami even if he has a kid with him?" "Yes." "And we're not going to abort this time even though that's what we've been doing for three straight weeks?" "No abort this time." "So, we're going to knowingly kill a kid today?" "Yes." "Why?" "Because the ground commander can't wait any longer." Frustrated, the pilot asked the JTAC to put the ground commander on the phone.

Their conversation was stressed, but not angry. The pilot needed to know why other options were off the table. Why not a raid? Sniper? Special Forces? The ground commander rebuffed them all. The pilot knew the region was dangerous, which made the other options nearly impossible; however, he hadn't expected the situation to come to this. Finally, he asked the ground commander: "Why today? Why was it okay to wait yesterday, but not today? Why not wait one more day? What changed in the last twenty-four hours that necessitates us killing a kid?" The ground commander simply said, "I'm not willing to wait any longer."

As the aircraft commander, the pilot had the final say on whether to take the shot. But he had never encountered a scenario, training or operational, where he'd prioritized his own opinion over others on the ground and actually in harm's way. Safely operating out of a base in Missou-

ri, barely a mile from his home, he felt a moral obligation to defer to the JTAC and ground commander's judgment. But profound trepidation caused him to search for a way out of this strike. The pilot turned to ask how his partner felt about this request. The pilot felt a little guilty asking, because it wasn't the sensor operator's place to make this decision; nor was it the pilot's place to let him. The pilot knew it was his decision to make, but he thought maybe if they both didn't want to take the shot, it could provide a wedge to pry their way out of the situation. Maybe if they presented a united front—power in numbers and all that. The sensor operator's reply was immediate, straightforward, and exactly what it should have been; "I'll do whatever you tell me to, sir."

The pilot thought to himself, "Damn."

Suddenly, there was a knock on the GCS door. The sensor operator knocked back to signal it was okay to enter; when the door opened, I walked in. My presence surprised the crew. Normally, squadron commanders don't drop in on a crew in the middle of a mission. But the operations director had notified me about the troubling nature of this situation, and I felt the need to personally inquire.

The pilot couldn't have known yet what my experience and command authority had taught me. The ground commander was not blood-thirsty, frustrated, or flippantly deciding that he was "not willing to wait any longer." The situation on the ground was dynamic, and every new detail affected the decision calculus. Intelligence data has varying degrees of importance; the rules of engagement (ROEs) work in concert with each other, meaning that one piece of information can become amplified and drastically increase the threat. Perhaps Miami's IEDs were becoming more lethal, or he was gaining greater influence in the region, or he was teaching his skills to others. Whatever, new information had changed the calculus enough to necessitate an immediate strike. I was not concerned with the ground commander's strike request. His chain-of-command made that recommendation after reviewing the ROE with military lawyers and evaluating new intelligence reports. No, my concern now was to support both the ground commander and my pilot.

I took a seat behind the crew and asked what was going on. The pilot spoke quickly, bringing me up to speed, and I nodded. I reminded him of our role in this fight: to support ground units by employing our full weapons system, which included reconnaissance *and* strike capabilities. Acknowledging that this was an unusually tough situation, I finished by telling him, "I'll support you, whatever you decide." Then, looking him

in the eye, I said, “But, I need to know what you’re going to do. Are you gonna be able to take this shot?”

The pilot looked away for a moment, desperately trying to rectify his emotions and the facts to reach a decision. He didn’t look at the screen where the kids were playing, or at the sensor operator who was anxiously awaiting his reply. He stared down then after a few seconds that felt like an eternity to him, the pilot slowly shook his head and responded, “No, I can’t.” I patted him on the shoulder, nodded, and said, “Okay.” I picked up the phone and made a quick call to the squadron. About a minute later, there was a knock on the GCS door.

Another pilot entered—one who hadn’t given the children nicknames or watched the target spend time with his family. The new pilot slipped into the control chair, and I supported his decision as well.

Considerations for Future Combat Integration

As this story alludes, the RPA enterprise grew so quickly that little time was spent evaluating how use of remote aircraft would affect the remote operators who controlled them. While new capabilities can enhance battlefield awareness via multi-domain operations, technology has the potential to complicate execution in unexpected ways.

In uncontested airspace, RPAs have proved invaluable; loiter time and weapons capability make them a multirole asset. Nevertheless, the time spent watching an area and “getting to know” the people who live and work there has an effect on those watching, whether they want it to or not. It’s far easier to show up on short notice, employ weapons, and return to base. But when a crew spends time developing a target area, the unintended effect is that the members relate to it; the longer a person observes, the deeper that sense of connection grows. Yet our focus must remain on mission accomplishment and role execution.

It is imperative that commanders, both ground and flight, establish and maintain open lines of communication and strong working relationships. This can be difficult in an environment where RPAs are tasked to a different ground unit every day. A better paradigm would be working as a team with supported and supporting units that share longer-term mission goals beyond just one flight, one target, and one day. Building relationships between RPA pilots and ground units is essential to ensure proper prioritization of combat support and mission execution.

Consider also that the ground commander is not in the pilot’s chain of command. As the story demonstrated, a pilot can refuse a request for an air

strike. In this case, my intervention as squadron commander changed the dynamic. If I had told the pilot to take the shot, the pilot would have been obligated to do so; some may argue this would be the proper resolution. Clearly, I believed more deeply in my unit's supportive role to the ground commander, despite any collateral damage concerns. This trust was developed through years of flying RPAs and my experience working with ground commanders during that time.

Developing trust between individuals or units does not require a specific number of years of working together. To ensure mission success in future large-scale combat operations, commanders should reach out to units they work with, share their goals, and align everyone's efforts. In this way, pilots flying RPAs will develop a stronger connection to their JTAC and ground forces—and the mission goals they are trying to accomplish—and trust that the ground commander's decision to strike is the best one.

Notes

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, *Close Air Support* (Washington, DC: 2014).
2. Thomas E. Ricks, "Fiasco," *Armed Forces Journal* (1 August 2006), <http://armedforcesjournal.com/fiasco/>.

Army Ethic Principle 7

C. Anthony Pfaff

We continuously advance the expertise of our chosen profession through lifelong learning, professional development, and our certifications.¹

As discussed previously, competence is a moral imperative. Professions serve social needs that society cannot satisfy without them, so clients must go to the professional. This is especially true for the military. Unlike the medical and legal professions, where clients have some ability to change providers for professional services, the military is the sole provider for defense, at least in well-functioning states.² Thus, members of the military professions have a special *moral* burden to ensure they have the expertise to effectively carry out tasks associated with that defense. To fulfill that moral burden, soldiers must possess and be certified in necessary warfighting skills, skills that are integrated at the various levels of the enterprise. Individual skill is not sufficient; the Army must ensure its institutions are effective as well.

Moreover, this commitment to competence is a life-long, or at least career-long, pursuit. As S. L. A. Marshall famously argued, “Just as a rough approximation, any officer’s work week should comprise about 50 percent execution and the other half study. . . . It is always worthwhile to ask a few very senior officers what they think of these jokers who refuse to study. They will say that the higher up you go, the more study you have to make up, because of what you missed somewhere along the line.”³

Current Army doctrine recognizes that expertise, in general, as the application of landpower “to prevent, shape, and win in the land domain.”⁴ Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession*, identified four areas of competence that constitute this expertise: military-technical, human development, moral-ethical, and political-cultural. The military-technical category describes how the Army applies landpower to achieve military, and consequently, political objectives. Human development includes “creating, developing, and maintaining expert knowledge” among the population of soldiers, noncommissioned officers, officers, and civilians.⁵ The moral-ethical category aligns individual behavior with the profession to ensure that coercive force is used ethically and that Army professionals maintain trust and legitimacy with the American people. The political-cultural category addresses challenges associat-

ed with managing the interaction between the “Army and the broader defense community,” which includes the public, industry, and government.⁶

To be a professional means being certified in each of these areas. Certification across these categories should, if done well, enable professional success at both the institutional and individual levels. Sometimes, however, that is not the case. Gallup polls showed that trust in the military among the general population dropped from 80 percent in 2003 to around 70 percent by 2007 and more recent years.⁷ A more recent Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation survey indicated public trust and confidence in the military had further fallen, from 70 percent in 2018 to 56 percent in 2021.⁸ Ratings were even lower for the demographic from which the Army recruits. According to a 2019 Harvard poll, trust among Americans in the 18- to 29-year-old range was around 50 percent. Within that same age group, trust varied significantly according to race: 55 percent of whites, 34 percent of African-Americans, and 43 percent of Hispanics indicated they trust the military.⁹ In the Reagan Foundation poll cited above, only 38 percent of Americans under the age of 30 had confidence in the military. These polls suggest two things: trust in the military is fragile and it matters who gives it. It is not enough for the Army, as a profession, to be obedient to civilian leadership. As evidenced by the polls, the US military must work to maintain the trust and respect of those it relies on for its future.

In Chapter 9, Sanders Marble describes the career of Brig. Gen. and Dr. Frederick Blesse, who navigated the ethical demands of two professions: medical and military. In doing so, Blesse was a model leader who continually innovated, developing innovative policies and procedures that saved soldiers’ lives. He spoke truth to power when that power put soldier well-being at risk.

Notes

1. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession* (Washington, DC: 2015), 2-6.
2. Max Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” in Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs, editors, *Weber: Political Writings* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 310–11.
3. General S. L. A. Marshall, *The Officer as Leader* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966), 60–61.
4. Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: 2012), 1-1.
5. Richard Lacquement, “Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice,” in Don Snider and Lloyd Matthews, editors, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 217. See also Department of the Army, ADRP-1, 5-1.
6. Lacquement, 217.
7. “In Depth Topics: A TO Z—Military and National Defense,” Gallup, 3 April 2020, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/1666/military-national-defense.aspx>; I owe this point to Don Snider and David A. Uthlaut.
8. “Reagan National Defense Survey,” The Ronald Reagan Foundation and Institute, February 2021.
9. “Harvard Youth Poll,” Harvard University Institute of Politics, accessed 26 January 2021, <https://iop.harvard.edu/youth-poll/past>; I owe this point to Don Snider and David A. Uthlaut.

Chapter 9

Two Professions, Two Ethics: Brig. Gen. Frederick Blesse and Adapting Military Medicine in World War II

W. Sanders Marble

Army physicians must master two professions and two sets of ethics. Physicians owe a responsibility to their patients; Army officers, as noted in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession*, also have responsibilities to the Army as an entity.¹ A doctor's roles change if the doctor shifts from simply patient care to staff and command; those who move into staff and command can influence medical practice across larger organizations, affecting the care provided to many patients and thus military operations as a whole. Every commander wants a medical system that prevents sickness and promptly evacuates patients so the unit can focus on its mission. These elements also benefit individual soldiers, as prompt, high-quality medical care speeds them toward recovery and return to duty or discharge to civilian life.

Frederick A. Blesse was an Army doctor and dual professional. He spent less than five years of his thirty-three-year Army career seeing individual patients but held positions of high responsibility and directed medical care for millions of soldiers. Blesse kept the "Army" part of "Army medicine" in mind. More than simply treating individuals, he helped protect combat power and provide commanders with healthy soldiers able to perform their missions. Blesse certainly knew enough medicine to make clinical decisions, but his broad experience and substantial professional military education gave him the expertise for effective staff work and pushing projects to completion. His military professionalism also gave him credibility in the Army, where the main focus is not medicine. Blesse dealt with other doctors—civilians in uniform for the war who had different ethical priorities—and did his best to direct their focus on the patients to helping the Army as a whole. In WWII, Blesse integrated civilian medical advances into the military to keep soldiers healthy; return to duty those who were sick, injured, or wounded; and improve the system.

Early Career, 1917–30

Born in Elgin, Illinois, in 1888, Frederick Blesse graduated from Hahnemann Medical College in 1913. After two years of postgraduate training, he entered private practice near St. Louis, Missouri. In 1916 he

applied to join the Army Medical Corps and took the qualifying exams 2–9 January 1917. As Blesse waited to hear about his Army commission, the United States declared war on Germany, and he registered for the draft, taking no chances of being left out of the fight altogether. Blesse entered active duty on 18 July, his first assignment a one-month abbreviated course at the Army Medical School.² Expansion of the Army was so rapid that Blesse, inexperienced as he was, was assigned as an instructor at the Medical Officers Training Camp, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.³ After three months as an instructor, he was reassigned to an ambulance company, then to a field hospital. When the Army started demobilizing after the 11 November 1918 armistice, Blesse was transferred to the post hospital at Fort Sam Houston and served as a ward surgeon and then as adjutant, all standard assignments for a junior medical officer.⁴ For the next five years, he worked as post surgeon at small installations in Panama and Nebraska, where he had responsibility for both direct patient care and public health/sanitation.⁵ Unlike civilian physicians who typically treat patients individually, Army doctors considering a population's health and the finite resources available to effect improvements. This differing focus forces ethical considerations. Army doctors must consider the most effective ways to protect public health with available resources—and persuade the installation commander. Such efforts might involve funding or other support for swamp drainage, perhaps putting a restaurant out-of-bounds that did not keep its kitchen sanitary, or working with a neighboring city to close a red-light district. Such requirements force an Army doctor to be a staff officer, not just someone who treats patients.

Seven years after he joined the Army, Blesse finally completed normal officer training—first the Army Medical School, which he completed in 1925, then the Medical Field Service School, where was an honor graduate in June 1925. After graduation, he remained at the Medical Field Service School in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, as an instructor, with a concurrent assignment in the 1st Medical Regiment (the school demonstration troops) as both adjutant and plans and training officer. In this new role, he demonstrated to officer and noncommissioned officer students how to run an infantry regiment medical detachment, including what platoon medics should do, directing litter-bearers, and running an aid station.⁶ Blesse apparently showed a strong aptitude as a field medical officer, training officers and helping to shape the troops into effective units; he certainly had many such assignments early in his career rather than traditional hospital assignments.

A Rising Star, 1930–40

In 1930, Blesse was the only Medical Department officer selected to attend the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. As was true throughout his career, Blesse's focus there was a mix of medical and Army; he wrote papers on WWI combat operations and also compared US and German medical evacuation systems. His next assignment following graduation (1932–35) was as a staff officer, chief of the Training Division of the Office of the Surgeon General. There Blesse directed policies and plans for Regular and Reserve medical units and the medical reserve officer training corps programs; wrote training regulations; and oversaw the training program at the Medical Field Service School. While there were no short-term crises at the time, he and other officers dealt with cuts in Army strength and training budgets created by the Great Depression.⁷

Blesse was one of two Medical Department officers sent to the Army War College in 1935–36, a clear indication that the Army had identified him as a future senior leader. Following graduation, his next assignment was quite different: executive officer of the Philippine Army's medical regiment, which was severely below strength, more of an organization on paper. A year later, however, America's policy on Philippine defense changed; as part of a ten-year plan for Philippine independence, the United States would help the Philippine military expand and become more capable. More US officers were assigned to the small American Military Mission in the Philippines, directed by retired General Douglas MacArthur. From the autumn of 1937, now-Lieutenant Colonel Blesse split his time between the medical regiment and working part-time on MacArthur's staff to help organize the Philippine Army Medical Service (PAMS).⁸

At this point in his career, Blesse's War College experience became far more relevant as he had to develop a medical service from (almost) scratch, making the case for resources and shaping the environment rather than working within it. From 38 officers in the whole organization in 1935, the PAMS grew dramatically; 333 reserve officers were called up for training in 1936, and 113 were on duty at the end of the year.⁹ Blesse described the work as "very interesting" and noted that it gave him "a good chance to use your own ideas and initiative" and made him grapple with issues such as force structure, personnel, finances, and supplies—far removed from working with individual patients.¹⁰ Blesse used his previous work at Carlisle and in the Surgeon General's Office as a model for the PAMS development. He designed medical units to support the new Phil-

ippine infantry divisions, established medical care for the training camps, won support to train adequate numbers of medical personnel (which came at the expense of training combat arms personnel), and sourced supplies and equipment in the Philippines to reduce costs. The Armed Forces of the Philippines awarded Blesse the Philippine Distinguished Service Star (equivalent to the US Distinguished Service Medal) for his work. When he returned to the United States in August 1939, Blesse also brought letters of appreciation from MacArthur and, more significant for his future career, Lt. Col. Dwight Eisenhower, who also served on MacArthur's staff.

In May 1940, Blesse was assigned as division surgeon of the 3rd Infantry Division, which was in the process of reorganizing, coming to full strength, and training for amphibious warfare at Fort Lewis, Washington. As there were only four divisions in the Army at the time, the appointment was prestigious. Blesse reorganized the divisional medical regiment, which was designed to support the "square" division of four infantry regiments, into a medical battalion for a three-regiment "triangular" division—and doubtless encountered now-Colonel Eisenhower, who commanded one of the infantry regiments.

What Blesse was not doing in the 1930s was developing his clinical expertise. He had no further medical training beyond self-study as a member of the American Medical Association. During the 1920s and 30s there was increasing specialization among civilian doctors; while most American physicians were still general practitioners, the increasing depth of medical knowledge led specialists to organize themselves into boards. Board certification recognized individuals who had special experience and expertise, but also established standards to be recognized as a specialist in, for example, dermatology, pediatrics, or pathology. The Army had few such clinical specialists, due largely to its requirements. Most Army doctors provided general care at posts and units scattered around the world and thus had to be general practitioners; only a handful could be spared for the major hospitals where they could see enough patients with particular conditions to specialize in any type of medicine. For example, few military doctors saw enough dermatology patients to be considered a dermatologist. While some military physicians had distinguished clinical careers, most were clinical generalists. Rather than downgrading patient care, this deliberate decision was made to manage finite human resources. Surgeon General Merritte Ireland expected to use reservists to provide most patient care; Regular Army doctors would be senior staff, administrators, and medical unit commanders.¹¹ An orthopedic specialist might train at Mass General, an internist at Penn, and an Army doc at an Army school. A senior doctor

commented that after WWI, an Army doctor who graduated from Leavenworth “specialized in sanitation, the care and discipline of the soldier, and more particularly, in transportation, administration, and the field tactics of the Medical Department.”¹² Maj. Gen. Sam Seeley, whose service career included being chief of surgery at Walter Reed General Hospital, recalled: “We of the Medical Corps of the Army were not specializing.”¹³ Instead, most Army doctors thought of military medicine as their specialty; they knew how to keep troops healthy (through sanitation, public health, and offering diversions to alcohol and prostitution), enough about trauma to care for the wounded, and how to organize medical support from the unit level up to planning major operations.¹⁴ They kept their responsibility to the Army in mind, as well as their responsibility to individual patients.

Senior Leadership Positions, 1941–50

In January 1941, Blesse was called to Washington to serve as the medical staff officer in the War Department General Staff G-4 office (analogous to the Department of the Army Staff), where he advised on medical supplies and hospitalization. In July, he became chief surgeon at US Army General Headquarters (GHQ). GHQ was responsible for training all ground forces based in the Continental United States, drafting operations plans for future operational theaters, and commanding theaters and task forces as assigned by the Army chief of staff. Blesse’s responsibilities were broader than the current Forces Command surgeon, or any of the combatant command surgeons. As US forces took defensive positions on British Caribbean and Atlantic islands, those garrisons fell under GHQ; Blesse, who was responsible for their health, argued—unsuccessfully—to add a doctor to the Caribbean Defense Command staff.¹⁵ He also developed medical support plans for the US troops occupying Iceland, and for various operations that never took place.

In March 1942, GHQ was retitled Army Ground Forces (AGF) and lost responsibility for the overseas garrisons and operations. This allowed Blesse to focus on the health of troops in training—by far the largest part of the Army at the time, around two million men—and on designing new medical units. AGF could add little to disease-prevention policies or epidemiological investigations; those were largely run from the Surgeon General’s Office even though it had only ‘dotted-line’ authority to AGF units and bases.¹⁶ Instead, Blesse’s team worked to make sure new units like airborne and armored divisions had adequate medical support. Existing units were organized to refight WWI, and thus AGF was reorganizing them based on new equipment and doctrine. Blesse was responsible for

designing medical support, including training, equipment, doctrine, and organization requirements, then overseeing the training so units would be ready to deploy. Unlike many headquarters at that time and today, AGF functioned as a military unit: personnel marched in formation to the headquarters building every morning and colors were carried and passed in review on Saturdays.¹⁷

Next, Blesse was sent to North Africa to be the chief surgeon of 5th Army when it was activated on 4 January 1943, a key assignment as 5th Army was the first army in action in WWII. Blesse was the personal selection of the new army commander, Lt. Gen. Mark Clark; he knew Clark from Fort Lewis and GHQ. The 5th Army's missions were manifold: preparing to defend the rear areas if fascist Spain declared war; training US forces; helping organize Free French forces; and supporting II Corps as it advanced into Tunisia.¹⁸ Blesse supervised medical training and troop health and sanitation. Due to a shortage of experienced officers, he drew up operational medical plans for the advance into Tunisia for others to implement.¹⁹ Additionally, Blesse was a member of an Army-wide board that examined unit organization, equipment, and supplies and made recommendations back to AGF. He also visited hospitals operating in his area that answered to the joint British-American theater command, Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ). Then on 31 January, Blesse learned he would move to AFHQ because Eisenhower—now Allied and US theater commander—wanted him there. Eisenhower preferred staff officers he personally knew, so Blesse's years in the Philippines were probably more important than the fact he was already in North Africa.

In March 1943, Blesse became chief surgeon for North African Theater of Operations, US Army (NATOUSA), the US component of AFHQ, and AFHQ deputy surgeon (reporting to a British superior).²⁰ During this time, Blesse was involved in activities large and small. At NATOUSA, he supported numerous operations and adapted many advances from civilian medicine for field use in the Army, part of his tremendous range of responsibilities.

During Blesse's years as theater surgeon, NATOUSA supported three invasions—Sicily, Italy, and Anzio—as well as troops in North Africa and continuing combat operations on the Italian mainland.²¹ Those operations all called for detailed planning and continuing care of casualties by NATOUSA hospitals. For Sicily, where a corps headquarters had to plan an army-sized invasion, the NATOUSA surgeon's office (Blesse and four other officers, with Blesse the only physician) actually did most of the medical planning for the US forces. Blesse's staff assigned medical units to the

invasion forces, even coordinating their movement to embarkation ports; coordinated US Navy, British, and invasion task force evacuation plans; arranged with the Army Air Forces for air evacuation; and coordinated reception for and hospitalization of casualties in North Africa.²² For the Salerno invasion, Fifth Army's staff was more robust, and Blesse's staff helped select units and plan supplies.²³

Blesse drew on still-developing clinical data about the safety of air evacuation and changed operational plans to include air evacuation of wounded from bridgeheads rather than relying on water evacuation. Instead of waiting days to be evacuated, patients could be moved in hours. This was good for patients since definitive care could start sooner, and for the whole medical system as well since fewer hospitals were needed. Blesse stayed abreast of operations by visiting hospitals and forward areas, including all three US amphibious invasions, and coming under fire.²⁴ As the theater matured and more US troops were in secure rear areas, a wide range of preventive medicine topics required more of his attention. Malaria and dysentery were still endemic, North Africa was experiencing a major bacillary dysentery epidemic, with rates peaking at 445 cases per thousand average strength in June 1943. Blesse was involved in both traditional methods to keep troops healthy such as sanitation and novel methods like new anti-malaria drugs and DDT to control both mosquitos and lice that spread disease.²⁵ Venereal disease was also a major problem; prostitution was legal, and rife, and GI pay was ample for various recreations. Blesse repeatedly advised theater leadership to put brothels off-limits, but he did not win the argument as medical matters were only one part of the larger question of diplomatic relations with the French.²⁶ Instead, the Army let soldiers get infected then treated them, perhaps easier to explain politically and diplomatically but an ethically questionable choice. The disease harmed individual soldiers and Army readiness. Blesse also established the first US policy in WWII for medical care of prisoners of war. The 1929 Geneva Convention required captors to provide medical care for prisoners of war; Blesse had to turn that into reality, but also husband resources.²⁷ His solution was to rely first on captured medical personnel and supplies then make US personnel, facilities, and supplies available when needed.²⁸ The approach provided the required medical care, while conserving US resources.

Blesse used his significant experience in Army medicine to integrate recently developed patient care improvements into Army practice. When sulfa drugs proved to only pause bacterial growth rather than kill bacteria, he directed doctors to appropriately modify their reliance on these drugs.²⁹

When plasma proved less effective than expected in treating physiological shock, Blesse oversaw development of a whole-blood supply system that saved lives—though his civilian-in-uniform colleagues did not always agree. Identifying whole blood as clinically superior to plasma was much easier than getting the Army to create a rapid and refrigerated supply chain solely for whole blood. Lt. Col. Edward Churchill, a Harvard Medical School professor commissioned in 1942, thought the Army (and Blesse) was not moving fast enough, and worked outside the chain of command; he wrote letters to friends in Washington, DC, and was interviewed by the *New York Times*. Blesse, who was working on the issue himself, criticized Churchill for his unorthodox methods; Churchill apparently viewed the criticism as a badge of honor. Instead, Blesse worked through proper channels and, within a few months, the Army had its whole blood supply and the relationship between Blesse and Churchill improved.³⁰ During this same period, Blesse and his staff were planning support for the invasion of Sicily and reorganizing forward surgery. They were very effective at juggling multiple priorities.

About this time, the US Army was faced with an unexpected problem: combat fatigue. Previously the Army had believed pre-induction screening could weed out any recruits who might break down in combat. As a result, “organized psychiatric effort was nonexistent” in the theater.³¹ That approach was not effective. Blesse quickly adopted a completely new conceptual model of psychiatric breakdown, including forward treatment of exhausted men, which remains the standard today.³² Blesse observed Capt. Frederick Hanson performing forward psychiatry with excellent results.³³ Judging from Hanson’s results rather than his rank, Blesse supported the young doctor’s work, picking him as the theater consultant—essentially technical adviser—in psychiatry; he arranged for Hanson to make a training film.³⁴ Based on Hanson’s research and other developments, the Army established the position of division psychiatrist to practice forward psychiatry. Hanson, who was the most combat-experienced psychiatrist in the Army at the time, became a lecturer for the initial mass training class of sixty. Though Blesse recommended Hanson for the lecturer role, he wrote to Surgeon General Norman Kirk: “I hope you will not find it necessary to keep [Hanson] there very long for I need him, and if you have no objection I would like to have him return here just as soon as possible.”³⁵ Forward treatment for combat fatigue helped more patients recover, and those patients recovered more quickly, allowing the Army to retain trained, experienced soldiers in theater. The ethical choice for the organization, and the nation, had different nuances than what an

individual soldier might have preferred—especially as there was no rotation policy; soldiers stayed in their unit until they were killed or medically evacuated, or the war ended. Returning to duty may not have been the best choice for the individual patient, but it was what the nation needed.

Blesse managed human resources effectively. To improve the quality of patient care, he shifted medical personnel to establish specialty hospitals—concentrating patients with a particular condition, such as hepatitis, at one hospital so the staff would see larger numbers of patients with the condition; he also improvised reconditioning centers to maximize return-to-duty rates.³⁶

In these various examples, Blesse worked well with a range of eminent medical specialists, doctors with far more clinical experience than he had. He had a surgical consultant, Lt. Col. Edward Churchill, and a medical consultant, Lt. Col. Perrin Long, who came straight from Johns Hopkins. Blesse used their expertise to improve medical care across the theater. For instance, Long was an expert in antibiotics and advised against excessive reliance on sulfas instead of surgery; he also recommended in mid-1943 that most penicillin available for medical purposes be used to treat venereal disease patients.³⁷ While the penicillin approach received mixed reviews from medical ethicists, Blesse agreed and implemented it to return soldiers to duty more quickly—clearly prioritizing Army interests over the individual.³⁸ Later when more penicillin became available, Blesse worked to have an officer in each hospital trained to use the drug so patients at all hospitals could benefit.³⁹ Blesse incorporated input from experts and research—as well as his own sense—to establish standards of practice across NATOUSA.⁴⁰ His team created “circular letters” that applied purely to the Medical Department, and did not require staff coordination. The messages were updated periodically, or customized for special circumstances such as forward surgery in amphibious operations. Other changes, such as adapting various units to provide effective forward surgery and hospitalization, required staffing. Blesse had solid credibility with non-medical officers to win arguments; he took the clinical expertise from others and transformed it into a workable Army solution.

In addition to medical decisions, Blesse had to deal with administrative matters in his role as NATOUSA chief surgeon. He worked well with the Army Air Forces medical staff, a capability that the Army Air Forces noted was unusual.⁴¹ He also dealt with political pressures to efficiently use professional personnel, especially doctors and dentists. Blesse arranged for NATOUSA to survey doctors about their education and ex-

perience then assigned specialists to be used to best effect; he even went to the press with the positive message about moving doctors from “desk jobs such as adjutant, registrar, and mess officer” and replacing them with Medical Administrative Corps officers.⁴² Blesse also disbanded some small hospitals and moved the personnel to larger hospitals, getting more treatment capacity from the same number of personnel.⁴³ Finally, Blesse worked to move older doctors out of combat units and into rear-area ones, arranged for rear-area assignments for wounded or injured medical officers rather than a return to combat, and tried to rotate doctors after two years with combat units.⁴⁴

Blesse was well aware that North Africa and the Mediterranean were important combat theaters but also testing grounds for upcoming major battles in France and Germany. In October 1943, about a month after the fighting ended, he provided material for a report on lessons from Army medical support during the Sicilian Campaign.⁴⁵ He also wrote to AGF colleagues on force structure topics, and encouraged consultants to visit from England to observe the latest developments.⁴⁶ The European Theater’s surgical consultant visited, collected a range of the NATOUSA circular letters as well as his own observations, then returned to England to help adjust US policy and pass the information to the British.⁴⁷ Blesse also approved a NATOUSA *Medical Bulletin* with articles of clinical use in the theater. He wrote an editorial in each issue, including one that reminded doctors of their collective responsibility to the Army and that they should return soldiers to duty as quickly as possible:

There appears to be a tendency . . . to concentrate on the more serious cases and to lose interest in those who are recovering. As a result, many convalescents are overlooked, and are not promptly returned to duty.⁴⁸

Blesse’s credibility with his commander was important in handling one particularly sensitive moment. When Lt. Gen. George Patton slapped two soldiers in Sicily, Blesse received the information through medical channels. He faced an ethical dilemma: was the event sufficiently important to report to Eisenhower? If he did not, would Patton—unreported and unchecked—continue to endanger the health of soldiers in hospitals? Blesse took the report to Eisenhower, then personally delivered Eisenhower’s hand-written reprimand to Patton. Eisenhower also instructed Blesse to fully investigate the matter but keep things quiet.⁴⁹ Although no notes remain from any of the interviews, Eisenhower obviously trusted Blesse as an officer and gentleman and not just as a physician.

While Blesse was respected, he was not perfect. When warned about a November 1943 typhus epidemic in Naples, he ignored offers of assistance from both the United States of America Typhus Commission (a joint military-civilian organization) and the British Typhus Commission for six weeks. While there were only three cases among US military personnel, who had been vaccinated against typhus, the disease spread quickly among the civilian population—in part because of Blesse's inaction; the epidemic eventually affected military logistic routes through Naples.⁵⁰ It was clear that the Allies—primarily the United States—would need to provide medical and sanitary supplies to help fight the epidemic, but the specific roles for the Civil Affairs and Military Government groups had not been established at that point. It probably further muddied the waters that 5th Army's head of Military Government, Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Edgar Hume, was a doctor with considerable public health experience and expertise. Blesse let events unfold instead of pushing for a solution.

In May 1944, Brigadier General Blesse returned to Army Ground Forces, a lateral move; his replacement in North Africa was a major general, indirectly reflecting the level of responsibility with Blesse's previous position. Back in Washington, Blesse continued to seek advisors, trying to add a dentist and veterinarian to his staff to gain expertise.⁵¹ He continued to monitor health conditions at training camps, and inspect medical units training for deployment. Blesse also reviewed suggestions from combat theaters for changes to standard unit organization and equipment to identify any with lasting value; to help, he tried to get experienced officers rotated onto his staff.⁵² Thanks to his experience with Army staffing, Blesse received reports through staff channels that had been reviewed by commanders instead of just accepting what doctors said they wanted.⁵³ One major concern was the need to recruit more physically fit men into combat units; the Army adopted a physical profile system in 1944 while he was ground surgeon. Blesse also stressed making individual soldiers responsible for their own health; troops going to Europe were instructed on how to prevent trench-foot and those bound for the Pacific received training on how to avoid tropical disease. Blesse retired for age in 1948 but the next day was recalled to duty and stayed until 1950. His input was still desired regarding new equipment, maximizing use of professional personnel, and efficient organization of units.⁵⁴

In hindsight, Blesse's highest-profile action may have been winning approval for the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital.⁵⁵ Starting in early 1943, Blesse had worked on ways to push resuscitative surgery forward on the

battlefield. After efforts to mitigate surgery delays failed in Tunisia, he organized new methods that were implemented in Sicily, then arranged for a statistical study that identified where the wounded were dying, stratified by echelon of care.⁵⁶ The results demonstrated the value of putting field hospital platoons and surgical teams at the division clearing station, and showed that pushing them farther forward would have very limited effects if it were possible. Blesse continued to monitor the function and attempted to improve battlefield surgery. Though one proposal failed in August 1944, he used his experience and effective staff work to implement improvements in mid-June 1945—despite opposition from Army Service Forces and some Army Medical Department surgeons.

Conclusion

Brigadier General Blesse had a successful career as an Army doctor, with the emphasis on Army. Though knowledgeable about medicine, he seldom practiced it after 1924; instead, Blesse was a medical leader, leading as both a commander and a staff officer. He effectively integrated emerging medical practices and personnel into the Army, reorganized and equipped units to accommodate personnel and equipment shortages, and brought the best medical practices to soldiers. His effectiveness was due not to his clinical acumen but his understanding of medical support and the realization that preventive and curative medical requirements must be tailored to meet exigencies both in garrison and on campaign. Blesse balanced military and medical ethical imperatives. He directed public health measures that kept soldiers healthy, but at times was overruled because of diplomatic priorities that required the Army to do as much as possible to protect the force. Blesse organized and reorganized medical support to benefit the individual soldier within the resource constraints of the overall force—and sought more resources to do more. He worked to provide the best medical care to troops, through improvements like whole blood and penicillin, but also prioritized some penicillin to maximize the number of troops who returned to duty. Where possible, Blesse rotated doctors from forward areas, reminding them to return patients to duty as quickly as possible. He took quick and unequivocal action when Lieutenant General Patton slapped soldiers, part of a range of ethical choices that Frederick Blesse had to make as both a doctor and an officer. Army doctors cannot focus solely on patients; they must ethically balance the needs of the Army and the needs of individual patients.

Notes

1. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession* (Washington, DC: 2015). For military medicine, see Ronald F. Bellamy, ed., *Military Medical Ethics*, vol. 1 and vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 2003).
2. See Stephen Craig, "Evolution of Military Public Health Education, 1893–1966," *Army Medical Department Journal* (April–June 2006): 7–17 for more about the Army Medical School.
3. Regarding the Medical Officers Training Camp, see the *Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1919*, 1128–34 (hereafter *ARSG* with year).
4. For more on ambulance company and field hospital training, see William Bispham, *Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War, VII, Training* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1927), chap. 4. For doctrine, see *Manual for the Medical Department, U.S. Army, 1916* (Washington, DC: War Department, 1918), 207–16.
5. For his time in Panama, see *ARSG 1921*, 199, and *ARSG 1922*, 208–9; for Fort Omaha, see *ARSG 1924*, 276.
6. NARA RG112 Entry N(Posts) (Carlisle 315) boxes 41, 45, 47.
7. *ARSG 1933*, 161; *ARSG 1934*, 148; and *ARSG 1935*, 142.
8. Full-time assignment to the mission was 1 March 1938, when Blesse's two years in the Philippines was extended a year. Blesse was not the first physician on MacArthur's staff. Maj. Howard Hutter was a friend of MacArthur's and provided medical care to the mission, and to MacArthur's mother, who accompanied him to Manila. Daniel Holt and James Leyerzapf, *Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 1905–1941* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 293. Although Blesse outranked Hutter, many American Military Mission records were lost when the Japanese occupied Manila in 1942, so it is not clear how responsibilities were reorganized when Blesse was assigned to the mission.
9. *Annual Report of the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army 1936* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1937), 8–9. See also Roman Salacup, "History of the Medical Service Armed Forces of the Philippines," *Military Surgeon* 104, no. 3 (March 1949): 183–87.
10. Blesse to MG Charles Reynolds, 4 Nov 1938. I am obliged to Col. (Retired) James Blesse, who provided copies of his father's WWII diary and other papers that are now on file in the Army Medical Department Center of History and Heritage, Fort Sam Houston, TX. See also Frederick Blesse, "The Filipino Fighting Man: An Appraisal of the Men Charged with Defending the Philippine Commonwealth," *Philippines* 1, no. 8 (November 1941): 6–7.
11. Merritte Ireland, "The Duties and Responsibilities of the Medical Department in the Formulation of Mobilization Plans," *Military Surgeon* 55, no. 1 (July 1924): 1–9; and "Keeping Abreast of the Times: Specialization–Generalization," *Medico-Military Review for the Medical Department* 4, no. 8 (15 April 1921): 102–4.

12. James L. Bevans, "The Function of Medical and Surgical Consulting Staffs Determined by the Experience of the Late War," *Military Surgeon* 46, no. 5 (May 1920): 465–506, 484.

13. Quoted in Albert Cowdrey, *The Medics' War* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1987), 14.

14. For more about the profession of military medicine, see Bobby Wintermute, *Public Health and the U.S. Military: A History of the Army Medical Department, 1818–1917* (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2011), especially 72–74.

15. Ebbe Hoff, *Medical Department, U.S. Army, Preventive Medicine in World War II, VIII, Civil Affairs/Military Government Public Health Activities* (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1976), 112.

16. Charles Wiltse, *Medical Department, U.S. Army, Organization and Administration in World War II* (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1963), 52, 49

17. *A Short History of the Army Ground Forces* (Army Ground Forces, c. 1946), accessed 4 February 2014, <http://www.history.army.mil/books/agf/AGF002/index.htm>.

18. "Fifth Army History, Part I: From Activation to the Fall of Naples," HQ Fifth Army, 27 October 1944, chap. 1 and 2, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll8/id/1451>.

19. Blesse Diary, 23 and 30 December 1942; 1, 3, 8, and 31 January 1943; and 24 and 26 February 1943.

20. For a description of the NATOUSA medical organization, see W. Paul Havens Jr., *Medical Department, U.S. Army, Internal Medicine in World War II, I, Activities of Medical Consultants* (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1961), 152–54, and "History of the American Medical Section, AFHQ," 10 November 1945, RG112 entry 31, box 241.

21. See Charles Wiltse, *The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History), 1964, chap. 3 to 7 and 9 for an overview of medical support during the period Blesse was in the Mediterranean.

22. See "Hospitalization and Evacuation During the Sicilian Campaign," RG112 entry 31 box 246; and "Historical Report, Medical Section Fifth Army 27 July–31 December 1943," RG 407 Box 2378, NARA.

23. "Historical Report, Medical Section, Fifth Army 27 July–31 December 1943," NARA RG407 box 2378.

24. Blesse Diary, 20 July, 1 August, 24 September–1 October 1943, and 2 and 5 February 1944.

25. Havens, *Medical Consultants, I*, 170–79, 224–25; Ebbe Hoff, ed., *Medical Department, U.S. Army, Preventive Medicine in World War II, IV, Communicable Diseases Transmitted Chiefly Through Respiratory and Alimentary Tracts* (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1958), 362–70.

26. Ebbe Hoff, ed., *Medical Department, U.S. Army, Preventive Medicine in World War II, V, Communicable Diseases Transmitted Through Contact or*

By Unknown Means (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1960), 5, 204–12.

27. “Convention of July 27, 1929, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,” article 12.

28. Wiltse, *Mediterranean*, 201–3; Havens, *Medical Consultants, I*, 193–208; and Blesse Diary, 8 and 12 May 1943.

29. Edward Churchill, *Surgeon to Soldiers: Diary and Records of the Surgical Consultant Allied Force Headquarters, World War II* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1972), 63–67; see also B. Noland Carter, *Medical Department, U.S. Army, Activities of Surgical Consultants, I* (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1962), 42–3.

30. Churchill, *Surgeon to Soldiers*, 48–55, 81–82; Douglas Kendrick, *Medical Department, U.S. Army, Blood Program in WWII* (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1964), especially 54–57, 391–95; and Carter, *Activities of Surgical Consultants I*, 141–43, 338, 525. This may have encouraged Blesse to engage the press himself: he gave at least one interview to the *Times* and was interviewed for two radio programs. “Medical Shift in Algiers,” *New York Times*, 4 December 1943, 7; Blesse Diary, 19 June 1943 and 28 February 1944.

31. Albert Glass and Robert Bernucci, *Medical Department, U.S. Army, Neuropsychiatry in World War II, II, Overseas Theaters* (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1973), 1.

32. Glass and Bernucci, 1, 11, 26.

33. Hanson had trained as a neuropsychiatrist in Canada then joined the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps and was in England when US forces deployed there. He transferred to the US Army, and thus brought British experience in psychiatry that was more advanced than US practice.

34. Glass and Bernucci, *Neuropsychiatry, I*, 66n.

35. Glass and Bernucci, 408–9; and Wiltse, *Mediterranean*, 254n. See also Kirk’s letter to Blesse thanking him for sending Hanson, 23 December 1943, RG 112 entry 31AJ, box 4.

36. Wiltse, *Mediterranean*, 194–96, 216–17; and Churchill, *Surgeon to Soldiers*, 214–17.

37. Churchill, 63–67; Havens, *Activities of Medical Consultants, I*, 185–86. Sources consistently mentioned “medical penicillin” and since Army hospitals of the time were divided into medical, surgical, and neuropsychiatric elements, it is possible other penicillin was available for surgical patients, including the wounded.

38. See Gerald R. Winslow, *Triage and Justice* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1982), 1–11; and Henry K. Beecher, *Research and the Individual: Human Studies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 209–10.

39. Blesse to Kirk, 6 February 1944, RG 112 entry 31AJ box 4.

40. A number are in Mather Cleveland, ed., *Medical Department, U.S. Army, Orthopedic Surgery in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1957), 299–316.

41. Wiltse, *Organization and Administration*, 272.
42. Charles Wiltse, ed., *Medical Department, U.S. Army, Personnel in World War II* (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1963), 281–83; and “Medical Shift in Algiers,” *New York Times*, 4 December 1943. The Medical Administrative Corps was a predecessor of the Medical Service Corps.
43. Wiltse, 301.
44. Wiltse, 334.
45. “Medical Problems in the Recent Sicilian Campaign,” Monthly Progress Report—Health, Army Service Forces, October 1943, 10–11.
46. Blesse Diary, 16–18 April, 31 May 1943, and 15 February 1944.
47. B. Noland Carter, ed., *Medical Department, U.S. Army, Activities of Surgical Consultants, II* (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1964), 121–27, 181. See also Kenneth Allen, *Medical Department, United States Army, Radiology in World War II* (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1966), 419 et seq.
48. “Keep ’Em Fighting,” *Medical Bulletin of the North African Theater of Operations* 1, no. 3 (March 1944): 1.
49. For more on the slapping episode, see Stephen Ambrose, *The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower* (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 228–30; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York, Doubleday, 1948), 179–81. Blesse was oblique in his diary, simply mentioning going to see Patton: Blesse Diary, 18 and 20 August 1943.
50. For more on the epidemic, see Wiltse, *Mediterranean*, 363–65; Ebbe Hoff, *Medical Department, U.S. Army, Preventive Medicine in World War II, IV, Communicable Diseases Arthropodborne Diseases Other than Malaria* (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1964), 214–31; and Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1964), especially chap. 12.
51. Wiltse, *Organization and Administration*, 129.
52. Wiltse, 129–31.
53. Blesse to MG Albert Kenner (SHAEF Surgeon), 19 July 1944, NARA RG337, Special Staff, box 26.
54. “Report of War Department Equipment Board,” 1946, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll11/id/1109>; George Jeffcott, *Medical Department, U.S. Army, United States Army Dental Service in World War II* (Washington DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1955), 294–97; and Jacob Devers, *Postwar Report, Army Ground-Field Forces* (Fort Monroe, VA: Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, 1949).
55. For more detail, see Sanders Marble, “Forward Surgery and Combat Hospitals: The Origins of the MASH,” *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 69, no. 1 (2014): 68–100.
56. “Medical Problems in the Recent Sicilian Campaign,” Monthly Progress Report.

SECTION III
STEWARDSHIP

Stewardship Introduction

C. Anthony Pfaff

Stewardship is an expression of the fiduciary responsibility that Army professionals have to the society they serve. The core virtue associated with stewardship is prudence. As Aristotle observed, prudent leaders consider the good not just for themselves, but all persons whom their decisions will affect.¹ Moreover, the “good” in this context is not simply the satisfaction of individual desire or interest. Aristotle understood it broadly and in terms of what is necessary for humans to flourish and thrive. Determining what those conditions are, much less how to promote them, is beyond the capabilities of the Army professional. What they can and should do, however, is understand how the profession contributes to that greater good and act within their means to promote it.

In pursuing this greater good, Dubik argued that prudence is a moral obligation of the Army professional, even in war. Prudence, in his view, is the exercise of sound judgment that avoids the extremes of taking too much or too little risk. It is synonymous with the Aristotelian notion of “practical wisdom,” which he indicated is the virtue that connects other virtues to action.² It is not enough to act courageously; one must also have the prudence and practical wisdom to identify the right, courageous course of action. According to Dubik, prudence “lies at the very heart of *jus in bello*’s war-waging responsibilities.”³

In warfighting, prudence manifests itself in the obligation to protect the force. War requires soldiers to risk their lives but prohibits their commanders from doing so foolishly. There is a difference between taking prudent risks and gambling. The former is the result of a collaborative and rigorous process, given time and other constraints, while the latter relies more on individual instinct. Dubik pointed out that while some leaders have better instincts than others, there is no “Clausewitzian genius” able to handle the complexity of warfare alone.

As stated in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession*, stewardship is a fundamental condition for trust.⁴ To gain that trust, Army professionals—as stewards of the profession—must actively prepare for the Army’s future vitality. At the individual level, good stewards promote the well-being of each person in the organization. At the organizational level, they work to build effective teams.⁵ Moreover,

promoting that individual and team well-being requires leaders to ensure all persons and organizations reflect the principles, values, and character of the Army profession.

Notes

1. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1800.
2. David Wiggins, "Deliberation and Practical Reason," in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ed., *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 222.
3. James M. Dubik, *Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2016), 99.
4. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession* (Washington, DC: 2015), 5-1.
5. Aaron Churchill et al., "What Is Stewardship and Should All Great Leaders Practice It?," *New York Times*, accessed 22 June 2020, <https://nytimesineducation.com/spotlight/what-is-stewardship-and-should-all-great-leaders-practice-it/>.

Army Ethic Principle 8

C. Anthony Pfaff

*We embrace and uphold the Army Values and standards of the profession, always accountable to each other and the American people for our decisions and actions.*¹

Being competent requires expertise in discerning the ethical dimensions associated with professional practice. In doing so, an Army professional upholds the values of the profession. From an institutional perspective, fulfilling this moral imperative requires the ability to hold professionals accountable for their actions as professionals. The accountability requirement underscores why a sense of corporateness and an associated bureaucracy are necessary for the health of the Army profession, despite tension that can arise when bureaucratic requirements and professional demands conflict.

The Army, of course, uses a number of methods to hold its professionals accountable. The most obvious is the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which is a minimum standard that works coercively. An individual who failed to uphold the code in many circumstances would be removed from the profession.² Much of professional life, however, involves striving for unattainable excellence. It makes sense, then, to invest in norms that express that ideal but do not come with the sanctions associated with a legal code.

Army core values and the Soldiers' Creed are examples of other such norms. They provide a means by which members of the profession—whether superior, subordinate, or peer—can assess, question, and shape expectations for professional behavior. These values and creeds also underscore that the best accountability comes from within. External concerns such as simple self-interest and fear of sanction are seldom sufficient to motivate the effort and sacrifice that soldiering requires. Such an external view of motivation is perfectly fine in a bureaucracy, but in a professional context sets conditions for moral failure when the perceived threat of sanction is remote and the possibility of harm is great. Rather, members of the profession must have an internal view of their profession, the service it provides, and the values necessary to ethically provide that service.

Professionals with an internal view see such values as *their* values and a failure to uphold those values as a compromise of *their identity*. It is not enough to know the difference between right and wrong, or to simply believe that something is valuable. As discussed previously, the Army

profession is a *calling*; that knowledge, and those values, must translate into a motive to act. For that action to be moral, an individual must also understand how the profession serves the greater good and shapes actions to serve that good, not simply the profession.

In Chapter 10, Lt. Col. Mark J. Balboni describes instances when senior military leaders failed to adequately hold soldiers accountable, with a resulting corrosive effect on discipline that eventually led to war crimes. Of particular interest is the effect of perhaps well-intentioned, but poorly conceived, guidance by General George S. Patton. His actions led to a failure to uphold “benevolent quarantine,” a soldier’s obligation to accept the surrender of enemy soldiers and, once in custody, feed, house, and protect them.³ This example suggests that leaders need to *explicitly* consider the Army ethic even when forming what appears to be practical guidance. Fortunately, other professionals took the initiative—at great personal risk—to ensure the story of these atrocities was told and at least some of those responsible were held accountable. So, while this story focuses on moral failure, it also demonstrates moral courage.

Notes

1. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession* (Washington, DC: 2015), 2-6.

2. Chris Bray, *Court-Martial: How Military Justice Has Shaped America from the Revolution to 9/11 and Beyond* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2016).

3. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 5th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 46–47.

Chapter 10

Corruption of Conscience:

George Patton and the Biscari Massacres

Lt. Col. Mark J. Balboni

American soldiers are expected to serve honorably and uphold the commonly held values of the United States through their conduct on and off the battlefield. In representing the nation through their actions, they are held to highest levels of conduct. It is not enough to win on the battlefield; the American soldier is expected to win with honor and integrity by maintaining the moral high ground. During the invasion of Sicily in 1943, some US soldiers disregarded that responsibility and instead followed what they believed was their senior commander's guidance on how prisoners of war should be treated. The murders that occurred at Biscari demonstrated that, like the enemy, American soldiers were capable of conducting heinous acts on the battlefield. But these individuals chose to do something that was morally reprehensible for American soldiers. Even if some soldiers lose their moral virtue and conduct atrocities, the Army must respond appropriately to the crimes, ensuring that the values of the American soldier are upheld.

The Biscari massacres have remained relatively unknown compared to the more familiar Malmedy massacres or the Bataan Death March that involved the murder of American personnel.¹ The United States launched concerted information campaigns to tell the world about wartime atrocities committed by its enemies, but the US Army worked to conceal similar immoral actions by its soldiers. The Army hid these shameful acts from not only the enemy but from the American public back home. US military leaders feared national outrage if it became known that American soldiers were capable of such crimes. This lack of public information on these atrocities left the American people believing that only the enemy could commit such malfeasance.

The murder of prisoners of war and other war crimes go far beyond the local battlefield and have operational and strategic effects. These effects can change the course of an operation, a campaign, a war—or even affect future national strategy. This was especially true because the commander involved in the Biscari murders was arguably the most successful and well-known American operational commander of the war.

The story of the American Army during World War II cannot be told without recalling the charismatic George Patton. He was the hero of North

Africa then an embarrassment for slapping soldiers with post-traumatic stress disorder in Sicily. His star rose once again with the employment of 3rd Army across France, and his legendary status was cemented with his brilliant command performance during the Battle of the Bulge, followed quickly by his death shortly after the end of the war. Patton was representative of a wartime military leader: tough, decisive, and aggressive. The lore ignores his toxic behavior and remembers his battlefield glory. When objectively assessed against modern views of leadership, Patton was a dichotomy—excelling on the battlefield but clearly failing in ethical morality.

The story of the Biscari massacre is not only one of moral failure; the resulting reactions illustrate individual courage as well. While some US soldiers participated, others identified that immoral actions had occurred and rejected that behavior as unacceptable. They took a stand for their own moral beliefs of right and wrong, regardless of what their higher commander thought. These soldiers knew that the murders were immoral and upheld their personal ethical values by reporting these crimes and ensuring they were investigated. They forced investigations regardless of how it might affect their own careers, because they knew right from wrong and stuck with their core moral beliefs.

Setting the Stage: The 45th Infantry Division

In 1940, the 45th Infantry Division participated in the largest maneuvers in US Army history.² Involving more than 400,000 soldiers, the Louisiana Maneuvers tested Army concepts and doctrine to validate the capabilities of a rapidly expanding Army after years of neglect. While many senior commanders involved in the maneuvers retired due to old age over the next year, other Army officers who shaped the Army during WWII earned their initial fame during the Louisiana Maneuvers. Using antiquated equipment, the poorly trained 45th Infantry Division soldiers did not inspire confidence through their execution of the maneuvers. They did, however, have a single bright spot during the initial exercise. They pushed back an attack by the 2nd Armored Division, then commanded by Maj. Gen. George Patton, in the decisive battle during the first phase of the exercise.³ Despite poor performance overall during the maneuvers, the division was called to active duty a month later as the Army continued its preparations to go to war. The 45th Infantry Division conducted combat training in Oklahoma, Texas, Massachusetts, and New York before moving to Virginia for final training and embarkation for North Africa.⁴

The division arrived in North Africa on 22 June 1943 and immediately began final rehearsals for Operation Husky, as the invasion of Sicily

would be known. The 45th Infantry Division was assigned to II Corps, part of the newly activated American 7th Army, and assigned the mission of guarding the British 8th Army's left flank during the invasion. The 1st Infantry Division simultaneously landed to the west of the 45th Infantry Division while elements of the 82nd Airborne dropped behind the beaches to prevent Italian and German forces from counterattacking against the II Corps beachheads.⁵



Figure 10.1. Map of Operation Husky Invasion of Sicily, July 1943. Created by Army University Press.

At the end of the 45th Infantry Division rehearsal exercise, now-Lieutenant General Patton gave an inspirational speech to the 45th Infantry Division. Soldiers who were not in attendance were told Patton's guidance by their chain of command. Although no written record of the speech exists, Capt. John Compton swore under oath at his trial that he remembered Patton's speech verbatim:

When we land against the enemy, don't forget to hit him and hit him hard. We will bring the fight home to him. We will show him no mercy. He has killed thousands of your comrades, and he must die. If you company officers in leading your men against the enemy find him shooting at you and, when you get within two hundred yards of him and he wishes to surrender, oh no! That bastard will die! You will kill him. Stick him between the third and fourth ribs. You will tell your men that.

They must have the killer instinct. Tell them to stick him. He can do no good then. Stick them in the liver. We will get the name of killers and killers are immortal. When word reaches him that he is being faced by a killer battalion, a killer outfit, he will fight less. Particularly, we must build up that name as killers and you will get that down to your troops in time for the invasion.⁶

As the first joint Allied invasion, Operation Husky served as the initial building block for future invasions in regard to planning and execution and the necessity for thorough planning when conducting joint multi-domain operations. These lessons were learned in blood as Husky began to go awry from the very beginning. The plan was for airborne operations to prevent reinforcement of the Axis fortifications along the beaches by forces further inland so that Allied invasion forces would meet minimal resistance during the invasion. Instead, half of the airborne units missed their assigned targets because of high winds and coordination issues with the Army Air Force; because of additional coordination issues between the maritime and air domains, twenty-three friendly transport aircraft were shot out of the sky by Allied naval forces.⁷ The paratroopers who did land were separated from each other and away from their intended land zones but were able to disrupt the Axis response; as small groups of paratroopers came together to attack any German and Italian units they found, regardless of whether they were the originally intended target. During these initial days of the Sicily campaign, Allied troops linking up with II Corps began hearing stories about heinous acts by Italians and Germans who murdered captured paratroopers. Additionally, the troops found bodies of paratroopers.

While most Allied seaborne landings hit their assigned landing objectives, the 45th Infantry Division was widely spread out. Luckily the Axis defenders had planned to counterattack the Allies back into the sea instead of employing strong defenses along the entire coastline, so their initial resistance against the landings was minimal. This gave the Allies time to correct mistakes involving the 45th Infantry Division. Among the issues: overly efficient naval transport crews caused a landing battalion to circle back when the landing was delayed, the division paymaster accidentally being part of the initial landing force—with all of the division's pay, and a 45th Infantry Division regimental commander accidentally dropped off by a landing craft on a 1st Infantry Division beach.⁸ While the Allies consolidated their landing forces, Italian and German ground forces moved toward the beach to counterattack the landing force, but the Axis units were having their own challenges.

To help minimize coordination issues for the combined-joint operation, British and American planners designated American and British sectors, but challenges still arose. Air support in the American sectors was severely limited in the first forty-eight hours until airfields could be seized for use by American fighters. Boundary coordination issues developed between the American 7th Army and British 8th Army, resulting in numerous challenges to both field armies and lasting hard feelings toward both US and British commanders. While the Allies slowly worked through their problems, the Axis partnership achieved new levels of dysfunction and ineptness.

Due to previous poor performance of Italian forces during the war, German commanders had little confidence in Italian fighting capabilities. The mutual distrust often resulted in Italian and German units having no idea where nominally friendly units were located. Axis attacks were conducted piecemeal as German armor and Italian infantry would be committed independently instead of as combined arms force. As a result, the Allies defeated these attacks by exploiting attacking force deficiencies of either armor or infantry then consolidated and reinforced their landing positions under outstanding fire support provided by Allied naval forces.

The German counterattack force consisted of elements of the *Fallschirm-Panzerdivision* 1 Hermann Göring. The *Fallschirm-Panzerdivision* 1 was a *Luftwaffe* armored division that started the war as Göring's personal bodyguards and grew into a larger combat role without losing any of its original fanaticism. The Hermann Göring Division replaced the 15th *Panzer Grenadier* Division as the southernmost German armored unit in Sicily. The *Fallschirm-Panzerdivision* 1 had plenty of tanks within its formation but minimal infantry support. This caused challenges during 11

July 1943 counterattacks near Gela to drive the Allies into the Mediterranean, because the armor attacked with limited infantry support.

The 1st Battalion of the 180th Infantry Regiment under Lt. Col. William Schaefer fought a pair of violent actions against elements of the *Fallschirm-Panzerdivision 1*.⁹ The German armor forces deployed their heavy Tiger tanks, which could only operate on roads; dense local vegetation prevented the optimal use of armor. The 1st Battalion initially performed well. The German armor failed to coordinate attacks with their supporting infantry or often even with other tanks. The fight turned into an unorganized melee. The local German commander pulled back, consolidated his forces, then hastily re-attacked the 1st Battalion. His troops captured Lieutenant Colonel Schaefer and some of his men while the remainder of Schaefer's force escaped toward the beach. The German armor attack was eventually defeated by 3rd Battalion, 180th Infantry Regiment, and the remaining elements of the *Fallschirm-Panzerdivision 1* withdrew. Within the first forty hours of the invasion, 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry Regiment replaced key leaders at the battalion level—leaders who might have prevented the coming atrocities.

The 180th Infantry Regiment continued to engage with the *Fallschirm-Panzerdivision 1* and Italian forces as they attacked toward the Biscari Airfield. Persistent ambushes and fighting withdrawals caused heavy casualties during company and battalion attacks as the Allied troops slogged toward their objective through challenging terrain. The constant enemy contact kept the soldiers of the 180th on edge as they had not yet learned the essential battlefield skill of when to sleep in combat. With each passing hour, stress and sleep deprivation continued to degrade both soldier and leader cognitive abilities. Their diminished mental cognition, combined with anger and frustration from watching friends being wounded and killed, may have driven them toward choices they would not have made if better rested and mentally prepared.¹⁰

The Loss of Virtue: The Murder of Enemy Prisoners of War

The fighting was initially intense then temporarily died down as elements of the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry Regiment secured their objective: control of Biscari Airfield. Securing the airfield helped improve close air support and fighter cover for American forces. American air elements could fly from the closer captured airfields to assist the Allied advance through Sicily instead of flying sorties from North Africa across the Mediterranean Sea. Along with capturing key terrain near the airfield, the American forces captured forty-eight enemy soldiers.




Figure 10.2. Map of Biscari Airfield Attack. Created by Army University Press.

The battalion executive officer, Maj. Roger Denman, was the senior officer in the formation; he ordered forty-five Italian and three German prisoners moved to the rear for questioning. Major Denman's guidance may have inadvertently encouraged the murders that followed. Denman ordered his soldiers to move the captured prisoners "to the rear, off the road, where they would not be conspicuous, and hold them for questioning."¹¹ By this point, the soldiers had already searched the prisoners and removed their weapons. Many of the prisoners had their shirts and shoes taken as well to identify that they had been captured and to discourage escape.

The detail had moved approximately a mile away from the point of capture when the noncommissioned officer in charge, Sgt. Horace T. West, ordered the soldiers and prisoners to halt. West ordered the prisoners to separate into two groups. He selected eight or nine of the youngest prisoners to be taken to the regimental intelligence officer for interrogation under the belief that younger soldiers would be more likely to provide information. About forty remaining prisoners were taken off the road and lined up.

Sergeant West then asked First Sgt. Haskell Brown for his submachine gun. When Brown asked why he needed the weapon, West replied that he was going to "kill the sons of bitches."¹² Brown handed over the weapon despite the comment, and West began murdering the prisoners. He walked through the carnage as he reloaded the weapon, firing additional rounds into the chests of any gunned-down prisoners who were still moving. No one tried to stop West.

Approximately thirty minutes after the shooting, Lt. Col. William E. King, the 45th Infantry Division chaplain, discovered the bodies of the murdered prisoners. Finding dead Italian and German soldiers was not out of the ordinary in Sicily at the time, but these victims were clearly captured prisoners. King correctly identified that something horrific had occurred. At his earliest opportunity, he reported the murders to the division chain of command.¹³ The first Biscari Massacre executions were being discussed as more were about to occur.

Capt. John Compton's C Company, 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry Regiment was engaged in heavy fighting with Italian forces on the other side of the airfield from Sergeant West. Captain Compton had stayed awake for the first three days of the invasion and had only slept for an hour the previous evening; the stress of commanding in combat had prevented him from sleeping longer. The company received heavy direct and indirect fire as they secured their objective. Italian snipers were targeting wounded Americans along with medical personnel working on the wounded—even

though the 1864, 1906, and 1929 Geneva Conventions prohibited attacks on medics and wounded soldiers. The enemy heavy fire resulted in twelve casualties from the 2nd Platoon alone.¹⁴

During the attack, Private Raymond Marlow surprised an Italian soldier, who disappeared into a bunker and returned with thirty-five additional Italian soldiers who surrendered to the Americans. Wearing a mixture of uniforms and civilian clothing, the Italians were tactically questioned by Sgt. Jim Hair, with Private John Gazzetti serving as the translator. The prisoners remained silent throughout, including when Hair asked if they had been involved in the sniping. Hair then took the prisoners to his platoon leader, 1st Lt. Richard Blanks.¹⁵

Unsure how the prisoners should be handled, Blanks asked Captain Compton how he would like to proceed. Captain Compton asked if the captured prisoners had been the ones sniping his soldiers. When Blanks confirmed that they were, Captain Compton replied: "Tell Sergeant Hair to execute the prisoners."¹⁶ Hair then organized a detail of eleven soldiers with Browning automatic rifles and Thompson submachine guns, who marched the prisoners to the edge of a nearby ridge. Compton gave the order to commence firing and the soldiers continued shooting until thirty-six prisoners lay dead.

The 45th Infantry Division officers recognized the massacres as crimes and notified Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley to press charges. When Bradley informed Patton about the atrocities, he brushed aside Bradley's concerns. His only concern was how the story would be viewed back in the United States:

I told Bradley that it was probably an exaggeration, but in any case to tell the officer to certify that the dead men were snipers or had attempted to escape or something, as it would make a stink in the press and also would make the civilians mad. Anyhow, they are dead, so nothing can be done about it.¹⁷

Patton clearly knew American Army moral expectations but, instead of reinforcing those high standards and ordering an in-depth investigation into the matter, he attempted to subvert those values with his own. This was in stark contrast to Bradley, who learned about the massacres and immediately went to talk to Captain Compton himself to understand what had happened. While Bradley chose to investigate, Patton viewed the incident as a minor distraction. When the 45th Division Inspector General's report confirmed that the prisoners had been murdered, Patton finally allowed Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton, the 45th Infantry Division commander, to try the accused for their crimes.¹⁸

The Trials

German and Italian forces retreated back to the Italian mainland, and Sicily was secured by the Allies on 17 August 1943. Captain Compton fell ill and returned temporarily to North Africa to be treated, so Sergeant West was the initial defendant to stand trial. Only Compton and West would be tried in courts-martial. The Army view was that the soldiers who conducted the second set of executions were following Compton's orders and thus not culpable based on the doctrine and policies of the time. None of the personnel with West were tried either—not even First Sergeant Brown, who gave his submachine gun to West. Sergeant West's court-martial began on 2 September 1943 and lasted all of two days, including witness testimonies and sentencing.

West pled not guilty to the murder charges. His counsel initially attempted a temporary insanity defense, indicating that West had been traumatized by combat and was likely suffering from what is now known as post-traumatic stress disorder. The attorneys claimed this was caused by having seen American prisoners of war murdered by Italian forces. Despite the possible logic of this defense, West had been medically assessed as understanding his actions and medically cleared as fit to stand trial. With the insanity defense denied because of his initial medical report evaluation, the defense brought up Patton's speech as a possible cause for the killing, that Sergeant West was just following orders.

His attorneys only mentioned in passing that West was following Patton's orders; that was not the focus of their client's defense. This was likely because the defense team was comprised of members of the unit detailed to perform trial defense functions rather than lawyers. Members of West's chain of command, including his regimental commander, Col. Forrest Cookson testified that the unit received aggressive guidance from Patton and that he had repeated the speech verbatim to the members of the regiment who did not hear it in person.

At the end of his short trial, West was found guilty of premeditated murder but only received a sentence of life imprisonment. Because of his previous good conduct and character, he was not given a dishonorable discharge or any disciplinary action beyond incarceration. West was sentenced to serve his punishment at the US Army Disciplinary Barracks in Beekman, New York.¹⁹ To avoid possible operational and strategic consequences if Italy and Germany learned about the massacres, West was held in the theater of operations in order to control information distribution.²⁰ As long as West stayed in the theater, the Army could limit who knew

about the killings. Once he returned stateside, the Army would have less influence over who had access to West.

After recovering in North Africa, Captain Compton returned to Sicily to stand trial. Due to language in the 1940 War Department Field Manual (FM) 27-10, *Rules of Land Warfare*, Compton's soldiers were not charged; they were following Compton's orders and not culpable for their actions.²¹ Compton used the same defense, arguing that he was following Patton's order to kill the enemy. FM 27-10 stated:

Individuals of the armed forces will not be punished for these offenses in case they are committed under orders or sanction of their government or commanders. The commanders ordering the commission of such acts, or under whose authority they are committed by their troops, may be punished by the belligerent into whose hands they may fall.²²

The doctrine of the time seemed to give Compton a viable justification for the murders. Would the court-martial panel view that he was only following Patton's orders?

The court-martial members were all from the 45th Infantry Division, as were the prosecution and defense counsel. The prosecution consisted of two lieutenants who were clearly not aggressive in pursuing a conviction of Captain Compton. The prosecutors focused on validating already known information; they had members of Compton's company testify about what they had been ordered to do. Everyone agreed that the prisoners had been murdered; the only question was who was culpable for the killings.

Compton's defense team used the same FM 27-10 defense that kept Compton's soldiers from being charged; he was only following orders. In his defense, Compton stated:

I ordered them shot because I thought it came directly under the General's instructions. Right or wrong, a three-star general's advice, who has had combat experience, is good enough for me and I took him at his word.²³

Compton's fellow officers within the 180th Infantry Regiment rallied around him. They testified on his behalf that they would have acted similarly to follow Patton's guidance for the division to be aggressive killers in combat.

While the prosecutors may have been modest in laying out their case, Capt. George Fisher, the defense consul, aggressively described the just nature of Compton's actions. Since some of the victims were captured

in civilian clothing, he argued, they were not authorized the protections afforded to actual prisoners of war. Compton would have been authorized to consider combatants out of uniform to be irregular forces that were subject to be summarily punished as if they were captured as spies.²⁴ During the war, US troops viewed snipers as even worse than irregular forces. In the mind of the trial witnesses, snipers were pure evil. More than simply executing individual soldiers, snipers fought until the last second and only surrendered when they had no options left. While there were no regulations to support the murder of snipers, American soldiers commonly held the opinion that it was acceptable to kill snipers by any means.

The prosecution chose not to deliver a closing argument. After a short deliberation, the court-martial panel acquitted Compton of the charges. The members agreed that he was only following orders. At face value, the acquittal demonstrated that murdering captured enemy personnel was acceptable if it followed a senior commander's guidance. The senior commander who had theoretically ordered the murders was not charged. In the wake of the court-martials, the Army had multiple problems within the information domain to resolve regarding the massacres. Even though the court-martial panel chose not to convict Compton, there would be repercussions for his actions.

The 45th Infantry Division adjutant general, Lt. Col. William Cooks, conducted his own assessment and came to different conclusions.²⁵ The immediate issue for the division was that a noncommissioned officer and a commissioned officer had both been accused of murder and had received drastically different results despite similarity between the cases. It was a morale and trust issue that the sergeant would spend life in prison while the captain was set free without any punishment. The 180th Infantry Regiment leadership was proactive in maintaining trust. The regimental commander, Colonel Cookson, spoke on West's behalf to the court-martial panel. Colonel Cookson testified that West was following Patton's orders and had been an outstanding soldier up until that point.²⁶ His support played a role in West receiving only a prison sentence, avoiding any additional punishments that would normally accompany that type of prison sentence. The regiment's soldiers needed to have their trust in leadership reaffirmed to ensure that the regiment would continue to accomplish its assigned missions. At the operational level, the transition of the 45th Infantry Division from 7th Army under Patton to 5th Army under Lt. Gen. Mark Clark helped ease concern about following the orders of senior leaders. Quick action by tactical and operational leaders ensured that soldiers maintain trust in their leadership. A case of coincidental morbid

timing also assisted this process. After his trial, Compton was transferred to the 179th Infantry Regiment, also within the 45th Infantry Division. Within sixteen days of his acquittal, he was killed in action. While West was in prison, at least he was still breathing.

The most controllable, but also potentially the most catastrophic issue for the Army was fear that the American public would no longer trust in the Army as a moral institution. The Army had worked hard to cultivate the American peoples' history of strong faith and confidence in its service members. Most Americans wanted to believe that US soldiers fought with honor and righteousness. This allowed families to support their sons and daughters when they chose to serve and to believe that when their loved ones returned, they would be better people than when they left. If the American public had become aware of the massacres at Biscari, it could have tremendously hurt the war effort. In more recent times, America's an all-volunteer fighting force requires even higher levels of public support. The massacres would have given an excuse to those looking to refuse to serve, refuse to ration, or even protest fighting the war itself. Large-scale combat operations are violent and costly in both human and financial capital, often requiring great sacrifices to ensure success. If the military asks citizens to lay down their lives or the lives of their loved ones for a cause, they must know it is a just cause and that those who serve will do so with honor and dignity.

The Army had simple, but effective, ways of controlling the release of the information to the public. Mail from the front lines, which was the primary means of communication, was already being censored. Court-martial documents were sealed and classified. Compton was dead so was not going to share his side of the story, which left only Sergeant West as a possible leak point. The Army had a simple solution: keep him locked up in an American detention facility in the theater of operations.

If no one could talk to Sergeant West, they could not hear his story. Other 45th Infantry Division who knew about the incident were too busy with the invasion of Italy and had limited ability to communicate with anyone in the states. Even when reporters were able to talk with West in the months after his parole, it was unlikely that they or even fellow soldiers in the new division would know about the crimes he had committed in Sicily.²⁷ Sergeant West created his own story about why he was not with the 45th Infantry Division, and no one seemed interested in correcting his fiction.²⁸



Figure 10.3. Lt. Col. Lyle Bernard from 30th Infantry Regiment (right) discusses military strategy with Lt. Gen. George S. Patton near Brolo, Sicily, in 1943. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration.

Limiting distribution of information to the American public also helped with a third issue: enemy reprisals against captured Americans. US Army leaders were concerned that captured American prisoners might be executed as retribution for the murders, but timely events prevented Italy and Germany from understanding what had happened to their captured soldiers. Command and control of Axis forces in Sicily was disjointed, the Benito Mussolini government collapsed, Italy surrendered to the Allies, and German forces were suddenly required to disarm their former partners. Grappling with internal challenges, Axis leaders did not learn the secrets of what happened at Biscari held until the 1950s when the information was finally unclassified by the Army.

There are few examples of US Army personnel being murdered in large groups following capture during World War II. With the offensive

nature of US involvement during the majority of the war, there were few chances for mass captures of American prisoners; attacking forces tend to capture more prisoners. Most American mass captures occurred at the beginning of the war while most captures later in the war involved pilots captured after their planes were shot down. A rare exception occurred in December 1944 near Malmedy in Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge; German soldiers massacred eighty-four American prisoners of war.

Similar to Biscari, the Malmedy massacres involved the surrender of American forces who were quickly overwhelmed by attacking German units, specifically *Kampfgruppe* Peiper, part of the 1st SS *Panzerdivision* “*Leibstandarte* SS Adolf Hitler.” The 1st SS *Panzerdivision* had already established a unit tradition of murder and mayhem. Part of the unit assisted with “factory actions” to remove Jews working in the German arms industry. As a reward for their work, the soldiers were given watches and winter coats from the murdered Jews. *Kampfgruppe* Peiper, named after its commander, Joachim Peiper, earned the nickname of the “Blowtorch Battalion” for burning the thatched roofs of Soviet villages.²⁹ This included burning to death 250 civilians in a church near Yefremovka in February 1943. They carried that homicidal tradition into Italy, murdering fifty-six Italian and Greek Jews near Lake Maggiore in October 1943. In early July 1944, the 1st SS *Panzerdivision* murdered civilians again, this time French citizens near Tavaux and Plomion as the division broke out of the Falaise pocket.³⁰

The 1st SS *Panzerdivision* originally began as Hitler’s personal bodyguards and maintained a taste for hate and destruction as they lived and breathed Nazi fanaticism. Long before the Ardennes offensive, the division’s culture was that murdering captured civilian and military personnel was not only acceptable but encouraged. Hitler issued an order that no prisoners were to be taken during the Ardennes offensive, which reinforced standing division policy.

On 17 December 1944, 120 American soldiers from the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion were captured by elements of *Kampfgruppe* Peiper near Baugnez. Analogous to Captain Compton’s case, the captured soldiers were moved to a field and executed with machine gun fire. This would be one of thirteen separate incidents that would make up the Malmedy massacre. There were striking differences between the Biscari and Malmedy events. The first was that Americans learned about the Malmedy massacres within hours and news of the murders spread among US soldiers like wildfire. The second was that the Americans understood that what had been done at Biscari was wrong and felt shame

for the actions while the Germans had been conditioned through their Eastern front experiences against the Soviets and thought nothing was wrong with the incidents at Malmedy. Following Malmedy, the unofficial rules of engagement regarding treatment of captured enemy personnel on the Western front changed immediately. Combatants learned a fundamental lesson: if you murder prisoners of war, US soldiers will have no clemency when they capture you. Retribution for Malmedy was swift and violent and—to some extent—justified America’s secrecy about the Biscari massacres.

Survivors from the Malmedy massacres made their way back to Allied lines within hours, and news of the butchery quickly spread through Allied lines. *Kampfgruppe* Peiper and the 1st SS *Panzerdivision* were quickly identified as the perpetrators of the crimes, and Allied leaders responded. In the 328th Infantry Regiment’s 21 December 1944 Fragmentary Order 27, Col. Ben Jacobs of the 26th Infantry Division instructed soldiers: “No SS troops or paratroopers will be taken prisoners but will be shot on sight.”³¹ Then Allied troops discovered the mutilated bodies of eleven soldiers from Battery C, 333rd Field Artillery Battalion near Wereth, Belgium, six weeks after they had been murdered, reinforcing the verbal orders that German troops should be given no quarter.³²

This wrongful conduct toward prisoners—by both Allied and Axis soldiers—continued on the Western front through the end of the war. Allied soldiers from the 45th Infantry Division, this time the 157th Infantry Regiment, murdered SS guards at the Dachau concentration camp. Lt. Col. Joseph Whitaker, the Seventh Army’s assistant inspector general, investigated the incident and determined that the American soldiers segregated SS guards from the *Wehrmacht* guards then executed the SS guards. The US military was considering court-martials for those involved until General George Patton, the newly appointed American military governor of Bavaria, intervened and dismissed all charges against the accused. Despite almost two years between the Biscari and Dachau events, Patton apparently maintained a consistent view of how enemy prisoners should be treated that did not align with American moral values.

Why It Matters

American officers are expected to be servant leaders: striving to understand, empathize, and persuade their soldiers to accomplish difficult tasks instead of coercing them through threats as many armies do.³³ To separate commissioned officers into a distinct caste from noncommissioned officers and enlisted troops cuts deep into developing that trust

within a unit. That trust was degraded when Captain Compton was acquitted for murder while Sergeant West was found guilty of similar charges. How can soldiers trust their leadership if there are different rules depending on rank? How can leadership accomplish challenging missions without the trust of their soldiers?

In many cases, leaders who directed soldiers involved in the Biscari massacres were equal or superior to those of other units that participated in Operation Husky. Senior leaders within the corps, division, and regiment were respected by soldiers and had long-standing records of moral righteousness. These trained professionals had spent the majority of their military careers on active duty. Leaders at the platoon and company level had done well in training and shown promise as soldiers. The unit was as prepared to fight as any American infantry unit during the war. Despite this preparation, war crimes were committed. How such atrocities are dealt with shows the real character of the Army.

The challenge with using hyperbole in motivational speeches is that individuals may take you seriously when you talk about extreme courses of action. While this is less of an issue for business leaders who talk about killing the competition, such comments are a significant concern within an army with the capability and will to carry out aggressive guidance. Commanders must be mindful of what they say to soldiers and, more importantly, how soldiers perceive what they hear. Leaders must be crystal clear with their intent or run the risk of catastrophic results.

Senior leader motivational speeches to soldiers are more than just feel-good moments; they are orders. Junior leaders in paternalistic organizations like the Army can lean toward blind obedience to orders instead of using their best judgment. Additionally, small groups of soldiers may interpret leader guidance to their own ends. While the commander may have one intention when sharing guidance, a soldier may hear something completely different. Patton intended to inspire his only division that had not yet been tested in battle, to get them ready for the Sicily invasion. In any case, Patton gave highly questionable guidance about shooting enemy personnel attempting to surrender. Interestingly, even Captain Compton did not recall that Patton ordered soldiers to execute prisoners of war. There is room to debate whether Patton intended for his soldiers to murder the enemy or simply made a misguided attempt to motivate unproven soldiers. It is obvious that Patton's conscience and ethics failed when it came time to investigate and punish crimes after the events were brought to his attention.

Patton through a Modern Lens

The 2019 Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, identified three attributes and three competencies for an Army leader to be successful.³⁴ The attributes are character, presence, and intellect, while the competencies are leads, develops, and achieves. Patton clearly had a dominant presence that could inspire excellence—or outright fear. He had the battlefield intellect to see events before they occurred or as they were unfolding. This allowed him to take advantage of opportunities with short windows that many of his peers did not recognize. Patton was a tactical and operational genius who was only concerned about the strategic ramifications after the fact.

Identifying Patton's competencies is more difficult, dependent on the individuals involved and how they viewed him. While Patton enjoyed the trust of Generals George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, General Bradley, his former subordinate, did not trust him. Marshall and Eisenhower often overlooked Patton's character flaws, but Bradley had firsthand experience from working under Patton—watching him ignore war crimes and countermand Bradley's battlefield orders to subordinates.³⁵

Patton's leader development of subordinates through the lens of ADP 6-2 was also convoluted. He clearly prepared junior leaders for future command opportunities—as evidenced by Bradley as well as Lieutenant Generals Troy Middleton and Lucian Truscott, who were division commanders for Patton during Sicily. Patton always maintained high professional standards, ensuring that his soldiers looked like soldiers trained and prepared to carry out their missions. He failed, however to develop a positive environment. His counterproductive leadership led to an organization culture based on fear; Patton was clearly not the ethical standard-bearer that the Army expects senior leaders to be.³⁶

If the United States had lost the war, George Patton would likely have been tried as a war criminal and executed for his role in the Biscari massacres. His leadership style was the result of his aggressive nature and failure of moral reasoning. While he was a talented tactician and inspiring leader at times, Patton was selfish—behavior that could and did result in challenges for his soldiers and senior officers and had the potential to greatly affect mission outcome. If George Patton had been permanently relieved of command following the Biscari massacres and slapping incidents in Sicily in the fall of 1943, the US Army still would have been successfully in the European Theater.

Even Patton's peers at the time held him liable for the actions of West and Compton. Then-Brig. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer from the War Department's War Plans Division was conducting a US Army battlefield assessment in North Africa in the summer of 1943. Wedemeyer, who had been present when Patton briefed the 45th Infantry Division, was later interviewed by a War Department Inspector General's Office investigator regarding Patton's role in the Biscari massacres. Wedemeyer recalled that Patton had told the 45th Infantry Division soldiers that enemy soldiers had "shot our unsuspecting men" or had thrown hand grenades at them and "to watch out for this treachery and to kill the s.o.b.'s" unless they were certain that the soldiers really intended to surrender.³⁷ Wedemeyer clearly blamed Patton: "I am sure that the captain and sergeant who are now under investigation for shooting German prisoners misunderstood Patton's instructions as well as his intentions."³⁸

Army leaders from team leaders to corps commanders need to be mindful in communications to subordinates. They must clearly spell out their vision and intentions to subordinates, especially during the chaos of large-scale combat operations. Even then, some soldiers may make the wrong moral and ethical choices. When that happens, leaders must decisively investigate alleged war crimes and ensure that American values are upheld even during the rigors of combat.

The challenge that the Army may face in future large-scale combat operations is that soldiers like Patton—despite character flaws—get things done and accomplish the mission. They act aggressively, decreasing casualties by diminishing the length of the conflict through their battlefield success. Future leaders may be forced to choose between a morally flawed tactical and operational genius or a leader with more character but less *coup d'oeil* on the battlefield.³⁹ Could saving soldier lives, or even possibly winning a war, outweigh the moral failures of an individual; or does fighting with honor and living up to our American values mean more than battlefield genius no matter what the cost?

Notes

1. Biscari was renamed Acate in 1938 after the nearby Acate River. The maps used by the Americans were based on pre-war data that had not been updated to reflect the town name change.

2. Composed of National Guard personnel from Oklahoma, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico, the 45th Infantry Division was federally recognized on 3 August 1923. The division's geographic territory included some of the largest Native American reservations in the country. To embrace its regional heritage, the 45th Infantry Division initially chose the Navajo whirling log symbol as its shoulder sleeve insignia. The division conducted limited unit training and professional development during the depression era. It was called periodically to respond to labor strikes and natural disasters. With the rise of Nazi Germany and because the Navajo whirling log was similar to the Nazi swastika, the division changed its unit insignia. Following an open contest, the Firebird insignia designed by Kiowa artist Woodrow Wilson Big Bow was chosen as the new division design.

3. Flint Whitlock, *The Rock of Anzio: From Sicily to Dachau, a History of the U.S. 45th Infantry Division* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2005), 23–24.

4. Whitlock, 21–34.

5. Rick Atkinson, *The Day of Battle, The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007), 74.

6. Compton Testimony, Trial Proper, Compton Court-Martial.

7. The naval crews understandably confused the twin-engine C-47s with the twin-engine Junkers Ju 88 bombers. The incident resulted in 318 American soldiers killed or wounded. It was one of the worst friendly fire incidents in American history.

8. Center of Military History (CMH) Publication 6-2-1, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1965), 142; and Whitlock, *Rock of Anzio*, 46. Lt. Col. Ross Routh was the 45th Infantry Division paymaster who assaulted the beach on the first day. Six safes with the division's \$2 million pay allotment, which were in a different landing craft, had been dumped into the water. Routh and his team spent the next week drying out the money.

9. Lieutenant Colonel Schaefer was unkindly remembered by one of his lieutenants as "the ugliest looking man in the US Army, maybe the Navy and Marines as well;" Atkinson, *Day of Battle*, 116.

10. Compton Testimony, Trial Proper, Compton Court-Martial. Compton testified that he was "too excited to sleep."

11. Officer of the Inspector General Headquarters, 45th Infantry Division, "Report of Investigation of Shooting of Prisoners of War by Sgt. Horace T. West," 5 August 1943.

12. Haskell Brown Testimony, West Court-Martial.

13. Officer of the Inspector General Headquarters, "Report of Investigation of Shooting of Prisoners of War."

14. Compton Testimony, Trial Proper, Compton Court-Martial, 60–62.
15. Blanks, Gazzetti, Hair, and Marlow Testimonies, Trial Proper, Compton Court-Martial, 7–9, 15, 27–35.
16. Office of the Inspector General, 45th Infantry Division, “Report of Investigation of Shooting of Prisoners of War under Direction of Captain John T. Compton,” 5 August 1943.
17. Rick Atkinson, *The Day of Battle, The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007), 119.
18. Atkinson, 119.
19. Now known as Green Haven Correctional Facility.
20. Atkinson, *The Day of Battle*, 119.
21. The current equivalent is Field Manual (FM) 6-27, *The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare*.
22. War Department Field Manual (FM) 27-10, *Rules of Land Warfare* (Washington, DC: 1940), paragraph 347.
23. Compton Testimony, Trial Proper, Compton Court-Martial, 63
24. Cassius Dowell, *Military Aid to the Civil Power* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: General Service Schools Press, 1925).
25. Office of the Inspector General, “Report of Investigation of Shooting of Prisoners of War under Direction of Captain John T. Compton.
26. Cookson Testimony, Trial Proper, West Court-Martial.
27. Thomas Harper Kelly, “War Criminal Paroled: Horace T. West and the Final Chapter of the Biscari Massacre,” *The Army Lawyer* 5 (2020): 19–22.
28. Kelly.
29. Some defenders of the *Waffen*-SS believe that the unit insignia looked like a blowtorch and that was the origin of its name, not for burning thousands of homes and churches.
30. Hugh Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1965), 257–71, https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_11.htm.
31. Cole, chap. XI.
32. The 1907 Hague Convention’s Article 23 made it illegal to “declare that no quarter will be given.” With his declaration of taking no prisoners, Colonel Jacobs from the 328th Infantry Regiment was in violation of the convention.
33. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Leader Development* (Washington, DC: 2015).
34. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession* (Washington, DC: 2019).
35. Citation for Patton overriding Bradley’s order to a division commander.
36. Department of the Army, ADP 6-22, page 6-5, paragraph 6-26; AR 6-22 defines counterproductive leadership as the demonstration of leader behaviors that violate one or more of the Army’s core leader competencies or Army Values, preventing a climate conducive to mission accomplishment. Counterproductive leadership is also known as toxic leadership.

37. Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (1958; New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2019), 215.

38. Wedemeyer, 215.

39. From Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976): "When all is said and done, it really is the commander's coup d'œil, his ability to see things simply, to identify the whole business of war completely with himself, that is the essence of good generalship. Only if the mind works in this comprehensive fashion can it achieve the freedom it needs to dominate events and not be dominated by them."

Army Ethic Principle 9

C. Anthony Pfaff

We wisely use the resources entrusted to us, ensuring our Army is well led and well prepared, while caring for soldiers, Army civilians, and families.¹

Stewardship is a unique form of leadership essential to the military profession not only because of the trust relationship between the service and the American people, but also because of the trust relationship between professionals. Stewardship is not simply about making responsible use of personnel and resources; it is about strengthening the profession so that it continually becomes more effective. In short, stewardship demands constant striving for excellence. It is not enough for professionals to fulfill their duties; they should fulfill their duties as well as they can and seek to do better next time. Meeting these requirements, however, sets up ethical tensions that professionals must negotiate to fulfill their obligations.

The first tension is between the individual and the institution. The public entrusts Army professionals with a great deal of resources in terms of money, equipment, and people. It can sometimes be tempting to take advantage of those resources and that trust. In 2008, for example, an Army officer pled guilty to conspiracy, bribery, and money laundering in awarding base services contracts in Iraq in return for more than \$9 million in bribes. That same year the United States charged a Pentagon contractor and a number of co-conspirators with defrauding the government for sending faulty, out-of-date ammunition to the Afghan Security Forces.²

The second tension arises not because of individual failures, but institutional ones. Modernizing the force often comes at the expense of readiness. Given limited resources, Army leaders must decide whether to spend money, people, and other resources developing more advanced equipment or, instead, maintain current systems and train soldiers to use them. This tension is exacerbated when the Army acquisition process is cost ineffective and prone to failure. For example, taxpayers paid approximately \$26 billion for a string of Army acquisition failures that included the XM2001 Crusader Howitzer, RAH-66 Comanche, and the Future Combat System; Senator John McCain commented that he was “embarrassed” to ask his constituents for more money for military budgets when so much had been wasted.³ Acquisition failures do more than just reduce the Army’s effectiveness. They can erode public trust as well.

Chapter 11 indirectly addresses the stewardship of Army resources, encouraging Army professionals to take a broader view of what they should steward and remember that such obligations extend beyond war-fighting. Capt. David F. Bonner discusses the importance of stewardship when applied to property of cultural significance. He shares the story of the “Monuments Men,” who provided the vital function by preserving history that was threatened by the enormous destructive power of armies fighting in both theaters. To underscore the importance of this effort—as well as the powerful example of stewardship it represents—it is worth quoting Eisenhower’s charge, as Bonner does in his chapter: “In the path of our advance will be found historical monuments and cultural centers which symbolize to the world all that we are fighting to preserve. It is the responsibility of every commander to protect and respect these symbols whenever possible.” The lesson here is that stewardship extends beyond those personnel and resources immediately under the commander’s charge to include the well-being of the society that Army professionals defend.

Notes

1. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession* (Washington, DC: 2015), 2-6.

2. Bruce Burton and Lauren McLean, “The Black and White of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse,” *Defense Acquisition Magazine* (March–April 2009), https://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/DATLFiles/2009-03-01/burt_ma09.pdf.

3. Dan Parsons, “McCain Tears into Army Acquisition during DoD Officials’ Confirmation Hearing,” *Defense Daily*, 12 July 2017, <https://www.defense-daily.com/mccain-tears-army-acquisition-dod-officials-confirmation-hearing/congress/>; and Sebastian Sprenger, “30 Years: Future Combat Systems–Acquisition Gone Wrong,” *Defense News*, 25 October 2016, <https://www.defensenews.com/30th-annivesary/2016/10/25/30-years-future-combat-systems-acquisition-gone-wrong/>.

Chapter 11

Fighting for Our History: The Strategic Importance of Protecting Cultural Property in Combat Operations

Capt. (US Air Force Reserve) David F. Bonner

Only days before the Allied Invasion of Normandy, General Dwight D. Eisenhower issued a memorandum to his subordinate commanders regarding the preservation of historical monuments. Eisenhower's orders reflected a well-known, but unspoken, principle of Operation Overlord that it was not simply enough for the Allied Nations to liberate Europe, they had to *save* it:

Shortly we will be fighting our way across the continent of Europe in battles designed to preserve our civilization. . . . In the path of our advance will be found historical monuments and cultural centers which symbolize to the world all that we are fighting to preserve. It is the responsibility of every commander to protect and respect these symbols whenever possible.¹

More than a principled statement of the Allies' mission, Eisenhower's message was a reminder to soldiers in uniform of what they had sworn to defend. Although US armed forces are strongly reinforced by the tradition of American democratic values, the Profession of Arms—often referred to as the Army Ethic—is in fact quite distinct and must be taught as a unique discipline. The men and women of America's armed forces must understand the ethical component of what they are asked to do on behalf of the state if they are to discharge their duties in a professional manner. Among the evolving set of laws, values, and beliefs that make up the Army Ethic, the notion of preserving life is paramount. Equally important, however, is preserving a people's *way of life*, which includes defending their traditions, culture, and historical achievements.

All military commanders in large-scale combat operations face the challenge to protect cultural property, historic landmarks, and holy sites. When historic buildings stand in the way of military objectives, troops can destroy priceless works of art, thus robbing humanity of vital pieces of its cultural identity. Following the end of World War II, new international laws such as the 1949 Geneva Convention and 1954 Hague Convention were adopted to prevent such wanton destruction, but these laws have often been ineffective.² That was especially true when the perpetrators were non-state actors such as terrorists or criminal organizations; such individ-

uals are driven by ideological motivations or a complete disregard for the rule of law. Past issues reinforce the need for US military officers to be informed and take precautions when carrying out missions. More than simply protecting valuable works of art or revered monuments, they must maintain moral credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

The legacy of a community is reflected in its cultural heritage, history and, identity. Preserving that legacy helps to rebuild broken communities after armed conflicts and link their past with their present and future.³ Cultural heritage can also play a vital role in promoting peace and reconciliation, as it can often mitigate the sense of loss and frustration caused by armed conflicts. Unfortunately, culture has been placed at the center of many wars over the last few decades, both in terms of collateral damage and as a target for belligerents who seek to eradicate vulnerable societies and their way of life. The long-term effects of this destruction weaken the foundations for peace and hinder possibilities for reconciliation between opposing forces after a conflict ends. Because cultural sites are strategically important in modern conflicts, US armed forces must adapt tactics and battle plans to protect cultural heritage as an integral part of sustainable peacekeeping and security operations.

Commanders must also be aware that theft or destruction of antiquities is becoming part of a broader warfighting strategy; enemies can use it as a political tool. Seizing or destroying cultural property can demonstrate territorial dominance, even if the belligerents are not directly occupying the area; such deplorable actions demonstrate that the former regime or its allies are incapable of protecting these sites.⁴ Conventional military forces need to safeguard cultural property both to comply with international laws and as a tactic for achieving overall mission success. A policy of protection can be a force multiplier during peacekeeping operations by fostering goodwill and encouraging a host nation to accept a liberating force, in addition to impressing the media and general public.

Important lessons can be learned from US armed forces successes and failures with protecting cultural property. Army leaders have taken significant steps in recent years, and new challenges lie ahead. Commanders and their subordinates must recognize the importance of protecting these sites and offer recommendations to strengthen and enhance existing programs.

The Occupation and Rebuilding of Japan

In his peacetime role as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur faced the daunting task of rebuilding a decimated post-war Japan. Maintaining public safety, restoring basic

utilities, providing food and medical services were paramount in the early days of the occupation, not to mention re-establishing political and social order.⁵ All military occupations require an enormous amount of manpower and resources, and commanders rarely have enough troops with requisite skills to carry out all reconstruction efforts. Support area forces, even field engineers and medical personnel, are trained primarily to support combat operations; plus, food and equipment supply chains might be broken for weeks or months because of a damaged or collapsed infrastructure. An occupation's success, therefore, depends heavily on establishing a sense of goodwill with the civilian leadership, as well as earning the trust and cooperation of the citizenry. Commanders must develop a comprehensive strategy that emphasizes stability operations, while at the same time respecting local customs and traditions and protecting cultural sites.

MacArthur addressed the most urgent problems of food shortages and communicable diseases first. At the beginning of the occupation, people in Japan's cities were starving, living on a mere 800 calories a day—less than half the caloric intake for a healthy diet.⁶ People were growing desperate, and small mobs were beginning to form in the streets. American diplomat John K. Emmerson, who served as MacArthur's special adviser, notified Secretary of State James Byrnes: "Political parties, elections, democracy, the Emperor: all are of academic importance when the rice bowl is empty."⁷ MacArthur had to move quickly. By mid-1946, the American Famine Emergency Committee led by former President Herbert Hoover finally delivered sufficient grain shipments to Japan.⁸ By the end of the year, the United States had provided 3.5 million tons of grain, enough to feed the people above subsistence levels.⁹ Once MacArthur stabilized the humanitarian crisis, it was time to address rule of law and issues of governance.

During the March 1942 evacuation of the Philippines, rebels burned MacArthur's headquarters building and personal residence, along with most of his 8,000-volume personal library, which included books inherited from his father.¹⁰ Although not a patron of the arts, MacArthur was an avid reader; the loss of his private collection, as well as the greater cultural loss of the city of Manila, left a lasting impression on him. This experience, in turn, motivated MacArthur to protect Japanese cultural property.¹¹ Given the desperate levels of poverty in the country following the surrender, as well as the number of urban residents selling antiques to farmers, the risk of looting was a serious concern. To help protect historic sites as well as art and antiquities, MacArthur asked the Japanese to compile a list of the country's most important temples and shrines. Ultimately, police success-

fully guarded more than 150,000 sites identified by the government. In five years of occupation, not a single museum or temple was looted.¹²

In addition to historical sites, great masterpieces of Japanese artwork and cultural artifacts needed to be protected. For this critical assignment, MacArthur turned to the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (MFAA) section of the Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories, more popularly known as the Monuments Men. Already famous for their heroic exploits during the Allied invasion of Europe, the MFAA consisted of roughly 350 Allied soldiers and civilians who were assigned to protect artwork and cultural treasures. Following the surrender of Germany, a handful of MFAA specialists deployed to Japan under the direction of Langdon Warner, the curator of the Harvard Fogg Museum; Warner and his team, in cooperation with the Japanese Ministry of Culture, conducted a thorough inventory of all Japanese arts and monuments.¹³ The specialists were to identify temples, buildings, gardens, and national parks; evaluate war damage; and prepare plans to restore these sites.

After completing their work in Japan in 1948, the MFAA specialists returned to the United States to resume careers as museum curators and academics. Though the project to safeguard Japan's cultural property was over, the Department of the Army decided to extend the MFAA effort in a rather imaginative way. Unlike Europe and the United States, where artwork is largely considered to be paintings and sculptures, Japan's definition of artwork is much broader, including performing arts such as kabuki plays and bunraku as well as crafts such as pottery, papermaking, embroidery, and metalwork.¹⁴ Given its struggling economy and the fact so many residents had been displaced during the war, Japan faced a very real danger that these skills would die out and a crucial piece of its culture would be lost forever.

MacArthur and his diplomatic advisors determined that art preservation meant more than simply protecting "works" of art; it also included supporting future art by providing assistance to living artists. At their urging, the Diet (Japanese Assembly) passed the Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties, which included a designation for artists as "Living National Treasures" and considered them "Keepers of Important Intangible Cultural Properties."¹⁵ Japanese artists received grants to continue their craft and, most importantly, to train apprentices. No country had ever developed such a comprehensive program to support the arts; as a result, traditional Japanese artistry and crafts flourished following the end of the war. Another lasting impact on Japanese culture was made by two MFAA advisors on MacArthur's staff, Harold Henderson and Reginald Blyth, who

assisted in drafting the “Humanity Declaration” speech in which Emperor Hirohito renounced his personal divinity as the sovereign.¹⁶ For his role in the occupation, MacArthur received the new Japanese government’s full support, and his efforts to safeguard their traditions solidified a lasting bond between Japan and the United States.

The Monuments Men in Europe

While preserving cultural property in post-war Japan stands as one of the most successful humanitarian missions in history, that project was dwarfed in scale by the original MFAA mission during the Allied invasion of Europe. Unlike MacArthur, who was only concerned with preserving and safeguarding of antiquities after combat operations ended, the MFAA in Europe took an active role in advising commanders on the battlefield. Even more challenging was the fact that there was no blueprint for this type of operation, as no unit had ever before performed preservation duties in an active combat zone. Although the methods for identifying and safeguarding cultural property and heritage sites were still being developed, the MFAA had two clear objectives that guided its mission.

The first and most obvious was to protect European society’s historical treasures. Perhaps less obvious at the time, the second reason was to protect the legitimacy of the Allies after the war. Both objectives were clearly expressed in a summer 1942 memo written by one of the founding members of the MFAA, George Stout:

To safeguard these things will not affect the course of battles, but it will affect the relations of invading armies with those peoples and [their] governments. . . . To safeguard these things will show respect for the beliefs and customs of all men and will bear witness that these things belong not only to a particular people but also to the heritage of mankind.¹⁷

Stout’s memo and other recommendations were delivered at an October 1943 meeting at the War Department where senior administration officials voiced similar concerns. Robert L. Sherwood, director of overseas operations in the Office of War Information, recommended that MFAA efforts be publicized to counter Axis propaganda and “reassure the world that Americans were not vandals and ignorant of European culture.”¹⁸ At the time the MFAA commission made its appeal to Congress for funding, one point most emphasized by its members was the role they would play in protecting the US Army from accusations of careless destruction.¹⁹ House Appropriations Committee Vice Chairman David Finlay recognized this point: “It is a record of which we shall all be proud as Americans, and that record

should be available for future historians.”²⁰ Just as US contributions were absolutely essential to winning the war, MFAA efforts to preserve history and culture helped maintain America’s standing in the eyes of the world.

Throughout the war, the MFAA issued regular field reports to Allied Command. One consistent theme was to counter Axis propaganda about damage caused to cultural sites by Allied bombing campaigns. The Italian puppet government seized every opportunity to publicly denounce the Allies for damaging holy sites, most notably the destruction of the historic Abbey of Monte Cassino and subsequent loss of Mantegna frescoes in the Church of the Eremitani during the bombing of Padua. The Italians even issued a set of pamphlets titled “The War Against Art” and “The Stones Speak” in an attempt to sway public opinion.²¹ Axis propaganda described the MFAA as “an organization of thieves and Jews” looting artistic treasures on behalf of the Allies.²² The MFAA’s ongoing efforts fundamentally disproved claims that the Allies were indiscriminately targeting Europe’s historic sites, or that their arrival would lead to large-scale vandalism and looting.

In addition to field reports, the MFAA issued handbooks to Army commanders; the very pragmatic language urged them to respect monuments and cultural sites. Above all, they emphasized, respecting cultural property would positively affect the ability of Allied Forces to control occupied countries. The handbooks listed cultural sites in France, Holland, Greece, and Hungary, and clearly stated that preservation efforts would enhance “the morale of the population,” and aid the Army in “enlisting their cooperation.”²³ The MFAA mission was one of the finest examples of a concerted effort to “win the hearts-and-minds” of a people. MFAA’s final report at the end of the war included this assessment of its activities in France:

The most important general aspect of the MFA&A work in France is the most intangible, the exhibition of goodwill on the part of the military authority towards an aspect of French national life and sentiment of which the French themselves are especially conscious. The French have been given a feeling that their national possessions and sentiments are not a matter of indifference to us.²⁴

Failures in Iraq follow Successes in Japan and Germany

The post-war lessons of Japan and Germany were tragically lost during the US-led occupation of Iraq beginning in 2003. However honorable America’s objectives may have been going into Iraq to free its people from an oppressive regime, the effort failed utterly due to massive incompetence, fraud, and a complete lack of planning. The hope that the Iraqi people would greet American forces as liberators did not come to fruition,

and the Coalition Provisional Authority's failure to understand Iraq's political infrastructure resulted in a complete breakdown of the civil society. Planners should have recognized that Iraq was fundamentally different from Japan and Germany; the normal process is to analyze the situation and develop a contingency plan for stability operations once the initial conflict has ended. Regrettably, US leaders failed to develop a contingency plan prior to the launch of combat operations.



Figure 11.1. The Monuments Men at Neuschwanstein Castle, May 1945. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration.

One of the first challenges American forces failed to address after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime was the rampant looting that ensued. The Iraqi National Museum in Baghdad became a prime target for plunder; between 8 April 2003 when the museum was abandoned and 12 April 2003 when many of the staff returned, thieves made off with an estimated 15,000 items, many of them priceless Assyrian Empire relics including ritual vessels, amulets, ivories, and 5,000 cylinder seals.²⁵ The looting had already taken place by the time US troops arrived to protect the museum on 16 April. Their failure to secure the antiquities, along with a number of ongoing archaeological excavations in the surrounding area, led to harsh criticism from city residents. A wildly inflated accusation circulated that American generals allowed 170,000 priceless artifacts to be looted while soldiers were protecting "corporate oil" interests.²⁶ Officers on the scene made the case that a large contingent of soldiers was assigned to protect petroleum installations and refinery offices from further vandalism, but their indifference toward the museum looting did untold damage to the

American cause. In a separate incident, Coalition forces unintentionally damaged an archaeological dig in Babylon, Iraq, when they used the site for a large-scale military base and landing area for helicopters.²⁷

Iraqi reactions to these events were far more negative than the American public realized at the time. The unintended perception was that the US government did not care or, perhaps worse in terms of security, was incapable of safeguarding public property. To make matters worse, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made these comments at an 11 April 2003 Pentagon briefing:

Stuff happens! But in terms of what's going on in that country, it is a fundamental misunderstanding to see those images over, and over, and over again of some boy walking out with a vase and say, "Oh my goodness, you didn't have a plan." That's nonsense. . . . They know what they're doing, and they're doing a terrific job. And it's untidy, and freedom's untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things. They're also free to live their lives and do wonderful things, and that's what's going to happen here.²⁸

Rumsfeld's total misreading of the situation on the ground and the casual manner in which he brushed off any criticism did enormous damage to the legitimacy of the occupation, as well as the strategic standing of the United States.

New Threats in Syria

The Syrian civil war began as a nonviolent protest in 2011 then quickly escalated into a full-scale conflict that devastated the entire country, resulting in the deaths of more than 470,000 people and the displacement of more than 1 million civilians. The ongoing conflict continues to pose a new kind of threat to cultural heritage sites because it involves the militaries of several nations, rebel militias, and terrorist groups; each has a different agenda and ideology. From 2012 to 2016, the historic city of Aleppo—which the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) lists as one of Syria's six heritage locations—became a battleground between government and rebel forces.²⁹ Many historic landmarks, such as the *hammam* (Turkish baths) inside of the Souk al-Medina, lay in ruins. Some of the earliest Islamic mosques and Crusader-era fortifications were caught in the crossfire and destroyed, while other historical sites now resemble the surface of the moon, pocked by countless illicit excavations.³⁰

In this conflict, terrorist groups such as the Islamic State, or ISIS, present a new kind of threat to monuments, antiquities, and historical sites. In May 2015, hundreds of ISIS fighters overran the ancient city of Palmyra, another UNESCO heritage site renowned for its Roman-era ruins.³¹ Throughout the Syrian civil war, the ISIS propaganda wing disseminated numerous online videos showing members rampaging through museum galleries and destroying priceless artifacts with jackhammers. The city of Palmyra and its artifacts served a different purpose for ISIS, according to Jason Lyall, a research fellow at Yale’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. “Palmyra is in the news a lot because it was destroyed—that’s the language that is used in the media,” he said. “It’s actually not true. About 80 percent of Palmyra remains undamaged.”³² Lyall noted that ISIS repurposed many cultural heritage sites throughout the region as a means for state-making.

ISIS, in fact, appropriated a number of sites in the city of Palmyra for its own purposes, such as using one ancient Roman amphitheater to hold show trials and executions as part of its court system. “It wasn’t destroyed, it was repurposed, as an instrument of war; as an instrument of state-making,” commented Lyall.³³ But as powerful as these images may have been for the ISIS propaganda campaign, they galvanized Russian-backed Syrian forces to reclaim the city in March 2017.



Figure 11.2. ISIS militants used the Roman amphitheater in Palmyra to conduct show trials and executions until Syrian forces recaptured the site in March 2017. Courtesy of Bernard Gagnon, Wikipedia.

Another alarming reality that ISIS brought to light is that in addition to robbing countries of their cultural heritage, looting of antiquities can be a substantial revenue source for terrorist groups. According to a 2018 RAND Corporation report, ISIS smuggled as much as \$400 million of looted antiquities out of Iraq and Syria to sell on the black market in 2015.³⁴ Revenues were then used to invest in legitimate businesses, such as hotels, hospitals, farms, and auto dealerships in countries like Turkey.³⁵ After the United States destroyed the group's oil and natural gas operations, looting and black-market trading became one of its largest sources of cash and enabled ISIS to recruit and pay foreign fighters for several more years. The inability of the United States and its NATO allies to curb black market trading presents a terrifying dilemma. Since groups like ISIS are not official government entities and, therefore, not subject to traditional sanctions or embargoes, they will inevitably turn to alternative revenue sources such as smuggling antiquities, or worse, taking human lives.

Lessons for Today

Like their World War II predecessors, today's field commanders face the challenge of accomplishing the mission and safeguarding the lives of the men and women under their command. While the preservation of life must never be compromised, commanders cannot lose sight of the long-term strategic implications of protecting cultural property. So then, what can US soldiers do to prepare for contingency operations involving heritage sites and antiquities? In 2011, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) established a task force to help protect cultural property and identify roles and responsibilities for six US agencies: the State Department, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, the Treasury, Department of Defense, and the Smithsonian.³⁶ The task force identified five protection activity categories; 1) awareness raising, 2) information sharing, 3) law enforcement efforts, 4) overseas capacity building, and 5) preventing destruction.

To help raise awareness, the US Army announced in October 2019 that US Army Reserve soldiers and historical preservationists would work together to protect cultural heritage sites during combat operations. The Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative and the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command signed a memorandum of understanding to train and support soldiers "whose mission is to ensure cultural property is not destroyed or damaged during armed conflict."³⁷ In the tradition of the Monuments Men of World War II, this cadre of officers and field experts trainings Army Reserve civil affairs soldiers and advises commanders on military government responsibilities related to protecting

cultural property and the rule of law. Commanders in the field need to take full advantage of the expertise of these new civil affairs officers, and ensure that all soldiers under their command understand the importance of protecting cultural property as a part of stability operations. Senior theater commanders also have a responsibility that is perhaps less straightforward.

The failures in Iraq, in large part, resulted from a colossal failure in planning. Senior officers seemed to believe that planning for the end of the war was the sole responsibility of civilian leadership and that their job ended once the initial fighting stopped. Whether deliberate or not, they appeared unwilling to accept their role in winning the peace. Post-war occupations require initiative and imagination on the part of senior officers. MacArthur and Eisenhower understood the vital importance of preserving the cultural heritage of allies as well as defeated foes in World War II. They recognized that to be seen as liberators and not conquerors, American forces needed a proactive approach to preserve a people's way of life. By acting with restraint in combat and magnanimity in victory, the United States preserved the cultural achievements of Eastern and Western civilization and upheld the highest standards of the Western military tradition.

Notes

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Army Ethic Principle 10

C. Anthony Pfaff

*We continuously strengthen the essential characteristics of the Army Profession, reinforcing our bond of trust with each other and the American people.*¹

The Army's professional jurisdiction—the application of landpower—is never stable. Its professional character is always in tension with its bureaucratic structure. As a result, the Army sometimes abandons expert knowledge in favor of the bureaucratic *status quo*. As military scholar Don Snider observed, “Professions excel where bureaucracies cannot—in the creation and adaptation of abstract expert knowledge and its application to new situations.”²

It is easy, especially in times of crisis or reduced resources, to let bureaucratic tendencies win. When the consequences of taking risks are high, it is natural to be cautious. For example, the massive bureaucracy required to maintain forward deployed forces to face a potential Soviet attack resisted the kind of unconventional warfare. As a result, the US military was often unprepared to effectively operate in unconventional environments like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan—and even peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Bosnia.³ As British psychologist Norman F. Dixon argued in *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*:

The root cause of (military incompetence) is that since men are not by nature all that well-equipped for aggression on a grand scale, they have had to develop a complex of rules, conventions, and ways of thinking which, in the course of time, ossify into outmoded tradition, curious ritual, inappropriate dogma, and that bane of some military organizations, irrelevant “bullshit.”⁴

When the Army cedes its professional status, the society it serves loses two benefits: 1) the development and adaptation of expert knowledge to solve problems associated with land combat and 2) soldier discipline, which could weaken if soldiers view themselves more as “employees.”⁵ Army professionals need to improve their own competency and, in so doing, improve the profession as well. The two are, of course, related. A healthy profession educates its members, and those individuals expand their knowledge as the profession encounters new challenges. That expanded knowledge is then transmitted to other members systematically through a professional education system.

Maintaining the Army as a profession requires great effort and constant vigilance; failure comes with a potentially higher cost. As scholars Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour noted in *Unmasking Administrative Evil*, bureaucratic procedure can “mask” evil that results from collective administrative actions. They analyzed the 1985 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, pointing to a series of apparently reasonable decisions by NASA centers involved with the launch. In each case, the decision was authorized and validated by a legitimate authority. These decisions, however, took place in a competitive environment where no NASA center wanted to be responsible for a launch delay. The result was a series of procedurally correct decisions that obscured risks associated with launching at below-freezing temperatures—risks that were known and understood by many of the engineers.⁶

To avoid such outcomes, an Army professional requires more than just technical expertise. A professional must understand the human dimension and be sensitive to the potential negative impact that environment can have on individual psychology. The moral-ethical dimension obviously requires prioritizing the good that the profession provides over procedure. Because of special challenges for the Army profession, soldiers must consider broader moral concerns, including the rights and well-being of others affected by actions and decisions. Finally, because of the political-cultural dimension of the Army profession, bureaucratic structures of varying character can create an environment that facilitates bad outcomes.

The tension between the profession and the bureaucracy is, of course, unresolvable; the Army profession requires a functioning bureaucracy. Acknowledging the authority of the bureaucratic hierarchy, however, often crowds out notions of personal and social responsibility, especially when those notions conflict with bureaucratic efficiency. But the point here is not that the Army professional *should* set aside or subordinate bureaucratic requirements, which are often critical for accountability and transparency. Rather, the Army professional needs to discern when those requirements undermine the cause and threaten the society it serves then take action.

In Chapter 12, Chase Spears provides a good example of what it takes to strengthen one aspect of the Army profession: public affairs. He addresses the need for commanders at all levels to contend with the challenges and demands of information warfare. More importantly, Spears chronicles successes and failures, underscoring the importance of doing so ethically.

Notes

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Chapter 12

Preserving Credibility through a Culture That Enables Ethics-Based Army Communication Practices

Maj. Charles M. “Chase” Spears

In early 2020, most of the world’s population was caught off guard by a pandemic that spread globally at the speed of jet aircraft. Though mitigating public illness is not a staple of the US Army’s trained capabilities, the topic demanded tremendous attention from service leaders, as the military deployed forces to support civil medical response efforts around the nation. Those events crossed from discussions of science and medicine into the political and military realms. Early news reporting included claims that the Department of Defense was developing plans for how to maintain order if the federal government was rendered incapable.¹ This threatened to tarnish the US military’s image during an already turbulent time. This moment illustrated that commanders must continually work to preserve trust, as trust is never more needed than when a crisis strikes.

According to polling data, America’s military services have enjoyed high levels of public trust, compared to other public or private institutions, on a consistent basis since the 1990s.² This trust is critical to sustaining effectiveness at all times and must not be taken for granted. Credibility that is sacrificed for a short-term convenience could be lost for many years. If the United States again engages in large-scale combat operations, the number of casualties could exceed anything the nation has suffered since the Vietnam conflict. If that happens, military and political leaders must be prepared to justify why attaining the goals of warfare through the use of large-scale combat operations is worth the potential loss of life.³ The level of credibility that a military force brings to a humanitarian support, disaster response, or large-scale combat operations directly impacts the risk that commanders and military service members will face from the local population.

Large-scale combat operational environments will be intense information environments. In training for large-scale combat operations, commanders must prepare to compete across the information realm every bit as much as they prepare for operating in the physical realm. US Army culture invests significant time and resources in defining and enforcing the standards that classify fighting readiness within regulations, such as physical fitness and medical checks, as well as individual and collective training. How much time and priority are allocated for public engagement preparation, however, largely depends on the commander. For military

units to be effective in the courts of public opinion at home and abroad, they must operate and train accordingly as a matter of routine.

History offers many examples when a collapse of public trust played a role in undermining an institution's effectiveness, and sometimes even its existence. Commanders and public affairs officials must not count on receiving the benefit of the doubt from homeland and foreign publics in future wars. As former Defense Secretary James Mattis noted, "History makes clear that America has no preordained right to victory on the battlefield."⁴ Military officials should embrace ethical communication practices that include communicating proactively, speaking authentically, and owning mistakes quickly. Many commanders and supporting military communicators already subscribe to this philosophy. US military history also includes commands that used communication postures based on convenience instead of policy. The US Army needs to inculcate a culture that reinforces communicating ethically in the same way it prioritizes rules pertaining to the physical attributes of soldiers.

The Case for an Army Code of Communication Ethics

With the information domain's growing relevance for national policy, the Army will likely rely as much on its reputational power as its firepower capabilities as an instrument of persuasion in the future. Whether US Army forces are considered trustworthy could be a significant factor in the level of cooperation and resistance that they encounter across lands where they are deployed, a lesson highlighted not long ago during combat operations in Iraq.⁵ An ethics-based perspective asks whether a mission accomplished through unethical methods is truly a victory. Col. Clark Barrett noted in 2012 that unethical conduct in war could undermine efforts to win, preserve peace, and maintain the public's trust.⁶

Among commanders and military communicators, behavior that violates the spirit of the Department of Defense "Principles of Information" risks eroding trust.⁷ Pentagon correspondent Lara Seligman wrote of military public affairs officers who openly lied.⁸ Author Tom Ricks commented about public affairs officials releasing potentially embarrassing or sensitive information over a weekend to obscure it from the news cycle.⁹ Other techniques for avoiding transparency include over-classification, using an unnecessarily passive communication stance, misleading through omission, releasing information after news production deadlines, or using vague language.¹⁰ While Joint and US Army regulations set clear expectations for maximum disclosure and minimum delay, information engagement procedures vary across the military institution. Matching actions to words is key

to growing trust. If commanders across the military institution cannot or will not universally embrace a canon of transparency in public disclosure, it leaves open a door to theorize if there should be consequences for violating disclosure and engagement guidance, or if the services should revisit current defense public affairs policy.

Prioritizing ethical communication practices across the force would help set a cultural tone for the Army's accountability to the public. Enforcing this requirement, which already exists in policy, into operating culture would further motivate commanders to comply with public expectations of honest, transparent disclosure in a uniform manner.¹¹ If the military culture prioritized ethical public engagement practices, commanders could more effectively compete against hostile attempts to shape combat conditions through misinformation campaigns.¹² Beyond that, ethical practices enhance leader development and help to improve morale.¹³ Commanders set the tone for their organizations. Facilitating and enforcing an ethical culture is their responsibility.

Lessons from History

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has engaged in military actions of limited means, rather than unlimited means, to defend US interests. This limited nature of military engagements reflects a mindset that is attuned to the political ramifications of public perception.¹⁴ American public opinion was divided over the American Revolution.¹⁵ Many of the nation's founding fathers disliked the concept of a standing army, concerned that it could do as much harm to the nation as good.¹⁶ The United States experienced tremendous societal division during the Civil War, as its military forces fought against citizens who had once lived and served under the stars and stripes. Nearly a century later, public opinion shifted from an isolationist approach to overwhelming support for the United States to enter the Second World War, a war in which more than 10 percent of the American population served in uniform.¹⁷ Those who served approximately thirty years later did not enjoy the comparative national unity that was evident during the world wars. They instead suffered social fallout from the Johnson administration's mismanagement of US military operations in the 1960s. Tactical successes in Vietnam could not overcome strategic perceptions. The resulting loss of public trust forced an end to that military campaign in a way that failed to achieve the desired political ends.¹⁸ The United States likely would have had a stronger chance of succeeding if national and military leaders had not withheld and manipulated information about progress toward US military objectives in Vietnam.¹⁹ It took two decades to begin restoring the American public's trust.

Military professionals must help advance the profession of arms.²⁰ Those who serve swear an oath to the US Constitution, not a cabinet agency or military service; they are obligated to be truthful with the public, as the military is owned by and accountable to the American people.²¹ Credibility is a priceless resource. Public trust is earned over the long term, and can be destroyed quickly. Without it, the US military would not receive the resources that make it the most formidable force of arms on the global stage. Military commanders and public affairs officers are stewards of that trust. Some who served before did not bear that responsibility well.

Keeping information from the public is a tradition that dates back far beyond the existence of the republic. Presidents and military officials throughout our nation's history have withheld more information than necessary in the belief that doing so protected operational security, and at times obfuscated information for political benefit. America's experience in Vietnam offers a recent historical example of the dangers of such actions. The American public tended to trust wartime information from the government through the early 1960s.²² In 1962, the Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor said: "Our strength anywhere in the world is our credibility."²³ Yet within the same decade, certain military officials became complicit in keeping information from the public for the benefit of President Lyndon Johnson's reelection bid.²⁴ They placed a higher priority on saving face in the midst of tactical setbacks in Vietnam, over their duty to be honest to the American public.²⁵ Journalists began referring to US military press briefings as the "five o'clock follies" and "the longest-playing tragicomedy in southeast Asia's theatre of the absurd."²⁶ The fallout caused reputational damage to the Army that lasted decades.

The US military was last called on to fight large-scale combat operations during Operation Desert Storm. Through a proactive information stance, in conjunction with a military campaign that had a clear strategy, the US Army improved its public profile.²⁷ Many Vietnam veterans, who bore visible and unseen scars from their service, received overdue apologies for the treatment they received from their country decades before.²⁸ Many who served in uniform after the Vietnam War put great effort into reviving trust between the military and the public. That lesson in the value of honesty and active communication engagement was lost on some among the generation of military officials who prosecuted the Global War on Terrorism.

The 2019 Afghanistan Papers revealed that military officials once again withheld information from the public, this time about the lack of progress toward securing Afghanistan.²⁹ In a December 2019 *Washington Post* editorial, former Air Force public affairs officer Lauren Kay Johnson

acknowledged the practice at the time to direct “embedded reporters to only the sunniest stories, keeping them away from disgruntled troops who might not stick to tidy talking points. Our job wasn’t only to mislead the American public; our information campaign extended to the Afghan people and to higher-ups within the American military itself.”³⁰ Regarding Afghan elections, Johnson wrote that command guidance was to highlight the legitimacy of the elections, in spite of indicators pointing to voter intimidation, ballot tampering, and fraud.³¹ Then-Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, director of intelligence for the International Security Assistance Force, noted a positivity bias in the Afghanistan Papers, an institutional desire to report good news that overcame policy requirements to report accurately on the security conditions in Afghanistan.³² Flynn noted that conditions were described in a “rosy” light, because painting a challenging picture was not necessarily well received.³³ He added that every single commander who left Afghanistan reported that they accomplished the mission.³⁴ A 2018 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction report echoed this assessment, documenting that projections for progress in Afghanistan reflected a more optimistic picture than conditions warranted.³⁵ This harkened back to Vietnam-era military officials who were willing to bend the truth to protect America’s image and highlight their personal contributions to the fight.³⁶

During military action across Iraq and Afghanistan, unethical communication practices resulted in headlines like “Pat Tillman: The Superstar Cut Down by Friendly Fire then Used to Sell War,” “What the Army Doesn’t Want You to Know About Bowe Bergdahl,” and “5 Years Ago: When the Pentagon and Media Lied about Jessica Lynch.”³⁷ In these examples, military officials either allowed a false narrative to take hold, or reported a false story. In the case of Bowe Bergdahl, military officials allowed a rumor to endure that he might have been taken captive after falling behind on a patrol, when the facts of the case pointed to a deliberate decision to walk away from his base in 2009.³⁸ Bergdahl’s case gained national attention after his captors returned him to American custody in 2014; prominent political figures hailed the former prisoner of war as a victim until many of his former unit members accused him of deserting them in Afghanistan.³⁹ In 2017, Bergdahl pled guilty to desertion and misbehavior before the enemy and received a dishonorable discharge, a sentence he was challenging in a civil lawsuit as of the time of this writing.

In 2004, military officials perpetuated a false narrative regarding the nature of former National Football League star Pat Tillman’s death during an enemy engagement in Afghanistan. The Arizona Cardinals drafted Tillman after his successful college career at Arizona State University. Till-

man put his football career on hold after the terrorist attacks of September 11th and enlisted in the Army with his brother Kevin in 2002. Tillman joined and deployed with the 75th Ranger Regiment. His unit engaged in a firefight with enemy forces on 22 April 2004 in Afghanistan, an engagement during which he died as a result of friendly fire. Tillman's command misrepresented the nature of his death, transforming it "into an inspirational message that served instead to support the nation's foreign policy wars in Iraq and Afghanistan," according to a 2008 congressional report.⁴⁰ A Department of Defense Inspector General report ultimately acknowledged that military officials misrepresented the nature of Tillman's death.⁴¹

In 2003, the story of Army Private 1st Class Jessica Lynch made headlines. Military officials misrepresented the facts surrounding her capture and rescue.⁴² Lynch was a member of the 507th Maintenance Company, which came under attack on 23 March 2003 in An Nasiriyah, Iraq. She survived and was transported to a hospital by Iraqi forces. Military public affairs officials portrayed Lynch as "the little girl Rambo from the hills of West Virginia," a brave soldier who shot at enemy troops until she ran out of ammunition, killed several enemy fighters, intent on fighting to the death, not wanting to be taken alive.⁴³ The subsequent Special Forces operation to recover Lynch was briefed as an event worthy of Hollywood treatment, with a US Central Command public affairs officer calling it "an awesome story."⁴⁴ Facts came to light that some Defense officials presented Lynch's story in a way that would bolster support for a war that was highly debated among the American public. Lynch described this portrayal of her as "not true," adding, "I am still confused about why they chose to lie and try to make me a legend."⁴⁵ In each case, the Army accomplished no tactical or strategic gain by being anything other than forthright. While the fog of war can obscure initial information, the full reality regarding these soldier stories was known much sooner than was acknowledged officially. Allowing false information to take hold sets conditions for scandal when the facts ultimately become clear.

The Cultural Norm Clash

Unethical, or otherwise unprofessional behavior, among military leaders is cause for attention because of the sense of honor and duty signaled by the military services. In spite of codified conduct rules, some choose a different path.⁴⁶ Lt. Col. Jeffery Schwander noted in a 1988 US Army War College research project that in spite of regulations that demand ethical behavior, some soldiers cede the moral high ground, undermining military professionalism.⁴⁷ This practice undermines trust, and creates perceptual risk that could prevent commanders from succeeding in future military op-

erations.⁴⁸ In 2014, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel expressed concern for a number of high-profile ethical lapses across the Defense Department.⁴⁹ A 2015 War College report titled “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession” echoed that concern, noting a cultural acceptance—even necessity—for US Army leaders to bend the truth in routine processes despite documented ethical requirements.⁵⁰ The Department of Defense “Principles of Information” clearly state that Department of Defense policy is “to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, the Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy.”⁵¹ Yet, this guidance is not enforced consistently across military culture.

Adhering to formalized service values is important because the military is the only US institution trusted by the public to aggressively take life. Military dishonesty at any level could create a negative perception of the institution as a whole. Command communication practices that violate “Principles of Information” requirements can negatively impact the military institution’s reputation. Yet, the US Army’s command-centric culture affords commanders tremendous flexibility in how, or whether, they fulfill public disclosure requirements. Unlike the US Army, most military forces that compete with US forces do not share a belief that honesty has a place in warfare. Our current social perspective on institutional transparency and honesty is rather a new addition to the practice of warfare in the historical sense. In times past, nations at war were more likely to send messages of impending victory to their populace, and the inevitability of defeat to their antagonists, regardless of actual conditions at the time. That is a harder sell among many audiences today, who have access to a prevalence of immediate information. To be deliberately deceitful risks destroying trust. Public trust, or lack thereof, is a factor that brings strategic consequence. Commanders and public affairs officials must work together to fulfill the US military’s unique policy of being honest with the public, in order to grow and maintain the public’s trust.

When a major crisis happens in the US, state and national leaders frequently call on military resources to assist with response efforts. In 2020 and 2021, military units supported local law enforcement during periods of civil unrest, assisted with COVID-19 vaccination and testing efforts, and provided additional manpower to address border security challenges. The effects of these missions were amplified by social media activity, a factor that commanders of past eras did not have to consider. Whether in peacetime operations, or in large-scale combat operations, military leaders should expect public scrutiny—and associated misinformation—on levels

previously unseen in warfare. Military efforts are more likely to be effective when the service, commands, and messengers are trusted. Keeping trust in this high-volume disinformation environment will be key to retaining the support and resources needed to successfully achieve national strategic objectives, and for reducing non-military resistance to completing the mission. Command culture is critical to build and preserve that trust.

Public Relations and Public Affairs: An Imperfect History

Public communicators wield tremendous influence over people, society, and culture.⁵² The history of public relations is marked by those who used media influence solely for the good of clients, often to the public's detriment.⁵³ As some twentieth century public relations professionals used the social sciences to manipulate how people think, World War II-era military communicators employed mass communication to influence the American public to support the war effort.⁵⁴ These practices helped shape the image of organizational communicators as spin doctors.⁵⁵ Absent a sense of ethical responsibility, public communication practices can prove dangerous tools of influence for those who know how to wield them.

Some military officials believe that accomplishing the military objective should be the primary consideration for military public engagement efforts; they view communication like a bullet, artillery shell, or missile that can be shot for a battlefield effect.⁵⁶ In *Parameters*, Col. Kenneth Payne acknowledged that sometimes the interests of transparency and military objectives do not align.⁵⁷ Payne endorsed prioritizing public affairs efforts on operational objectives first, then honesty and accountability.⁵⁸ In *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Maj. Gen. (Retired) Paul D. Eaton stated that while military leaders are obligated to answer controversial policy questions from members of Congress, they have every right to avoid answering similar questions from the press.⁵⁹ Capt. (Royal Canadian Navy-Retired) J. D. Scanlon warned that these kind of practices actually increase strategic risk.⁶⁰ Likewise, former Department of Defense Director of Press Operations Capt. (US Navy-Retired) Jeff Davis cautioned that using public affairs as a weapon system runs counter to the basic values of the profession, and the values that the military seeks to defend.⁶¹

Codes of Professional Communication Ethics

Professions establish ethical codes that serve as a contract between the profession and society.⁶² Professor Patricia Parsons, who specializes in communication ethics and strategy, commented that the best way to change the negative view of public communicators is to self-impose a standard that values integrity above all else.⁶³ The Hippocratic Oath is a

well-known pledge for medical professionals to first do no harm. Attorneys are expected to abide by legal codes for their accrediting state bar association. Likewise, public relations associations around the world have established ethics codes for their members.

The Public Relations Society of America published a code of ethics for its members in 1950, followed by the International Association of Public Relations, which published the “Code of Athens,” in 1965.⁶⁴ The European Confederation of Public Relations adopted the “Code of Lisbon,” in 1978.⁶⁵ The International Association of Business Communicators, the Arthur W. Page Society, and the National Association of Government Communicators all similarly codify expectations of their members based on honesty and accuracy.⁶⁶ The US Department of Defense published the “Principles of Information” in 2000.⁶⁷ In 2012, the Department of the Navy became the first US military service to incorporate a canon of ethics in its public affairs regulation.⁶⁸ The Army added a code of professional ethics in its 2020 update to Army Regulation (AR) 360-1, *Public Affairs*. This code includes a principle-based vision dedicated to accuracy, public transparency, and courage, rather than a litany of overly detailed rules.⁶⁹ This is a terrific move for policy. Yet it will take command priority across the force to inculcate this code consistently in an organization of the Army’s size.


- 
1. Tell the truth.
 2. Prove it with action.
 3. Listen to stakeholders.
 4. Manage for tomorrow.
 5. Conduct public relations as if the whole enterprise depends on it.
 6. Realize an enterprise’s true character is expressed by its people.
 7. Remain calm, patient, and good-humored.

Figure 12.1. Summary of the Page Principles. From Arthur W. Page Society.

Members of any organization need to commit to its standard of professional ethics before crisis strikes. Ethical values help avoid crisis situations; then when a crisis develops, an ethical communication stance can help leaders manage the situation and retain the trust of stakeholders within and beyond the organization. To maintain the ethical high ground, princi-

ples must be ingrained in an organization's culture.⁷⁰ Unlike commercial or non-profit entities, the US Army does not face a threat to its very existence when a crisis happens. The nation and military services take for granted that Congress and the president will continue to approve defense appropriations every year, as providing for the common defense is an ultimate essential service of the federal government. For military commands, however, fallout from a crisis can cause severe repercussions that interfere with achieving military objectives. Oftentimes, crisis situations stem from practices that disregard ethical perspective and existing policies.

Role of Professional Ethics in Army Communication

Organizational leadership sets the tone for how members perform.⁷¹ Ethical codes within business and institutional policies are meaningless if leaders do not support and enforce them.⁷² To gain a credible information edge in large-scale combat operations, the US Army must back its public affairs capabilities as a force of ethical counsel, to the same level that commanders consider ethical advice from staff ministry and legal counselors. The US Constitution, "National Security Strategy," "Principles of Information," and Joint and US Army policy emphasize honesty and transparency not only as best practices, but requirements. Military communication practitioners sometimes encounter organizational resistance when implementing these practices based on unit culture, or the personality and experience of a commander. Though military doctrine teaches that ethical behavior is paramount in all things, no formal mechanism enforces those requirements in how commanders and their public affairs officers conduct communication activities. Every US service member receives annual training on behavior expectations. However, in 2018 the US Army eliminated the requirement for its members to receive annual public affairs training.⁷³ The Army's prevailing culture prioritizes enforcing rules for personal conduct, physical fitness, and combat engagement. Yet enforcement of rules pertaining to some practices, which are not typically included in training and readiness briefings, is often based on local command preference. While being dishonest with superiors can be a punishable offense according to Defense policy, dishonesty with the press or public is not.

Because communicators work on behalf of their organizations and the public, ethical dilemmas are inevitable.⁷⁴ One professionalism challenge is to manage competing loyalties between the organization and the profession.⁷⁵ Loyalty to the organization can translate into a loyalty to the bureaucracy, in which the priority is to defend the organization in its current state.⁷⁶ Unchecked, individuals can use dishonest techniques to protect the

organization.⁷⁷ In contrast, loyalty to a profession prioritizes socio-ethical imperatives that uphold the ethical commitments of a professional body to honor both the client organization and the public.⁷⁸ Unlike the legal system, not every issue or leader is entitled to a defense in the court of public opinion.⁷⁹ The ethical communicator must know where to draw the line. Military commands must establish a culture in which service members are not forced to choose between the organization and the profession.

Ethics as Strategy

Using an ethics-based approach to command communication can help protect trust across the cognitive space, which can have tangible impacts in the physical space. An ethical communication posture does not simply mean the proactive release of all things at all times. Ethical strategy seeks to serve all members involved with the institution to the best extent possible. Different ethical lenses can offer different solutions. At times it might be ethical to temporarily limit disclosure, without deliberately misleading the public.⁸⁰ For example, sometimes withholding information is necessary to achieve a greater good, like the policy to withhold the identity of deceased service members until twenty-four hours after next of kin are notified, or protecting information that could be used by enemy forces.⁸¹ The principles and policies for withholding information must be carefully defined before they are needed. Organizational values or rules of information engagement should be identified well before an organization, or military command, faces a crisis.⁸²

Policy documents often spell out values-based communication practices. For example, the 2017 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” instructed that direct communication campaigns should advance American influence, counter challenges from ideological threats, and “adhere to American values.”⁸³ The Department of Defense “Principles of Information” directed departmental transparency within the confines of operations security.⁸⁴ Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-0, *The Army Profession*, requires that US Army personnel act according to the Declaration of Independence and US Constitution, adhere to the nation’s values, and be fully accountable to their fellow citizens.⁸⁵ Army Regulation (AR) 360-1, *Public Affairs*, requires proactive release of accurate information to help facilitate informed perceptions about military operations, counter misinformation and disinformation, reinforce public support for the Army, and help achieve national, strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.⁸⁶ These documents offer ample strategic guidance to nest unit-level ethical communication practices within.

A New Concept of Public Affairs Mission, Professional Ethics

The American history of warfare suggests that public trust is one of the best predictors of which party will prevail in a military contest involving US forces. In adapting to the modern strategic environment, the US Army should put the same energy into a culture change effort to build trust through ethical communication practices that it does to redefine physical readiness parameters. During the COVID-19 outbreak, the military rapidly adapted work processes, as well as non-essential grooming and fitness testing standards. Senior service leaders demonstrated that where there is a will, there is a way to immediately bring cultural change across the force. This same energy can be applied to defining and enforcing ethical communication practices across all commands.

At the core, a communication officer is keeper of an organization's soul and advocate between an organization and its publics.⁸⁷ Though military public affairs and public relations are not the same, both vocations share similar tools and methods to carry out closely related functions. In 2019, then-Secretary of the Army Mark Esper referred to public affairs officers as communication professionals.⁸⁸ The prevailing concept is that societies proffer profession status on a specialized field that functions as a community of self-policing workers who perform and innovate, providing benefits to society.⁸⁹ Key to that designation is adherence to a code of ethics.⁹⁰ It is, however, not enough to create a code of professional communication ethics. Leaders must forcefully and frequently reinforce that code into their service and unit cultures.⁹¹ This will require training ethical communication practices across all phases of professional military education for both enlisted and commissioned soldiers, and frequently reinforcing them during steady-state operations.

The ability to mass and coordinate force in large-scale combat operations will never cease to influence military contests. More important, the military force that proves trustworthy will have the advantage over the one regarded in a negative light, and this reality will be multiplied in the modern information environment. Military commanders who are trusted at home and abroad are more likely to enjoy long-term support and resourcing to accomplish the mission, and face less resistance from civilians and other non-military actors on the battlefield. Ethical communicators within the ranks can, and should, influence command actions and communications to rightly earn and hold public trust. The time to enable communicators to fulfill that calling is now—before the United States engages a peer threat in large-scale combat operations.

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Conclusion

The Ethics of Large-Scale Combat Operations

Lt. Gen. James E. Rainey

As this volume has illustrated, winning in a complex world will require a professional Army capable of generating new expert knowledge that addresses the demands of the evolving character of large-scale combat operations (LSCO) and, perhaps more importantly, the evolving society that the military serves. Critical to applying this expert knowledge will be doing so ethically, since demonstrating our moral commitments is the cornerstone of our trust with the American people. This trust will be essential if the Army Profession is to navigate the uncertain and ambiguous environment associated with twenty-first century security challenges.

This volume has explored what it takes to gain and maintain that trust, as well as the costs of failing to do so. What has been clearly demonstrated throughout each application of the Army Ethic principles is that trust in the Army as a profession is earned by professionals who fully buy into the profession. Buying into the profession requires an understanding of what a profession is, who a professional is, and what a professional does. This understanding is not only critical to what the profession does now but, more importantly, how it will handle challenges in the future.

What a Profession Is

There are many ways to think about professions; however, not all those ways will lead to the kind of trust the Army requires to effectively serve the American people. The Army needs the kind of trust that motivates the government to resource it and the American people to join it. Because of this, Army leaders must ensure our status as a profession underpins everything we do. While unique specialized knowledge associated with the application of landpower is what distinguishes the Army as a profession, it takes much more than simply expertise to earn that trust. Army professionals must also be willing to serve selflessly and sacrificially and use their expertise for the public benefit.

That is why there are few true professions today: law, medicine, the clergy, and—as I argue here—the military. The expertise in each of these fields represents knowledge and skill that is not easily acquired; but without it, you are not a professional nor should you engage in the activities of that profession. If you are not a lawyer, you should not defend a client; if you are not a doctor, you should not perform surgery or prescribe med-

ication. And, certainly, if you are not a soldier, you should not engage in combat. In times of crisis, non-professionals may—out of necessity—perform some of these functions. These are exceptions, however, that prove the rule and underscore why professions are important to prevent crisis and, failing that, ensure a competent response.

Thus, it is important to understand what “specialized expert knowledge” means in the Army’s professional context. This kind of knowledge is specialized in the sense that it serves a specific social need: in this case, security. It is expert in that you could not do the work in question without the specialized knowledge. As such, knowledge is abstract—acquired through education, training, and discipline. For the Army, the permission to kill on behalf of the American people is a serious undertaking and requires fully committed professionals who exercise that permission responsibly. To ensure that permissions and commitment endure, professions also must be self-regulating and hold their members accountable when they act unethically.

Finally, this expertise can lead to great harm when exercised—or not exercised. Thus, professions also require an ethic to use the skill and knowledge for good, even if that exercise means taking risks, and prohibits its use for harm, even if that exercise benefits the profession. Of course, in the actual exercise of this knowledge it may not be possible to avoid certain harms, regardless of intent. In fact, the nature of warfighting assures such unavoidable, even moral, harms. As also noted in this volume, warfighting requires balancing three imperatives: military necessity, non-combatant immunity, and force protection. In accomplishing the mission, Army leaders put soldiers and sometimes civilians in harm’s way. Doing that well requires understanding that the ethics of the profession is its own kind of expertise that needs to be integrated and developed in the same way as knowledge of how to apply force.

The Army’s expert knowledge is diverse: the infantry soldier has different expertise than the logistician who has different knowledge than the communications technician. What unites this diverse expertise is their purpose, which academic Samuel P. Huntington described as the “management of violence.” While I will say more later about what constitutes the Army’s expert knowledge, the ability and commitment to apply one’s specific knowledge to serve that purpose is what makes one an Army professional.

Harnessing that expertise, of course, requires some bureaucracy in our immense enterprise; however, that bureaucracy creates a further tension that professionals must manage. Put simply, professions privilege effec-

tiveness whereas bureaucracies privilege efficiency. While both are necessary, the Army leader with a professional mindset is in the best position to navigate that tension so that both values are optimized. The profession must control the bureaucracy.

Who Professionals Are

Early studies on the military as a profession, such as those by Huntington and sociologist Morris Janowitz in the 1950s, only included officer corps with regular Army commissions. Huntington and Janowitz believed noncommissioned officers should not be included because their knowledge was not sufficiently expert to warrant professional status. Army civilians were excluded because they were not involved in what Huntington described as the purpose of the military profession: the management of violence.

Whatever may have been true about the Army when Huntington and Janowitz were writing, it should be clear from this volume that things have changed. Army operations on today's battlefield require a great deal of expertise at every rank. Moreover, if the Army's purpose is to win the nation's wars and not simply manage violence, Army civilians play a critical role as well. Thus, excluding them from the profession does not make sense given their critical role in maintaining the strength of the Army profession, both in CONUS and when deployed.

Of course, not everyone in the Army is a professional. Professionals are experts who have committed themselves to an ethic of public service and hold themselves and other members accountable to that ethical standard. Thus, the first standard for a professional is certification in that expert body of knowledge. In this context, expertise is a high bar which cannot be reduced to a simple test. Rather, it requires the acquisition of abstract knowledge, the skill to apply it, and experience that enables effective application in routine as well as unexpected situations.

Acquiring that kind of knowledge and experience takes time. Newly minted soldiers and Army civilians are not yet members of the profession. That does not diminish their achievement in graduating from entry-level training or being selected for their position. Rather, it underscores that professional status is aspirational and requires continual certification. Moreover, this view of professions requires Army leaders at all levels who fully buy in and not only see themselves as certified professionals but also understand that the professionalizing process never ends. There is always more to learn and more soldiers to develop.

What Professionals Do

As stated above, the Army's purpose is to win wars. More to the point, the purpose is to win wars in a way that is both sustainable and honors the sacrifices necessary to win them. That does not mean there are no other uses for the Army; however, this core purpose enables those other uses. For example, the Army plays an important role in strengthening relations with allies and partners through security cooperation activities. The Army also deters conflict by signaling to adversaries that the United States and its partners will defend their vital interests. The US Army is able to play these roles because partners see these activities as something to emulate and adversaries see them as something to avoid. Achieving that effect requires an Army that is strong, committed, and professional.

So, if its purpose is to win wars, the Army needs warfighting expertise and leadership skills at all levels. These are two important and related, but different, fields. A soldier can be a good warfighter and a poor leader, or vice versa. As discussed above, being a good warfighter means recognizing how one's core skill, whatever it is, contributes to mission accomplishment. As demonstrated throughout this volume, that contribution requires sacrifice and courage. That's where leadership comes in—the competency to motivate others to accept that sacrifice and exhibit courage as well.

Commensurate with leadership is responsibility. Army professionals have responsibilities to their superiors, their subordinates, and the American people. This responsibility is manifested in many ways. To superiors, Army professionals must perform their best and continually develop their abilities so they can perform better. Doing so entails both mastering what you already know as well as acquiring new skills and technology to keep up with the evolving character of war. Additionally, Army professionals must ensure that subordinates develop their own expertise and apply it toward legitimate ends; and, most importantly, they must guarantee that any sacrifice that a subordinate makes is not in vain. Further, Army professionals owe accountability to the American people, both for “getting the job done” and doing it ethically.

Acting ethically means not only abiding by the Law of Armed Conflict and other humanitarian concerns; it also means acting as stewards of the profession, effectively and responsibly using the resources they are given. In this regard, sexual assault and its many manifestations are probably the biggest current threat to the Army's professional status. If we fail to address this problem effectively, the Army risks undermining the trust of all stakeholders: the soldiers who join, the families that send them, the

Congress that provides resources, and the executive branch that employs it. The Army needs the trust of all these constituencies to be a truly professional force.

Why It Matters

The American people have not always desired a professional force. Before there was a United States, American colonists mistrusted the kind of occupational elitism they left in Europe and viewed the idea of expert mastery of systematic knowledge as “old world.”¹ At a time when people hunted with the same weapons they used in war, holding such a view did not place an individual or society at a disadvantage. Militaries needed charismatic leaders and courageous, dedicated soldiers. Any “specialized” knowledge was easily acquired. That view changed, however, as scientific knowledge increased and the weapons, tactics, and strategies of war became more complex. Today, it would be unthinkable, much less unethical, to fight a war with an army of amateurs.

There are, of course, a number of reasons this is the case. First, the US Army is an all-volunteer force. We expect the American people not only to support the Army, but to join it. If the Army is not seen as a professional force, it will not attract the talented, committed, and dedicated individuals needed to fulfill its role effectively. Second, the principle of civilian control obligates civilian leaders, specifically the executive branch and Congress, to both resource and wisely employ the Army. Maintaining an army capable of global deployment is both expensive and, even outside of war, dangerous. To commit those resources as well as the authority to use them, civilian leaders need to see the Army as a professional force accountable to them for the ethical application of force. Third, the Army demands much not only from soldiers, but from their families as well. Soldiers must view Army service as something bigger than themselves. They are following a calling, rather than just doing a job.

The Future of the Profession

With a solid understanding of the Army profession, soldiers will be in a better position to understand future ethical challenges. While the focus of this discussion has been LSCO, technological developments over the last several years have expanded the ways and means that states and non-state actors can compete, blurring the lines between war and peace. Developments in surveillance technologies as well as autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons have allowed a range of actors to strike adversaries in more precise, prolific, and deniable ways. The spread of cyber

technologies and increasing global connectivity have exposed new vulnerabilities—enabling a range of coercive, if non-violent, measures. Not only are critical infrastructure and critical services at risk of disruption by cyber operations, but the ability of adversaries to manipulate information in the public sphere threatens to undermine the legitimacy of governments and institutions that are necessary for a successful defense.

These types of changes enable weaker states and even non-state actors to take on global powers and win. The distinction between regular and irregular warfare, gray zone and hybrid conflicts, and peaceful and adversarial competition will mean very little as the Army prepares to fulfill its purpose. Because of such changes, the lessons of LSCO will apply in a variety of other contexts.

From the normative perspective, the proliferation of these technologies will challenge legal and ethical norms either because current norms do not apply or, where they do, violators cannot be held accountable. The resulting vacuum will necessitate new norms governing the range of coercive measures that characterize this competition. Otherwise, the international community will likely see a continued drift toward the international lawlessness that characterized eras prior to World War II. Army professionals will need to shape how those norms evolve.

The kinds of risks that Army professionals must manage will be different as well. These points, taken together, suggest that the twenty-first century battlefield will not involve fewer risks, just different ones. Thus, how leaders manage technology acquisition and employment will profoundly impact not just on how soldiers experience courage but, by extension, the individual soldier's identity.

While some soldiers will be physically harmed, that risk will decrease for many, especially those involved with remote platforms and technologies. At the same time, the risk of psychological harm may increase, and in unexpected ways. Studies indicate that mental trauma associated with the use of autonomous technologies range from desensitization and moral disengagement to trauma and moral injury. These effects will require redefining ethical obligations to fellow soldiers and veterans.

Technology will also impact the civil-military relationship that is a cornerstone of the Army profession. For example, artificial intelligence (AI) may exercise specialized human knowledge that reduces the required expertise of the human user. While there will likely be genuine expertise required for a period, reliance on AI systems may enable the use of com-

plex weapon systems with little training and no education. Reducing soldiering to “using an app” would diminish the Army’s professional status unless leaders start thinking about how to reconceive Army expert knowledge for the future.

Human enhancement technologies could also impact how the American people regard the Army profession. Technology can make soldiers less vulnerable or less fearful. Such reductions diminish, if not eliminate, the need to demonstrate courage. This willingness to accept risk and danger is a key element of how civil society values, and rewards, soldiers and veterans. If soldiering no longer requires much sacrifice, then it *will* be “just a job,” best filled by technicians.

Today’s US Army is a product of a complex history of expanding expert knowledge driven by new technologies, changing jurisdictions, and new threats. As operations demanded not just a larger army, but a more skilled one, the Army required a *professional* class of leaders and an ethic that went beyond that of civil society, much like the professions of law and medicine. Today, professional armies, rather than bureaucratic ones, win wars.

Healthy and functional professions develop and build expert knowledge to serve the social good. The US Army has built trust not only among Army professionals but also with the government and American people, collectively providing the authority necessary to keep the profession effective. This jurisdiction and authority, however, are not stable. As the Army transformed from citizen militias to an all-volunteer force, it undertook a range of insurgent, counterinsurgent, constabulary, and conventional missions. Results were often mixed, because Army professionals failed to anticipate the demands of these new jurisdictions.

The lesson to be learned from this volume is that professionals must be vigilant in ensuring that the bureaucracy’s demands do not undermine the profession, its expert knowledge, or its ethical practices. Conceiving the Army as a profession connects the moral imperative of defense with the Army’s functional imperative, which is to win wars. Just as importantly, the profession demands that soldiers not only perform their best in service to the greater good, but continually improve. Otherwise, they risk losing the trust of those they serve.

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About the Authors

Jonathan D. Bailey

Chaplain (Maj.) Jonathan D. Bailey has served as an active-duty chaplain for more than thirteen years and is an ethics instructor at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He has a BA in history and religious studies from Stetson University and master's degrees in divinity and sacred theology in ethics from Boston University.

Mark J. Balboni

Lt. Col. Mark J. Balboni is a Joint Planner with Combined Forces Command in the Republic of Korea. He wrote "Battle of Bataan, 1942: Security Force Assistance in the Close Combat Fight," in *The Last 100 Yards: The Crucible of Close Combat in Large-Scale Combat Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2019). Balboni has a BA in history from Westfield State University and an MA from the Institute of World Politics. His assignments included four combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Paul E. Berg

Col. Paul E. Berg is an active-duty aviation officer currently serving at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He was editor of *The Last 100 Yards: The Crucible of Close Combat in Large-Scale Combat Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2019) and co-authored "Task Force Normandy: The Deep Operation that Started Operation Desert Storm" in *Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Sustainment in Large-Scale Combat Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2018). Colonel Berg has nearly thirty years of active duty, including four combat deployments, and is a former battalion commander. He has a BBA and MBA from the University of North Texas and an MS and PhD in adult and continuing education from Kansas State University.

Keith R. Beurskens

Keith R. Beurskens is the Deputy, Directorate of Academic Affairs at Army University. He was lead author for the "Army University White Paper" and the "Strategic Business Plan for the Army University," which led to the Army's 2015 establishment of Army University. He also was editor of *The Long Haul: Historical Case Studies of Sustainment in Large-Scale Combat Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2018) and has written numerous articles as well as "Assured Mobility and River Crossing Operations" in *The Last 100 Yards: The Crucible of Close Combat in Large-Scale Combat Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2019). Beurskens is also Chief Editor for the *Journal of*

Military Learning. He completed a twenty-four-year military career and has a doctorate in management in organizational leadership.

David F. Bonner

Capt. (US Air Force Reserve) David F. Bonner is a graduate of the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps Program at Texas Christian University and served as an ICBM Combat Crew Officer at the 319th Missile Squadron at F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming. He has an MBA from the University of Wyoming and earned his master's in history from the University of Edinburgh. He is pursuing a PhD in history from the University of Edinburgh. Bonner is an active member of the Japanese American Citizens League and the Go for Broke Veterans Foundation and has published with the Army University Press on the 442nd Regimental Combat Team.

Joel N. Brown

Joel N. Brown is an assistant professor of philosophy at the US Air Force Academy. A former US Air Force lieutenant colonel, he commanded at the squadron level and worked in operational planning, operations analysis, research and development, recruiting, and campaign assessment. Bless, a distinguished graduate of the US Air Force Air Command and Staff College, has a PhD from Syracuse University.

Arthur W. Gullachsen

Capt. (Canadian Army) Arthur W. Gullachsen is assistant professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada. He wrote *An Army of Never-Ending Strength: Reinforcing the Canadians in Northwest Europe 1944–45* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2021). Gullachsen also published in the *Canadian Military History Journal* and *Britain at War* magazine and wrote “The Battle of Bretteville l’Orgueilleuse: The Assault of Kampfgruppe Meyer/Wunsche, 8–9 June 1944,” in *The Last 100 Yards: The Crucible of Close Combat in Large-Scale Combat Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2019).

Kenneth A. Hawley

Col. (Retired) Kenneth A. Hawley served in the Army for thirty years. He has a BS in history from the US Military Academy and an MBA from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University and an MA from the Naval War College. He is pursuing a doctoral degree in executive leadership from the University of Charleston.

W. Sanders Marble

W. Sanders Marble, PhD, has been a historian with the Army Medical Department since 2003, including a period as Command Historian at Wal-

ter Reed Army Medical Center. He has written or edited more than a dozen articles, chapters, and books on US Army medicine.

John L. Morales

Chaplain (Lt. Col.) John L. Morales retired from active service after twenty-two years as an Army chaplain, most recently as the Deputy Combined Arms Center Chaplain. Additionally, he served in the enlisted ranks of the Navy on active duty and as a reservist. His assignments included Chaplain Ethicist and Liaison for the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic and four years as the ethics instructor and writer for the US Army Field Artillery Center and School, in addition to duties as an Army chaplain.

C. Anthony Pfaff

C. Anthony Pfaff is Research Professor for Strategy, the Military Profession, and Ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. A retired colonel, Pfaff served as a foreign area officer for the Middle East, where he was a Military Advisor for the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team in Iraq, Defense Attaché in Kuwait and Baghdad, and Senior Military and Army Advisor at the State Department. He has a bachelor's in economics and philosophy from Washington and Lee University, an MA in philosophy from Stanford University, and a PhD from Georgetown University.

James E. Rainey

Lt. Gen. James E. Rainey is Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 and previously was Commanding General, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College. During nearly thirty-five years with the US Army, he has served in a variety of command and leadership positions from platoon level to division as well as key staff assignments including Chief of War on Terror Plans for US European Command; G-3 of the 4th Infantry Division and Multi-National Division-Baghdad; and Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Headquarters Department of the Army. Rainey has a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Eastern Kentucky University, a master's degree in advanced military arts and science from the School of Advanced Military Studies and a master's degree in public administration from Troy University.

Robert J. Rielly

Lt. Col. (Retired) Robert J. Rielly served in numerous armor and staff assignments throughout his career. He is an associate professor for the Department of Command and Leadership, US Army Command and General Staff College. He received a BA from Norwich University, an MS from Kansas State University, and an MA from the College of Naval Command

and Staff. He wrote “Defeat from Victory: Korea 1950,” in *The Last 100 Yards: The Crucible of Close Combat in Large-Scale Combat Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2019)” as well as several *Military Review* articles on unit cohesion and war crimes.

Daniel J. Sieben

Maj. (US Air Force) Daniel J. Sieben is an English instructor at the US Air Force Academy. Prior to teaching, he flew manned and unmanned aircraft, most recently as an instructor/evaluator at the Air Force’s largest formal training unit for remotely piloted aircraft. He has a BA from St. Cloud State University, an MA in English from the University of Hawaii, an MBA from Trident University, and a JD from Mitchell Hamline School of Law.

Don M. Snider

Don M. Snider is professor of political science emeritus at West Point and an adjunct professor at the US Army War College. He served three combat tours as an Infantry officer in Vietnam and retired from the Army in 1990 with the Defense Distinguished Service Medal. While serving as a professor at the Army War College, he led the two-year effort to produce the US Army’s first-ever doctrine on the military profession: Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession*. Snider has received a variety of awards, including the Morris Janowitz Career Achievement Award, the Malham Wakin Founder’s Award for Lifetime Achievement in the field of military ethics, and the Bengt Abrahamson Award for lifetime contributions to the international study of military professions.

Charles M. Spears

Maj. Charles M. “Chase” Spears specializes in communication professionalism and the role of communication in organizational leadership and culture setting. He has served in public affairs, command, and combat camera positions over seventeen years as an enlisted and commissioned soldier. Spears currently is a training advisor to brigade and division public affairs teams and a leadership communication doctoral student at Kansas State University. He has master’s degrees in the communication sciences from the University of Tennessee and Georgetown University, as well as an MMAS from the US Army Command and General Staff College.

Matthew R. Thom

Lt. Col. Matthew R. Thom is the Director of Operations for Army University at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a BS from the University of Oregon and an MS from Central Michigan University and is continuing his education at Kansas State University. Thom’s assignments include tours in Germany and Southeast Asia and deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.