



# SPECIAL REPORT

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## ABOUT THE REPORT

An effective police force is critical to countering insurgency. In Pakistan, an understaffed and underequipped police force is increasingly called on to manage rising insecurity and militant violence. This report evaluates the obstacles to upgrading the existing police system and recommends traditional and innovative reform options, including major restructuring of the total civilian law enforcement infrastructure, without which the police force cannot be effectively improved. Because Pakistan's police capacity has direct implications for the country's ability to tackle terrorism, the United States and its allies would realize counterterrorism dividends by helping law enforcement efforts through modern training and technical assistance.

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*Hassan Abbas*

## Reforming Pakistan's Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure

### Is It Too Flawed to Fix?

#### Summary

- An efficient, well-functioning police service is critical to counterinsurgency as well as counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan, now and in the future. At the same time, the police force must also address rising crime rates and a deteriorating law-and-order situation, among many other tasks.
- The capacity of the Pakistan Police Service to deliver on all these fronts is severely diminished by political manipulation, the lack of forensic services, inadequate training and equipment, corruption, and weaknesses in the judicial sphere. Disconnect and lack of coordination between numerous kinds of policing and intelligence organizations are major hurdles on the path leading to collective strategizing.
- Upgrading the existing police system as the central law enforcement institution in the country cannot occur in isolation, however. Instead, it must be part of an overarching restructuring of the total law enforcement infrastructure, including a reform of the criminal justice system and the stripping of politically motivated amendments from the Police Act of 2002. Both traditional and innovative reforms would be expected to bear fruit in this arena. With a high degree of public consensus on the need for far-reaching law enforcement reforms in Pakistan, there is political space to make tough, reform-oriented choices. Pro-reform circles within police are also gaining strength.

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**Table 1. Total Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan, 2006–09**

Year	Total attacks	Annual increase (%)	No. killed	No. injured
2006	675	159	907	1,543
2007	1,503	129	3,448	5,353
2008	2,577	43	7,997	9,670
2009	3,816	48	12,632	12,815

Source: *Pakistan Security Report 2009* (Islamabad: Pak Institute of Peace Studies, 2010).

- The United States and its allies, especially the EU countries, would reap major dividends from an upgraded police service that has as one of its mandates the interdiction of militants' efforts to disrupt U.S. interests and security. However, donor aid in the form of financial and technical support should be coordinated and targeted toward improved police services, rather than earmarked only for counterinsurgency efforts.

## Current Challenges

For many years, Pakistan has been engaged in battling a hydra-headed insurgency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPP, formerly known as North-West Frontier Province). An expanding terrorist campaign targeting Pakistan's major cities is inextricably linked to this insurgency. The growing number of suicide attacks across Pakistan underscores the dangerous nature of the crisis.<sup>1</sup> From 2002 to 2005, the total number of suicide attacks in Pakistan was fifteen, while over the next four years (i.e., the 2006–09 period), the number rose to around two hundred. The statistics on the numbers killed or injured are astounding if all terrorist attacks and consequent casualties are included (table 1).

Pakistan has suffered more than 30,000 casualties in the war on terror so far.<sup>2</sup> This trend continues: around 2,250 civilians and security personnel lost their lives in 2010 alone at the hands of terrorists.<sup>3</sup> While those under fire are chiefly religious leaders challenging extremists, politicians associated with progressive political parties, and innocent civilians, the police are increasingly being targeted as a symbol of the state. Terrorists understand well that the military and the police are their most important enemies.

The changing tactics and targets of the various terrorist groups operating in the country pose a formidable challenge to a police force with limited resources, poor training, and inadequate equipment. Pakistan's civilian law enforcement structure has failed to develop any systematic and advanced counterterrorism strategy owing to the lack of modern investigative tools, requisite skills, and incentives. For the same reasons, it is no surprise that the rate of crimes not associated with terrorism has also jumped in recent years. Law-and-order duties and VIP protection responsibilities consume a significant chunk of police resources.<sup>4</sup> The lack of forensic support further diminishes police effectiveness and capacity to deliver. Corruption, nepotism, and political manipulation are rampant; they damage police integrity, credibility, and public image. An additional impediment to criminal law enforcement is the ineptitude of Pakistan's judicial sector.

Police capacity is critical for tackling terrorism and controlling insurgency-infested areas. A growing body of empirical research has established that law enforcement, not military force, is the most effective tool for this task.<sup>5</sup> As Christine Fair of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service aptly observes, "A police-led effort would be better than one led by the army, as the history of successful insurgency movements in disparate

theatres across the globe shows.”<sup>6</sup> A RAND Corporation study titled *How Terrorist Groups End* also provides evidence that effective police and intelligence work, rather than the use of military force, delivers better counterterrorism results.<sup>7</sup> Douglas P. Lackey in a counterterrorism article goes a step further when he argues, “The killing of civilians by terrorists is not war, but murder, so the social genre of terrorism is crime, and terrorists should be classified as criminals,” and from this premise he rightly deduces, “If terrorists are criminals, their natural antagonists are the police.”<sup>8</sup> As he points out, most of the activities considered vital for any counterterrorism effort fall within the scope of standard police activity, including the forensic analysis of terrorist attack sites, gleaning information from abandoned terrorist camps, searching suspected terrorist locations, the penetration of terrorist organizations by undercover agents, surveillance of suspicious sites, monitoring suspects, and maintaining databases of suspects. Hence, whether it is to combat insurgency or terrorism, a good police force is any state’s best bet.

Military operations can substitute for police action in certain circumstances, but that creates a new set of issues, ranging from high civilian casualties to human rights violations. A disproportionate use of force is almost always counterproductive. Most militaries, including that of Pakistan, are not trained or equipped to deal with internal law-and-order crises. Ideally, the military should act as a backup force that is ready to move in if needed in support of police action.

This report evaluates the capacity and performance of Pakistan’s civilian law enforcement structure in relation to counterterrorism efforts, with a special focus on police forces. The attention to law enforcement as a whole is warranted as the law enforcement infrastructure includes all police departments (provincial and federal), various investigative organizations, specialized forces (including paramilitary units that support police work), and intelligence outfits that share information with police. The police force is the central institution in the law enforcement structure of any state, but it is not the only one, and therefore it cannot be treated in a vacuum. After a brief explanation of why police reforms in Pakistan are essential and possible, the report examines the current state of the Pakistan police force in terms of infrastructure and manpower. It then evaluates obstacles to reform and considers (1) traditional reform options that, if implemented, could upgrade and improve the existing police system to effectively support counterinsurgency and counterterrorism measures and the goal of mitigating extremism in society, and (2) innovative reform options, including a major restructuring of existing police organizations or the creation of new police organizations to circumvent and reach beyond traditional problems. Effective remedies for the shortcomings of the police service likely depend on equally far-reaching reforms of the criminal justice system and political administrative changes. The counterterrorism operations led by Pakistan’s armed forces (especially the army and air force) in FATA are beyond the scope of this report.

## **An Opportunity**

With the increasing insecurity and instability in the country, the government of Pakistan must consider making major changes to the police and other law enforcement structures and the coordination mechanisms these various entities use in their counterterrorism efforts. Some initiatives have been launched in this direction since 2009. For instance, additional recruiting from a pool of retired army soldiers is being considered to raise specialized counterterrorism units in each province.<sup>9</sup> Yet the expert consensus is that Pakistan lacks the local expertise and capacity to achieve a turnaround in law enforcement performance on its own. The time is ripe for U.S. and international support to Pakistan in this sphere. Helping the police and civilian intelligence agencies with modern training and technical assistance would pay counterterrorism dividends for the United States and the EU.

***Whether it is to combat insurgency or terrorism, a good police force is any state’s best bet.***

Admittedly, the task is not easy; the obstacles on the path of police reform in Pakistan are potent and entrenched. Moreover, for Pakistan to attract international assistance it needs to introduce concrete and well-thought-out organizational reforms in the law enforcement sector as well as in the related intelligence infrastructure. Such reforms have not been forthcoming thus far. Moreover, building the capacity of only one segment of the law enforcement infrastructure is impractical, as overarching reform is needed. In other words, the counterterrorism capacity of the police service cannot be improved in isolation; a comprehensive approach is necessary. Rule of law, a critical prerequisite for democracy, is also closely linked to effective law enforcement. Nevertheless, the stakes are simply too high for international partners to walk away from the challenge. It is undeniable that successful police reforms that enhance Pakistan's counterterrorism performance and strengthen the rule of law will stabilize Pakistan and improve the prospects of peace in the region.

The Obama administration's revitalized engagement with Islamabad provides a unique opportunity to usher in significant law enforcement reform on an urgent timetable to improve Pakistan's counterterrorism capacity. This addresses one of the most vital U.S. interests in the country and the region—preventing the sanctuary of global terrorists with the aim and capacity to strike the United States and its allies. The episode involving Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani American who tried to explode a bomb in Times Square in New York in May 2010, is a case in point. The United States has signaled its willingness to assist in this area under the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, but the issue deserves priority treatment.


## Law Enforcement Organizations in Pakistan

Before reform measures can be considered, a clear understanding of the present status of the law enforcement structure is essential. There are two sets of law enforcement organizations in Pakistan: those that operate under the federal government, and the provincial police organizations. Nineteen major organizations operate directly under the federal government dealing with a variety of law enforcement responsibilities (including intelligence gathering, border and coast surveillance, and policing) and answering to different authorities. The total strength of all law enforcement and intelligence services' officials at the disposal of the federal government (with cross-provincial jurisdiction) is approximately 210,000.<sup>10</sup> Rarely do these organizations coordinate their plans and activities or strategize together. The chain of command of the organizations varies, which further complicates coordination and collective policy planning. As a result, decisions are often poorly implemented.

The eighteen federal law enforcement organizations (figure 1) can be grouped into four broad categories:

- *Forces under the Ministry of the Interior.* These forces include five paramilitary organizations, namely, the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh and Punjab), the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency, the Frontier Corps (KPP and Balochistan), and the Frontier Constabulary and Northern Areas Scouts (Gilgit-Baltistan), in addition to the Islamabad Police and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA).
- *Police planning and management organizations under the Ministry of the Interior.* These include the National Police Bureau, the National Police Management Board, the National Police Foundation, and the National Public Safety Commission. The National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) is the latest organization to be included in this category.
- *Other federal organizations.* In this category are those organizations that are not under the direct control of the Ministry of the Interior. They include the National Highways and Motorway Police (under the Ministry of Communications), the Pakistan Railways Police (under the

**Figure 1. Police Organization in Pakistan**



Ministry of Railways), the Airport Security Force (under the Ministry of Defense), and the Anti-Narcotics Force (under the Ministry of Narcotics Control).

- *Intelligence organizations.* The Intelligence Bureau (IB), a civilian agency, and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), led by a serving army lieutenant general, are the two major intelligence outfits. They have regional and provincial offices throughout Pakistan.

A brief description of responsibilities, jurisdiction, and chain of command of these organizations is given in the appendix.<sup>11</sup>

The second category of law enforcement infrastructure comprises the four provincial police organizations, as well as those operational in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). These provincial and regional police organizations are all organized along similar lines and abide by the same set of laws and rules. For instance, the procedural criminal laws (i.e., the Pakistan Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order) are uniformly applicable to all parts of the country (except FATA). The Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), a federal service recruited through the Federal Public Service Commission, provides more than 80 percent of senior supervisory officers (with the rank of assistant superintendent of police and above, who act as subdivisional police chiefs) to the provincial police departments. Its recruitment, training, and career management (including transfers to provinces and federal law enforcement agencies) are managed by the Establishment Division (federal government), though PSP officers report to provincial governments and draw their salaries from provincial budgetary provisions. These PSP officers can be assigned to any province, but lower ranks of police are permanent employees of provincial police organizations and cannot be transferred outside their respective provinces. Since the British era, this complicated service structure has created an elitist PSP that is a source of frustration for junior ranks. The statistics in table 2 indicate police strength and resources in the four provinces, AJK, and Gilgit-Baltistan.

**Table 2. Police Organizations in the Provinces, AJK, and Gilgit-Baltistan**

Province	Population (millions)	Police stations	Police strength	Budget 2009 (millions of rupees)
Punjab <sup>a</sup>	93	637	170,031	43,000
KPP <sup>b</sup>	21	250	55,000	9,677
Sindh	36	440	70,133	24,900
Balochistan <sup>c</sup>	8	84	46,022	3,500
Gilgit-Baltistan <sup>d</sup>	2	26	4,662	450 (approx.)
AJK <sup>e</sup>	5	42	8,373	
<b>Total</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>1,479</b>	<b>354,221</b>	<b>82,513</b>

a. Abida Ellahi, "Overview of Police in Pakistan," *scribd.com*, December 13, 2010, [www.scribd.com/doc/24031499/Pakistan-Police](http://www.scribd.com/doc/24031499/Pakistan-Police).

b. For the latest data, see Government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, "White Paper 2010–11," Finance Department, June 12, 2010.

c. Balochistan Police, "Annual Policing Plan 2007–08," 2007, [www.balochistanpolice.gov.pk](http://www.balochistanpolice.gov.pk).

d. Since the promulgation of the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order of 2009, the police in that region now fall under the direct supervision of the government of Gilgit-Baltistan. Also, a new force named the Karakoram Security Force is being raised (by recruiting 1,500 employees) to manage the highways in the area.

e. "More ASIs, Constables to Enroll in AJK," *Pakistan Observer*, June 13, 2010, [pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=26876](http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=26876).

## Reasons for the Weakness of the Law Enforcement Infrastructure

*There is a broad consensus in Pakistan that . . . its police force is failing to combat crime effectively, uphold the law, provide basic security to citizens, and fight growing militancy.*

There is a broad consensus in Pakistan that after decades of abuse and neglect, its police force is failing to combat crime effectively, uphold the law, provide basic security to citizens, and fight growing militancy. Since its inception in 1947, despite frequent ethnic confrontations, sectarian battles, and sharp rises in criminal or insurgent activity, policy-makers have never put the law enforcement and police sector at the top of their priority list for investment and reform. As a result, the overall police infrastructure is poorly organized. Many reports were commissioned to improve policing standards, but either their recommendations were too general or the governments of the day lacked the will to implement the recommended changes. Some of the major reasons relevant to police engagement in counterterrorism activities are insufficient numbers and scant resources, institutional disconnect, political challenges, corruption, and lack of modernization.

### *Insufficient Numbers and Scant Resources*

Pakistan's total population is estimated to be around 180 million, and the combined federal and provincial law enforcement forces (including paramilitary and related wings of the intelligence organizations) have a total strength of close to 575,000 personnel.<sup>12</sup> Thus, the police–population ratio is one police official for every 304 persons. On paper, Pakistan is in better shape than, say, India, where there is on average one policeman for every 794 people. Pakistan also fares well vis-à-vis the UN standard for peacetime policing, which recommends one police officer for every 400 persons.<sup>13</sup> However, given the nature of the crisis in Pakistan, especially the heightened terrorist activity and insurgency situations in FATA and parts of Balochistan Province, coupled with rising crime figures nationwide, the numbers are not as good as they appear. Moreover, the UN standards assume an efficient, well-resourced, honest police force, which is not the case in Pakistan. And the ratio worsens if only forces directly involved in routine police work are counted and the paramilitary forces with a specific focus (such as maritime and airport security) and administrative personnel in various ministries and intelligence organizations are excluded.<sup>14</sup>



In the domain of counterterrorism, despite the sharp rise in terrorist attacks across the country, no significant investment has been made in specialized expertise. For instance, the FIA's Special Investigation Group, which is responsible for investigating major terrorist attacks in the country, has a very limited number of terrorism specialists. Its number of investigators has only recently risen from a mere thirty-seven to eighty-seven (plus thirteen additional specialists in explosives, banking, and law).<sup>15</sup>

### **Provincial Police Forces, Islamabad Police, and Others**

While substantial financial commitments have been made to increase the police capacity in KPP, the KPP administration has serious concerns about the availability of funds. For example, recruitment has increased substantially, shooting up to 78,320 in 2010–11 after attaining levels of 55,450 in 2009–10 and 50,892 in 2008–09, according to the KPP government, and the financial budget for police has more than doubled over the past five years.<sup>16</sup> However, unexpectedly large increases in salaries, health care costs, and compensation for police officials killed in the line of duty have depleted the funds needed for expansion.

Fortunately, the belated but critical U.S. support for the provincial police force has helped the institution through increased resources and enhanced professional expertise to tackle terrorism. The support included specialized training for officers, the upgrading of police stations in sensitive areas, funds for the establishment of the first police academy for women, and the provision of protective gear, modern communications systems, and vehicles to KPP police.<sup>17</sup> The U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs deserves credit for some of these initiatives. However, this new partnership has not proceeded without hitches: more than 3,000 bulletproof jackets given by the United States to KPP police and the Frontier Corps languished at the Islamabad airport for months in 2010, apparently because of poor coordination between various departments, including the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Commerce, and Pakistan International Airlines, which operates under the Ministry of Defense.<sup>18</sup>

Punjab Province has also made a significant contribution to increasing police capacity in the 2009–10 budget.<sup>19</sup> A sharp rise in terrorist attacks in Punjab, especially in Lahore, targeting religious institutions and police infrastructure convinced the provincial government of the need to increase resources for police. However, so far the only effect has been an increase in salaries for police officials, which is a positive change but far from what is needed to transform the institution. The chief of police in Lahore, Mohammad Aslam Tareen, aptly argues, "We are in transformation period where we badly need huge reforms in the police department," while emphasizing the need for "adopting a joint strategy among security agencies, police, and public."<sup>20</sup> For example, while there are around 170,000 police officials in Punjab, there are only 82,000 weapons and 5,000 bulletproof vests for the officers.<sup>21</sup> After a major terrorist attack against two religious centers of the Ahmaddiya community in Lahore in May 2010, senior police officials admitted that the department faces a serious shortage of equipment and lacks training.<sup>22</sup> In Sindh Province, while a lobby within the Sindh police in support of change has been gaining strength, no reforms of substance have been implemented. An analysis conducted by some pro-reform police officers concluded that nothing short of a "cultural transformation" in the police institutions would bear any fruit.<sup>23</sup> The analysis revealed the following: junior officers, who manage police stations, are unqualified for the job; ordinary police officials work between sixteen and eighteen hours a day; and an insufficient number of police in urban centers has compromised law enforcement efficiency.<sup>24</sup> Unprecedented levels of street crime and a consistent pattern of ethnic and sectarian-motivated target killings in Karachi are just one indication of the nature of the challenge.

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The situation in Balochistan is even more desperate. In January 2010 in Quetta city, hundreds of police officials surrounded the governor's and chief minister's residences to protest low salaries. The protesting officers used official weapons for aerial firing, blocked various roads, damaged vehicles, and beat up civilians.<sup>25</sup> Though stern action was taken against senior officials, the only improvement made after the crisis ended was an increase in the compensation for police personnel killed by terrorists while on duty.

Islamabad police also suffer from inadequate force numbers. It is especially surprising in light of the nature of the threat to the capital city. As the Pakistani writer Ayesha Siddiq points out, how can 11,000 cops effectively guard (and in some cases monitor) 81 embassies, 76 ambassadors' residences, 22 UN offices, 14 hospitals, 20 universities, 1,044 schools and colleges, 77 markets, and 305 madrassas?<sup>26</sup> In addition, they have to protect the head of state, government, and other dignitaries who visit the capital. It is an impossible task.

The resource capacity of law enforcement organizations, other than the provincial police forces, is inconsistent. The National Highways and Motorway Police, established in 1997, is one of the most efficient organizations in the country and an almost corruption-free institution as a result of higher salaries, good training facilities, recruitment on merit, and the availability of modern equipment.<sup>27</sup> However, other federal law enforcement organizations, such as the Pakistan Railways Police and the Airport Security Force, have not been that fortunate. In recent months the Pakistan Railways Police could not install donated scanners at two important and vulnerable stations because of a lack of funds, and its request for closed-circuit cameras in twenty-three large railway stations has not been fulfilled.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, the Airport Security Force continues to use a type of bomb detector at one of the largest airports whose export from the UK was banned after it led to the deaths of 275 people.<sup>29</sup>

### ***Institutional Disconnect***

In accordance with the constitution of Pakistan, which provides for a federal system of government, the four provincial governments are directly responsible for law-and-order functions. Consequently, the police are supervised at a provincial level. Police and paramilitary forces in the capital city of Islamabad and Levies and Khasadars in FATA, however, are under the direct jurisdiction of the federal government. The police of AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan are managed by their respective governments (somewhat similar to the situation in the provinces), although the federal government has more direct leverage because of the special legal status of these regions. PSP officers who serve in senior supervisory positions all across Pakistan are deemed employees of the federal government even when they serve in provincial police institutions. In case of a center-province tussle, the central government can recall any PSP officer or refuse to send any requisitioned officer to a province. The federal government's discretionary authority has sometimes been misused for political ends, making the work environment for police officials very hard and strenuous.

The police forces in each of the provinces act independently of each other, and there is no nationwide integration in terms of training standards and coordination. The federal interior ministry exercises overall supervision, but provincial inspector generals of the police service report directly to their respective chief ministers and are funded from the provincial government. In addition, there is no standardized system of hiring, transferring, and promotion in the four provincial police departments, which creates employment disparities. Lack of coordination among provincial police services often leads to poor information sharing and ineffective monitoring of criminal and terrorist networks.

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## ***Political Challenges***

The police in Pakistan have traditionally been used by the state to suppress dissent and tame opposition.<sup>30</sup> Many senior police officers became politicized in recent decades in an attempt to be in the good books of one political party or the other, and prized field appointments are often made based on political connections. Ironically, the Police Act of 1861 (along with the Police Rules of 1934), a colonial legacy that was meant to control people rather than serve them, remained applicable in Pakistan as a central law (with very minor modifications) until 2002, when a reform-oriented Police Order replaced it. The autocratic and oppressive nature of the old law negatively affected police culture and the professionalism of the force.

Improvements to correct years of oversight of the police were attempted during the Musharraf era. For instance, the Police Act of 2002 emulated the Japanese National Safety Commission system in institutionalizing oversight of the police by public representatives at various levels, and independence of the prosecution service was encouraged to keep police high-handedness in check. Additionally, mechanisms for registering complaints against police were streamlined. However, these adjustments were deemed contrary to the political interests of the legislators (mostly feudal and partisan) aligned with Musharraf at the time, and thus were diluted through amendments.

In rural areas (almost 60 percent of the country), local police officers can influence the fate of politicians in elections by allowing or curbing rigging. Moreover, feudal and tribal elements in remote areas often use police for torturing or “teaching a lesson” to their opponents, who are mostly peasants. Hence, they need influence with the police. Therefore, while Musharraf’s new law was very good on the books, few of the changes were ever implemented, and various amendments inspired by political expediencies were incorporated into the law in 2004, thus nullifying the intent and purpose of the original 2002 act. This is a clear indication of the level of politicization in decision making pertaining to the police force; even well-thought-out plans are virtually impossible to implement without strong political will.

## ***Lack of Modernization and Corruption***

The police in Pakistan have a terrible reputation, and ordinary people often avoid approaching police to report crime or communicate grievances.<sup>31</sup> There is a general perception that the institution of the police is corrupt, institutionally incompetent, and brutal. Consequently, justice is elusive, insecurity is rampant, and ordinary citizens are the victims of this system. Even internal police assessments acknowledge the police force’s lack of credibility in the public eye.<sup>32</sup> However, in the overall scenario and in comparative terms, police performance is not much different from the functioning of customs officials, bureaucrats running the provincial and federal secretariats, and the intelligence services. The police officers get the most blame because they are visible to everyone and are expected to do everything in Pakistan, from crisis management to resolving political and legal disputes, in addition to facing the wrath of people venting their frustrations over blunders committed by the country’s leadership, both political and military. Still, the police force cannot be defended for its routine excesses, violations of human rights, and inefficiency.

The police regularly use torture to elicit confessions because they lack other, more sophisticated means of investigation. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s forensics capabilities are rudimentary at best. Until the late 1990s the country had only one major laboratory (located in Rawalpindi), staffed by a handful of experts, and only under “special circumstances” (i.e., in high-profile cases) could a police officer get access to this resource. In the 2002–07 period four additional laboratories were sanctioned, one in each provincial capital. Even though the increased capacity is a significant improvement, the forensic services still can-

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not meet the demand. In fact, the Sindh laboratory is not even fully functional. Therefore, cases for evaluation are sent to Islamabad, as happened with the evidence collected from the crime scenes of the major terrorist attacks in Karachi in recent months.<sup>33</sup> Despite a \$40 million grant from the Asian Development Bank to the Sindh police to upgrade the existing Sindh Forensic Science Laboratory in Karachi and set up two new facilities in the interior of the province, in Hyderabad and Larkana, almost no progress has been made.<sup>34</sup> Because of budgetary constraints, the government has also discontinued funding for the envisioned National Forensic Science Agency headquarters and its main laboratory in Islamabad.<sup>35</sup> As a result, only a DNA laboratory is operating.

A lack of attention to developing modern investigation and interrogation techniques is another serious issue. Most police officers vie for command positions in investigative work because the primary work of any police force is not even considered a field job,<sup>36</sup> which is a mandatory requirement for promotion to a senior supervisory role.<sup>37</sup> Only very recently has the government considered a proposal to declare service in the Investigation Wing a field posting, to encourage prime officers to work in this area. This development will remove the anomaly, which has so far deterred many professionally competent officers from serving in the Investigation Wing; officers will now be able to count their service with the Investigation Wing as a two-year field posting.

Most police training schools are in a deplorable state due to a paucity of funds. The instructors are often officials who were removed from field duties for political reasons, and it is hardly surprising that the performance of a demoralized and sidelined faculty leaves much to be desired. Fortunately, there is some international interest in revitalizing this area. The U.S. government is supporting the KPP government in building an additional police academy, which is a positive investment.<sup>38</sup> France is sending experts to conduct training at police academies in Pakistan, and funds from the EU are likely to be geared toward enhancing police training standards.<sup>39</sup> British assistance to Pakistan's FIA is especially noteworthy here.<sup>40</sup> However, based on interviews with government officials in the United States, France, and the UK, it appears that much more coordination is needed among international donors involved in supporting Pakistan's law enforcement capacity, as the support currently shows some level of duplication. Perhaps Pakistan can facilitate synchronization in this sector.

## **Counterterrorism Capacity and Interinstitutional Complexities**

The Pakistani police force was traditionally not trained for counterterrorism. Indeed, for reasons of lack of training and insufficient capacity already mentioned, it is barely able to operate as an entity in checking crime and carrying out basic law-and-order functions. However, current circumstances have upended the traditional model and thrust the police into the forefront of the counterterrorism effort. Lack of police expertise in countering the growing extremist menace is undermining the stability of the Pakistani state and claiming thousands of lives in terrorist attacks. This shortcoming is catastrophic, as counterterrorism will be part of the portfolio of the Pakistani police for years to come.

In the counterterrorism segment of the larger law enforcement sphere, a number of overarching problems are obvious impediments to reform efforts. Four warrant special attention, for without remedial measures to treat these major inadequacies, reform of the law enforcement sector, especially in the counterterrorism domain, cannot succeed.

***Lack of police expertise in countering the growing extremist menace is undermining the stability of the Pakistani state and claiming thousands of lives in terrorist attacks.***

## ***Dysfunctional Relationship between Police and Intelligence Organizations***

Lack of trust and coordination between the police force and intelligence outfits have been a long-standing concern for Pakistani law enforcers, and this concern is amplified by the sometimes close relationship between certain armed groups and elements of the intelligence services. For example, according to a well-informed Pakistani journalist, throughout the 1990s one or two intelligence officers in each district of Pakistan were tasked to help out members of the state-supported militant groups if police “creat[ed] any problems for them.”<sup>41</sup> In private discussions police officers routinely mention apprehending militants and criminals but quickly receiving “requests” from intelligence agencies (civilian or military) to let them go. Although the intensity of such practices has decreased in the post-9/11 environment, even today police hesitate to pursue militants and activists associated with groups generally known for their close relationship with the intelligence services.

Poor data collection with regard to crimes and criminals is another major lacuna in the system. Many criminals who join militant religious groups are not traced and tracked efficiently. Even banned militant organizations are not well profiled.<sup>42</sup> According to a senior official of NACTA, many militants currently incarcerated have not been interviewed by experts, which is critical to understanding their networks.<sup>43</sup> In many instances, militant organizations continue their publications, and wanted criminals and terrorists may simply change their affiliations to a group that is not under government scrutiny. All the while, the police remain clueless.

A discernible lack of coordination among the police force, the civilian-run IB, and the military-run intelligence agencies lies at the heart of the problem. For instance, to get data from telephone companies (to trace calls made by criminals and terrorists), the police and the FIA must send a request to intelligence agencies, and the time delay can be crucial to the investigation. Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, a renowned Pakistani politician who remained interior minister during the Musharraf years, publicly acknowledged that coordination between and among the ISI, IB, police, and the Special Branch of the police is far from satisfactory and that intelligence agencies often have information but do not share it with law enforcement agencies.<sup>44</sup> Admittedly, since 2008, the army has been proactive in providing training to a select group of police officers. Such collaboration in KPP has been highly praised by the inspector general of police in the province, Malik Naveed. In a television interview he mentioned that around 5,000 police officials in KPP had undergone counterterrorism and combat training by army instructors.<sup>45</sup> Apparently in lieu of special training, retired army soldiers were recruited by police institutions, especially in the Swat and Peshawar districts, over the past year. And subsequent to the government of Punjab’s request that the army help train the provincial police force, the military operations directorate in Rawalpindi has asked the 10th Division headquarters in Lahore to devise a training plan.<sup>46</sup> Thus, in principle, the army welcomes improvement in police capacity building. Perhaps this will ultimately lead to better coordination between police and intelligence services in practical terms.<sup>47</sup>

## ***Poor Analytical Capacity***

Effective police work is hugely dependent on the analytical competence of the law enforcement infrastructure. Without access to relevant crime or terror data and professional expertise to interpret the underlying trends, no effective strategy can be formulated. According to FIA investigations, five major suicide bombing attacks in Islamabad in October and November 2009 were planned and conducted by former students of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), indicating that police utterly failed to profile these students in the immediate aftermath of the Red Mosque crisis of July 2007.<sup>48</sup> All those who surrendered (around

1,300 persons) were initially kept in police custody for a few weeks. Similarly, the main culprit (known as Dr. Usman) in the October 2009 attack on Pakistan army headquarters in Rawalpindi, Aqeel, was reportedly arrested by police earlier and even interrogated in the presence of officials from an intelligence organization before being cleared. Both police and intelligence specialists failed to gauge his mind-set accurately. Worse still, the attack on the army headquarters was predicted by Punjab police based on information gleaned from a computer memory stick found on a militant in Dera Ghazi Khan, but to no benefit, either because of mistrust between the army and police or because of poor coordination.<sup>49</sup> An overload of intelligence information streaming in from multiple directions also plays a role in such warnings not being heeded.

### ***Ineffective Strategy***

The rising tide of suicide attacks all across Pakistan since 2006 has created widespread fear and insecurity. Though police officials have faced this challenge bravely, sustaining a high number of casualties in such attacks, the law enforcement agencies have not been able to disrupt the cycle in any systematic way. Complacency about the strength and operational capability of some militant groups also hinders formulation of an efficient strategy. For instance, Punjab police as well as intelligence agencies remained in denial for some time about the threat posed by militant groups based in south Punjab, which allowed the militants' networks not only to survive but to grow.<sup>50</sup> Ayesha Siddiqi maintains there is widespread reluctance in the security sector as well as on the part of the present Punjab government "to focus on the four main Punjab-based jihadi groups: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Lashkar-e-Taiba. . . . These jihadi groups could actually be thwarted by a concerted, integrated police and intelligence operation."<sup>51</sup> Even though the situation has somewhat improved, because attacks in Punjab convinced the provincial government of the source of these troubles, critical time has been lost in the process.

### ***Ineffective Criminal Justice System***

Inadequate and defective criminal justice systems are another critical problem. The witness protection system in Pakistan is almost nonexistent. Consequently, those who testify against powerful criminals and militants in courts receive no security. In dozens of cases, police officers investigating militants have been gunned down. The best-known case is that of Sipah-e-Sahaba terrorist Malik Ishaq, whose police charge sheet includes at least seventy murders but who has never had a conviction that has stuck,<sup>52</sup> and those who testified in court as witnesses against him now live in fear of reprisal.<sup>53</sup> Judges face similar security threats, and in many instances lower court decisions in terrorism cases are supposedly pending owing to such fears. In recent months, alleged terrorists arrested for involvement in the Islamabad Marriott bombing and some major attacks in Punjab Province were released by the courts for lack of evidence. The police had to put the individuals under "house arrest" afterward to buy time before challenging the verdicts in higher courts.<sup>54</sup>

## **Recommendations for Reform: Traditional versus Innovative Policing**

Pakistan desperately needs reform of its law enforcement infrastructure. This need is now increasingly recognized in the policy circles within Pakistan and among donor countries, especially the United States and the EU.<sup>55</sup> Over the years, the government of Pakistan has attempted to introduce various reforms to control rising crime and violence, but all such attempts—made half-heartedly and reluctantly—have had only marginal impact. Additionally, a change of government in Pakistan often leads to abandonment of initiatives of the

previous government. Reform efforts in different provinces are also uncoordinated. For instance, the Punjab government has been working on formulating special legislation to govern police functioning in the province called the Punjab Police Act 2010; commendable as it is, no similar changes are in the offing in the other provinces.<sup>56</sup>

The scale and extent of the problem are such that the limited and disjointed reform efforts such as those described can have little impact on the overall situation. Lack of resources is a big obstacle, but merely throwing money at the problem is unlikely to bear dividends. Technical issues and the need for modernization in police investigations are only one aspect of the challenge. Remedies for police shortcomings depend on equally far-reaching reforms of the judicial and court systems. All this requires extreme political will. As Frederic Grare, a leading French expert on Pakistan, points out, "Capacity building and the political will to fight terrorism cannot be separated. Should political will or real determination to fight terrorism be missing, capacity building will inevitably end in failure, regardless of the amount of foreign assistance invested."<sup>57</sup>

There may be no better moment to press ahead with far-reaching law enforcement reforms in Pakistan, given the public consensus against militancy and extremism since 2008, which has provided the political space to make tough, reform-oriented choices.

The recommendations for police reform can be divided into two broad categories, traditional and innovative reforms. Traditional police reforms generally include providing better salaries and basic facilities, professional training, modern equipment, and readily available forensic support, in conjunction with strengthening the prosecution sector. Community policing and refinement of the legal framework governing police organizations also fall in this category. There are no two views about the necessity of these measures in Pakistan, and the country has embarked on this path lately, though without much coordination between provinces and with meager resources. In this domain, financial as well as technical support from the United States and the EU can make a difference.

### ***Recommendations for Traditional Reforms***

The following recommendations can help the traditional reform aspects.

- **Implement the original 2002 Police Act nationwide.** All of the 2004 amendments to the 2002 Police Act, which reintroduced tools of political manipulation, should be discarded and the new ideas introduced in the Punjab Police Act of 2010, which makes police more accountable and encourages a community policing model, should be incorporated into the original 2002 Police Act. All four provinces, FATA, the Azad Kashmir region, and Gilgit-Baltistan should be governed by a common police act.
- **Increase public awareness.** The level of public awareness about the changes introduced with the 2002 reforms was very low. As a result, the new mechanisms for ensuring police independence and opportunities for redress of grievances against police high-handedness remained largely unimplemented. A public information campaign focusing on citizens' rights and police accountability can help this cause. Lately, the independent broadcast media in Pakistan have started exposing police brutality and are making an impact nationwide. The government of Pakistan needs to understand that an effective and independent police service will add to the legitimacy of democratic governance.
- **Focus on junior officers.** Investigative field work is primarily done by junior ranks, whereas most of the international training facilities are currently offered to senior supervisory officers. This pattern needs to be reversed so that junior officers have significant training opportunities.
- **Provide training support and equipment.** Pakistan has a poor track record in utilizing international aid, especially when it comes in the form of financial handouts. Corrupt officials

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in Pakistan and foreign private contractors from donor countries often benefit most from such aid. Support for investigative training and help in the acquisition of modern equipment (e.g., small weapons, scanners, bulletproof jackets, armored vehicles) will be more effective. Moreover, police training academies are often overlooked by international donors, an oversight that needs correction.<sup>58</sup> Finally, foreign donors should avoid framing everything in the context of counterterrorism, as Pakistani public opinion is likely to be more appreciative of international help in this arena if it is focused on enhancing the crime-fighting capacity of police. Donors should also involve their own police organizations in the process rather than depending overwhelmingly on the private sector.

- **Help NACTA in analytical and research work.** This fledgling organization needs both internal and external help in attracting experienced experts and analysts who can focus on scientific and statistical studies dealing with crime patterns and develop databases useful for counterterrorism. For effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, the law enforcement model also needs nonpolicing corrective measures, such as developing public awareness about the nature of the threat through the media and incorporating counter-extremist discourse into the public schools curriculum. Decommissioning the brigades of militants and terrorists will require well-resourced and well-devised deradicalization programs. NACTA can spearhead such initiatives if given requisite funds and independence from bureaucratic channels. Unfortunately, NACTA has already been the victim of political turf battles; its first director general and a leading counterterrorism expert, Tariq Pervez, resigned in July 2010 because of the opposition in some quarters to placing NACTA directly under the prime minister (as opposed to the Ministry of the Interior).<sup>59</sup>

### ***Recommendations for Innovative Reforms***

As is evident from the half-hearted implementation of the 2002 reforms and predictable governmental dithering out of short-term political expediency, traditional reforms by themselves are rarely enough. They need to be coupled with innovative reforms. Two critical ones are described below.

- **Restructuring of law enforcement organizations.** Though Pakistan must resist the temptation to create new specialized antiterrorism structures that marginalize the country's already existing institutions, establishment of a central organization similar to the Department of Homeland Security in the United States will go a long way toward improving coordination between various law enforcement agencies in the country. As explained earlier, the chain of command for various organizations is complicated and dispersed. A restructuring of the overall command setup that brings all the federal institutions under one umbrella can help system effectiveness considerably. Provincial police chiefs, operating under the executive control of chief ministers, can be increasingly involved in policy planning at the central level through this new organization. Staunch proponents of provincial autonomy will likely be the strongest opponents of such a reorganization. One way to alleviate their concerns is to involve all stakeholders in the decision-making process and ensure that the new institution focuses on coordination rather than on controlling. The fact that such experienced hands as retired Lieutenant General Moeen-ud-din Haider, who remained minister of interior under General Musharraf, support the creation of such an institution indicates that many well-informed voices can be counted on to support such a major overhaul of the system.<sup>60</sup>
- **Reform of the criminal justice system.** The credibility of Pakistan's higher judiciary has increased in recent years with the judiciary's defiant response to former president Musharraf's arbitrary removal of the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Mr. Iftikhar Chaudhry, and in the aftermath of the popular lawyers' movement. Consequently, at the



level of the Supreme Court and the provincial High Courts, the judiciary is increasingly independent. However, police performance faces its first test in the lower courts, which are in poor shape, largely for reasons similar to those that plague police work—limited resources, lack of professionalism, and incompetence. Through a new National Judicial Policy, the higher judiciary has already begun introducing major reforms to the lower courts, but considerable financial support will be needed from the government to bring this initiative to fruition. According to one of Pakistan’s widely respected and most competent senior police officials, Tariq Khosa, who is currently federal secretary in the Ministry of Narcotics in Islamabad, police accountability through an independent judiciary is one of the most effective ways to ensure improvement in police performance.<sup>61</sup>

## Conclusion

Pakistan’s law enforcement and police system is by no means too flawed to fix. Moreover, at least within the police service, there is a discernible desire to improve performance. In comparative terms, better performance by the National Motorway Police (Highways Police) and a few effective counterterrorism operations in the late 1990s show that improvement and reform are indeed possible. The laudable performance of Pakistani police officers and junior officials while serving in various UN peacekeeping operations also show promise. Lately, many police officials across Pakistan have shown bravery in facing suicide bombing attacks. Courageous police officers like Malik Saad and Safwat Ghayur who sacrificed their lives while leading from the front have inspired many young police officers in Pakistan.<sup>62</sup>

For reform to take root along the lines suggested in the recommendations, however, Pakistan must first overcome internal lacunae: political appointments must end; postings, recruitment, and promotions must be made on merit alone; and corrupt officers must be punished publicly. No financial resources are required to accomplish these goals. Second, Pakistan has to start investing its own funds in enhancing overall law enforcement capacity. International donors must understand that supporting the larger police and law enforcement reforms is the only effective way to enhance Pakistan’s capacity to fight terrorism. Such support, besides strengthening the rule of law and democracy in the country, will improve interagency coordination for intelligence sharing and joint investigations with donor countries, which have acquired increased importance in recent times.

In December 2009 I had the opportunity to ask U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton if the U.S. government would be supporting the police and law enforcement reform agenda in Pakistan. Her enthusiastic response should be of interest to U.S. and Pakistani policymakers alike:

We would be honored to do so, because I agree with you that the police truly are on the front lines. They often have to deal with the rush of violence that comes in cities or towns and they don’t have the support they need, they don’t often have the equipment that they need. . . . I met a number of police officers, both in Lahore and in Islamabad, who are very committed, but underresourced. And I am more than happy to consider any request from the Pakistani government to help the police force.<sup>63</sup>

## Appendix: Federal Law Enforcement and Intelligence Organizations

Organization	Mandate and jurisdiction	Command and strength
1. Frontier Corps (a) FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa <sup>a</sup> (b) FC Balochistan	The Frontier Corps supports local law enforcement in maintaining law and order when requested by the federal government. The corps's primary task is to monitor and obstruct smuggling along Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan and Iran. Increasingly, these forces are involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; FC KPP is playing an especially important role in FATA.	
2. Rangers <sup>b</sup> (a) Rangers, Punjab <sup>c</sup> (b) Rangers, Sindh <sup>d</sup>	This organization secures Pakistan's border with India and assists when called in by respective provincial governments to maintain law and order. Sindh Rangers also provide security to VIPs visiting Sindh and are especially active in Karachi. Both organizations regularly assist police in border regions and focus on intelligence gathering. An antiterrorist wing, trained by the army's Special Services Group, was incorporated in 2004 in both organizations.	The director general, an army officer with the rank of major general, leads both forces. Commanders of these forces closely coordinate with local military commanders in Karachi and Lahore. Deputy director generals are appointed by provincial governments. The Rangers' strength in Punjab is 19,475, and in Sindh, 24,630.
3. Northern Areas Scouts (Gilgit-Baltistan)	This paramilitary force secures areas that border Gilgit-Baltistan and provides assistance to local police forces for law-and-order duties.	It is led by a serving army brigadier, and the organization coordinates closely with military deployed in the area. Its total employees number 3,679.
4. Frontier Constabulary <sup>e</sup>	This paramilitary force (formed after the merger of Samana Rifles and Border Military Police in British India), though largely drawn from KPP, can be deployed anywhere in Pakistan by the Ministry of the Interior. The majority of its units operate in KPP, FATA, and Islamabad.	It is led by a senior police officer designated as commandant. The inspector general of police can request support from this force during any crisis. Its current strength is 22,817.
5. Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (Pakistan Coast Guards)	It is responsible for enforcing maritime law, maintenance of seamarks, border control, and antismuggling operations. It is deployed in the coastal areas of Sindh and Balochistan Provinces.	Formerly part of the Pakistan Army, it now operates under the Ministry of the Interior and is led by a serving army officer (rank of major general), and its various battalions are led by army officers (lieutenant colonel rank) seconded from the army. Its present strength is 4,067.
6. Capital Territory Police (Islamabad) <sup>f</sup>	It performs standard police duties in Islamabad (divided into thirteen police station areas) and operates directly under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. The total population of Islamabad is close to two million.	Led by an inspector general of police, its current strength is 10,995. The Police Act of 2002 has not been fully enforced in Islamabad. <sup>g</sup>
7. Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) <sup>h</sup>	The FIA investigates offenses committed in connection with matters that concern the federal government, are of interprovincial scope, or involve transnational organized crime. Its jurisdiction encompasses economic crimes, terrorism, cyber crimes, banking offenses, and enforcement of immigration laws and exit control lists. It also maintains a Redbook of high-profile criminals and terrorists.	It is led by a senior police officer (rank of inspector general) designated as director general. The agency has offices in all four provincial headquarters, plus headquarters in Islamabad. Its total strength is around 3,500.
8. Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) <sup>i</sup>	It is primarily tasked with eliminating the trafficking and distribution of narcotics in Pakistan, enhancing international cooperation against drugs, and liaising with international organizations on the subject.	It is led by a serving army officer of the rank of a major general with the designation as director general. It operates under the Ministry of Narcotics Control. Its strength is around 3,100.
9. National Highways and Motorway Police (NHMP) <sup>j</sup>	Established in 1997, it is specifically assigned traffic control functions and policing on national highways. The organization is reputed for its efficiency, integrity, and discipline.	Led by an inspector general of police, its officials are drawn from the police service as well as through direct recruitment. It operates under the Ministry of Communications, and its total strength is estimated to be around 5,000.
10. Airport Security Force (ASF) <sup>k</sup>	It is responsible for protecting all the airports in the country. Besides safeguarding the civil aviation industry, it is responsible for maintaining law and order within the limits of airports. In recent years it has been trained for counterterrorism measures at airports.	A serving army brigadier is appointed by the Ministry of Defense as director general of the ASF. The ASF's total strength is estimated to be around 4,500.

Organization	Mandate and jurisdiction	Command and strength
11. Pakistan Railways Police (PRP)	The PRP is responsible for law-and-order duties on trains and at train stations across the country. Since 2008, the PRP has assumed police duties in 1,500 railway employees colonies (covering a 2,000 square kilometer area) and in other areas owned by the Railways Department. <sup>l</sup>	It is led by a senior police officer designated as inspector general. The total number of PRP employees is around 7,000 (according to 2007 records). <sup>m</sup> The PRP also has a 600-strong commando unit for counterterrorism tasks.
12. National Police Bureau (NPB)	It acts as a national focal point for all police-related research and development matters. It functions as a permanent secretariat for the National Public Safety Commission (NPSC), which oversees the functioning of federal law enforcement agencies, and the National Police Management Board (NPMB), which advises the federal and provincial governments about criminal justice reform, public safety, and police information technology.	Operating under the Ministry of the Interior, it is headed by a director general, an officer from the police service. NPSC has twelve members who meet periodically. NPMB, which comprises all the heads of the police and law enforcement agencies (except the FC), meets very rarely. Total NPB employees are fewer than 100.
13. National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA)	This newly established institution will focus on preparing national threat assessment reports on extremism, terrorism, and insurgency and will help the government formulate a National Action Plan for counterterrorism. It will primarily focus on research, data collection, and analysis of terrorism-related issues, in addition to serving as a liaison with international organizations focusing on the subject.	It is led by an inspector general of police and operates under the Ministry of the Interior. The organization has three wings: Counter Extremism, Counter Terrorism, and the Research, Analysis, Training Wing. It is currently recruiting employees for all sectors of the organization. The total strength of the organization is 203. <sup>n</sup>
14. Intelligence Bureau (IB)	Its responsibilities include gathering intelligence (including for counterterrorism purposes) within the country and disseminating it through the Ministry of Interior to political leadership and various police organizations.	It is led by a director general who is either a serving police officer (typically the case during periods of civilian rule), or a serving major general from the army (often the case during military rule). Its employees supporting police work total around 2,000.
15. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) <sup>o</sup>	Pakistan's premier intelligence organization, only part of its responsibilities deal with law enforcement work. ISI's internal wing, the Counter Terrorism Centre, focuses on intelligence gathering and analysis and provides intelligence assessments to the government. The ISI is responsible for sharing relevant information with police organizations in the country through the federal government.	Led by a serving lieutenant general from the Pakistan Army (designated as director general), the ISI reports directly to the prime minister of Pakistan. However, its head also sits in army corps commanders' meetings and reports to the Chief of Army Staff. Approximately, 3,500 ISI employees are involved in work that is linked to police work and counterterrorism.
Total number of employees of all federal organizations		209,790

- a. Source for FC (KP) strength: Eric Schmitt and Jane Perlez, "Distrust Slows U.S. Training of Pakistanis," *New York Times*, July 11, 2010.
- b. See The Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959, [www.pap.gov.pk/uploads/acts/106.html](http://www.pap.gov.pk/uploads/acts/106.html).
- c. For details, see [www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPRReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=139](http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPRReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=139).
- d. For details, see [www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPRReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=141](http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPRReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=141).
- e. Historically, the Frontier Constabulary's basic job was to man the border between the tribal areas of FATA and the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province.
- f. For details, see [www.islamabadpolice.gov.pk](http://www.islamabadpolice.gov.pk).
- g. The Police Act of 2002 significantly improved the laws and rules that govern the police organizations of Pakistan. It emulated the Japanese National Safety Commission system to ensure oversight of police by both elected and nominated members at local (district), provincial, and national levels. It also provided for an independent prosecution service to place additional checks on the police. It provided police with operational autonomy in administrative as well as investigative spheres, while the various responsibilities of the police service (ranging from investigations and intelligence to watch-and-ward and guard duties) were divided among separate police departments to improve the efficiency of the system. Its various provisions were further amended in 2004.
- h. For more details about FIA's mandate, see the Federal Investigation Agency Act of 1974, [http://www.fia.gov.pk/abt\\_background.htm](http://www.fia.gov.pk/abt_background.htm).
- i. For details, see Ministry of Narcotics Control, Government of Pakistan, About Ministry—Overview, [www.narcon.gov.pk/about.htm](http://www.narcon.gov.pk/about.htm).
- j. For details about the National Highways and Motorway Police, see its official website, [www.nhmp.gov.pk/](http://www.nhmp.gov.pk/); see also Muhammad Faisal Ali, "Motorway Police Facing Shortage of Personnel," *Dawn*, October 29, 2007.
- k. For details about the Airport Security Force's responsibilities, see "ASF Gets New Head," *Dawn*, April 2, 2010.
- l. Asif Chaudhry, "Govt Extends Railways Police Jurisdiction," *Nation*, October 7, 2008.
- m. See [www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/publications/yearbook2008/Transport%20&%20Comm/20-17.pdf](http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/publications/yearbook2008/Transport%20&%20Comm/20-17.pdf).
- n. An official of the Ministry of Interior in discussion with the author, June 2, 2010.
- o. For details about the ISI's role, see Frederic Gare, "Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan's Transitional Democracy" (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009).

## Notes

1. For year-over-year data, see [www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm).
2. Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Pakistan Loses \$400m to 'Enhanced Oversight,'" *Dawn*, March 3, 2010.
3. For details, see <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm>; Amir Mir, "2010: Suicides Drop by 35 pc, Deaths Up by 1 pc," *News*, December 24, 2010.
4. The budget for VIP protection varies in urban and rural areas but on average consumes around 30 percent of the total police budget. It is estimated to be around 50 percent in major urban centers of the country.
5. For instance, see *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda* (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corp., August 2008), [www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG741-1.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf). See also Kelev I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, May–June 2005: 8–12, [www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf).
6. Christine Fair, "Policing Pakistan," *Wall Street Journal Asia*, June 30, 2009.
7. *How Terrorist Groups End*.
8. Douglas P. Lackey, "The Good Soldier versus the Good Cop: Counterterrorism as Police Work," *Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly* 55 (January 2006): 66–82.
9. This is especially the case in NWFP's troubled Swat district. For details, see Amanda Hodge, "Elite Force to Police Swat Valley," *Australian*, July 18, 2009.
10. A few estimates are used here as updated information about the total number of employees of various organizations is not available publicly. It should also be noted that intelligence agencies perform a range of standard functions, some of which are unrelated to law enforcement work, and the figures provided here are an approximation, especially with regard to the number of intelligence officials who are directly involved in counterterrorism work (see the appendix to this report for details).
11. For a useful and informative source on the subject, see Asad Jamal and Sanjay Patil, eds., *Police Organizations in Pakistan* (Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative), 2010, [www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Police\\_Organisations\\_in\\_Pakistan%5B1%5D.pdf](http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Police_Organisations_in_Pakistan%5B1%5D.pdf).
12. This final figure also includes an estimate of total employees of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, four provincial Home Ministries (which oversee law enforcement organizations), and relevant administrative offices in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan—around 10,000 employees altogether.
13. Madhur Singh, "Can India Reform Its Wayward Police Force?," *Time*, August 10, 2009; "City Has Lowest Police-Public Ratio," *Hindu*, March 27, 2010.
14. For instance, see statistics in Imran Ayub, "KARACHI: City's Police-Population Ratio Abysmally Low," *Dawn*, November 24, 2008.
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