


Joint Publication 3-33



Joint Task Force Headquarters



16 February 2007



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine for the formation and employment of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters to command and control joint operations. It provides guidance on the JTF headquarters role in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing JTF operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by

the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



WALTER L. SHARP
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-33 (FORMERLY 5-00.2)
DATED 13 JANUARY 1999

- **Changes the publication title and number from Joint Publication (JP) 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, to JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters***
- **Reduces redundancy with other joint publications and brings this publication in-line with current approved and emerging joint doctrine**
- **Includes various sections on interagency coordination that include interagency relationships and interagency support requirements**
- **Adds a discussion on strategic communication**
- **Expands the section on joint task force liaison personnel**
- **Enhances the discussion on joint task force staff organization**
- **Adds a paragraph on joint task force headquarters processes and systems**
- **Provides a discussion on the standing joint force headquarters**
- **Establishes input on cross-functional staff organization and battle rhythm**
- **Addresses standing rules for the use of force**
- **Updates paragraphs on the joint force air component commander, joint force land component commander, and joint force maritime component commander**
- **Enhances the discussion of commander's critical information requirements**
- **Includes a section on personnel planning**
- **Expands the section on protection and its relationship to force protection**
- **Addresses the deployment distribution operations center**
- **Enhances the paragraph on communications system support standardization and procedures to include a subparagraph on the importance of a disclosure policy**

- **Adds an appendix (Appendix A) on the “commander, joint task force personal and special staffs”**
- **Adds an appendix (Appendix B) on “checklists” that can assist the commander, joint task force and joint task force staff in performance of their duties**
- **Adds an appendix (Appendix C) on “contracting and contractor management planning”**
- **Adds an appendix (Appendix D) on “information management”**
- **Updates the glossary to better reflect a more accurate use of terms and definitions in the publication — includes adding new terms and definitions to the glossary**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	xi
CHAPTER I	
INTRODUCTION TO THE JOINT TASK FORCE	
• General	I-1
• Joint Task Force Organization	I-4
• Command and Control	I-4
• Manpower and Personnel	I-5
• Intelligence	I-5
• Operations	I-5
• Logistics	I-6
• Plans and Policy	I-7
• Communications System Support	I-7
• Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Considerations	I-8
• Multinational Considerations	I-9
• Strategic Communication Considerations	I-10
• Checklists	I-11
CHAPTER II	
JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING	
SECTION A. FORMING THE JOINT TASK FORCE STAFF	II-1
• General	II-1
• Options for Forming a Joint Task Force Staff	II-1
SECTION B. COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES	II-6
• Command and Staff Roles and Responsibilities	II-6
• Staff Organization	II-10
SECTION C. JOINT TASK FORCE LIAISON PERSONNEL	II-17
• General	II-17
CHAPTER III	
JOINT TASK FORCE SUBORDINATE COMMANDS	
• General	III-1
• Service Component Commands	III-2
• Functional Component Commands	III-2
• Special Purpose Subordinate Task Forces	III-15

CHAPTER IV

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL

- General IV-1
- Joint Task Force Headquarters Management Process IV-1
- Joint Task Force Headquarters Command and Control Factors IV-6

CHAPTER V

JOINT TASK FORCE MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL

- General V-1
- Organization V-1
- Primary Responsibilities V-2
- Additional Responsibilities V-8
- Personnel Planning V-9

CHAPTER VI

JOINT TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE

- General VI-1
- Organization VI-1
- Intelligence Disciplines and Sources VI-4
- Collection Disciplines VI-5
- Responsibilities VI-5
- Multinational Intelligence Operations VI-8
- National Intelligence Support Team VI-10
- Supported Combatant Commander’s Joint Intelligence Operations Center VI-10
- Joint Intelligence Support Element VI-11
- Intelligence Centers and Other Support VI-13

CHAPTER VII

JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATIONS

- General VII-1
- Responsibilities VII-1
- Organization VII-3

CHAPTER VIII

JOINT TASK FORCE LOGISTICS

- General VIII-1
- Authority VIII-1
- Organization VIII-2
- Planning Considerations VIII-5
- Responsibilities VIII-8

- Multinational Logistics VIII-10
- United Nations Logistics VIII-11
- Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental
Organization Support Requirements VIII-12
- Contracting Support VIII-13
- Host-Nation Support VIII-13
- Logistic Supporting Agencies and Organizations VIII-15
- Logistic Boards, Offices, and Centers VIII-17

CHAPTER IX

JOINT TASK FORCE PLANS AND POLICY

SECTION A. PLANS AND POLICY DIVISION IX-1

- General IX-1
- Organization IX-1
- Responsibilities IX-1

SECTION B. JOINT TASK FORCE PLANNING IX-4

- General IX-4
- The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System IX-5
- The Joint Operation Planning Process IX-7
- Operational Design IX-7
- Joint Planning Group IX-10

CHAPTER X

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SUPPORT

- General X-1
- Organization X-3
- Responsibilities of the Joint Task Force Establishing Authority X-4
- Commander, Joint Task Force Communications System Support Responsibilities X-4
- Joint Task Force Communications Officer Responsibilities X-4
- Associated Communications Responsibilities X-5
- Communications Requirements X-7
- Information Systems Support X-8
- Multinational Communications System Support Standardization and Procedures X-9
- Global Command and Control System X-12

APPENDIX

- A Commander, Joint Task Force Personal and Special Staffs A-1
- B Checklists B-1
- C Contracting and Contractor Management Planning C-1
- D Information Management D-1

E	References	E-1
F	Administrative Instructions	F-1

GLOSSARY

Part I	Abbreviations and Acronyms	GL-1
Part II	Terms and Definitions	GL-7

FIGURE

I-1	Joint Task Force Organizational Options	I-1
I-2	Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities	I-2
II-1	Building Upon the Core Staff	II-3
II-2	Cross-Functional Staff	II-11
II-3	Basic Working Group Model	II-13
II-4	Basic Planning Team Model	II-14
II-5	Typical Joint Task Force Staff Organization	II-15
II-6	Staff Interaction Supporting Decision-making	II-16
II-7	Liaison Officer Guidelines	II-19
III-1	Possible Joint Task Force Organization	III-1
III-2	Typical Service Component Commander Responsibilities	III-3
III-3	Typical Joint Force Air Component Commander Responsibilities	III-5
III-4	Notional Joint Force Air Component Commander Staff and Joint Air Operations Center Organization	III-6
III-5	Typical Joint Force Land Component Commander Responsibilities	III-8
III-6	Notional Joint Force Land Component Commander Organization	III-10
III-7	Typical Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Responsibilities	III-12
III-8	Notional Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Staff Organization	III-13
III-9	Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Organization	III-14
III-10	Typical Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander Responsibilities	III-16
III-11	Typical Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Responsibilities	III-17
III-12	Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Organization	III-18
III-13	Typical Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Responsibilities	III-20
III-14	Notional Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Headquarters Organization	III-21
IV-1	Commander's Decision Cycle	IV-3
IV-2	Sample Joint Task Force Headquarters Battle Rhythm	IV-5
IV-3	Commander's Critical Information Requirements Process	IV-9
IV-4	Typical Joint Task Force Operational Areas	IV-12
IV-5	Elements of Rules of Engagement Formation	IV-16
V-1	Notional Joint Task Force J-1 Organization	V-2
VI-1	Notional Joint Task Force J-2 Organization	VI-2

VI-2	Commander, Joint Task Force Intelligence Responsibilities	VI-3
VI-3	Considerations for Multinational Intelligence Support	VI-8
VI-4	Notional Joint Intelligence Support Element	VI-11
VII-1	Notional Joint Task Force J-3 Organization	VII-4
VII-2	Protection Working Group	VII-9
VIII-1	Notional Joint Task Force J-4 Organization	VIII-3
VIII-2	Host-Nation Areas of Support	VIII-14
IX-1	Notional Joint Task Force J-5 Organization	IX-2
IX-2	The Joint Operation Planning Process	IX-8
IX-3	Elements of Operational Design	IX-9
IX-4	Joint Task Force Plans and Operations Synchronization	IX-11
IX-5	Joint Planning Group Composition	IX-13
IX-6	Forming and Informing the Planning Groups and Teams	IX-15
X-1	Information Quality Criteria	X-2
X-2	Notional Joint Task Force J-6 Organization with Joint Network Operations Control Center	X-3
A-A-1	Joint Force Public Affairs Organization	A-A-5
A-D-1	Functional Areas	A-D-7
A-D-2	Notional Joint Task Force Surgeon’s Office Organization	A-D-9
A-E-1	Notional Inspector General Organization Structure	A-E-3

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Provides an Introduction to the Joint Task Force**
 - **Covers Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization and Staffing**
 - **Describes Joint Task Force Subordinate Commands**
 - **Discusses Joint Task Force Command and Control**
 - **Describes Functions and Responsibilities of the Joint Task Force Staff Directorates**
-

Introduction

Commanders, joint task forces have full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders.

A joint task force (JTF) is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by a JTF establishing authority (i.e., the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander [CCDR], a subordinate unified commander, or an existing commander, joint task force [CJTF]) to conduct military operations or support to a specific situation. It usually is part of a larger national or international effort to prepare for or react to that situation. In most situations, the JTF establishing authority will be a CCDR.

Unified action is a fundamental concept of joint operations. CJTFs may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. Organization of joint forces also needs to take into account interoperability with multinational forces (MNFs).

JTFs may be **established on a geographical area or functional basis** when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. However, there may be situations where a CJTF may have a logistics-focused mission. In these situations, the JTF will require directive authority for common support capabilities delegated by the CCDR over specific logistic forces, facilities, and supplies.

JTFs may take many forms and sizes as they are employed across the range of military operations. The specific organization, staffing, and command relationships will vary based on the mission assigned, the environment within which operations must

be conducted, the makeup of existing and potential adversaries or nature of the crisis (e.g., flood, earthquake), and the time available to achieve the end state.

Command and control.

Command and control (C2) guidance, both internal and external to the JTF, should be established prior to JTF activation. The JTF establishing authority should provide the initial C2 guidance that includes command relationships. The CJTF should aggressively establish JTF internal C2 guidance and, in a like manner, seek clarification when C2 guidance external to the JTF is not thoroughly understood. Command relationships should be based on the nature of the mission and the objectives to be accomplished. Command relationships, including supported and supporting commander(s) relationships should be delineated clearly and succinctly.

Interagency, intergovernmental organization, and nongovernmental organization considerations.

The unique aspects of the interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordination process require the JTF headquarters (HQ) to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of US agencies, IGOs, NGOs, affected en route and participating host nations, and multinational partners. **The JTF must establish organizational structures, processes, and procedures to consider interagency, IGO, and NGO perspectives and positions into its planning, execution, and assessment process.** Depending on the type of contingency operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency involvement, the focal point for operational and tactical level coordination with civilian agencies may occur at the JTF HQ, the civil-military operations center, or the humanitarian operations center.

Multinational considerations.

US-led JTFs should expect to participate as part of a MNF (i.e., a coalition or alliance) in most future military endeavors throughout the range of military operations. Such participation with MNFs may complicate normal unilateral organization, planning, and operations. Complex matters (e.g., information sharing, communications system, intelligence, and logistic support) may be complicated further when planned and executed in conjunction with MNFs.

Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization and Staffing

There are several options that may be used to form a joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ).

The preferred option for organizing a JTF HQ is to form it around a combatant command's **Service component HQ or the Service component's existing subordinate HQ** (such as a numbered fleet, numbered Air Force, Marine expeditionary force, or Army corps) that includes an established command structure. In some cases, the CCDR may designate the **standing joint force headquarters (core element)** as the core HQ element and augment it with additional Service functional experts. As a third option, a CCDR may initially deploy a **combatant command assessment team**, or like organization, as the JTF core element. This third option would likely be employed in a location where no military presence currently exists.

Integration and sustainment of the JTF staff is a routine but important function. The primary planner and executor of these integration and sustainment functions for the JTF HQ normally is the HQ commandant. Integration of the JTF staff is a significant challenge. Even after the initial formation of the JTF staff, personnel continue to flow into and out of the HQ for a number of reasons (e.g., different rotation policies, different deployment timelines, and casualties).

Staff organization.

Effective joint operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing **across** the staff directorates. The most common technique for promoting this **cross-functional collaboration** is the formation of centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups (WGs), and planning teams and other enduring or temporary organizations that manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. These centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams facilitate planning by the staff, decision-making by the commander, and execution by the HQ. Although cross-functional in their membership, most centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams fall under the principal oversight of the staff directorates.

Liaison personnel.

Liaison is the contact by which communications can be maintained between elements of military forces or other organizations and agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. **The CJTF must identify the requirement for liaison personnel based on command relationships and mission support requirements.** Liaison officers (LNOs) must be

requested at the earliest opportunity. Per this request, any specific qualifications and functions for these personnel should be noted by the CJTF. LNOs to the JTF HQ should be of sufficient rank (**recommend equal rank to JTF primary staff officers**) to influence the decision-making process.

Joint Task Force Subordinate Commands

Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands and subordinate task forces with operational responsibilities.

All joint forces include Service component commands because administrative and logistic support for joint forces is provided through Service component commands.

Both Service and functional component commanders have the following general responsibilities:

Plan and conduct operations in accordance with CJTF guidance and detailed plans.

Monitor the operational situation, share information and, as required, provide recommendations to the CJTF.

Coordinate with other JTF component commanders to ensure effective and efficient conduct of operations. In addition, coordinate with supporting agencies, supporting commanders, and friendly forces and governments as authorized and as necessary to fulfill assigned responsibilities.

Provide liaison personnel to the CJTF, other component commanders, and supporting commanders as necessary or as directed by the CJTF.

Service component commands.

A JTF-level Service component command consists of the Service component commander and all Service forces that have been assigned or attached to the JTF.

Functional component commands.

CJTFs have the authority to and normally establish functional component commands to control military operations. A functional component command is a command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time.

Functional component commanders exercise command authority (e.g., operational control, tactical control) as delegated, over forces or military capabilities made available to them.

CJTFs establishing a functional component command have the authority to designate its commander. Generally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the C2 capability to control them will be designated as the functional component commander; however, the CJTF always will consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, and force capabilities in selecting a commander.

The CJTF must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command authority the functional component commander will exercise.

The responsibilities and authority of a functional component commander must be assigned by the CJTF. Establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the CJTF.

Joint Task Force Command and Control

JTF HQ management process.

Information Management. The complexity of JTF operations requires a process to assist the commander in exercising C2. The information management process facilitates the commander's decision-making by improving the speed and accuracy of information flow as well as supporting execution through reliable communications. **The goal of common understanding of information and appropriate sharing of the same is achieved through the proper management of personnel, equipment and facilities, and procedures.** This management is conducted by a viable information management organization.

Commander's Decision Cycle. The commander's decision cycle is a process that depicts how command and staff elements determine required actions, codify them in directives, execute them, and monitor their results. The commander's decision cycle has four phases: monitor, assess, plan, and direct.

HQ Battle Rhythm. Battle rhythm is described as the sequencing and execution of actions and events within a joint force HQ that are regulated by the flow and sharing of information that support

all decision cycles. A **battle rhythm is a routine cycle of command and staff activities intended to synchronize current and future operations.** As a practical matter, the HQ battle rhythm consists of a series of meetings, report requirements, and other activities. These activities may be daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly requirements.

Joint Task Force Staff Directorates

Manpower and personnel directorate.

The JTF manpower and personnel directorate (J-1) is principal staff assistant to the CJTF on **manpower, personnel readiness, and personnel services.** The J-1 also is the focal point for personnel support actions and synchronizes personnel support during all phases of an operation.

The J-1 has primary responsibility for manpower management; personnel augmentation; personnel accountability and strength reporting; pay and entitlements; postal operations, morale, welfare, and recreation; casualty reporting; personnel performance evaluations; and awards and decorations. In addition, the J-1 provides support and assistance to the office of primary responsibility with regard to Reserve Component call-up; stop-loss; noncombatant evacuations operations and noncombatant repatriation; personnel recovery; and detainee operations.

Intelligence directorate.

The intelligence directorate's primary function is to **satisfy the commander and staff's intelligence requirements** by planning, conducting, collecting, analyzing, and disseminating reliable and timely intelligence pertinent to intentions, indications and warning, information operations, targeting, assessment, and a description of the current operational environment characteristics. To ensure unity of effort, the CJTF makes certain intelligence, operations, and plans function as a cohesive team. The JTF intelligence directorate (J-2) conducts all-source, multi-discipline intelligence operations and ensures full access to an uninhibited flow of information from all sources in accordance with Department of Defense and Director of National Intelligence approved procedures. Within the scope of the essential elements of information, the J-2 participates in joint staff planning and in coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling intelligence efforts. The J-2 advises the JFC on what the adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, their probable intent, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. The J-2 is responsible for joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment.

Operations directorate.

The operations directorate (J-3) assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the **direction and control of operations**, beginning with planning and through completion of specific operations. In this capacity, the J-3 **plans, coordinates, and integrates** operations. The flexibility and range of modern forces require close coordination and integration for effective unified action.

Logistics directorate.

The logistics directorate (J-4) is charged with the **formulation of logistic plans** and with the **coordination and supervision** of supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and other services to include mortuary affairs and related logistic activities. Given the functional role of this directorate and the Service responsibilities for support to their respective JTF components, consideration should be given to the established policies and procedures of the various Military Departments. The J-4 is responsible for **advising the CJTF** of the **logistic support** that can be provided for proposed courses of action and approved concept of operations. In general, the J-4 formulates policies for the CJTF's approval to ensure **effective logistic support** for all forces in the command and **coordinates execution** of the CJTF's logistic policies and guidance.

Plans directorate.

The plans directorate (J-5) assists the commander in **planning and preparation of joint plans, orders, and associated estimates of the situation**. The J-5 may also contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses to assist the commander in plans preparation activities, or such a cell may be established as a special staff division or section. The JTF J-5 must provide political-military oversight for all aspects of the JTF's operations.

Communications system directorate.

The JTF communications system directorate assists the commander in all responsibilities for **communications infrastructure, communications-computer networking, communications electronics, information assurance, tactical communications, and interoperability**. This includes development and integration of communications system architecture and plans that support the command's operational and strategic requirements, as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable communications system support to exercise command in the execution of the mission.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint doctrine for the formation and employment of a JTF HQ to command and control joint operations. It provides guidance on the JTF HQ role in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing JTF operations.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE JOINT TASK FORCE

“While engaged in multiple worldwide operations to meet these requirements, the Armed Forces of the United States must maintain force quality, enhance joint warfighting capabilities and transform to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Executing this strategy will require a truly joint, full spectrum force – with a seamless mix of active forces, the Reserve Component, DOD civilians, and contracted workforce – fully grounded in a culture of innovation. It will require the highest quality people – disciplined, dedicated, professional – well trained, well educated, and well led.”

**National Military Strategy
of the United States of America
2004**

1. General

a. A joint task force (JTF) is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by a JTF establishing authority (i.e., the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander [CCDR], a subordinate unified commander, or an existing commander, joint task force [CJTF]) to conduct military operations or support to a specific situation. It usually is part of a larger national or international effort to prepare for or react to that situation. In most situations, the JTF establishing authority will be a CCDR. Figure I-1 illustrates JTF organizational options. Figure I-2 outlines key JTF establishing authority responsibilities.

(1) **CJTFs have full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders.** CJTFs should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of CJTFs, while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of Service organizations.




Figure I-1. Joint Task Force Organizational Options

JOINT TASK FORCE ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY RESPONSIBILITIES

- Appoint the commander, joint task force (CJTF), assign the mission and forces, and exercise command and control of the joint task force (JTF).
 - In coordination with the CJTF, determine the military forces and other national means required to accomplish the mission.
 - Allocate or request forces required.
- Provide the overall mission, purpose, and objectives for the directed military operations.
- Define the joint operations area (JOA) in terms of geography or time. (Note: The JOA should be assigned through the appropriate combatant commander and activated at the date and time specified.)
 - Ensure freedom of action, communications, personnel recovery, and security for forces moving into or positioned outside the JOA.
- Ensure the development and approval of rules of engagement or rules for the use of force tailored to the situation.
- Monitor the operational situation and keep superiors informed through periodic reports.
- Provide guidance (e.g., planning guidelines with a recognizable end state, situation, concepts, tasks, execute orders, administration, logistics, media releases, and organizational requirements).
- Promulgate changes in plans and modify mission and forces as necessary.
- Ensure administrative and sustainment support.
- Recommend to higher authority which organizations should be responsible for funding various aspects of the JTF.
- Establish or assist in establishing liaison with US embassies and foreign governments involved in the operation.
- Determine supporting force requirements.
 - Prepare a directive that indicates the purpose, in terms of desired effect, and the scope of action required. The directive establishes the support relationships with amplifying instructions (e.g., strength to be allocated to the supporting mission; time, place, and duration of the supporting effort; priority of the supporting mission; and authority for the cessation of support).
- Approve CJTF plans.
- Delegate directive authority for common support capabilities (if required).

Figure I-2. Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities

The manner in which CJTFs organize their forces directly affects joint force operational responsiveness and versatility.

(2) Unified action is a fundamental concept of joint operations. CJTFs may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. Organization of joint forces also needs to take into account interoperability with multinational forces (MNFs). Complex or unclear command relationships and organizations can be counterproductive to developing synergy, especially among MNFs.

b. JTFs may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. However, there may be situations where a CJTF may have a logistics-focused mission. In these situations, the JTF will require directive authority for common support capabilities delegated by the CCDR over specific logistic forces, facilities, and supplies. Even as a US unilateral force, a JTF usually will operate in an interconnected joint, interagency, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and multinational environment in which the CJTF and staff must work with and through many agencies and organizations.

(1) The mission assigned should require execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort, or should require coordination of local defense of a subordinate area. Normally, JTFs are established to achieve operational objectives.

(a) JTF headquarters (HQ) basing depends on the JTF mission, operational environment, and available capabilities and support. JTF HQ can be land- or sea-based with transitions between both basing options.

(b) JTFs are usually assigned a joint operations area (JOA).

(2) Execution of responsibilities may involve air, land, maritime, space, information, and special operations in any combination executed unilaterally or in cooperation with friendly nations, MNFs, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and other agencies.

c. A JTF is dissolved by the proper authority when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.

d. **Semipermanent Joint Task Forces.** Certain JTFs, due to the nature of the operations they are performing, the desire for continuity and efficiency, and the relationships they have established with non-Department of Defense (DOD) agencies and organizations, have evolved to semipermanent JTFs. Examples include JTF-North and Combined JTF-Horn of Africa.

(1) Once a decision has been reached to establish a semipermanent JTF, a top priority for the CJTF and staff will be to reevaluate the organization and staffing of the JTF HQ and conduct an in-depth mission analysis. Once this analysis is complete, the CJTF can articulate a restated mission statement, develop an appropriate concept of operations (CONOPS), request additional resources, and task the JTF components.

(2) Time may be a significant factor affecting semipermanent JTFs in at least two ways:

(a) There may not be sufficient time allotted to plan for transition to a semipermanent JTF. Use of the original JTF organization and staffing to the greatest extent possible will facilitate timely planning and initial execution.

(b) Rotation of personnel from the United States to overseas duty in a semipermanent JTF is another consideration where time may be a factor. An equitable rotation policy must be planned and implemented in the early stages of forming a semipermanent JTF. A combination of unit and individual personnel rotation provides maximum flexibility without undermining operational effectiveness.

To assist the JTF staff in accomplishing its tasks, refer to Annex A, “Checklist for Transition to Semipermanent Joint Task Forces,” to Appendix B, “Checklists.”

Joint Publications (JPs) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and 3-0, Joint Operations, provide additional details for organizing joint forces.

2. Joint Task Force Organization

JTFs may take many forms and sizes as they are employed across the range of military operations. The specific organization, staffing, and command relationships will vary based on the mission assigned, the environment within which operations must be conducted, the makeup of existing and potential adversaries or nature of the crisis (e.g., flood, earthquake), and the time available to achieve the end state.

For specific guidance for organizing and staffing a JTF and for information and guidance concerning the various components and subordinate task forces that may comprise a JTF, refer to Chapter II, “Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization and Staffing,” and Chapter III, “Joint Task Force Subordinate Commands,” respectively.

3. Command and Control

a. **Command and control (C2) guidance, both internal and external to the JTF, should be established prior to JTF activation.** The JTF establishing authority should provide the initial C2 guidance that includes command relationships. The CJTF should aggressively establish JTF internal C2 guidance and, in a like manner, seek clarification when C2 guidance external to the JTF is not thoroughly understood.

b. Command relationships should be based on the nature of the mission and the objectives to be accomplished. Command relationships, including supported and supporting commander(s) relationships should be delineated clearly and succinctly. This also includes: developing a clear understanding of the chain of command; identifying any additional agencies and organizations that must be kept apprised of operations; ensuring command relationships are consistent with

the commander's intent; determining if agencies outside the formal chain of command require results of assessments or can assist the JTF in conducting assessments; and coordinating information sharing.

For definitive guidance concerning JTF C2, refer to Chapter IV, "Joint Task Force Command and Control."

4. Manpower and Personnel

The planning for JTF manpower and personnel support requirements must begin early in the planning process and continue through the execution of operations and redeployment. To ensure optimal JTF personnel support, the JTF manpower and personnel directorate (J-1) will be required to synchronize and coordinate personnel support efforts with Service components and functional components.

For background information and guidance on JTF personnel and administration matters, refer to Chapter V, "Joint Task Force Manpower and Personnel."

5. Intelligence

a. Intelligence concerns and requirements must be addressed from the earliest stages of JTF planning through the redeployment stage of operations. The CJTF's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) drive the JTF's intelligence operations. Both DOD and non-DOD intelligence agencies and organizations provide assistance to the JTF intelligence directorate (J-2) in support of activities and operations within the JOA.

b. The CJTF may establish a JTF-level intelligence element such as a joint intelligence support element (JISE) or a joint intelligence operations center (JIOC), under the direction of the JTF J-2, to manage the JTF intelligence collection, production, and dissemination. The decision as to the type of intelligence element required will be based on the scope and breadth of the mission assigned to the JTF. If the CJTF requires a JIOC, the decision to establish a fully manned JIOC at the JTF-level may require augmentation and should be approved by the CCCR. Note: JISE will be used throughout this publication when discussing the JTF-level intelligence element.

For specific guidance concerning JTF intelligence support, refer to Chapter VI, "Joint Task Force Intelligence."

6. Operations

a. The expeditionary nature of JTF operations requires great flexibility in both planning and execution. The JTF operations directorate (J-3) assists the commander in directing and controlling operations, beginning with planning through completion of operations. In this capacity the J-3, in concert with subordinate components, plans, coordinates, and integrates operations. Within the JTF staff, this is accomplished, in part, by working closely with the JTF plans directorate

(J-5) and the logistics directorate (J-4) to ensure the CJTF's intent is captured in planning and implemented in execution. JTF planning and execution typically consider, as supported or supporting activities, integration of actions and activities of the interagency, multinational participants, and nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations.

b. The CJTF should establish a joint operations center (JOC), under the direction of the JTF J-3, to manage all operational matters.

For more details concerning organization and procedures of the JTF J-3 directorate, refer to Chapter VII, "Joint Task Force Operations."

7. Logistics

a. Logistics plays a key role throughout JTF operations from the initiation of planning through the redeployment of forces and often involve non-DOD organizations to include private contractors and other nations.

b. The J-4 directorate should be tailored to the operation. Organizing factors include but are not limited to the mission, the nature of anticipated operations, composition of JTF forces, geographical and seasonal conditions, operational environment, existing logistic arrangements, and quality and quantity of potential host-nation support (HNS) and acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs). JTF J-4 should consider forming a JTF joint logistics operations center (JLOC), a joint movement center (JMC), or a deployment distribution operations center (DDOC).

c. Logistic limitations influence all planning efforts. Therefore, it is imperative that logistic planners are integral members of the joint planning group (JPG) and other centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups (WGs), and planning teams.

d. J-4 responsibilities and authority must be clearly delineated to ensure uninterrupted sustainment of ongoing and future operations. The often-austere environment in which JTFs will operate may require coordination of common logistic efforts necessary for JTF mission accomplishment. Implications of logistic support — to include deployment of supplies, equipment, and personnel from non-JTF organizations and agencies operating within the JOA but not operating under JTF control — must be anticipated and the J-4 must be prepared to integrate these capabilities into the overall support plan, as necessary. While these organizations and agencies may not require direct support from the JTF, they will compete for space at ports, airfields, and transportation nodes; and local commercial support capability.

For more details concerning JTF logistic support, including information on forming a JLOC, refer to Chapter VIII, "Joint Task Force Logistics."

8. Plans and Policy

a. The JTF J-5 develops, updates, reviews, and coordinates joint operation plans (OPLANs) required for successful accomplishment of JTF mission(s). As operations are executed, the J-5 will prepare OPLANs or operation orders (OPORDs) as directed in support of future operations.

b. Typically, **a JPG is established to facilitate integrated planning efforts**. A JPG should include representation from all JTF principal and special staff sections, components, the interagency, multinational partners, and nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations as required.

For more details concerning JTF planning and policy procedures, refer to Chapter IX, “Joint Task Force Plans and Policy.”

9. Communications System Support

a. The JTF communications system must support an overall JTF command climate and organizational design that encourages timely, effective, and accurate flow of information and guidance within the joint, interagency, and multinational environments in which the JTF operates, and it must effectively link all higher, supporting, and subordinate organizations. It also must provide a rapid, reliable, secure flow of data processing to ensure continuous information exchange throughout the JTF, from the earliest stages of planning through redeployment.

b. Based on operational communications system procedures developed by the JTF establishing authority, the CJTF must develop operational procedures that provide interoperable, compatible JTF networks. Interoperability with nongovernmental, intergovernmental, and other organizations also must be a planning consideration.

c. Communications system resources may require the CJTF to adjudicate or assign subordinate command responsibilities for providing systems. This may include the assignment of a designated approving authority and computer network defense service provider. At a minimum, JTFs should assign an information assurance manager to ensure information systems are securely implemented. The communications system directorate (J-6) may be the designated approving authority and is responsible for accrediting communications system networks. The designated approving authority will assign a certifying authority within each component.

For more details concerning designated approving authority, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, and DOD 8570.01-M, Information Assurance Workforce Improvement Program.

Specific guidance for JTF communications support is located in Chapter X, “Joint Task Force Communications System Support.”

10. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Considerations

a. Unlike the military, most US Government (USG) agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, with the result that JTF personnel interface with individuals who are coordinating their organization's activities at more than one level. The unique aspects of the interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination process require the JTF HQ to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of US agencies, IGOs, NGOs, affected en route and participating host nations (HNs), and multinational partners. The JTF must establish organizational structures, processes, and procedures to consider interagency, IGO, and NGO perspectives and positions into its planning, execution, and assessment process. Depending on the type of contingency operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency involvement, the focal point for operational and tactical level coordination with civilian agencies may occur at the JTF HQ, the civil-military operations center (CMOC), or the humanitarian operations center.

b. The CCDR's joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) also is an element that can assist the JTF with an increased capability to coordinate with other USG agencies and departments. The JIACG, an element of a CCDR's staff, is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts assigned to CCDRs and tailored to meet the CCDRs' specific needs, the JIACG provides the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACG members participate in contingency, crisis action, and theater security cooperation planning. They provide a collaborative conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of nonmilitary organizations.

c. The CJTF should consider the establishment of C2 structures that take account of and provide coherence to the activities of all elements in the JOA. In addition to military operations, these structures should include the political, civil, administrative, legal, and humanitarian elements as well as NGOs, IGOs, and the media. The CJTF should ultimately consider how joint force actions and those of involved organizations contribute toward the end state. This consideration requires extensive liaison with all involved parties. JTF operations often seek to support or are supported by these nonmilitary organizations or agencies.

d. Planning with NGOs and IGOs often is necessary, particularly for foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), peace operations, and other civil-military operations (CMO). Incorporating NGOs, IGOs, and the interagency into the planning process requires the CJTF and staff to balance these information requirements of the organizations and agencies with operations security (OPSEC). An effective mechanism to coordinate this and achieve unity of effort during the crisis response execution is to conduct daily operational level civil-military coordination board meetings in the JOA with attendance of the CJTF, ambassador, and the special representative to the Secretary-General as applicable.

Specific guidance for interagency coordination is located in various chapters throughout this publication and in JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.

11. Multinational Considerations

a. US-led JTFs should expect to participate as part of a MNF (i.e., a coalition or alliance) in most future military endeavors throughout the range of military operations. Such participation with MNFs may complicate normal unilateral organization, planning, and operations.

b. Complex matters (e.g., information sharing, communications system, intelligence, and logistic support) may be complicated further when planned and executed in conjunction with MNFs. JTF multinational considerations are in relevant chapters throughout this publication.

c. **Strategic-level Integration.** When a JTF is in support of multinational operations a hierarchy of bilateral or multilateral bodies is established to define objectives, develop strategies, and to coordinate strategic direction for planning and executing multinational operations. Through dual involvement in national and multinational security processes, US national leaders integrate national and theater strategic planning with that of the alliance or coalition. Within the multinational structure, US participants including the CJTF ensure that objectives and strategy complement US interests and are compatible with US capabilities. Within the US national structure, US participants ensure that international commitments are reflected in national military strategy and are adequately addressed in strategic direction for joint operation planning.

d. **Operational-level Integration.** The commander of US national forces operating as part of a multinational military organization is responsible for integrating joint operation planning with multinational planning at the operational level. Normally, this will be the CCDR or the subordinate CJTF responsible for the geographic area within which multinational operations are to be planned and executed. These commanders function within both the US and multinational chains of command. Within the multinational organizations, they command or support the designated MNF and plan, as appropriate, for multinational employment in accordance with strategic direction and guidance emanating from multinational leadership. Within the US chain of command, they command joint US forces and prepare joint OPLANs in response to taskings from the President or Secretary of Defense. These taskings include developing joint plans and orders to support each multinational commitment within the CCDR's area of responsibility (AOR) and planning for unilateral US contingencies within the same area. In this dual capacity, the US commander coordinates multinational planning with joint operation planning.

e. **Transition of a JTF into a MNF or transition to a follow-on MNF**

(1) There likely will be several transitions during a JTF life cycle. Transitions are inherent throughout the range of military operations. Transitions must be thoroughly coordinated between the JTF, follow-on MNF, and supporting IGOs, NGOs, and the interagency.

(2) Most multinational operations start with the lead nation's JTF HQ framework for initiation of crisis response actions. They transition to a MNF framework during the activation and forming of the MNF. This needs to be thoroughly planned to ensure the former JTF and the new MNF transition to a fully integrated multinational command with respect for all participating nations' national guidance, planning input, and limitations. Both the Multinational Interoperability Council, within the Joint Staff J-3, and the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team whose secretariat is located within the US Pacific Command Directorate for Exercises can provide assistance based on real-world experiences.

To further assist the JTF staff in accomplishing its tasks, refer to Annex L, "Checklist for Transition of a Joint Task Force into a Multinational Force or Transition to a Follow-On Multinational Force," to Appendix B, "Checklists."

f. Multinational considerations must also include international law, agreements, and arrangements in place or required to protect the sovereign interests of national territories that JTF forces must cross, particularly if affected nations do not participate in JTF operations. The DOD Foreign Clearance Guide (<https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil>) lists HN peacetime restrictions to determine if additional bilateral agreements/arrangements should be coordinated through US embassies.

Additional multinational guidance is available in JPs 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 3-0, Joint Operations, 3-16, Multinational Operations, and 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.

12. Strategic Communication Considerations

a. Strategic communication comprises efforts to advance USG interests, policies, and objectives using coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. The CJTF should plan to conduct activities that support strategic communication objectives. This includes efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests and policies by coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and products integrated with the actions of all instruments of national power.

b. Communication activities should be fully integrated in command operational planning and execution processes, so that there is consistency in intent and effect between command actions and information disseminated about those actions. While audiences and intent may at times differ, the CJTF should ensure planning for information operations (IO), psychological operations (PSYOP), public affairs (PA), and activities that support CMO and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) are coordinated to make certain consistent themes and messages are communicated that support the overall USG strategic communication objectives.

c. The CJTF should consider requesting additional capability or assets beyond what is assigned to the JTF, to include the US Joint Forces Command's Joint Public Affairs Support

Element (JPASE). See Chapter II, “Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization and Staffing,” for an overview of JPASE capabilities.

For further details concerning strategic communication, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manuals (CJCSMs) 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures), and 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II (Planning Formats), and JPs 3-13, Information Operations, 3-0, Joint Operations, and 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

13. Checklists

Appendix B, “Checklists,” includes various “checklists” to assist the CJTF and JTF staff in accomplishing their tasks. These example checklists should only be used as general guidelines, since they do not cover all contingencies and related tasks.

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CHAPTER II

JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING

“JFCs [joint force commanders] integrate and synchronize the actions of military forces and capabilities to achieve strategic and operational objectives through joint campaigns and operations.”

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

SECTION A. FORMING THE JOINT TASK FORCE STAFF

1. General

CJTFs organize staffs and forces to accomplish the mission based on their vision and CONOPS. This chapter addresses how a JTF staff is formed, its organization, processes, and systems. It reflects the significance of a well-balanced HQ staff that is representative of the whole force. An efficient and effective JTF HQ organization assists the CJTF in setting conditions that lead to subordinate success.

2. Options for Forming a Joint Task Force Staff

a. There are several options that may be used to form a JTF HQ. The preferred option is to form a JTF HQ around a combatant command’s Service component HQ or the Service component’s existing subordinate HQ (such as a numbered fleet, numbered Air Force, Marine expeditionary force, or Army corps) that includes an established command structure. In some cases, the CDR may designate the standing joint force headquarters (core element) (SJFHQ [CE]) as the core HQ element and augment it with additional Service functional experts. As a third option, a CDR may initially deploy a combatant command assessment team, or like organization, as the JTF core element. This third option would likely be employed in a location where no military presence currently exists. No matter which option is employed, the capabilities and composition of the JTF HQ must be a function of careful analysis that has determined the span of control (based on the projected magnitude of the operation) and required expertise (and associated personnel) the JTF HQ must possess.

b. **Building upon an existing HQ.** The JTF’s core staff may not have the required expertise to address all aspects of the mission. Consequently, additional expertise and associated personnel will be required to augment the core staff. This augmentation of the JTF staff is a function of both the JTF’s mission and its force composition.

(1) The JTF mission is the most important factor in determining the required type of core staff augmentation. Mission analysis should consider necessary JTF HQ capabilities and other related functions. Factors include:

- (a) Likely duration of the mission.
- (b) Geographic scope of the mission.

- (c) Interagency requirements.
- (d) Multinational involvement.
- (e) Campaign or joint operation phasing.
- (f) Communication strategy requirements.
- (g) Logistic support requirements.

(2) The composition of the JTF as a whole is a critical factor in determining the type of augmentation that the core staff should receive. In broad terms, the JTF staff should be representative of the force composition as to numbers, experience, and influence of position and rank of members among participating Services, functional components, subordinate task forces, supporting commands, and MNFs.

(3) For example, a JTF may be formed around an Army corps HQ because the mission requirements are dominated by ground combat. Consequently, many key positions may be filled by members of that Army corps HQ. That same JTF, however, may have significant mission requirements to integrate airpower and special operations forces (SOF) and may contain a significant number of multinational partners. These factors may drive the CJTF to augment the Army corps staff with significant expertise from the Air Force, from SOF, and from multiple multinational partners. This may also be true for a multinational HQ (combined JTF).

(4) There are several sources for augmentation to the core staff that are depicted in Figure II-1 and discussed in the following subparagraphs or elsewhere in the publication.

(a) **Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element).** The SJFHQ (CE) is another important source of personnel and expertise for rapidly forming a fully functioning JTF HQ. The SJFHQ (CE) is a full-time, joint, cross-functional C2 element within a geographic combatant command staff. This element is fully integrated into the combatant command's planning and operations processes. The SJFHQ (CE) is staffed during peacetime to provide a core element of trained personnel that may serve as both a nucleus of key functional and C2 expertise and a foundation on which to build, through augmentation, the joint C2 capability for specific mission areas. The SJFHQ (CE) (in its entirety or selected portions) can provide additional expertise to an existing JTF HQ, JTF-designated Service component HQ, or the interagency. Thus the designated CJTF should collaborate with SJFHQ (CE) early in the process of forming the JTF HQ and should request standing joint force HQ augmentation as required.

(b) **Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC).** A CCDR also has the option to establish a DJTFAC or similar "cell" to augment a core staff.

(c) **Individual Augmentation.** Individual augmentation is an important mechanism for providing personnel to a JTF HQ. Individual augmentation requirements are identified by the core HQ or the establishing combatant command and documented in a joint




Figure II-1. Building Upon the Core Staff

manning document (JMD). The requirements are then filled by the Services in accordance with those manning documents. The JMD is validated by the combatant command and submitted to the Joint Staff J-1 for individual augmentation sourcing solution development. When conducting multinational operations, partner nations also may provide JTF HQ individual augmentation beyond liaison requirements. The core HQ should identify individual augmentation requirements as early as possible when forming the JTF HQ, due to the extended time that may be required to source, process, and deploy individual augmentees, especially those with special technical or language skills.

For more details concerning individual augmentation, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1301.01C, Individual Augmentation Procedures.

(d) **Joint Organization Augmentation.** The following is a list of possible joint organizations that may provide JTF augmentation. This list is not all-inclusive but it should provide insight into the type of augmentation a JTF can receive and the purpose behind that augmentation.

1. Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). The JCSE provides connectivity both to and from the JTF HQ. Its purpose is to provide a temporary solution to JTF communications requirements. The JCSE can support up to two JTFs and two joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs) simultaneously. The JCSE normally redeploys when its functions are replaced by unit or commercial equipment.

2. National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). The NIST is a nationally sourced team of intelligence and communications experts from Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and other agencies. The NIST's purpose is to provide a national level deployable all-source intelligence team to meet combatant command or JTF requirements.

3. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). DTRA's mission is to safeguard America and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives [CBRNE]) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat, and mitigate its effects. DTRA has the capacity to provide specialists to support JTF operations.

4. Joint Information Operations Warfare Command. The joint information operations warfare command is the principal field agency for joint IO support of combatant commands. The joint information operations warfare command fulfills this role by planning, coordinating, and executing DOD IO.

5. Joint Communications Security Monitoring Activity (JCMA). JCMA can provide information security monitoring and analysis support to JTFs.

6. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA). JPRA is the principal joint DOD agency for coordinating and advancing personnel recovery (PR).

7. Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC). JWAC assists in preparation and analysis of joint OPLANs and Service chiefs' analysis of weapons effectiveness. JWAC normally provides this support to JTFs through the supported combatant command.

8. Joint Public Affairs Support Element. JPASE can provide scaleable, deployable, trained, qualified, and equipped joint PA capability to support emergent communications strategy requirements.

9. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). DLA will support the JTF using a variety of capabilities. DLA has robust logistic planning experience, logistic surge and sustainment expertise, forward (such as DLA regional commanders and staff, deployable distribution capability), and expeditionary forces (DLA contingency support teams, liaison officers [LNOs], and other experts) imbedded physically and virtually with the warfighting and support organizations. In addition to executing its responsibilities as the executive agent for Classes I (Subsistence), III (Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants), IV (Construction Materiel), and VIII (Medical Materiel), DLA exercises item manager duties for supply support across the other classes of

supply. DLA can access and use a variety of information management tools to monitor the availability of supplies and equipment.

(5) **Other JTF HQ forming considerations**

(a) **Liaison Requirements.** JTF HQ generally have to manage significant liaison requirements both to and from its HQ. These requirements may include (but are not limited to) the following:

1. Liaison to the combatant command or subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs).
2. Liaison to or from supporting commands.
3. Liaison to or from the DOD or other interagency organizations.
4. Liaison to a US embassy.
5. Liaison to or from foreign military organizations.
6. Liaison from JTF components or major subordinate commands.

For more details on JTF liaison personnel, refer to Section C “Joint Task Force Liaison Personnel.”

(b) **Linguist and Interpreter Support.** Linguists and interpreters often are critical to JTF operations. Early in the planning and forming stages of the JTF’s lifecycle, requirements for interpreters and linguists must be identified and resourced. Some positions require military or other USG linguists based on security clearance requirements. Other positions may be sourced through vetted, contracted interpreters.

(c) **Forming Information Resources.** US Joint Forces Command has developed a number of products and resources that will assist CJTFs and staffs in expediting the forming process. These products and resources range from JTF HQ templates that contain JMDs and C2 baselines, architectures, systems, software, telecommunications and video requirements, United States Joint Forces Command *Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure*, and learning resources for JTF staff positions. These resources and products can be found on the US Joint Forces Command unclassified webpage under Joint Trainer at: <https://www-secure.jwfc.jfcom.mil/protected/trainer.html> and Integration at the following SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) links: Templates — <http://www.jfcom.smil.mil/j8/j89/inarch.nsf> and Turnkey Playbook — <https://gesportal.dod.smil.mil/sites/jtf-turnkey/default.aspx>. Note: Turnkey is hosted on Defense Online and requires soft public key infrastructure certificates, registration, and an access from US Joint Forces Command.

c. **Integration and Sustainment of the JTF Staff.** Integration and sustainment of the JTF staff is a routine but important function. The primary planner and executor of these integration and sustainment functions for the JTF HQ normally is the headquarters commandant (HQCOMDT). Refer to Annex H, “Special Staff: Headquarters Commandant,” of Appendix A, “Commander, Joint Task Force Personal and Special Staffs,” for a more detailed discussion of the HQCOMDT duties.

(1) Integration of the JTF staff is a significant challenge. Even after the initial formation of the JTF staff, personnel continue to flow into and out of the HQ for a number of reasons (e.g., different rotation policies, different deployment timelines, and casualties). Consequently, the HQCOMDT must establish mechanisms to quickly integrate new personnel into the JTF HQ operations. These should include: reception, initial orientation and training, and communications and computer systems access and security training.

(2) The HQCOMDT determines requirements for transportation, messing, billeting, and all other JTF HQ sustainment requirements under the chief of staff’s supervision. Based on the situation, the HQCOMDT may have other duties like oversight of security or force protection (FP) of the HQ and its personnel.

SECTION B. COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

3. Command and Staff Roles and Responsibilities

a. **Commander, Joint Task Force.** The CJTF is ultimately responsible to the establishing authority for JTF actions. The CJTF duties may include (but are not limited to) the following:

(1) Making recommendations to the establishing authority on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces for accomplishing assigned missions.

(2) Supervising all aspects of the JTF’s planning efforts to include development of campaign plans, OPODs, OPLANs, concept plans, and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).

(3) Establishing requisite policies and guidelines. This includes providing guidance to the chief of staff concerning the establishment of centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams.

(4) Applying operational risk management to all levels of war, across the range of military operations, and all phases of an operation to include any branches or sequels of an operation.

(5) Exercising, or delegating as appropriate, operational control (OPCON) over assigned and normally over attached forces. The CJTF also may exercise tactical control (TACON), have coordinating authority, or be in a supported or supporting relationship.

(6) Providing guidance to subordinate and supporting forces for planning and conducting operations.

(7) Ensuring ongoing operations are properly monitored.

(8) Keeping the JTF establishing authority informed on the progress of ongoing operations and the progress towards overall mission accomplishment.

(9) Ensuring the JTF staff conducts proper coordination with other forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments, NGOs, or IGOs.

(10) Establishing, if necessary, coordinating procedures for specific functions or activities among assigned, attached, and supporting forces.

(11) Establishing the succession of command.

(12) Exercising directive authority for those common support capabilities delegated by the CCDR deemed essential to the accomplishment of the mission. If the CCDR has not delegated this authority to the CJTF by way of warning order, OPORD, or other formal directive, then the CJTF should initiate a request for this authority.

(13) Ensuring that cross-servicing support is provided and that forces operate as effective, mutually supporting teams.

(14) Identifying any requirement for additional forces or personnel to the establishing authority.

(15) Appointing officials as required (e.g., space coordinating authority [SCA]). A CJTF normally designates a SCA to coordinate joint space operations and integrate space capabilities. Based on the complexity and scope of operations, the CJTF can either retain SCA or designate a component commander as the SCA. The CJTF considers the mission, nature and duration of the operation; preponderance of space force capabilities made available and resident C2 capabilities (including reachback) in selecting the appropriate option. The SCA is responsible for coordinating and integrating space capabilities in the operational area, and has primary responsibility for joint space operations planning, to include ascertaining space requirements within the joint force. The SCA normally will be supported by assigned or attached embedded space personnel. The processes for articulating requirements for space force enhancement products are established, specifically tailored to the functional area they support, and result in prioritized requirements. Thus the SCA typically has no role in prioritizing the day-to-day space force enhancement requirements of the joint force. To ensure prompt and timely support, the supported geographic CCDR and Commander, US Strategic Command may authorize direct liaison between the SCA and applicable component(s) of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Joint force Service component commands should communicate their requirements to the SCA, or designated representative, to ensure that all space activities are properly integrated and synchronized.

(16) Determining whether to retain control of joint security operations, normally coordinated through the JTF J-3, or to designate the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) as an area commander with joint security responsibilities. To facilitate joint security operations, **commanders should establish a joint security element, led by the joint security coordinator, to coordinate these operations.**

(17) Serving concurrently as a Service component commander. When assigned as both as a CJTF and Service component commander, the commander retains all responsibilities associated with the Service component command. This command organization is not optimal as it may detract from the CJTF's primary duties.

b. **Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force (DCJTF).** The selection of the DCJTF usually is based on mission requirements and the composition of the JTF as a whole. Typically, the DCJTF is not from the same Service as the CJTF. The DCJTF should be of equal or senior rank to the component commanders. Based on the situation, there can be more than one DCJTF. The duties of the DCJTF may include (but are not limited to) the following:

- (1) If required, serving concurrently as JTF chief of staff.
- (2) Serving as the principal assistant to the CJTF.
- (3) Performing special duties as directed by the CJTF. Examples include:
 - (a) Representing the CJTF when authorized.
 - (b) Assuming command if the commander becomes a casualty or is otherwise incapacitated or unavailable to exercise command.
 - (c) Chairing designated boards in support of JTF decision-making processes.
 - (d) Supervising designated aspects of JTF planning.
 - (e) Supervising designated subordinate units.
 - (f) Supervising designated subordinate unit activities or functions.

c. **Chief of Staff. The chief of staff is the key JTF staff integrator.** This is accomplished through the establishment and management of staff processes and procedures that support the command's decision-making process. The chief of staff duties may include (but are not limited to) the following:

- (1) Coordinating and directing the staff directorates work.
- (2) Supervising the preparation of staff estimates, plans, and orders.

(3) **Establishing and monitoring the JTF battle rhythm** to ensure that it effectively supports JTF planning, decision-making, and other critical functions.

(a) **This includes requiring the JTF proponent for a center, group, bureau, cell, office, element, board, WG, and planning team to provide criteria and supporting rationale for establishing it (i.e., purpose and authority) and its proposed membership.**

(b) The CJTF makes the final decision on the establishment of all centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams.

(4) **Managing the JTF information management process.**

(5) Representing the CJTF when authorized.

(6) Implementing JTF policies as directed by the CJTF.

(7) Formulating and disseminating staff policies.

(8) Ensuring effective liaison is established with the JTF's higher HQ, with subordinate HQ, and with other critical agencies and organizations.

(9) Supervising sustainment of the JTF staff and its HQ and facilities.

(10) Supervising staff training and integration programs.

d. **Command Senior Enlisted Leader (CSEL).** The CSEL is a key advisor to the commander, often serving as a sounding board for the commander. The CSEL also can serve as a trusted observer of activities within the operational area in the commander's absence. The CSEL duties may include (but are not limited to) the following:

(1) Serving as the primary advisor to the commander on issues related to JTF enlisted personnel.

(2) Performing special duties as directed by the CJTF. Examples include:

(a) Monitoring or observing critical subordinate unit actions.

(b) Monitoring the discipline, morale, and mission readiness of JTF elements.

e. **Personal and Special Staff Groups.** Personal and special staffs perform duties as prescribed by CJTF and handle special matters over which the CJTF wishes to exercise close personal control (Refer to Appendix A, "Commander, Joint Task Force Personal and Special Staffs," for a more detailed discussion of the roles and responsibilities of these staff groups). These staff groups may include (but are not limited to) public affairs officer (PAO), staff judge

advocate (SJA), chaplain, surgeon, inspector general (IG), provost marshal (PM), comptroller, HQCOMDT, historian, and others (e.g., safety officer, political advisor) as directed.

f. **Joint Task Force Staff Directorates.** The basic element of the JTF staff is the directorate. Typically, these are the J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and J-6.

(1) These primary staff directorates provide staff supervision of related processes, activities, and capabilities associated with the basic **joint functions** described in JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*. For example, the J-2 focuses on the intelligence function, the J-1 and J-4 focus on their parts of the sustainment function (personnel services and logistics respectively), the J-3 focuses on movement and maneuver, fires, and many aspects of protection. See Chapter III, “Joint Functions,” of JP 3-0 for a comprehensive discussion of joint functions.

(2) These staff directorates provide expertise and experience for the planning, decision-making, execution, and assessment processes within the JTF staff. The directorates also manage systems and processes internal to their staff directorate. Chapters V to X describe in detail the internal organizations and systems of these directorates.

(3) Based on mission requirements and the nature of the operational environment, CJTFs commonly establish additional staff directorates. Examples of these are engineer, resource management, and civil-military. The addition of directorates does not fundamentally change any of the staff processes described in this publication.

4. Staff Organization

a. **A Cross-functional Approach to Staff Organization.** Effective joint operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing **across** the staff directorates. The most common technique for promoting this **cross-functional collaboration** is the formation of centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams and other enduring or temporary organizations that manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. These centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams facilitate planning by the staff, decision-making by the commander, and execution by the HQ (see Figure II-2). Although cross-functional in their membership, most centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams fall under the principal oversight of the staff directorates (see Figure II-5). This arrangement strengthens the staff effort in ways that benefit the JTF and its commander in mission execution.

b. **Functional Staff Organization Employing Centers, Groups, Bureaus, Cells, Offices, Elements, Boards, Working Groups, and Planning Teams.**

(1) **Center.** A **center** is an enduring functional organization, with supporting staff, designed to perform a joint function within JFC’s HQ. Often, these organizations have designated locations or facilities. Examples of centers include the JOC and the CMOC.




Figure II-2. Cross-Functional Staff

(2) **Group.** A **group** is an enduring functional organization, which is formed to support a broad HQ function within a JFC’s HQ. Normally, groups within a JTF HQ consist of one or more planning groups. The planning group manages JTF HQ planning. The functions of JTF HQ planning groups include:

- (a) Managing designated planning efforts.
- (b) Resourcing planning teams.
- (c) Coordinating planning activities with other staff directorates.
- (d) Managing the subordinate planning teams’ conduct of the operational planning process.

(3) **Bureau.** A **bureau** is a long-standing functional organization, with a supporting staff designed to perform a specific function or activity within a JFC’s HQ. A joint visitors bureau is an example of a bureau common to many JTFs.

(4) **Cell.** A **cell** is a subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a JFC's HQ. A cell usually is part of both a functional and traditional staff structures. An example of a cell within the traditional staff structure could be an IO cell subordinate to operations branch within the J-3 directorate. An example of a cell within a functional staff structure could be a current operations cell within the JOC.

(5) **Office.** An **office** is an enduring organization that is formed around a specific function within a JFC's HQ to coordinate and manage support requirements. An example of an office is the joint mortuary affairs office (JMAO).

(6) **Element.** An **element** is an organization formed around a specific function within a designated directorate of a JFC's HQ. The subordinate components of an element usually are functional cells. An example of an element is the joint fires element (JFE).

(7) **Boards.** A **board** is an organized group of individuals within a JFC's HQ, appointed by the commander (or other authority) that meets with the purpose of gaining guidance or decision. Its responsibilities and authority are governed by the authority which established the board. Boards are chaired by a senior leader with members representing major staff elements, subordinate commands, LNOs, and other organizations as required. There are two different types of boards:

(a) **Command Board.** A command board is chaired by the commander and its purpose is to gain guidance or decision from the commander.

(b) **Functional Board.** A functional board's purpose is to gain functionally specific guidance and decisions from the commander (or designated representative) based on a staff recommendation. These boards often focus on:

1. Synchronizing a particular function (e.g., IO, targeting, collection, and distribution) across multiple planning initiatives.

2. Allocation of resources between ongoing or future operations.

3. Maintaining continuity of purpose across ongoing operations.

(8) **Working Group.** A **WG** (see Figure II-3) is an enduring or ad hoc organization within a JFC's HQ formed around a specific function whose purpose is to provide analysis to users. The WG consists of a core functional group and other staff and component representatives.

(9) **Planning Team.** A **planning team** is a functional element formed within the JFC's HQ to solve problems related to a specific task or requirement. The planning team is not enduring and dissolves upon completion of the assigned task (see Figure II-4).




Figure II-3. Basic Working Group Model

(10) **Planning teams and WGs** are complementary. WGs enhance planning through their provision of functional staff estimates to multiple planning teams. In contrast, planning teams integrate the functional concepts of multiple functional WGs into plans and orders.

(11) **Centers, Groups, Bureaus, Cells, Offices, Elements, Boards, WGs, and Planning Teams Employment.** As a practical matter, the JTF HQ establishes and maintains only those centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams that enhance planning and decision-making within the HQ. The HQ establishes, modifies, and dissolves these functional entities as the needs of the HQ evolve. Figure II-5 depicts an example of a JTF’s employment of centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams (NOTE: this diagram is not meant to be either all inclusive or directive). The figure additionally depicts the most common proponent (by staff directorate or special staff group) for each center, group, bureau, cell, office, element, board, WG, and planning team (refer to Chapters V to X for more detailed discussions of specific centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams).




Figure II-4. Basic Planning Team Model

c. Cross-Functional Organization in Support of Planning, Decision-making, and Operations. The cross-functional organization of the staff must facilitate the planning and decision-making processes that are crucial to the JTF’s success. Figure II-6 is a notional depiction of the basic relationships within the cross-functional staff structure.

(1) Future plans and future operations planning teams conduct planning through conduct of the operational planning process. Based on the complexity of the planning problem and time available, planning teams interact with elements both internal (e.g., WGs, cells) and external (other HQ, agencies, and organizations) to the staff. As the planning teams move through the operational planning process, they ultimately gain guidance, intent, or decision through the conduct of designated decision boards.

(2) In contrast to the future operations and future plans planning teams, the current operational planning teams normally complete their assigned planning tasks without significant interaction with other staff elements (e.g., WGs). Generally, these teams are established and




Figure II-5. Typical Joint Task Force Staff Organization

execute planning in the JOC under the supervision of the chief of operations. The commander is kept advised of ongoing near-term planning initiatives through appropriate mechanisms (e.g.,




Figure II-6. Staff Interaction Supporting Decision-making

commander's critical information requirements [CCIRs], serious incident report, or conduct of a battle update assessment).

SECTION C. JOINT TASK FORCE LIAISON PERSONNEL

"During [Operation] JUST CAUSE, I had good, competent liaison officers; not just to keep me informed of what their respective units were doing, but to also convey to their units how the battle was going. They are crucial to success, and you have to pick your best people. They have to have the moxie to stand up in front of a two or four star general, and brief him what their commander is thinking, their unit's capabilities, and make recommendations."

LTG C. W. Stiner, USA
Commander, Joint Task Force South
Operation JUST CAUSE

5. General

Liaison is the contact by which communications can be maintained between elements of military forces or other organizations and agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Exchanging LNOs is the most commonly employed technique for establishing close, continuous, physical communications between organizations. Liaison personnel will enhance interoperability and contribute significantly to mission success.

a. **The CJTF must identify the requirement for liaison personnel based on command relationships and mission support requirements.** LNOs must be requested at the earliest opportunity. Per this request, any specific qualifications and functions for these personnel should be noted by the CJTF. LNOs to the JTF HQ should be of sufficient rank (**recommend equal rank to JTF primary staff officers**) to influence the decision-making process. Ideally, LNOs should possess the requisite skill sets (technical training or language) to liaison and communicate effectively with receiving organizations.

(1) The CJTF should establish a familiarization program for all liaison personnel. A joint reception center (JRC) could perform this requirement.

(2) The CJTF must determine what staff officer or staff section will have overall cognizance of all liaison personnel reporting to the JTF HQ for duty (e.g., DCJTF, chief of staff, or J-3).

b. Liaison should be established between the JTF HQ and higher commands, between adjacent units, and between supporting, attached, and assigned forces and the JTF HQ. Additionally, the JTF also may exchange LNOs with MNFs, NGOs, IGOs, HN, and the interagency.

(1) Liaison personnel perform their duties within the JTF staff directorate that is responsible for functions related to the liaison personnel's assigned duties.

(2) They are representatives of their commanders and normally will attend briefings and maintain close contact with the JTF JOC. LNOs should have access to the CJTF.

LIAISON FUNCTIONS

Monitor, coordinate, advise, assist in operation planning, and assist the command/organization to which liaison is attached.

c. LNOs, whether individually or in teams, perform several critical functions that are consistent across the range of military operations. The extent to which these functions are performed depends on the mission and the direction established by the commander they represent. A successful LNO performs four basic functions as depicted above and discussed below.

(1) **Monitor.** LNOs monitor JTF operations, the gaining organization, and the sending organization and must understand how each influences the other. LNOs must know the current situation and planned operations, understand pertinent staff issues, and understand their commanders' intent. The JTF battle rhythm, in part, drives the LNOs' daily schedule and allows them to maintain the current situation and better advise their commanders.

(2) **Coordinate.** LNOs help synchronize current operations and future planning between the sending organizations, gaining organizations, or the JTF. They also accomplish this by coordinating with other LNOs and other organizations.

(a) Successful coordination requires a collaborative process that enhances communications between the LNOs' organizations.

(b) This process may range from understanding how various organizations function to collaborative systems that improve communications between organizations.

(3) **Advise.** LNOs are the experts on the sending organizations' capabilities and limitations. They advise the CJTF, JTF staff, and the gaining organizations concerning capabilities of their organizations. They must be proactive in providing the supported staff with relevant information on their organization's capabilities. **They are not decision makers and cannot commit their parent organizations to actions without coordination and approval.**

(4) **Assist.** LNOs provide assistance to various centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams and like organizations by providing their expertise and facilitating coordination between their organizations. They must not accept formal tasking by the JTF or any other organization. Formal taskings should be accomplished through normal C2 channels or as agreed to by the respective organizations.

d. LNOs provide an essential C2 bridge between the JTF HQ, its parent organizations, and its subordinate organizations.

e. To help ensure LNOs are properly employed and not misused, the JTF should follow certain basic guidelines. See Figure II-7 for details.

To further assist the JTF staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex B, “Checklist for Liaison Personnel,” to Appendix B, “Checklists.”

For further details concerning LNOs, refer to Field Manual (FM) 5-01.12, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-1B, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 5-02, and Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP [I]) 3-2.21, JTF LNO Integration, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Officer Integration.

LIAISON OFFICER GUIDELINES

- Liaison officers (LNOs) are personal and official representatives of the sending organizations and should be treated accordingly.
- LNOs support the gaining organizations and serve as critical conduits between organizations.
- LNOs remain in their parent organizations' chain of command.
- LNOs perform four basic functions: monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist.
- LNOs are not full-time planners.
- LNOs are not watch officers.
- LNOs are not substitutes for delivering critical information through normal command and control channels or a conduit for general information sharing.
- LNOs are not replacements for proper staff-to-staff coordination.
- LNOs are not replacements for augmentees or representatives.
- LNOs do not have the authority to make decisions for their commander without coordination and approval.

Figure II-7. Liaison Officer Guidelines

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CHAPTER III

JOINT TASK FORCE SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

“In any joint operation, the JFC [joint force commander] can choose from a wide variety of joint and Service capabilities and combine them in various ways to perform joint functions and accomplish the mission.”

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

1. General

a. Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands and subordinate task forces with operational responsibilities. Figure III-1 illustrates a possible JTF organization.

b. All joint forces include Service component commands because administrative and logistic support for joint forces is provided through Service component commands.




Figure III-1. Possible Joint Task Force Organization

c. Both Service and functional component commanders have the following general responsibilities.

(1) Plan and conduct operations in accordance with CJTF guidance and detailed plans.

(2) Monitor the operational situation, share information and, as required, provide recommendations to the CJTF.

(3) Coordinate with other JTF component commanders to ensure effective and efficient conduct of operations. In addition, coordinate with supporting agencies, supporting commanders, and friendly forces and governments as authorized and as necessary to fulfill assigned responsibilities.

(4) **Provide liaison personnel to the CJTF, other component commanders, and supporting commanders as necessary or as directed by the CJTF.**

d. Chapter IV, “Joint Task Force Command and Control,” discusses C2 as it relates to subordinate commands.

e. The intent of the remainder of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of Service and functional components.

2. Service Component Commands

A JTF-level Service component command consists of the Service component commander and all Service forces that have been assigned or attached to the JTF. Figure III-2 highlights typical Service component commander responsibilities.

3. Functional Component Commands

a. **CJTFs have the authority to and normally establish functional component commands to control military operations.** A functional component command is a command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time.

b. Functional component commanders exercise command authority (e.g., OPCON, TACON) as delegated, over forces or military capabilities made available to them.

c. CJTFs establishing a functional component command have the **authority to designate its commander**. Generally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the C2 capability to control them will be designated as the functional component commander; however, the CJTF always will consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, and force capabilities in selecting a commander.

TYPICAL SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

- Making recommendations to the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on the proper employment of the forces of the Service component.
- Accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.
- Assuming responsibility for areas of operations, if assigned (land and maritime forces).
- Coordinating sustainment support through Service channels for the forces of the Service component.
- Informing the CJTF of planning for changes in logistic support that would significantly affect operational capability.
- Retaining responsibility for certain Service-specific functions such as internal administration, training, logistics, and Service component intelligence operations.
- Conducting joint training.
- Selecting and nominating specific units of the parent Service component for assignment to other subordinate forces.
- Providing, as requested, supporting joint operation and exercise plans.
- Establishing combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on CJTF guidance.
- Planning and coordinating operations and employing Service forces in support of CJTF's concept of operations.
- Issuing planning guidance.
- Analyzing various courses of action.
- Coordinating with other joint task force component and subordinate task forces to ensure that the most effective support is provided to the CJTF.
- Evaluating the results of operations.
- Focusing on operational-level Service core capabilities.
- Functioning as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the CJTF.
- Integrating base operating support and providing common-item support to elements of the joint force when directed by the supported combatant commander.
- Coordinating safe and effective airfield operations when assigned as the senior airfield authority by the supported combatant commander.
- Assessing and mitigating risk.

Figure III-2. Typical Service Component Commander Responsibilities

d. The CJTF must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command authority the functional component commander will exercise.

e. The responsibilities and authority of a functional component commander must be assigned by the CJTF. Establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the CJTF.

(1) The commander of a functional component command is responsible for making recommendations to the CJTF on the proper employment of the military capability made available to accomplish the assigned responsibilities.

(2) The functional component commander usually will be a Service component commander. As a Service component commander, the functional component commander also has the responsibilities associated with Service component command for those assigned forces.

(a) When a functional component command is composed of forces of two or more Services, the functional component commander must be cognizant of the constraints and restraints imposed by logistic factors on the capability of the assigned and attached forces and the responsibilities retained by the Services.

(b) When a functional component commander will employ forces from more than one Service, the functional component commander's staff should be staffed with Service representation appropriate to the level and type of support to be provided. This requires advance planning for efficient operations.

1. Joint staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill these billets should be identified, and those individuals should be used when the functional component command is formed for exercises or actual operations. Staff officers who augment functional component staffs should be trained as part of a joint training and exercise program.

2. The structure of the staff should be flexible enough to expand or contract under changing conditions without loss in coordination or capability.

For more details on functional components, refer to JPs 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 3-0, Joint Operations, 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, and 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.

f. Examples of Functional Component Commanders

(1) Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)

(a) **The CJTF usually designates a JFACC based on the mission, CONOPS, the missions assigned to subordinate commanders, forces available, duration and nature of joint air operations, and the degree of control of joint air operations required. A CJTF typically will assign JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of air assets and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air operations.**

(b) The JFACC is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the CJTF. The JFACC typically **exercises TACON over air capabilities or forces made available for tasking**. The CJTF also may establish support relationships between the

JFACC and other components to facilitate operations. **The JFACC conducts joint air operations in accordance with the CJTF’s intent and CONOPS.**

(c) The responsibilities of the JFACC are assigned by the CJTF. These include, but are not limited to: planning, coordinating, and monitoring joint air operations and the allocation and tasking of joint air operations forces based on the CJTF’s CONOPS and air apportionment decision. Figure III-3 depicts typical JFACC responsibilities.

(d) JFACC Staff Organization

1. The JFACC normally establishes a joint air operations center (JAOC) to plan and direct joint air operations. The JAOC staff should be filled with subject matter experts who reflect the capabilities and forces available to the JFACC for tasking and include

TYPICAL JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

- Developing a joint air operations plan to best support the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives
- Recommending to the JFC apportionment of the joint air effort, after consulting with other component commanders
- Allocating and tasking of air capabilities/forces made available based upon the JFC’s air apportionment decision
- Providing oversight and guidance during execution of joint air operations
- Coordinating joint air operations with operations of other component commanders and forces assigned to or supporting the JFC
- Evaluating the results of joint air operations
- Performing the duties of the airspace control authority (ACA) or performing the duties of the area air defense commander (AADC), unless a separate ACA or AADC is designated
- Accomplishing various missions to include, but not limited to:
 - (1) Counterair
 - (2) Strategic air attack
 - (3) Airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
 - (4) Air interdiction
 - (5) Intratheater air mobility
 - (6) Close air support
- Functioning as a supported/supporting commander, as designated by the JFC
- Establishing a personnel recovery coordination cell to account for and report the status of isolated personnel and to coordinate and control air component personnel recovery events; and, if directed by the CJTF, establish a separate joint personnel recovery center for the same purpose in support of a joint recovery event

Figure III-3. Typical Joint Force Air Component Commander Responsibilities

appropriate component representation. This representation will provide the JFACC with the knowledge and experience required to effectively employ the available forces. Functional component staffs require advance planning for efficient operations. JFACC staff billets requiring specific expertise or individuals should be identified, staffed accordingly, trained, and employed during peacetime exercises to ensure their preparedness for operations. To be most effective, the JFACC should incorporate appropriate component representation throughout the staff. Figure III-4 illustrates a JFACC staff and JAOC organization.




Figure III-4. Notional Joint Force Air Component Commander Staff and Joint Air Operations Center Organization

2. Functional Area and Mission Experts. Functional area experts (such as intelligence, IO, logistics, space operations, legal, airspace, plans, and communications personnel) provide the critical expertise in support, plans, execution, and assessment functions. Mission experts in air-to-air, air-to-ground, ground-to-air, reconnaissance, air refueling, and others provide the technical warfighting expertise required to plan and employ capabilities or forces made available by the components. Functional and mission experts from other components will provide staffing throughout the JAOC and at all levels of command.

3. Liaison. The components have ready access to the JFACC, the JFACC's staff, and the other components through their LNOs. LNOs **work for their respective component commanders and work with the JFACC and staff.** Each component typically provides liaison elements (battlefield coordination detachment, Army air and missile defense command, naval and amphibious liaison element, Marine LNO, special operations liaison element (SOLE), and others as appropriate) that work within the JAOC. These liaison elements consist of personnel who provide component planning and tasking expertise and coordination capabilities. They help integrate and coordinate their component's operations with joint air operations.

4. Preparation. For each specific operation, the **nucleus of the JFACC staff should be trained in joint air operations and be representative of the joint force.** Staff augmentation with staffing as identified above ensures joint representation throughout the JAOC. The JFACC, in coordination with other component commanders, will determine specific staffing requirements.

For further details concerning the JFACC, refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

(2) Joint Force Land Component Commander

(a) When required, the CJTF designates a JFLCC and establishes the commander's authority and responsibilities.

(b) The designation of a JFLCC typically occurs when forces of more than one Service component participate in a land operation and the CJTF determines that doing this will achieve unity of command and effort among land forces.

(c) The CJTF should consider the following when deciding upon the formation of a JFLCC: availability of ports of debarkation; amount of mutual support possible between land forces; duration of the mission; requirement for land force simultaneous or sequential operations; likelihood of land forces operating adjacent to one another; requirements for special capabilities resident in one land force being required for use by the other; and amount, level of intensity, and requirement for coordination of other component support to land forces.

(d) If designated, the JFLCC typically is the commander with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite C2 capabilities.

(e) The JFLCC's overall responsibilities and roles are to plan, coordinate, and employ designated forces in support of the CJTF's CONOPS. Figure III-5 depicts typical responsibilities of the JFLCC.




Figure III-5. Typical Joint Force Land Component Commander Responsibilities

(f) JFLCC Staff Organization

1. Once the CJTF designates a JFLCC, the HQ is organized according to the mission and forces made available. Normally, it is built around an existing Service component HQ staff. JFLCC-capable HQ include Army Service component commands, theater armies, Army corps, Army divisions, and Marine air-ground task forces (in all likelihood a Marine expeditionary force).

2. Augmentees from the other Services are integrated into the core staff to form the JFLCC's staff. Ideally, the JFLCC and the deputy JFLCC would come from different Services. This construct should be replicated throughout the staff leadership to ensure an understanding of the distinct capabilities of each Service to optimize force employment. Figure III-6 depicts a notional JFLCC organization.

3. The standing operating procedure (SOP) for the Service from which the JFLCC is designated usually forms the baseline for the JFLCC's SOP. However, Services may use supplemental SOPs to conduct operations with Service-unique capabilities.

4. Liaison. The JFLCC's liaison requirements include, as a minimum, liaison with other components of the JTF, either functional or Service. The commander may require additional liaison with other organizations such as JTF HQ, major subordinate commands, and multinational land forces not assigned or attached to the command.

5. Personnel to fill the JFLCC billets should be identified and trained during peacetime and used when this type of staff is formed for exercises to ensure an effective transition during execution of planned operations.

For further details concerning the JFLCC, refer to JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.

(3) Joint Force Maritime Component Commander

(a) The CJTF may designate a JFMCC to C2 joint maritime operations. As a functional component commander, the JFMCC has authority over assigned and attached forces and forces or assets made available for tasking to perform operational missions. Generally, maritime assets may include navies, marines/naval infantries, SOF, coast guards and similar border patrol and revenue services, nonmilitary shipping managed by the government, civil merchant marines, army/ground forces (normally when embarked), and air and air defense forces operating in the maritime environment.

(b) Typical JMFCC missions include: sea control, maritime power projection, deterrence, strategic sealift, forward maritime presence, and seabasing operations.

(c) When designated, the JFMCC is the single maritime voice regarding maritime forces and requirements and makes recommendations to the CJTF regarding prioritization and




Figure III-6. Notional Joint Force Land Component Commander Organization

allocation of joint maritime force assets, and synchronization of maritime operations with overall operations. Some considerations for designating a JFMCC and employing a joint force maritime component are planning, duration, maritime perspective, span of control, multinational operations, and timing.

(d) **Responsibilities.** The CJTF assigns responsibilities to the JFMCC. These will include, but are not limited to, planning, coordination, allocation and tasking of joint maritime operations based on the CJTF's CONOPS and maritime apportionment decisions. Specific responsibilities that generally are assigned to the JFMCC are included in Figure III-7.

(e) **JFMCC Staff Organization.** Figure III-8 shows a notional JFMCC staff organization.

1. **Core Staff.** The JFMCC is generally built from an existing Service (Navy) component or a Navy numbered fleet command staff and then augmented with appropriate staff representation as soon as practical.

2. **Augmented JFMCC Staff Organization.** The organization of the Service component core staff forming the nucleus of this component usually is the first priority. The augmented staff's SOPs normally form the baseline for the maritime component SOPs.

3. **Liaison.** The JFMCC prioritizes liaison with other components to coordinate the planning and execution of assigned operations. The JFMCC must consider existing liaison requirements from the assigned Service components when establishing liaison requirements with other designated Service and functional component commanders for joint support. CJTFs centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams must have the appropriate JFMCC representation through LNOs or virtual presence through a collaborative environment.

For further details concerning the JFMCC, refer to JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.

(4) **Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC)**

(a) The CJTF may designate a JFSOCC or JSOTF to accomplish a specific mission or control SOF in the JOA.

1. The JFSOCC generally will be the commander with the preponderance of SOF and the requisite C2.

2. The commander of the theater special operations command may function as the JSOTF commander or JFSOCC.

(b) Normally, the JFSOCC exercises day-to-day C2 of assigned or attached forces. C2 of SOF usually is executed within the SOF chain of command.

TYPICAL JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

- Develop a joint maritime operations plan to best support joint force objectives.
- Provide centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of forces/capabilities made available.
- Request forces of other component commanders when necessary for the accomplishment of the maritime mission.
- Make maritime apportionment recommendations to the commander, joint task force (CJTF).
- Provide maritime forces to other component commanders in accordance with CJTF apportionment decisions.
- Control the operational level synchronization and execution of joint maritime operations, as specified by the CJTF, to include adjusting targets and tasks for available joint forces/capabilities. The JFC and affected component commanders will be notified, as appropriate, if the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) changes the planned joint maritime operations during execution.
- Act as supported commander within the assigned area of operations (AO).
- Assign and coordinate target priorities within the assigned AO by synchronizing and integrating maneuver, mobility and movement, fires, and interdiction. The JFMCC nominates targets located within the maritime AO to the joint targeting process that may potentially require action by another component commander's assigned forces.
- Evaluate results of maritime operations and forward combat assessments to the CJTF in support of the overall effort.
- Support information operations with assigned assets, when directed.
- Function as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the CJTF.
- Establishing a personnel recovery coordination cell to account for and report the status of isolated personnel and to coordinate and control maritime component personnel recovery events; and, if directed by the CJTF, establish a separate joint personnel recovery center for the same purpose in support of a joint recovery event.
- Perform other functions as directed by the CJTF.

Figure III-7. Typical Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Responsibilities




Figure III-8. Notional Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Staff Organization

(c) The JFSOCC allocates forces as a supported or supporting commander based on guidance from the CJTF.

(d) When multiple JTFs are established, the theater special operations command commander functioning as a JFSOCC may establish and employ multiple JSOTFs to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTFs special operations (SO) requirements. The geographic CCDR, as the common superior, normally will establish supporting or TACON command relationships between JSOTF commanders and CJTFs. A notional JSOTF organization is depicted in Figure III-9.

(e) While SO personnel should be included in centralized planning at the CCDR and subordinate JFC levels, successful SO require decentralized planning and execution for




Figure III-9. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Organization

individual missions. Independent judgment and effective coordination by SOF leaders at every echelon are vital to successful SO.

(f) The JFSOCC or commander, JSOTF may establish a joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC) responsible for planning and executing joint SO air activities. This includes the responsibility to coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the assigned and attached joint SO aviation assets. The establishing SOF commander (JFSOCC or commander, JSOTF as appropriate) normally exercises OPCON of joint SO aviation through a JSOACC. However, there also are circumstances where the SOF commander may elect to place selected SO aviation assets under separate control. A single JSOACC can support multiple JSOTFs.

(g) The SOLE, in close coordination with all JFSOCC components, coordinates and deconflicts SO surface and air operations with conventional air forces.

1. JFSOCC provides a SOLE to the JFACC or JFC staff or appropriate Service component air C2 facility to coordinate and synchronize SOF air and surface operations with joint air operations.

KEY TERM

Joint Special Operations Task Force

- A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service.
- Formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations.
- May have conventional units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.

2. Shared asset coordination and fratricide prevention are the major SOLE responsibilities. SOLE must consider airborne fire support and reconnaissance, C2 platforms, air refueling, and deconfliction of deep operations.

3. The senior SOLE representative works directly for the JFSOCC and assigns LNOs throughout the JAOC. Under the direction of the senior SOLE representative, these LNOs provide SOF air, land, and maritime expertise throughout the JAOC.

(h) Normally, the JSOACC will be the SOF aviation commander providing the preponderance of air assets or being most capable of controlling special air operations in a specific situation.

(i) **The CJTF may define a joint special operations area (JSOA) for use by the JSOTF.** The establishment of a JSOA may delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.

(j) Figure III-10 illustrates typical responsibilities of the JFSOCC.

For further details concerning joint SO, refer to JPs 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

4. Special Purpose Subordinate Task Forces

Because of the nature and visibility of PSYOP and CMO, the CJTF may desire to establish separate task forces for these activities. **As a rule, the PSYOP and CMO task forces work directly for the CJTF.** However, in certain circumstances (e.g., crisis response and limited contingency operations) civil affairs (CA) and PSYOP task forces may be attached to the JSOTF.

a. Commander, Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF)

TYPICAL JOINT FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

- Advising the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on the proper employment of special operations forces (SOF) and assets.
- Planning and coordinating special operations (SO) and employing designated SOF in support of the CJTF's concept of operations.
- Issuing planning guidance.
- Analyzing various courses of action.
- Coordinating the conduct of SO with the other joint task force component commanders and subordinate task forces.
- Evaluating the results of SO.
- Focusing on operational-level functions and their control.
- Synchronizing sustainment for SOF.
- Establishing a combat identification standing operating procedure and other directives based on CJTF guidance.
- Establishing an unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell to coordinate and control nonconventional assisted recoveries (including unconventional assisted recoveries) and recovery mechanisms in support of joint personnel recovery center and personnel recovery coordination cell.
- Functioning as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the CJTF.

Figure III-10. Typical Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander Responsibilities

(1) CJTFs are responsible to conduct CMO and they may establish a JCMOTF when the scope of CMO requires coordination and activities beyond that which a CA representative on the staff could accomplish.

(2) It is resourced to meet specific CMO requirements (e.g., stability operations).

(3) Figure III-11 depicts typical responsibilities of the JCMOTF.

(4) A notional JCMOTF organization is depicted in Figure III-12.

(a) The composition of this organization should be representative of the forces comprising the JCMOTF. A JCMOTF may have both conventional and special operations forces assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. By design, the Army's

TYPICAL JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE RESPONSIBILITIES

- Advising the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on policy, funding; multinational, foreign, or host-nation sensitivities; and their effect on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions.
- Providing command and control or direction of military host-nation advisory, assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by joint US forces.
- Assisting in establishing US or multinational and military-to-civil links for greater efficiency of cooperative assistance arrangements.
- Performing essential coordination or liaison with host-nation agencies, country team, United Nations agencies, and deployed US, multinational, and host-nation military forces and supporting logistic organizations.
- Assisting in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects, to build civil acceptance and support of US operations, and to promote indigenous capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.
- Planning and conducting joint and combined civil-military operations training exercises.
- Advising and assisting in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services and otherwise facilitating transition to peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated hand-off to other United States Government (USG) agencies, international organizations, or host-nation responsibility.
- Assessing or identifying host-nation civil support, relief, or funding requirements to the CJTF for transmission to supporting commanders, Military Services, or other responsible USG agencies.
- Establishing combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on CJTF guidance.

Figure III-11. Typical Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Responsibilities

CA brigade organizational structure can provide the operational C2 system structure to form a JCMOTF.

(b) A JCMOTF is a US joint force organization, similar in organization to a JSOTF or JTF and is flexible in size and composition, depending on mission circumstances. It usually is subordinate to a JTF.

(c) In rare instances, and depending on available resources, a JCMOTF could be formed as a standing organization.

(d) A JCMOTF can be formed in theater, in the United States (within the limits of the law), or in both locations, depending on scope, duration, or sensitivity of the CMO requirement and associated policy considerations.




Figure III-12. Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Organization

For further on CMO and CA, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

b. Commander, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF)

- (1) The CJTF may establish a JPOTF based on the following:
 - (a) Mission analysis.
 - (b) Geographical size of the JOA requires dispersed operations.
 - (c) Number and types of supported units exceed the capability of a psychological operations support element to advise and assist.
 - (d) Number and types of PSYOP units or assets to be coordinated exceed the C2 capability of a psychological operations support element.
- (2) A JPOTF is capable of supporting activities across the range of military operations.
- (3) Figure III-13 describes some of the typical JPOTF responsibilities.
- (4) **JPOTF Staff Organization.** United States Army and Air Force personnel primarily will fill the composition of the JPOTF staff. Figure III-14 depicts a notional JPOTF HQ organization.
- (5) Proactive use of PSYOP throughout the full range of military operations acts as a force multiplier. All PSYOP activities must be coordinated with PA. Also, PSYOP activities supporting CMO and DSPD require coordination and deconfliction to make certain consistent themes and messages are communicated to the appropriate target audience.

For further details concerning PSYOP, refer to JP 3-13.2, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

TYPICAL JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE RESPONSIBILITIES

- Advise the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on psychological operations (PSYOP).
- Conduct PSYOP planning and execution.
- Issue planning guidance.
- Advise the CJTF on the targeting process regarding PSYOP, PSYOP enabling actions, and targeting restrictions.
- Provide public information to foreign audiences within the joint task force operational area.
- Assist in countering propaganda, misinformation, and opposing information to correctly portray friendly intent and action to foreign target audiences.
- Analyze various courses of action.
- Develop, produce, distribute, and disseminate PSYOP products and actions to achieve PSYOP objectives.
- Coordinate with the other subordinate task forces and components to synchronize operation plans and PSYOP efforts in support of CJTF objectives.
- Conduct PSYOP dissemination operations.
- Evaluate the change in behavior of the target audience.
- Conduct liaison with host-nation agencies and other United States Government organizations.
- Coordinate and synchronize all PSYOP public information activities with public affairs.
- Provide defense support to public diplomacy efforts through a military information support team in the US embassy.

Figure III-13. Typical Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Responsibilities




Figure III-14. Notional Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Headquarters Organization

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CHAPTER IV

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL

“If officers desire to have control over their commands, they must remain habitually with them, industriously attend to their instruction and comfort, and in battle lead them well.”

Stonewall Jackson, Winchester, VA, November 1861

1. General

This chapter describes three management processes and seven additional C2 factors that influence JTF C2. The three management processes are JTF information management, the commander’s decision cycle, and the HQ battle rhythm. The additional factors are JTF C2 information systems and information sharing; the role of the commander in the JTF C2; command relationships; operational area management; operational limitations; interagency implications on JTF C2; and multinational implications on JTF C2.

2. Joint Task Force Headquarters Management Process

a. **General.** The CJTF and staff use a number of processes, such as the joint operation planning process (JOPP) that support the JTF’s requirements, activities, and products. Three of these processes — JTF information management, the commander’s decision cycle, and the HQ battle rhythm — are especially important for the efficient management of day-to-day HQ operations.

(1) **Information Management.** The complexity of JTF operations requires a process to assist the commander in exercising C2. The information management process facilitates the commander’s decision-making by improving the speed and accuracy of information flow as well as supporting execution through reliable communications. **The goal of common understanding of information and appropriate sharing of the same is achieved through the proper management of personnel, equipment and facilities, and procedures.** This management is conducted by a viable information management organization.

(a) The information management organization is operationally focused to facilitate the command’s information flow processes (internally, externally, vertically, and horizontally). These are formalized in a command information management plan (IMP) or SOP. **Information management refers to the processes a command uses to receive, obtain, control, and process data into useful information.**

(b) **The commander sets the tone for the entire command by establishing priorities for information requirements and dissemination.** The commander defines what information is needed and how it should be delivered. Additionally, the commander focuses the staff by designating certain information as critical. These CCIRs will change over time as the situation continues to evolve.

(c) **The chief of staff understands the HQ information requirements and dissemination needs and directs and synchronizes the staff in these efforts. The chief of staff normally implements the IMP and ensures that the staff adheres to the processes that have been developed.**

(d) The information management officer (IMO) generally is responsible for developing and capturing the command's information management processes and publishing them in the IMP. The IMO additionally coordinates information management training for the staff and components to ensure familiarization with the IMP and coordinates the joint information management board (JIMB) activities.

(e) **Joint Information Management Board.** The JIMB acts as the center point for oversight and coordinating information management within the JTF. It is comprised of operational or function information managers and information managers from all the primary staff sections, JTF components, and stakeholder information managers. It is co-chaired by the IMO and JTF J-6 who enables decisions by the chief of staff or CJTF. The JIMB convenes initially to capture and identify both the existing and evolving processes that are needed to ensure effective flow of information throughout the command and to develop the IMP. Once a plan is approved, the JIMB provides oversight of processes and resolves information management cross-functional issues.

For further details concerning information management at the JTF level, refer to Appendix D, "Information Management," Chapter X, "Joint Task Force Communications System Support," JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, and the US Joint Forces Command Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure.

To further assist the JTF IMO in the preparation of an IMP and coordinating information management with other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs, refer to Annex K, "Checklist for Information Management," to Appendix B, "Checklist."

(2) **Commander's Decision Cycle.** The commander's decision cycle is a process that depicts how command and staff elements determine required actions, codify them in directives, execute them, and monitor their results. The commander's decision cycle has four phases (refer to Figure IV-1).

(a) **Monitor.** Monitoring involves measuring ongoing activities that may impact the JTF's operational area or impact the JTF's ongoing or future operations. The baseline for this measurement of the situation is the current plan or plans. This baseline allows the staff to measure the current situation against the one envisioned in the plan. This allows the commander and staff to identify where the current situation deviates from the one envisioned in the plan. Although staff sections monitor their individual staff functions to maintain current staff estimates, the preponderance of the JTF's monitoring function is conducted by the JTF's centers (e.g., the JOC, the JLOC).




Figure IV-1. Commander's Decision Cycle

(b) **Assess.** Within the commander's decision cycle, assessment is the determination of the impact of events as they relate to overall mission accomplishment. Fundamental to assessment are judgments about JTF progress in designated mission areas as measured against the expected progress in those same mission areas. These judgments allow the commander and the staff to determine where adjustments must be made to operations and serve as a catalyst for planning. Ultimately, assessment allows the commander and staff to keep pace with a constantly evolving situation while staying focused on mission accomplishment.

(c) **Plan.** In the planning portion of the commander's decision cycle, the commander and staff make adjustments to the current plan or develop new plans with the purpose of successful completion of the broader mission.

(d) **Direct.** JTF HQ directs actions to ensure that current orders and directives are completed as intended. This direction is done with the broader purpose of achieving the overall mission. Tools like the commander's intent and CCIRs assist the JTF HQ in this role. The preponderance of the JTF's directing function is conducted by the JOC.

(3) **HQ Battle Rhythm.** Battle rhythm is described as the sequencing and execution of actions and events within a joint force HQ that are regulated by the flow and sharing of information that support all decision cycles.

(a) **General. A battle rhythm is a routine cycle of command and staff activities intended to synchronize current and future operations.** As a practical matter, the HQ battle rhythm consists of a series of meetings, report requirements, and other activities. These activities may be daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly requirements. Typically, **the JTF HQs battle rhythm is managed by the JTF chief of staff** (see Figure IV-2). There are several critical functions for a battle rhythm; these include (but are not limited to) the following:

1. Making staff interaction and coordination within the HQ routine.
2. Making commander and staff interaction routine (in so much as it can be).
3. Synchronizing centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams activities.
4. Facilitating planning by the staff and decision-making by the commander.

(b) **Factors that Shape a Battle Rhythm.** Many factors influence the establishment of a battle rhythm. These include (but are not limited to) the following:

1. The higher HQ battle rhythm and reporting requirements.
2. The subordinate HQ battle rhythm requirements.
3. The duration of the operation.
4. The intensity of the operation.
5. The planning requirements within the HQ (e.g., future plans, future operations, and current operations).
6. Other factors (e.g., battlefield circulation).

b. Information Systems and Information Sharing. Information systems are the equipment that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. This includes computers — hardware and software — and communications as well as policies and procedures for their use. Information systems assist commanders and staffs to gain situational awareness and support the CJTF's decision-making process.

(1) **Physical Information Sharing.** Physical information sharing is done primarily face-to-face in centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams and other forums, and also shared via LNOs and through documents.

SAMPLE JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS BATTLE RHYTHM

TIME	EVENT	LOCATION	PARTICIPANTS
NOTE: EVENT TIME IS SITUATIONALLY DEPENDENT	SHIFT CHANGE	JOC	BATTLE STAFF/OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	TARGETING MEETING	BRIEFING ROOM	AS REQUIRED
	SITUATION UPDATE TO CJTF	BRIEFING ROOM	CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF's PERSONAL AND SPECIAL STAFFS, COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	PLANS UPDATE TO CJTF	BRIEFING ROOM	CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF's PERSONAL AND SPECIAL STAFF, COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	CJTF's CONF CALL TO COMPONENTS	CJTF CONF ROOM	CJTF, COMPONENT COMMANDERS
	JPG	J-5 PLANS CONF ROOM	J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CORE PLANNERS COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	JTCB MEETING	BRIEFING ROOM	DCJTF, J-2, J-3, JFACC, COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	JOINT INFORMATION MANAGEMENT BOARD	BRIEFING ROOM	COS, J-3, J-6, STAFF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT REPS, COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	IO WORKING GROUP	BRIEFING ROOM	IO STAFF, CA, PA, DSPD, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	BATTLE UPDATE ASSESSMENT	BRIEFING ROOM	CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF'S PERSONAL AND SPECIAL STAFFS, COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	PROTECTION WORKING GROUP	JOC	FP OFFICER, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	SHIFT CHANGE	JOC	BATTLE STAFF/OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	ROE/RUF WORKING GROUP	BRIEFING ROOM	J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, SJA COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	COMBAT ASSESSMENT BOARD	BRIEFING ROOM	CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF'S PERSONAL AND SPECIAL STAFFS, COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED

CA	civil affairs	J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
CJTF	commander, joint task force	J-6	communications system directorate of a joint staff
CONF	conference	JFACC	joint force air component commander
COS	chief of staff	JOC	joint operations center
DCJTF	deputy commander, joint task force	JPG	joint planning group
FP	force protection	JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
IO	information operations	PA	public affairs
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff	ROE/RUF	rules of engagement/rules for the use of force
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff	SJA	staff judge advocate
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff		
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff		

Figure IV-2. Sample Joint Task Force Headquarters Battle Rhythm

(2) **Virtual Information Sharing.** Virtual information sharing allows organizations and elements within or external to a HQ, whether collocated or geographically separate, to have access to the same information. This occurs both horizontally within a HQ and adjacent units and staffs, and vertically with components and higher HQ. A virtual network approach can provide an easily accessible point for information sharing through employment of Web pages and directories for authorized uses. Information also can be disseminated via email, message traffic, and one of the collaborative tools or shared via video teleconferencing (VTC). Members of the JTF staff, centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams, LNOs, JTF components, and higher and adjacent commands can all collect or disseminate information in accordance with defined access permissions.

3. Joint Task Force Headquarters Command and Control Factors

a. **Role of the Commander, Joint Task Force, in Command and Control.** The CJTF's activities are central to JTF C2. The commander directs and assists the HQ in planning (i.e., supervises JTF HQ and subordinate HQ in their preparation for operations and directs the JTF HQ conduct of operations and supervises the conduct of operations by subordinate HQ). In all these tasks, the CJTF leverages experience and judgment to guide the command through the fog and friction of operations towards mission accomplishment.

(1) **Commander's Role in Planning Operations.** The commander's vision of an operation is translated into orders and actions during the JTF's planning processes. It is communicated by employing these three important mechanisms: **commander's intent, commander's planning guidance, and CCIRs**. These mechanisms assist the commander and JTF staff in establishing an effective dialogue to enable planning. Later, during preparation activities and operations, these mechanisms assist the entire JTF in remaining focused on the commander's original vision of the operation and its outcome.

(2) **Commander's Intent.** The commander's intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the military end state. The commander's intent assists in communicating the commander's vision to both the JTF staff and subordinate and supporting commands during the planning and conduct of operations. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders take actions to achieve the military end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. It also includes where the commander will accept risk during the operation.

(a) The initial intent statement can be stated verbally when time is short. The commander refines the intent statement as planning progresses. The commander's approved intent is written in paragraph 3, "Execution," as part of the operation plan or order.

(b) A well-devised intent statement enables subordinates to decide how to act when facing unforeseen opportunities and threats, and in situations where the CONOPS no longer applies. This statement deals primarily with the military conditions that lead to mission accomplishment, so the commander may highlight selected objectives and desired and undesired effects. The statement also can discuss other instruments of national power as they relate to the

JFC's mission and the potential impact of military operations on these instruments. The commander's intent may include the commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation.

(3) **Commander's Guidance.** The purpose of commander's guidance is to effectively communicate the commander's visualization and initial thoughts for a given operation to the staff. This, in turn, allows the staff to effectively plan in support of the commander. This guidance may be as broad or detailed as circumstances require. Although commanders provide guidance to their staffs throughout the planning process, there are two opportunities to provide early guidance to the staff to focus their efforts:

(a) **Commander's Initial Guidance.** Upon receipt of mission, the commander and staff normally conduct an assessment of the initiating directive to determine time available to mission execution, the current status of intelligence products and staff estimates and other factors relevant to the specific planning situation. The commander typically will provide **initial guidance** (not to be confused with the JFC's planning guidance that is a product of mission analysis), which could specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, authorize movement of key capabilities within the JFC's authority, and direct other actions as necessary.

(b) **Commander's Planning Guidance.** Commander's planning guidance normally follows mission analysis and sets the conditions for successful course of action (COA) development. It provides the staff insight into how the commander wants to conduct the operation and how the commander wants to plan for the operation. As the staff continues to plan, the commander provides additional guidance such as refining COAs, identifying items requiring further analysis, or modifying parts of the draft OPOD. The commander's planning guidance normally provides (but is not limited to) the following:

1. Feedback on the staff's mission analysis (to include feedback on the re-stated mission statement).
2. Guidance on **how** to conduct planning.
3. Approval/modification of planning timelines.
4. Assignment of planning priorities.
5. Designation of number of COAs to be developed.
6. Operational limitations.
7. CJTF's initial thoughts on desired and undesired effects.
8. Guidance on **what** to plan (e.g., COA development guidance [for single or multiple COAs]). This may include (but is not limited to) the following:

- a. Guidance on C2 structure.
- b. Guidance on sequencing/phasing.
- c. Guidance for organization of the operational area.
- d. Guidance for gaining decisions within designated COAs.
- e. Guidance on initial CCIRs.
- f. Guidance within other critical functional areas.

For more information on the JFC's guidance, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

(4) **Commander's Critical Information Requirements.** CCIRs are elements of information needed by the commander that directly affect decision-making. CCIRs are a key information management tool for the CJTF and help the commander assess the operational environment and identify decision points throughout the conduct of operations. The CJTF determines what information is critical based on personal experience, the mission, the higher commander's intent, and input from the staff. **CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander.**

(a) There are three broad categories of information sought in the CCIRs — enemy (**adversary**), **friendly**, and **environmental** (e.g., economic, political, meteorological, infrastructure). CCIRs are expressed as PIRs and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs). Not all proposed PIRs and FFIRs are selected as CCIRs. Those PIRs not selected are downgraded to information requirements. PIRs address the enemy (adversary) and environmental factors and drive intelligence collection and production requirements. FFIRs address friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities – they drive reporting and requests for information (RFIs).

(b) CCIRs change as the decisions the commander must make change. The initial CCIRs often address information needed to make decisions during planning. These information requirements often relate to selecting a COA. During preparation and execution, CCIRs address information required in making anticipated operational decisions or plan adjustments.

(c) CCIRs often seek information the commander requires to decide whether to execute a branch or sequel. **The number of CCIRs in effect at one time must be limited.** This practice sets priorities the staff uses to allocate resources and manage information. CCIRs normally focus on near-term decisions, not every anticipated decision. As decisions are made, the CCIRs change to support other anticipated decisions. CCIRs spare the commander from receiving irrelevant information. They also protect subordinate HQ and supporting agencies from receiving excessive RFIs.

(d) CCIRs set information management and resource allocation priorities for the staff. They set information management priorities by establishing the information most important

to the commander. CCIRs also establish priorities for allocating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources.

(e) To assist in managing CCIRs, CJTFs should implement a process to guide the staff. This process should include specific responsibilities for development, validation, dissemination, monitoring, reporting, and maintenance (i.e., modifying and deleting). Figure IV-3 illustrates a generic CCIR development process that can be tailored to a specific mission or operational area.

For more details concerning CCIRs, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.




Figure IV-3. Commander's Critical Information Requirements Process

(5) **Commander's Role in Preparing for Operations.** As the JTF prepares for an upcoming operation it conducts a series of activities to improve its ability to conduct the actual operation. The CJTF closely supervises the JTF HQ and component commanders during this critical period. These activities include (but are not limited to) the following:

- (a) Continued assessment of the situation.
- (b) Reconnaissance and surveillance operations.
- (c) Refinement of the plan.
- (d) Coordination and liaison.
- (e) Rehearsals.
- (f) Training.
- (g) Inspections.
- (h) Movements.

(6) **The Commander's Role in Directing Operations.** Directing converts the commander's decisions into effective action by subordinate forces. The commander generates effective action by directing forces, synchronizing joint functions, and, within authority and capability, integrating other instruments of national power. The CJTF directs operations by:

- (a) Guiding the command toward mission accomplishment.
- (b) Assigning missions.
- (c) Prioritizing and allocating resources.
- (d) Assessing and taking risks.
- (e) Assessing the situation and deciding when and how to make adjustments.

b. Command Relationships

(1) **C2 functions of the JTF Establishing Authority.** The JTF establishing authority exercises either combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) or OPCON of the JTF. The JTF establishing authority transfers forces from subordinate commands and attaches them to the JTF as appropriate. The JTF establishing authority also establishes the command relationships between the CJTF and other subordinate commanders to ensure the success of the JTF.

(2) **C2 Functions of the CJTF.** The CJTF exercises OPCON over assigned (and normally over attached) forces through designated component, major subordinate command, or subordinate task force commanders. The CJTF also may exercise TACON over forces or be a supported or supporting commander. Further, the CJTF may delegate OPCON or TACON of, or establish support relationships for, specific JTF forces or military capabilities to or between subordinate commanders to accomplish specified tasks or missions. The CJTF is responsible for determining the basis on which JTF component and other subordinate commanders will exercise C2 and for clearly assigning responsibilities, delegating authorities, and establishing command relationships. Establishing command relationships and delineating coordinating instructions are particularly important when JTF component and other subordinate commanders are assigned missions that bring their forces into common or contiguous areas.

For more details concerning command relationships, refer to JPs 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and 3-0, Joint Operations.

c. Understanding the Operational Environment

(1) Factors that must be considered when conducting joint operations extend far beyond the boundaries of the JFC's assigned operational area. **The JFC's operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment. Included within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation.** Understanding the operational environment helps commander's understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and how these affect the JTF's mission accomplishment.

(2) The CJTF and staff can benefit by a comprehensive perspective of the systems in the operational environment relevant to the mission and operation at hand. This is accomplished through joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). Developing a systems view can promote a commonly shared understanding of the operational environment among members of the joint, interagency, and multinational team, thereby facilitating unified action. A systems perspective of the operational environment strives to provide an understanding of interrelated systems (e.g., political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and others) relevant to a specific joint operation without regard to geographic boundaries. A variety of factors, including planning time available, will affect the fidelity of this perspective. Understanding these systems, their interaction with each other, and how system relationships will change over time will increase the JFC's knowledge of how actions within a system can affect other system components. This will help the commander and staff analyze centers of gravity, develop lines of operations, refine objectives and desired and undesired effects, and focus limited resources.

For further information on the operational environment and systems perspective, refer to JPs 3-0, Joint Operations, and 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

d. **Operational Area Management**

(1) **Organization of the Operational Area.** A critical function of the JTF is to organize the operational area to assist in the integration, coordination, and deconfliction of joint actions. The CJTF can employ areas of operations (AOs), JSOA, amphibious objective areas (AOAs), and joint security areas (JSAs) to support the organization of the operational area within the assigned JOA. Figure IV-4 depicts typical JTF operational areas.

(a) **Boundaries** are lines that delineate surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas.




Figure IV-4. Typical Joint Task Force Operational Areas

1. JFCs may use lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define AOs for land and naval forces. Such areas are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or maritime force commanders to accomplish their mission while protecting deployed forces.

2. Theater-wide air sorties are not constrained by surface boundaries, per se. However, because the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, the airspace control authority, on behalf of the JFC, promulgates airspace control measures to deconflict the multiple uses required of this space. In addition, delivery of air weapons inside surface boundaries requires coordination with the surface force commanders.

For additional airspace control guidance, refer to JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.

3. Boundaries may require relatively frequent adjustment based on the actual and projected rate of maneuver and the operational environment.

(b) **Area of Operations.** An AO is an operational area defined by the CJTF for land and maritime forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Within their designated AOs, land and maritime force commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, such commanders have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing within their AOs.

(c) **Joint Special Operations Area.** A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace defined by a CJTF who has geographic responsibilities, for use by joint SOF. CJTFs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations force actions in the same general operational area.

(d) **Amphibious Objective Area.** The AOA is a geographical area within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by an amphibious force. The AOA needs to be large enough for necessary air, land, maritime, and special operations.

For more details concerning AOs, JSOAs, and AOAAs, refer to JPs 3-0, Joint Operations, 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.

(e) **Joint Security Area.** A JSA is a specific surface area, designated by the CJTF as critical that facilitates protection of joint bases and supports FP, movement control, sustainment, C2, airbases/airfields, seaports, and other activities. JSAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat. JSAs may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements.

For more details concerning JSAs, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

(2) **Control Measures.** The CJTF establishes additional control measures to further integrate joint actions within the JOA and subordinate operational areas in coordination with their subordinate commanders. Control measures are directives to subordinate commanders to assign responsibilities, coordinate joint actions, and control operations. Commanders tailor their use of control measures to conform to the higher commander's intent, their own mission, and amount of authority delegated to subordinates. The CJTF employs control measures to achieve the following types of joint actions (NOTE: this list is not meant to be either all inclusive or restrictive):

- (a) Control of designated air, land, or maritime areas.
- (b) Control movements.
- (c) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations.
- (d) Conduct security operations.
- (e) Provide or coordinate fires.
- (f) Conduct air defense.
- (g) Designate lines of communications.
- (h) Identify critical logistic nodes or facilities.
- (i) Identify critical communications nodes or facilities.

e. **Operational limitations** are actions required or prohibited by higher authority and other restrictions that limit the commander's freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and HN issues. A **constraint** is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that **dictates an action**, thus restricting freedom of action. Operational limitations may restrict or bind COA selection or may even impede implementation of the chosen COA. Commanders must examine the operational limitations imposed on them, understand their impacts, and develop options that minimize these impacts in order to promote maximum freedom of action during execution.

(1) Operational limitations are commonly expressed as rules of engagement (ROE) and rules for the use of force (RUF). These are specific limitations by which the President, the Secretary of Defense, and operational commanders regulate the use of armed force in the context of applicable political and military policy and domestic and international law. More simply put, ROE and RUF are rules that govern "when, where, against whom, and how force can be used."

(2) ROE and RUF provide guidance for the use of force for self-defense and mission accomplishment across the range of military operations.

(3) ROE and RUF generally provide guidance on or impose limitations on the use of force by commanders and individuals based on three types of considerations.

(a) **Military.** Properly drafted ROE and RUF help accomplish the mission by ensuring the use of force in such a way that it will be used only in a manner consistent with the overall military objective. They must implement the inherent right and obligation of self-defense and support mission accomplishment. ROE can assist the commander by preventing the unintended start of hostilities prior to achieving a desired readiness posture, by establishing economy of force considerations during hostilities, and by protecting adversary infrastructure that may prove useful at a later date. Properly drafted ROE and RUF, in conjunction with the commander's guidance and intent, help to ensure that US forces do not accept unnecessary risk by hesitating to use force as appropriate in self-defense.

(b) **Political.** ROE and RUF are a reflection of USG and participating nations (including transited nations) political will.

(c) **Legal.** ROE and RUF also are a reflection of international and domestic law and existing multilateral and bilateral agreements and arrangements. See Figure IV-5.

(4) ROE and RUF will change and evolve as the mission changes and evolves. As the mission becomes more complex and, perhaps volatile, commanders should ensure they have conveyed use of force rules that provide subordinate commanders with sufficient flexibility to adapt changing conditions to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. Those rules may be influenced by among other considerations, the commander's judgment, the intent of higher authorities, the requirements of subordinates, the training of the force, and the concerns of multinational partners. Nothing in the ROE or RUF can limit the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in unit self-defense consistent with the law of armed conflict.

(5) **ROE and RUF issues emerge during the planning process as the staff begins to develop COAs.** Required ROE should be identified as a potential restraint during COA development. The supported CDR may provide ROE and RUF guidance to the CJTF via initial planning documents, which may precede COA development. The CJTF's proposed mission-specific ROE and RUF should be developed, exercised, and modified as necessary to support mission planning during the COA development, wargaming, analysis, and selection process. Mission objectives must drive the ROE and RUF formulation process and not vice versa.

(6) ROE and RUF development, distribution, training, and modification must be timely and responsive to changing mission and threat parameters.

(7) **Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE).** The President and the Secretary of Defense have provided the SROE as stand alone guidance for US forces worldwide that are equally applicable to all the combatant commands and can be easily amended or clarified to meet mission-specific requirements. SROE apply in addition to specific guidance, if any, from




Figure IV-5. Elements of Rules of Engagement Formation

higher authority in the form of supplemental measures. SROE also provide lists of numbered supplemental measures that may be provided by, or requested from, higher authority to tailor ROE for a particular situation.

(a) SROE generally do not apply to multinational forces; civil support operations; US Coast Guard units (and other units under their OPCON) conducting law enforcement operations; and US forces in support of operations not under OPCON or TACON of a CCDR, or performing missions under the direct control of the President or Secretary of Defense, Military Departments, or other USG departments or agencies.

(b) CCDRs also may augment the SROE to properly respond to the mission and threat in their AORs.

(c) The CJTF and staff must understand the military, political, and legal considerations that influence ROE and be able to distill the SROE and any CCDR-specific ROE

into baseline ROE for the unit commander, weapon system operator, and individual Service member to apply in the field.

(d) In developing ROE, it is critical that the staff consider any Service-specific core training in the SROE that the combat forces may have received prior to deployment.

(e) The CJTF and staff can lessen confusion and contribute to the readiness and effective use of force by providing timely, clear, and concise ROE guidance and by assisting the components in training at every level.

(f) Commanders at all levels are authorized to use all weapons and tactics available to accomplish assigned missions. ROE should strive, to the extent possible, to preserve flexibility.

(8) **Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF).** SRUF provide operational guidance and establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions taken by DOD forces performing civil support missions (e.g., military assistance to civil authorities and military support for civilian law enforcement agencies) and routine Service functions (including antiterrorism/FP duties) within US territory (including US territorial waters). The SRUF also apply to homeland defense missions occurring within US territory and to DOD forces, civilians and contractors performing law enforcement and security duties at all DOD installations (and off-installation, while conducting official DOD security functions), within or outside US Territory, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. HN laws and international agreements may limit US forces means of accomplishing their law enforcement or security duties. Additional examples of these missions, within the United States, include protection of critical infrastructure both on and off DOD installations; military assistance and support to civil authorities; DOD support during civil disturbances; and DOD cooperation with Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities, including counterdrug support.

(a) Unit commanders at all levels must teach and train their personnel how and when to use both non-deadly and deadly force in self-defense.

(b) Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unit self-defense includes the defense of other DOD forces in the vicinity.

For more details concerning ROE and RUF, refer to the CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (SECRET).

f. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Considerations

(1) Relationships between the JTF and the interagency, IGOs, and NGOs should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation. During combat operations such as Operation DESERT STORM or in FHA operations such as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by other agencies. When DOD is tasked to provide civil

support, its forces perform in a supporting role. Whether supported or supporting, close coordination between the military and other non-DOD agencies is a key to successful interagency coordination. Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination enables the JTF to build support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared goals through unity of effort.

(2) NGOs do not operate within a military, governmental, United Nations (UN), or other IGO hierarchies. As private organizations, NGOs are very unlikely to place themselves in a supporting role to the military. However, an associate or partnership relationship may develop during some missions. For example, if the UN has provided a grant to an NGO to implement a project, the NGO would be considered its “implementing partner.” If formed, the CMOC is the focal point where US military forces coordinate any support to NGOs.

(a) As mentioned above, a coordinated effort between the JTF and the interagency, NGOs, and IGOs is essential to achieve our national objectives but should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation. Military operations depend upon a command structure that often is very different from that of civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to coordination efforts. The various USG agencies’ different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques make achieving unity of effort a challenge. Still more difficult, some NGOs and IGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the USG, and particularly the US military.

(b) The military, on the other hand, tends to rely on structured decision-making processes, detailed planning, the use of standardized techniques and procedures, and sophisticated C2 systems to coordinate and synchronize operations. Civilian agencies similarly employ standardized, methodical decision-making principles but likely will not have the same degree of C2 capabilities as does the US military. Across agency lines, IGOs and NGOs tend to coordinate because there is a perceived mutually supportive interest, not because of any formalized arrangement. Close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation are necessary for many reasons and may include: ensuring that a clear understanding of each organization’s objectives; addressing inadequate structure and limited available commercial facilities and logistic support; developing coordination/mutual support procedures, and overcome bureaucratic and personal limitations. This understanding could help harmonize agencies’ responses in conjunction with joint operations, thus promoting unified action.

For further details concerning interagency C2 considerations, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.

g. Multinational Considerations

(1) **Command Authority.** The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over US forces. On a case-by-case basis, the President may consider placing appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a competent UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or coalition commander for specific operations authorized by the UN Security Council, or approved by the North Atlantic Council, or other authorized regional organization or coalition.

(a) US forces under the OPCON of a multinational force commander (MNFC) will follow the MNF ROE unless directed otherwise by the President or Secretary of Defense. MNF ROE and combat identification measures must not interfere with US forces' right and responsibility for self-defense. After assignment to non-US commands, US forces will report any changes to ROE and combat identification measures for review and approval.

(b) US forces will remain under the OPCON of a MNFC only if the CCDR and higher authority determine that the multinational force ROE are consistent with the policy guidance on unit self-defense and the rules for individual self-defense contained in the current version of CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for Use of Force for US Forces* (SECRET).

(2) **Organizational Structure.** The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: integrated; lead nation; or parallel command.

(a) **Integrated Command Structure.** Multinational commands organized under an integrated command structure provide unity of effort in a multinational setting. A good example of this command structure is found in NATO where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup. The key factors in an integrated combined command are:

1. A designated single commander.
2. A staff composed of representatives from all member nations.
3. Subordinate commands and staffs integrated into the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission.

(b) **Lead Nation Command Structure.** A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The lead nation command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. A good example of the lead nation structure is Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan wherein a US-led HQ provides the overall military C2 over the two main subordinate commands: one predominately US forces; the other predominately Afghan forces.

1. A lead nation command also may be characterized by an integrated staff and multinational subordinate forces. Integrating the staff allows the commander to draw upon the expertise of allied or coalition partners in areas where the lead nation may have less experience.

2. Rotational command, a variation of lead nation command sometimes found in combined commands, allows each participating nation to be the lead nation in turn. To be effective, command tour lengths should be adjusted so that participating nations may alternate exercising the

authority of the lead nation. However, command tours should not be so short to be operationally meaningless. An example of this type command is the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan which has 12 month command tours that rotate between the participants.

(c) **Parallel Command Structures.** Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated. The coalition leadership, along with coordination at the national strategic level, must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination centers. Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if at all possible.

(3) **Use of Special Operations Forces.** SOF have an inherent capability to provide **coalition support teams** that can provide the combined/coalition JTF commander with an accurate evaluation of the capabilities, location, and activities of coalition forces. Coalition support teams have played an integral role in assisting and integrating coalition units into multinational operations. Coalition support includes assisting with a communication interface to integrate coalition partners into the command and intelligence structure, establishing liaison to coordinate for combat support and combat service support, and training coalition partners on tactics and techniques.

(4) Additionally, JTFs must consider relationships and arrangements with HNs that do not directly participate in the operation but are required to grant overflight, access, and transit to their sovereign territories. This coordination most often will occur through US embassy representatives.

For additional guidance concerning multinational C2, refer to JPs 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 3-0, Joint Operations, and 3-16, Multinational Operations.

CHAPTER V

JOINT TASK FORCE MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL

“People are the most important asset in any military operation. Thorough planning and comprehensive personnel management directly impact mission readiness.”

Joint Publication 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations

1. General

a. The JTF J-1 is principal staff assistant to the CJTF on manpower, personnel readiness, and personnel services. The J-1 also is the focal point for personnel support actions and synchronizes personnel support during all phases of an operation.

b. **Manpower and Personnel Directorate.** The J-1 has primary responsibility for manpower management; personnel augmentation; personnel accountability and strength reporting; pay and entitlements; postal operations, morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR); casualty reporting; personnel performance evaluations; and awards and decorations.

(1) In addition, the J-1 provides support and assistance to the office of primary responsibility with regard to Reserve Component (RC) call-up; stop-loss; noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) and noncombatant repatriation; PR; and detainee operations. The J-1 must be fully involved in all phases of contingency planning and crisis action planning (CAP) to support effective planning for personnel support to joint operations and collaborate with other staff directors in the preparation of the commander’s estimate and plan development. The J-1 also must coordinate with the supported combatant command J-1 for personnel planning issues.

(2) Further, the J-1 maintains a dialogue with other staff directorates, Service components, and outside military and civilian agencies while also keeping subordinate commanders informed of personnel actions that affect their command and their Service members.

For further details, refer to JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

2. Organization

a. As depicted in Figure V-1, the J-1 may be organized as shown and as described below.

b. **Joint Manpower Division** provides policy oversight on joint manpower and management of joint forces and US contributions to multinational military organizations.

c. **Personnel Readiness Division** provides plans, policy, and guidance on joint personnel issues, to include oversight of joint personnel operations. Personnel readiness plans include development of the manpower mobilization requirements for inclusion in plans and orders. Personnel readiness issues normally are addressed in the plans and operations division of a joint force J-1.




Figure V-1. Notional Joint Task Force J-1 Organization

d. **Personnel Services Division** accomplishes actions for the internal staff, DOD civilians, and military members of the JTF. It also includes limited administrative requirements related to DOD contractors deploying with the force (CDF).

3. Primary Responsibilities

Some responsibilities and functions executed by the J-1 are:

a. Manpower Management

(1) The CJTF establishes manpower requirements by completing a thorough mission analysis. The JTF J-1 facilitates the consolidation and management of the manpower requirements through the creation of a JMD for the JTF HQ. The CDR is responsible for validating the JMD.

(2) If there are insufficient resources within the combatant command to staff the JTF HQ, individual augmentation may be required.

(3) Long-standing JTFs that evolve into subcomponents of the combatant command require establishment of formal manpower documents staffed through the Joint Staff J-1 and the Services in accordance with CJCSI 1001.01, *Joint Manpower and Personnel Program*.

b. Individual Augmentation

(1) Timely coordination for individual augmentation is critical to mission execution, and is a shared responsibility of the combatant command and JTF J-1.

(2) Individual augmentation guidance can be found in CJCSI 1301.01C, *Individual Augmentation Procedures*.

(3) The supported CCDR must anticipate individual augmentation requirements and provide a validated JMD to the Joint Staff and the Service components for sourcing. Requirements must be identified, and filled, in a timely manner, to ensure operational success. Normally, the personnel requirements for the JTF HQ will reflect the forces apportioned or assigned to it.

(4) The supported CCDR distributes the JMD, along with reporting instructions, report date, and duration of augmentation to the Service components to fill. The Service components request individual augmentees based on respective Service policies and procedures. Shortfalls are identified to the supported CCDR. Unfulfilled requirements are forwarded to the Joint Staff J-1 for prioritization and sourcing.

c. Joint Personnel Training and Tracking Activities (JPTTAs). JPTTAs may be established in a supporting CCDR's AOR upon request of the supported CCDR. These centers facilitate accountability, training, processing, and onward movement of both military and DOD civilian individual augmentees preparing for overseas movement for assignment to joint or combined staff positions. When established, a JPTTA is managed by the US Joint Forces Command. DOD civilians and CDF also should be processed through a replacement center in conjunction with the JPTTA prior to deploying to the operational area. Policy and procedures governing CDF, including pre-deployment requirements and processing at deployment centers and reception center are covered in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*.

d. Joint Reception Center

(1) Establishing a JRC facilitates the reception, accountability, training, processing, and onward movement or integration of individual replacements, augmentees, DOD civilian employees, CDF, and units into the JTF.

(2) The establishment of a JRC within the JOA will be at the direction of the CJTF.

(3) For JOAs with multiple entry and exit points, the CJTF should consider establishment of satellite JRCs.

(4) A JRC should be staffed with representation from all JTF Service components to facilitate reception of JTF component personnel and provide Service specific administrative support.

(5) Normally, the JTF J-1 would have overall responsibility for managing the JRC. The J-1 will coordinate with the J-4 for billeting, transportation, food service, and other required logistic support.

(6) The JRC can provide such things as orientation, briefings (e.g., ROE and RUF, cultural concerns, safety, OPSEC, and familiarization with JTF HQ, dining areas, and other facilities), religious support, initial billeting, joint training, onward movement of units or personnel, and accountability of all personnel joining the JTF.

(7) The JRC should be planned for, and established, when the JMD is developed and distributed to the Service components and the Joint Staff.

e. Personnel Accountability and Strength Reporting

(1) The CJTF is responsible to provide an accurate personnel strength report to the supported CCDR.

(2) J-1 prepares the report by combining Service component reports into the joint personnel status and casualty report (JPERSTAT).

(3) The J-1 monitors unit strength, both current and projected, by means of daily personnel status reports from Service component commands.

(4) A JPERSTAT normally is submitted daily through or by the supported CCDR to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) via the situation report.

For more guidance on JPERSTAT format, refer to CJCSM 3150.13A, Joint Reporting Structure — Personnel Manual.

f. Tour Length

(1) The supported CCDR coordinates tour-length policies with the Service components, the Joint Staff, and the Services.

(2) The decision to establish a specific rotation policy depends on the mission, anticipated length of the operation, operational environment, personnel tempo, unique training requirements, and the availability of required skills.

(3) The nature of any operation necessitates a rotation policy that addresses both mission and individual needs. Morale and job performance will improve when individuals know when they will rotate. This is true for both individuals assigned to the joint force and those who are identified for future rotations.

(4) Tour lengths for personnel on temporary duty orders usually are limited to a maximum of 179 days.

g. Civilian Employees and Contractors (provided for the JTF J-1 awareness). The J-1 is responsible for coordinating and integrating personnel plans and procedures for civilian support to joint operations. The Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness issues

guidance on theater admission requirements for use of DOD emergency-essential civilians and CDF to support OPLANs during contingencies. The CCDRs then revise theater admission requirements for DOD civilians and CDF as required. CCDRs coordinate with DOD components to ensure theater admission requirements and other terms and conditions affecting the integration of contractor personnel into OPLANs and OPORDs are incorporated into applicable contracts. The J-1 will identify pre-deployment requirements to include proper identification cards, security clearances, training, clothing, equipping, and medical processing. For CDF, the link to the deployment is established by a government contracting officer (or designee) issued letter of authorization (LOA). The LOA is required for CDF to process through a deployment center; to travel to, from, and within the AOR; and to identify any additional authorizations, privileges, or government support that they are entitled to under the contract. The J-1 should coordinate with component personnel officers and the J-4 to ensure contract LOAs reflect CCDR requirements and that LOAs are required at all vetting points processing CDF. The J-4 monitors contract issues, including administration, and coordinates with the J-1 for any special CDF issues, including administration support. The J-1 will establish an accountability system, which includes data on civilians supporting the operation. DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*, requires the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness to designate or develop a web-based joint database as the central repository of information for all CDF personnel and contract capability information. This database will provide by-name accountability of all CDF and contain, or link to, minimum contract information necessary to establish and maintain CDF personnel accountability and visibility of contract capability in the AOR.

(1) Contractors are used increasingly by DOD in the United States for CBRNE consequence management and civil support operations.

(2) They provide important expertise in a variety of fields. Thus, there are contractor-specific support issues that need to be addressed.

(a) **Personnel Issues.** CDF personnel issues for military operations within the United States will be coordinated between the contract program manager and the JTF J-1.

(b) **Medical Issues.** In military operations within the United States, ill or injured CDFs may be provided first responder or forward resuscitative care by DOD medical assets until such time that they are transferred to a civilian medical facility for further treatment. If civilian medical facilities are unavailable due to the disaster or CBRNE incident, CDFs may be treated by DOD medical assets with reimbursement to be determined.

(c) **Logistic Issues.** For CBRNE and natural disaster operations within the United States, CDFs are an integral part of the JTF and must be able to travel with the force at a moment's notice. Therefore, CDFs' travel and lodging will be covered by letters of identification for contractor travel.

h. Pay and Entitlements

(1) The CJTF should determine, or recommend to the supported CCDR, policy concerning pay and entitlements. The JTF J-1 must be involved in this policy decision and must be in consultation with the JTF financial management and the JTF support services officer.

(2) A consistent policy should be developed to prevent inequities among personnel from the various Services. Pay and entitlement requests normally take time to enact, so an early determination of a policy will facilitate personnel receiving proper and timely pay. The JTF J-1 should address the following during the planning process:

(a) Temporary duty allowances (per diem rates); use of field conditions.

(b) Imminent danger pay, if applicable. This pay is not placed in effect until authorized by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy and is not retroactive.

(c) Hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay, if applicable.

(d) Combat zone tax exclusion benefits, if applicable.

(e) Pass program.

(f) Rest and recuperation leave, if applicable.

(g) Government civilian employees.

1. Danger pay allowances.

2. Foreign post differential.

3. Overtime, compensatory time, shift differential, and Sunday/holiday premium pay.

i. Postal Operations

(1) The supported CCDR's J-1 will coordinate the movement of mail to the JOA, normally via a designated single-Service manager. The JTF J-1 will implement postal operations in the JOA based on guidance from the supported CCDR's J-1 and single-Service manager.

(2) The JTF J-1 must develop postal policies. Below are topics for consideration.

(a) JTF postal staffing requirements.

(b) Postal restrictions and embargo procedures.

- (c) Establishment of postal infrastructure in the JOA.
- (d) Start date for mail service.
- (e) Free mail.
- (f) Any Service member mail.
- (g) Holiday mail programs.
- (h) Appointment of one of the JTF component commanders as single manager to accomplish the above functions.

j. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

(1) MWR programs are essential to combat readiness. Establishment of these programs should be predicated on the combat situation. MWR programs can be “stress relievers.”

- (a) Morale calls.
 - (b) VTC access.
 - (c) Pass program.
- (2) These programs may include:
- (a) Exchange services.
 - (b) Fitness and recreation facilities.
 - (c) Entertainment services.
 - (d) Food and beverage sales.
 - (e) Newspaper issue and sales.
 - (f) Commercial telephone access.
 - (g) Rest and recuperation programs.
 - (h) Internet cafés.

(3) The JTF J-1 has the responsibility to organize component command support; to identify temporary and permanent obstacles to MWR activities; and identify external requirements to sustain

and improve MWR operations in the JOA. The CJTF should establish equitable MWR support policies and may designate a lead agent(s) for execution.

k. Casualty Reporting

(1) While casualty reporting is a Service responsibility, the JTF J-1 ensures casualty information is reported through the chain of command to make superiors aware of status-of-forces and events that may have significant DOD or media interest.

(2) JTF casualty reporting is accomplished via event or incident reports (Operational Report 3) or JPERSTAT, depending upon the intensity of operations and numbers of casualties.

(3) The joint mortuary affairs officer (under the cognizance of the J-4) must coordinate with the J-1 to effect casualty projections for each warfighting scenario.

l. Personnel Performance Evaluations. The JTF J-1 must ensure the timely preparation and submission of performance evaluations for assigned individuals in accordance with the established guidelines of the individual Services.

m. Awards and Decorations

(1) The JTF J-1 should develop and promulgate guidance concerning awards and decorations; consistent with DOD and combatant command awards policies.

(2) The JTF J-1 also should ensure that timely recommendations and supporting information for individual, unit, and campaign awards are forwarded to the appropriate command.

4. Additional Responsibilities

The JTF J-1 also is responsible for the following:

a. Develops annex E (Personnel) to the CJTF's plans and orders.

b. Maintains a dialogue not only with the other staff sections, but with the components and outside military and civilian agencies, as well.

c. Processes requests from directorate or staff sections for nonmilitary personnel (e.g., political advisors, linguists, and interpreters).

d. Ensures that subordinate commanders are kept informed of personnel actions that will affect their commands and their Service members.

e. Coordinates and is responsible to the CJTF for liaison and repatriation planning for NEOs. The CJTF will assign staff personnel for planning and administration as required and submit total numbers of evacuees through combatant command J-1 to Joint Staff J-1. To coordinate

effective support at a safe haven, the CJTF can use the automated NEO tracking system to manage individuals during NEOs.

For details concerning NEOs, refer to JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

f. Determines procedures concerning the use of local civilian labor (coordinate with the JTF J-4, J-2, and SJA).

g. Ensures that personnel-related activities are conducted to eliminate OPSEC vulnerabilities and support military deception initiatives.

h. Determines and enforces strict procedures for maintaining records management program.

i. Ensures equal opportunity and equal employment opportunity support is provided to all personnel in the JOA.

j. Coordinates early identification of personnel requirements under a RC call-up, when appropriate.

Additional information on specific procedures and requirements concerning RC call-up can be found in JPs 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, and 4-05.1, Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Call-Up.

k. Coordinates PR activities, from a personnel perspective, with the combatant command J-1. The JTF J-1's role in PR is systematic management for casualty assistance to isolated personnel and their families. It includes accountability and reporting (DD Form 2812, "Commander's Preliminary Assessment and Recommendation Regarding Missing Person") to the combatant command J-1. As directed by the CJTF, the JTF J-1 establishes a PR procedure that coordinates the efforts of other JTF staff sections.

l. Determines the joint and multinational publication requirements for the JTF.

m. In coordination with other staff sections, estimates and reports casualty rates.

5. Personnel Planning

a. The JTF J-1 must be fully involved in planning efforts and collaborate with other staff directors in the preparation of the commander's estimate and plan development. The following are JTF J-1 personnel planning responsibilities:

(1) Participate in the JTF decision-making and planning processes from the inception.

(2) Provide membership to appropriate centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams and other organizations in support of planning and operations.

(3) Inform the CJTF and other staff sections of personnel issues that may impact on the operation. The requirement for the possible early deployment of postal personnel, linguists, interpreters, and other personnel support specialists to the JOA should not be overlooked.

(4) Develop and maintain the personnel estimate. For an example of a personnel estimate, refer to CJCSM 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policy and Procedures)*, Enclosure T, “Concept Development Formats,” Appendix B, “Personnel Estimate.”

b. The JTF J-1 also must coordinate with the supported combatant command J-1 for related personnel planning issues.

To further assist the JTF J-1 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex C, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-1,” to Appendix B, “Checklists.”

CHAPTER VI

JOINT TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE

“Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge. What is called ‘foreknowledge’ cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.”

Sun Tzu

1. General

Intelligence Directorate. The intelligence directorate’s primary function is to satisfy the commander and staff’s intelligence requirements by planning, conducting, collecting, analyzing, and disseminating reliable and timely intelligence pertinent to intentions, indications and warning, IO, targeting, assessment, and a description of the current operational environment characteristics. To ensure unity of effort, the CJTF makes certain intelligence, operations, and plans function as a cohesive team. The JTF J-2 conducts all-source, multi-discipline intelligence operations and ensures full access to an uninhibited flow of information from all sources in accordance with DOD and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) approved procedures. Within the scope of the essential elements of information, the J-2 participates in joint staff planning and in coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling intelligence efforts. The J-2 advises the JFC on what the adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, their probable intent, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. The J-2 is responsible for JIPOE. As part of the JIPOE, the J-2 is responsible for managing the analysis and development of products that provide an understanding of the adversary systems and environment. A full understanding of the operational environment typically will require cross-functional participation by other joint force staff elements and collaboration with various intelligence organizations, other interagency organizations, NGOs, IGOs, and centers of excellence.

2. Organization

a. **J-2 Organization.** Figure VI-1 depicts a notional JTF J-2 organization. The J-2’s actual size and composition will vary based on the mission, campaign scope, and unit that forms the core of the JTF. (A number of the J-2 functions may be placed under the JISE, as shown in Figure VI-4, based on the CJTF’s preference.)

b. **Joint Intelligence Support Element.** The JISE is the hub of intelligence activity in the JOA and is responsible for providing CJTF, JTF staff, and JTF components and subordinate task forces with the adversary air, space, ground, and maritime situation. Paragraph 9 of this chapter provides additional information on the JISE.

c. The JISE implements processes to integrate all intelligence functions and disciplines that enables more agile and responsive intelligence operations across the JTF in support of the CJTF’s intelligence requirements. The JISE’s approach stresses persistent awareness and local




Figure VI-1. Notional Joint Task Force J-2 Organization

precision and is characterized by net-centric and fused operations, capabilities, planning, and organizations that together yield timely, assured, survivable, and actionable intelligence.

d. Joint intelligence should be provided at all command levels once the objectives, nature, and scope of military operations have been determined by the JTF.

e. At the JTF level, production focuses on the fusion of intelligence from all sources (to include strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence) from components, the supported CCDR's JIOC and Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DJIOC) to support the JTF mission and operations. Combatant command JIOCs possess organizational processes to integrate and synchronize military, national, operational, and tactical intelligence capabilities to increase intelligence fidelity and timeliness of dissemination to warfighters, and to decrease duplication of effort by intelligence centers.

f. The combatant command JIOC is the primary intelligence organization providing intelligence to joint warfighting at all levels. The JISE is the JTF J-2's focal point for multi-disciplined, all-source analysis, fusion, collection management, and dissemination. The JISE utilizes reach-back capabilities to the combatant command JIOC and DJIOC. See paragraph 8 for more details concerning a combatant command JIOC.

g. The joint deployable intelligence support system (JDISS) is a transportable workstation and communications suite that electronically extends a combatant command JIOC to a JTF J-2. JDISS is the principal means by which intelligence flows throughout the JTF. Local area networks or Service-specific systems are merely supporting assets.

h. In a "federated approach," a JTF receives its principal intelligence support from the combatant command's JIOC, which receives information from all echelons and performs all-source analysis and production.

i. Due to the shift from traditional military-on-military centric threat to the multidimensional, nontraditional threat, joint intelligence has rapidly evolved from exclusively a “push” system (from the national level down) to an appropriately balanced “share” system, where the lower echelons request tailored intelligence support; while the higher echelons make vital intelligence available to lower echelons in a net-centric information environment. In a large part the Global War on Terrorism is a tactical-level fight supported by “federated” intelligence support architecture. Using the “share” concept, a JTF can acquire timely, relevant intelligence to thoroughly evaluate the environment and the adversary’s situation based on its mission and specific phase of the ongoing operation. With the “share” system; information, such as indications of imminent or actual threats, significant military or political events, and force movement, is available to the JTF in a timely manner. The multidimensional environment requires a “share” process at all levels – strategic, operational, and tactical.

j. Figure VI-2 highlights some of the critical intelligence responsibilities of the CJTF. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, provides a more complete list.

k. The JTF intelligence staff must understand the intelligence requirements of superior, subordinate, and Service and functional component commanders; be able to identify organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls; and access theater and national systems to ensure appropriate intelligence is provided or available to the JTF.

l. All intelligence requirements must be identified, documented, and prioritized. The prioritized requirements will be passed to the supported CCDR’s JIOC.

COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES

- **Understand Intelligence Doctrine, Capabilities, and Limitations**
- **Provide Mission Guidance and Commander's Intent**
- **Define Area of Interest**
- **Identify Commander's Critical Information Requirements to Include Priority Intelligence Requirements**
- **Ensure Intelligence is Fully Integrated in Plans and Operations**
- **Engage Intelligence Personnel in Discussions of the Adversary, Force Protection, and Future Operations**
- **Demand High Quality, Accurate, Timely, and Predictive Intelligence, and Hold Intelligence Personnel Accountable**

Figure VI-2. Commander, Joint Task Force Intelligence Responsibilities

m. The intelligence effort must be integrated. Through the means of centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams; the J-2 staff integration of intelligence representatives and liaison personnel results in complete access to intelligence and information capabilities that feed into the commander's decision-making and support mission accomplishment. This same center, group, bureau, cell, office, element, board, WG, and planning team process also allows the J-2 to gain a broader understanding of the operational environment through the efforts of other staff sections that the J-2 requires, but would not normally collect with traditional intelligence methods.

n. Biographic information and leadership analysis are integral to understanding the nature and proclivities of adversaries or potential adversaries, their method of operation, and how they interact with their environment.

o. Intelligence must be provided in a form that is readily understood and directly usable by the recipient in a timely manner without overloading the user and, at the same time, minimizing the load on communications facilities.

p. Counterintelligence (CI) activities will provide key support to both the CJTF FP mission and compartmented contingency planning. The joint force staff CI and human intelligence (HUMINT) element (J-2X) must be included in all FP planning, including IO. Subparagraph 10b (1) provides additional information on this CI/HUMINT element.

For more details concerning CI, refer to JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (SECRET).

q. All aspects of the intelligence process are dependent upon the proper implementation and enforcement of security procedures to prevent violations and compromises, and to provide valuable time-sensitive information to commanders expediently and efficiently.

For more details concerning the intelligence process, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

3. Intelligence Disciplines and Sources

a. Intelligence disciplines are well-defined areas of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. Intelligence sources are the means or systems that can be used to observe and record information relating to the condition, situation, or activities of a targeted location, organization, or individual. Intelligence sources can be people, documents, equipment, or technical sensors. Intelligence sources are grouped according to one of the seven intelligence disciplines: geospatial intelligence; HUMINT; signals intelligence; measurement and signature intelligence; open-source intelligence; technical intelligence; and CI.

b. This document focuses on JTF intelligence support.

For more details concerning intelligence doctrine, refer to the JP 2-0 series, which also provides detailed implementing methodology for joint intelligence support and operations.

4. Collection Disciplines

a. Intelligence is developed from data collected through human or technical means associated with the seven major intelligence disciplines.

b. The JTF J-2 may establish elements to:

(1) Coordinate and deconflict source operational interests between intelligence disciplines, i.e., CI and HUMINT.

(2) Use the “federated approach” to intelligence operations, which decreases duplication of effort by divergent intelligence centers; increases timeliness of dissemination and fidelity of intelligence products; and speeds resolution of PIRs for the commander.

(3) Minimize duplication of efforts between intelligence disciplines.

(4) Coordinate the transfer of assets between intelligence disciplines.

(5) Ensure proper resource application.

(6) Provide coordination and integration of intelligence and reporting efforts for the JTF.

5. Responsibilities

Each JTF J-2 organizational structure is situation dependent. At a minimum, a core element of analytical and administrative capabilities is required. J-2 responsibilities may include, but are not limited to the following:

a. Determining personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate. These requirements must be forwarded to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

b. Providing the intelligence staff, all watch teams, and supporting intelligence organizations with a clear understanding of friendly objectives, intent, plans, and the unfolding conduct of joint operations.

c. Prioritizing the intelligence requirements. This should include review of CJTF CCIRs to ensure that intelligence requirements identified by the CJTF are being processed.

d. Requesting additional intelligence capabilities through established command channels.

e. Ensuring intelligence support to and representation on all appropriate centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams. The JTF J-2 directs the overall CJTF intelligence staff, including the joint collection management board (if established at the JTF level), to incorporate the following:

- (1) Synchronizing intelligence support with CJTF planning, operations, and execution.
- (2) Determining organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls.
- (3) Developing a JTF collection plan.
- (4) Providing fused, tailored, and timely all-source intelligence to the JTF.

(5) Keeping the combatant command's JIOC director and senior subordinate commanders informed of the current intelligence situation, priorities, and requirements.

(6) Providing, as required, intelligence information and support to JTF subordinate command's intelligence staffs.

f. Monitoring movement, status, and activities of national, theater, and organic intelligence and intelligence-related assets.

g. Apprising the CJTF and JTF staff of intelligence capabilities and limitations, as well as the potential effects on operations.

h. Developing and refining the intelligence estimate.

i. Manage the JTF's JIPOE process and products.

j. Developing a systems perspective of the operational environment and identifying adversary potential centers of gravity and decisive points to support JTF planning.

k. Assisting the CJTF to:

- (1) Develop and refine the estimate of the situation.
- (2) Identify relevant and attainable objectives.
- (3) Identify deception and other IO objectives.

(4) Draft and prepare PIRs from the JTF's mission, commander's estimate, operation phases' requirements, and objectives for the CJTF's approval.

l. Ensuring intelligence support to targeting is performed, i.e., analyzing the enemy and the situation and identifying and nominating to the CJTF those critical enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited by operations to attain the commander's intent and objectives.

m. Providing appropriate targeting intelligence support, including target intelligence packages, to the CJTF, joint targeting coordination board (JTCB), and component commanders.

n. Identify liaison, coordination, and communications requirements with higher, adjacent, and subordinate intelligence organizations.

o. Validating intelligence information requirements of subordinate and supporting commands.

p. Determining security requirements for intelligence information.

q. Planning for CI, to include:

(1) Providing multidisciplinary CI threat assessments.

(2) Coordinating CI plans and operations.

(3) Ensuring tailored CI or counterterrorism support to JTF FP programs.

r. Developing the JTF intelligence concept of the operation to include the following:

(1) Identifying potentially useful intelligence-related systems and personnel.

(2) Spelling out tasking authorities and reporting responsibilities.

(3) Documenting clear procedures for:

(a) Developing intelligence for subordinate commands and forces.

(b) Obtaining intelligence from combatant command JIOC and DJIOC, as appropriate.

(c) Obtaining geospatial information support and services, including digital products and services.

(d) Obtaining intelligence-related communications support.

(e) Identifying and maintaining continuity of minimum-essential support if communications are severely stressed or temporarily lost.

(f) Identifying JTF requirements for intelligence-related centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, planning teams, and other teams. See paragraph 7 for more details concerning a NIST.

s. Developing annex B (Intelligence) and annex M (Geospatial Information and Services), and provide input to appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) to the CJTF OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

t. Appointing a RFI manager to accomplish RFI responsibilities.

Additional JTF J-2 responsibilities can be found in JPs 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, and 3-60, Joint Targeting.

6. Multinational Intelligence Operations

a. Collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence in a multinational environment are major challenges, depending on an appropriate level of existing international standardization agreements or ad hoc arrangements to operate and communicate between elements. Figure VI-3 depicts considerations for developing intelligence organizations and procedures for multinational operations.

b. Intelligence sharing procedures between multinational partners should be agreed upon early in the planning process. **The JTF J-2 should have personnel knowledgeable in foreign disclosure policy and procedures and should obtain necessary foreign disclosure authorization from the DIA (through the CCDR) as soon as possible.** Multinational commands still may operate separate national intelligence systems in support of their own policy and military forces.



Figure VI-3. Considerations for Multinational Intelligence Support

c. The capability of components from various nations to communicate with each other, the degree of experience in working together, and the level of standardization of equipment, supplies, and operational procedures all impact on the effectiveness of multinational operations.

d. Intelligence used in multinational operations must be written simply, formatted clearly, and be classified properly to ensure its releasability to all operational forces involved — write for release.

e. Sharing and mutual support are essential to integrating all resources and capabilities into a unified system that best fulfills the prioritized intelligence needs for joint operations.

f. Considerations applicable to establishing JTF intelligence support for multinational operations include the following:

(1) **Providing to the supported CCDR details on JTF multinational intelligence architecture, organization, collection, and dissemination plans.**

(2) **Adjusting for national differences.** The JTF J-2 should be flexible enough to adjust to multinational concepts for intelligence support to make multinational action effective. For example, a single director of intelligence should be designated in the JOA.

(3) **Striving for unity of effort with a common mission.** The mission should be viewed from a national as well as a multinational perspective; a threat to one element of the force by a common adversary should be considered a threat to all members.

(4) **Determining and planning for multinational intelligence.** When possible, multinational intelligence requirements should be agreed upon, planned, and exercised in advance of the operation.

(5) **Seeking full exchange of intelligence.** When possible, intelligence sources and methods should be shared to the maximum extent possible within the limitations established by law, statutes, regulations, and published guidance.

(6) **Planning complementary intelligence operations.** Strengths can be enhanced and weaknesses overcome when multinational intelligence resources and capabilities are applied against the entire operation.

(7) **Establishing a multinational intelligence center.** This center should include representatives from all participating nations but does not replace the US only intelligence organization.

(8) Exchanging liaison personnel to eliminate potential problems between cultures, languages, doctrines, and operational intelligence requirements.

(9) Providing sanitized intelligence, in accordance with established guidance, to multinational forces as necessary.

(10) Forwarding RFIs from the multinational partners to the supporting JISE.

(11) Analyzing cultural information and considerations are of critical importance in dealing with both the multinational force and the adversary. Knowledge of cultural influences is vital in avoiding misunderstandings and improving overall operations effectiveness.

(12) Prioritizing, coordinating, and disseminating collection requirements to and from subordinate and multinational commands.

See JPs 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and 3-16, Multinational Operations, for more details on intelligence support for multinational operations.

7. National Intelligence Support Team

The combatant command JIOC will facilitate national-theater dialogue with the DJIOC to identify and provide NIST capabilities that leverage national-level, all-source intelligence support from throughout the intelligence community (IC) to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations. The NIST utilizes liaison teams from NSA, NGA, DIA, and Central Intelligence Agency, and incorporates other IC participants as required based on the needs of the CCCR and CJTF. It supports intelligence operations at the JTF HQ and is traditionally collocated with the JTF J-2. In direct support of the JTF, the NIST will perform functions as designated by the JTF J-2.

For more details concerning a NIST, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

8. Supported Combatant Commander's Joint Intelligence Operations Center

a. The combatant command JIOC fuses national-level, operational-level, and tactical-level intelligence, and acts as the CCCR's intelligence support mechanism to deployed JTFs, as required.

b. It is the focal point for in-theater intelligence analysis, production, dissemination, support to operation planning, and RFI processing and validation.

c. The combatant command JIOC support to JTF operations includes, but is not limited to, providing a complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation by integrating all intelligence information.

d. While in reality, a particular combatant command JIOC may not be able to satisfy every JTF RFI, it will coordinate support from other intelligence organizations above and below its echelon for those, it is unable to fulfill.

9. Joint Intelligence Support Element

a. The JISE integrates intelligence operations with operational and planning functions and performs common intelligence functions. Figure VI-4 shows a notional JISE. As shown, the JISE is the principal J-2 organization integrating with joint operations and plans.

b. By design, the JISE is scalable to meet the needs of the JTF and it is tailored to fit the operational environment based on identified CJTF requirements.

c. The JISE is composed of analytical experts and analysis teams that provide services and products required by the CJTF, JTF staff, and components. These all-discipline and all-warfare specialty analysis teams should be focused on substantive operational intelligence problems. Analysis teams should take into account pertinent information from all sources; a JISE capability for all-source analysis is the key to operational intelligence that is timely, relevant, and complete.

d. Analytical efforts of the JISE must be integrated with operations and planning elements, with responsibility for helping the CJTF to better understand how the adversary thinks (e.g., how an adversary will conceptualize the situation, what options an adversary will consider, and how an adversary will react to the JTF actions).

(1) When the JTF staff is engaged in planning operations, the JISE will integrate its efforts with the planning and operations elements by:

- (a) Identifying and nominating attainable military objectives.




Figure VI-4. Notional Joint Intelligence Support Element

- (b) Orienting planners to the situation (mission analysis).
 - (c) Providing situational updates during planning.
 - (d) Developing a system perspective of the operational environment.
 - (e) Identifying adversary centers of gravity, decisive points, critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.
 - (f) Identifying adversary COAs including which is most likely and which is most dangerous (COA development).
 - (g) Identifying intelligence capabilities and shortfalls that affect the development of COAs (COA development).
 - (h) Participating in COA analysis wargaming by representing adversary COAs.
 - (i) Conducting J-2 COA comparison.
 - (j) Identifying PIRs.
 - (k) Identifying time-phased force and deployment list requirements.
 - (l) Identifying and nominating deception and other IO objectives that will help attain military objectives.
 - (m) Performing the intelligence function of targeting, i.e., analyzing the enemy and the situation, and identifying and nominating to the CJTF those critical enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited by direct military operations to attain the commander's intent and objectives.
- (2) When the CJTF and subordinate commanders are engaged in conducting operations, the JISE will integrate its efforts with plans and operations by:
- (a) Coordinating with JTF J-3 watch teams and collection managers, managing all forms of reconnaissance and surveillance of the adversary that are necessary for understanding the situation, identifying objectives and opportune targets, and providing warning to forces.
 - (b) Preparing estimates of adversary C2, logistics, ground, air, space, air defense, maritime force and information capabilities, and intentions.
 - (c) Assessing the effectiveness of operations (to delay, disrupt, debilitate, destroy, dissuade, or coerce) on adversary capabilities and intentions.
- e. In addition, the JISE also may be used to manage intelligence resources and efforts and to coordinate application of senior, subordinate, and supporting commands' intelligence activities.

10. Intelligence Centers and Other Support

a. While not all of the organizations listed below may be required, each should be evaluated based on projected operations.

b. The following may be established or requested by the CJTF in addition to the JISE.

(1) Joint CI/HUMINT Support Element

(a) During joint operations, CI and HUMINT capabilities complement each other and work in partnership under the J-2X to provide JTF intelligence and FP. In concert with the mission, a J-2X may be established in joint force structures at every level across the range of military operations. In addition, individual Service or tactical components often may establish their own “2Xs” to manage internal CI and HUMINT functions, which interact with the J-2X. The J-2X reports to the JTF J-2.

(b) Planning and coordination for early engagement of CI and HUMINT collection and CI operations are essential to military operations and respective capabilities may take months or years to develop. It is important to initiate these operations, to the maximum extent possible, before the outbreak of a crisis. As soon as a JTF is established, a J-2X should be appointed by the CJTF, and immediately begin to integrate CI and HUMINT support into planning and operations efforts in the JOA.

(c) The basic J-2X structure includes the following four elements: a J-2X, a task force counterintelligence coordinating authority (TFCICA), a human intelligence operations cell (HOC), and an operations support element.

(d) Service components could be tasked to provide LNOs to augment the J-2X, HOC, and other joint HUMINT centers to facilitate the flow of their Service collection requirements and responses to the customer.

For more details concerning J-2X, refer to JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (SECRET).

(2) Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC)

(a) A JCMEC is formed from elements of the DIA Foreign Material Program and the Services’ technical intelligence organizations and explosive ordnance disposal personnel.

(b) It is activated during periods of hostilities and assists in management of recovery, exploitation, and disposal of captured enemy equipment. This type of equipment can provide critical information on adversary strengths and weaknesses that may favorably influence operational planning.

(c) A scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) LNO should be included in the JISE. A S&TI LNO evaluates the need for a JCMEC, or coordinates with an existing one. Since the JCMEC is formed and operated by DIA, it may operate with little JTF support. S&TI LNOs bridge the communication gaps that might arise.

(d) The JISE should notify the CJTF for JCMEC support and inform the combatant command JIOC. The combatant command JIOC will source and allocate any support as required.

(3) Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC)

(a) A JIDC conducts follow-on exploitation of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) or detainees. EPWs or detainees are screened and those of further intelligence potential are identified and forwarded to the JIDC for follow-on interrogation and debriefing in support of JTF and higher requirements. Besides EPWs or detainees, the JIDC also may debrief civilian detainees or internees, refugees, displaced persons, legal travelers, and other non-prisoner sources.

(b) The J-2X HOC manages JIDC activities. The HOC will coordinate with the TFCICA for CI augmentation for exploitation of those personnel of CI interest, such as civil or military leaders, intelligence and political officers, and terrorists. Appendix 5 (Human-Resource Intelligence) of annex B (Intelligence) to an operation plan or order contains JIDC planning considerations.

(4) Joint Document Exploitation Center (JDEC)

(a) A JDEC collects and exploits captured material (to include documents, electronic media — computer files, video) to obtain intelligence. Material exploitation can obtain information on a great range of topics, such as information on adversary intentions and planning (including deception), locations, dispositions, tactics, communications, logistics, and morale as well as a wealth of information for long-term exploitation.

(b) Coupled with other intelligence sources, document exploitation provides the CJTF (through the J-2) with a more complete picture of an unfolding operation and enemy capabilities.

(c) The JDEC is activated during periods of hostilities, deployed to the combatant command JIOC or assigned to the JTF to manage the recovery, exploitation, automated processing, and disposal of captured adversary documents. The JDEC may be collocated with the JIDC or the JCMEC to capitalize on the common use of translators and linguists.

NOTE

The JCMEC and JDEC conduct exploitation in the JOA, but their functions are not limited solely to combat operations. Both peace operations and refugee relief, for example, could require confiscating weapons and

contraband; refugee relief could also require screening refugees for critical information. Cosmetic name changes of these centers in such scenarios may be required.

(d) The JTF J-2 should notify the CJTF that the JTF requires JDEC support and inform the combatant command JIOC director. The combatant command JIOC director will source and allocate any support as required.

c. National Intelligence Support

(1) Combatant command JIOCs and the DJIOC leverage national intelligence assets and determine requirements through DNI and representatives detailed to combatant commands. JIOCs coordinate issues affecting DOD and national intelligence with the senior DNI representative, the appropriate defense intelligence combat support agency representative, senior IC representatives, and the DJIOC. DJIOC and combat support agencies representatives are given, and provide, broad access to information affecting JIOC intelligence operational planning and execution, consistent with applicable security policies. The DNI has authorized DNI representatives detailed to the DJIOC to levy requirements against national collection assets when national security and urgency dictate. DNI representatives to the DJIOC also recommend advisory tasking consistent with national priorities.

(2) **Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center.** The Director, DIA serves as the Director, DJIOC and reports to the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS. As the lead DOD intelligence organization for coordinating intelligence support to meet combatant command requirements, DJIOC coordinates and prioritizes military intelligence requirements across the combatant commands, combat support agencies, RC, and Service intelligence centers. The DJIOC formulates recommended solutions to de-conflict requirements for national intelligence with joint force component command for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and DNI representatives to ensure an integrated response to combatant command needs. The DJIOC also provides support to USSTRATCOM as requested.

(3) Combat support and defense agency (DIA, NGA, NSA, National Reconnaissance Office, Counterintelligence Field Activity, Defense Security Service) personnel or resources are assigned or attached to the DJIOC and combatant command JIOC.

(4) All detailed supporting agency, non law-enforcement CI, security countermeasure, and defense HUMINT elements are in a direct support role for mission accomplishment. All supporting elements not specifically assigned (to include attached forces) are in general support and shall accept and respond to combatant command JIOC requirements, consistent with national intelligence priorities.

To further assist the JTF J-2 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex D, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-2,” to Appendix B, “Checklists.”

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CHAPTER VII

JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATIONS

“Defeating adaptive adversaries requires flexible, modular and deployable joint forces with the ability to combine the strengths of individual Services, combatant commands, other government agencies and multinational partners. Joint forces will require new levels of interoperability and systems that are ‘born joint,’ i.e., conceptualized and designed with joint architectures and acquisition strategies. This level of interoperability ensures that technical, doctrinal and cultural barriers do not limit the ability of joint commanders to achieve objectives.”

**The National Military Strategy of the
United States of America 2004**

1. General

Operations Directorate. The J-3 assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the **direction and control of operations**, beginning with planning and through completion of specific operations. In this capacity, the J-3 **plans, coordinates, and integrates** operations. The flexibility and range of modern forces require close coordination and integration for effective unified action.

2. Responsibilities

The J-3 (and deputy) responsibilities include but are not limited to the following:

- a. Determine personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate. Forward these requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.
- b. Serve as principal advisor to the CJTF on operational matters for assigned, attached, and supporting forces within the JOA.
- c. Assist the CJTF in the direction and control of operations.
- d. Plan, coordinate, and integrate military operations.
- e. Monitor current operational status of friendly forces and conduct current operations planning.
- f. Recommend JTF organizations.
- g. Recommend and publish plans and orders.
- h. Assess operations for CJTF.

- i. Request modification of assigned JOA.
- j. Develop guidance and tasks as requirements for components.
- k. Identify the requirement for additional combat forces.
- l. Plan and execute CMO and civil affairs operations (CAO), as required. Associated with these types of operations, the J-3 also may be responsible for the planning, integrating, and conducting stability operations.
- m. Formulate requests to higher HQ for the use of lethal and nonlethal weapons not under the JTF control.
- n. Manage the JTF's assessment process.
- o. Disseminate the results of operational planning, assessment, and coordination.
- p. Train joint forces.
- q. Supervise meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) support.
- r. Recommend a joint or multinational force organization.
- s. Establish interface with the interagency, multinational agencies, NGOs, IGOs, and other organizations to synchronize JTF efforts with these organizations.
- t. Initiate requests for operations to be conducted outside the assigned JOA.
- u. Plan, coordinate, monitor, and integrate joint air operations and coordinate and integrate the use of airspace, and joint air defense in the JOA, when the CJTF does not designate a JFACC, airspace control authority, or area air defense commander.
- v. Establish a joint personnel recovery center (JPRC) within the JOC to plan for, execute and monitor PR within the JOA, unless the CJTF designates a subordinate component commander as the supported commander for PR.
- w. Prepare the operations estimate and other planning products and prepare annex C (Operations) of plans and orders. This also may include preparing the CMO estimate and annex G (Civil Affairs) if there is not a separate CMO directorate.
- x. Conduct analysis and coordination of future operations during the execution phase.
- y. Serve as the single point of contact for the operations aspects of IO.
- z. Develop the protection estimate in support of planning activities.

aa. Organize the functional aspects of the JTF HQ to include establishing and directing the JOC.

bb. Establish and organize functional related joint centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams.

3. Organization

a. Figure VII-1 depicts a notional JTF J-3 organization to support the accomplishment of the above responsibilities. It reflects both the traditional staff structure and the functional staff elements organized in centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams associated with the execution of operations. The actual J-3 composition will be dictated by the overall JTF organization and operations to be conducted.

b. **The J-3 (and deputy).** Serve as principal advisor to the CJTF on operational matters.

c. **Administrative Section.** Supports the J-3 section in maintaining J-3 correspondence, file maintenance, and general administrative support.

d. The **Current Operations** functions, to include; the air, land, maritime, space, and special operations aspects, normally are performed by the JOC.

e. **Joint Operations Center**

(1) The CJTF should establish a JOC to serve as a focal point for all operational matters and, in the absence of a JISE, intelligence matters. The JOC is led by the chief of operations.

(2) The JOC should be staffed and equipped to manage friendly and adversary information; maintain the tactical situation and status-of-forces; make recommendations; and promulgate CJTF orders in the execution of current operations. The JOC monitors, assesses, and plans ongoing operations to allow effective modifications to exploit success or to avoid failure. The JOC also tracks CCIRs and makes recommendations to the CJTF on decisions required.

(3) Early JOC establishment may assist in the flow of information, since it provides a centralized point for the handling, tracking, and recording of information. The JOC (or current operations cell) establishes a formal process to communicate and gain guidance from the CJTF through the battle update assessment brief.

(4) The JOC should be organized to perform and interface with each of the basic JTF HQ functions to support the commander's decision cycle (see Figure IV-1) described in Chapter IV, "Joint Task Force Command and Control." The related functions are described below:




Figure VII-1. Notional Joint Task Force J-3 Organization

(a) **Monitor**

1. Monitors the current status of assigned or attached forces and resources and provides information to aid in allocating and moving forces and materiel.

2. Monitors the ongoing situation of JTF forces and continuously reviews their progress in relationship to the current plan being executed.

(b) **Assess**

1. Monitors the implementation of OPORDs to ensure that CJTF's objectives are being met. Based on this assessment, the JOC leadership determines whether the plan needs to be adjusted (resources applied or adjusted) within the JOC's planning horizon. If the window is beyond this horizon or it is a complex planning problem, it is referred to future operations for action.

2. Evaluates actions to identify operational deficiencies and develops methods to improve joint effectiveness.

(c) **Plan.** The JOC assists in the preparation of current operation plans and orders. The JOC also must have the capability to conduct planning within its event horizon; this requires the staff expertise to quickly develop plans with minimal interaction with the rest of the JTF staff.

(d) **Direct.** Facilitates CJTF direction to JTF component commanders and takes other necessary actions within the authority delegated to the JOC by the CJTF. During current operations this requires the drafting, gaining approval for, and issuing of fragmentary orders.

(5) The JOC executes these functions with a current operations element and an information management element.

(a) The **current operations** element is staffed by J-3 air, land, maritime, and special operations watch officers. This group is responsible for: monitoring situational awareness of the operational environment; maintaining operational status; assessing the impact of current operations on future plans and operations; and preparing and transmitting orders and reports. Assisting the J-3 watch officers are a cadre of watch officers from other JTF staff sections and various cells and centers within the JTF staff as well as JTF component LNOs. In addition, functional LNOs provide information and expertise to the current operations section and in the case of component LNOs represent their respective commander's interests at the JTF level.

(b) The **JOC information management element** support includes:

1. RFI management and processing.

2. Display of JOC information to include CCIRs, execution and synchronization matrixes, and significant events displays.

3. Common operational picture (COP) management.

4. Compilation and presentation of briefings.

5. Transmission, receipt, and tracking of message traffic.

f. **Future Operations.** The future operations staff is the core set of J-3 planners that forms the nucleus of the planning teams focused on the near-term planning requirements. As Chapter IX, “Joint Task Force Plans and Policy,” states, they conduct planning through the operational planning process. Based on the complexity of the planning problem and the time available, future operations planning teams interact with elements both internal to the staff (e.g., WGs, cells) and external to the staff (other HQ and agencies). **As the planning teams move through the operational planning process, they ultimately gain guidance, intent, or decision through designated decision boards.**

g. **Training and Exercises.** The CJTF is responsible to the establishing authority for the conduct of JTF training. Within the JTF, the J-3 training and exercise branch is responsible for JTF training development and coordination. A joint training program should be established to include all JTF elements. The following are potential training areas for the joint force:

(1) Individual military skills. Although this type of training normally takes place during predeployment training, there still may be requirements for this type of training during deployments. The J-3 training and exercise branch may be responsible for providing training facilities (e.g., range facilities), coordinating component training schedules for the use of these facilities, and ensuring components are training to the CJTF’s guidance and direction. Additionally, JTF HQ personnel also must maintain their individual skills.

(2) Unit training and rehearsals.

(3) JTF staff section training.

(4) Operational area situational awareness.

(5) Media training.

h. **Joint Fires Element.** The CJTF normally forms a JFE. The JFE is an optional staff element comprised of representatives from the JTF J-3, the components, and other JTF staff elements, to include the J-2 targeting staff, the J-5 plans directorate, among others. The JFE is an integrating staff element that synchronizes and coordinates fires and effects planning and coordination on behalf of the CJTF. The JFE also assists the J-3 in accomplishing responsibilities and tasks as a staff advisor to the J-3 and may include any and all of the J-3 tasks with the CJTF’s approval.

For further details concerning the JFE and related matter, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

i. Joint Targeting Coordination Board

(1) The CJTF should establish a JTCB to provide a review and approval mechanism for targeting. The JTCB ensures that targeting efforts are consistent with the CJTF's CONOPS and the law of armed conflict.

(a) The CJTF defines the role of the JTCB and appoints its director. The DCJTF generally chairs the JTCB.

(b) The CJTF may delegate responsibility for running the JTCB to a subordinate component.

(2) The JTCB is composed of representatives from the staff, components (Service and functional), and others as required. The JTCB provides a forum in which all components can articulate strategies and priorities for future operations to ensure that they are synchronized and integrated.

(a) The JTCB normally facilitates and coordinates joint force targeting activities with the components' schemes of maneuver to ensure that the CJTF's priorities are met.

(b) Specific targeting issues are resolved below the level of the JTCB, by direct coordination between elements of the JTF, but the JTCB or CJTF staff may address specific target issues not previously resolved. The JTCB normally submits the coordinated draft joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) for CJTF approval.

(3) JTCB products may include approval of recommended modifications to targeting strategy, guidance and priorities, summaries of effectiveness assessments, and approval of the JIPTL, joint target list, restricted target list, and no-strike list.

(4) The JTCB is conducted daily or as required.

For further details concerning the JTCB and related subject matter, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

j. Information Operations. IO are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, PSYOP, military deception, and OPSEC, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own. JTF IO staff coordinates and synchronizes capabilities to accomplish CJTF objectives. Uncoordinated IO can compromise, complicate, negate, or harm other JTF military operations, as well as other USG information activities. CJTFs must ensure IO planners are fully integrated into the planning and targeting process, assigning them to the JTCB to ensure full integration with all other planning and execution efforts. Successful execution of an information strategy

also requires early detailed JTF IO staff planning, coordination, and deconfliction with USG interagency efforts to effectively synergize and integrate IO capabilities.

(1) **IO Staff.** The J-3 normally designates an IO cell chief to assist in executing joint IO responsibilities. The primary function of the IO cell chief is to ensure that IO are integrated and synchronized in all planning processes of the JTF staff and IO aspects of such processes are coordinated with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and multinational staffs. The IO cell chief is normally responsible for functions depicted in JP 3-13, *Information Operations*. During the execution of an operation, IO planners shall be available to the JOC or its equivalent to assist in integration, deconfliction, support, or adjustment of IO activities as necessary.

(2) **IO Cell.** The IO cell integrates and synchronizes the core capabilities of IO with IO-supporting and related capabilities and may be integrated as part of the staff's JPG or equivalent organization. The organizational relationships between the joint IO cell and the organizations that support the IO cell are per CJTF guidance. These supporting organizations provide guidance on the employment of their respective capabilities and activities. The specific duties and responsibilities of representatives from these supporting organizations should be established between the IO cell chief and the senior representative of each supporting organization. The CJTF should tailor the composition of the cell as necessary to accomplish the mission. Capability, staff function, and organizational representation on the IO cell also may include personnel identified in the information operations working group (IOWG).

(a) **The Information Operations Working Group.** This WG provides the support to planning and assessment from the core, supporting, and related IO capabilities. As such, the representation within this group includes not only the core IO staff, but other staff directorates and special staff to include PA, CMO/CA, engineers, SJA, intelligence, assessment, and planning.

(b) The agenda for this meeting should address both functional updates by the core, supporting, and related IO capabilities and support to the ongoing planning efforts. The output of this discussion is a coordinated staff estimate for the JPG and operational planning teams as appropriate. Additionally, the group provides input to the assessment process by synthesizing representative data for the task and assessment data for the assessment cell. In some cases, the IOWG is given the broader tasking of coordinating all staff informational capabilities listed above (IO, PA, CMO/CA, DSPD) and this group is renamed a communications strategy WG. See JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, for details concerning DSPD.

For further details concerning IO, refer to CJCSI 3210.01A, Joint Information Operations Policy, (SECRET) and JP 3-13, Information Operations.

k. **Force Protection Element.** The FP element is responsible for providing analysis and recommendations to the staff concerning risks to the mission, FP measures, vulnerability assessments, resource allocation as well as any other products required by the CJTF and staff. The FP section consists of the JTF FP officer and should contain personnel that have backgrounds

in operations, planning, security and counterterrorism operations, and any other expertise required depending on the mission of the JTF. The FP element forms the nucleus of the protection WG.

1. The Protection Working Group

(1) This group is chaired by the JTF FP officer, and meets as required to review and discuss protection issues raised by the CJTF, staff, planning teams, and the JTF’s major subordinate commands. Figure VII-2 depicts the members, purpose, inputs, and products of the protection WG. Each principal staff section should be represented and provides an accurate intelligence, operations, and logistic assessment. The staff sections in black represent the recommended standing membership of the protection WG. The personnel represented in red may attend this WG depending on the discussion issues.




Figure VII-2. Protection Working Group

(2) The purpose of the protection WG is to be the commander's primary body for handling protection issues. Some of the specific tasks the protection WG should accomplish are to:

(a) Provide detailed staff estimates to planning teams to assist with the development of plans and orders.

(b) Develop recommended risks to the mission.

(c) Recommend allocation of resources to mitigate risks.

(d) Monitor and disseminate protection information throughout the JTF (threat levels and threat warnings).

(e) Conduct protection vulnerability assessments to assist major subordinate commands with development of FP plans.

(3) Some of the products the protection WG should produce are:

(a) Detailed staff estimates and analysis to planning teams to allow planners the ability to produce OPORDs.

(b) Annexes and appendices to plans and orders.

(c) Protection matrixes to assist the staff with risk and threat management.

For more details concerning protection and FP, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

m. **Meteorological and Oceanographic Cell.** The JTF J-3 should appoint a joint METOC officer to oversee and coordinate joint force, functional component, and Service component METOC operations. The J-3 will determine if there is a requirement for a joint METOC forecast unit.

(1) Meteorological support for JTF operations requires METOC and space weather organization compatible with the JTF command structure.

(2) Early identification of all JTF elements specific atmospheric, ocean, land, and space weather support requirements is needed to ensure availability of necessary METOC information.

(3) US Navy and US Air Force strategic, operational, and tactical METOC units support JTF operations via reach-back using secure and non-secure common-user networks. METOC units provide JTF planners and warfighters with high-resolution meteorological satellite imagery and fine-scale, highly accurate, mission-focused forecast products. The basic information is supplemented by weather data collected from indigenous sources and observation data furnished by JTF elements.

For further details concerning METOC, see JP 3-59, Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support.

n. Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations

(1) Based on CJTF direction, the J-3 may have responsibility for the planning and execution of CMO and CAO.

(2) The organization of the civil-military section consists of a civil-military officer and personnel who assess and advise the CJTF and staff on the CMO that; maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment; provide essential government and social services; provide emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Depending on the significance of CMO or CAO, a CMO WG may be formed to coordinate CMO throughout the JTF staff. The CMO or CAO tasks also may be delegated to a JTF component.

For further details concerning CMO and CAO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

o. Joint Personnel Recovery Center

(1) The CJTF should establish a JPRC or its functional equivalent in the earliest stages of establishing a JTF. A JPRC may be established by the CJTF under the cognizance of the JTF staff (usually the J-3), or the CJTF may assign the responsibility to one of the component commanders. The JPRC coordinates with and assists, as necessary, the separately-organized component personnel recovery coordination cells during an isolating event.

(2) The JPRC should be augmented with appropriate representatives from the other JTF components.

(3) The JPRC coordinates with the unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell through the joint force SO component command or the JSOTF operations center for SOF non-conventional assisted recovery and unconventional assisted recovery operations.

(4) Multiple JPRCs may be necessary when there are multiple JTFs in an operational area or when the geographic size of an operational area requires additional nodes.

(5) Specific JTF guidance for personnel recovery will be in appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery [PR] Operations) to annex C (Operations) of the CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

For further details concerning PR, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

p. Rules of Engagement Working Group/Rules for the Use of Force Working Group. The JTF J-3 usually is responsible for the development of ROE or RUF in the planning process. The ROE WG/RUF WG provides a formal planning structure through which the J-3 can effectively perform

this responsibility. The ROE/RUF planning process requires timely and extensive intra-staff coordination and planning (usually between the J-2, J-3, J-5, and SJA). The starting point for mission-specific ROE/RUF is the SROE/SRUF, which may be modified with approved supplemental ROE/RUF. For details on ROE and RUF, refer to Chapter IV, “Joint Task Force Command and Control.” ROE and RUF are not static, however. They are tailored to the individual mission and threat environment and must remain responsive to changes in either. ROE or RUF planning process does not end when the OPLAN or OPORD is approved. The ROE WG/RUF WG should track and review the ROE or RUF and respond according to threat or mission changes. It also is the responsibility of the ROE or RUF WG to ensure that core SROE or SRUF training concepts from the Service and functional component forces are integrated into the ROE or RUF development process and that subsequent training on the approved mission-specific ROE or RUF build upon that core training base. The ROE WG/RUF WG ensures early ROE or RUF development. Key points regarding these WGs are as follows:

(1) At a minimum, J-2, J-3, J-5, and SJA representatives attend these WGs (other participation may vary according to the mission).

(2) The initial focus of effort by these groups is in support of the overall planning effort by the J-5 or JPG.

(3) Develop ROE or RUF early in the planning process (before or during COA development).

(4) Consideration of ROE or RUF issues is critical to the COA analysis process. Prepare for wargaming of COAs in the same manner as an opposition force cell by predicting probable ROE or RUF impact on operation planning and by discussing political and military aspects of the mission statement and forecasting probable ROE or RUF restrictions and allowances for use of force. Proposed ROE or RUF must be modified as necessary to support the mission objectives accomplishment.

(5) Gather threat indicators and decision points during COA development that will become the basis for drafting, requesting, or issuing mission-specific ROE or RUF.

(6) Draft mission-specific ROE or RUF (OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan appendix 6, (Rules of Engagement) to annex C, (Operations).

(7) Develop or review for uniformity and compliance with the ROE or RUF the tools for training, tracking, or interpreting these rules.

(a) Use ROE or RUF pocket cards at the unit level for training.

(b) Post the current ROE or RUF in force to the appropriate Web pages or portals.

(c) Develop ROE or RUF situation vignettes for use in training.

(8) Oversee ROE or RUF dissemination and training.

(9) React to component requests for mission-specific ROE or RUF.

(10) Generate mission-specific ROE or RUF requests based on the changing threat or mission.

(11) Assist the SJA and JTF J-3 in interpreting SROE or SRUF and existing ROE or RUF for the CJTF, JTF staff, and Service and functional component commanders.

(12) Participate in other centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams where ROE or RUF expertise is required. An example is the protection WG.

q. **Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC).** An EHCC may be established to predict, track, distribute information about, and mitigate explosive hazards within the JOA. The EHCC should establish and maintain an explosive hazards database, conduct pattern analysis, investigate mine and improvised explosive device strikes, and track unexploded explosive ordnance hazard areas. The cell provides technical advice on the mitigation of explosive hazards, including the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures, and provides training updates to field units. The EHCC coordinates explosive hazard teams.

For more information about the EHCC, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

r. **Joint Security Coordination Center (JSCC).** A CJTF may establish a JSCC using the designated joint security coordinator and representatives from the components in the operational area. Component and staff representation will vary based on the mission, forces, and threat and should support the planning, coordination, and execution of all joint security related operations especially those conducted in the designated JSA.

For more details concerning joint security operations, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

To further assist the JTF J-3 and staff in accomplish their tasks, refer to Annex E, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-3,” to Appendix B, “Checklists.”

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CHAPTER VIII

JOINT TASK FORCE LOGISTICS

“Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point.”

Jomini,
Précis de l' Art de la Guerre, 1838

1. General

a. **Logistics Directorate.** The J-4 is charged with the **formulation of logistic plans** and with the **coordination and supervision** of supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and other services to include mortuary affairs and related logistic activities. Given the functional role of this directorate and the Service responsibilities for support to their respective JTF components, consideration should be given to the established policies and procedures of the various Military Departments. The J-4 is responsible for **advising the CJTF of the logistic support** that can be provided for proposed COAs and approved CONOPS. In general, the J-4 formulates policies for the CJTF's approval to ensure **effective logistic support** for all forces in the command and **coordinates execution** of the CJTF's logistic policies and guidance.

b. Logistics should be based on requirements and established priorities.

c. **Logistics provide the foundation of combat power.** Logistics encompass the process of planning and executing, deployment, movement and sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of forces in the execution of plans and orders supporting the national security policy.

d. Joint logistics should use existing individual Service policies and procedures whenever possible. If this is not possible, the differences should be identified to the supported CCDR as early as possible for resolution.

e. Sharing logistic resources among field forces should be considered when operating in a multinational environment. Political, legal, and fiscal concerns must be identified and addressed prior to providing support.

2. Authority

a. Title 10 United States Code empowers the geographic CCDR to exercise COCOM, over assigned forces. Inherent in COCOM is directive authority for logistics (DAFL), which is the CCDR's authority to “issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved OPLANs.”

b. Although DAFL is a logistic authority of COCOM, and thus only applies to assigned forces, under crisis or wartime conditions, the CCDR may use the facilities and supplies of all forces, assigned or attached, necessary to accomplish the missions.

(1) Transfer of OPCON does not include DAFL.

(2) When forces are transferred or attached OPCON from one CCDR to another, DAFL does not transfer unless specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense. Granting of such authority usually is addressed in the execute order or other directives that transfers forces.

c. DAFL cannot be delegated to a subordinate commander.

d. A CCDR always retains DAFL but may delegate directive authority for a common support capability to the CJTF within the JOA. The CCDR may delegate directive authority for as many common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC as required to accomplish the subordinate CJTF's assigned mission.

e. It is critical that the JTF J-4 determine what, if any, logistic directive authority for common support capabilities the CCDR has delegated to the CJTF and if the scope of the authority meets the JTF requirements. The joint theater logistic concepts, described in JP 4-0, *Joint Logistic Support*, should be used to optimize resources by synchronizing materiel support efforts in-theater to provide the assets required for joint force mission accomplishment in a timely manner.

f. Each Service is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces, except when logistic support is otherwise provided through common-user, joint, or cross-servicing agreements with other Services, national agencies, or multinational partners. The supported CCDR may determine that common-user logistics would be beneficial within the theater or designated area. In addition, the applicability of NATO standardization agreements, foreign military sales and agreements under the NATO Mutual Support Act, other bilateral and multinational agreements, and international programs vary from nation to nation and the distinction between programs often is unclear. Determinations frequently must be made on a case-by-case basis.

g. The CCDR's logistic directive authority does not negate the individual Service's responsibility for logistic support of its forces, or discourage coordination by consultation and agreement, nor is it meant to disrupt effective procedures or efficient use of facilities or organizations.

h. DAFL applies to US forces and capabilities. Authority over logistics under multinational and UN operations varies and are situationally dependent. Areas, which must be clarified, include funding, cross-servicing, and mutual support agreements.

3. Organization

a. JTF J-4 organization should be tailored to respond to the anticipated operation. To accomplish this, it should include specialists from the various logistic functional areas: supply,

maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and other services (e.g., salvage, mortuary affairs, food service, billeting, textile repair and clothing exchange, and laundry and shower).

b. Figure VIII-1 shows a notional JTF J-4 organization. The actual composition of the J-4 will be dictated by the overall JTF organization and operations to be conducted. A number of the J-4's functions could be placed under an optional JLOC. See paragraph 12 of this chapter for an




Figure VIII-1. Notional Joint Task Force J-4 Organization

explanation of various centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams.

c. Logistic responsibilities follow single-Service command channels; therefore, it is recommended that the JTF J-4 staff have representatives or liaison personnel from each Service involved in the JTF. Since SOF relies on conventional Service counterparts for support, it also is recommended that the SO components or JSOTF, if activated, have representatives involved as well.

d. It is recommended that the CJTF establish a JLOC to provide the following joint logistic control and coordination functions.

(1) Monitor current and evolving JTF logistic capabilities.

(2) Coordinate logistic support and maintain asset visibility.

(3) Advise the CJTF on supportability of proposed operations or COA.

(4) Determine logistic requirements for planning and execution.

(5) Coordinate with the supported combatant command's J-4, DDOC, or JLOC and act as the JTF agent and advocate for logistic support.

(6) Provide a central point for logistic-related functions and centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams.

(7) The JLOC integrates its efforts with the JTF J-3 current operations through the establishment of a logistic cell within the JOC.

(8) The JLOC should be responsible for the time horizons assigned to J-3 current and future operations while the remaining J-4 functional divisions focus on long-term planning by integrating with the J-5 and JPG.

e. HNS specialists, HN liaison representatives, an international agreements liaison, linguists and interpreters, and domestic interagency liaisons on the JTF J-4 staff are essential when dealing with the HN, multinational forces, civilian populace, and contractors. CA can provide invaluable assistance in obtaining these personnel.

f. CCDRs may establish a DDOC to integrate strategic and theater deployment and distribution operations within their AORs. The JTF J-4 section (e.g., JMC) may be required to coordinate some of its deployment and distribution activities with the combatant command DDOC to better support JTF operations or the CJTF may choose to stand up a DDOC under the J-4.

(1) A DDOC confirms combatant commands deployments and distribution priorities and validates intratheater support requirements to components and to the JTF.

(2) Further a DDOC monitors JFLCC intratheater surface distribution support to other joint force components and adjudicates identified CCDR distribution and intratheater shortfalls.

(3) A DDOC also coordinates requests for additional US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) support, provides asset visibility, in-transit visibility for inter- and intratheater forces and materiel, and sets the conditions for effective theater retrograde.

4. Planning Considerations

a. **Employment planning considerations directly impact the projection or deployment of forces.** From employment planning decisions, the CJTF identifies force requirements/capabilities; intent for the deployment operation; the time-phased arrival of unit personnel, equipment, and materiel in-theater; sustainment requirements; and the closure of forces required to execute operations. Equally important to the successful conclusion of joint operations will be effective reconstitution and redeployment planning performed to either return a unit to home station or deploy it to another operational area. Transition planning must begin early, and include the following:

(1) Planning for what logistic infrastructure, materiel, and equipment will remain in country (if any).

(2) Determining what is required for redeployment of forces, materiel, and equipment.

(3) Determining the proper legal transfer authority before turning over US assets to HN or coalition forces.

b. **Forward Impetus.** Forward impetus derived from the synergy of information and logistic resources is required to provide rapid, continuous, and responsive support to the commander. This includes delivery, tracking, and shifting of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies (even while en route) to optimize support to the warfighter. A DDOC may be forward deployed from the supported combatant command to the JTF HQ to facilitate distribution and deployment. The decision to deploy this organization forward is operationally dependent and determined by the CCDR in coordination with the CJTF.

c. **Logistic Command and Control.** Unity of command requires coordination not only between Services, but also among USG departments and agencies, NGOs, IGOs, and multinational forces.

d. **Apportionment and Allocation.** Apportionment is, in a general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning. Allocation is, in a general sense, distribution of limited resources among competing

requirements for employment. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, forces, and others. Failure to maintain a system of apportionment and allocation can cause inflation of priorities, ultimate breakdown of the priority system, and loss of control over the logistic system.

e. **Accommodation for Requirements.** An effective J-4 organization should be able to meet all the anticipated JTF logistic requirements. If the scope or mission of the JTF should change, it is imperative that the staff and structure of the J-4 organization adapt.

f. **Logistic Discipline.** True economy of supply requires the careful planning and buildup of levels to provide those resources and combat facilities (based on threat distribution and phase duration) that are essential to initiate and sustain operations. At the same time, planners should avoid building too large a stockpile. Excess stocks waste resources, decrease flexibility, drain transportation resources from other priorities, and deny logistic support to other areas. Availability of strategic and intratheater transportation capability (e.g., people, materials handling equipment, lift assets) is critical to successful supply planning.

g. **Retrograde.** Availability of strategic and intratheater transportation capability is critical to providing timely and effective retrograde movement. Materiel requiring repair, programmatic upgrade, or evacuation from using activities for any other reason is referred to as retrograde. Retrograde of materiel is as important to the joint force as the original forward movement of an item to its using activity. Various reparable components or major end items themselves are distributed to operational and strategic level maintenance activities for repair, refit, or rebuild. Once the materiel is restored, it is returned to the user or placed in inventory for future use.

h. **Movement Control and In-transit Visibility.** Accurate, up-to-date information is vital to effective operations. A JTF needs the capability to track and account for forces, equipment, and supplies coming into and within the JOA. Appropriate automated information system support, augmented by automated identification technology, is essential for this requirement.

(1) **Transportation by air, land, and sea, is the “linchpin” of the JTF operation.** The JTF J-4 not only must understand the roles and functions of all mobility assets used in deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the JTF but also the impact of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civilian considerations on operational movement.

(a) Accurate, up-to-date transportation information is vital to effective operations. The JTF J-4 requires the capability to monitor and track movement of forces, equipment, and supplies in and out of the JOA.

(b) Success of Service logistic streamlining initiatives is heavily reliant on intratheater distribution support. The JTF J-4 must coordinate with the theater J-4 to ensure the theater distribution network is focused to meet the JTF’s deployment and initial logistic requirements.

(c) Coordination of movement and access to JOPES via Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is critical to deploying and supporting JTF forces. NATO's Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS) is a JOPES-like capability for NATO's Allied Command Operations and NATO member countries. ADAMS provides the tools to plan and manage deployment operations and links movement and transportation agencies with NATO.

(d) Logistic flow priorities should be established in the initial assessment and continually updated as operations progress. Materiel arriving before cargo handling equipment is on hand or personnel deploying well in advance of their equipment can cause major problems.

(e) The JTF J-4 should integrate theater movement requirements with strategic movement to ensure continued support of ongoing operations. Inadequate control of movement reduces efficiency and could cause bottlenecks (especially seaports and airports).

(2) The JTF J-4 and J-3 must coordinate requirements to create feasible force flow that best achieves the CJTF's CONOPS within the constraints of time, available lift, and JOA infrastructure. Prioritized requirements are then passed by the JTF J-3 to the supported combatant command for validation to USTRANSCOM. If surface delivery is possible and meets required delivery timelines, it should be used. The JTF should allow the Defense Transportation System to effectively move its requirements.

i. **Deployment Information.** The coordination and sharing of accurate, up-to-date information is vital to effective logistic planning, coordinating unit movements, and conducting sustainment operations. Knowing where units and supplies are located is critical to successful equipment and materiel support.

j. **Logistic Reserves.** Logistics can affect timing and tempo at the operational level of war when it determines how quickly a campaign can proceed. It is necessary to establish the requirement for logistic reserves with the supported CCDR.

k. **Industrial Base Requirements.** To ensure appropriate industrial surge planning for troop support items and spares, critical items must be identified and communicated through the appropriate inventory control point and through either DLA or Service materiel command to the industrial base.

1. Additional Planning Considerations

(1) Logistic plans should be written to anticipate changes.

(2) Early involvement of the JTF J-4 logistic staff is critical to the success of the operation and ensures logistic requirements are balanced with capabilities. Key logistic representatives and their responsibilities are listed below.

(3) Logistic planners.

(a) Review lessons learned databases for unique requirements, planning factors, and potential problem areas.

(b) Determine JTF resupply requirements and understand Services resupply abilities and restraints.

(c) Identify requirements and pass them to the supported CCDR. The supported CCDR will validate the requirements and pass them to the appropriate Service component, DLA, or outside agency for sourcing. Working with the Service components, the JTF J-4 can determine whether the JTF support should be provided from the military (Services), civilian sources, HN, UN, or other nations.

(4) Transportation infrastructure analysts from USTRANSCOM and its transportation component commands (TCCs) evaluate airports, seaports, and inland transportation systems capabilities against requirements.

(5) Contracting and supply specialists evaluate HN capabilities to provide support services, storage, and materiel.

(6) Engineers or facility managers determine the capabilities of existing infrastructure and develop plans and requirements to upgrade infrastructure to support the JTF.

(7) A JTF logistic plan should be integrated with component commands and other organizations and agencies, as well as HN and MNFs, to ensure success.

For further details concerning planning guidance and areas to consider when developing the logistic plan, refer to JPs 3-0, Joint Operations, and 4-0, Joint Logistic Support, and CJCSM 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II (Planning Formats).

5. Responsibilities

The JTF J-4 responsibilities are as follows:

a. Determine personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate. Forward these requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

b. Coordinate the overall JTF logistic functions and requirements.

c. Advise the CJTF concerning JTF logistic matters that affect mission accomplishment.

d. Formulate JTF logistic policies.

e. Develop annex D (Logistics) to CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans. Develop appropriate sections of paragraph 4 of the basic plan and CCDR's strategic concept.

f. Coordinate common item supply and services support in accordance with tasking assigned in the OPLAN or OPORD, annex D (Logistics).

g. Coordinate common-user logistics Service responsibilities as designated by the CCDR, agreements for inter-Service supply and support, local procurement and controls, and allocate indigenous facilities and logistic resources available at staging bases in the JOA.

h. Monitor critical classes of supply support capabilities for the purpose of mission tasking and economy of resources and allocating critical resources.

i. Arrange for and monitor transportation movement requirements; also assess capabilities and limitations of assigned and attached forces, supporting commands, agencies, and in-country assets.

j. Coordinate the operation of transportation nodes within the JOA including air and sea ports, and beaches.

k. Identify and coordinate JTF HNS and local resource requirements with the CMOC or primary agency. During disaster relief or FHA operations, the J-4 can play an important supporting role to the CMOC in meeting NGOs or IGOs requests for assistance and aiding them in coordinating all aspects of providing assistance with limited resources.

l. Arrange HNS with the appropriate agency in the JOA.

m. Identify theater requirements for contracting support against existing contracting assets. If warranted, take necessary actions, in coordination with the CCDR, to stand up requirements and contracting related boards and a joint contracting organization (either lead Service for contracting or joint contracting center [JCC]) necessary to maintain JOA-wide visibility of JTF requirements and component contracting efforts, and effectively support JTF requirements. Ensure contracting officers with appropriate warrants are requested. Additionally, identify resource requirements to support the contracting function, including protection, financial management, linguist, and legal support. Refer to Appendix C, "Contracting and Contractor Management Planning," for further details concerning contracting. Coordinate and manage contracting support within the JOA. This support will be coordinated with the lead Service for contracting (if appointed by the CCDR).

n. Exercise staff supervision or cognizance over applicable military engineering matters (e.g., construction, maintenance, and site development).

o. Coordinate maintenance, recovery, and salvage operations to ensure economy of inter-Service and HN resources, even though these are primarily a Service versus J-4 responsibility.

p. Assist the JTF surgeon in developing the logistic aspects of the JTF's health service support (HSS) system. Assist the surgeon in the development of annex Q (Medical Services) to CJTF's plans and orders, if required.

q. Coordinate joint mortuary affairs, including the return of remains. Mortuary affairs include the responsibilities for search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel within the theater. The responsibility extends not only to US forces, but also to multinational, civilian, third country, and adversary dead. Mortuary affairs in a defense support of civil authorities scenario (i.e., JTF operations within the United States) requires close coordination with civil authorities to ensure compliance with applicable statutes and established procedures.

For further details concerning mortuary affairs, refer to JPs 4-0, Joint Logistic Support, and 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.

r. With the PM, coordinate support for returning enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) or detainees, civilian internees, displaced civilians, and other detained or retained persons.

s. Refine logistic OPSEC planning guidance, ensure logistic-related activities are conducted to eliminate OPSEC vulnerabilities, and support military deception initiatives.

t. Maintain liaison with the other JTF staff agencies, subordinate task forces, and component commands.

u. Coordinate agreements, transactions, and implementing instructions with the appropriate component and multinational points of contact for US and multinational mutual support logistic exchange issues.

v. Provide reporting guidance and ensure Service components use published procedures for positive control of personnel and assets during deployment, sustainment, and redeployment operations.

6. Multinational Logistics

a. In the future, the United States will most likely be engaged in multinational military operations conducted with allies or coalition partners as part of an **alliance** or **coalition**. Logistic support and sustainment of forces is each nation's responsibility. However, to ensure that multinational operations are supported effectively and efficiently, participating nations need to coordinate their logistic activities and maximize use of logistic resources through mutual support arrangements. Unified action will be facilitated through establishing an integrated, multinational logistic C2 organization staffed with representatives from the Services and selected allies or coalition partners. This provides the J-4 visibility on the availability and flow of materiel, civil engineering, HNS, and theater contracting support.

b. Successful multinational logistic operations are governed by several unique principles. First, multinational logistic operations are a collective responsibility of participating nations and the MNFC, although nations are inherently responsible for supporting their forces. A second principle is that MNFC should be given sufficient authority over logistic resources to ensure the force is supported in the most efficient and effective manner. Third, cooperation and coordination are necessary among participating nations and forces, which should make use of multinational logistic support arrangements to reduce the logistic footprint in the operational area. Finally, synergy results from the use of multinational integrated logistic support; to ensure this, the MNFC must have visibility of the logistic activity during the operation.

c. In the absence of appropriate international agreements, no authority exists for the MNFC to provide for or accept logistic support from multinational partners. Once multinational support is established, the JTF J-4 should ensure that it is clearly understood what assistance can be rendered to MNFs and what reports higher authorities require — detailed accounting is a must.

d. Funding guidance to support MNFs should be identified as early as possible. Once funding guidance is determined, procedures should be developed to ensure there would be no adverse impact on operations.

e. Consensus on multinational logistic issues and requirements should be formed early. Potential problems can be avoided by early identification of differences among the nations' and Services' logistic doctrine, stockage levels, interoperability, and accountability.

f. The JTF J-4 staff should be aware of cultural differences (language, values, religious beliefs, economic infrastructure, nutritional standards, and social outlooks), which may have an impact on logistic support to multinational forces.

g. In conjunction with the JTF SJA, the JTF J-4 staff should develop a list of current agreements with other participating nations that provide for logistic support and should establish quality control and monitoring compliance for all multinational-provided services and supplies such as petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL); water; and food.

Additional multinational logistic information, considerations, and issues can be found in JPs 3-16, Multinational Operations, 4-0, Joint Logistic Support, and 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.

7. United Nations Logistics

a. UN logistic systems depend on member states to be self-sufficient at the unit level for a given length of time, normally 60 to 120 days. This period allows the UN to organize a logistic structure, acquire real estate and facilities, and establish contracts and memorandums of understanding, which will provide logistic support for the forces involved.

b. A UN survey and assessment team will evaluate the mission requirements and develop planning data for logistic support. When participating in a UN mission, the JTF should, if

possible, send a US logistic representative with the UN mission survey team to assist in preparing the UN assessment. JTF efforts to participate and coordinate with UN forces will further unified action and reduce potential conflicts for use of facilities or resources.

c. Once established, the UN logistic support structure normally will provide a measure of continuing support through a system of a lead nation(s) (one or more nations providing the UN support to other nations under a reimbursable agreement), civilian contractual arrangements, a UN force logistic support group, or a combination of the above.

d. The UN normally coordinates such logistic areas as bulk supplies (water, fuel, and rations of common-user items, for example, UN clothing, domestic consumables, batteries, and some vehicle spares) and services such as waste disposal, laundry, and bath.

e. For UN operations, the JTF J-4 should determine what standards are to be followed regarding support.

(1) US standards tend to exceed UN standards (e.g., consumption rates, space requirements, and safety levels). US military equipment and system sophistication and the expectations of US forces may be different than the quality of support the UN is providing.

(2) UN standards must be clearly understood regarding the level and quality of UN support provided and funded. Logistic support that is significantly more extensive than what is outlined in the UN agreement may not be reimbursable.

(3) The JTF must be prepared to bring its own support in the areas where the UN-provided support may not meet US requirements, especially in critical areas such as HSS.

8. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Support Requirements

a. The interagency, NGOs, and IGOs provide for their own logistic support. However, JTF logistic capabilities often are requested and provided to these organizations. The JTF may be asked to assume all or part of the burden of logistics for these organizations after arrival. This support may include intertheater and intratheater airlift, ground transportation of personnel, equipment and supplies, airfield control groups, and port and railhead operations groups.

b. The JTF must establish movement priorities between JTF requirements and those of other USG agencies, MNFs, UN forces, NGOs, and IGOs that may be established. A JMC, DDOC, or like organization is the primary organization for coordinating movements, including those provided by HNs or MNFs, to support joint operations in the operational area. Close communications should be established with all elements to ensure that their movement requirements are fully understood by the JTF to enable effective planning and security for materiel movement.

c. Although the JTF Service components or participating nations are responsible for their own logistics, these components and nations may use the common distribution system and other JTF-directed common-user logistic support to execute the overall logistic mission. Interagency support requirements will fall within this process and a single Service executing all common-user logistic functions directed by higher authority, contractual agreements, or an executive agency may provide this support. The JTF J-4 has overall responsibility to coordinate this effort.

9. Contracting Support

a. Recent operations have changed the way to view and use contractors. The military has become increasingly dependent on contractor support for combat essential capabilities. **The key for a CJTF is to make a decision early on as to what capabilities the JTF will need to fill the gaps caused by fast moving, crisis action situations.** Effective contractor management within the operational environment also is essential to ensure that contractor-provided support is orchestrated and synchronized with the overall plan or order, and that contractor employees are properly accounted for, protected, and supported.

b. **The CJTF and components must abide by applicable laws, regulations, and international agreements,** while implementing appropriate contractor planning, deployment, and redeployment requirements, and adhere to theater management procedures as they relate to the management of contractor personnel during contingency operations. In addition, they must ensure that the contract, as the legal basis for the relationship between the government and contractor, carefully specifies the terms and conditions under which the contractor is to perform, and procedures to process contractor personnel prior to deployment. They also must ensure the specific support relationship between the contractor and the government contains standardized clauses to ensure efficient deployment, employment, and redeployment of contractor personnel.

For further details concerning contracting, refer to Appendix C, “Contracting and Contractor Management Planning.”

10. Host-Nation Support

a. HNS can be a significant force multiplier. Whenever possible, available and suitable HNS should be considered as an alternative to deploying logistic support from other locations outside of the JOA. HNS may increase dramatically the timeliness of response to a developing situation and reduce the strategic airlift and sea lift requirements necessary to deploy forces to the JOA.

b. Countries without a government infrastructure may not be able to provide logistic assistance; however, limited support may be obtained through local contractors.

c. To maximize the JTF logistic effort, HNS functions (e.g., identification of requirements and procurement) should be centralized and coordinated within the J-4.

d. CA personnel assigned to the JTF are trained to identify and coordinate HNS resources and can provide valuable assistance to the J-4 staff.

e. The HNS agreement should include the authority for the CJTF to coordinate directly with the HN for support, acquisition, and use of facilities and real estate.

f. Every effort should be made to obtain language support for negotiations with local nationals. The most effective negotiations occur when military members show competence in local language and customs. The J-2 may assist in obtaining personnel for use in negotiations.

g. A JTF legal advisor should be involved in the development process for HNS agreements.

h. It is critical to determine a lead agency (UN, Service, component, or other agency) for contracting and negotiating for support.

i. Areas of potential HNS are shown in Figure VIII-2.

j. Authority for negotiations must be obtained through the supported CCDR, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Department of State (DOS) channels. Negotiations for HNS fall under two basic categories.

(1) No existing HNS agreements.

(a) The JTF J-4 determines potential HNS areas of logistic support required by the JTF and develops a concept of requirements for HNS.

(b) The JTF concept of requirements for HNS is passed to the supported CCDR for approval and action.




Figure VIII-2. Host-Nation Areas of Support

(c) The supported CCDR reviews and approves the JTF's HNS requirements and forwards them to the DOS via the OSD with a request that a general agreement be established between the HN and the United States. The general agreement provides the framework, procedures and the authority for the supported CCDR to conduct military-to-military negotiations. (If possible, the agreement should provide for direct negotiations between the JTF or component commanders and the HN.)

(d) A JTF legal officer should be directly involved in new HNS agreements, to ensure adherence to both HN and US laws.

(e) Once the general HNS agreement is established, the JTF J-4 provides a detailed statement of requirements to the HN and begins the negotiations for detailed JTF logistic support.

(2) A current HNS agreement exists.

(a) The JTF J-4 reviews the current HNS agreement, identifying the logistic support items in the HNS agreement that the JTF would like the HN to "activate." The JTF then requests, in accordance with procedures established in the general agreement, that these logistic support items be implemented.

(b) The JTF J-4 identifies additional HNS logistic support that the JTF requires and begins negotiations (within the framework of the general agreement) to obtain it.

(c) The JTF J-4 ensures the components use existing HNS, if applicable, to avoid duplication of effort with the HN.

(d) Component commanders inform the JTF J-4 if an ACSA exists with the HN. If an ACSA does not exist, the JTF, via the supported CCDR, and the DOS, should take steps to initiate an ACSA with the HN.

11. Logistic Supporting Agencies and Organizations

a. The supported CCDR, through the JLOC (if established), provides the link to interface with the Joint Staff, Services, DLA, USTRANSCOM, and other supporting commands and agencies. The supported CCDR's JLOC normally performs the following:

(1) Provides guidance concerning the CCDR's DAFL and coordinates the resolution of logistic issues and problems.

(2) Acts as the JTF agent for requesting additional resources, deconflicting demands on common use resources (when demand exceeds capabilities), and coordinates logistics with other multinational forces at the DOS and Joint Staff levels.

b. USTRANSCOM, as the Distribution Process Owner, will be responsible for the following:

(1) Providing global mobility, from origin to destination, to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy military forces.

(2) Procuring commercial transportation services through component commands.

(3) Activating, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Maritime Administration, Ready Reserve Force, Sealift Readiness Program, and the Voluntary Intermodal Shipping Agreement (Stages I and II). Stage III requires Secretary of Transportation's approval.

(4) Providing representatives to the JTF assessment team to help evaluate sea ports, airports, and inland transportation system requirements. Through its TCCs, USTRANSCOM performs the functions of the single port manager for both aerial and sea ports of debarkation.

(5) Monitoring movement data.

(6) Nominating a director of mobility forces (DIRMOBFOR), upon request.

(7) Assisting in the development and validation of the TPFDD; also may provide training to TPFDD development personnel on the JTF staff.

(8) Coordinating movement and transportation information in JOPES. This data is critical to deploying and supporting forces.

(9) Coordinating airlift and refueling aircraft diplomatic clearances through US embassies with HNs for en route and overflight and access.

c. Director of Mobility Forces

(1) The CJTF or the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) or JFACC should appoint a DIRMOBFOR to function as coordinating authority for air mobility with all commands and agencies, both internal and external to the JTF. **The DIRMOBFOR normally is a senior officer who is familiar with the AOR or JOA and possesses an extensive background in air mobility operations.**

(2) The DIRMOBFOR works directly for the COMAFFOR or JFACC as the senior air mobility advisor.

(3) At the discretion of the CJTF, COMAFFOR, or JFACC, the DIRMOBFOR may be sourced from the theater's organizations or USTRANSCOM.

(4) The DIRMOBFOR has the specific authority and responsibility to:

(a) Direct the integration of intertheater air mobility support provided by USTRANSCOM-assigned mobility forces.

(b) Direct the tasking of attached air mobility forces to the CJTF.

(c) Coordinate the tasking of USTRANSCOM air mobility forces operating in support of the CJTF.

(d) Coordinate with the JAOC director to ensure that all air mobility operations supporting the CJTF are fully integrated into the air assessment, planning, and execution process, and deconflicted with all other air operations.

(e) Coordinate with Air Mobility Command tanker airlift control center (TACC) through the Air Mobility Division, all intertheater air mobility missions to ensure the most effective use of these resources in accomplishing the CJTF, supported CCDR, and Commander, USTRANSCOM missions.

(f) Assist in the integration and coordination of the multinational air mobility plan. This assistance could come in the form of deconfliction of airfield maximum (aircraft) on the ground restrictions and coordination with the TACC on US intertheater airflow with multinational air movement.

For further details concerning logistics, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistic Support.

12. Logistic Boards, Offices, and Centers

a. Joint centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams may be required; the need for each should be evaluated based on the projected operations.

b. The following may be established by the CJTF to coordinate logistic efforts.

(1) **Joint Logistic Operations Center.** This center serves as the JTF J-4 operations center, for all logistic functions, centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams; and can provide to the JTF logistic oversight, coordination, and control of logistic functions. It also provides the link to interface with the combatant command J-4 staff, Services, DLA, USTRANSCOM, and other supporting commands and agencies.

(2) **Joint Movement Center.** The JMC implements the CJTF's taskings and priorities for movement. It tracks strategic movements to ensure that they meet the CJTF expected flow of force capabilities into the operational area, maximizing the use of available in-transit visibility automation tools. Additionally, the JTF's JMC coordinates the employment of all (including multinational and HN) transportation assets within the JOA.

(3) **Deployment Distribution Operations Center.** The mission of the DDOC is to support the CCDR's or CJTF's operational objectives by synchronizing and optimizing strategic and multi-modal resources to maximize distribution, force deployment, and sustainment. Its ultimate goal is to maximize the commander's combat effectiveness through improved end-to-end distribution and asset visibility.

(4) **Subarea Petroleum Office.** When tactical operations warrant extensive management of wholesale bulk POL in theater, the subarea petroleum office is established by the joint petroleum office to coordinate, plan, and execute common bulk petroleum products for the JTF.

(5) **Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB).** The JFUB evaluates and reconciles requests for real estate, facilities, inter-Service support, and construction at the JTF level. The provisions of JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*, will guide JFUB actions.

(6) **Contracting Office.** The JTF contracting office, working with the CCDR logistic procurement support board or JCC, is established (with warranted contracting officers) to coordinate contracting requirements for and assisting in the acquisition of local facilities, supplies, services, and support. The contracting office coordinates contracting support requirements among Services to preclude inter-Service competition for supplies or services to obtain effective utilization and advantageous prices through consolidation of JTF requirements. A listing of typical functions performed by such contracting offices is addressed in Appendix C, “Contracting and Contractor Management Planning.”

(7) **Joint Mortuary Affairs Office.** In most cases, the CJTF will direct the JTF J-4 to establish and operate a JMAO. Once established (see the checklist in Annex F, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-4,” to Appendix B, “Checklists”) the JMAO will:

- (a) Provide guidance to facilitate the conduct of mortuary affairs for the CJTF.
- (b) Maintain data pertaining to the recovery, identification, and disposition of all US dead and missing in the JOA.
- (c) Serve as a mortuary affairs liaison between the JTF and the JMAOs of the supported combatant command and Services.
- (d) Serve as the central clearing point for mortuary affairs related information.
- (e) Monitor the deceased and missing personal effects program.
- (f) Perform planning, execution, technical, and management functions.
- (g) Develop/disseminate standards/procedures and collection/present mortuary affairs management statistical data.

For further details concerning mortuary affairs and the JMAO, refer to JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.

To further assist the JTF J-4 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex F, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-4,” to Appendix B, “Checklists.”

CHAPTER IX

JOINT TASK FORCE PLANS AND POLICY

“The commander’s challenge is to identify quickly enemy strengths and weaknesses, and recognize critical vulnerabilities when they appear. He must rapidly devise plans to avoid the strengths, exploit the weaknesses, and direct the focus of effort toward attacking the critical vulnerabilities so that he can ultimately collapse the enemy’s center of gravity.”

Naval Doctrine Publication 1
Naval Warfare

SECTION A. PLANS AND POLICY DIVISION

1. General

a. **Plans Directorate.** The J-5 assists the commander in **planning and preparation of joint plans, orders, and associated estimates of the situation.** The J-5 may also contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses to assist the commander in plans preparation activities, or such a cell may be established as a special staff division or section.

b. The remainder of this chapter provides an overview of the J-5 organization and responsibilities. Details of the planning process are addressed in JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, and the CJCSM 3122 series of Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) publications.

2. Organization

Figure IX-1 depicts a notional JTF J-5 organization. The overall JTF organization and mission dictates the actual J-5 composition.

3. Responsibilities

The JTF J-5 must provide political-military oversight for all aspects of the JTF’s operations. The following is a list, not all inclusive, of JTF J-5 responsibilities:

a. Determine personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate. Forward these requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

b. Develop, revise, and coordinate required plans and orders in support of assigned CJTF missions.

(1) These plans or orders may exist as a coordinated part of a CCDR’s plans or orders or as a supporting OPLAN or OPORD.




Figure IX-1. Notional Joint Task Force J-5 Organization

(2) OPLANs or OPORDs may be prepared in response to a CCDR’s planning directive or a CJTF directive.

(3) During execution, the J-5 will prepare OPLANs or OPORDs as directed in support of future operations.

(4) Prepare the J-5 staff estimate.

c. Conduct analysis and coordination of future operations during the execution phase.

d. Coordinate planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, multinational HQ, and the interagency, IGOs, and NGOs as required.

(1) Review subordinate supporting plans for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with joint doctrine.

(2) Advise the CJTF on any supported CCDR’s plans and orders that relate to and may impact the JTF’s mission.

(3) Keep the supported combatant command’s J-5 or operational planning team aware of the JTF’s status of operational planning especially during the initial planning efforts.

e. Determine the forces required and available and coordinate deployment planning in support of the selected COA.

f. Ensure that the force requirements are entered in GCCS (JOPES).

(1) Ensure force movement requirements assigned to the JTF HQ are built into the TPFDD or request for forces and submitted to the supported CCDR for validation.

(2) Coordinate with the subordinate functional and Service components for force deployment TPFDD requirements via GCCS (JOPES) and ensure timely and accurate submission and certification to the supported CCDR.

g. Coordinate and review TPFDD input to ensure the force requirements are accurately entered in GCCS (JOPES) and the deployment flow supports the CONOPS.

h. Provide planning recommendations for HNS. This includes leading or assisting other JTF staff sections during the coordination of HNS for JTF operations or training when conducting operations in countries that do not have an existing status-of-forces agreement (SOFA), status of mission agreement, overflight and access agreements with nations en route and within the operational area, or some other type of HN agreement.

i. Provide assistance to the JTF J-3 in the preparation of orders.

j. Coordinate with the JTF J-3 to ensure that politico-military activities such as NEOs and CMO or CAO are properly addressed with the appropriate US embassies and HN governments (including en route countries) from a strategy and policy viewpoint.

k. Participate with the JTF J-3 and SJA in development of operational limitations.

l. Recommend, as part of the planning process, measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. Ensure these measures are consistent with those established by the higher HQ plan or order. Coordinate with the JTF J-3 on the adjustment of these measures during execution.

m. Provide J-5 personnel to the JTF HQ advanced echelon (ADVON).

n. Coordinate and incorporate planning with representatives of other nations, the interagency, NGOs, IGOs, and other interested non-US parties concerning the overall JTF mission, as directed. Take into account, that a number of these representatives and organizations may be “outside the wire” and have limited accessibility to information.

o. Provide the CJTF with an expanded perspective of theater strategic or operational joint warfighting concepts.

p. Form and supervise future plans, through the JPG.

- (1) Manage JPG planning requirements.
- (2) Establish and resource planning teams coordinating with other staff directorates to ensure these teams are adequately staffed with functional expertise.
- (3) Manage planning processes conducted by JPG planning teams to include planning timelines and receipt of planning guidance, intent, and decisions from the command group.
- (4) In coordination with the chief of staff, integrate events required for planning into the JTF HQ battle rhythm or calendar.

To further assist the JTF J-5 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex G, “Checklist for Joint Task force J-5,” to Appendix B, “Checklists.”

“The greatest lesson of this war [World War II] has been the extent to which air, land, and sea operations can and must be coordinated by joint planning....”

**Gen H. H. Arnold, USA
Chief, US Army Air Forces, 1946**

SECTION B. JOINT TASK FORCE PLANNING

4. General

a. Planning for joint operations is continuous across the range of military operations using the closely related, integrated, collaborative, and adaptive **JOPES and JOPP**. JOPES and JOPP share the same basic approach and problem-solving elements, such as mission analysis and COA development. **The combination of JOPES and JOPP promotes coherent planning across all levels of war and command echelons**, whether the requirement is for a limited, single-phase operation such as noncombatant evacuation or for a multiphase campaign involving large-scale combat operations.

b. **Planning Horizons.** Like most complex organizations, JTFs have long-, mid-, and near-term goals. **JTFs organize to conduct future planning, future operations planning, and current operations planning.** The division of labor between these planning efforts is linked to time or events; and is situation as well as the level of command dependent. Using time horizons to delineate responsibilities, a JTF HQ may focus current operations on activities inside of 24 hours, focus future operations on activities between 24 and 96 hours, and focus future plans on activities beyond 96 hours. Using these event horizons to delineate responsibilities, **a JTF HQ may focus current operations on activities associated with ongoing operations, focus future operations on branch planning, and focus future plans on sequel planning.**

(1) **Future Plans Planning.** The focus of the JTF’s future planning is development of plans, orders, and policy directives. Future planning processes and products generally require significant coordination with entities both internal and external to the JTF staff. They also

generally require adequate time to integrate the work of this broader planning audience. The future planning function usually takes place in the JPG. This allows it to leverage the functional expertise that resides there.

(2) **Future Operations Planning.** The focus of the JTF's future operations is the development of orders and complex fragmentary orders that are beneath the threshold of the long-term efforts of the future plans, but are not directly related to the management of current operations. Future planning processes and products generally require significant coordination with elements internal to the JTF. They also may require coordination with entities external to the JTF staff. The future operations function typically takes place in the JOC. This allows it to leverage the functional expertise that resides there. The planning for future operations often is accomplished under the cognizance of the J-3 (future operations cell).

(3) **Current Operations Planning.** The focus of the JTF's current operations planning is the management of the current operation or operations. This activity often includes the development of fragmentary orders to adjust or sustain these ongoing operations. The current operations planning function normally takes place within the JOC. This allows it to leverage the functional expertise that resides there.

5. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

a. **JOPES** formally integrates the planning activities of the entire joint planning and execution community during initial planning and plan refinement that occurs both in peacetime and when faced with an imminent crisis. While JOPES activities span many organizational levels, **the focus is on the interaction which ultimately helps the President and Secretary of Defense decide when, where, and how to commit US military capabilities** in response to a foreseen contingency or an unforeseen crisis. The majority of JOPES activities and products occur prior to the point when the CJCS approves and issues the execute order, which initiates the employment of military capabilities to accomplish a specific mission. In contrast, JOPP provides a less formal but methodical approach to planning at any organizational level and at any point before and during joint operations. JOPP provides an orderly framework for planning in general, particularly for organizations that have no formal JOPES requirements. JOPES is described in a multivolume set of CJCS unclassified and classified manuals. Three primary unclassified sources for JOPES information are:

(1) **CJCSM 3122.01A**, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*.

(2) **CJCSM 3122.02C**, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution)*.

(3) **CJCSM 3122.03B**, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II (Planning Formats)*.

b. CJCSM 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*, provides the foundation for joint operation planning. It specifies policies, procedures, and reporting structures — supported by modern communications and computer systems — for planning the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. It also contains sample formats for key documents such as the CJCS warning order, commander's estimate, and OPORD. CJCSM 3122.03B, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II (Planning Formats)*, provides planning formats and additional guidance, while CJCSM 3122.02C, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution)*, provides crisis action TPFDD development information. **JOPES applies to joint operations across the range of military operations and to all members of the joint planning and execution community.**

c. CJCSM 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*, provides for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision-making in two related but distinct categories — **contingency planning** and **CAP**. These categories differ primarily in level of uncertainty, amount of available planning time, and products.

(1) **Contingency planning is planning that occurs in non-crisis situations.** A contingency is a situation that likely would involve military forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. **Contingency planning facilitates the transition to CAP.**

(2) A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests. **CAP is based on circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs.** These circumstances may occur with little or no warning. Such a situation is fast-breaking and requires accelerated decision-making. JOPES provides additional CAP procedures for the time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the likely use of military forces in response to a crisis. In as little as a few days, commanders and staffs must be able to develop and approve a feasible COA, publish the plan or order, prepare forces, ensure sufficient communications systems support, and arrange sustainment for the employment of US military forces.

d. Combatant commands participate routinely in both contingency planning and CAP according to JOPES formal requirements (e.g., milestones, formats). Due to the nature of the organization, **a JTF HQ typically participates primarily in CAP.** However, Service component HQ designated in peacetime as prospective JTF HQ for specific plans usually participate in the combatant command's contingency planning effort. **When a JTF must prepare plans according to JOPES formal requirements, the JTF staff should carefully follow JOPES procedures.**

For further details on planning in accordance with JOPES procedures and formats, refer to CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures).

6. The Joint Operation Planning Process

a. Joint operation planning occurs in a networked, collaborative environment, which requires dialogue among senior leaders, concurrent and parallel plan development, and collaboration across multiple planning levels. Clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction between senior leaders and planners promote early understanding of, and agreement on, planning assumptions, considerations, risks, and other key factors. The focus is on developing plans that contain a variety of viable, embedded options for the commander to consider as the situation develops. This facilitates responsive plan development and modification, resulting in current up-to-date plans. Joint operation planning also promotes greater involvement with other US agencies and multinational partners. **Key to JOPP is on the interaction between an organization's (such as a JTF) commander, staff, and the commanders and staffs of the next higher, lower, and supporting commands.** Although an ultimate product is the OPLAN or OPORD for a specific mission, the process is continuous throughout an operation. Even during execution, it produces plans and orders for future operations as well as fragmentary orders that drive immediate adjustments to the current operation.

b. **JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the range of military operations.** It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning. This process is designed to facilitate interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate HQ throughout planning. JOPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent, and develop effective plans and orders.

c. This planning process applies to contingency planning and CAP within the context of responsibilities specified by JOPES. JOPP also is used by joint organizations that have no specific JOPES responsibilities. Furthermore, JOPP supports planning throughout the course of an operation after the execute order is issued. In common application, JOPP proceeds according to planning milestones and other requirements established by the commanders at various levels. Figure IX-2 shows the primary JOPP steps. Refer to JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, for a detailed discussion.

7 Operational Design

a. **Joint operation planning uses various elements of operational design** to help commanders and staffs visualize the arrangement of joint capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. **Operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a joint OPLAN and its subsequent execution.** While **operational art** is the manifestation of informed vision and creativity, **operational design** is the practical extension of the creative process. Together they synthesize the intuition and creativity of the commander with the analytical and logical process of design. The key to operational design essentially involves:

- (1) Understanding the strategic guidance (determining the end state and objectives).




Figure IX-2. The Joint Operation Planning Process

(2) Identifying the adversary's principal strengths and weaknesses.

(3) Developing an operational concept that will achieve strategic and operational objectives. Figure IX-3 lists the current elements of operational design contained in JPs 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

b. **Operational design is intrinsic to JOPP.** JOPP provides a logical set of planning steps through which the commander and staff interact, and operational design supports JOPP by providing a number of design elements to help the commander and staff visualize and shape the operation to accomplish the mission. The **elements of operational design** comprise a tool that

ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN




Figure IX-3. Elements of Operational Design

is particularly helpful during COA development, analysis, and comparison. Resulting design alternatives provide the basis for selecting a COA and developing the detailed CONOPS. **During execution**, the CJTF and staff continue to consider design elements and adjust both current operations and future plans to capitalize on tactical and operational successes as the joint operation unfolds.

For further details on the use of elements of operational design in planning and assessment, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

8. Joint Planning Group

a. The primary purposes for forming a JPG are to conduct CAP, assist in OPLAN and OPORD development, and perform future planning. As a JPG works through the CAP process towards development of an OPORD, it is important that the head of a JPG devise a system that analyzes COAs. There has to be a synchronization process to ensure that “all parts” of the JTF will work in unison from planning through operations. Early designation of a JTF will facilitate the forming of the JPG and commencement of the planning process. It may be possible to form a JPG without the JTF being fully organized and staffed.

(1) The JPG often is the focal point for OPORD development. The JTF OPORD typically will be based on the JTF’s establishing authority’s (supported CCDR) OPORD.

(a) The JPG chief must ensure that staff sections and individuals responsible for developing various sections of the OPORD are aware of their responsibilities.

(b) The format for an OPORD is provided in CJCSM 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*. Information that can be referenced in the supported OPORD need not be repeated in the supporting OPORD unless directed.

(2) Upon completion of the OPORD or OPLAN and based on CJTF guidance, designated planning team or teams focus on execution phase planning. Typically, this involves branch and sequel planning. Figure IX-4 represents **one organizational strategy** to synchronize long- and short-term planning, assessment, and commander’s guidance.

(3) A core JPG should be expanded for select planning functions. Typically, these “on-call” representatives will be needed when specific subject matter expertise and staff or component planning input is required. Many of these representatives are LNOs and JTF staff action officers with specific duties and responsibilities to the CJTF.

(4) JPG members provide analysis to the planning teams to which they are assigned based on their functional expertise. The JPG members maintain staff estimates that are informed through their participation in WGs and through the continued coordination with their parent staff directorate center or cell.

JOINT TASK FORCE PLANS AND OPERATIONS SYNCHRONIZATION




Figure IX-4. Joint Task Force Plans and Operations Synchronization

b. Composition of a JPG varies depending on the planning activities being conducted. Normally, all supporting components will have permanent representation in the JPG.

(1) There are no mandatory rules to determine the precise number of personnel to staff the JPG.

(2) Representation to the JPG should be a long-term assignment to provide continuity of focus and consistency of procedure.

(3) These representatives should be authorized spokespersons for their sections, directorates, components, or organizations.

(4) Often, representatives from the supported and supporting combatant commands, and multinational representatives or LNOs will augment the JPG.

(5) Composition of the JPG from the JTF staff may vary depending on the planning activities being conducted. A task specific organization may work best.

(6) The JTF HQ battle rhythm should be deconflicted to facilitate staff representative and LNO participation in the JPG.

c. The JPG chief forms planning teams to address specific planning requirements. The JPG chief organizes each planning team with the appropriate functional expertise and administrative support. Planning teams normally are organized with a lead planner, requisite functional planners, component or major subordinate command representatives, and other stakeholders (as required). Planning teams complete planning on assigned tasks and usually are dissolved upon completion of those tasks. Figure IX-5 depicts a JPG composition.

(1) Other planning teams may plan for termination of the joint operation and transition of the JTF to another military force, UN, regional organization, or civilian organization. The JPG chief also supervises these teams to ensure they provide the type of analysis and planning that meets the needs of the command group and ensures that the command group, in turn provides the required guidance, intent, and decisions to allow them to complete their tasks.

(2) To ensure that the planning teams remain focused, the JPG chief:

(a) Supervises their conduct of JOPP.

(b) Ensures they meet command group requirements.

(c) Synchronizes their activities to ensure they do not compete for the same resources or functional experts.

(d) Ensures that the JPG's planning teams are effectively linked to other staff agencies (e.g., WGs, centers, and staff directorates). This link is solidified through the staff




Figure IX-5. Joint Planning Group Composition

estimate process in which planning team members inform the planning process through their staff estimates while continuing to keep their functional chief or staff director informed of ongoing planning efforts.

(e) Determines procedures for coordination with higher authority to include message traffic and distribution.

(3) One planning team formed by the JPG chief provides initial assessments of a crisis situation, develops the organization of the JTF, and conducts CAP. This planning team is familiar with the CAP process and JOPES products. A focused effort is critical during the initial phases of CAP. A combatant command's SJFHQ (CE) or DJTFAC (if established) could augment this core group to provide continuity and "jump-start" the JTF planning process. See Figure IX-6 that illustrates the forming and informing of the planning group and teams.

d. Other JPG Considerations

(1) The JPG chief arranges for briefings to appropriate individuals (e.g., CJTF, supported CCDR, and others as required) as JPG milestones are reached.

(2) The value of an organization such as a JPG only can be measured by the coordination, cooperation, and communication among the staff directorates. Without these factors, quality products will be difficult to produce.

(3) To reiterate a key point, the establishment, functions, and interaction (with the JTF staff) of the JPG must be clearly articulated by the CJTF to prevent misunderstandings and disputes.




Figure IX-6. Forming and Informing the Planning Groups and Teams

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CHAPTER X

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SUPPORT

“During [Operation] Provide Comfort, we probably brought in 1300 short tons of communications equipment over and above the TO&E [table of organization and equipment] equipment to gain the necessary interoperability between all national forces”

**MajGen A. C. Zinni, USMC
DCG, MCCDC (1992-1994)**

1. General

a. **Communications Systems Directorate.** The JTF J-6 assists the commander in all responsibilities for communications infrastructure, communications-computer networking, communications electronics, information assurance, tactical communications, and interoperability. This includes development and integration of communications system architecture and plans that support the command’s operational and strategic requirements, as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable communications system support to exercise command in the execution of the mission.

b. The objective of the joint communications system is to facilitate the proper integration and employment of joint force operational capabilities through effective C2. A role of the communications system is to ensure connectivity throughout the operational environment, thus providing CJTFs with the capability to effectively plan, conduct, and sustain joint operations. A second role is to provide CJTFs the principal tool to collect, transport, process, protect, and disseminate data and information.

(1) All military forces, the interagency, NGOs, IGOs, HN agencies, and other organizations involved in an operation (e.g., peace operations or civil support) must be able to effectively and efficiently communicate with one another, when appropriate.

(2) The communications system normally focuses on JTF operations; however, it also must support intelligence, logistics, and SO. Detailed communications system techniques and procedures necessary to deploy and sustain a JTF are contained in the CJCSM 6231-series, *Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications*, architectures; and annex K (Communications Systems) of the CJTF OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

c. The communications system gives the CJTF the means to exercise authority and direct assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The CJTF uses information to support decision-making and coordinate actions that will influence friendly and adversary forces to the CJTF’s advantage.

“A joint force that is linked and synchronized in time and purpose is considered networked. The joint force capitalizes on information and near simultaneous dissemination to turn information into actions. An effective communications system helps the JFC conduct distributed operations in a nonlinear battlespace. To do this, the communications system must be interoperable, agile, trusted, and shared.”

Joint Publication 6-0, Joint Communications System

d. Component tactical communications systems must be responsive to the CJTF. Because of their inherent capabilities, all communications are considered for joint use. Commercial communications systems may offer a cost-effective alternative means to satisfy the commander’s needs and may effectively augment DOD constrained resources.

e. The complexity of joint operations and the finite amount of communications system resources may require the CJTF to adjudicate or assign subordinate commands responsibilities for providing this support. This normally is done in annex K (Communications System) to the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan.

f. The design of a communications system should be based on the continuous need for quality information to support JTF operations. Figure X-1 provides information quality criteria to be used by the JTF staff. USSTRATCOM or Service network operations (NETOPS) components control the communications system with input from the CJTF to ensure data and information get to the right place on time and in a form that is quickly usable by its intended recipients.

INFORMATION QUALITY CRITERIA

- **ACCURACY** - information that conveys the true situation.
- **RELEVANCE** - information that applies to the mission, task, or situation ahead.
- **TIMELINESS** - information that is available in time to make decisions.
- **USABILITY** - information that is in common, easily understood format and displays.
- **COMPLETENESS** - all necessary information required by the decision maker.
- **BREVITY** - information that has only the level of detail required.
- **SECURITY** - information that has been afforded adequate protection where required.

Figure X-1. Information Quality Criteria

g. The JTF establishing authority ensures communications system requirements are supported; coordinates these activities; prepares policy and guidance; and ensures JTF systems compatibility.

h. Communications systems must be interoperable, flexible, responsive, agile, disciplined, survivable, and sustainable.

“We are talking about moving information at speeds and in forms that permit winning at minimum cost.”

GEN F. M. Franks, Jr., USA

2. Organization

J-6 Organization. Figure X-2 depicts a notional JTF J-6 organization. The actual composition of the J-6 will be dictated by the overall JTF organization and operations to be conducted. Several of the J-6’s functions may be placed under the joint network operations control center (JNCC).




Figure X-2. Notional Joint Task Force J-6 Organization with Joint Network Operations Control Center

3. Responsibilities of the Joint Task Force Establishing Authority

- a. Ensure that communications system personnel, communications security (COMSEC), and equipment requirements are supported.
- b. Coordinate communications system activities with the CJCS, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations, Services, combatant commands, component forces, and others, as appropriate.
- c. Prepare communications system policy and guidance to enable subordinate forces to operate within the combatant command structure.
- d. Ensure or facilitate compatibility of subordinate communications systems.

4. Commander, Joint Task Force Communications System Support Responsibilities

- a. Provide overall management and protection of all communications systems not within joint or Service-provided NETOPS supporting the JTF.
- b. Ensure a compatible, adequate, and effective communications system that allow reliable, near-continuous access to enterprise information and services are available to support JTF C2 infrastructure.
- c. Publish communications system plans, annexes, and operating instructions to support the assigned mission and coordinate these plans prepared by subordinate commands.
- d. Adjudicate or assign subordinate commands the responsibility to provide communications systems support based on the situation or available resources.
- e. Use the request for forces message process to gain additional capability or assets beyond what is assigned to the JTF, to include the US Joint Forces Command's JCSE. See subparagraph 6a for a discussion of JCSE capabilities.
- f. Coordinate and provide CJTF/CCDR directives to joint/Service NETOPS functions to ensure the proper level of service to JTF operations and units.

5. Joint Task Force Communications Officer Responsibilities

- a. Determine personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate and forward these requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.
- b. Provide the communications system to support reliable, timely information flow in support of joint operations. This includes the development of communications system architectures and

plans, as well as policy, guidance, and instructions for the integration and installation of operational communications system. The JTF J-6 exercises staff supervision of all communications system assets. This also includes CJCS-controlled transportable assets, automated information systems, COMSEC, and networks necessary to accomplish the overall JTF mission.

c. Ensure that subordinate Service or component HQ establish NETOPS centers. The JTF J-6 establishes clear lines of communications and reporting obligations between control centers. Each element of the JTF must have clearly defined missions and responsible areas within the network.

d. Coordinate cross-servicing agreements between the JTF HQ, component planners, and the JNCC. The JTF J-6 establishes a JNCC to manage the communications system deployed during operations and exercises. The JNCC:

(1) Exercises control and technical management over communications control centers belonging to deployed components and subordinate commands.

(2) Serves as the senior control agency for management and operational direction of the joint communications networks and infrastructure.

(3) Performs planning, execution, technical, and management functions.

(4) Develops and disseminates standards and procedures; collects and presents communications system management statistical data. The JNCC manages all tactical communications systems and strategic communication connectivity as defined by the joint operational architecture.

e. Review all communications system plans prepared by subordinate component commanders. The JTF J-6 facilitates the execution of all communications system actions to maximize support to the CJTF and adjudicates any conflicts.

f. Provide J-6 planning support to the JTF.

g. Direct NETOPS and retain situational awareness. The JNCC requires timely support from a subordinate command's communications control center, commonly referred to as systems control or network operations and security center (NOSC). Subordinate command and agency NOSC are responsible for assimilating and integrating NETOPS situational awareness of their respective operational areas.

6. Associated Communications Responsibilities

a. Joint Communications Support Element

(1) The JCSE is a unique communications systems organization under the OPCON of the US Joint Forces Command. Headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, FL, the JCSE consists

of an active duty element of about 500 personnel and two Air National Guard joint communications support squadrons. JCSE's primary mission is to provide tactical communications support for two simultaneously deployed JTFs and two JSOTFs. The JCSE possesses a wide range of tactical communications systems capabilities tailored to meet a variety of contingency missions. The unit is staffed with personnel from all the Services and is equipped with a wide array of tactical and commercial communications equipment.

(2) Use the process discussed in subparagraph 4e above to request JCSE support.

(3) JCSE personnel are allocated to support communications system requirements during predeployment, ADVON deployment, main-force deployment, and employment phases.

(4) JCSE has a variety of transmission equipment available for employment to meet the requirements of a JTF or JSOTF HQ. Included are: military (ultrahigh frequency [UHF], super-high frequency [SHF]), extremely high frequency, and commercial satellite systems (C, Ku, Ka, international maritime satellite), tropospheric scatter, and line of sight microwave.

(5) JCSE can provide a full range of C2 support capability including voice, classified or unclassified data, and VTC.

(6) JCSE can provide communications packages to subordinate and component HQs that include: SHF satellite terminals, multiplexing equipment, and UHF single channel satellite systems. These packages are tailored to the requirement. Subordinate HQs include JSOTF HQ, special forces operations bases, and naval special warfare task groups.

b. **Turnkey C2** is a US Joint Forces Command initiative to facilitate more effective and efficient JTF HQ equipping efforts. See Chapter II, "Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization and Staffing," subparagraph 2b (5) (c) for further details.

c. **Defense Information System Agency or Joint Task Force Global Network Operations Liaison Officer.** This LNO serves as the principal interface between the JTF J-6 and DISA HQ and assists the JTF J-6 in coordinating, planning, executing, and evaluating the defense information infrastructure (DII) of the Global Information Grid. DISA manages the employment of communications resources at designated gateways and extends the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) services to tactical networks. DISA contingency and support plans provide guidance for the request and termination of DISN services in the tactical environment. The appropriate DISA theater NETOPS center supervises the allocation, routing, and restoration of channels and circuits to provide positive DISN support of deployed forces.

d. **Regional Space Support Center Liaison Officer (RSSCLO).** The RSSCLO serves as the primary point of contact in coordinating all ground mobile forces satellite requirements for JTF support. The CJTF requests deployment of the RSSCLO when needed.

e. **Frequency Management Detachment.** A frequency management detachment, known as a joint spectrum management element, normally deploys with the JTF. The detachment

coordinates, manages, and deconflicts joint force frequency allocation and assignments with the area-supported CCDR's J-6 and HN communications authorities.

f. CJCSM 6231 series, *Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications*, provides a detailed description of each tactical communication element, its responsibilities, and reporting requirements.

g. **Joint Communications Security Management Office (JCMO).** The JCMO, based at MacDill Air Force Base, FL, provides joint COMSEC support to meet the operational needs of the joint planning and execution community, traditional and nontraditional allies, and non-DOD agencies. JCMO is the controlling authority for all joint intertheater COMSEC packages material and all global Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) COMSEC programs. Deploying forces require JCMO controlled keying material to communicate. JCMO controls worldwide joint COMSEC access, including multinational circuits in support of shared early warning systems.

7. Communications Requirements

a. JTF HQ and each assigned component must be prepared to provide its own communications support. JTF HQ communications support may be provided by the JCSE or other CJCS-controlled assets when requested by the supported CCDR and approved by the CJCS. However, if the JCSE is already committed, the supported CCDR may direct that this support be provided by a Service component or a consolidation of assets from the CCDR's components. In either case, communications support to the JTF HQ and connectivity to the components routinely will be coordinated by the JTF J-6.

b. Extension of the DISN services into the assigned JOA initially is accomplished through Teleport, Standardized Tactical Entry Points (STEPS) sites, Defense Satellite Communications System entry points, and high frequency entry stations. As forces build in the JOA, requirements will surge past the capability of STEP sites to support. Other means to connect the JTF with the DISN will be introduced into the JOA to include commercial satellite and leased communications services. These systems will assume the primary support role from the STEP sites due to their greater bandwidth and ability to put the tactical entry point within the JOA. DISA will direct the employment of communications resources at designated gateways to extend DISN services to tactical networks. DISA contingency and support plans provide guidance on the requesting and termination of DISN services in the tactical environment. The DISA Global NETOPS Support Center or theater NETOPS centers will supervise the allocation, routing, and restoration of channels and circuits of the DII to provide DISN services for positive communications support of deployed forces.

c. Component commanders may be tasked with providing personnel and equipment required to install, operate, and maintain communications for their HQ support and for communications circuits from the component HQ to subordinate commanders. Additionally, component commanders may be tasked to provide communications from their component HQ to the CJTF.

d. When two or more commanders are collocated, communications system requirements will be coordinated and consolidated to the maximum degree possible. The JTF J-6 will initiate and coordinate any cross-servicing agreements with the JNCC (if formed) and the component planners. Additionally, component commanders may be tasked to provide communications (i.e., a deployable joint C2 capability) from their component HQ to the JTF.

8. Information Systems Support

a. **The JTF J-6 has overall responsibility for JTF information systems support.** The J-6:

- (1) Co-chairs the JIMB with the IMO.
- (2) In consultation with the CCDR's J-6, JTF staff elements, JTF components, and other supporting organizations, develops the JTF communications plan (annex K) to include the establishment of C2 systems architecture.
- (3) Establishes a JNCC — single control agency for the management and operational direction of the joint communications network.
- (4) Establishes a technical help desk for network and systems administration issues for information systems (e.g., collaboration software and COP systems).
- (5) Assists the IMO in developing documented processes and procedures for standardizing and effectively using information systems and technology.
- (6) Processes security accreditation packages for CJTF approval.
- (7) Establishes network and electronic mail (E-mail) accounts, JTF telephone directories, and E-mail global address lists.
- (8) In consultation with the CCDR's J-6, JTF staff elements, JTF components, and other supporting organizations; consolidates and validates a list of communications system requirements based on validated information exchange requirements. Ensures compliance with the joint technical architecture and submits a validated list to the JTF chief of staff.
- (9) Oversees the process of providing network status and architecture to the JOC in coordination with the JNCC.
- (10) Establishes information assurance procedures in accordance with the IMP.
- (11) Plans for, and ensures, network and communications or computer system training and familiarization for JTF staff and augmentees is accomplished.

(12) Plans and ensures that deployed nonmilitary information systems are open and nonproprietary with commonly accepted standards and protocols that interoperate with military information systems. This should be coordinated by the supported combatant command prior to establishment of a JTF.

(13) Manages network drive storage, and backs up and restores network drive data.

(14) Appoints the JTF Web administrator.

(15) Appoints the JTF records manager.

(16) Assigns appropriately trained and certified personnel to privileged user and information assurance management positions.

b. The J-6 ensures information systems support complements the overall IMP. See Appendix D, "Information Management," for additional information.

9. Multinational Communications System Support Standardization and Procedures

a. Multinational communications system operations may be comprised of allied or coalition partners. Coalitions can be composed of diverse groups of security and information sharing systems. MNFs may have differences in their communications system, language, terminology, doctrine, and operating standards that can cause confusion and interoperability problems in an operational environment. Once the CJTF establishes the specific C2 organization for a joint or multinational operation, the information exchange requirements are established as communications system planning begins. Planning considerations include electromagnetic spectrum management, equipment compatibility, procedural compatibility, cryptographic and information security, identification friend or foe, and data link protocols. The makeup of these multinational systems is subject to instantaneous change. These and other planning considerations are further amplified below:

(1) **Establish Liaison Early.** Effective communications system interface in joint and multinational operations demands the use of liaison teams. Their importance as a source of both formal and informal information exchange cannot be overstated. Requirements for liaison should be established early and to the extent possible, liaison teams should be trained and maintained for known or anticipated requirements.

(2) **Early Identification of Communications Systems Requirements.** The demand for information often exceeds the capabilities of communications system assets within joint and multinational commands. It is crucial that the CJTF identify communications system requirements early that are external to the command or require support from national or HN communications system resources (e.g., space-based systems support, CJCS-controlled assets, JCSE, NATO Standing communications systems equipment pool, and frequency spectrum). Multinational

communications system support planning must include the early establishment and incorporation of multinational networks. Resources need to be identified and planned for accordingly.

(3) **Standardization of Principles.** Standardization of principles and procedures by MNFs for multinational communications is essential. As US forces introduce new technology and become network-centric, this area of concern becomes increasingly important. NETOPS; including activities conducted to monitor, control, and protect US networks; must be reevaluated in the context of multinational networks.

(a) New technology also can be introduced by nations other than the United States that may require standardization of principles and procedures.

(b) **Standardization of principles and procedures will be a challenge regardless of the situation and may not even be achievable.**

(c) Every effort should be made to have MNFs participate in exercises with DISA to confirm interoperability of their equipment with US equipment. This can be accomplished through the Joint Interoperability Test Command.

(4) **Agreement in Advance of Military Operations.** Multinational communications agreements should be made in advance of all phases of military operations with probable multinational partners. These should cover principles, procedures, and overall communications requirements (including standard message text formats, cryptographic or COMSEC requirements, standard databases and data formats, electromagnetic spectrum management, and procedures for deconflicting frequency problems between multinational and civilian organizations). Proposed multinational communications agreements should take into account existing treaty obligations as well as applicable SOFAs or status of mission agreements between the United States and other nations. Conditions may exist that require units to provide US communications equipment and personnel to facilitate connectivity with multinational partners. Requests for equipment to support this requirement should be addressed early with the supported combatant command.

(5) **US Interpreters.** The United States will provide or acquire its own interpreters to ensure that US interests are adequately protected.

(6) **Releasability.** This planning consideration pertains to US keying material and equipment, and allied connectivity to US networks. The operational acceptability and disclosure or release of communications security to foreign governments for multinational use will be determined and approved by the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee before entering into discussions with foreign nationals. CJTFs and their staffs should be aware of the limitations in sharing classified information, especially information from space platforms or other national assets, with multinational partners. CJTFs must plan for the additional time and coordination necessary to ensure compliance with established security requirements. See subparagraph 9d for more details concerning sharing information.

For more detailed guidance on foreign access, connections and COMSEC release see CJCSIs 6510.06, Communications Security Releases to Foreign Nations, and 6211.02B, Defense Information Systems Network (DISN): Policy, Responsibilities and Processes, and CJCSM 6510.01, Defense-in-Depth: Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense.

(7) **Disclosure Policy.** Foreign disclosure officers should be appointed early in the planning process at all levels of command involved in multinational operations. Their primary purpose is to ensure common understanding of information that can be shared with multinational partners.

b. CJTFs and staffs must consider several factors as they establish a multinational architecture.

(1) Rapidly determine what is shared, when, and with whom. Adapting a network to meet dynamic information-sharing rules advances modern warfighting operations in a multinational environment.

(2) Understand the mission, intent, and CONOPS. Different phases of a multinational operation necessitate different and distinct levels of communications system support.

(3) Have a comprehensive knowledge of the multinational structure and relationships.

c. Communications system planning must be an integral part of CJTF planning. Commanders and planners must:

(1) Understand, expect, anticipate, and be prepared to deal with change.

(2) Clearly understand the capabilities and limitations of available strategic, operational, and tactical communications system resources.

(3) Ensure that communications to facilitate information sharing are established with non-US and HN commanders.

(4) Identify communications system requirements that exceed the capabilities within the joint or MNF and coordinate (electromagnetic spectrum, equipment, or connectivity) any mitigating actions through appropriate channels when HN support is required.

(5) Ensure communications system capabilities and employment procedures for non-US forces are understood. To enhance multinational operations, at least three options for communications system assets and interoperability are available.

(a) Use system-to-system compatibility to ensure interoperability. The United States may have to provide communications system resources to multinational partners to achieve this status.

(b) Establish and manage an interface between incompatible communications systems through a combination of interface hardware, software, and tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure interoperability.

(c) Establish basic (often voice or data) communications links and facilitate unified action through the use of tactics, techniques, and procedures and liaison personnel.

(d) Although any multinational operation is likely to use a mix of these three methods, the wider the participation, the greater will be the reliance on the use of voice links and liaison personnel.

To focus on enhanced communications system combat capabilities for US military forces to communicate and share data and information with MNFs, refer to CJCSI 2700.01B, International Military Agreements for Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States, Its Allies, and Other Friendly Nations.

d. It is important for CJTFs to take into consideration that during multinational operations, some MNFs or organizations may be “outside the wire.” This will require some form of a communications system to ensure these forces and organizations have interoperability and remain part of the “team.”

(1) The JTF can facilitate information sharing by coordinating with the supported CCDR to establish a coalition local area network such as the CENTRIXS.

(2) CENTRIXS defines the standards for establishing and maintaining multinational connectivity at the tactical and operational level, with reach-back capability to the strategic level. The basic CENTRIXS operational architecture framework is the same for all combatant commands and leverages existing networks, technology, and network centers.

(3) CENTRIXS services include E-mail, web, chat, and COP capabilities and uses controlled interfaces for two-way information flows among US military commands and multinational partners.

e. The Joint Staff J-6 is the office of primary responsibility for communications system multinational doctrine.

10. Global Command and Control System

GCCS is a suite of software applications and hardware designed for planning, execution, C2 of forces, data, information and multi-discipline intelligence processing. The system receives multiple sensor feeds and reports that assist in the development of the COP. Planning and execution applications also support supply, maintenance, transportation, acquisition, finance, personnel, engineering, and force health protection (FHP) needs. As a system, it supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CCDRs through JOPES in contingency and crisis action planning.

To further assist the JTF J-6 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex H, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-6,” to Appendix B, “Checklists.”

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APPENDIX A
COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE PERSONAL AND SPECIAL STAFFS

- Annex A Personal Staff: Public Affairs
- B Personal Staff: Staff Judge Advocate
- C Personal Staff: Chaplain
- D Personal Staff: Surgeon
- E Personal Staff: Inspector General
- F Personal Staff: Provost Marshal
- G Personal Staff: Comptroller
- H Special Staff: Headquarters Commandant
- I Special Staff: Historian
- J Special Staff: Safety Officer

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A PERSONAL STAFF: PUBLIC AFFAIRS

“ . . . we are meeting today in what is the beginning of the sixth year in which our nation has been engaged in what promises to be a long struggle against an enemy that in many ways is unlike any our country has ever faced. And in this war, some of the most critical battles may not be fought in the mountains of Afghanistan or the streets of Iraq, but in the newsrooms in places like New York and London and Cairo and elsewhere.”

**Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Council on Foreign Relations
17 February 2006**

1. Overview

a. It is the responsibility of DOD to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand facts about national security and defense strategy.

“Media coverage of operations and the real-time dissemination of information will also dramatically affect international relations and strategic interaction. Operations will involve a ‘fight of ideas.’ Losing that battle can mean losing the ‘moral high-ground’ in the public arena and can lead to defeat as quickly as a decisive military victory.”

The Joint Operational Environment - The World Through 2020 and Beyond

b. PA operations communicate truthful information, good and bad, to internal and external audiences, producing global influence and deterrence, public trust and support, and morale and readiness of forces. The CJTF must be prepared for a surge of local, regional, and international interest upon arrival in the JOA. If the press is not already in the JOA to cover military activities, the CJTF may be asked to take the media to the appropriate locations to ensure coverage.

(1) PAOs must be involved in all phases of operational planning; advise the CJTF on potential implications of operational decisions on public perception; and prepare the CJTF and applicable personnel to address the media prior to arrival in the JOA. PA representatives should participate in JTF centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams as appropriate.

(2) PA personnel must review or develop PA plans and ensure they support strategic communication objectives and are developed in conjunction with other public communications efforts (e.g., PSYOP, CA) prior to or immediately upon arriving in the JOA. The use of coordinated communication plans and efforts throughout operations allows for the delivery of consistent messages to key audiences and serves to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests and policies.

(3) There are several fundamentals of information that guide commanders for effective employment of PA operations and for an appropriate relationship with the media and apply across the range of military operations. These basics complement the “DOD Principles of Information” and describe the best practices to follow when fighting in the global information environment.

(a) **Tell the Truth.** JTF PA personnel will only release truthful information. The long-term success of PA operations depends on maintaining the integrity and credibility of officially released information. Deceiving the public undermines trust in and support for the Armed Forces and military operations. Accurate, balanced, credible presentation of information leads to confidence in the Armed Forces and the legitimacy of operations.

(b) **Provide Timely Information.** CJTFs should be prepared to release timely, factual, coordinated, and approved information about military operations. The global visibility of operations can affect strategic or operational deterrence and effect commanders’ decisions. Stories in the global information environment may be inaccurate, incomplete, or presented out of context. They may be based on rumor or be the result of intentional disinformation efforts. Commanders must anticipate how adversaries might attempt to shape the information environment and prevent adversaries from setting the terms of a conflict in the public arena. Timely release of truthful information enables the CJTF to frame the public debate. Timely release of truthful information also applies to difficult issues and events. Attempting to deny unfavorable information or failing to acknowledge its existence leads to media speculation, the perception of cover-up, and lost public trust.

(c) **Practice Security at the Source.** All DOD personnel are responsible for safeguarding sensitive information. As sources of information, each DOD member should be aware of OPSEC issues, whether being interviewed by the media or sharing information with family or friends. Therefore, it is critically important that information be approved for public dissemination before it is released.

(d) **Provide Consistent Information at All Levels.** The global information environment enables the public to simultaneously receive information about military operations from many levels. Media coverage routinely combines reports from the operational area with information released at higher levels up to and including DOD. CJTFs should ensure that DOD PA has the latest information about operations to disseminate a consistent message about military activities. Information released should be appropriately coordinated and in compliance with official guidance before it is released to the public.

(e) **Tell the DOD Story.** Every military and civilian member of the DOD should help provide accurate information about the Armed Forces and national defense operations to the public consistent with OPSEC. Although commanders may designate a single spokesperson, they should educate and encourage all personnel to tell the DOD story by providing them with timely information that is appropriate for public release. By projecting confidence and knowledge during interviews or talking to family and friends, DOD personnel can help educate the public about military operations.

c. The level of effort required to support the media consistent with CJTF objectives must be developed as soon as planning begins. Once the media learn that forces are preparing for a deployment, the information likely will be reported in a manner accessible by adversary forces. The information environment needs to be shaped with pre-planned themes and messages. PA facilitates media access to meet CJTF objectives including countering or neutralizing adversary disinformation efforts. PA demands are highest at the outset of operations as they inform the public via the media about military activities to the maximum extent possible consistent with OPSEC and personnel safety.

d. PA assets should be deployed as early as possible (preferably with the ADVON) to help in handling the media and facilitate maximum coverage within the operational area.

e. PAO should be viewed as a force multiplier and be involved during each step of the operational planning process. PA activities should be tailored to support missions across the entire range of military operations.

(1) PAO should establish information goals based on guidance from the CJTF.

(2) PAO is responsible for developing annex F (Public Affairs) of the CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

(3) The PA staff must ensure their efforts are coordinated. The formation of an information coordination committee or an interagency WG, under the supervision of the deputies or principals committees, may be necessary to integrate, coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize information dissemination plans and activities derived from PA, PSYOP, and the interagency at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

(a) A continual exchange of information must exist during execution.

(b) **Although messages that support PA, IO, and CA products are different, they must be coordinated to ensure they do not negatively impact one another.** Even though each has its own specific audiences, information often will overlap and make message deconfliction crucial. However, PA operations and activities must always be based upon the truth and shall not focus on directing or manipulating public actions or opinion.

(c) PA and IO products should provide a timely flow of information to external and internal audiences. Based on policy, PA and PSYOP must be separate and distinct even though they often reinforce each other. Each function requires distinct efforts to plan, resource, and execute as part of the commander's OPLAN. Therefore, IO representatives should coordinate with command PA offices supporting the joint information bureau (JIB) and PA representatives present within joint planning organizations such as the JPG, operations planning group, or IO cell.

(d) PA and IO products must be coordinated and deconflicted early in the planning process and during execution. Although PA and IO generated information may be different, they must not contradict one another or their credibility will be lost. Under no circumstances

will personnel working in PA functions or activities engage in IO activities. Commanders will establish separate agencies and facilities for PA and IO activities, with PA being the commander's primary contact with the media.

For further details, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations.

2. Commander, Joint Task Force Responsibilities

a. Provides overall direction and focus to PA activities in the operational area.

b. Ensures that the media receive access to military operations, access to command and staff personnel for briefings and interviews, and the logistic support necessary to accomplish their mission.

c. Designates JTF PAO and a JIB director.

d. Selects a trained and capable officer to serve as media briefer.

e. Conducts media interviews when feasible.

f. Designates an officer to accomplish a security review of combat camera imagery. All unclassified imagery not of a sensitive nature should immediately be provided to the JIB for potential release to the media.

g. Figure A-A-1 depicts a joint PA organization.

3. Joint Information Bureau, Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, and Combat Camera

a. **Joint Information Bureau.** The CJTF should consider establishing a JIB to manage media operations and facilitate media coverage within the JOA.

(1) The JIB also facilitates dissemination of information to internal and external audiences.

(2) Additionally, it provides a central location for news and media access and support. The JIB typically will be located in a facility convenient to the media. Good coordination links to the JTF PAO and staff are essential.

(3) The CJTF should appoint a JIB director to manage JIB operations on behalf of the JTF PAO.

(a) The JIB director, with supporting JIB staff, is responsible for coordinating all media operations within the operational area, and provides and coordinates support to the CJTF through the JTF PAO.




Figure A-A-1. Joint Force Public Affairs Organization

(b) The JIB director is responsible to the JTF PAO for all activities conducted in support of the media relations mission. This includes close coordination with the joint force operations staff to ensure that releasable information is accurate, timely and is issued with security sensitivities in mind. The JIB director also must ensure that HN sensitivities and media guidelines are considered. The deputy JIB director performs these functions in the absence of the JIB director and assists in the management of the tasks associated with support of the joint operation, including daily feedback summaries that include media support activities, analysis of media reporting, and theme or message development.

b. Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS). The deployment of AFRTS offers the CJTF and PAO an important means to communicate directly to DOD personnel in the operational area, as well as DOD personnel and family members in other locations. AFRTS outlets may not be used for any type of political purpose or PSYOP, and may not produce or broadcast programming to serve interests other than the DOD internal audience. Deployment of AFRTS assets into an operational area usually requires special approvals for frequencies, real estate, and facilities

which must normally be coordinated by the JIB. The senior AFRTS officer commands the AFRTS station and serves as a member of the JIB.

c. **Combat Camera.** The deployment of combat camera teams offers the CJTF a sophisticated capability to enhance operational and PA missions.

(1) The still and video images produced provide a balance of useful operational information. Combat camera products should be reviewed for OPSEC as soon as possible. Imagery that does not violate OPSEC should be forwarded as expeditiously as possible to the JIB for possible release by PA. This is particularly helpful for the JIB as combat camera teams sometimes have access to events and areas unavailable to media representatives and military journalists. Further, they bring with them a technological capability allowing for the timely transmission of images during fast-moving operations and the documentation of operations in austere environments.

(a) All imagery, regardless of clearance or release status, should be forwarded as expeditiously as possible to the DOD Joint Combat Camera Center via the joint combat camera management team.

(b) **Advance planning for combat camera should include in theater declassification and delegation of in-theater release of unclassified combat camera products to the JIB director to meet time-sensitive media requirements.**

(2) By doctrine, combat camera is assigned to the J-3. As a major user of combat camera imagery, it is imperative that PAO identify specific imagery acquisition requirements for inclusion in J-3 taskings to combat camera.

(3) See CJCSI 3205.01B, *Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM)*, for additional details regarding combat camera policy, procedures, tasking of combat camera assets, and appropriate use and distribution of products.

For further details concerning PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A PERSONAL STAFF: STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

1. Responsibilities

a. The JTF SJA is the principal legal advisor to the CJTF and is responsible for the training, equipping, and employment of legal personnel assigned or attached to the JTF. The SJA provides the full spectrum of legal services to the CJTF and staff and coordinates with the supported CCDR's SJA to optimize legal support. As the CJTF's personal legal advisor, the SJA normally should have direct access. The advice should not be filtered through an intermediary. General responsibilities include:

(1) Task organize the SJA's office to meet the JTF's mission-specific requirements. The office must be joint and provide the mix of legal subject matter experts necessary to fully support the CJTF. The task organization will vary depending on the JTF mission.

(2) Provide legal advice and support to the CJTF and staff.

(a) Operational law (including law of armed conflict, ROE, RUF, law of the sea, airspace law, detention operations, SOFAs, status of mission agreements, concepts and regional issues concerning national sovereignty, and general international law).

(b) Military justice (including uniform policies to maintain good order and discipline, disposition for misconduct, and supervision of military justice process).

(c) Claims (including Personnel Claims Act, Military Claims Act, Foreign Claims Act, SOFA claims, tort claims, admiralty, solatium payments, Article 139 claims, and affirmative claims).

(d) Legal assistance.

(e) Administrative law (including environmental law, contract law, and fiscal law).

(f) Provide expertise in JTF rule of law operations.

(3) Provide legal advice to centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams across the various staff sections covering the full spectrum of JTF staff operations (including but not limited to participation in the JPG, targeting boards, current and future operations cells, contracting and acquisition boards, detention review boards, civil support teams, reconstruction boards).

(4) Serve as a single point of contact for component SJAs regarding legal matters affecting forces assigned or attached to the JTF.

(5) Serve as a CJTF point of contact with the interagency, IGOs, and NGOs in the execution of rule of law operations.

(6) Provide assistance with drafting command policies, orders, and international agreements.

(7) Ensure all plans, ROE, RUF, policies, and directives are consistent with DOD law of armed conflict (law of war) program and domestic and international law.

(a) Draft appendix 4 (Legal) to annex E (Personnel) of the CJTF's OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan (legal services support plan) and oversee execution of the legal services support plan at the JTF and component levels (component SJAs primarily are responsible for the execution of the legal services support plan, except as concerns JTF staff members).

(b) Assist in the development, review, and drafting of general and restrictive orders (e.g., General Order No. 1).

(c) Assist in the development, review, and drafting of appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement) to annex C (Operations), as well as requesting modification of ROE or RUF. The SJA or a representative is a member of the ROE or RUF WG.

Refer to Chapter IV, "Joint Task Force Command and Control," Paragraph 7 for more details on ROE and RUF in accordance with CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, (SECRET). See Chapter VII, "Joint Task Force Operations," subparagraph 3p for more details on the ROE or RUF WG.

(d) Assist in the development, review, and drafting of appendix 1 (Enemy Prisoners of War [EPW], Civilian Internees [CI], and Other Detained Persons [DET]) to annex E (Personnel).

(e) Review the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan for legal sufficiency.

(f) Review target and weapon plans for compliance with the law of armed conflict. In this regard the SJA or a representative should be a member of the JTCCB, if one is established (see Chapter VII, "Joint Task Force Operations," for more details on the JTCCB).

(8) Coordinate and oversee JTF and component ROE and RUF training.

(9) Assist in resolving claims for compensation by foreign personnel within the JOA. The SJA also must consider similar circumstances for JTFs conducting domestic operations.

(10) Assist in resolving cases where foreign authorities assert criminal jurisdiction over US forces within the JOA. The SJA also must consider similar circumstances for JTFs conducting domestic operations.

b. Capture and share joint legal lessons learned, issues and significant observations from training events and operations and provide input to the appropriate lessons learned organization.

2. The Planning Process

a. The SJA must be involved throughout the planning process, including strategy and COA development, to ensure that plans comply with US and international laws, treaties, and agreements. SJA involvement in the planning process from the beginning is especially critical to the issues of EPWs, detainees, CMO, targeting, ROE, or RUF.

b. **Legal Estimate.** The SJA also develops the legal estimate during the planning process. The legal estimate is contained in appendix 4, (Legal) to annex E, (Personnel) and should reflect the description of legal support required to support the CJTF and the assigned mission as developed during the planning process. It should include a review of laws that influence and govern the operations to include foreign and domestic statutes and regulations as well as international treaties and customs. The legal estimate should clearly identify all anticipated issues related to the law of war, human rights, claims, contracts and procurement, HNS, fiscal law, environmental law, SOFAs, and status of mission agreements. Specifically, the legal estimate should:

(1) Describe any legal considerations (authorities and limitations) that may affect implementation of the plan or order.

(2) Cite applicable references and inter-Service, HN, and reciprocal support agreements.

(3) Define key terms.

(4) Identify the legal section organization and staffing.

(5) Describe the provision of legal assistance and military justice support to the JTF; including claims, military justice, legal assistance, trial defense, and trial judiciary services.

(6) Identify the requirements for submitting legal status reports.

(7) Identify the authority under US and international law, agreements, and arrangements for military operations and the use of force; including freedom of navigation and overflight/ access of international and sovereign national airspace in support of military operations for all en route and operational areas.

(8) Describe the exercise of disciplinary authority over members of other Services, including establishment of joint command convening authority.

(9) Describe the process and procedures for responding to assertions of foreign criminal jurisdiction over US personnel. The SJA also must consider similar circumstances for JTFs conducting domestic operations.

- (10) Identify SOFA and status of mission agreement issues.
- (11) Describe the legal ability to negotiate and conclude international agreements.
- (12) Describe the process for reporting and investigating serious incidents (e.g., fratricide, violations of the law of war, ROE, or RUF noncompliance).
- (13) Describe the process and procedures for responding to requests for political asylum and temporary refuge.
- (14) As appropriate, describe the legal issues relative to migrant and refugee operations.
- (15) Address legal issues related to civilian employees and contractor employees who accompany US forces abroad.
- (16) Identify the legal issues associated with the acquisition of real property, goods, and services during combat or other military operations.
- (17) Develop the legal procedures associated with accounting for captured weapons, war trophies, documents, and equipment.
- (18) Identify any fiscal law issues that may affect operations, to include fiscal and accountability issues related to property transfer or disposal.
- (19) Describe the legal issues related to provision of logistic support to non-USG entities, including MNF, HN authorities, NGOs, and IGOs.
- (20) Describe the legal review of plans, orders, and target lists at every echelon.
- (21) Identify the legal issues related to the treatment of EPWs and other detainees.
- (22) Describe the legal support for intelligence oversight and IO.
- (23) Describe the process for review of ethics issues, such as giving and accepting gifts.
- (24) Identify the environmental aspects of the operation.

For further details concerning legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A PERSONAL STAFF: CHAPLAIN

1. General

The JTF chaplain has the responsibility to plan, coordinate, and supervise the provision of all religious support within the JTF. The two primary tasks of the JTF chaplain are to provide or perform direct personal religious support, to include advising the CJTF and staff on moral and ethical decision-making, and to advise the CJTF and staff on the religious dynamics of the indigenous population in the operational area.

2. Responsibilities

- a. Developing joint religious support plans in support of the operation. This includes preparation of appendix 6 (Chaplain Activities), under annex E (Personnel) of the CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans, to include appropriate tabs.
- b. Identifying religious support team requirements, including:
 - (1) Personnel staffing and augmentation requirements.
 - (2) Facilities, equipment, transportation and communication requirements.
- c. Organizing the religious support teams to provide comprehensive religious support, to include:
 - (1) Coordinating religious support with Service component command chaplains.
 - (2) Maintaining liaison with the chaplains of MNFs and appropriate HN civilian religious leaders.
 - (3) Coordinating appropriate training for religious support teams.
- d. Coordinating with the other staff sections to ensure sufficient religious support assets are available to support combat forces, medical services, civilian detainees, prisoners of war, and other related areas.
- e. Recommending a JTF religious support policy.
- f. When appropriate, and in coordination with the CMOC, the JTF chaplain may conduct liaison with NGOs and IGOs.
- g. Providing religious support and pastoral care to the JTF staff.

For more detailed responsibilities of the JTF chaplain, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations.

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX A PERSONAL STAFF: SURGEON

1. General

a. The JTF surgeon is a senior medical department officer from the Army, Navy, or Air Force who has ideally completed the joint planning orientation course and the JTF senior medical leader seminar. As the JTF senior medical leader, the JTF surgeon serves as the CJTF's principal advisor for joint FHP and HSS, and reports directly to the CJTF. The JTF surgeon is responsible for the coordination, integration, and implementation of FHP and HSS policies and programs designed to protect and sustain the health of forces assigned or attached to the JTF; and directs personnel that comprise the JTF surgeon's office. FHP complements FP and is defined as all measures taken by commanders, leaders, individual Service members, and the Military Health System to promote and conserve the mental and physical well-being of Service members across the range of military operations. These measures enable the fielding of a healthy and fit force, prevention of injuries and illness, protection of the force from health threats, and the provision of excellent medical and rehabilitative care to those who become sick or injured anywhere in the world.

b. Working with the combatant command surgeon, the JTF surgeon assesses JTF FHP and HSS requirements and capabilities (both quantitatively and qualitatively), and provides recommendations to the CJTF. The responsibilities of the JTF surgeon are similar to those of the geographic combatant command surgeon. The JTF surgeon should:

(1) Expect to receive broad guidance and a general concept of medical operations from the combatant command surgeon.

(2) Determine JTF surgeon's office requirements, establishing and organizing the office, and preparing to deploy the section to conduct continuous (24-hour) operations.

(3) Advise the CJTF concerning the following:

(a) The health of the joint force such as disease and nonbattle injury/battle injury rates and other health factors that could affect JTF operations to include medical threat identification and protective measures.

(b) FHP and HSS aspects of joint operations.

(c) Rest, rotation, and reconstitution policies and procedures within the JOA.

(d) Prevention and protection measures and procedures; including immunizations, field sanitation and hygiene, veterinary services support, prophylactic countermeasures, and other risk management procedures.

(e) Health surveillance; including medical, occupational, and environmental.

(f) FHP operations during the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration phase of the joint force deployment process.

(g) The treatment and evacuation of US, joint, and MNF personnel within the JOA.

(4) Establish priorities for actions within the JTF surgeon's staff and identify HSS issues that are significant information reporting requirements.

(5) Determine requirements to establish, as a minimum an area joint blood program office (AJBPO), and a joint patient movement requirements center (JPMRC). If a JPMRC is not established to provide management for both regulating and patient evacuation, direct liaison must be established with the theater patient movement requirements center (TPMRC) or the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC) and Service patient movement components.

(6) Ensure that JTF FHP and HSS planning:

(a) Identifies and provides appropriate HSS resources and infrastructure that supports the CJTF's CONOPS at the operational and tactical levels.

(b) Provides the CJTF a healthy and fit force, prevent casualties, and manage and effectively care for casualties and the total delivery of responsive HSS to the deployed force.

(c) Provides essential care of the injured and ill in the JOA and their rapid evacuation to definitive medical care.

(d) Identifies joint deficiencies and risks, and develops joint alternative COAs to address shortfalls.

(e) Conducts HSS operations in a uniform manner that promotes collaborative planning between JTF components, DOD and other USG agencies, and appropriate NGOs and IGOs, HN and multinational participants, and builds on collaborative strengths.

(f) Considers as functional HSS categories for JTF planning: patient movement, blood program, hospitalization, forward resuscitative care capabilities, HSS for other than US forces, returns to duty, medical logistics, FHP, and preventive medicine, dental services, veterinary services, combat and operational stress control, medical communications system and intelligence, laboratory services, area medical support, and HNS or other US Federal agency support.

(g) Considers support for medical civil-military support operations.

(h) Provides for prescription refills of maintenance medications within the JOA.

(7) Ensure membership and required medical liaison relationships to appropriate JTF centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams.

(8) Provide, in conjunction with the JTF SJA, the CJTF with medical engagement protocol recommendations.

(9) Assist component commands in identifying FHP and HSS requirements and assign cross-Service support where practical; and conduct liaison with each component surgeon to ensure FHP and HSS support is provided and maintained.

(10) Establish the JTF operational area FHP, HSS and patient movement plan; and ensure efficient and effective interface of the theater and strategic aeromedical evacuation systems through the JPMRC.

(11) Monitor medical regulating and patient movement activities of the JPMRC and ensure procedures are established to provide patient in-transit visibility information to the JTF J-1.

(12) Assist the CJTF in formulating a recommended patient evacuation policy within the JOA and monitor evacuation requirements.

(13) Advise the CJTF on the medical analysis of the COAs and the medical estimate based on the integration of all health and safety risk assessments.

(14) Establish FHP and HSS procedures for operations in a CBRNE environment to include recommending the patient movement policy of contaminated patients.

(15) Provide analysis of medical intelligence or information to the JTF J-2 for inclusion in the JIPOE.

(16) Provide preventive medicine support and information on cultural issues relevant to interactions with HN medical systems; and participate in the selection of bed-down locations.

(17) Provide guidance for development of medical annexes to joint plans, HSS estimates, and patient estimates based on casualty planning factors.

(18) Coordinate with all other medical support activities in the JOA that may play a role in the mission to ensure unity of effort. These may include NGOs, IGOs, multinational medical units, HN medical assets, and other USG agencies and activities or interest in the public health sector.

(19) Coordinate all FHP and deployment health surveillance and readiness pre-deployment, deployment, employment, and redeployment activities and tasks.

(20) Be aware of the presence of SOF within the JOA and provide FHP and HSS support as required.

(21) Ensure appropriate medical care is provided for DOD emergency essential civilians, DOD contractors, allied military personnel, EPWs, and detainees per mission requirements, established medical engagement protocols, DOD policy, contractual obligation, or applicable national agreements.

(22) Plan for providing support in the prevention and treatment of stress.

(23) Monitor mass casualty plans for the JOA.

(24) Plan for support to PR operations.

(25) Coordinate disaster relief/humanitarian assistance augmentation, and provide HSS support to CA forces as required.

(26) Recommend the task organization of HSS units to satisfy all JTF mission requirements; and monitor the availability of, and recommend the reassignment and utilization of HSS assets in the JOA.

(27) Determine, in conjunction with the JTF SJA and the chain of command, the eligibility for medical care in JTF medical treatment facilities (MTFs).

(28) Maintain situational awareness by coordinating HSS information with the combatant command surgeon, component surgeons, JTF HSS units, multinational surgeons, and other agency medical support personnel as required.

(29) Coordinate HSS consultation services for the JTF to include telemedicine as required.

(30) Evaluate and interpret medical statistical data (biometrics).

(31) Recommend policies, and determine requirements and priorities for HSS logistics to include blood and blood products, medical supply and resupply, and medical equipment maintenance and repair services.

(32) Ensure medical records are established and maintained on patients that are treated at JTF MTFs.

(33) Ensure a viable veterinary program is established as required by mission requirements.

(34) Ensure a medical laboratory capability is established for the identification and confirmation of the use of suspect biological and chemical weapons agents against JTF forces as required by mission requirements.

(35) Integrate health risks with other operational risks using risk management principles to reduce the impact on JTF missions and personnel during joint operations.

(36) Evaluate and characterize the occupational and environmental health threats in the JOA and make recommendations for countermeasures to control or reduce occupational and environmental health, and safety threats that may impact personnel health or mission objectives.

(37) Promote FHP by evaluating and suggesting corrective measures for environmental factors that may affect the performance of JTF units within the JOA.

(38) Ensure individual informed consent is established as described in Executive Order 13139, "Improving Health Protection of Military Personnel Participating in Particular Military Operations," prior to the administration of investigational new drugs use as a countermeasure for endemic diseases in the JOA or to protect JTF forces against possible CBRNE agents.

(39) Ensure communications equipment compatibility, standardization of radio frequencies, report formats, treatment protocols, and requirements for equipment with allied, coalition, and multinational HSS units, and other USG agencies when appropriate.

(40) Ensure the development and distribution of a standardized operational and medical terminology reference guide to facilitate the synchronization of HSS efforts, and minimize misinterpretation with multinational HSS units.

(41) Promote and improve the health of the joint force through programs on injury prevention, dental health, good nutrition, tobacco use prevention and cessation, physical fitness and weight control, responsible sexual behavior, stress management, suicide prevention, alcohol and drug abuse prevention, and other health initiatives.

(42) Capture and apply operational and medical lessons learned.

(43) Communicate risks on health and safety including protective countermeasures and other topics such as use of chemoprophylaxis, sanitation, and first aid to JTF personnel in the JOA (to include all military personnel, essential DOD civilian, and contractor personnel who directly support deployed forces).

(44) Attend CJTF and chief of staff director's planning meetings and briefings, as required.

(45) Ensure the appropriate functions of FHP and HSS are integrated into the JTF HQ battle rhythm.

(46) Ensure medical modeling and simulation tools are used to tailor medical force structure to tactical missions during the deployment when available, and employ software to maintain a medical COP as an overlay to the warfighter COP.

(47) Assist CJTF with establishing specific medical readiness requirements to include pre-deployment and FHP requirements and any requisite individual medical training to include safety, first aid, sanitation, health threats, and health protection measures, including those related to CBRNE, and environmental threats; necessary for contingency contractors deploying with the force in the JOA.

(48) In conjunction with the JTF J-3 and J-4, ensure that HSS, either as a responsibility of the contractor or the CJTF is fully delineated in OPLANs, OPORDs, and contracts to assure appropriate medical staffing for CDF in the JOA.

(49) Establish a health surveillance capability in the JOA to monitor disease and environmental hazards, carry out significant event epidemiological investigations, coordinate activities of in-theater laboratory and support assets, provide related-support to units, assist with documenting in medical records environmental and occupational monitoring results and exposure diagnoses, and communicating health risks.

(50) In conjunction with the JTF SJA and supported combatant command surgeon, develop JTF policies and procedures for detainee medical care. Ensure policies and procedures for detainee medical care comply with DOD instructions and other existing guidance.

c. The JTF surgeon's office coordinates FHP and HSS matters for the JTF, under the leadership and guidance of the JTF surgeon. The surgeon's staff should be joint and reasonably balanced in numbers of personnel, experience, influence of position, and rank amongst the Services to effectively facilitate the following tasks:

- (1) Joint coordination of FHP and HSS initiatives.
- (2) Deployment health surveillance.
- (3) FHP and HSS operations sustain collaborative joint planning between combatant commands, Services, the interagency, NGOs, IGOs, and HN and multinational participants as required.
- (4) Standardization and interoperability.
- (5) Development of the HSS plan and COA analysis.
- (6) Review of subordinate plans and operations.
- (7) Joint coordination of intratheater patient movement.
- (8) Reach-back support to components.
- (9) FHP operations and HSS.

(10) The collection of FHP and HSS lessons learned data that provides operational documentation that result in recommendations for change to current plans and policy.

(11) The implementation of programs and processes that promote and sustain a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, protect the force from health threats, and deliver responsive HSS to the deployed force.

2. Organization

a. The JTF surgeon’s office is staffed and task organized based on the JTF mission and possesses the requisite expertise to adequately manage the functional areas shown in Figure A-D-1. Some considerations for determining the functions required by the staff include:

- (1) The amount of time required for planning and forming the staff.
- (2) HSS forces assigned.
- (3) The anticipated threat (including CBRNE).




Figure A-D-1. Functional Areas

- (4) Specialists required.
- (5) Size of the workspace (on a ship, in tents, in a building).
- (6) Environmental factors (tropical, mountainous, desert, arctic).
- (7) HN or multinational support.

b. The surgeon's staff may be organized as shown in Figure A-D-2. These positions represent the functional medical expertise the JTF surgeon may require to staff the surgeon's office. Some of the functions of these positions may be combined as necessary and appropriate to the JTF mission. The typical staff positions for a base JTF surgeon's office include: deputy surgeon, medical plans officer, medical operations officer, patient movement officer, preventive medicine or medical intelligence officer, medical logistic officer, area joint blood program officer (as required by the mission for an AJBPO), FHP officer, J-4 medical LNO, senior medical noncommissioned officer (NCO) or chief petty officer, medical operations NCO or petty officer, and administrative support staff.

3. Responsibilities

a. The mission of the JTF surgeon's office functional areas and primary staff are as follows:

(1) The **deputy JTF surgeon** is a senior medical planner from the Army, Navy, or Air Force who has ideally completed the joint medical planner's course, joint planning orientation course, and the JTF senior medical leader seminar. The deputy JTF surgeon often is seen as one of filling "gaps" when the JTF surgeon's staff requires specific detail guidance, and should assist the JTF surgeon by performing the following:

- (a) Determining office staffing, equipment, and transportation requirements.
- (b) Developing guidelines for types of medical supplies needed, supply procedures, stock-age levels, sizes and location of medical supply installations, and medical equipment maintenance support.
- (c) Assigning responsibilities to individual sections or individuals as appropriate, to include the assignment of liaisons to the JTF J-4, CMOC as required, joint civil-military coordination board as required, humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) as required; JIACG, and membership duties to the JPG and other JTF organizations as required.
- (d) Maintaining oversight of implementation of JTF surgeon's policies and procedures.
- (e) Supervising augmentation medical teams, as required.
- (f) Ensuring that the appropriate training is conducted for the JTF surgeon's staff.




Figure A-D-2. Notional Joint Task Force Surgeon's Office Organization

- (g) Maintaining a master policy file and monitoring the JTF surgeon's office SOP.
- (h) Supervising the plans and operations section of the JTF surgeon's office and the development of HSS plans.
 - (i) Keeping the JTF surgeon informed on the status of HSS throughout the JTF by monitoring the status of patient beds, evacuation requirements, joint blood program, medical logistics, veterinary support and food safety service programs, dental services and deployment health surveillance, and preventive medicine programs.
 - (j) Forming, organizing, and supervising appropriate JTF surgeon medical boards, offices, and cells as required.
 - (k) Directing the development of annex Q (Medical Services) of operation plans and orders.
 - (l) Compiling reports reflecting the overall JTF medical readiness.
 - (m) Establishing the JTF surgeon's battle rhythm.
 - (n) Coordinating and managing the JTF surgeon's office daily battle update assessment meeting.
 - (o) Coordinating with the JTF chief of staff to ensure that the appropriate functions of FHP and HSS are integrated into the JTF HQ battle rhythm.
 - (p) Serving as chief, joint medical operations center (JMOC) as required.
 - (q) Serving as member, JPG and joint medical working group (JMWG) as required.
 - (r) Performing JTF surgeon duties when directed.
 - (s) Monitoring JTF Surgeon's staff actions and functions to ensure compliance of assigned taskings (to include common administrative tasks).

(2) **JTF Surgeon Administrative Staff.** This staff provides administrative, planning, individual training, and personnel support services to the JTF surgeon and staff. The administrative staff may comprise of any combination of administrative NCOs or petty officers and a clerk typist.

(3) **Plans and Operations Section.** This section is the focal point for all HSS operational matters within the JTF surgeon's office. Its primary functions are to plan and develop the HSS infrastructure to protect the health of JTF forces and mitigate the effects of illness and injury within the JOA, and serve as the hub for achieving HSS situational awareness, by establishing a JMOC for information management and the facilitation of HSS synchronization.

Staffing may include a medical operations/plans officer, patient movement (evacuation) officer, environmental science officer or environmental health officer, senior medical operations NCO or chief petty officer.

(4) **The medical logistics section** is the central point for HSS logistics within JTF surgeon's office. Its primary function is to plan, develop, and coordinate the medical logistic infrastructure and support for the JTF. Staffing may include a medical logistic officer, an area joint blood program officer, and a JTF J-4 medical LNO.

(5) **The FHP section** is responsible for ensuring a vigorous and comprehensive joint FHP program within the JTF. Its primary function is to assist the JTF surgeon and component surgeons with establishing policies and procedures to deliver a healthy and fit force, prevent casualties, and maintain the health of the JTF while deployed. Staffing may include an industrial hygiene officer/bioenvironmental engineering officer, sanitary engineer, veterinary services officer, or public health officer/public health nurse.

(6) **The LNO section** primary functions are to monitor, coordinate, advise, and facilitate multinational HSS contributions. Medical LNOs provide the JTF surgeon with the capability of monitoring and synchronizing current, and future multinational HSS operations; foster effective coordination between multinational HSS staffs, and advises the JTF surgeon regarding the optimal utilization of multinational HSS capabilities. Staffing may include an international health officer LNO, HN HSS LNO, multinational force HSS LNO, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations LNOs, and USG LNOs, as appropriate.

(7) **JTF Surgeon Centers, Offices, Groups, Cells, and Teams.** The JTF surgeon may establish centers, offices, groups, cells, and teams or may be asked to provide medical liaison relationships to internal JTF organizations and teams to coordinate FHP and HSS issues. These boards, centers, cells, teams, and internal JTF organizations include, but are not limited to the following: JPMRC, AJBPO, JMOC, JMWG, J-4 medical liaison cell, HAST, ADVON team and CMOC.

(a) **Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center.** The JPMRC provides theater patient movement requirements capability for a JTF. The JPMRC is a deployable patient movement requirements center, under the OPCON of the CJTF. It maintains coordinating relationships and normally collocates with the JTF movement organization, and communicates movement requirements to the transportation component responsible for executing the mission. The JPMRC coordinates closely with the TPMRC and GPMRC for movement into theater controlled beds outside the JOA. JPMRC membership is coordinated between the supported combatant command surgeon and the GPMRC.

(b) **Area Joint Blood Program Office.** The geographic combatant command surgeon in collaboration with the JTF surgeon may direct the establishment of an AJBPO to provide regional blood management in the theater. The AJBPO may be established upon activation of a JTF as outlined in the respective OPLAN or OPORD. The AJBPO's scope of responsibilities

and functions are typically limited to a specific operational area. The AJBPO performs the following functions:

1. Determines and establishes, in conjunction with the combatant command joint blood program officer, blood and blood product distribution requirements to support the blood transshipment centers (BTCs), blood supply units (BSUs), and MTFs in the AJBPO operational area, regardless of Service component. Ensures the blood program meets Food and Drug Administration requirements for the tracking, transporting, and application of blood products.

2. Evaluates blood donor centers (BDCs), blood products depots (BPDs), BTCs, BSUs, and MTF transfusion services capabilities within the designated operational area to ensure the geographic CCDR's blood support requirements are met in accordance with JTF operation plans and orders.

a. AJBPO core membership includes a blood bank laboratory officer, who usually is dual-hatted as the deployed officer in charge of the area BTC, BSU, BPD, or BDC; along with logistic, clinical laboratory, and administrative NCOs/chief petty officers.

b. Supporting membership includes a laboratory technician and an administrative NCO or petty officer.

(c) Joint Medical Operations Center. To facilitate and provide responsive health services to the CJTF, medical resources must be effectively organized and synchronized to support joint operations. The JMOC is organized to plan, coordinate, and harmonize the JTF's HSS assets. It is organized with essential JTF surgeon staff to perform and manage the daily operations of the surgeon's office. The JMOC does not replace the AJBPO or the JPMRC. Staffing of the JMOC is situational dependent, but would normally include the following positions: operations officer (chief), plans officer, senior medical plans (NCO/chief petty officer), medical operations (NCO/chief petty officer), environmental science officer/environmental health officer (also functions as the medical intelligence officer), sanitary engineer/bioenvironmental engineer officer/industrial hygiene officer, joint medical logistic officer, HN liaisons, IGOs/NGOs/interagency liaison, MNF liaison, and administrative staff (clerk/typists and NCO/chief petty officer support as required).

(d) Joint Medical Working Group. The JMWG provides a forum for medical planners to validate, coordinate, and synchronize issues identified through the logistic coordination board of the SJFHQ or the JTF JPG, and from other JTF centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams as appropriate. Once established, the JMWG functions are integrated into the JTF surgeon's staff battle rhythm.

1. JMWG core membership includes the supported geographic combatant command medical planner, JTF medical planner, JTF patient movement officer, JTF medical logistic officer, JTF component medical planners and the JTF J-4 medical cell LNO.

2. Supporting membership includes: deputy JTF surgeon, industrial hygiene officer/bioenvironmental engineer officer/sanitary engineer, JTF area joint blood program officer, JTF international health officer, veterinary services officer, and preventive medicine officer/public health officer/public health nurse.

(e) **J-4 Medical Liaison Cell.** This cell functions as a coordinating group for health service logistic planning and operations, and serves as a conduit from the JTF surgeon to the JTF J-4 in support of HSS requirements as they relate to logistics to include: contracting, engineering, transportation, medical supplies, and personnel services.

1. JTF J-4 medical liaison cell core membership includes medical liaison cell leader and medical liaison cell NCOs/petty officers.

2. Supporting membership includes JTF medical logistic officer and administrative NCO or petty officer.

(f) **Joint Planning Group.** As the medical representative to the JPG, integrate JTF FHP and HSS effort to include:

1. Evaluate and assess HSS for various COAs scenarios developed during JPG planning sessions.

2. Develop HSS plans in support of various contingencies and OPORDs.

3. Identify joint HSS resources to meet medical support requirements for crisis and contingency operations.

4. Establish the JMWG.

(g) **Civil-Military Operations Center.** The JTF surgeon may be asked to provide medical liaison to support CMOC activities. The medical liaison to the CMOC should:

1. Provide advice on civilian healthcare infrastructure; medical resources and interagency HSS requirements, capabilities, and limitations within the JOA.

2. Be prepared to provide sanitation and medical requirements for displaced civilian camps and assembly areas per OPLAN annex Q (Medical Services) when requested by appropriate authority.

3. Establish and foster working relationships with key NGOs, IGOs, USG agencies, and multinational medical forces.

4. Coordinate and assist with the prevention, control, and treatment of endemic or epidemic disease within the civilian population that affects military operations.

5. Be prepared to provide technical expertise, and assistance in identifying and assessing foreign national public and private health care systems, resources, facilities, and sanitation systems.

6. Be prepared to assist with and, when necessary, conduct assessments and area studies of public health systems as required, and assist with mission planning on military medical interaction with civilians and medical units.

7. Assist with transition operations to hand off military-run medical operations back to civilian authorities.

8. Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

9. Coordinate the use of foreign national government and private health resources for CMO, and in support of government administration.

10. Be prepared to provide advice and assistance in establishing technical requirements for public health services and resources to support government administration (e.g., clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation and storage, ambulance transportation, medical personnel, and education).

11. Provide advice and coordination in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering and maintaining government public health systems and agencies during CMO.

(h) **An ADVON team** often is established to provide a minimum capability for C2 during the buildup of the JTF. This team can assist in clarifying the JTF mission, determine force requirements to accomplish the mission, establish a sequence for force deployment, evaluate HNS, and determine if there are ongoing operations being conducted by other than military forces. Medical personnel assigned to augment the ADVON team provide FHP support, assess HN medical systems (to include information on cultural issues relevant to interactions with HN medical systems), and participate in the selection of bed-down locations for the JTF.

1. Medical membership to the ADVON team may consist of the environmental science officer or environmental health officer or sanitary engineer, or industrial hygiene officer or bioenvironmental engineer officer, and JTF medical planner.

2. Supporting membership may include the veterinary services officer, international health officers, preventive medicine officer or public health officer.

(i) **The HAST** is designed to deploy to a crisis country and immediately affect liaison with US embassy officials and any other USG agencies that may already be present in or have deployed to the crisis country. The primary mission objective of the HAST is to conduct a military assessment of the situation and obtain, develop, and communicate critical information to assist the CJTF and geographic CCDR in the decision-making process, to effect timely allocation

of military resources. Medical membership to the HAST may consist of any of the following JTF surgeon staff: an environmental science officer or environmental health officer, industrial hygiene officer/bioenvironmental engineer officer/sanitary engineer, international health officer, veterinary services officer, and preventive medicine officer or public health officer.

For more details concerning HSS, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support, and the US Joint Forces Command Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure.

b. **Checklist.** To assist the JTF surgeon and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex I, “Checklist for Health Service Support,” to Appendix B, “Checklists.”

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ANNEX E TO APPENDIX A PERSONAL STAFF: INSPECTOR GENERAL

1. General

a. The IG is an extension of the eyes, ears, voice, and conscience of the CJTF. The CJTF should strive to have this function as part of the JTF. The IG provides the CJTF with a sounding board for sensitive issues, and typically is a trusted agent in the command. The IG is a candid broker and an impartial fact finder. The rank of the IG should be commensurate with the overall JTF organization.

(1) Basic IG functions are inspecting, assisting, and investigating.

(2) IG responsibilities may include:

(a) Monitoring, evaluating, assessing, or inspecting operational and other areas essential to mission performance; and assessing the ability of all echelons of the JTF to accomplish assigned missions.

(b) Responding to operational matters; however, at the direction of the CJTF the IG may inspect any matter within the scope of the CJTF's authority.

(c) Providing assistance to all members of the JTF. The IG will refer cases, to include those dealing with family members to the supported CCDRs' or component commanders' IGs as appropriate.

(d) Reviewing and assisting with JTF member morale and welfare, family, and other issues as appropriate.

(e) Conducting inquiries and investigations as necessary.

(f) Serving as the point of contact for coordination with the supported CCDR's IG, to include coordination relevant to assessment of the JTF.

b. The JTF IG may provide support on site, from "a normal working location," or through a combination of regular site visits and reachback based on the situation and the CJTF desires. The JTF IG will maintain points of contact with IGs of the supported CCDR and each of the JTF component commanders to facilitate referring cases that are Service-specific. The JTF IG will ensure that information on how to contact the supported CCDR's IG, component commanders' IGs, and the DOD IG Hotline is displayed at all times in a conspicuous JTF location.

c. Typical JTF IG actions include assessing and reporting to the CJTF on the following:

(1) Mission: orders, documents, and agreements; mission clarity, mission rules for termination or extraction, and "mission creep."

(2) Resources: equipment and personnel appropriate to mission(s) and sufficiency of administration, support, and logistics.

(3) Operational readiness: joint planning and conduct of operations, joint doctrine, readiness reporting, OPSEC, intelligence oversight, communications, and the discipline of assigned and attached personnel.

(4) Welfare and morale of assigned and attached personnel.

(5) Fraud, waste, and abuse.

(6) Other duties as specified by the CJTF.

2. Organization

a. **General.** The JTF HQ IG office should be tailored to suit the mission, size, scope, and expected duration of the JTF. Other factors that must be considered are the geographic location, dominant Service, and political environment. The following guidelines should be considered:

(1) The JTF IG should be a field grade officer (O-4 or above) with grade directly linked to the level of JTF employed, e.g., 2-star JTF = O-4/O-5 IG, 3-star JTF = O-5/O-6 IG, and for a 4-star JTF = O-6 officer.

(2) To be effective, the JTF IG must work for and have access to the CJTF and all elements and activities within the command.

(3) The JTF IG office must draw on augmentees to gain the functional expertise needed for inspection teams.

b. **JTF IG Minimum Personnel Requirements.** If the JTF maintains an IG function on-site, the minimum recommended staff would include the IG (O-4 or above) and an E7 assistant. A notional JTF IG organization is provided in Figure A-E-1.

c. JTF IG Minimum Equipment Requirements

(1) Means of transportation to visit all JTF locations.

(2) Unclassified phone and fax (with access to classified phone and fax).

(3) Computer system with software compatible with systems in use by the JTF.




Figure A-E-1. Notional Inspector General Organizational Structure

3. Tasks, Functions, and Procedures

a. The JTF IG is concerned with operational matters and compliance with policies and procedures at the JTF level. For cases that deal solely with a single-Service issue and do not affect the joint force, the JTF IG normally will refer the matter to the respective Service component.

b. The JTF IG will prepare an activity plan for approval by the CJTF. The activity plan will show inspections, assistance visits, and any IG-related activity directed by the CJTF.

c. The JTF IG will ensure that IGs of subordinate units establish contact upon assignment or arrival in the JOA. The JTF IG will provide technical guidance to subordinate IGs, and coordinate common IG activities.

4. Considerations

a. Become involved, early on, in the CJTF's planning process to understand the commander's intent and CONOPS.

b. Focus on high-payoff issues that impact on the JTF's ability to rapidly deploy, sustain itself, conduct operations, redeploy, and prepare for the next mission or reconstitution. These

issues may include, but are not limited to, unit readiness for deployment, training, ammunition distribution, mail service, standards of discipline, and other Service member welfare issues.

c. IGs can expect an increasing frequency of requests for information and assistance. Historically, assistance cases account for the majority of the deployed IG's workload.

5. Planning Rhythm

The JTF IG battle rhythm is synchronized with and responsive to JTF operational requirements. It will include:

- a. Conducting scheduled inspections.
- b. Providing assistance to members of the JTF as required.
- c. Conducting investigations as directed.

6. Reports

The IG will report directly to the CJTF on the results of each inspection or investigation.

Checklist. *To further assist the JTF IG and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex J, "Checklist for Inspector General," to Appendix B, "Checklists."*

ANNEX F TO APPENDIX A PERSONAL STAFF: PROVOST MARSHAL

1. General

The JTF PM is capable of developing and issuing policies, programs, and guidance for the planning and conduct of military police operations.

2. Responsibilities

- a. Assist with the collection, processing, and reporting of EPWs or detainees.
- b. Advise the CJTF on technical and procedural aspects of physical security and FP.
- c. Provide the CJTF with a focal point on all matters of law enforcement planning, policy, and reporting, and provides a liaison for the CJTF with civilian law enforcement authorities.
- d. Recommend ways in which military police and security forces capabilities can best support the JTF's mission based on the CJTF's intent and CONOPS.

For further details concerning the CJTF personal staff, refer to JP 3-63, Detainee Operations, and the US Joint Forces Command Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure.

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ANNEX G TO APPENDIX A PERSONAL STAFF: COMPTROLLER

1. General

Financial management support to the JTF includes resource management and finance support.

2. Responsibilities

- a. Serve as the principal financial management advisor to the CJTF.
- b. Represent the CJTF in identifying JTF financial management requirements to the supported CCDR, component commanders, and others as required.
- c. Establish financial management responsibilities and coordinate the designation of lead agents for specific financial management functions or special support requirements.
- d. Provide estimates of resource requirements to the supported CCDR, component commanders, and others as required.
- e. Establish positive controls over the funding authority received.
- f. Coordinate with the JTF J-4 and IG to develop a system for prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse.
- g. Prepare appendix 3 (Finance and Disbursing) of annex E (Personnel) of the CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.
- h. Coordinate with the JTF J-4 on logistic and contracting requirements to ensure they complement the financial management responsibilities.

For further details concerning the CJTF personal staff, refer to the US Joint Forces Command Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure.

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ANNEX H TO APPENDIX A SPECIAL STAFF: HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

1. General

The HQCOMDT is the point of contact for coordinating direct support to the JTF HQ at its employment location. Typically, the HQCOMDT has functional specialists who liaison with the host installation for this support. The HQCOMDT also has support elements that provide dedicated support to the JTF staff. Currently, there is no unit type code for the HQCOMDT and the design of the HQCOMDT organization is notional and should be considered during planning. There may be a requirement for the JTF chief of staff to direct one of the staff directorates (e.g., J-4) to perform the HQCOMDT planning and other responsibilities until the establishment of this position or until the designated HQCOMDT joins the JTF.

2. Organization

Headquarters Commandant Organization Design and Development. Normally, the JTF HQ will be located at a host base and will have access to standard base support, making the HQCOMDT planning highly dependent on coordination with the host support and logistic groups. In some cases, the host installation may be a foreign military installation and may present difficulties in establishing reliable agreements quickly. In the instance of a non-US host installation, the HQCOMDT organization will need to be more self-sufficient. Additionally, split-based operations are becoming more common, in which case multiple HQCOMDTs may have to be utilized.

3. Identifying Support Requirements

a. The lead HQCOMDT planner should work with the JTF chief of staff to identify the HQCOMDT chief(s) at the earliest possible time. The lead HQCOMDT planner(s) should develop a WG consisting of functional specialists from the staff that can advise on the specific requirements needed to support the JTF HQ staff. Suggested WG members include the J-4 (logistic plans, supply, transportation, engineering, services), PM, J-1 (personnel), and J-6 (communications plans). Additionally, the lead HQCOMDT planner should coordinate with the JTF chief of staff and other staff principals in identifying detailed support requirements.

b. **Headquarters Commandant Development at a US Base.** Agreements need to be made early on with the host base with respect to specific support requirements. A support agreement should be established (time permitting) that will identify the specific support arrangements. In some cases, the HQCOMDT chief may require a small staff to coordinate with the base support element; in other cases the HQCOMDT chief may need an entire element to provide complete functional support to the JTF HQ staff, to include FP. After evaluating the level of base support expected, the lead HQCOMDT planner will develop a liaison staff to coordinate with host base supporting elements and identify augmentation elements to fill gaps that the host base is not able to support. The HQCOMDT planning WG should advise the lead

HQCOMDT planner on all functional requirements and assist in designing the HQCOMDT composition.

c. **Headquarters Commandant Development at a Non-US Host Installation.** Past experience has shown that support made available by other Services or foreign militaries generally is very limited. The HQCOMDT planning WG should design the HQCOMDT organization with careful consideration of all augmentation requirements and consider identifying standard support unit type codes to support the deployed location when necessary.

d. **Obtaining Augmentees.** Once the support requirements are identified and the HQCOMDT organization is designed, the HQCOMDT lead planner must identify HQCOMDT positions and augmentees that need to be sourced. Position requirements, reporting instructions, and line remarks (special qualifications) must be submitted to the J-1 for sourcing by the relevant Service components.

ANNEX I TO APPENDIX A SPECIAL STAFF: HISTORIAN

1. General

a. The JTF historian provides the necessary historical coverage for all JTF operations, and ensures that proper documentation and historical reports will be available for future researchers.

b. Typically, the JTF historian will be a senior officer (O-4 to O-5 level) or appropriate level civilian with training as a military historian. Depending upon the circumstances of the JTF employment, the historian may have an assistant. The historian will be considered part of the special staff with direct access to the chief of staff.

c. The JTF HQ historian will receive staff guidance and support from the supported combatant command historian, not his/her Service history office. At the conclusion of the operation, the historian's records and materials will be turned over to the combatant command historian. The JTF historian will coordinate with the component historians and provide assistance and advice as necessary; but the component historians will receive their guidance from their respective Service history offices.

d. A robust historical program will serve as the basis for factual, objective histories, both official and unofficial. The results of the history program will be most apparent during the years following the operation, as the need for an informed account grows.

2. Functions of the Joint Task Force Historical Office

a. Maintaining the command historical file, to include a chronology of significant JTF activities.

b. Maintaining a document reference collection in either electronic or paper copies. This duty is distinct from the formal records management requirements of a JTF.

c. Conducting an oral history program, to include interviews of the CJTF and key staff members.

d. All other duties as related to the command history program. To perform these duties the command historian must have access to key staff meetings, as well as access to key documents.

For further details concerning the joint historian, refer to CJCSI 5320.01A, Guidance for the Joint History Program, and CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures).

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ANNEX J TO APPENDIX A SPECIAL STAFF: SAFETY OFFICER

1. General

Safety is a command responsibility. The JTF safety officer assists the CJTF and subordinate component commands in executing their responsibility to protect government personnel, property, and prevent unintended impact on civilians by ensuring safe operations in support of their mission. The safety officer supports the CJTF's safety programs to enhance mission success by developing proactive mishap/accident prevention programs; providing effective cross-flow of safety information between components; collecting and disseminating joint safety lessons identified; and tracking mishap/accident investigations. The safety officer tracks corrective actions applicable to JTF operations and reports the results to the commander.

2. Fundamental Principles

a. CJTFs are responsible for establishing command-level, joint safety programs for assigned and attached forces and should appoint a safety officer to assist in developing these programs. A safety officer may be a member of the CJTF's personal staff or special staff. In smaller JTFs, a safety officer may be a subordinate staff officer, collateral duty, or additional duty.

b. The scope of the safety program should be limited to those activities designed to ensure proper mishap/accident reporting and investigation, enhance mishap/accident prevention, and protect DOD personnel, resources, and the public without duplicating the efforts of Service safety programs.

c. Effective safety programs require leadership involvement in risk management at all levels, enforcement of discipline, and compliance with applicable standards. Subordinate commands should establish specific procedures (inspections and risk assessments) to ensure all personnel and activities comply with those standards. Commanders must ensure risk management is integrated at each functional level and is effectively applied throughout the command.

3. Joint Task Force Safety Officer Responsibilities

a. Provide commanders an unbiased perspective of the safety climate and preclude conflicts of interest with other staff sections. Subordinate unit safety officers, safety managers and safety specialists provide mishap/accident data, trend analysis, process accident reports, and submit safety recommendations to the JTF safety officer.

b. Provide timely reports of Classes A through D mishaps/accidents and other potential high-interest safety incidents (near miss) to the combatant command safety office.

c. Provide timely summaries, trends, and analysis of Classes A through D mishaps/accidents for the commander and key staff review.

d. Notify combatant command safety office of all critical safety issues that might impact other components or operations. Disseminate safety information, issues, and recommendations to the JTF and all components.

4. Mishap/Accident Prevention

a. Safety is a function of risk assessment. To that end, commands should identify operations and activities that pose an increased risk for mishaps/accidents, and develop procedures and programs to keep losses of manpower and equipment, injury to personnel, and prevent unintended impact on civilians. Mishap/accident prevention efforts should be implemented in such a manner as to have minimal adverse impact on operations. Whenever possible, safety measures taken should be applicable to combat as well as peacetime operations to reduce training artificialities and promote sound operational techniques.

b. Particular emphasis should be given to accident prevention efforts in the following areas: pre-mishap/accident plans; weapons and explosive safety; vehicle safety; and aviation safety. Depending on the organizational mission, other areas may pose greater hazards than those listed and must also be addressed. Based on assessment of mishap/accident potential and operational risk, commanders should place emphasis on a “worst hazard first” basis. Where joint or multinational operations are being conducted, safety personnel should ensure inter-Service/national coordination of elevated-risk operations to reduce the potential of accidents due to differences in equipment and procedures.

c. **Pre-Mishap/Accident Plans.** Commanders should ensure they have a current pre-mishap/accident plan established. This plan will be tailored to a specific location and situation during the operation or exercise. The plan should include, at a minimum, lifesaving and rescue information, notification procedures for contacting firefighting assets, medical evacuation and ambulance services, notification of key personnel in the chain of command, and notification of personnel responsible for mishap/accident investigation and safeguarding the mishap/accident scene. Standing mishap/accident investigation boards may be established.

d. **Risk Management.** Risk assessments should be completed for all training and operations. The assessment may be formal or informal in accordance with Service-specific directives. Risk assessments provide a means to systematically review potential hazards associated with specific operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and develop plans to mitigate those risks. Once identified, unnecessary risks should be eliminated, and operational risks reduced to a level that the commander determines acceptable. If a risk cannot be reduced to a level acceptable to the responsible commander, the decision to conduct the operation should be elevated to the appropriate level in the chain of command.

APPENDIX B CHECKLISTS

- Annex A Checklist for Transition to Semipermanent Joint Task Forces
- B Checklist for Liaison Personnel
- C Checklist for Joint Task Force J-1
- D Checklist for Joint Task Force J-2
- E Checklist for Joint Task Force J-3
- F Checklist for Joint Task Force J-4
- G Checklist for Joint Task Force J-5
- H Checklist for Joint Task Force J-6
- I Checklist for Health Service Support
- J Checklist for Inspector General
- K Checklist for Information Management
- L Checklist for Transition of a Joint Task Force into a Multinational Force or Transition to a Follow-On Multinational Force

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX B
CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION TO SEMIPERMANENT
JOINT TASK FORCES

- Review mission statement and be aware of “mission creep” (prevalent in some peace operations and foreign humanitarian assistance operations).
 - Conduct mission analysis and deploy an assessment team when practical.
 - Issue planning guidance.
 - Provide commander’s intent.
 - Identify current rules of engagement (ROE) or rules for the use of force (RUF) and request mission-specific ROE/RUF.
- Identify end state or define ongoing operations.
- Develop courses of action (COAs) and staff estimates.
 - Analyze and compare COAs.
 - Select or modify COAs.
 - Adjust or develop time-phased force and deployment data.
- Issue fragmentary orders or operation orders.
- Determine command relationships.
- Validate the joint operations area (JOA) with the supported combatant commander (CCDR) — establish headquarters (HQ) area.
- Assign or adjust components’ areas of operations.
- Identify (new) basing requirements, where appropriate.
- Develop information management plan.
- Seek new host-nation support agreements, when necessary.
- Coordinate with appropriate US diplomatic mission.
- Determine force (combat and support) requirements.

- Determine joint task force (JTF) HQ structure.
- Identify critical billet requirements. Is there a requirement for additional depth on the staff? For example, is there a need for an inspector general?
- Identify critical equipment requirements (e.g., communications equipment).
- Determine JTF organization. Will functional components be required in addition to Service components?
- Identify to supported CCDR all new requirements (e.g., forces, equipment, personnel).
- Reevaluate the JTF's and components' personnel rotation policy based on new mission.
- If they are available, plan for transition to fixed communications infrastructure or contracted services.
- Plan for transition to fixed communications infrastructure or contracted communications and intelligence services.
- Develop a redeployment plan for those units and personnel no longer required.
 - Identify what equipment must stay behind from any redeploying units.
 - Coordinate with components and supported or supporting combatant commander on stay-behind equipment.
- Reinforce force security requirements. Force security is of utmost importance during a transition period.
- Reevaluate personnel recovery architecture based on new force structure and mission.
- Evaluate JTF training and exercise program for units and personnel.
 - Develop and implement joint training and theater indoctrination programs for units rotating into the JOA.
 - Establish or strengthen training programs for JTF HQ.

- Prioritize joint training where required and training needs to incorporate all parts of the JTF.
- Develop or adjust exercise program, which is especially important for new units and personnel.
- Develop a program that enhances military awareness among JTF personnel.
 - Review joint doctrine that pertains to the mission.
 - Reinforce the importance of the mission and staying abreast of the situation.
 - Highlight the importance of working as a “team.”
- Integrate public affairs in all phases of transition planning to ensure public awareness of policy and operational changes with respect to the JTF.
- Reevaluate or establish morale, welfare, and recreation requirements — means to prevent or reduce complacency.

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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX B CHECKLIST FOR LIAISON PERSONNEL

- Before departure to the gaining headquarters (HQ), liaison personnel should:
- Be thoroughly briefed on:
 - The current situation of their parent unit.
 - Their commander's intent, including details of the concept of operations (e.g., unit locations and combat readiness factors such as personnel strength and logistic considerations).
 - The current status and missions of the unit to which they are being sent.
 - Operations security applicable to the mission.
- Obtain specific information or liaison requirements from each staff section.
- What boards, bureaus, centers, cells, or working groups require liaison representation?
- Understand clearly their mission and responsibilities.
- Ensure that arrangements for **communications, computer systems, and transportation** will meet mission requirements (e.g., check radios, joint communications-electronics operating instructions, challenge and passwords, rations).
 - Obtain necessary credentials for identification and appropriate security clearances.
 - If conducting liaison with a multinational unit, check language and interpreter requirements.
 - Become familiar with the potential issues, capabilities, employment doctrine, and operational procedures of their unit and, to the extent possible, those of the unit to which they are being sent.
 - Become familiar with command relationships among all major commands participating in the operation.
- On arrival at the HQ to which sent, the liaison personnel should:

Report to the supported commander or their representative (e.g., deputy commander, joint task force, chief of staff, or J-3), state their mission and exhibit their directive or credentials (if in writing), offer assistance, and be prepared to brief them on their unit's situation.

Visit each staff section, provide information as required, and obtain all necessary information to be transmitted to their unit.

Establish communications with their unit and exchange updated information, as required.

During the liaison tour, liaison personnel should:

Keep informed of the situation of their own unit and make that information available to the commander and staff of the unit to which they are sent. (Such action is of special importance to liaison personnel of attached or supporting units.)

Find out how their parent command will be employed (e.g., mission, unit location, future locations, future operations, commander's intent).

Accomplish their mission without interfering with the operations of the HQ to which they are sent.

Report promptly to their own HQ if they are unable to accomplish their liaison mission.

Report to their parent command on those matters within the scope of their mission.

As permitted by official orders, inform the visited unit commander of the content of reports dispatched to the liaison personnel's parent HQ.

Inform the appropriate supported staff officer or commander about:

Significant problems being experienced by the liaison personnel's parent unit that could affect operations of other commands and vice versa.

Liaison personnel suggestions to enhance the effective employment of their parent command.

Liaison personnel recommendations concerning improved procedures for maximizing the effectiveness of their parent commands.

- Ensure the liaison location at the HQ is known at all times (e.g., inform the joint operations center's duty officer or chief of staff of daily activities).
- Advise parent unit (if possible) of departure from the liaison location.
- Attend the commander, joint task force's daily situation update briefing and other meetings, as required.
- Keep an appropriate record of their actions and reports.
- Report their departure to the visited unit commander at the completion of their mission.
- Upon return to their own HQ, liaison personnel should:
 - Brief the commander or designated representative on all pertinent information received during their visit (e.g., detailed information concerning the mission of the higher HQ unit locations, future locations, and commander's intent).
 - Transmit promptly any request of the visited commander.
 - From the visited HQ, transmit mission requirements and requests for information.
 - Transmit information required by higher HQ in each staff area.
 - Keep abreast of the situation and be prepared to respond to future liaison requirements.

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ANNEX C TO APPENDIX B CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-1

- Does a personnel information management system exist that allows summation of separate Service personnel status reports, including authorized, assigned, and deployed strengths; critical personnel shortages; casualty accounting; and personnel requisitions?

- Do plans include a current summary of joint task force (JTF) manpower requirements?
 - Are minimum grade, security clearances, and occupational skill requirements specified?
 - Are critical positions (billets) identified?
 - Are special experience requirements consistent with pay grade level and military occupational designations?
 - Have procedures been established to identify JTF augmentation requirements and functional component augmentation requirements? Have shortfalls been identified to the appropriate authority?

- What centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, and planning teams require J-1 representation?

- Have procedures been established to capture personnel information on all in-bound JTF personnel immediately upon their arrival?

- Have reporting instructions been issued addressing, as a minimum: reporting date, passports, visas, immunizations, uniform and equipment requirements, and travel restrictions? If appropriate, billeting arrangements also should be addressed in reporting instructions.

- Have procedures been established by component commanders, to accomplish Service-specific preparation for movement actions prior to deployment?
 - Giving deploying members the opportunity to update wills and powers of attorney.
 - Allowing deploying members the opportunity to adjust pay allotments and establish direct deposit.
 - Making provisions to pay members while deployed.

- Providing passports and visas if required.

- Have other personnel actions been accomplished, such as medical screening, (e.g., immunizations, dental readiness, human immunodeficiency virus screening), identification cards and tags, Service record updates, including records of emergency data?

- Consideration must be given as to how personnel will be deployed (temporary duty, field conditions) to ensure that adequate compensation is provided and to prevent unnecessary loss of pay and allowances.

- Have the following support programs been established, if applicable?
 - Special leave.
 - Hostile fire or imminent danger pay.
 - Federal income tax combat-zone exclusion.
 - Free mail.
 - Sole surviving son or daughter.
 - Absentee voting.

- Have morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities for JTF personnel been coordinated?
 - Have MWR fitness facilities been secured?
 - Has coordination been made with exchange services for immediate and short-term support?
 - Has a point of contact information been provided to the responsible agent for receiving newspapers?
 - Has a morale call policy been established and all personnel informed?
 - Has the commander, joint task force identified a location for a local rest and recreation program? Has it been coordinated and approved by the supported combatant commander?

- Has a location for MWR computer support for e-mailing and video teleconference access been identified and the information provided to the supported combatant command?
- Do JTF and component commands' plans adequately and equitably address military postal support?
 - If the operation will be dependent on mail for supplies and equipment, consider increasing postal support.
- Is there adequate J-1 staff to support operations?
 - 24-hour operations.
 - Distributed locations of headquarters or joint reception center.
- Is the headquarters commandant or J-1 providing personnel service to the JTF headquarters?
- Has coordination been made with other staff sections to ensure unambiguous reporting of personnel information within the headquarters?
- Have reporting procedures been established for subordinates that account for operational phases and all command and control relationships throughout the operations? Do they meet the commander's decision cycle?
- Are all JTF's personnel proficient with the command's software standards?
- Has liaison been established with the International Red Cross regarding the internment of enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, retained personnel, and other detainees?
- Has coordination with the joint personnel recovery center been accomplished to address personnel recovery, especially reintegration responsibilities and missing personnel reports?
- Have procedures been developed to process personnel returning to duty from medical channels?
- Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified materials?

- Consistent with operational requirements, is maximum practical use being made of local national civilian labor?
- Have JTF J-1 supporting plans been developed for the evacuation of noncombatant personnel?
- Have internal standing operating procedures been developed and coordinated to streamline the execution of recurring activities and reports?
- Have all JTF components been provided reporting formats and requirements?
- Have requirements for Service, joint, and multinational publications been identified?
- Has a rating scheme been developed for JTF headquarters personnel?
- Has a point of contact list been developed and published?
- Has coordination with the joint personnel recovery center been accomplished to address personnel recovery, especially reintegration responsibilities and missing personnel reports?
- Has a rotation policy been established and published?

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX B CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-2

General

- With inputs from the joint task force (JTF) J-3, have the JTF J-2's missions, tasks, and requirements been clarified, prioritized, and confirmed with the commander, joint task force (CJTF)?
 - Have intelligence support requirements to personnel recovery (manpower and collection requirements) been identified for the joint personnel recovery center?
- Has a complete intelligence assessment of the situation been developed?
 - Have the current intelligence and indications and warning situations in the joint operations area been identified?
 - Have current regional and threat assessments been accomplished?
 - Are situation assessments periodically updated?
 - Has an intelligence situation assessment been completed and submitted to the CJTF and up the chain of command?
- Are the CJTF intelligence tasking and guidance completely understood, and have they been analyzed and applied to regional or theater assessments?
- What centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams require J-2 representation?
- Have intelligence priorities been regularly updated and passed throughout the entire chain of command, including components and supported commands?
- Has the status (such as number, type, and readiness condition) of JTF's and combatant commander's (CCDR's) organic intelligence collection and production assets been determined?
- Has the JTF J-2 designated a J-2X to coordinate and deconflict counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection activities?
- Has national intelligence support team support been requested?
- Have the JTF J-2 requirements for personnel augmentation, to include regional or functional experts, linguists, or reservists, been identified?

- Have the deployable elements to support the JTF's efforts in collection management, Service expertise, communications, and tactical in-depth analysis been identified?
- Have the JTF Joint Operation Planning and Execution System managers been kept up-to-date on intelligence personnel, equipment, and related movement requirements?
- Have the requirements for a joint intelligence support element to support the JTF been determined?
- Has the JTF J-2, in coordination with the JTF J-6, developed a JTF intelligence communications architecture that achieves interoperability laterally, vertically, and with multinational forces? (JTF communications links include satellite, microwave, radio, landline, and local area network to carry intelligence information.)
- Has the intelligence architecture for flow of responsibilities for priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and request for information been determined?
- Have intelligence responsibilities been clearly delineated between JTF, supported CCDR, and national levels?
- Have any JTF subordinate units, such as special operations forces, been receiving intelligence support from the supported CCDR or national levels?
- Has the JTF coordinated with the supported CCDR's joint intelligence operations center (JIOC) to determine whether PIRs already have been established for the current situation? (PIRs should be built around the CJTF commander's critical information requirements.)
- In concert with the JTF J-3 and the supported CCDR's JIOC, have PIRs been tailored for the current situation?
- Have PIRs been kept current, and are they updated periodically?
- Have the CJTF and component commanders been fully apprised of all relevant current events?
- Do any current events require closer examination or reporting to higher authority?

- Have the JTF J-2's automated data processing equipment requirements been identified, and are they compatible with the supported CCDR's and subordinate's systems (to include compatibility for multinational JTF operations when required)?
- In concert with the supported CCDR's J-2 and the JTF J-3, have all the JTF intelligence collection requirements been identified, developed, and published?
- Have JTF intelligence shortfalls in collection capabilities been identified?
- Have collection requirements to cover shortfalls been developed and forwarded to the supported CCDR's JIOC for collection by theater resources or to the Defense JIOC for subsequent national tasking?
- Have requirements for all geospatial information and services support been identified?
- Have JTF geospatial information and services shortfalls been identified?
- Has information to support the joint intelligence estimate for planning been passed to Defense Intelligence Agency?
- Has the annex B (Intelligence) been prepared for the CJTF's operation plan, operation order, or campaign plan?
- Can the JTF J-2 continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and issue status reports to the superior commander as directed?
- Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?
- Have deliberate targeting plans been reviewed and are target materials up-to-date?
- Has the Defense JIOC been notified of any potential need for a quick reaction team?

Human Intelligence, Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)

- Have the JTF's requirements for HUMINT, GEOINT, SIGINT, and MASINT collection been identified?

- Have the requirements for a HUMINT operations cell and supporting HUMINT collection forces, to include facility locations and personnel requirements, been established?
- Has the requirement for establishment of a joint captured materiel exploitation center (JCMEC) or joint document exploitation center (JDEC) and supporting technical intelligence collection forces been analyzed?
 - Is a scientific & technical intelligence liaison officer determining or coordinating foreign materiel acquisition and recovery requirements?
 - Have elements been requested for a JCMEC or JDEC as required?
 - If the full center capability is not necessary, have adequate smaller elements (teams or cells) been requested?
 - Have the requirements for interrogation and debriefing capabilities been identified?
- Have HUMINT management, liaison, and exchange program requirements been identified?
- Has emergency disclosure authority for geospatial intelligence been obtained?
- Has tailored GEOINT (i.e., mission specific data) been requested (once target has been identified)? Has all imagery been forwarded to the requesting command?
- Has the requirement for SIGINT operational tasking authority been identified? If not, work with cryptologic support group and command national cryptologic representative to obtain.
- Have MASINT management liaison and exchange programs been identified?
- Has a sensitive compartmented information facility been established and accredited?

Counterintelligence

- Have JTF CI, counterterrorism, and force protection related intelligence requirements been identified?
- Has the CJTF appointed a task force CI coordinating authority (TFCICA)?

- Has CI been incorporated into the planning as a force protection measure?
- Has CI been included in collection management planning?
- Have component CI organizations been advised of possible TFCICA staff augmentation requirements?
- Have intelligence security guidelines been developed and disseminated?

Multinational Interaction

- Has liaison been established between joint and combined force intelligence structures?
- Have procedures been established and reviewed to expedite sharing US-generated intelligence products with multinational forces (for example, sanitize products)?
- Have friendly objectives, intentions, and plans been fully communicated to appropriate intelligence organizations?

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ANNEX E TO APPENDIX B
CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-3

- Have current plans been evaluated?
- Have regional options been developed, prioritized, and passed to the superior commander?
- Have regional military objectives been developed and forwarded to the superior commander?
- Have component and supporting commanders been tasked to analyze the situation and begin tentative planning to support proposed courses of action (COAs)?
- What centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, and planning teams require J-3 representation?
- Have the disposition and location of assigned and attached forces been reviewed, and, if needed, has an increased force posture and force readiness been directed within established authority? (Respond as necessary within existing rules of engagement or rules for the use of force, requesting modification if necessary.)
- What is the extent of multinational participation and resolve?
- How will multinational involvement affect remaining aspects of the checklist?
- Have COAs been evaluated and prioritized? (“Wargaming” is one method.)
- Has the commander’s estimate, containing an appropriate risk assessment, been developed and submitted to the superior commander?
- Has the status of noncombatants in the joint operations area (JOA) been evaluated to determine the requirement for a noncombatant evacuation operation plan?
- Has the process of obtaining country clearances and overflight, landing, and staging rights been initiated?
- Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?
- What is the deployment status of reserve units?
- Have replacement units been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the superior commander for resolution?

- Has the superior commander's tasking and guidance been analyzed?
- Has guidance been developed for components?
- Have completed COAs, including validated forces and sustainment, been developed?
- Have pre-hostility special operations (e.g., special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, psychological operations, combating terrorism) been considered during COA development?
- Has the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) been notified that the selected COA is ready for evaluation?
- Has the joint task force (JTF) legal officer been consulted concerning applicable international agreements or special requirements of the law of armed conflict?
- Has a Global Command and Control System teleconference been established, or does one need to be established to support planning?
- What is the effect of identified shortfalls on the COA?
- Can the shortfalls be resolved using organic resources, or do they require elevation to the superior commander?
- How will the COA likely be perceived by the indigenous, US, and allied publics?
- Have supported command execution planning instructions been developed?
- Has the COA been adjusted based on the superior commander's guidance?
- Has the time-phased force and deployment data been validated by the supported combatant commander and sent to US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) for a feasibility analysis?
- Have appropriate JPEC organizations been tasked to develop information for support annexes?
- Have all support annexes been incorporated in the operation plan (OPLAN), operation order (OPORD), or campaign plan?
- Is the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan complete and in the proper format?

- Has the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan been submitted to the superior commander for approval?
- Has an execute order been received?
- Has the OPORD or campaign plan been adjusted for the superior commander's execute order before issuing the commander, joint task force (CJTF) execute order?
- Are plan objectives being met?
- Is a reassessment of objectives required?
- Are situations developing that require additional force and sustainment resources, or redirection of allocated force and sustainment resources?
- Do current conditions indicate the need for replanning actions?
- Has replanning guidance been issued to the JPEC (if necessary)?
- Does the situation call for termination of operations?
- Does the situation call for redeployment planning?
- Can the JTF J-3 continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and issue status reports to the superior commander as directed?
- Have US and friendly government agencies and in-country relief organizations been contacted to ensure maximum support of component civil-military operations (CMO)?
- Have personnel recovery (PR) capabilities and limitations been addressed in COA development?
- Have components, multinational forces, and other government agencies PR capabilities been assessed for PR support to operations?
- Has the superior commander's CMO plan provided guidance on CMO priorities and are the priorities supporting on-going operations?
- Have CMO priorities been coordinated with the JTF component staffs?

In the absence of a joint planning group, the JTF J-3 normally will establish an operations planning and execution cell, composed of J-3, J-4, and J-5 planners (as a minimum), to complete the timed-phased force and deployment data planning tasks, monitor the flow of forces and nonunit supplies into the joint operations area, and track forces to their destination. The following questions are for use by this team.

Have plan identification numbers been established in Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) for each COA?

Have movement requirements for each COA been created and tested?

Has plan information been entered in JOPES?

Have in-place or in-theater forces been identified in JOPES?

Have noncombatant evacuation operation, medical evacuation, and retrograde cargo movement requirements been developed?

Have units that are moving by organic lift been identified?

Has USTRANSCOM been requested to provide COA transportation evaluation?

Have deployment estimates been developed for each COA?

Does the closure profile meet COA requirements?

Can identified transportation shortfalls be resolved organically, or do they need to be elevated to the superior commander?

Have deployment requirements been verified?

Has transportation lift allocation been verified?

Has each daily deployment increment been validated?

Have intratheater movement plans been developed?

Is the first increment deployment flow being monitored?

Has the next deployment increment been confirmed once the first increment is under way?

- Is organic lift being monitored to ensure that arrival times meet OPORD requirements?
- Have reception and onward movement capabilities been evaluated?
- Are use rates, requirements, and all transportation modes being monitored?
- Is the reprioritization of lift requirements (if required) being coordinated with the supported combatant commander and USTRANSCOM?
- Is actual arrival data, if different than scheduled, being entered into the JOPES? (Continue to update deployment information on the JOPES deployment database.)
- Is unit status being reported after arrival?
- Is the joint operations center (JOC) staff trained or experienced?
- Is there a necessity to establish a JOC or portions thereof during the crisis action planning (CAP) process?
- Has a split JOC operation been considered for infrastructure or reach-back concerns?
- If established during the CAP process, what role does the JOC play?
- If directed by the CJTF (based on J-3 recommendation):
- Has a joint personnel recovery center been established?
- Has a joint targeting coordination board been established?
- Has a joint fires element been established?
- Has a rules of engagement planning cell been formed?
- Has a weather cell been formed?
- Has an information operations cell been formed?
- Has the CJTF (or designee) provided initial guidance concerning the functions and responsibilities of the above organizations?

- Have these organizations been properly staffed?
- Have these organizations analyzed all phases of the operation (deployment through redeployment)?
- Is there a requirement to establish a civil-military operations center?
- If directed by the CJTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to plan, monitor, and direct execution of joint air operations?
- If directed by the CJTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate the use of airspace in the JOA?
- If directed by the CJTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate joint air defense operations within the JOA?
- Have combat identification measures been established?
- Have all mission areas of space operations been considered during planning and COA development (i.e., space control, force enhancement, and force application)?
- Has United States Strategic Command's joint space operations center been contacted to provide space operations support to the JTF?
- Have the effects of weapons of mass destruction been evaluated and the appropriate technical operations components been notified?
- Have recommendations been provided to the J-3 pertaining to the organization, use, and integration of attached civil affairs forces?
- Have specific plans, policies, and programs been developed to further the relationship between the JTF and the civil component in the JOA?
- Has the CJTF been advised on the effect of civilian populations on JTF operations?
- Do CMO plans, policies, procedures, and programs deconflict civilian activities with military operations within the JOA? (This may include dislocated civilian operations, curfews, and movement restrictions.)

- In coordination with the staff judge advocate, has the CJTF been advised of legal and moral obligations incurred from the long- and short-term effects (economic, environmental, and health) of JTF operations on civilian populations?
- Have civil-military plans, programs, and policies been coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with strategic objectives and the interagency efforts?
- Have systems been emplaced prioritizing and monitoring expenditures of allocated Overseas, Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Assistance Aid, Commander's Emergency Response Program, payroll, and other funds dedicated to CMO?
- Have procedures to facilitate movement, provide security, and control funds to subordinate units been identified?
- Has coordination been established with CMO funds controlling authority/ financial managers to meet the CJTF objectives?
- Have the requirements for CMO and civil affairs operations area assessments and area studies been coordinated and integrated in support of the CMO plan?
- Have culturally significant sites been identified and coordinated with the joint targeting coordination board as no-fire or restrictive fire areas?
- Has coordination been established for the integration of civil inputs to the CJTF common operational picture?
- Have military units and assets that can perform CMO missions been identified and integrated with the CMO plan?
- Have military units that can perform detainee/enemy prisoner of war missions been identified and a qualified chief of detainee operations appointed?
- Have joint security areas been identified to protect high-value facilities and a joint security coordinator appointed?

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ANNEX F TO APPENDIX B
CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-4

General

- Has a thorough review of the operation plan or operation order been made?
- Has the establishing authority's (combatant commander's [CCDR's]) logistic guidance been reviewed?
- What, if any, logistic directive authority for common support capabilities has the CCDR delegated to the commander, joint task force?
- Are annex D (Logistics) and the logistic estimates prepared?
- Is initial distribution of supplies included?
- Have logistic plans been coordinated with component commanders?
- Are movements of personnel, equipment, and supplies included? Have adequate provisions been made for security during movements?
- Do force deployment plans include early movement of port openers and cargo handlers?
- Are construction and other engineering requirements included?
- What major logistic tasks need to be performed, including support relationships by phase and component? What tasks will be requested of supporting agencies? Have potential intermediate staging bases, forward operating bases, or domestic base support installations been identified?
- What centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, and planning teams require J-4 representation?
- Which CCDR's logistic centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams impact the joint task force (JTF)?
- What logistic support currently is in place from contractor support and from host-nation support (HNS)? What authority and responsibilities does the JTF have for this support? What additional support is required from either contractor or HNS?
- Are support organizations, such as an Army theater sustainment command, in place? What coordination authority does the JTF have to request support?

- What major common-user logistics (CUL) has the CCDR chosen for theater support? What related organization and management options (single-Service logistic support or lead Service or agency support with or without operational control or tactical control) have the CCDR chosen for theater support?
- Which common items/CUL are designed for support of the JTF, multinational partners, and other organizations? What control/authority does the commander, joint task force have over these items? What Service or agency is responsible for the support?
- For multinational operations, what support is provided and received from multinational forces? What authority does the JTF have over multinational support?
- For multinational operations, what support is provided and received from multinational forces? What authority does the JTF have over multinational support?
- What process (e.g., joint theater logistics management) does the CCDR use to manage joint theater logistics? How does the JTF interface with this process?
- Are mission-essential services provided by contractors and civilians incorporated into contingency plans? Are pre-deployment standards established for training and equipping civilians? What are the requirements to provide life support and security for contractors or other US civilians supporting the operation? What is the backup plan if a contractor cannot produce to standard? Have identified manpower and materiel been incorporated into planning and deployment databases?
- How many days can assigned forces sustain operations with organic supplies? Are sustainment supplies phased to provide uninterrupted operations? What is the supply safety level?
- What is the potential impact on logistic capabilities from competing government and nongovernmental agencies or organizations?

Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL)

- Should a subarea petroleum office for resupply of POL be established?
- What is the concept of operations for petroleum support?
- What HNS is available?

- What are component responsibilities for petroleum support? Have components provided estimates of POL requirements? Who is compiling volatile strategic airlift requirements? Have requirements been provided to the defense energy support region?
- Have arrangements been made with either the supported joint petroleum office or the defense energy support region to contract for host nation sources?
- Has a quality control program for POL or liquid oxygen been established?
- Have POL storage methods and sites been selected? Have security arrangements for the sites been established?
- Have arrangements been made for transportation of POL within the assigned joint operations area (JOA)?

Munitions

- What are the critical munitions required for this operation as determined by the warfighter? Are there suitable substitutions available?
- Are sufficient stocks of these critical munitions available?
- Have munitions been properly relocated or positioned to support the operations?
- Can any critical munitions shortfalls be remedied through transfer between component commands or from foreign forces?
- Have components provided estimates of ammunition resupply requirements and common-user support?
- Have ammunition storage sites been selected and were explosive safety considerations considered?
- Have security arrangements for the ammunition sites been established?
- Have arrangements been made for transportation of ammunition within the JOA?

Joint Mortuary Affairs

- Has a joint mortuary affairs office been established to:
 - Provide oversight of mortuary affairs support within the area of responsibility of the combatant command?
 - Maintain two-way coordination with the central joint mortuary affairs office?
- Have mortuary affairs guidelines been established in accordance with JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations*?
- Does the plan provide for establishment, staffing, and support of the mortuary affairs collection point? Does this site plan include:
 - Procedures for decontamination of remains?
 - Theater mortuary evacuation point?
 - Personal effects depot?
 - Current death, concurrent return and graves registration programs?

Sustainability

- Are procedures established for maintenance, recovery, and salvage operations? Is there a requirement to provide disposal support within the theater where there is no Defense Reutilization Management Office (DRMO)? Is a useable DRMO located in the vicinity of the theater?
- Have HNS availability and requirements been determined?
- Has it been determined if any HNS agreements exist? Have required steps been taken to start the process for requesting authorization to begin negotiations?
- Have arrangements been made to obtain maintenance support not organic to the JTF?
- Have the Services established procedures for the return of retrograde to the repair source? Does the capability exist to track movement of retrograde?

- Have laundry and bath support requirements been generated in coordination with the medical authority, with consideration for environmental factors?
- Does the JTF require contracting personnel in country? Is a JTF contracting office required?
- Have procedures been established to coordinate with US embassies and host nations for acquisition of supplies and services?
- Are paying agents/field ordering offices required and has coordination been made with contracting and financial management operations?
- Has a joint logistic communications plan been developed to support J-4 command and control requirements?
- Are adequate security procedures established for classified logistics data transmission?
- Have the requirements for logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP), Air Force contract augmentation program, and Navy global contingency construction contract program assistance been evaluated?
- Do the Services have procedures established for equipment accountability during deployment and redeployment operations?

Transportation

- Have joint-use transportation requirements been established?
- Has a joint movement center (JMC) or deployment distribution operations center (DDOC) been established (if needed) to ensure transportation requests are validated and theater common-user transportation resources are employed with maximum effectiveness?
- Are common-user transportation requirements, capabilities, and performance monitored?
- Are transportation shortfalls and conflicts in priorities deconflicted?
- What HN transportation facilities and equipment are available?
- Has the JMC or DDOC evaluated and disseminated information about host nation transportation systems, facilities, equipment, and personnel?

- Has the JMC or DDOC established the necessary communications (Global Command and Control System) to monitor and effect changes to the deployment of forces and supplies?
- Has the JTF J-4 coordinated with United States Transportation Command throughout planning, deployment, execution, and redeployment phases?
- Has the JTF J-4 coordinated with the JTF J-1 to ensure customs and duty issues do not hinder the expeditious movement of Department of Defense cargo?

Engineer

- Has a JTF engineer been assigned or identified?
- Have engineer policy and guidance been established?
- Have a joint civil-military engineering board and joint facilities utilization board been established? Are board procedures in place?
- Have traffic regulations, dictated by physical conditions of routes and communications been established?
- Has engineer support in the collection and processing of information for preparation and revision of maps been identified?
- Have future engineering requirements been anticipated and planned for?
- Have component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction been evaluated and prioritized? Are procedures in place for this to occur?
- Have provisions been made for battle damage repair (e.g., rapid runway repair)?
- Has the JTF engineer established, issued, and executed the JTF environmental management support plan?
- What HN engineer support is available?
- What Class IV (construction and protection material) is available?
- What are the component responsibilities for engineering support?
- Will contract construction (to include LOGCAP) be utilized?

ANNEX G TO APPENDIX B
CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-5

- What is the current politico-military situation?
- Have current plans been evaluated (e.g., Department of State Political-Military Plan)?
- What centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, and planning teams require J-5 representation?
- Have all appropriate warning, planning, and implementing directives been thoroughly reviewed and mission analysis completed?
- Have regional military objectives been developed and forwarded to the combatant commander (CCDR)?
- Has US Strategic Command's joint space operations center been contacted to provide space planning support?
- Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?
- Have replacement units been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the joint task force (JTF) establishing authority for resolution?
- Has the supported CCDR's tasking and guidance been analyzed?
- Has guidance been developed for components?
- Have operation order (OPORD) or operation plan (OPLAN) shortfalls and limitations been identified and resolved?
- Have all support annexes been incorporated in the OPORD or OPLAN?
- Is the OPORD or OPLAN complete and in the proper format?
- Has the composition of the joint planning group (JPG) been determined?
- Has the JPG battle rhythm been established?
- Does the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database accurately reflect all force and sustainment requirements needed to accomplish the assigned mission? Are these requirements properly routed, phased, prioritized, and sourced?

- Do current conditions indicate the need for replanning actions?
- Do current conditions indicate the need and suitability for planning for operations during prehostilities, such as special operations, psychological operations, public affairs, and civil-military operations?
- Does the situation call for redeployment planning?
- Has a military end state been identified?
- Are consequence management forces required?
- Is planning for stability operations or peace operations required?
- Has a strategic theater estimate been developed?
- Have protection issues been identified?
- Have special technical operations requirements been considered?
- Has military deception planning been conducted and included in the overall plan?

ANNEX H TO APPENDIX B
CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-6

General

- Is the communications system planner brought into the planning process early?
- Is a joint communications system planning meeting scheduled? Is a communications system planner from each organization attending the communications system planning meeting?
- What centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, and planning teams require J-6 representation?
- Are the command relationship decisions made in sufficient time to allow supporting communications to be adequately planned and communications system decisions to be promulgated in a timely manner?
- Are the communications system planners familiar with the command relationships for this operation and are these relationships adequately covered in communications system planning documents?
- Are the operational impacts of potential communications problems brought to the attention of the operational planners and superior commanders?
- Has information management been identified?
 - What information is critical to the joint task force (JTF) headquarters battle rhythm?
 - Who produces that information?
 - Who updates the information?
 - Which countries or partners are not allowed access to particular information?
- Is there a network diagram or description showing connectivity to all commands and organizations included in the operation plan or implementing instructions?
- Can communications system support each course of action being addressed?
- Are close-hold and limited access procedures understood by all planners?

- Is planning adequate to ensure that all communications nets have interoperable communications security (COMSEC) devices and keying material? Is secure equipment availability and installation adequate for this operation (e.g., encrypted ultrahigh frequency [UHF] satellite communications [SATCOM] narrowband secure voice terminals)?
- Has an information assurance manager been assigned?
- Has the JTF J-2, in coordination with the JTF J-6, developed a JTF intelligence communications architecture that achieves interoperability laterally, vertically, and with multinational forces? (JTF communications links include satellite, microwave, radio, landline, and local area network to carry intelligence information.)
- Has a memorandum of agreement been established between the designated approving authorities responsible for each interconnected system?
 - Have the information systems been certified and accredited?
- Is the use of the intertheater COMSEC package (ICP) being considered to ensure interoperable keying materiel? Do all forces hold all necessary components of the ICP? Has North Atlantic Treaty Organization COMSEC been considered?
- Have considerations been made or plans formulated to accommodate multinational personnel and communications and information equipment into the JTF deployment?
- Has interoperability been considered?
- Are provisions being made to ensure that all participating organizations are notified as to which frequencies, call signs, and COMSEC procedures are to be used for the operation?
- Has a joint spectrum management element been tasked and stood-up?
- Is there adequate planning to ensure joint communications-electronics operation instructions (JCEOI) are prepared in a timely manner? Are frequency management decisions made in a timely manner to enable JCEOI dissemination to participating units when needed? Is the Joint Revised Battlefield Electronic JCEOI System being employed for generating JCEOI or signal operating instructions?
- Are operations codes available at all commands?

- Is planning for special operations forces and conventional forces interoperability adequate for this operation?
- Are procedures in place to adequately plan communications system for special operations under both special operations and mission-imposed close-hold restrictions?
- Are theater and tactical communications system interfaces (Defense Information System Network [DISN] entry points) adequate to provide timely and accurate situation reporting for crisis management reporting to superior commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Secretary of Defense?
- Does communications system planning for deployment include command relationships, force operational control procedures, force communications for underway sea or airlift and for Air Mobility Command communications system?
- Are deployable Global Command and Control System (GCCS) terminals needed and planned for?
- Does the JTF have qualified GCCS operators?
- Is planning adequate to have communications into the objective area in the proper sequence and in sufficient amount and type to support the tactical operation?
- Have the functions of the joint network operations control center been developed and published?
 - Have the J-2, J-3, and J-6 prioritized the intelligence requirements within the overall communications requirements?
 - Are all intelligence systems requirements identified? Which intelligence systems have organic communications and which ones require communications provided by the J-6?
 - Are the intelligence systems communications integrated into the overall communications planning? Are there provisions for frequency deconfliction to protect friendly use of the spectrum?
 - Are adequate communications systems available to get near-real-time imagery, signals data, and an accurate picture of the local situation to the tactical commanders?

- Are communications with all engaged civilian organizations adequately addressed in planning to include those only with unclassified commercial capabilities?

- Does communications planning include means for electronic conferencing/virtual collaborating with multiple disparate organizations (military and civilian)? Do branch plans include adding additional organizations as missions expand?

- Is the CJTF aware of various Global Positioning System (GPS) user equipment employed in theater to include commercial sets?

- Are the GPS frequencies L1 (1575.42 megahertz [MHz] and L2 (1227.60 MHz) incorporated into unit and headquarters frequency plans to preclude inadvertent GPS interference from tactical communications equipment?

- Has a GPS concept of operations been disseminated?

- Has the JTF standard datum been disseminated for GPS user equipment?

- Have personnel recovery (PR) personnel coordinated PR communications early?
 - Are PR communications adequately covered in planning?
 - Are plans for PR adequately promulgated to the operating forces?

- Are medical evacuation and casualty evacuation communications adequately covered in planning?
 - Are plans for medical evacuation and casualty evacuation communications adequately promulgated to the operating forces?

- Have planners provided for dedicated and secure communications for public affairs to provide quality public information products to internal and external audiences both within and outside the joint operations area (JOA)?

- Is there a heavy dependence on any one means of communications during the operation (e.g., UHF SATCOM)?

- Have SATCOM requirements been evaluated to ensure proper use of limited assets?

- Have user requirements and use patterns been evaluated to determine the feasibility of time sharing or combining SATCOM nets to reduce total nets required and loading of satellite networks?
- Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?
- Have provisions been made to plan for replacement of tactical communications (tactical satellite and ground mobile facility terminals) at the earliest opportunity (if applicable) with commercial or other appropriate longer-term communications?

Predeployment

- Do the JTF headquarters (HQ) and identified component HQ have systems to provide secure voice, record, and data communications (including GCCS) for:
 - Issuing command instructions?
 - Updating the force database?
 - Coordinating course of actions?
 - Managing force status and generation?
 - Multinational partners?
- Do marshalling and loading sites possess interoperable communications and compatible cryptographic keys?
- Have authenticating memorandums been written and signed by the commander, joint task force within 24 hours of JTF activation, authorizing JTF directors or their designated representatives to pick up message traffic up to and including special category?**
- Have the threats to the communications system been clearly defined and actions taken to eliminate or minimize the impact to these systems?

Advanced Echelon (ADVON) Deployment

- If ADVON deploys aboard a ship, are communications capabilities adequate? Can transmission security be maintained?

If ADVON deploys by air, are secure communications available to communicate with JTF HQ, the supported and supporting combatant commanders (CCDRs), and the appropriate US embassy?

Once in the assigned JOA, does the ADVON have secure voice, common-user telephone circuits, and secure record and facsimile capabilities for effective exchange of current intelligence, graphics, planning, and adjustments to operational assessments and orders?

Main Force Deployment

Are arrangements required for airborne or maritime communications system capabilities (e.g., joint airborne communications center or command post, Airborne Warning and Control System, Joint Strategic Targeting and Reconnaissance System, or amphibious command ship)?

Have radio nets for en route communications been developed and coordinated with supported CCDR and components?

If an intermediate staging base (ISB) is used:

Have ISB communications requirements been developed and coordinated?

Has a responsible element been identified to make installation?

JTF Requirements

As forces deploy into the area and the JTF HQ joins the ADVON (if used), has a ground- or sea-based communications package (capable of providing secure voice, record, and automated data processing data transmission capabilities) been made available to satisfy requirements for communications links with:

Supported CCDR?

Secretary of Defense?

Component HQ?

Multinational HQ?

United Nations?

- US embassies?
- DISN?
- Civilian organizations (the interagency, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and media)? May have only unclassified commercial capabilities – including teleconferencing and virtual collaboration.
- Commercial access — single channel?
- Commercial access — multichannel?
- If requirements exist, are there adequate capabilities to:
 - Link deployed forces with the DISN, the Defense Special Security Communications System, and GCCS?
 - Duplicate communications capabilities at the alternate JTF HQ?
- Have procedures been established for reporting meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion to the joint command and control warfare center?
- Are sufficient frequencies available to support the course of action?
- If the deployment is to foreign soil, has the host nation approved frequencies for the operation?
- Are the J-2, J-3, and J-6 working together to develop a joint restricted frequency list to protect friendly operations and exploit adversary operations? Did the J-3 approve the list?
- Has a procedure been developed to standardize operating systems, their client computer workstations, and associated group policies throughout the JTF HQ and subordinate commands?
- Has interoperability of communications systems been ensured?

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ANNEX I TO APPENDIX B CHECKLIST FOR HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

- Are the medical tasks, functions, and responsibilities delineated and assigned?
- Is a comprehensive medical surveillance plan developed? Predeployment (threat assessment conducted and preventive medicine countermeasures integrated into the plan); deployment (environmental monitoring and disease and nonbattle injury statistics collected); and post-deployment (health assessments) actions?
- Are there any specific plans, policies, agreements, or treaties to consider?
- What centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, and planning teams require health service support (HSS) representation?
- Are provisions made to provide emergency medical assistance to US nationals in the joint operations area (JOA) and to enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, displaced civilians, and other detained persons?
- Has the theater evacuation policy been established? If so, have requirements for hospitals and patient movement workload been identified?
- Is sufficient medical support available for deploying forces to ensure a continuum of care for those ill, injured, or wounded? Are all units on the time-phased force and deployment data scheduled for timely arrival?
- Have estimates of medical sustainability and anticipated resupply requirements been established?
- Have resupply channels been determined? If applicable, have provisions been made to establish a single integrated medical logistics item manager for medical equipment and supplies?
- Has a joint task force (JTF) joint patient movement requirements center been established to coordinate movement of patients within and out of the assigned JOA?
- Has a blood program system been established?
- Has a area joint blood program office been activated to plan and coordinate the handling, storage, and distribution of whole blood within the assigned JOA and consolidate and forward resupply requirements to the Armed Services Blood Program Office?

- Has a joint medical operations center been established to provide a central location for medical planning and operations?
- Have medical personnel augmentation packages been identified and requirements submitted? Do hospitals have enough personnel and equipment to support movement of critical patients? Are there sufficient litters, straps, blankets, and other supplies as required, to support anticipated workload?
- Have the numbers, types, and locations of patient evacuation conveyances been identified? Are they sufficient to meet projected workload?
- Has an evacuation plan for ground and air ambulances been prepared?
- Are noncombatant evacuees a consideration for HSS?
- Have primary and secondary aeromedical airfields been identified?
 - Are sufficient aeromedical staging assets planned or in place?
 - Are aeromedical evacuation liaison teams located at key locations within each component's medical system?
- Have preventive medicine procedures been established and sufficient personnel identified to ensure protection of the health and well-being of personnel assigned to the JTF?
- Have medical communications channels, frequencies to be used by medical personnel, and any dedicated or medical-unique communication nets, operating procedures, or requirements been identified?
- Has coordination with the joint personnel recovery center been accomplished for recovery and reintegration support?
- What does medical intelligence indicate?
- Has the supported combatant commander requested that Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center be tasked to provide an area medical threat assessment?
- What military forces are involved? What are their organic medical capabilities?
- If other nations are involved, what are their unique medical requirements?
- Are host-nation medical support systems in place?

- What are the HSS reporting requirements?
- Should civilian contracts for medical support be considered?
- Is pre-regulation of patients to specific hospitals required?
- Are sufficient supplies and equipment in place; has a program for sustainability and resupply been established; is a single integrated medical logistics system required?
- Has liaison or coordination with other agencies been established?
- Have all other areas of joint HSS been addressed such as dental, mental health, and veterinary support?
 - Reinforce the importance of the mission and staying abreast of the situation.
 - Highlight the importance of working as a “team.”
- Integrate public affairs in all phases of transition planning to ensure public awareness of policy and operational changes with respect to the JTF.
- Reevaluate or establish morale, welfare, and recreation requirements — means to prevent or reduce complacency.

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ANNEX J TO APPENDIX B CHECKLIST FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL

- Is the inspector general (IG) prepared to accept and work an increased number of assistance cases? Typical requests for assistance include:
 - Early return of family members.
 - Emergency leave procedures.
 - Nonsupport of family members.
 - Family support issues (identification card, health care, post exchange, and commissary privileges).
 - Service member entitlements.
 - Shipment or storage of household goods.
 - Family care plans.

- Have inspections been scheduled and announced? Inspections should verify the status of:
 - Personnel and equipment readiness.
 - Joint task force operational readiness or effectiveness.
 - Processing for overseas movement.
 - Ports of debarkation processing.
 - Casualty affairs and graves registration.
 - Deployment operations.
 - Pre-operational training.
 - Ammunition resupply operations.
 - Operational feeding.
 - Enemy prisoners of war or detainees processing.

- Mail services.
- Reconstitution.
- Replacement system.
- War trophies or contraband.
- Accountability and serviceability of returning equipment.
- Information management and information operations.
 - Operations security.
- Force protection and safety.
- Is the IG prepared to conduct investigations? Investigations are normally more difficult to complete because:
 - Of limited access to the commander, joint task force.
 - Of time and distance factors.
 - Of a greater reliance upon technical channel support from other IGs.

ANNEX K TO APPENDIX B
CHECKLIST FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

- Does Paragraph 1 “Introduction” address the following?
 - Purpose.
 - Scope.

- In Paragraph 2 “Joint Task Force Information Management Organization,” are the following discussed?
 - Joint task force (JTF).
 - Commander, joint task force (CJTF).
 - Deputy commander, joint task force.
 - Chief of staff.
 - Information management officer.
 - Joint information management board.
 - Joint information management cell.
 - Others, as required.
 - JTF information management roles and responsibilities.
 - JTF information management organization.
 - JTF components.
 - Allies and coalition partners.
 - Higher headquarters (HQ) and other organizations.
 - Higher HQ.
 - Other organizations (nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], intergovernmental organizations [IGOs], and the interagency).

- Does Paragraph 3 “Commander’s Dissemination Policy” address the following?
 - Critical information elements.
 - Relative priorities of information flows.
 - Relative priorities of information users depending on:
 - User.
 - Organization.
 - Mission.
 - Information type (survival information, administration information, operational information, intelligence information).
 - Information release policies:
 - Public affairs guidance.
 - Release of real-time operational information to subordinate units, allies, and coalition partners.
 - Release of real-time intelligence information to subordinate units, allies, and coalition partners.
 - Information priority policies:
 - Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
 - Communication network architecture.
 - Information operations goals and objectives.
 - Identification of routine information products.
 - Limit access to specific information by content, source, type or location.
 - Releasability of information transfer due to security or classification policy.

Are the below topics addressed in Paragraph 4 “Information Requirements and General Procedures?”

CCIRs.

Friendly force information requirements.

Priority intelligence requirements.

Requests for information.

Common operational picture management.

Collection management.

Records management.

Records managers responsibilities.

Records custodians responsibilities.

Action officers’ responsibilities.

Information technology services branch responsibilities.

Files maintenance and disposition plan.

Records maintenance and disposition policies.

Records collection.

Reports.

Does Paragraph 5 “Digital Rules of Protocol” discuss the following?

Virtual meeting rooms facilitator.

Audio practices — standard military radio/telephone procedures should be employed.

Text chat practices.

Session/meeting closure.

- Collaboration tools file cabinets.
- Whiteboard.
- Virtual conference center/auditorium collaboration.
- Ad hoc meetings via chat.
- Document file naming convention.
- Briefing slide show file production and management.
- File management.
- Calendar operations.

- Does Paragraph 6 “Battle Rhythm” discuss the impact of the battle rhythm of higher HQ and subordinate commands? (Applicable to each organization pursuant to their procedures.)

- Does Paragraph 7 “Information Assurance or Computer Network Defense” address the following?
 - Information priority matrix of critical mission systems.
 - Information confidence convention (ICC):
 - Information source assurance and reliability.
 - Information currency.
 - Information content and completeness.
 - Use of the ICC.
 - Computer network defense:
 - Joint intrusion detection and monitoring plan.
 - Information assurance vulnerabilities assessment.
 - Information operations condition actions.

- Operational impact assessment.
- Continuity of operation plan.
- Are the below issues discussed in Paragraph 8 “Information System Tools and Procedures”?
 - Tactical data systems.
 - Collaborative tools.
 - Voice communications.
 - Local area network or wide area network management.
 - Data management.
 - Electronic messaging:
 - Organizational messaging.
 - E-mail.
 - Chat.
- Does Paragraph 9 “System Recovery Procedures” provide sufficient information concerning system recovery procedures? (Applicable to each organization pursuant to their operating system)

**NON-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
INTEGRATION GUIDELINES OR CHECKLIST**

1. General

The mission assigned a JTF will require not only the execution of responsibilities involving two or more Military Departments but increasingly, the support of all types of US Government (USG) — i.e., the interagency, NGOs, and IGOs. The CJTF has at least two responsibilities usually associated with those of combatant commanders — the requirement for unified action in the CJTF’s joint operations area and the necessity to interface with the interagency, NGOs, IGOs, and host nation (HN) agencies. The JTF HQ serves as the operational focal point for interagency coordination.

- Non-DOD agency operations can be grouped into two general categories — domestic and foreign operations.
- Identify and appoint a liaison officer for each non-DOD organization.
- Identify policy or framework for information exchange requirements between the interagency, NGOs, IGOs, and HN agencies (need to know; access).
- Identify technical communications link parameters.
- Identify information security exchange parameters.
- Incorporate the interagency, NGOs, and IGOs battle rhythm, as practical.
- Incorporate non-DOD information requirements into information management plan and CCIRs.
- Incorporate non-DOD annexes into overall JTF plans and orders.
- Define relationships with the interagency, NGOs, and IGOs.
- Conduct mission analysis in coordination with JTF staff.
- Identify and define end state of planned and ongoing operations.
- Develop and recommend appropriate courses of actions to support the JTF.

2. Liaison Checklist

The following checklist can be used as a guide to aid in the flow of information between the JTF and external organization:

- Telecommunications systems compatibilities and requirements.
 - Radio channels, call signs, and frequencies — see the JTF frequency manager.
 - Network connectivity and bandwidth requirements.
 - Video teleconferencing interfaces and bridges.

- Media feed.
- Phone links.
- Phone books.
- Data transmission protocols.
- Information systems compatibility.
 - Information assurance tools.
 - Desktop operating systems.
 - E-mail bridges and gateways.
 - Office application.
 - Network operating system.
 - Firewall.
 - Router protocols and polices.
 - Digital rules of protocols — file interface standards.
 - Web site adjustments.
 - Main frame.
 - Operational requirements.
 - Synchronize daily rhythms and operation times.
 - Organization structure and chain of command.
 - Action officers or liaison officers.
 - Reporting procedures.
 - Utility requirements.
 - Power.

- Air conditioning.
- Infrastructure.
- Classified access requirements.

ANNEX L TO APPENDIX B
CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION OF A JOINT TASK FORCE INTO A
MULTINATIONAL FORCE OR TRANSITION TO A FOLLOW-ON
MULTINATIONAL FORCE

- Begin the transition plan well in advance of multinational force (MNF) arrival. Establish measures of success.
- Establish transition joint planning group with planners from the existing and incoming headquarters (HQ).
- Establish senior national representative planning review group.
- Determine objectives of the transition process: timely and rapid activation of the MNF and component HQ and participating nations integrated into the MNF organization.
- Conduct transition risk assessment. The level of violence can “rise” during or after a transition occurs; develop counter-contingency plans to avoid serious escalations and ensure operational security.
- Establish senior-level MNF transition board to coordinate participating nation’s reconnaissance/survey teams, liaison teams, support and force levels, rules of engagement, negotiate memorandums of understanding, status-of-forces agreements, transfer of responsibility, and funding.
- Establish MNF HQ location, real estate, and resource requirements. Identify MNF logistics, medical, and other required areas if different from existing joint task force (JTF) facilities.
- Receive and integrate MNF HQ forward command element and liaison officers.
- Coordinate/implement agreed information sharing arrangements with MNF HQ and force elements.
- Establish communications with United Nations (UN) and the new strategic command if required.
- Dispatch liaison officers to MNF and consider provision of JTF communications detachments level during transition period.
- Coordinate reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and relief in place between JTF and MNF headquarters and force elements. Recommend a staging base and points of entry (aerial and sea ports of debarkation). Coordinate force preparation program and recommend an acclimatization period.

- Establish multinational movement coordination center.
- Establish multinational public affairs office.
- Recommend MNF deployment priority and sequence into theater.
- Develop relief in place schedule, procedures, and timeline. Include the force lay down plan. Develop transition synchronization matrix including major events and timing.
- Identify MNF capability shortfalls, means to address shortfalls including consideration of leaving key JTF assets in place with appropriate logistic support. Determine equipment and resource to gift to MNF. Identify key areas of MNF interoperability.
- Determine MNF funding and national implementing arrangements. Ensure local contacting arrangements have been considered by incoming MNF. Confirm existing arrangements that will transfer to incoming force with host nation government, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
- Recommend tactical areas of responsibility within an area of operations /joint operations area.
- Develop force protection plan for incoming and outgoing forces during transition period.
- Ensure transition addresses personnel recovery capability assessment and multinational force requirements.
- Transfer lessons learned.
- Develop handover package and acceptable level of achievement on existing civil and military projects to the MNF.
- Transition addresses coordination with IGOs and NGOs. The MNF/follow-on force understands cultures of key players and respect the roles and missions of local authorities and these organizations; determine how to leverage their contributions.
- Establish mutually agreed criteria to set the preconditions before transition of command may occur.

- Identify the timing and prepare for formal transfer of command.
- When the MNF or follow-on force is prepared to assume command, clear and distinct change of responsibilities and authority must occur.

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APPENDIX C

CONTRACTING AND CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT PLANNING

1. Purpose

This appendix provides the CJTF and staff considerations regarding use of contracting as a source of support. It is a necessary addition to this JP because of the unique challenges in planning for both contracting as well as contract and contractor personnel management, especially in complex, long-term stability operations. These two topics of contracting and contract or contractor personnel management are related, but distinct, areas of concern and are discussed separately below. The guidance is **NOT** all-inclusive, nor are all items contained herein relevant for all operational situations.

2. Overview

a. Contracting can be, and often is, a significant source of logistic and combat support requirements. Contracting also can be a key source of non-logistic support for such things as interpreters and communications. **Contracting support capabilities should be considered when ACSAs and HNS agreements do not exist or when these agreements cannot provide the required supplies or services.** While there always will be some contracted support in all military operations (e.g., technical representative supporting newly fielded equipment), significant use of contracting as a source of support also should be considered when there is a restriction on military support structure or when contracting can be effectively utilized in lieu of military support. See Paragraph 6 “Acquisition and Cross-Servicing, and Host-Nation Agreements,” for more details concerning ACSAs and HNS agreements.

b. Contracting out CJTF support functions can have significant operational benefits as well as risks. Possible benefits include:

(1) Bridging gaps between early deploying combat forces and late deploying logistic forces.

(2) Reduced strategic transportation requirements.

(3) Positive impact on the civil aspects of the OPLAN.

c. Possible risks and other negative factors of utilizing contracted support include:

(1) Loss of operational flexibility.

(2) Increased FP and security requirements.

(3) Increased risk of loss of critical support capabilities in high-threat operations.

(4) Increased short-term costs.

d. The CJTF should work closely with the CDR, Service, and logistic agency contracting officers to determine the best approach for sourcing JTF requirements to meet materiel and capability needs, considering cost and other factors. Additionally, CJTFs and their staffs must keep in mind that **contracting is not a “fire and forget system” — it requires significant involvement from organizations receiving contractor services as well as robust professional contract management capabilities.** Without proper command involvement and contract management in place, the CJTF is likely to experience significantly increased operational costs, and more importantly, possible loss of operational effectiveness.

e. CJTFs and their staffs must have a detailed plan in place to properly manage the total contractor force of the JTF. Just as each operation is different, so are the responsibilities a CJTF may have when dealing with contractor support. **The CDR determines the authority and many of the responsibilities that a CJTF will have when working with contractors.** No single publication addresses all the contracting and contractor management challenges that a JTF may encounter. However, numerous publications and DOD policy documents cover joint contracting and contractor management. Key publications include DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*, and DODI 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crisis*.

3. Types of Contracted Support

JP 4-0, *Joint Logistic Support*, and DODI 3020.41 lay out three broad types of contracted support: **theater support contract, external support contract, and systems support contract.** In addition to these basic types of contracts, planning for and managing contract employees is influenced by contractor personnel nationalities and place of hire. A general doctrine and policy overview on this subject is provided below.

a. **Theater Support Contract.** Theater support contract contractors support deployed operational forces under prearranged contracts, or contracts awarded from the mission area, by contracting officers serving under the direct contracting authority of the Service component commanders or designated joint or multinational chief of contracting responsible for theater support contracting in a particular operational area. These contractors provide goods, services, and minor construction; usually from commercial sources within the JOA; to meet the immediate needs of the CJTF and subordinate component commanders. **Theater support contracts are the type of contract typically associated with contingency contracting.** Also of importance, local national personnel make up the bulk of the theater support contract employees.

b. **External Support Contract.** External support contract contractors provide a variety of logistic and other noncombat related JTF support. External contracts may be prearranged contracts or contracts awarded during the contingency itself to support the mission and may include a mix of US citizens, third country nationals (TCNs), and local national subcontractor employees. The largest and most commonly used external support contracts are the Services' civil augmentation contracts including the Army's logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP), the Air Force contract augmentation program (AFCAP),

and the Navy's global contingency construction (GCC) contract program. These programs commonly are used to provide JTF life support, transportation support, and many other logistic and non-logistic support functions to deployed military forces and other organizations within the JOA as directed by the CDR or CJTF.

c. **System Support Contracts.** System support contracts are prearranged contracts by the Service's program managers or major logistic commands. These contracts provide technical support, maintenance support and, in some cases, Class IX (Repair Parts) support for selected weapons and other major systems such as aircraft, land combat vehicles, and automated C2 systems. Systems contractors, primarily US citizens, provide support in garrison and often deploy with the force in both training and contingency operations. **The CJTF generally has less control over system support contracts than other types of contracts.** Much of JTF Service components' equipment will be maintained either partially or fully through contractor logistic support (CLS). The CJTF and staff should be cognizant there often will be no military or other support alternative for the support provided by the original equipment manufacturer field service or technical representatives.

d. **Other Important Contract and Contractor Personnel Constructs.** The CJTF and staff should understand that contracting, and especially contract management challenges, also are affected by contractor and contracting constructs.

(1) **Nationality.** Contractor personnel (includes subcontractor personnel) can, and will be, a mix of US citizens, TCNs, and local nationals. More importantly, some, but by no means all, contractor personnel management requirements will be different depending on the nationality of the contractor personnel. For example, US mail service support will be different for US, TCN, and local national employees. Specific contractor personnel management nationality nuances are addressed in DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*, or in other DOD policy and doctrine documents referenced in this publication.

(2) **Contractors who deploy with the force.** This contractor employee construct, recently addressed in DODI 3020.41, is very important. CDF are, in accordance with this new DOD policy, subject to special deployment, redeployment, and accountability requirements and responsibilities that set them apart from locally hired TCNs and local nationals, particularly in aspects of deployment preparation and security. More specifically, CDF personnel are required to meet theater entrance requirements equal to DOD civilians who are being deployed to the operational area. Additionally, **the CJTF is responsible to ensure the security of these CDF personnel is equal to that of DOD civilians.**

(3) **DOD versus non-DOD Contractors.** In general, contract and contractor personnel management related DOD policy and joint doctrine only applies to contractors who are hired by, and are in support of DOD forces. In many operations however, the CJTF and staff also must be cognizant of non-DOD contractors within the JOA, especially DOS contracts in long-term, high-threat, stability operations as have been observed in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In these types of operations, the military may in fact be responsible to provide, or at least coordinate,

security for designated non-DOD contract support sites. In some cases, the military also may be responsible to support DOS in letting and managing their contracts.

4. Joint Task Force Contracting Planning Considerations

a. **Overview.** JTF contract planning generally focuses on theater and external support contracting. Key to success in this challenging area is centralized contracting planning at the combatant command and JTF-levels. The CJTF, in coordination with the CCDR and Service components, must ensure that Service component contracting organizations do not end up competing for limited local vendor resources to meet their own organizations' needs thus driving up prices and creating artificial shortages across the JOA, possibly resulting in a negative effect on the overall readiness of the joint force. **Title 10, US Code holds Service components responsible for their own logistic support, including contracted support.** Contracted support must be properly coordinated, managed, and organized JOA-wide to ensure that JTF interests are not subordinated to component interests. This may include centralized management, if not direct control of, contracting by the CJTF within the JOA. In all operations, the CJTF must consider existing Service component contracting assets and organizations in the operational area and how they might need to evolve in terms of staffing, relationships, organization, and authorities to best meet the changing needs. JTF contracting goals include:

- (1) Meeting the CJTF's support requirements in the most expeditious and effective manner possible.
- (2) Filling gaps in organic military support capabilities.
- (3) Maximizing the use of the limited local vendor base.
- (4) Eliminating competition for resources among Service components and multinational partners.
- (5) Maintaining visibility over all JOA contracts, contracting capabilities, and requirements.
- (6) Combining to the maximum extent possible component requirements in order to achieve the most economic buys.
- (7) Reducing reliance on cost-plus Service contract augmentation programs (LOGCAP, AFCAP, and Navy's GCC) contracts as soon as possible.
- (8) Cultivating local sources to facilitate the shift to local contracts designed to reduce cost and to contribute to the JTF's civil objectives.

b. **CJTF Authorities.** During the planning process, the CJTF and staff should work closely with the supported CCDR to establish the appropriate authorities, relationships, or JTF organizations necessary for the CJTF to exert control and maintain visibility over contracting

within the JOA. As stated above, contracting is a Title 10, US Code function belonging to the DOD components and US Special Operations Command. The geographic CCDRs depend on the Service component commanders to execute their contracting authority in support of the JTF. However, because they do not possess contracting authority themselves, the geographic CCDR's ability to influence the execution of such authority must be done indirectly through command authority over its Service components, designations of lead agents over common user logistics and contracting, delegation of its own Title 10 directive authority for logistics, and in some operational situations (e.g., Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), through mission specific executive agency designations from the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS.

c. **JTF Management and Control of Contracting.** Control of contracting and theater requirements vetting typically is performed through CCDR appointed boards such as the logistics procurement support board (LPSB) or the joint acquisition review board (JARB). However, in large, complex or long-term contingencies, it may be beneficial for the CCDR to designate a lead Service component commander for contracting or to standup a JCC to execute some of the more labor intensive duties of such boards and allow the boards to concentrate on more strategic contracting issues. **While the CCDR has overall responsibility for and authority over, logistics and contracting for assigned forces within the AOR, this authority does not automatically include attached forces.** In evaluating the adequacy of authority over contracting efforts in the JOA, the CJTF considers the mission and authority required to effectively manage contracting efforts throughout the JOA and support the mission.

d. **JTF Contracting Organizational Options.** The CJTF, depending on specific mission requirements and CCDR guidance, may choose from several contracting options.

(1) **Boards and Centers.** Contracting boards or centers normally are established by the CCDR in support of the CJTF. The LPSB or JARB usually are chaired by JTF J-4 and include designated contract lawyers and JTF staff members (as required) as well as representatives from each Service component and DOD logistic organizations. They also may include representatives from MNFs or the interagency.

(2) **Lead Service.** During contingencies, CCDRs may assign a lead Service component commander responsible to manage theater contract support for the JTF. In these cases, the lead Service principal assistant for contracting (PARC), appointed by the Service head of contracting authority (HCA), will lead the JARB and will execute theater contracting support based on CJTF guidance and priorities.

(3) **Joint Contracting Center.** In larger or more complex contingencies, the CJTF may require more control than what typically can be provided through the boards and centers or lead Service methodologies. In these cases, the CCDR may establish a JCC. The JCC, by design, will be jointly staffed by all JTF Service components and will control most, if not all, Service component contracting organizations and personnel within its designated support area (could be JOA or AOR). However, due to current US law and DOD funding processes, the JCC contracting authority still must flow from a designated military Service through an appointed HCA and PARC.

e. Contracting Support Plan

(1) CJCSI 3110.03, *The Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, requires the CCDR to designate a lead Service component commander or agent for contracting in the OPLAN to develop a contracting support plan (CSP) that supports all joint operations phases. The instruction also addresses required CSP elements as follows:

(a) Theater contracting authority.

(b) Theater support contracting organizational (lead Service or joint contracting boards/center) requirements.

(c) Contract administration services delegation.

(d) Command and coordination organization and procedures.

(2) A CSP also should:

(a) Identify requiring activities to be supported.

(b) Identify available contracting capabilities to satisfy requirements.

(c) Identify ACSAs and other HNS agreements.

(d) Identify sources of supply in the JOA for commonly required supplies and services. This section also should address development of an area database containing all available information concerning local resources. The database may include area studies, locally developed logistic support data, a complete listing of existing LOGCAP, Navy's GCC, AFCAP, HN, and other foreign country agreements available in the JOA, and recommendations from DOS Foreign Service and Commerce Department Foreign Commercial Service personnel. Information also may come from the US or civilian organizations such as nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations familiar with the area. This part of the CSP must be continually updated. The database should address security and quality control aspects of contracting to include inspection of goods received to ensure against sabotage, poisoning, or other terrorist-style actions and fraud.

(e) Identify sources of supply in the United States for commonly required supplies and services not available in the JOA.

(f) Detail contracted services and capabilities desired in the JOA.

(g) List contracts likely to be used in the JOA and summarize the capability they bring.

(h) Identify existing relationships of DOD and non-DOD contracting activities in the JOA, including memoranda of agreement or memoranda of understanding, and opportunities for additional

agreements to improve contracting coverage.

(i) Identify subordinate commands' requirements that may be met by HN, foreign nation (FN), LOGCAP, Navy's GCC, AFCAP, ACSA, or contracting support.

(j) Identify process for vetting contracting solutions and solution sets during logistic planning and incorporating in plans and orders.

(k) Identify logistics required to support contracting, financial management support, program management support, legal support, foreign language translator support, and FP support.

(l) Identify procedures and policies for implementing contracting support in the JOA assuring appropriate utilization of theater support as well as external support contracts (especially LOGCAP, AFCAP, and Navy's GCC).

(m) Identify process and players for assuring contract compliance across the JOA. (Contract compliance is ensuring that the contractor is following the contract's terms and conditions. The key to effective contract compliance is ensuring contract language accurately reflects theater requirements, especially in characterizing the relationship between the contractor and DOD. The CJTF and the supported CDR must ensure planners consider the variety of requirements relating to contractor support, include them in plans and orders, and communicate these plans to the DOD components so that they can be included in applicable contracts.)

5. Contract and Contractor Management Planning Considerations

a. **General.** Contract and contracting management support should not be considered just another support option when planning JTF operations. There are some very unique planning considerations involved when planning to use contract support that was not covered in the CSP discussed above. Planning for contractor support identifies the full extent of contractor involvement, how and where contractor support should be provided, and any Service component commanders' responsibilities in providing support to contractor personnel. The reality is that contract and contractor personnel management challenges cross numerous staff directorates, yet it is the JTF J-4 who normally is held responsible to ensure that major contract and contractor personnel management planning considerations are taken into account when developing the JTF's OPLAN or OPORD. This planning may or may not include a separate contractor integration plan that addresses operational specific contractor policies and requirements, but in all operations, such requirements should be at a minimum, addressed in the applicable section of the OPLAN or OPORD. This information also should be provided to JTF components to ensure said requirements are adequately incorporated into their Service and DOD contingency contracts. Also, the need for contingency arrangements if a contractor fails to or is prevented from performing must be considered by each Service component commander in accordance with DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*, paragraph 6.2.1. Special consideration must be given to system-support requirements where no military support currently is available.

(1) During the planning process, it is imperative that the CJTF and staff work closely with the supported CCDR and DOD components to define respective roles and responsibilities regarding contingency contractors. DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*, provides a useful framework for managing contingency contractor personnel and identifies additional references that should be consulted when building an OPLAN integrating the use of such personnel in military operations. However, a complete understanding of the issues associated with such contractors is not possible without reviewing the contents of its references. These references are largely DOD directives and instructions.

(2) The type and quality of support that a contractor provides are similar to that provided by military combat support and combat service support units. However, the CJTF and JTF staff should be aware of some of the fundamental differences between contractors and military members of the force. A synopsis of the generic contract and contractor personnel management planning considerations follow.

(a) **General Legal Considerations.** Contracted support to the military involves three main bodies of law, i.e., international, HN, and United States. A CJTF must ensure that a SJA or legal counsel is consulted at the outset and involved in the planning and reviews of all OPLANs and OPORDs to ensure compliance with various international, US, and HN laws as well as applicable treaties, SOFAs, status of mission agreements, memoranda of understanding, and memoranda of agreements. It is important to note that in some operations, HN laws may impact the ability of DOD contractors to employ TCNs and US nationals and subject them to HN criminal jurisdiction.

(b) **Contractor Personnel Legal Status.** Contractor personnel are neither combatants nor noncombatants, but are defined by the Geneva Conventions and other international agreements as civilians “authorized” to accompany the force in the field. Authorization to accompany the force is demonstrated by the possession of a DD Form 489 (Geneva Conventions Identity Card for Persons who Accompany the Armed Forces). Contractor personnel, in general, cannot be required to perform combat-related tasks and in high-risk contingencies may require security and FP support by military means. Additionally, the CJTF must ensure that contractor employee status is not jeopardized by the ways in which they are required to provide contracted support.

(c) **Command and Control.** The CJTF is responsible for C2 of military and DOD civilian personnel assigned or attached to the JTF, but the CJTF only has limited control over, and no command of, contractor personnel. CJTF command authority should not be confused with the USG contracting officer’s contract authority. This type of authority does not transfer to the commander. Commanders must manage contractors through component contracting officers and their appointed contracting officer representatives (CORs) and administrative contracting officers (ACOs) per the terms and conditions of the contract. When in doubt, the CJTF and staff should work closely with the supported CCDR and staff to determine CJTF authority and responsibilities over contractor personnel.

(d) **Contract Language.** The relationship between and respective responsibilities of the USG and a contractor should be defined in the terms and conditions of the contract, especially in its statement of work and its clauses. This includes the specific support relationship between the USG and the contractor. DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*, contains numerous contingency contractor support requirements that must be addressed by Service component contracting officers in DOD contracts that contemplate deploying contractor personnel in support of the Armed Forces of the United States in foreign countries. Common terms and conditions required by the DODI have been addressed in a mandatory Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) clause.

(e) **Contractors perform only tasks specified in contracts.** Other duties as assigned do not apply in a contract environment. Commanders need to be sensitive to having contractor personnel performing tasks that are outside the scope of their contract or that could be construed as personal services or as an unauthorized commitment.

(f) **Government Furnished Support.** Contractors are expected to be self-sufficient, handling all actions necessary to perform under the terms and conditions of the contract without significant assistance from the USG. However, in some circumstances, it may be appropriate and necessary for the USG to provide military support, to include security FP measures, to a contractor when deployed into an operational area. USG-furnished support may be appropriate if it is less expensive than contractor-provided support or required by operational conditions. Additionally, government-furnished support may be necessary when the USG controls the support needed or is the only source of support, such as transportation within an operational area. In all cases, the support the USG will provide must be specified in the contract.

b. **Role of Key JTF Personnel and Organizations**

(1) **JTF J-4 and Other JTF Staff.** JTF J-4 is the lead staff officer responsible to ensure that major contract and contractor personnel management planning considerations are taken into account when developing the JTF's OPLAN or OPORD; however, most JTF staffs have a specific role to play in their own functional areas. **For example, the JTF J-3, not the J-4, should analyze and recommend specific contractor personnel related security or FP requirements.**

(2) **DOD Component Contracting Officers.** **By virtue of their contracting authority, contracting officers are the only personnel authorized to make changes to contract deliverables and resolve issues related to contract performance.** Commanders should consult the procuring contracting officer if in theater or the ACO if contract administration has been delegated to that officer (generally a Defense Contract Management Agency [DCMA] officer for major system support and external support contracts) when experiencing problems or issues with contractor personnel or contract performance. Commanders only may direct contingency contractor personnel to take lawful actions in emergency situations (e.g., enemy or terrorist actions, natural disasters).

(3) **Contracting Officer’s Representatives.** CORs act as the contracting officer’s “eyes” and “ears.” However, they do not have the authority to make changes to the contract. It is imperative that the CJTF ensure component commanders understand the importance of COR duties and that they have a plan to designate and train an adequate number of CORs to ensure proper contract compliance and contractor personnel within the JOA.

(4) **Defense Contract Management Agency.** DCMA acts as the ACO on many external support and systems support contracts and generally will have a presence in the JOA in support of the JTF. However, **DCMA is not a source of contracted support. Its mission is strictly focused on contract compliance.** Before contracts are awarded, DCMA provides advice and services to help construct effective solicitations, identify potential risks, select the most capable contractors, and write contracts that meet the needs of customers from the interagency and allied governments. After contracts are awarded, DCMA monitors contractors’ performance and management systems to ensure that cost, product performance, and delivery schedules are in compliance with the terms and conditions of the contracts.

For more details concerning DCMA, refer to JP 4-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations.

c. **Deployment and Theater Admission Requirements and Procedures.** Contingency contractor personnel constitute those personnel authorized to accompany the Armed Forces of the United States under DOD contracts for military operations in foreign countries. Contingency contractor personnel fall into two personnel categories: CDF and non-CDF. CDF are employees of system support and external support contractors, and associated subcontractors, at all tiers, who are specifically required in their contract to deploy through a deployment center or process to provide support to US military deployed forces. Other contingency contractor personnel are generally HN and TCN personnel hired locally under theater support and external support contracts (or subcontracts at any tier).

d. Detailed planning for the deployment and redeployment of contractor personnel is essential to successfully integrating them into the total force. CCDRs are responsible for articulating such requirements and DOD components are responsible for incorporating them into DOD contracts. In a nonrestricted theater, these CDF contractors may self-deploy utilizing commercial assets (if authorized by the contracting officer and CCDR to deploy through an equivalent deployment center like process). In a restricted theater, they most likely will deploy utilizing military deployment processes and strategic-lift assets. How and when contractors enter the operation must be planned and stipulated in plans and orders to ensure supporting contracting activities can incorporate deployment and redeployment requirements. This allows contractors to efficiently plan and prepare for movement of personnel and equipment. Failure to identify and coordinate the method of arriving in the operational area may interfere with the organized flow of forces. **The J-3 staff must be fully cognizant of contractor deployment and redeployment requirements.** Additional discussion on key challenges and issues related to contractor personnel theater entrance requirements and deployment follow.

(1) **System Support Contractor Logistics Support Contracts.** Program managers should, but sometimes do not, coordinate proposed CLS arrangements with CCDRs in advance of CLS decisions. The practical result of this lack of coordination is that CCDRs and subordinate CJTFs often are left with little or no choice in matters concerning system support contracts. The CJTF and JTF staff must understand there always will be numerous Service component weapon systems and support equipment that will require civilian contractor support and that appropriate JTF policies and plans should address the provision of support to such contractors.

(2) **Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development.** Deployment data for CDF personnel and equipment deploying with the force must be incorporated into TPFDD development and addressed in the contract. **Commanders and planners should be aware that contractor support may result in conflicts with military force movements.** If not properly managed, contractor personnel, equipment, and supplies may compete for transportation resources with military forces and civilian requirements during the deployment process. This is why all contracted support must be coordinated as directed by the CCDR.

(3) **JOA Entrance Requirements.** The CJTF, in close coordination with the CCDR, must ensure that any special JOA entrance requirements are identified and incorporated into published special area, country, and theater personnel clearance guidance and that this information is passed to all JTF components for planning purposes and incorporation into relevant contracts.

(4) **In-Theater Reception.** All CDF are required to process through a JRC or other personnel center designated by the CCDR.

e. **Specific JTF-level, In-theater Contract, and Contractor Management Planning Considerations.** As previously stated, the type and quality of support that a contractor provides is similar to that provided by military combat support and combat service support units. However, the CJTF and JTF staff must be aware of the significant differences between contractors and military members of the force and plan accordingly for these differences. See the discussion below for more details on some key contract and contractor personnel management challenges.

(1) **DOD and CCDR Policy.** Policy guidance for the proper employment of contractor personnel in support of US forces is extensive. While DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*, ties the existing DOD policy together and provides additional policy to fill gaps, it should be read in conjunction with applicable references to ensure compliance. In any consideration to contract for particular capabilities, manpower and legal authorities should be consulted to ensure compliance with restrictions on contracting inherently government functions. The CJTF should identify the specific operational contractor policies and requirements the CCDR has identified and directed for a particular operation or operational area and ensure they are addressed in JTF plans and policies.

(2) **Contractor Personnel Direction and Discipline.** Contractor personnel are subject to US, HN, and international laws and regulations, but as discussed above, they are not directly supervised by the normal military chain of command. Contractor supervisors, not local military commanders, are responsible for directing and disciplining their employees. However, DOD contractor personnel are

subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice during a declared war or if they are retired US military members. While the CJTF and subordinate commanders have limited authority to take disciplinary action against contractor employees, there are judicial and nonjudicial remedies available to them. For criminal misconduct, prosecution by the Department of Justice may be possible under applicable Federal Laws, including the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. For lesser offenses, commanders may impose nonjudicial actions including revoking or suspending security access or imposing restrictions from installations. In addition, the DFARS specifies that the contracting officer may direct the contractor, at its own expense, to remove and replace contractor personnel who jeopardize or interfere with mission accomplishment or who fail to comply with or violate applicable requirements of the DFARS. In all such cases, the CJTF should seek the assistance of the SJA, the contracting officer responsible for the contract, and the contractor's management team.

(3) **International and HN Support Agreements.** As these agreements may affect contracting by restricting, limiting, or prohibiting contracted services; the CJTF and applicable staff members should ensure that they are aware of existing international and HNS agreements and take them into account as necessary.

(4) **SOFAs and Status of Mission Agreements.** Contractor personnel generally are not covered by SOFAs and therefore will not enjoy the protections or privileges offered to the US military forces they accompany. During the JTF planning process, existing SOFAs and status of mission agreements should be reviewed to determine their impact on the status and use of contractors in support of contingency operations. If warranted and possible, such agreements should be renegotiated to address the use of contractor personnel. Planners and contracting officers should consult with their Services' legal offices to ensure all applicable agreements have been considered and reviewed. When feasible, DOD, coordinating with DOS, should negotiate agreements that address the status of contractor personnel. Ideally, contractor personnel should be given the same status as DOD civilians for the purpose of providing operational support to US forces.

(5) **Contractor Use Restrictions.** There are no specific DOD-level restrictions on the location or timing of contractor support during military operations. However, the CJTF, in close coordination with the Service components and selected DOD logistic agencies, may place specific restrictions on locations or timing of contractor support based on the operational situation, realizing that such restrictions may decrease the JTF's ability to maintain and sustain adequate combat power at the point and time required.

(6) **Contractor Personnel Accountability.** Accountability of contractors in an operational area is required for security, allocating resources, and administration. DOD policy requires JTF components to maintain by-name accountability of all CDF personnel in support of military operations. In addition, DOD policy allows CCDRs to require maintenance of by-name accountability for theater support contractor personnel under selected theater support contracts. Currently, there are no standard procedures or automated systems specifically designed to capture visibility of contractors within an operational area. However, DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*, requires the Office of the Secretary of Defense to designate or develop a web-based joint database to capture both individual contractor accountability

and contractor capability. At the time of this writing, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is in process of designating an interim solution. Presently, there also is no specific policy or approved doctrine that clearly designates the lead staff element responsible for establishing and maintaining contractor personnel accountability. Therefore, it is imperative that JTF J-1 and J-4 work together to determine JTF specific responsibilities and procedures for contractor accountability early in the planning process.

(7) **Contractor Visibility.** It is imperative that the CJTF maintain overall visibility of all support requirements and capabilities within the JOA to include contracted support. The overall contractor company and personnel presence, along with applicable readiness implications, must be made part of the overall force readiness reporting. Contractor visibility couples individual contractor personnel accountability information with additional contract-related information to include identifying contractors' companies supporting the operation, where they operate, when they provide support, and the criticality of their support.

(8) **Security and Force Protection.** CJTFs, in coordination with their CCDR and Service components, are required to develop a security plan for the protection of contingency contractor personnel in those locations where there is not sufficient or legitimate civil authority. The commander may determine that it is in the best interest of the USG to provide security because the contractor cannot obtain effective security services, such services are unavailable at a reasonable cost, or threat conditions necessitate security through military means. In high-threat operations (i.e., when Levels II or III threats exists or are possible), it normally will be in the interest of the CJTF to provide security and FP for contractor personnel because it would be inappropriate to have the contractor obtain effective security services through other than military means. In these cases, CDF personnel supporting and residing in military controlled compounds will be provided security and FP to the same general level as provided to deployed DOD civilians. In all cases, the contracting officer will include the level of protection to be provided to contingency contractor personnel in the contract. CJTF and JTF planners must determine the need for contractor security and FP early in the planning process and if required, identify forces to provide this security. Mission, threat, and location determine the degree of security and FP needed. To properly plan for the security of contractor personnel in high-threat operations, the CJTF, supporting contracting officer, and responsible requiring unit or activity must establish and utilize procedures to identify contractor personnel and their status and location within the JOA.

For more details, refer to DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces, and JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

(9) **Issue and Use of Weapons on an Individual Basis.** Contractor personnel usually are not armed, but may obtain government-issued or geographic CCDR-approved personal protection weapons (defined as rifle or sidearm only) if they meet the stringent policy guidance found in DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*. **Approval authority for arming individual contractor personnel resides with the CCDR or his designated flag officer representative.** Contingency contractor personnel will not be authorized to possess or carry personally owned firearms or ammunition.

(10) **Use of Contingency Contractor Personnel for Security Services.** In accordance with DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*, contractors can be used to provide security services to US military forces, facilities, and supplies in contingency operations except when major combat operations are on-going or imminent; however, since the term major combat operations is not adequately defined in policy nor doctrine, this policy stipulation is still very much open to interpretation. In all cases, the CJTF should be very cautious when planning to use contracted security when there is the possibility of anything above a Level I threat within the JOA. Whether a particular use of contracted security capability is permissible is dependent on the operational situation and requires detailed legal analysis by all levels of command and must be approved by the CCDR or his designated flag officer per DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*.

(11) **Personnel Recovery.** Key for CJTF planning is that CDF personnel are required by policy and doctrine to be included in the CJTF's PR program.

For more details concerning PR planning, refer to Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2310.2, Personnel Recovery, and JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

(12) **Mortuary Affairs.** Contingency contractor personnel who die in support of US forces are covered by the DOD Mortuary Affairs program.

For further details on mortuary affairs, refer to JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.

(13) **Medical Support and Evacuation.** Generally, DOD medical support to contingency contractor personnel consists of resuscitative care, stabilization, hospitalization at Level III MTFs, and assistance with patient movement where loss of life, limb, or eyesight could occur. Hospitalization is limited to stabilization and short-term medical treatment with an emphasis on return-to-duty or placement in the patient movement system. Primary care for CDF personnel may be authorized, but must be authorized as determined by appropriate military authority. In all JTF operations, the JTF surgeon must closely work with the other JTF staff and component staff to ensure that contractor personnel medical care is properly planned for and executed.

For additional information concerning medical support and evacuation procedures related to contractor personnel, refer to DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces, and JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

(14) **Other Government Furnished Support.** This category addresses other support that the government may provide to contingency contractors, including postal, commissary, MWR, exchange services and religious support. The provision of such support should be identified in the contract and consistent with DOD component policy, applicable laws, SOFAs and international agreements. The JTF J-4 should ensure that the Service components have a proper plan to provide this support as operations dictate.

(15) **Non-DOD US Government Contractors Operating in the JOA.** As stated above, there often will be interagency contractors, mostly DOS, working in the JOA. This fact will be especially true in large-scale, long-term stability operations. In all operations, the JTF J-3 must ensure that the CJTF is aware of DOS or other interagency contractors working in the JOA. **This coordination between the JTF and the interagency directing the contracted support is critically important if the interagency contracts include significant contracted security forces requirements.** In stability operations such as those in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the CJTF may decide that it is necessary to set up a separate operation center dedicated to coordinating JTF and the interagency contracting and contractor related security measures.

For more details concerning interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.

6. Acquisition, Cross-Servicing, and Host-Nation Agreements

a. **Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements and Host-Nation Agreements.** ACSAs are flexible bilateral agreements that may be used for the purpose of obtaining HNS (or support from other coalition countries). **ACSAs provide CCDRs with alternative, potentially more efficient sources of logistic support to US forces during deployments and contingency operations.** They have been successfully employed during Operations DESERT STORM, RESTORE HOPE, JOINT ENDEAVOR, and IRAQI FREEDOM.

b. HN, FN, and cross-servicing support agreements exist with numerous countries. New HN and cross-servicing support agreements may be negotiated for a specific operation. **These agreements permit acquisitions and transfers of specific categories of logistic support to take advantage of existing stocks in the supply systems of the United States and allied nations.** The operational level commander must carefully weigh the risks associated with HNS against using US forces to provide the support. HNS is an excellent source of common support, but is very theater and situation dependent. Available support depends on the operational area, prior agreements, and friendliness of the nations in the area, and a nation's willingness and ability to provide it at the time it is needed. In some potential operational areas, agreements may exist between the United States and the HN. In others, no nation may be friendly to the United States and no HNS will be available — at least not initially.

c. Providing contracted support to the JTF and its subordinates may require interaction with foreign governments, commercial entities, NGOs, IGOs, and other organizations. Contracting can be an effective force multiplier of combat service support for deployed forces. When properly used, contracting is another essential tool of the CJTF in support of the mission. **Contracting can bridge gaps that may occur before sufficient organic support units can deploy or before scheduled LOGCAP, Navy's GCC, AFCAP, ACSA, or FN resources can provide support.** It also is valuable where no FN agreements exist or where FN agreements do not provide for the supplies or services required. This also requires close coordination with CA, financial management, and legal support activities.

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APPENDIX D INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

1. General

a. CJTFs make decisions based on their understanding of the operational environment (to include location, disposition, and status of friendly and enemy forces). The role of information management is to provide a timely flow of relevant information that supports all aspects of planning, decision-making, and execution; to include all activities involved in the identification, collection, filtering, fusing, processing, focusing, disseminating, and using information. IMOs assemble information that promotes understanding of the information environment and enable the CJTF to better formulate and analyze COAs, make decisions, execute those decisions, and understand results from previous decisions.

b. Information management uses established procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, protect, display, disseminate, and dispose of information. A JTF requires a continuous flow of quality information to support operations. Information flow strategy is developed to ensure that this quality information gets to the right place on time and in a form that is quickly usable by its intended recipients. To that end, the effective flow of information requires the information to be:

(1) **Positioned Properly.** The requirements for specific types of information often are predictable. Positioning the required information at its anticipated points of need speeds the flow and reduces demands on the communications system (e.g., using public folders to post required information).

(2) **Mobile.** The reliable and secure flow of information must be commensurate with the JTF's mobility and operating tempo. Information flow must support vertical and horizontal data sharing (e.g., collaborative [integrated] planning system).

(3) **Accessible.** All levels of command within the JTF must be able to pull the information they need to support concurrent or parallel planning and mission execution. If possible, channel information to the required user via automated means, reducing the need for manual exchange (e.g., graphic depiction of forces in a COP).

(4) **Fused.** Information is received from many sources, in many mediums, and in different formats. Fusion is the logical blending of information from multiple sources into an accurate, concise, and complete summary. A key objective of information management is to reduce information to its minimum essential elements and in a format that can be easily understood and acted on (for example, threat assessment disseminated in graphic form on an automated COP system).

c. The JTF's communications system provides the means for information dissemination. Users of information are ultimately responsible for its management. Principal, special, and supporting staff directors or chiefs must clearly identify their information requirements and

work closely with the JTF IMO ensuring processes are automated in the most effective way possible.

2. Information Management Plan

a. **Information Management Plan.** An effective management plan provides guidance to ensure availability of decision-quality information. It is needed to articulate not just the processes that exist, but also the means by which the JTF will perform those processes. **This plan is the JTF IMP.**

b. The JTF IMP should cover the JTF information management requirements that cut across all elements of the organization. A construct that works well is that of the “4 Ps”: people, process, pipes, and protection. Examples include the duties, responsibilities, and skill requirements (people); information management processes, and procedures (process); information management systems and requirements (pipes); and information management system protection (protection). Some of the key items are:

- (1) Commander’s dissemination policy.
- (2) Information requirements and general procedures (COP management, CCIRs).
- (3) Digital rules of protocol (also referred to as business rules). These rules provide correct use and promote proper etiquette when working with collaboration tools and other digital information systems within a JTF.
- (4) Battle rhythm or schedule of events.
- (5) Information assurance or computer network defense.
- (6) Information systems tools and procedures (to include collaborative planning tools).
- (7) RFI management procedures.
- (8) Network applications and architecture. This guidance may include using records management, web pages, or other applications.
- (9) Reports management.
- (10) Master suspense action log.
- (11) Significant events log.
- (12) Orders distribution.

(13) System recovery procedures.

c. **Commander's Dissemination Policy.** The commander's dissemination policy serves as the commander's guidance portion of the IMP on dissemination of information within and outside of the JTF. The commander's dissemination policy is not a separate document, but a part of the IMP. It provides a foundation for developing the IMP and aids in prioritizing information management activities. It provides policy to guide JTF information management decisions in the absence of specific guidance or detailed instructions. Critical information needs must be predetermined and prioritized to ensure support for critical missions, prevent overload of routine information, and provide guidance to apportion information assets.

(1) The commander's dissemination policy may incorporate policies pertaining to:

- (a) CCIRs.
- (b) PA guidance.
- (c) Communications network architecture.
- (d) Release of real time operational information.
- (e) Release of real time intelligence information.
- (f) IO goals and objectives.
- (g) Communications system status.

(2) Other areas a commander should consider for inclusion in the commander's dissemination policy are:

(a) Identifying the routine information products that must be sent to users based on their functional role(s) or mission(s).

(b) Weighting the main effort, allowing for dynamic adjustment to available bandwidth, and a reallocation of bandwidth to specific missions.

(c) Prioritizing information flow within an operational area.

(d) Prioritizing requests for information based on:

- 1. User.
- 2. Organization.
- 3. Mission.

4. Location.

5. Information type (i.e., STRIKEWARNING, contact report).

(e) Overriding automatic assignment of priorities.

(f) Interfacing with databases and other information sources associated with building the COP and providing for rapid tailoring of information required to create a new or updated COP.

(g) Limiting access to specific information by content, source, type, or location.

(h) Limiting file transfer sizes.

(i) Limiting information transfer due to security or classification policy and delivery tools.

For further details concerning information management at the JTF level, refer to Chapter X, "Joint Task Force Communications System Support," JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, and the US Joint Forces Command Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure.

3. Responsibilities (People)

To aid the commander in tracking, controlling, and fusing the vast amounts of information that a JTF can encounter, an effective information management organizational structure must be established. For a large JTF, a group of individuals will be required to accomplish effective information management. Regardless of its size, though, an information management organization will provide the JTF with an information flow strategy designed to meet the commander's needs for relevant and timely information while optimizing the use of information infrastructure resources. Depending on the JTF size, a CJTF may use some, all, or none of the elements listed below to create an information management organization. **In the organization discussed below, the IMO reports directly to the chief of staff.** An advantage of putting the IMO under the chief of staff is to provide leverage to manage information management policies effectively. In some situations, however, the JTF J-3 may be best positioned to manage the IMO. Ultimately, the CJTF decides where to place the IMO function.

a. Commander, Joint Task Force

(1) Establishes priorities for information gathering and reporting by identifying the type of information needed to attain a better understanding of the situation. This also includes establishing the CCIRs and commander's dissemination policy.

(2) Approves the command IMP.

- (3) Approves the command communications plan that supports the IMP.

b. Chief of Staff

(1) **Manages the JTF information management process** — a logical and effective approach to information management.

- (2) Approves the HQ battle rhythm or operations cycle.

- (3) Implements and enforces the IMP.

- (4) Appoints the IMO.

- (5) Appoints the RFI manager.

- (6) Establishes the JIMB.

(7) Determines liaison requirements, establishes liaison information exchange requirements, and receives liaison teams.

c. Information Management Officer. The information manager's position is a primary duty assigned to a qualified individual with operational experience. The IMO is policy focused, the senior JTF information manager, and is responsible for developing and publishing the commander's IMP. The information manager may be a commissioned or staff noncommissioned officer who best meets the command's requirements. The IMO should be intimately aware of the JTF's information needs and possess the authority to coordinate actions and processes accordingly. The IMO must be capable of working closely with JTF personnel of all ranks and specialties to coordinate procedures and capabilities that satisfy CJTF warfighting requirements and the JTF staff. Specifically, the IMO needs to understand how the command operates, and be able to articulate that understanding to communicators. The IMO:

- (1) Ensures the JTF information management system accurately reflects the JTF IMP.

(2) Approves the format and structure of information posted and distributed from JTF briefings and reports using the JIMB.

(3) Coordinates additional training requirements by staff and component elements to support information management.

- (4) Works to develop effective and efficient JTF COP management procedures.

d. Joint Information Management Board

(1) The JIMB is policy focused and responsible for building the JTF's IMP in conjunction with the staff directorates' information managers. Periodically, the board is required to make updates or changes to the IMP. JIMB composition should include:

- (a) JTF IMO – co-chairs the JIMB with the JTF J-6.
- (b) Staff section information management coordinators.
- (c) COP manager.
- (d) JNCC representative.
- (e) JIMB representative.
- (f) RFI manager.
- (g) Information assurance representative.
- (h) Web/database administrator/manager.
- (i) External organization representatives, as required.
- (j) Records manager.

(2) The JIMB:

- (a) Identifies and validates information exchange requirements.
- (b) Creates and maintains the IMP.
- (c) Acts as a focal point for coordinating JTF information management policy.
- (d) Operates under the supervision of the chief of staff (or designated staff directorate).
- (e) Resolves cross-functional and contentious information management issues.
- (f) Coordinates additional training required by staff and component elements to support production of quality information through effective information management procedures.

e. **Joint Task Force Staff Directors**

(1) Implement internal staff directorate procedures to comply with the IMP.

(2) Identify critical and relevant information to be placed on the HQ battle rhythm matrix. The JOC staff informs the IMO of any changes to information needs prompted by the HQ battle rhythm.

(3) Appoint a staff directorate information management representative and RFI manager as points of contact for information management matters and RFIs. This can be the same individual, though it is not recommended to dual-hat in the JTF J-2 and J-3 directorates.

(4) Ensure training is completed for basic information management, RFI management, and security procedures for all personnel in the staff directorates.

(5) Assess information management to assure the flow of quality critical and relevant information.

(6) Note: The JNCC, as an element of the JTF J-6, exercises control over the communications system and serves as the **single control agency for the management and operational direction of the joint communications network**. The JNCC performs planning, execution, technical direction, and management over the communications system. See Chapter X, “Joint Task Force Communications System Support,” for further discussion of JTF J-6 information management responsibilities as they relate to information management systems management.

f. **Joint Information Management Cell.** Depending on the size of the JTF and scope of operations, the JTF chief of staff may establish a joint information management cell within the JOC. The joint information management cell reports to the JOC chief (or possibly the JTF J-3), and facilitates information flow throughout the JOA. In the absence of a standing joint information management cell, the responsibilities defined below must be assumed by other positions within the information management structure. The joint information management cell:

(1) Is responsible for ensuring the commander’s dissemination policy is implemented as intended.

(2) Takes guidance published in the commander’s dissemination policy and combines it with the latest operational and intelligence information obtained from the JOC or joint analysis center.

(3) Works closely with the JNCC to coordinate potential changes in communications infrastructure to satisfy changes in the commander’s information dissemination requirements.

(4) Coordinates the accurate posting of all current, approved CCIRs.

(5) Acts as the focal point for COP coordination within the JTF.

(6) Reviews and validates subordinate data inputs to provide an accurate JTF COP.

(7) Is actively involved in resolving all cross-functional COP issues.

(8) Advocates that the components establish their own COP point of contact to manage their portion of the JTF's COP.

g. Joint Task Force Staff Directorate Information Management Representatives

(1) May be commissioned or staff noncommissioned officers, regardless of rank or specialty.

(2) Oversee the internal and external information flow of their staff directorates.

(3) Provide the IMO with staff directorate information requirements for incorporation into the IMP.

(4) Provide the JNCC a list of their respective requirements for network support.

(5) Ensure compliance with the priorities, processes, and procedures in the IMP for web sites, message handling, E-mail, RFIs, and suspense control procedures.

(6) Coordinate and conduct information management training for internal staff directorate members.

h. Joint Task Force Request for Information Managers

(1) The JTF RFI manager is a non-table of organization billet, normally a secondary duty assigned to an individual in the JTF J-3 with operational experience. The JTF J-2 will designate an RFI manager for intelligence-related requirements, and these requirements will be tracked via community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers.

(2) JTF section or component RFI managers are responsible for receiving, validating, prioritizing, and submitting RFIs to the appropriate authority for resolution in a timely manner. RFIs should be focused upon validating planning assumptions.

(3) The JTF RFI manager develops and manages a tracking system to ensure RFIs are processed and the responses expeditiously disseminated to the requester. It is critical that the question, response, and identification of who responded is displayed — web-based RFI tools work best.

i. Component Information Management Officers. Each component commander will appoint an IMO as a primary point of contact for information management matters. The JTF and component IMOs:

(1) Component IMOs have similar duties and rank requirements as the JTF IMO.

(2) Conduct liaison with the JTF IMO.

(3) Coordinate and assist personnel with training required to produce quality information throughout the command.

j. **JTF Information System User Responsibilities.** Every user has inherent responsibilities to acquire, assess, reason, question, correlate, and disseminate quality information to other users. The JTF information and information system user responsibilities are to:

(1) Handle all information as directed in the IMP.

(2) Ensure accuracy and relevance of information before further dissemination. Clearly differentiate between original information and previously reported information to avoid duplicative reporting.

(3) Properly control, classify, protect, and archive all information and information systems for which they are responsible. This requires a clear understanding of approved control measures for various classifications of information.

(4) Validate the authority to dispose of JTF information before destruction.

(5) Read and comply with the information requirements published in the JTF IMP.

4. Information Management Processes and Procedures (Process)

Central to the success of meeting the operational needs of the user is the JTF IMO, the JIMB, and the joint information management cell. The IMO supports the chief of staff in the horizontal and vertical integration of the command and its subordinates, primarily by integrating the command's key processes. It is not necessary or desired to document every single IMP process, but to describe those processes critical to how the command operates. As such, the IMO must focus on the integration of the key processes. "Best practices" have shown that the following are critical processes for which procedures are required to properly integrate them.

a. **Commander's Critical Information Requirements.** CCIRs are elements of information required by the commander that directly affect decision-making. CCIRs are a key information management tool for the commander and help the commander assess the operational environment and identify decision points throughout the conduct of operations. CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander.

For more details concerning CCIRs, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and Chapter IV, "Joint Task Force Command and Control."

b. Request for Information

(1) RFIs primarily are designed to validate planning assumptions. The CJTF establishes RFI procedures to provide a systematic method for requestors to obtain information. Providing visibility to the rest of the organization on the questions, answers, and identification of those providing answers to those questions is more important than merely allowing requestors to get information.

(2) An RFI can be initiated to respond to operational requirements and will be validated in accordance with the geographic combatant command's procedures. RFIs are sent to higher, subordinate, and adjacent HQ or to other agencies requesting the information necessary to support the planning and decision-making processes.

(3) The JTF J-2 processes intelligence-related RFIs, and the JTF J-3 all other RFIs. They assign an RFI manager to receive and prioritize RFIs. A tracking system known as the community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers is established to register, validate, track, and manage crisis and non-crisis intelligence information requirements.

(4) Effective RFI procedures provide requestors with an "information pull" mechanism for access to a variety of vital information. RFI procedures do not replace typical internal staff research available to JTF members (e.g., intel link via the SIPRNET and Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network [NIPRNET]). Instead, the RFI process provides a mechanism for a formal request to other echelons when the issue or question is beyond the resources of the staff. The process also provides visibility of those requests forwarded, their status, and responses to these requests.

(5) Component RFI managers submit RFIs to the JTF RFI manager that are beyond the components capability and staff resources to answer. Component RFI managers submit intelligence related RFIs, in accordance with established procedures.

(6) Normally, RFIs are not necessary among JTF directorates. However, if a JTF is not in a single location or the RFI is exceptionally complex, the JTF staff directorate RFI manager submits its to the JTF RFI manager by posting it to a JTF web page or other approved means. The JTF RFI manager processes the request and forwards it to the appropriate agency for resolution. Each directorate RFI manager is responsible for monitoring their RFIs and closing the request.

c. **Battle Rhythm.** The "daily operations cycle" is synonymous with the HQ "battle rhythm." This is the chief of staff's tool to integrate the meetings and products in such a manner to provide the CJTF and staff with the products, information, and decisions that are required for decision-making. To ensure information is available when and where required, the JTF daily operations cycle is essential. All JTF staff, components, and supporting agencies should participate in the development of the daily operations cycle. The JTF chief of staff must be the approval authority for changes. See Chapter IV, "Joint Task Force Command and Control," for more details concerning the HQ battle rhythm.

d. **Reports.** Standardized reports help reduce the amount of staff work to meet recurring information requirements.

e. **Orders and Distribution.** Orders are the means for the JTF to direct the actions of other organizations. The CJTF issues guidance and direction in the form of warning orders, fragmentary orders, execute orders, OPORDs, and other directives. The JTF JOC is the focal point for disseminating orders. The JTF IMP must address procedures for the management of plans and orders throughout their life cycle to include, distribution, acknowledgment, and protection.

f. **Briefings and Meetings**

(1) Briefings and meetings can be the biggest time consumer for JTF members if they are not conducted properly. Meetings should occur to accomplish a specific purpose, on an as-needed basis. There are three roles that need to be specified for all meetings. The **meeting organizer** schedules the meeting, and publishes the agenda. This agenda will specify the attendees, purpose of the meeting, and desired outcomes of the meeting. The **moderator** is the person who runs the meeting, gathers input, and assigns tasking during the meeting. The final role is that of the **recorder**, who acts as the scribe, and at the end of the meeting, reads back all taskings to include who was tasked. The chief of staff determines which meetings occur via the published JTF HQ battle rhythm. The IMO is responsible for specifying procedures in the IMP to disseminate the products of the meeting, especially any decisions or direction given during the meeting.

(2) **CJTF Daily Update Brief.** This brief normally is conducted once daily to update the CJTF on current operations, future, and long range plans and provides the CJTF with analyzed information essential for decision-making and synchronizing the JTF efforts. A secondary purpose is efficient cross leveling of information within the staff. Brevity, clarity, and a cross-functional analysis of the operational environment are goals of the CJTF update brief. The most common error occurring in the daily update brief is that the focus is purely on what happened, versus the future. CJTFs and staffs should ensure their update briefs remain focused on the future, rather than the past.

g. **Multinational Procedures and Systems.** The CJTF establishes procedures for information and data transfer between the JTF and multinational components. The CJTF establishes a security CONOPS for the specific “how-to” for data transfer and develops information sharing/disclosure policies in accordance with DOD or approved multinational policy or procedures. Multinational procedures for transferring data addressing sensitive compartmented information are handled through special security office channels.

5. Information Systems (Pipes)

a. The goal of information systems and information management procedures is to produce an accurate picture of the operational environment and to support decision-making. Information systems must provide effective and secure information exchange throughout the JTF. Having the JTF J-6 co-chair the JIMB allows the board to provide insight to the communicators on the

needs of the JTF, and allows the JTF J-6 to tailor the communications infrastructure to the JTF's needs. Users need to develop an understanding of the information systems available and information management procedures to match their information requirements.

b. Network Application Management

(1) Networking technologies are expanding the options available for managing the flow of information. The JTF can achieve a collaborative environment for sharing information using web pages, public folders, and E-mail. For example, networks provide the JTF access to information, allowing individuals to send and receive unclassified and classified information worldwide. The NIPRNET provides access to the Internet. SIPRNET and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System provide access to classified information.

(2) The intranet network infrastructure for a JTF HQ may differ from one JTF to another, but the concepts are generally the same. A JTF intranet is a communications network in which access to published information is restricted. The communication standards of the Internet and the content standards of the worldwide web normally are the basis for a JTF intranet. Therefore, the tools used to create an intranet usually are identical to those used for Internet and web applications. Using local area networks protected by firewalls, virtual private networks, intrusion detection systems, and demilitarized zones; a network administrator has the tools to establish a JTF intranet structure.

(3) The JTF IMO must work closely with the JTF web administrator and the component IMOs to develop and establish procedures for local area network management. The JTF IMP should identify how the JTF shares information. The JTF IMO must establish procedures enabling each staff section to access, post, and update information. Each staff section ensures the information posted is accurate, current, and relevant.

(4) Web Sites and Portals

(a) A well-organized web site assembles, organizes, and presents vital information in a timely manner. The JTF HQ, staff directorates, components, and supporting agencies should develop and maintain their own web pages for the site. Information on these web pages should include important updates, status reports, common staff products, and current activities.

(b) The JTF should organize the web site around a master "JTF home page." The JTF home page or "front door" sits at the top of the JTF web site acting as a point of entry into the site. In a complex JTF web site, it is impractical to populate the JTF home page with dozens of links. Complicated or large home pages are long and will not load quickly in a bandwidth-constrained environment. Therefore, each major element or unit of the JTF should have their own home page with direct links back to the JTF home page. However, a JTF home page could list (without links) Uniform Resource Locators for other applicable JTF home pages to advertise their existence. Web pages or pages within a component should have a consistent design to facilitate navigation.

(5) **Electronic Mail**

(a) E-mail is a highly effective means to communicate information, providing rapid dissemination of time critical information within the JTF. E-mail permits rapid and asynchronous communications, eliminating “telephone tag.” It permits a single user to communicate with one or several users simultaneously. However, to reduce E-mail overloads, consider establishing functional versus individual accounts to avoid unnecessary E-mail overload. This helps prevent a message backlog for personnel not on shift. Additionally, development of a precedence system within E-mail identifies messages requiring timely handling and review. However, E-mail can overload the network if used improperly. Unnecessary information and large message attachments overload the network. Use web sites, public access drives, or send a link (vice the actual attachment) on the local area network to disseminate information. Remove graphics, imagery, and text documents that do not add information content. Develop graphics or briefing slides relying on few colors since not all users have access to color printers.

(b) At times, it is necessary to notify a large audience that a particular piece of information is available (e.g., warning orders). Users should use some discretion in selecting E-mail addressees. In most situations it is preferable to send a link to the information and notify intended recipients where it may be retrieved, versus attaching the item to multiple E-mail messages. This procedure reduces the bandwidth used when sending multiple copies of E-mails with attachments. Users should periodically review their E-mail group addresses for accuracy and ensure topic-related group members are still current. Remember, undeliverable E-mail may double the network load (once to attempt delivery and again to notify the sender of the delivery failure). Users should take prompt action to resolve the cause of undeliverable E-mail.

(6) **Shared disk drives and folders** are another means to allow common access to information. Organizations using shared drives should have an established policy for deleting obsolete and outdated information. Shared drive folder names may be topical or use the same titles as those shown in the file plan drive.

c. **Collaborative Tools.** Collaborative tools can be used to bridge seams across an organization, such as between components separated by distance, or for elements within the JTF staff. These tools, however will not improve information flow and decision-making if procedures are not developed, documented in the IMP, trained to, and enforced to standardize their use. Collaborative tools fall into two categories: synchronous (real time) and asynchronous (non-real time). Examples of the former include VTC, collaboration suites on computers, and telephones. Examples of the latter are shared web spaces and web portals. The following are some examples of how to use such tools:

(1) Present an interactive visual projection enabling JTF members to see the collaborative effort both on their workstation screens and on a large “movie screen” display.

(2) Support the JTF planning process by permitting JTF planners to enter virtual meetings to share intent and build common planning documents across all echelons.

(3) Provide means that enable meetings and products to be shared throughout the JOA.

(4) Share and work on documents between the JTF HQ and subordinate organizations. These documents include force lists and availability, intelligence information, TPFDD, worldwide map system, unit capabilities, equipment, and organization for each US Service force and MNF as required.

d. **Local Area Network or Wide Area Network Requirements.** The JTF local area network can be set up with shared or private hard drive space. Private drive space is intended to limit access to stored data. Access generally is limited to specific functional areas as defined by user login names (i.e., specific joint-code staff sections). Since this capability is difficult to share across organizations, it is a good location for work that is not ready for publication. The IMP must specify the requirements for publication. Staff sections are responsible for the currency, accuracy, and maintenance of their shared drive information.

e. **Video Teleconferencing Procedures.** The purpose of the JTF VTC capability is support of the CJTF and JTF staff. VTCs are effective for sharing information and C2 between the CJTF and geographically dispersed subordinate commanders and staffs. While VTC is a key means of C2, the CJTF could use alternate methods of communication such as conference calls if a VTC system is not available. Since this is a high-bandwidth tool, the IMP should specify prioritization for its use (i.e., mainly focused on the command echelon).

f. **Priority Communications.** Information and the value of information based on the commander's requirements drive the installation and restoration of communications means. To assist in making this happen, the JTF J-6 establishes specific responsibilities for establishing connectivity between the JTF HQ and components. Normally, the higher HQ is responsible for establishing all connections to a lower HQ. The JTF should possess redundant means of voice communications, data transfer, and functional specific data systems.

6. Information and Information System Protection (Protection)

a. The increasing dependence of societies and military forces on advanced information networks creates new vulnerabilities, as well as opportunities. The J-6 primarily is responsible for information assurance; however, the IMO must include JTF J-6 approved information assurance procedures for the command. Potential adversaries could exploit these vulnerabilities through means such as computer network attack. Vulnerabilities caused by advancements in C2 systems must be mitigated. Mission accomplishment depends on protecting and defending information and information systems from destruction, disruption, and corruption by safeguarding them from intrusion and exploitation. These are critical tenants for mission accomplishment and aid in accomplishing information superiority, an enabler to full spectrum dominance.

b. To ensure information integrity and assurance for the force, the CJTF must have an understanding of the various types of threats to JTF information systems and the consequences if these threats are not mitigated. Threats against friendly C2 vary by potential adversaries'

technical capabilities and motivation. The IMP must anticipate internal and external threats across the range of military operations. Additionally, sound system configuration along with a proactive network monitoring plan aid in risk mitigation.

(1) **External Threats.** Attacks emanating from outside of the network continue to challenge security professionals due to the ethereal complexities of detection. Attack techniques, such as E-mail spoofing or internet protocol hopping, require a significant level of skill for the system administrator to detect and mitigate. Anti-virus software, information assurance vulnerability alerts, and DOD computer emergency response team advisories provide measures to protect against many external attack weapons.

(2) **Insider threat.** Threats emanating from within the joint information infrastructure pose a significant risk to the overall information systems. Individuals with legitimate system access, whether recruited, self-motivated, or through carelessness have entry to information and information systems that are otherwise protected against outside attack. Within the system, a malicious insider may launch a series of computer attacks, which may create spill-over effects throughout the entire JTF network.

To further assist the JTF IMO in the preparation of an IMP and coordinating information management with other USG organizations, IGOs, and NGOs, refer to Annex K, "Checklist for Information Management," to Appendix B, "Checklist."

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APPENDIX E REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-33 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Department of Defense Directives and Instruction

- a. DODD 2000.12, *DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program*.
- b. DOD O-2000.12-H, *DOD Antiterrorism Handbook*.
- c. DODD 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery*.
- d. DODD 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)*.
- e. DODD 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities*.
- f. DODD 5400.13, *Joint Public Affairs Operations*.
- g. DODI 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crisis*.
- h. DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*.
- i. DODI 5400.14, *Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations*.
- j. DODI 6055.1, *DOD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program*.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions

- a. CJCSI 1001.01, *Joint Manpower and Personnel Program*.
- b. CJCSI 1301.01C, *Individual Augmentation Procedures*.
- c. CJCSI 2700.01B, *International Military Agreements for Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States, Its Allies, and Other Friendly Nations*.
- d. CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*. (SECRET)
- e. CJCSI 3210.01A, *Joint Information Operations Policy*. (SECRET)
- f. CJCSI 3241.01, *Counterintelligence (CI) Support*. (SECRET)
- g. CJCSI 5810.01B, *Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program*.

- h. CJCSI 6110.01A, *CJCS-Controlled Communications Assets*.
- i. CJCSI 6211.02B, *Defense Information Systems Network (DISN): Policy, Responsibilities and Processes*.
- j. CJCSI 6510.06, *Communications Security Releases to Foreign Nations*.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manuals

- a. CJCSM 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*.
- b. CJCSM 3122.02C, *Joint Operation and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution)*.
- c. CJCSM 3122.03B, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II (Planning Formats)*.
- d. CJCSM 3150.01A, *Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions*.
- e. CJCSM 3150.13A, *Joint Reporting Structures — Personnel Manual*.
- f. CJCSM 3500.04D, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*.
- g. CJCSM 3500.05A, *Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide*.
- h. CJCSM 6120.05, *Manual for Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance for Joint Operations Joint Interface Operational Procedures for Message Text Formats*.
- i. CJCSM 6231 Series, *Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications*.
- j. CJCSM 6510.01, *Defense-in-Depth: Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense*.

4. Joint Publications

- a. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.
- b. JP 1-0, *Personnel Support to Joint Operations*.
- c. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.
- d. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*.

- e. JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations* (SECRET).
- f. JP 2-03, *Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.
- g. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.
- h. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.
- i. JP 3-05.1, *Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*.
- j. JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*.
- k. JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*.
- l. JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*.
- m. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*.
- n. JP 3-13.2, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*.
- o. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.
- p. JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*.
- q. JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*.
- r. JP 3-32, *Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations*.
- s. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.
- t. JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*.
- u. JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.
- v. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.
- w. JP 3-63, *Detainee Operations*.
- x. JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.
- y. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistic Support*.
- z. JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*.

- aa. JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations*.
- bb. JP 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations*.
- cc. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.
- dd. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

5. Other Publications

- a. United States Joint Forces Command *Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure*.
- b. United States Pacific Command *Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures*.
- c. FM 5-01.12, MCRP 5-1B, NTTP 5-02, AFTTP (I) 3-2.21, *JTF LNO Integration, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Officer Integration*.

APPENDIX F ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Joint Forces Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 5-00.2, 13 January 1999, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*.

4. Change Recommendations

- a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CDRUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA//JW100//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>.

- b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

- c. Record of Changes:

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GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACO	administrative contracting officer
ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
ADAMS	Allied Deployment and Movement System
ADVON	advanced echelon
AFCAP	Air Force contract augmentation program
AFRTS	Armed Forces Radio and Television Service
AFTTP(I)	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction)
AJBPO	Area Joint Blood Program Office
AO	area of operations
AOA	amphibious objective area
AOR	area of responsibility
BDC	blood donor center
BPD	blood products depot
BSU	blood supply unit
BTC	blood transshipment center
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAO	civil affairs operations
CAP	crisis action planning
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CDF	contractors deploying with the force
CENTRIXS	Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System
CI	counterintelligence
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJTF	commander, joint task force
CLS	contractor logistic support
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COMAFFOR	commander, Air Force forces
COMSEC	communications security
CONOPS	concept of operations
COP	common operational picture
COR	contracting officer representative

CSEL	command senior enlisted leader
CSP	contracting support plan
DAFL	directive authority for logistics
DCJTF	deputy commander, joint task force
DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency
DDOC	deployment and distribution operations center
DFARS	Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DII	defense information infrastructure
DIRMOBFOR	director of mobility forces
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DISN	Defense Information Systems Network
DJIIOC	Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center
DJTFC	deployable joint task force augmentation cell
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOS	Department of State
DSPD	defense support to public diplomacy
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EHCC	explosive hazards coordination cell
E-mail	electronic mail
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
FFIR	friendly force information requirement
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP	force health protection
FM	field manual (Army)
FN	foreign nation
FP	force protection
GCC	global contingency construction
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GPMRC	Global Patient Movement Requirements Center
HAST	humanitarian assistance survey team
HCA	head of contracting authority
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HOC	human intelligence operations cell
HQ	headquarters

HQCOMDT	headquarters commandant
HSS	health service support
HUMINT	human intelligence
IC	intelligence community
IG	inspector general
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IMO	information management officer
IMP	information management plan
IO	information operations
IOWG	information operations working group
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-2X	joint force staff counterintelligence and human intelligence element
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6	communications system directorate of a joint staff
JAOC	joint air operations center
JARB	joint acquisition review board
JCC	joint contracting center
JCMA	joint communications security monitoring activity
JCMEC	joint captured materiel exploitation center
JCMO	joint communications security management office
JCMOTF	joint civil-military operations task force
JCSE	joint communications support element
JDEC	joint document exploitation center
JDISS	joint deployable intelligence support system
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFE	joint fires element
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JFUB	Joint Facilities Utilization Board
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIB	joint information bureau
JIDC	joint interrogation and debriefing center
JIMB	joint information management board
JIOC	joint intelligence operations center
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JIPTL	joint integrated prioritized target list
JISE	joint intelligence support element

JLOC	joint logistics operations center
JMAO	joint mortuary affairs office
JMC	joint movement center
JMD	joint manning document
JMOC	joint medical operations center
JMWG	joint medical working group
JNCC	joint network operations (NETOPS) control center
JOA	joint operations area
JOC	joint operations center
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPP	joint operation planning process
JP	joint publication
JPASE	Joint Public Affairs Support Element
JPERSTAT	joint personnel status and casualty report
JPG	joint planning group
JPMRC	joint patient movement requirements center
JPOTF	joint psychological operations task force
JPRA	Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
JPRC	joint personnel recovery center
JPTTA	joint personnel training and tracking activity
JRC	joint reception center
JSCC	joint security coordination center
JSA	joint security area
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSOACC	joint special operations air component commander
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
JTF	joint task force
JWAC	Joint Warfare Analysis Center
LNO	liaison officer
LOA	letter of authorization
LOGCAP	logistics civilian augmentation program
LPSB	Logistics Procurement Support Board
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
METOC	meteorological and oceanographic
MNF	multinational force
MNFC	multinational force commander
MTF	medical treatment facility
MWR	morale, welfare, and recreation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation

NETOPS	network operations
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIPRNET	Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
NIST	national intelligence support team
NOSC	network operations and security center
NSA	National Security Agency
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PARC	principal assistant for contracting
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
PM	provost marshal
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PR	personnel recovery
PSYOP	psychological operations
RC	Reserve Component
RFI	request for information
ROE	rules of engagement
RSSCLO	regional space support center liaison officer
RUF	rules for the use of force
S&TI	scientific and technical intelligence
SCA	space coordinating authority
SHF	super-high frequency
SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SJA	staff judge advocate
SJFHQ(CE)	standing joint force headquarters (core element)
SO	special operations
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SOLE	special operations liaison element
SOP	standing operating procedure
SROE	standing rules of engagement
SRUF	standing rules for the use of force
STEP	standardized tactical entry point

Glossary

TACC	tanker airlift control center
TACON	tactical control
TCC	transportation component command
TCN	third country national
TFCICA	task force counterintelligence coordinating authority
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TPMRC	theater patient movement requirements center
UHF	ultrahigh frequency
UN	United Nations
USG	United States Government
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VTC	video teleconferencing
WG	working group

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-02)

adversary. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 1-02)

airspace control authority. The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Also called ACA. (JP 1-02)

allocation. In a general sense, distribution for employment of limited forces and resources among competing requirements. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, etc. (JP 1-02)

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

area air defense commander. Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the area air defense commander's headquarters. Also called AADC. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

battle rhythm. A deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

board. An organized group of individuals within a joint force commander's headquarters, appointed by the commander (or other authority) that meets with the purpose of gaining guidance or decision. Its responsibilities and authority are governed by the authority which established the board. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

bureau. A long-standing functional organization, with a supporting staff designed to perform a specific function or activity within a joint force commander's headquarters. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

campaign plan. A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

campaign planning. The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of an operation plan for a campaign. Campaign planning may begin during contingency planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the President or Secretary of Defense selects the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. (JP 1-02)

cell. A subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a joint force commander's headquarters. A cell usually is part of both a functional and traditional staff structures. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

center. An enduring functional organization, with a supporting staff, designed to perform a joint function within a joint force commander's headquarters. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations center. An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and intergovernmental organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. (JP 1-02)

civil support. Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Also called CS. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. (JP 1-02)

combat service support. The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by Service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces within the operational environment. Also called CSS. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 4-0.)

command and control system. The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned and attached forces pursuant to the missions assigned. (JP 1-02)

commander's critical information requirement. An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making. The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. Also called CCIR. (JP 1-02)

common item. 1. Any item of materiel that is required for use by more than one activity. 2. Sometimes loosely used to denote any consumable item except repair parts or other technical items. 3. Any item of materiel that is procured for, owned by (Service stock), or used by any Military Department of the Department of Defense and is also required to be furnished to a recipient country under the grant-aid Military Assistance Program. 4. Readily available commercial items. 5. Items used by two or more Military Services of similar manufacture or fabrication that may vary between the Services as to color or shape (as vehicles or clothing). 6. Any part or component that is required in the assembly of two or more complete end-items. (JP 1-02)

communications system. Communications networks and information services that enable joint and multinational warfighting capabilities. (JP 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. Also called commander's concept or CONOPS. (JP 1-02)

consequence management. Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. (JP 1-02)

contingency. A situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect US interests. (JP 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

course of action. 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase and the course-of-action determination steps of the joint operation planning process. Also called COA. (JP 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to a nation, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02)

crisis action planning. One of the two types of joint operation planning. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and operation orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning is based on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. (JP 1-02)

crisis management. Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or an act of terrorism. It is predominantly a law enforcement response, normally executed under federal law. Also called CrM. (JP 1-02)

defense support to public diplomacy. Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United States Government. Also called DSPD. (JP 1-02)

deployment planning. Operational planning directed toward the movement of forces and sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area for conducting the joint operations contemplated in a given plan. Encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging areas, and holding areas. (JP 1-02)

element. An organization formed around a specific function within a designated directorate of a joint force commander's headquarters. The subordinate components of an element usually are functional cells. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

employment. The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces. (JP 1-02)

end state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 1-02)

essential elements of information. The most critical information requirements regarding the adversary and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. Also called EEIs. (JP 1-02)

fires. The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. (JP 1-02)

force health protection. Measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical wellbeing of Service members. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. Also called FHP. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02)

foreign humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

fragmentary order. An abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order. Also called FRAGORD. (JP 1-02)

friendly force information requirement. Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. Also called FFIR. (JP 1-02)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

geospatial intelligence. The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 2-03.)

group. 1. A flexible administrative and tactical unit composed of either two or more battalions or two or more squadrons. The term also applies to combat support and combat service support units. 2. A number of ships and/or aircraft, normally a subdivision of a force, assigned for a specific purpose. 3. A long-standing functional organization that is formed to support a broad function within a joint force commander's headquarters. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

health service support. All services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutrition therapy, and medical intelligence services. Also called HSS. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

human intelligence. A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (JP 1-02)

imagery intelligence. Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Also called IMINT. (JP 1-02)

information assurance. Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called IA. (JP 1-02)

information management. The function of managing an organization's information resources by the handling of knowledge acquired by one or many different individuals and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that knowledge or a right to that knowledge. (JP 1-02)

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

interagency. United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02)

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (JP 1-02)

joint fires. Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective. (JP 1-02)

joint fires element. An optional staff element that provides recommendations to the operations directorate to accomplish fires planning and synchronization. Also called JFE. (JP 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFLCC. (JP 1-02)

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFMCC. (JP 1-02)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 1-02)

joint information bureau. Facility established by the joint force commander to serve as the focal point for the interface between the military and the media during the conduct of joint operations. When operated in support of multinational operations, a joint information bureau is called a “combined information bureau” or an “allied press information center.” Also called JIB. (JP 1-02)

joint intelligence operations center. An interdependent, operational intelligence organization at the Department of Defense, combatant command, or joint task force (if established) level, that is integrated with national intelligence centers, and capable of accessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations planning, execution, and assessment. Also called JIOC. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 2-0.)

joint intelligence support element. A subordinate joint force element whose focus is on intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. Also called JISE. (JP 1-02)

joint interagency coordination group. An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian agencies and departments. Also called JIACG (JP 1-02)

Joint Logistics Operations Center. The Joint Logistics Operations Center is the current operations division within the Logistics Directorate of the Joint Staff. It monitors crisis, exercises, and interagency actions. It also works acquisition and cross-servicing agreements as well as international logistics. The Joint Logistics Operations Center reviews deployment orders produced by the Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff for logistic issues and ensures the correct airlift priority code is assigned. Also called JLOC. (JP 1-02)

joint operation planning. Planning activities associated joint military operations by combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders in response to contingencies and crises. Joint operation planning includes planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. (JP 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. A system of joint policies, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and computer systems, that is used by the joint planning and execution community to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPEs. (JP 1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02)

joint patient movement requirements center. A joint activity established to coordinate the joint patient movement requirements function for a joint task force operating within a unified command area of responsibility. It coordinates with the theater patient movement requirements center for intratheater patient movement and the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center for intertheater patient movement. Also called JPMRC. (JP 1-02)

joint personnel recovery center. The primary joint force organization responsible for planning and coordinating personnel recovery for military operations within the assigned operational area. Also called JPRC. (JP 1-02)

joint planning group. A planning organization consisting of designated representatives of the joint force headquarters principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the joint force commander. Also called JPG. (JP 1-02)

joint reception center. The center established in the operational area (per direction of the joint force commander), with responsibility for the reception, accountability, training, processing, of military and civilian individual augmentees upon their arrival in the operational area. Also the center where augmentees will normally be outprocessed through upon departure from the operational area. Also called JRC. (JP 1-02)

joint security area. A specific surface area, designated by the joint force commander to facilitate protection of joint bases that support joint operations. Also called JSA. (JP 1-02)

joint security coordinator. The officer with responsibility for coordinating the overall security of the operational area in accordance with joint force commander directives and priorities. Also called JSC. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02)

joint staff. 1. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), that includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. 2. (capitalized as Joint Staff) The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities. Also called JS. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

lead nation. One nation assumes the responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum of logistic support for all or a part of the multinational force and/or headquarters. Compensation and/

or reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties involved. The lead nation may also assume the responsibility to coordinate logistics of the other nations within its functional and regional area of responsibility. (JP 1-02)

liaison. That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JP 1-02)

logistic assessment. An evaluation of: a. the logistic support required to support particular military operations in a theater, country, or area; and b. the actual and/or potential logistic support available for the conduct of military operations either within the theater, country, or area, or located elsewhere. (JP 1-02)

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (JP 1-02)

measurement and signature intelligence. Technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and describes the unique characteristics of fixed and dynamic target sources. Measurement and signature intelligence capabilities include radar, laser, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear radiation, radio frequency, spectroradiometric, and seismic sensing systems as well as gas, liquid, and solid materials sampling and analysis. Also called MASINT. (JP 1-02)

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

national intelligence support team. A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from either Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or any combination of these agencies. Also called NIST. (JP 1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations directed by the Department of State or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEOs. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic

development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02)

nonlethal weapons. A weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. (JP 1-02)

office. An enduring organization that is formed around a specific function within a joint force commander's headquarters to coordinate and manage support requirements. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02)

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. (JP 1-02)

operation order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. (JP 1-02)

operation plan. 1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 2. In the context of joint operation planning level 4 planning detail, a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. Also called OPLAN. (JP 1-02)

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response contingencies involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-07.3.)

personal staff. Aides and staff officers handling special matters over which the commander wishes to exercise close personal control. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

planning team. A functional element within a joint force commander's headquarters established to solve problems related to a specific task or requirement. The planning team is not enduring and dissolves upon completion of the assigned task. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

priority intelligence requirement. An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the environment. Also called PIR. (JP 1-02)

protection. 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. 2. Measures that are taken to keep nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards from having an adverse effect on personnel, equipment, or critical assets and facilities. Protection consists of five groups of activities: hardening of positions; protecting personnel; assuming mission-oriented protective posture; using physical defense measures; and reacting to attack. 3. In space usage, active and passive defensive measures to ensure that United States and

friendly space systems perform as designed by seeking to overcome an adversary's attempts to negate them and to minimize damage if negation is attempted. (JP 1-02)

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)

risk. 1. Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. 2. See degree of risk. (JP 1-02)

risk management. The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also called RM. (JP 1-02)

rules for the use of force. Directives issued to guide United States forces on the use of force during various operations. These directives may take the form of execute orders, deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans. Also called RUF. (JP 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

semipermanent joint task force. A joint task force that has been assigned an expanded or follow-on mission and will continue to conduct these operations in a specified area for an undetermined period of time. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02)

signals intelligence. 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT. (JP 1-02)

special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly

support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02)

staff supervision. The process of advising other staff officers and individuals subordinate to the commander of the commander's plans and policies, interpreting those plans and policies, assisting such subordinates in carrying them out, determining the extent to which they are being followed, and advising the commander thereof. (JP 1-02)

standing joint force headquarters. A staff organization operating under a flag officer providing a combatant commander with a full-time, trained joint command and control element integrated into the combatant commander's staff whose focus is on contingency and crisis action planning. Also called SJFHQ. (JP 1-02)

strategic communication. Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02)

subordinate command. A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. This includes the designated

combatant commands and Department of Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 1-02)

supporting forces. Forces stationed in or to be deployed to an operational area to provide support for the execution of an operation order. Combatant command (command authority) of supporting forces is not passed to the supported commander. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)


time-phased force and deployment data. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including the following: a. In-place units; b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation; c. Routing of forces to be deployed; d. Movement data associated with deploying forces; e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces; and f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (JP 1-02)

warning order. 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. 2. A planning directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military courses of action by a supported commander and requests that the supported commander submit a commander's estimate. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. Also called a WARNORD. (JP 1-02)

working group. An enduring or ad hoc organization within a joint force commander's headquarters formed around a specific function whose purpose is to provide analysis to users. The working group consists of a core functional group and other staff and component representatives. Also called WG. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-33** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

