Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means (Green Book) - Appendix L. Monitoring the Effects of Welfare Reform

[Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means (Green Book)]
[Appendices]
[Appendix L. Monitoring the Effects of Welfare Reform]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]

APPENDIX L-ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF
WELFARE REFORM INITIATIVES

INTRODUCTION

The 1996 welfare reform law set sweeping goals of reducing welfare
dependency, and addressing both out-of-wedlock pregnancies and single
parenthood. In creating the block grant of Temporary Assistance for
Needy
Families (TANF), the 1996 law gave States broad latitude to design
programs that promote work among those receiving welfare assistance as
a way to meet the goals. TANF was created at a time when a large
number of States were already experimenting with welfare-to-work
programs, and many State TANF programs are the product of these
experiments. Further, the 1996 welfare law gave States the authority
to use TANF funds to address other social issues commonly associated
with welfare dependency but which extend beyond the immediate
population receiving cash assistance.
No single study can provide a complete and definitive assessment of the
effects of welfare reform and the broad social initiatives undertaken
both before and after the enactment of the 1996 welfare law. However,
a large body of data and research has been developed to help policy
makers determine what is happening and which provides a sense of the
likely impact that some of the changes in both Federal and State policy
have had. Each data source or study is like a piece of a puzzle B a
small piece of the overall picture with its own limitations and
requiring caveats about the implications of its findings. However, when
these pieces are put together, a picture does emerge of the changes

that have taken place since the mid-1990s. As a whole, the research
provides the ability to assess whether Federal and State policy
initiatives have influenced these changes.
Much of this research has been supported by Federal funds. General
indicators of the low-income population come from national surveys of
the U.S. Census Bureau and other agencies. Further, the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) has long sponsored research on the
effects of welfare-to-work initiatives and required an evaluation of
the welfare-to-work experiments of the mid-1990s that preceded TANF.
This appendix focuses on these federally-funded efforts. It provides
a summary of trends in the indicators of work, welfare, and economic
well being from national survey data. It then summarizes findings from
research completed through December 2002 from federally-funded studies
of specific welfare populations and evaluations of program changes.
The last part of this appendix outlines research currently planned or
ongoing, focusing on federally-funded efforts to fill in some of the
"missing" pieces of the puzzle that would help the public and
policymakers assess the effects of welfare reform.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM EXISTING RESEARCH

Generally, States have used TANF funds to promote and support work for
low-income families. For the most part, States have implemented

Awork-first@ programs that stress job search and rapid entry into
employment. State programs also have focused on supporting work, by
permitting recipients to keep a part of their welfare check when they
get a job. Progress toward reducing welfare dependency has been made,
as welfare-to-work efforts-together with the economic boom of the
mid- and late-1990s-succeeded in sharply reducing welfare rolls and in
increasing work by mothers raising children alone.
All available data from both national surveys and administrative data
sources document the dramatic plunge in the cash welfare rolls.
National survey data show that the proportion of single mothers
receiving cash welfare was relatively steady in the late 1980s and
early 1990s (at about 1/3), but after 1993 fell precipitously to 10.6
percent in 2002. Coinciding with the fall in the cash welfare rolls,
employment among single mothers increased sharply in the mid-to
late-1990s. In 1993, 68 percent of single mothers worked at some
point during the year, a proportion that had risen to 83 percent in
2000.
Federal and State policy changes likely influenced the trends in work
and welfare following enactment of welfare reform. Program evaluations
have consistently found that mandatory participation in job search or
other job preparation activities increases employment and decreases
welfare receipt. This finding has been replicated over and over again
in evaluations of such initiatives from the 1980s to the present. This
is not to say that the healthy economy did not also affect the trends
in welfare and work that occurred during the economic boom of
the mid-and late-1990s. In fact, the trend toward higher work and
lower welfare receipt rates actually preceded enactment of the 1996
welfare reform law, though many States were experimenting with their
welfare programs at the time. However, the available evidence shows
that the type of policies implemented at the Federal and State level
in welfare reform did have a part in decreasing welfare dependence and
increasing work. Poverty rates have declined since the mid-1990s,
though the decline in poverty has not been as great as the decline in
the cash welfare rolls.
National survey data show that the percent of single mothers who were
poor peaked at 45 percent in the early-to-mid 1990s, but fell to 32
percent in 2002. However, the cash welfare rolls declined faster
during the same period, and an increasing proportion of poor single
mothers did not receive cash welfare.
It is harder to make the connection between policy changes and trends
in poverty than it is between policy changes and welfare receipt and
work.
Program evaluations consistently have shown that requiring workBwhile
increasing earnings and decreasing cash welfare receiptBoften does not
change a recipient=s combined income. That is, earnings gains are
offset by declines in welfare benefits. Those programs that increased
recipients= income generally did so by expanding welfare eligibility
for families with earnings (as many States have done). Further,
evidence from studies of those who leave welfare (Aleaver studies@)
shows that the earnings of single mothers often are by themselves
insufficient to lift a family out of poverty and many remain poor.
These research findings generally come from studies of families who had
entered the welfare system; evidence is lacking to assess how TANF may
have affected the economic well-being of families who never sought
assistance.
Some evaluations of welfare-to-work programs included assessments of
the well-being and development of the family=s children. These studies
examine a broad range of child outcomes. Requiring work of single
mothers generally does not appear to have unfavorable impacts on the
behavior, academic functioning, or health and safety of children.
For younger children, there is no consistent pattern, with some
favorable and some unfavorable impacts. However, a number of studies
have pointed out unfavorable academic and behavioral outcomes for
adolescent children. There is little definitive evidence of the effect
of TANF on progress toward its family formation goals of decreasing
out-of-wedlock pregnancies and promoting two-parent families. Progress
toward these goals is perhaps the most difficult to assess. TANF gives
broad latitude to States to address family formation issues, permitting
States to do so not only for cash welfare and low-income families but
for the population in general. To date, States have spent very little
of their TANF money directly on such activities and there is very
little research available to assess the impact that such programs would
have on family formation outcomes such as reducing out-of-wedlock
child-bearing and marriage.
Much of the available research on the effect of welfare reform on
family formation comes from broader assessments of welfare-to-work
programs. Most provisions of these programs were not intended to
directly affect child-bearing or marital status, but might indirectly
have done so. A few evaluated programs included such policy
initiatives as a family cap (no increase in the cash payment
upon the birth of a new baby) or elimination of restrictions for
two-parent families. These programs have not produced consistent
impacts on births or marital status outcomes. Programs without such
provisions also sometimes have, but sometimes do not have, impacts on
births and marital status.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

In 2003, welfare policy and research stands at the end of one era and
the beginning of another. A large body of research shows that
mandatory participation requirements can be effective in moving
recipients from welfare to work. However, the limits of such policies
also have been learned, as these programs tend not to increase incomes
for those who come through the welfare system.
In great part, the protracted debate on welfare reauthorization in 2002
and 2003 focused on policies that were seen as addressing the
limitations of Awork-first@ programs. Reauthorization proposals
generally would raise work standards, require additional hours of
activity, and allow States to engage more of their caseload in
activities that would go beyond pre-employment job search. The debate
over promoting marriage in part reflects a recognition of the
difficulty that single mothers have in achieving economic well being.
Many of the ideas discussed in Congress during this two-year period are
the subject of research projects already underway. The concluding
section of this appendix discusses ongoing or planned research
sponsored by HHS. It discusses the initiatives in the areas of
post-employment services, specialized services for certain welfare
populations, and new policies and programs to affect family formation
decisions that represent the Federal welfare research agenda
for the future.

ECONOMIC STATUS OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES: NATIONAL
SURVEY DATA

OVERVIEW

This section examines trends in welfare, work, and economic well-being
among families headed by single mothers, the group that is the main
focus of TANF Programs. The analyses use national household survey
data, specifically, the U.S. Census Bureau's March Current Population
Survey (CPS) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX). CPS data were examined from March 1988 (income year
1987) to March 2002 (income year 2001). CEX data were examined from
1994 through 2001.
The analyses seek to describe the changing circumstances of single
mothers over the period, but do not attempt to isolate the effects of
particular policy changes or to ascribe causation. These analyses are
presented to provide background and context for the subsequent
discussions of research focused specifically on welfare reform
initiatives. Given the precision of estimates obtained from the CPS
and CEX, this section focuses primarily on overall trends, rather than
specific year-to-year changes.
The number of single mothers grew by 17 percent over the 4-year period
from 1989 to 1993, but has since leveled off and remained at around 10
million (Chart L-2). Dramatic changes in work, welfare, and poverty
among this population have occurred in recent years, especially since
1992-93, as detailed in the following charts. Highlights include:
? The percentage of single mothers who worked at some time during
the year rose from 67 percent in 1992 to 83 percent in 2000, dropping
somewhat to 81 percent in 2001 (Chart L-1). Single mothers' employment
rates, once below those of married mothers, now exceed those of their
married counterparts (Chart L-5). Employment gains have been greatest
for single mothers with children under age 3 (Chart L-5).
? The percentage of single mothers who received cash welfare,
based on CPS data, shrank from 35 percent in 1993 to 11 percent in 2001
(Chart L-1).
? The percentage of poor single mothers (on the basis of
pretransfer income) who reported receiving cash welfare declined from
63 percent in 1993 to 25 percent in 2001 (Chart L-3). Declines
occurred even among those with very low pretransfer income (e.g., below
25 percent of poverty) (Chart L-4).
? The percentage of single mothers who were poor based on money
income, after cash transfers (the official poverty measure), declined
from 45 percent in 1993 to 32 percent in 2001 (Chart L-1 and
Chart L-7). If in-kind food assistance and the EIC (net of taxes) were
counted as income, the poverty rate would have dropped from 41 percent
in 1993 to 26 percent in 2001 (Chart L-7).
? 1997 marked a transition year in which, for the first time over
the period examined, the share of poor single mothers who worked during
the year exceeded those who received welfare (Chart L-6).
? Average total income of poorest single mothers (mothers in the
bottom income quintile) has yet to reach its 1994 peak-level
(Chart L-9). Growth in net earnings and EIC transfers since 1994
($1,760) have not been sufficient to offset concurrent losses in cash
welfare and food stamps over the period (-$2,981), resulting in lower
net income in 2001 ($6,960) than in 1994 ($7,602).
? However, among single mothers in the second lowest income
quintile, gains in earnings and the EIC have more than offset declines
in cash welfare and food stamps, resulting in higher average total
income in 2000 ($17,789) than at any time during the preceding 13 years
for this subset of the population (Chart L-10). Average total income
for this group fell somewhat in 2001, to $17,324.
? Single-mother families appear better off when compared on the
basis of their reported consumption expenditures than when compared on
the basis of their reported incomes. Among single-mother families
overall, 36.1 percent were considered poor in 2001 based on their
incomes reported on the CEX, whereas 26.7 percent were considered
poor based on their level of consumption expenditures relative to the
poverty income threshold.
Under both measures, single-mother families appear to be economically
better off in 2001 than in 1994 (Table L-1). Consumption expenditure
data suggest that in spite of declining welfare receipt the poorest one
-fifth (bottom quintile) of single-mother families maintained their
level of consumption over the 1994-2000 period, and had somewhat higher
consumption levels in 2001 when compared to 1994, even after counting
increased work-related expenses (transportation, child care, payroll
taxes) over the period (Table L-2).

CHART L-1 -- WELFARE, WORK AND POVERTY STATUS AMONG
SINGLE MOTHERS, 1987-2001

CASH WELFARE RECEIPT

CPS data show an increase in cash welfare receipt (AFDC, TANF, or
other assistance) among single mothers during the late 1980s and early
1990s and a decrease in the mid-to-late 1990s that corresponds to the
caseload rise and fall documented by administrative data. Chart L-2
shows that the total number of single mothers increased from 8.4
million in 1989, to about 9.9 million in 1993, an increase of 1.5
million, or 17 percent. Since 1993, the number of single mothers has
remained fairly stable, between 9.7 and 10.1 million, but the number
of single mothers receiving cash welfare has fallen each year.

CHART L-2 -- SINGLE MOTHERS: POVERTY AND CASH
WELFARE RECEIPT, 1987-2001
Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial
census derived weights. Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research
Service. Based on analysis of U.S.Census Bureau March 1988-2002
Current Population Survey data.

The number of single mothers in families receiving cash welfare
increased from 2.5 million in 1989, to 3.4 million in 1993, an increase
of 900,000, or 36 percent over the 4-year period. Since 1993, the
number of single mothers reporting cash welfare has fallen to 1.1
million (a 69 percent decline). Over the same period, the number of
poor single mothers who reported receiving no cash welfare increased by
532,000, from 1.7 million in 1993 to 2.5 million in 2001 (the middle
shaded area shown in Chart L-2). Chart L-3 shows that cash welfare
recipiency rates among single mothers overall, and among poor single
mothers based on their pretransfer income (cash income excluding cash
welfare), remained fairly steady during the 1987-93 period, but have
fallen considerably since. Among single mothers who were poor based on
their pretransfer cash income, the share who received cash welfare held
relatively steady, around 63 percent, over the 1987-93 period. As the
chart shows, the likelihood of cash welfare receipt has decreased since
1993 among this population. In 1993, the cash welfare recipiency rate
among single mothers with pretransfer income below poverty was 63
percent; by 2001, it had fallen to 25 percent.

CHART L-3 -- SINGLE MOTHERS: CASH WELFARE RECIPIENCY
RATES, 1987-2001

* Pretransfer income is cash income other than cash welfare payments.
r Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial
census derived weights. Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research
Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-2002
Current Population Survey data.

Chart L-4 shows cash welfare recipiency rates based on families'
pretransfer (i.e., precash welfare) income relative to poverty. The top
line of the chart depicts the share of single mothers without other
income who reported receiving cash welfare. The line shows that nearly
90 percent of single mothers with no pretransfer income reported
receiving cash assistance in the years 1987 to 1990. However, since
1990, the reported rate of cash welfare recipiency for this group has
continuously declined, to 77 percent in 1996, and to 35 percent by
2001. Similarly, for families with very low pretransfer income
(below 25 percent of poverty), and for families with pretransfer
incomes between 25 and 50 percent of poverty, cash welfare recipiency
also shows dramatic declines: for the former group from 72 percent in
1996 to 33 percent in 2001, and for the latter group from 60 percent in
1995 to 31 percent in 2001.

CHART L-4 -- CASH WELFARE RECIPIENCY RATES AMONG
SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES BY PRETRANSFER INCOME POVERTY
STATUS, 1987-2001

Likewise, food stamp recipiency rates among low-income households also
have fallen considerably since 1994. In 1994, 71 percent of
single-mother families with household income below 130 percent of
poverty (the Food Stamp Program's gross income qualifying limit)
reported receiving food stamp benefits; by 2000, the share fell to 50
percent, where it has since remained. Among those with household
incomes below 50 percent of the low-household income threshold, in 1994,
80 percent reported food stamp receipt; in 2001, 61 percent
reported food stamp receipt.

RATES OF EMPLOYMENT

While welfare receipt has declined, dramatic gains in single mothers'
employment have occurred since 1993. Chart L-5 shows employment rates
of single and married mothers by age of youngest child in March, from
1988 to 2002. The chart shows single mothers' employment rates, once
lower than those of married mothers, now exceed those of their married
counterparts.

CHART L-5--EMPLOYMENT RATES OF SINGLE AND MARRIED
MOTHERS, BY AGE OF YOUNGEST CHILD, MARCH 1988-MARCH 2002

Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial
census derived weights.

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on
analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-2002 Current Population
Survey data.

The increase in employment among single mothers with very young
children (under age 3) has been most dramatic. Their employment rate
increased from a recent low of 35.1 percent in March 1993 (18.1
percentage points below the rate for married mothers) to a high of 59.1
percent in March 2000 (exceeding the rate for their married
counterparts by 2.3 percentage points). Their employment rate has
dropped slightly since, to 57.9 percent in 2002. Single mothers with a
youngest child age 3-5 also experienced marked employment gains over
the mid-to-late 1990s. Their employment rate grew from a recent low of
54.1 percent in March 1992, to a high of 74.4 percent by March 2000, a
20.3 percentage point increase, surpassing that of their married
counterparts by 9.7 percentage points. Single mothers whose youngest
child was of school age (age 6-17) have had employment rates slightly
above those of their married counterparts since 1988.
The healthy economy during much of the 1990s, combined with a
transformed welfare system, improvements in the EIC, and increases in
the minimum wage, are among the factors thought to have encouraged work
among single mothers in recent years. TANF, and the AFDC waivers that
preceded it, transformed cash assistance from a needs-based entitlement
to a program of temporary assistance by encouraging work and personal
responsibility. Imposition of work requirements, time limits, and
sanctions and, in some States, more generous earnings disregards, all
serve to encourage work either in lieu of welfare or for a temporary
period, in conjunction with welfare. The EIC, which is conditioned on
earnings, is thought to encourage work among most groups, especially
single parents who were not working or who were marginally attached to
the labor market. Increases in the EIC, passed by Congress in 1993
and phased in between 1994 and 1996, have increased the financial
incentive for many single mothers to work. Other factors, such as
increased funding for child care subsidies, also may have contributed
to making work possible for more single mothers.

WORK AND WELFARE AMONG POOR SINGLE MOTHERS

As shown in the previous section, poor single mothers are less likely
to be receiving cash welfare than in previous years. Likewise, like
all single mothers, poor single mothers are now more likely to be
working. Changes in poor mothers' participation in work and welfare
first became evident in the early-to-mid 1990s, with rates of welfare
receipt declining after 1993, and rates of employment increasing after
1992 (see Chart L-6, top 2 lines). A crossover point was reached by
1996, after which time the chances that a poor single mother would be
working exceeds the chances that she would be receiving welfare.
Chart L-6 shows that the share of poor single mothers who received cash
welfare at any time during the year fell from about 60 percent in the
1987-93 period, to about 23 percent in 2001. The rate of decline in
welfare receipt among poor single mothers has been greatest since 1996,
a period coinciding with the passage and implementation of national
welfare reform legislation. Similarly, the share of poor single mothers
who were working at any time during the year increased from 44 percent
in 1992, to a peak of 64 percent in 1999, but has fallen since, to
about 59 percent in 2001. The share of poor single mothers who relied
on cash welfare without working dropped from a peak of 43 percent in
1991, to about 13 percent in 2001 (an over two-thirds drop from the
1991 rate). The share of poor single mothers who worked without
relying on cash welfare has increased from a recent low of about 25
percent in 1993, to 48 percent in 2001 (nearly double the 1993 rate).
The share of poor single mothers who combined work and welfare over the
year had remained relatively constant, around 20 percent, until
dropping to 14 percent in 2000 and 10 percent in 2001.
The share of poor single mothers who reported that they neither worked
nor received cash welfare during the year (the dashed line in
Chart L-6) has increased from a low of about 13 percent in 1991 to a
high of about 29 percent in 2001. This surprising combination may
reflect a mix of circumstances, including income or support from other
sources such as family members, support from unrelated household
members (which is not included in the official poverty measure), and
other means of support from outside the household not counted on the
CPS. It also may reflect income reporting problems on the CPS,
especially with regard to welfare income. Finally, welfare sanction
and diversion policies may have contributed to the increased number of
poor mothers neither working nor receiving welfare.

CHART L-6 -- POOR SINGLE MOTHERS: WORK AND WELFARE
STATUS DURING THE YEAR, 1987-2001

EFFECTS OF EARNINGS, TRANSFERS, AND TAXES ON SINGLE
MOTHER'S POVERTY

As shown in Chart L-1, single mothers' poverty status has improved
since 1993. Changes in the economy and changes in welfare policy and
other programs, such as the EIC, have both direct and indirect effects
on poverty.
However, the official U.S. poverty measure counts only family cash
income (excluding capital gains and lump-sum or one-time payments)
against a family's poverty threshold, which varies by family size and
composition, to determine whether a family is counted as poor. The
definition does not include the value of in-kind benefits, such as food
stamps, school lunches, or public housing subsidies, nor does it
include the effects of taxes or tax credits such as the EIC.
Inclusion of in-kind benefits and the EIC provides a more comprehensive
income definition than the official definition. Additionally, other
unrelated household members may contribute to the family's economic
well-being, but determining the extent to which resources are shared
among unrelated household members is often difficult.
Chart L-7 shows the effects of income from these other sources on
poverty among all single mothers. Components of family income are
sequentially added and measured against families' poverty thresholds,
as one moves from the top line of the chart to subsequent lines below:

CHART L-7 -- EFFECTS OF EARNINGS, TRANSFERS, AND TAXES ON
FAMILY POVERTY AND HOUSEHOLD LOW-INCOME STATUS ON
SINGLE MOTHERS, 1987-2001

Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial
census derived weights.
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on
analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-2002 Current Population
Survey data.
--Line 1: The top line shows the percent of single mothers who would
be counted as poor if only family earnings were counted against the
poverty line.
--Line 2: The second line down includes other sources of cash income,
in addition to earnings that were already counted above. However, this
line does not include cash welfare.
--Line 3: The third line down adds cash welfare to the other sources
already mentioned, and with those sources, represents the income
definition used in the official poverty measure.
--Line 4: The fourth line down shows the value of in-kind food
assistance (i.e., food stamps, free and reduced price school lunches,
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and
Children (WIC) payments) when added to cash income and compared
to the family poverty threshold.
--Line 5: The fifth line down shows the effect of adding the value of
the EIC, less Federal and State income taxes and payroll taxes, to
line 4.
--Line 6: The bottom (dashed) line shows the effects of counting all
income in the household in which the single mother lives, not just that
of her own family, and comparing it to an unofficial "household low-
income threshold." The household low-income threshold used here
applies family poverty income thresholds, which are based on family
size and composition, to households, based on household size and
composition. It must be noted that official poverty measurement is
based on a family concept, which assumes that family members share
income and economies of scale that result from shared living
arrangements. It is generally agreed among researchers that
assumptions regarding income sharing and shared economies of scale
among related family members, who have ties based on blood,
marriage, and adoption, do not apply to the same extent among
unrelated household members. Consequently, these estimates of
household low-income status likely overstate the effect of household
income on reducing poverty among families headed by single mothers.
In viewing Chart L-7, note that the trend in earnings is the principal
factor affecting the declining trend in poverty, whereas the other
income sources, with the exception of the EIC, affect the level of
poverty, more than its trend overtime. Evidence of this effect is that
most lines in the chart, with the exception of the EIC, roughly run
parallel to the ones above.

Effect of earnings and other nonwelfare cash income on poverty
Chart L-7 shows that between 1993 and 2000, single mothers'
poverty, based on family earnings alone, fell from 56.2 percent
to 40.8 percent (line 1). In 2001, their "earned-income poverty rate"
increased to 41.9 percent, presumably due to the effects of the
economic recession. Adding other cash income, except cash welfare, to
family earnings (line 2), reduces poverty in 1993 from 56.2 percent
(line 1) to 47.4 percent (line 2), and in 2001 from 41.9 percent to
33.3 percent. Effect of cash welfare on poverty When added to other
income, cash welfare benefits have only a small impact on the poverty
rate, as these benefits generally are not sufficient, even when
combined with other cash income, to lift families above the Federal
poverty threshold. As shown by Table 7-16 (breakeven points) in
section 7, in all but nine States, Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) families that go to work lose eligibility for
benefits before earnings reach the poverty line, usually long before.
Consequently, cash welfare benefits have little impact on the poverty
rate. The addition of cash welfare (line 3, representing the
official income definition for measuring poverty) reduces poverty only
slightly, from 47.4 percent (line 2) to 45.2 percent (line 3) in 1993,
and from 33.3 percent to 32.4 percent in 2001. Nonetheless, cash
welfare benefits can have a significant impact on the level of poor
families' incomes, affecting the degree to which their incomes fall
below the poverty income standard. This impact is not captured by
changes in the poverty rate.

Effect of in-kind food assistance on poverty
The fourth line from the top in Chart L-7 shows the effect on the
poverty rate of single mothers by counting government food assistance,
in the form of food stamp benefits and school lunch benefits and WIC
payments. The line shows that food assistance reduces the poverty rate
of single mothers from about 2-3 percentage points over the period.
The antipoverty effectiveness of food assistance seems to have lessened
somewhat in recent years. In 1995, food assistance reduced the poverty
rate from 40.2 percent (its official measure) to 36.9 percent, a 3.3
percentage point (8.1 percent) reduction in poverty. In 2001, food
assistance reduced the poverty rate from its official rate of 32.4
percent, to 30.9 percent, a 1.5 percentage point (5.6 percent)
reduction.

Effect of EIC and taxes on poverty
As noted above, the net effect of the EIC (after counting the effect of
reductions in income from Federal and State income taxes and FICA
taxes) (line 5), when added to total family cash income and food
assistance (line 4), causes a divergence in trend from the lines above.
This is especially notable after 1993. A major expansion of the EIC,
passed by Congress in 1993 and phased in between 1994 and 1996,
increased the amount of the EIC work bonus families might receive.
The antipoverty effectiveness of the EIC was approximately three times
greater in 1998 than in 1993. In 1993, the EIC reduced the poverty
rate (counting food assistance) among single mothers from 42.7 percent
(line 4), to 40.7 percent (line 5), a 2.0 percentage point
(4.6 percent) reduction. In 2001, the EIC reduced poverty from 30.9
percent to 26.2 percent, a 4.7 percentage point (15.2 percent)
reduction. As receipt of the EIC is conditioned on earnings,
the growing impact of the EIC in part reflects the rise in work rates
among single mothers. Among those who are working and poor (before
counting the EIC), the EIC helps lift the income of some above the
poverty line. Although the EIC expansion provided additional income
to low-income families who already were working, it also may have
helped induce increased employment among family heads with low to
moderate earnings potential, and thus contributed to the decline in
Aearned-income poverty@ that has occurred since 1993 (shown as the top
line in the chart). Note too, that to the extent that changes in cash
welfare programs in recent years have encouraged work, these changes
may have had an indirect effect on poverty by increasing earnings and,
through earnings, making the EIC available to a greater number of
families.

Effect of all household income on poverty
The household low-income line (bottom line) shows that if all household
members' income were shared equally among household members, the
poverty rate among single mothers would drop by at most 3-4 percentage
points over the 1987-2001 period. Adding other members' household
income, and counting them as though they were family members who shared
income equally, reduced the post-in-kind transfer, posttax, poverty
rate in 1993 from 40.7 percent (line 5) to 36.8 percent (line 6); in
2001 the post-in-kind transfer, posttax, poverty rate would have
dropped from 26.2 percent to 22.5 percent. Again, this is most
likely an overstatement of the possible effect that shared household
living arrangements might have on single mothers' poverty status,
because of uncertainty about the extent to which such income is
actually shared.

EARNINGS-POOR SINGLE MOTHERS AFTER TAXES AND TRANSFERS

This section focuses specifically on single mothers with family incomes
below poverty, based on family earnings alone, to gauge the effects of
other income, transfers, and taxes over time. This group, shown in the
top line in Chart L-7 for the 1987-2001 period, accounted for between
56 and 41 percent of single mothers over the period depicted. Chart L-8
shows their distribution, relative to the poverty threshold, after cash
income from all sources, in-kind food assistance, and taxes (including
the EIC) is taken into account. Unlike Chart L-7 above, which simply
measured whether income was below poverty, Chart L-8 examines the
degree of poverty after taxes and transfers, for families defined as
poor based on family earnings alone. The chart includes families with
no earnings, as well as those who have earnings but whose earnings fall
below poverty.
Chart L-8 shows that while the majority of Aearnings-poor'' single
mothers have seen improvements in income relative to poverty since 1991,
the improvement occurred mostly in 1994 and 1995. Since 1995, the
bottom 50 percent of these single mothers have seen no improvement in
their income relative to poverty, and the bottom 20 percent have
actually seen declines in their income status relative to poverty since
1996. Chart L-8 shows, for example, that over the 1987-2001 period,
the top 20 percent of single mothers who were poor based on earnings
alone had income from other sources that helped bring their families'
incomes above the poverty line. Over the period, these families became
somewhat more economically secure: in 1987, the top 20 percent of
earnings-poor mothers had a net in-kind aftertax income that was 5
percent or more above the poverty line. Since 1995, the top 20 percent
of earnings-poor single mothers had net income that was 20 percent or
more above poverty. The chart shows strong net income gains relative
to poverty among earnings-poor single mothers over the 1993-95 period,
but little or no progress afterwards. After 1996, those in the bottom
20 percent show a decline in their level of income security, with net
income relative falling from 52 percent of poverty in 1996, to 39
percent of poverty in 2001.

CHART L-8 -- POSTTAX POST-IN-KIND TRANSFER INCOME AS A
PERCENT OF POVERTY AMONG SINGLE MOTHERS CONSIDERED
POOR BASED ON FAMILY EARNINGS ALONE, 1987-2001

INCOME SOURCES AMONG POOREST SINGLE MOTHERS

The composition and level of income among the poorest single-mother
families has changed markedly in recent years, reflecting increased
earnings supplemented by increased earned income credits (EIC) and
reductions in cash welfare and food stamps. For single mothers in the
bottom fifth (bottom quintile), increased earnings and EIC have not
been sufficient in recent years to offset losses in cash welfare and
food stamps, resulting in reduced income since 1996. Families in the
bottom 20-40 percent (second quintile) also received less cash welfare
and food stamps in recent years, but since 1998, increased earnings
supplemented by the EIC have more than offset these losses.
Charts L-9 and L-10 examine sources of income among the bottom
quintile (bottom 20 percent) and the second lowest quintile (bottom
20-40 percent) of single-mother families, respectively, based on their
pretax cash income relative to poverty. The charts show the average
annual income, in 2001 dollars, from the following sources: cash public
assistance (Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), TANF, and
general assistance); Supplemental Security Income (SSI); food stamps
(market value); child support and alimony; other cash income other than
earnings; net earnings (earnings net of the employee share of FICA
payroll taxes and any Federal or State income taxes); and the EIC.
The employee share of FICA payroll taxes, and any Federal or State
income tax payments are also shown as negative values. Note
that these estimates are based on year-to-year income comparisons of
cross-sectional survey data, rather than a comparison of incomes for
the same families over time.
Chart L-9 shows declining reliance on cash welfare and food stamps
since 1994, and increased reliance on earnings, supplemented by the
EIC, among families headed by single mothers in the bottom income
quintile. However, earnings gains, even when supplemented by the EIC,
have not been sufficient to offset the losses in income from cash
welfare and food stamps since 1994. In 2000, increased earnings and
EIC helped to raise average total income of single mother families in
the bottom income quintile to $7,384, still short of total family
income for this group of $7,602 in 1994. Total income of mothers in
the bottom quintile fell from 2000 to 2001 to $6,960, due to reductions
in earnings and EIC as well as most other income sources. Increased
food stamp benefits helped offset these losses somewhat.
Average cash welfare and food stamp benefits reported by single mothers
in the bottom quintile have fallen since 1994. In 1994, combined
average AFDC and General Assistance benefits were $2,701 for this
population; by 2001 combined TANF and General Assistance had fallen to
$815, 30 percent of their 1994 value. Similarly, in 1994, average food
stamp benefits amounted to $2,632; by 2001 they had fallen to $1,537,
58 percent of their 1994 value. In spite of increased earnings,
supplemented by increased EIC benefits, earnings gains have been
insufficient to offset reductions in cash welfare and food stamp
aid that have occurred since 1994.

CHART L-9 -- BOTTOM QUINTILE OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES:
AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME BY SOURCE, 1987-2001 (IN 2001
DOLLARS)

Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial
census derived weights. Note- Quintiles based on ranking of ratios of
family cash, pretax income, relative to poverty. Taxes include Federal
and State income taxes and FICA taxes.
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based
on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-2002 Current Population
Survey data.

The growing importance of the EIC as an earnings supplement can be
illustrated by comparing the average EIC as a share of average earnings
shown in Chart L-9. Legislative expansions to the EITC in 1990 (phased
in between 1991 and 1992) and in 1993 (phased in from 1994 through
1996) expanded the credit=s Awork bonus@ to families with children,
amounting to a supplement of as much as 40 cents on each dollar earned.
In 1990, the average EIC depicted in Chart L-9 amounted to about 13
percent of average earnings of mothers in the bottom income quintile.
By 1993, the EIC "work bonus" increased to 18 percent of earnings, and
then doubled to 37 percent of earnings by 1996, once legislative
expansions had completely phased in. In 2001, the average EIC ($819)
received by families headed by single mothers in the bottom income
quintile about equaled the average cash assistance ($815) families in
this income category received. In addition to providing needed income
to low-income working families, the EIC has also likely encouraged work
and increased earnings.
Chart L-10 is similar to Chart L-9, but shows average income by source
for the second quintile of single-mother families, ranked by their
income relative to poverty. Chart L-10 shows comparatively large gains
in average total income from 1993 to 1995, due largely to increased
earnings and EIC. Over this short period average total net income
increased from $12,382 to $15,681, a gain of nearly 27 percent. With
the exception of 1996 and 2001, average earnings for single mothers in
the second quintile have grown each year since 1993.

CHART L-10 -- SECOND QUINTILE OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES:
AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME BY SOURCE, 1987-2001
(IN 2001 DOLLARS)

Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial
census derived weights. Note-Quintiles based on ranking of ratios of
family cash, pretax income, relative to poverty. Taxes include
Federal and State income taxes and FICA taxes. Source: Prepared by the
Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census
Bureau March 1988-2002 Current Population Survey data.

Average total income among single mothers in the second quintile
reached its highest level over the 15-year period examined in 2000.
Average total income of mothers in the second income quintile fell
somewhat in 2001, as a result of declines in earnings and the EIC,
brought about, most likely, by the recession. In 2000, the peak-income
year, earnings in combination with the EIC more than offset the loss in
combined cash assistance and food stamps that occurred over the 1995 to
2000 period. Over the period, the gain in average net earnings, in
combination with EIC ($5,358), more than offset the $3,092 loss in
combined cash assistance and food stamps. By 2000, average net
earnings ($10,625) accounted for 60 percent of these families= incomes
($17,789) and cash assistance ($649) accounted for just under 4 percent.
In contrast, in 1987, earnings accounted for about 28 percent of this
group=s income ($3,654 in earnings out of a total net income of
$13,052) and cash assistance ($4,517) comprised about 35 percent. In
2000, average total income for families in the second quintile
($17,789) was 36 percent above that in 1987 ($13,052).

CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES

Though annual income information is the basis of most official measures
of economic well-being (e.g., poverty statistics), it suffers some
drawbacks. Income during any one period imperfectly measures the value
of goods and services a family can consume, since families may
liquidate savings, borrow money, or access some other sources of funds.
This section presents information on consumer expenditures from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), as a
complement to the preceding analysis of income data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS).
Consumption data are derived from the CEX, which has a relatively small
sample size of approximately 7,500 households, interviewed quarterly,
compared to the annual demographic survey of the CPS, which has an
annual sample of nearly 100,000 households interviewed in March 2002.
Families headed by single mothers amount to approximately 1,500
respondents accumulated over 4 quarters of the 2001 CEX and 8,700 on
the March 2002 CPS. The small CEX sample size, relative to the CPS,
means that data from the CPS are likely to be statistically more
reliable, and large year-to-year differences are required for changes
estimated from the CEX to meet standard tests of statistical
significance. In the CEX tables that follow, values that statistically
differ from their 1994 estimates at the 90 percent statistical
confidence level are noted. All dollar amounts are shown in 2001,
inflation-adjusted, constant dollars.

Single mothers income and consumption levels
Table L-1 summarizes information on income, consumption expenditures,
welfare receipt, and work for single-mother families from 1994 to 2001.
The table shows, for example, that median after-tax income of these
families (including the value of food stamps), increased from $16,578
in 1994 to $19,651 in 2001, or 18.5 percent. The table shows lower
rates of income poverty among single-mother families in later years
than in earlier years, as their estimated poverty rates in 1998, 2000
and 2001 are statistically lower than in 1994. According to the CEX
data, 36.1 percent of single-mother families were poor in 2001,
compared to 45.2 percent in 1994, based on their after-tax cash income
and food stamps, about a 20 percent decline. Income-based poverty
measures on the CEX generally tend to be higher than those derived from
the CPS, most likely due to the poorer accounting of income on the CEX
than on the CPS (discussed further below). Nonetheless, the CEX income
poverty rate trend is similar to the CPS-based poverty trend shown
earlier, which fell by 22 percent over the same period.
The CEX data, like the CPS data depicted earlier, show declining rates
of cash welfare (in 2001, down 67 percent from 1994 levels) and food
stamp receipt (in 2001, down 46 percent from 1994) among single-mother
families, as well as an increasing probability of having earned income
(up 21 percent in 2001, compared to 1994) over the period.
Table L-1 shows overall consumption expenditures for single-mother
families but also divides consumption expenditures into: (1) a category
that explicitly includes spending on items commonly associated with
work (transportation, child care, and retirement contributions
including the employee share of Social Security payroll taxes); and
(2) all other expenditures (including expenditures to meet basic needs
such as food and shelter). As shown in the table, some of the
increase in overall consumption expenditures is attributable to
increased work-related expenses. Median work-related expenses among
single-mother families are statistically higher in all years since 1997,
compared to 1994, whereas other consumption expenditures are
statistically higher only in 2000, when compared to 1994. The increase
in work-related expenses is consistent with other trends in the table,
such as declining welfare receipt and increased work among
single-mother families. The table shows that median consumption
expenditures reported on the CEX tend to be somewhat higher than median
income over the period examined. For example, in 2001, median
consumption expenditures of single-mother families amounted to $21,303,
compared to median after-tax income of $19,651. The median ratio of
consumption to income among single-mother families ranged from between
1.07 (2001) and 1.22 (1997) over the period depicted in the table.
Single-mother families appear less likely to be poor based on their
spending than based on their income. For example, in 2001, 36.1
percent of single-mother families appeared to be poor based on their
income, whereas 26.7 percent appeared to be poor based on their
spending. Table L-1 shows that poverty based on single mother-
families' spending was statistically lower in all years (except for
1998) since 1997, when compared to 1994 levels. The table shows that in
spite of increased likelihood of single-mother families' working in
more recent than in past years, the percent of families with child care
expenses has not differed from 1994 levels, with the exception of 2001.
In 2001, 18.9 percent of single-mother families reported having child
care expenses, compared to 25.7 percent in 1994. Among families with
child care expenses, at the median those expenses amounted to between
7.8 percent and 10.4 percent of family after-tax income over the period.

Income and consumption expenditures for the poorest families
Analyses of national income surveys (for example, the CPS) have shown
that income growth among the poorest single mothers stagnated after
1994. The CEX also shows that income of the poorest one-fifth of
single mothers has not grown since 1994; the data indicate that poorest
single mother families' incomes were actually below their 1994 levels
in 1998 and 1999, when compared on a price-adjusted basis, and below
their 1994 level from 1996 through 1999, when compared on an income
relative to needs basis (see Table L-2). When compared on the basis of
consumption, poorest single mother families appear better off than when
compared on the basis of their income. Yet, with the exception of
2001, consumption expenditures on a price-adjusted basis have not
differed significantly from their 1994 levels for these families.
Unlike the income data, which showed a decline in the poorest single
mothers' incomes in some years, compared to 1994, the consumption
expenditure data suggest that these poorest families at least
maintained consumption levels attained in 1994, measured either on a
price-adjusted dollar basis or on a consumption to needs basis, and in
2001 exceeded 1994 consumption levels. It should be noted that even
though the consumption expenditure data suggests a more favorable
picture for single mother families than does income data, only in 2001
have consumption expenditures exceeded 1994 levels. Additionally,
these families' consumption levels fall short of meeting basic needs,
as measured against the poverty standard (i.e., consumption
expenditures to needs ratio). The median consumption to needs ratio for
these families ranged from a low of 0.76 in 1994 to a high of 0.87 in
2001.

A note on income and consumption patterns
Data from the CEX show that consumption expenditures among single
mother families tend to exceed their reported income. This is
especially true among the poorest families, for whom median consumption
expenditures ranged from 1.8 to 2.5 times families' reported incomes.
These observed differences in consumption, relative to income, appear
not just among single mother families, depicted in this analysis, but
among families generally on the CEX who are in the bottom two-thirds of
the income distribution (Rogers and Gray, 1994). There are several
possible explanations for the gap between consumption and
income seen on the CEX:
1. Income on the CEX, as with most surveys, tends to be
underreported. The CEX does a much better job at measuring consumption
than income. Consumption expenditures are recorded by quarterly
interview for each month in the quarter and by use of weekly
expenditure diaries. In contrast, CEX sample households are asked to
report income information by recounting income received over the prior
12 months. Besides being prone to error in accounting, income received
over the prior 12 months may not accurately reflect current income.
Families appearing at the bottom of the income distribution especially
may be comprised of families for whom income underreporting is an issue,
thus in part accounting for their appearance in the bottom of the
income distribution. The analysis in this section has been restricted
to families who provided responses to major income sources on the CEX.
These families are referred to as "complete income reporters." However,
even among these families, income from all sources may not be
accounted for fully. Very-low income single mothers may use a variety
of survival strategies to make ends meet, such as network-based or
agency-based support, unreported work and work in the underground
economy, and cash contributions from families, friends, boyfriends, or
former spouses who live elsewhere (Edin and Lein 1997). These types
of "income" are unlikely to be reported as income on household
surveys.
2. Some who have low incomes are temporarily poor. For those
families that are experiencing a temporary dip in income, with savings
withdraws can finance consumption expenditures that exceed income.
However, it is unlikely that most families who are identified as
"income poor" have substantial assets/savings upon which they can
draw to fund current consumption.
3. Some low-income people might access credit markets to pay for
spending that exceeds income. Poor families increased their credit
card debt in the early-to-mid 1990s (Bird et al., 1999) to a greater
extent
than other families. If this trend continued into the later 1990s,
it could account for some of the growing gap in spending and income
among the low-income populations. To the extent which the poor are
funding current consumption by increasing debt, consumption data may
overstate the true level of economic well-being.

EXAMINATIONS OF FAMILIES THAT EXITED THE WELFARE
SYSTEM: THE WELFARE LEAVERS

The previous section examined how single mothers on the whole are
faring. This section turns to how families who were once on welfare
and left the rolls, commonly referred to as "welfare leavers," fare.
(See Section 7, TANF, for information about those who are on the
rolls.) Since the mid-1990s, many States have conducted studies of
welfare leavers, capturing information about employment, earnings, and
receipt of government benefits for those who leave the welfare rolls.
These studies have varied a great deal, in terms of their methods,
populations examined, and so on, and have been reviewed elsewhere
(including the 2000 edition of the Green Book). Though these studies
have provided a relatively consistent picture of how welfare leavers
fare, making inferences from them is hampered by differences in their
methods and data. Using funding from the special welfare outcomes
appropriations, HHS provided grants to 15 States and localities to
conduct a series of leaver studies with more consistent methods and
data. The HHS leaver studies generally confirmed what had been found
in the State-developed leaver studies:

TABLE L-1 -- INCOME, CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES, WELFARE RECEIPT, AND WORK EXPERIENCE OF
SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES, 1994-2001

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

1 Indicates value is significantly different from 1994 value at the 90 percent statistical confidence level.

Note-Data are from quarterly interview surveys. Quarterly expenditures have been annualized for purposes of display. Year represents the year in which
expenditures occurred. Income is from the 12 months prior to the survey. The estimates exclude families with incomplete income reporting. All dollar
amounts have been inflation-adjusted to 2001 dollars.

Source: Congressional Research Service tabulations of data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey.

TABLE L-2 -- INCOME, CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES, WELFARE RECEIPT, AND
WORK EXPERIENCE AMONG THE POOREST FIFTH (AFTER-TAX INCOME TO NEEDS
QUINTILE) OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES, 1994-2001
[In constant 2001 dollars]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

1 Indicates value is significantly different from 1994 value at the 90
percent statistical confidence level.

NR- Not reported. Standard error of estimate considered too large for
estimate to be deemed statistically meaningful.

Note- Data are from quarterly interview surveys. Quarterly
expenditures have been annualized for purposes of display.
Year represents the year in which expenditures occurred. Income is
from the 12 months prior to the survey. The estimates exclude families
with incomplete income reporting. All dollar amounts have been
inflation-adjusted to 2001 dollars.

Source: Congressional Research Service tabulations of data from the
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer
Expenditure Survey.

--The majority of those who leave welfare have a job after leaving the
rolls;
--However, many former recipients do not have steady employment
after leaving and some eventually do return to the rolls;
--The average earnings of welfare leavers tend to be low-with earnings
in many States and localities insufficient to raise the average former
welfare family above the poverty line; and
--Because the earnings and incomes of former recipients tend to be low,
many may still qualify for government assistance other than cash aid.
A large share of former recipients continue to receive government help
in the form of food stamps and Medicaid, though there has been
concern that some who are eligible for these benefits fail to receive
them.
Because the HHS leaver studies were developed to facilitate
cross-state comparisons, this section will focus on these 15 leaver
studies.

FROM WELFARE TO WORK: EMPLOYMENT AND RECIDIVISM OF
WELFARE LEAVERS

The majority of those who leave welfare work. Among the 15
States and localities examined in the HHS leaver studies, many studies
reported employment rates in the first quarter after leaving the rolls
of just under 60 percent. The "median study"- the midpoint of the
ranking of all 15 studies, showed 57 percent of its leavers employed in
the first quarter after exiting the rolls. Employment rates tended to
remain fairly constant when examining the second, third, and fourth
quarters after exit. In most States and localities examined, more than
half the leavers were reported employed in each of the four quarters
examined. However, as discussed below, this does not mean that the
same leavers were employed in each of the four quarters.
Though most work after leaving the rolls, most studies report
that only between 30 percent and 40 percent of those who left the
welfare rolls worked in all four quarters after leaving welfare.
(Cuyahoga County, Cleveland, Ohio, reported that 47 percent of its
leavers worked in all four quarters after exiting the rolls.) Work
reported in all four quarters does not necessarily mean steady work
for the entire year, as these former recipients might have experienced
weeks of unemployment within a quarter.
Because not all welfare leavers find work or steady work, some
of those who exit the rolls return to welfare. In the fourth quarter
after leaving welfare, many of the States and localities reported that
about one-fifth (20 percent) of their leavers had returned to the rolls.
Over the course of the year after leaving, even more had returned to
spend at least a month on welfare.
Table L-3 shows the employment rates (percent working) and recidivism
rates (percent returning to the rolls) for leavers in the 15 HHS leaver
studies. The table identifies the study, quarter of exit for leavers in
the study, employment rates, and returns to welfare.

TABLE L-3 -- EMPLOYMENT RATES AND RETURNS TO WELFARE
RATES: HHS LEAVERS STUDIES

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001).

EARNINGS AND INCOME OF WELFARE LEAVERS

The average earnings of welfare leavers vary widely by State. Among
the 15 States and localities in the HHS leaver studies, 12 of the
studies reported average quarterly earnings of those working in the
quarter after leaving welfare that were below the Federal poverty line
for a family of three. The 3 jurisdictions where earnings were above
poverty were the District of Columbia, New York, and Los Angeles.
These findings should not be interpreted as indicating that welfare
leavers were worse off working and not on welfare than being on welfare
and not working. In none of the jurisdictions noted above were cash
assistance benefits greater than poverty. These findings do indicate
that the earnings of welfare leavers were typically low-insufficient by
themselves to raise a family of three above the poverty line. Further,
while there was some growth in average earnings over the year after
leaving welfare, earnings remained low.
Table L-4 shows the earnings of cash welfare leavers by State and
locality. It shows average earnings of working welfare leavers in both
the quarter after exit and the 4th quarter after exit. It also
compares these earnings to
the Census poverty threshold for a family of 3 (one adult, two
children) for the quarter in which earnings are examined. The variation
in the earnings of welfare leavers is in part explained by differences
in State policies. The key policy affecting the average earnings of
leavers is the level of earnings at which eligibility for cash benefits
ends, often called the "breakeven level" of earnings. This level of
earnings varies widely by State (see Section 7, TANF). In States such
as New York and California, this level of earnings is relatively high;
in States such as Arizona and South Carolina, this level of earnings is
fairly low. In States like New York and California, a recipient who
takes a low paying job can remain on the welfare rolls while working
(i.e., they do not become welfare leavers). It takes a higher paying
job to end eligibility for welfare in these two States than it does in
many of the others studied here, accounting for their relatively high
average earnings for welfare leavers.

TABLE L-4 -- AVERAGE QUARTERLY EARNINGS OF WELFARE
LEAVERS

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001).

Of the 15 HHS leaver studies, eight (Arizona; the District of Columbia;
Illinois; Iowa; Missouri; Washington; Cuyahoga County, Cleveland, Ohio;
and the San Francisco Bay Area in California) surveyed leavers and
captured information on household income. Unlike the earnings
information cited above, total household income captures the earnings of a
spouse or other household member as well as additional cash income benefits (e.g. Supplemental Security
Income). The studies found that average total household income too tends to be
near the poverty line in great part because a former recipient's own earnings
were the most important source of income for her household.

RECEIPT OF OTHER GOVERNMENT BENEFITS

A goal of the TANF block grant is to reduce dependency on government
benefits by promoting work, job preparation, and marriage. Therefore, the
ultimate goal of Federal policy is to move a family away from all benefits-not
just cash welfare. However, as discussed above, the average earnings and
income of former recipients tend to be low. Many former cash assistance
families continue to be eligible for benefits from other programs, most notably
food stamps. Most cash recipients are also eligible for medical assistance from
the Medicaid program while they receive cash welfare. Further, Federal law
provides "transitional medical assistance" (TMA) under the Medicaid program
for former cash welfare recipients who lost eligibility for cash because of
increased earnings. TMA is generally available for one year, but could be
available for a longer period of time under "waivers" of Federal law.
Table L-5 shows the percent of leavers in households receiving food
stamps and the percent of families in which the adults were recipients of
Medicaid for States and localities in the HHS leaver studies. For Medicaid, only
adult recipients are shown because eligibility for children is less restrictive than
for nondisabled and nonelderly adults. Most children can be covered by
Medicaid by virtue of being poor or near poor. The table shows this
information for the first quarter and fourth quarter after exit as well as whether
the benefit was received at any time during the year after exit.
The table shows that receipt of Medicaid was somewhat more common
than receipt of food stamps. This should be expected given the TMA rules.
However, the percentage of families with adults receiving Medicaid was lower
by the fourth quarter after exit, when Medicaid covered half or fewer welfare
leavers in most States.

TABLE L-5 -- PERCENT OF WELFARE LEAVERS RECEIVING
MEDICAID AND FOOD STAMPS
State/locality
Quarter of exit
Percentage of leaver
families receiving food
stamps

Percentage of
families with adults
receiving Medicaid

1st
quarter
4th
quarter
Ever
during
the year
after exit

1st
quarter
4th
quarter
Ever
during
the year
after exit
Arizona
1Q98
51
42
67

60
45
72
District of Columbia
4Q97
40
41
53

44
50
58
Florida
2Q97
45
35
67

55
45
74
Georgia
1Q98
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA
Illinois
3Q97-4Q98
33
33
56

57
40
69
Iowa
2Q98
50
56
67

54
46
68
Massachusetts
Dec98-Mar99
42
44
51

NA
NA
NA
Missouri
4Q96
57
40
70

41
31
NA
New York
1Q97
NA
NA
NA

NA
35
NA
South Carolina
Oct98-Mar99
78
61
84

69
45
69
Washington
4Q97
46
36
NA

53
43
NA
Wisconsin
2Q98-4Q98
70
63
83

80
76
87
Cuyahoga Co
(Cleveland OH)
3Q98
56
47
68

60
46
70
Los Angeles Co. (CA)
3Q96
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA
Bay Area (CA)
4Q98
26
NA
NA

74
NA
NA
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001).

Food stamp recipiency dropped rapidly upon exit from welfare. In many
places, less than half of welfare leavers were receiving food stamps in the
quarter after exit. There has been concern that some who leave welfare but have
income low enough to qualify for food stamps fail to receive them because they
do not know they remain eligible for food aid. The 2002 Farm Bill adopted
provisions that seek to retain more eligible families on food stamps when they
leave cash welfare.

THE IMPACT OF PROGRAMS: FINDINGS FROM WELFARE REFORM
EVALUATIONS

The period between the enactment of the Family Support Act of 1988
(P.L. 100-485) and the passage of the 1996 welfare reform law was
characterized by a large number of States and localities experimenting with
welfare reform initiatives to promote work and responsibility by parents of
needy children who receive cash aid. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act
permits HHS to waive certain Federal requirements of certain programs for
experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects that are "likely to promote the
objectives" of the program. HHS required formal evaluations of any such
waiver program. During this era of experimentation, States tested a variety of
policy changes such as stronger work requirements, time limits on benefits,
rewards and penalties, and personal behavior rules which ultimately were
adopted in the design of State TANF programs. Therefore, these evaluations
can be used to assess the impacts of similar policies adopted in the wake of
Federal welfare reform. With the enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law,
States no longer needed waivers to continue such policies and Federal law
permitted States to end their waiver programs.
However, the 1996 welfare law permitted States to continue their waiver
programs to expiration and provided funding to continue their evaluations if
they opted to do so. Some States did continue their waiver evaluations; for
many of these States, final reports are now available. However, many States
chose to cut short their waivers and their evaluations and therefore there are no
findings from these experiments.

THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF METHOD
AND LIMITATIONS OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS

There are a number of different techniques available to evaluate the
impact of policy changes, but most evaluations conducted after the passage of
the Family Support Act in 1988 used random assignment to experimental and
control groups. Random assignment experimental studies assign potential
participants to two or more groups. Individuals assigned to a control group are
subject to current policies (no policy change); individuals assigned to the
experimental group (or groups) are subject to a different package of policy
initiatives, such as time limits on assistance, or sanctions for failing to comply
with a mandatory work requirement. Because individuals are randomly
assigned to these groups, any differences between the experimental and control
groups may be attributed to the policy initiative itself. This difference is
therefore the impact of these policy changes.
Though the experimental method has advantages over other research
methodologies in determining a program's impact, there are some drawbacks to
using it in a social policy context. The findings of impact evaluations are most
valid for the particular place, time, context, and policy examined in the study.
Generally, more confidence can be placed in findings that are replicated in a
number of different settings. The findings of a random assignment evaluation
are also limited to the population studied. This is often smaller than the entire
population that might be affected by a policy. Most random assignment
evaluations of welfare policy changes examine only those already receiving or
applying for assistance. However, welfare policy changes might affect those not
receiving assistance by making welfare more or less attractive to them. Random
assignment impact evaluations generally do not measure these "entry effects."
Further, some welfare reform evaluations-particularly those of programs
operated under "waivers" of pre-welfare reform Federal rules-are for programs
that combine several different policy changes. For example, many waiver
programs (and the TANF program) combined stricter work requirements and
time limits with enhanced financial incentives to work and more generous
welfare benefits for working families. The experimental group-control group
comparison gives the impact of the entire package of changes (work
requirements, time limits, and financial incentives). Therefore evaluations of
programs with, for example, time limits, should be interpreted as evaluations of
programs with time limits, but not evaluations of time limits per se.
Finally, the impacts most commonly reported from experimental
evaluations are average impacts over the entire population studied. The welfare
population is quite diverse, and average impacts may mask positive program
impacts for some that are offset by negative impacts for others.

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM WELFARE-TO-WORK
EVALUATIONS?

This section presents results from a review of impact evaluations of
programs undertaken since passage of the Family Support Act of 1988 that serve
the cash welfare population and, in a few cases, other low-income individuals.
Most of these evaluations were supported, at least in part, by Federal funds. The
discussion focuses on evaluations available as of December 2002.

Welfare-to-Work Findings
Promoting work to end dependence on government benefits is part of the
stated purpose of the TANF program. TANF requires recipients to engage in
work (as defined by the State) within 2 years, and requires States to penalize
recipients who fail to meet work requirements. In addition, States are subject to
work participation standards.
Research shows that offering cash welfare to families reduces work effort.
The decision to work requires a choice between the benefits that can be obtained
in the workforce and those available from allocating time to domestic activities
(such as child-rearing) or leisure. Though the low-income population is diverse,
low wage offers can make welfare an economically more attractive option than a
job. Additionally, some who are working might decide to reduce their hours of
work and make up part of their lost earnings with the welfare payment.
The major issues in welfare-to-work evaluations can be classified into two
groups:
- Can programs be designed to overcome the work disincentives inherent
in welfare? What are the effects of programs that require work or provide
incentives to work?
- Can programs be offered that increase the earnings capacities of welfare
recipients so that work becomes more attractive than welfare? What type
of programs are most effective, "work-first" or education-focused
programs?

Requiring Participation and Encouraging Work
Empirical research dating back to the 1960s provides evidence that
welfare is a disincentive to work. To counteract the work disincentives,
policies have sought to require work or participation in job preparation
activities. Federal TANF law requires States to operate mandatory welfare-to-
work programs, requiring States to sanction families with a noncomplying
member. It also gives States the freedom to provide financial incentives to
recipients to encourage work, and almost all States have adopted policies to
increase the financial reward for taking a job.
The findings of most evaluated welfare-to-work programs show that
requiring participation in a pre-employment activity - be it a job search or an
education program - increases employment and reduces welfare receipt. Most
programs evaluated since the passage of the Family Support Act required
participation, rather than made participation in job preparation activities
voluntary. Required participation means that if a family fails to engage in
activities, it faces at least a partial loss of benefits (a sanction). The impact
evaluations indicate that there must be at least some enforcement of the
participation requirement to be effective. However, these evaluations have not
provided evidence that one type of sanction (such as a total loss of benefits) is
more effective than other forms of sanctions (such as partial loss of benefits);
sanctions were one of many policy changes made as part of a State's waiver
program, which limits the ability to determine if the impact occurred because of
the sanction or because of some other change.
As mentioned, most States have adopted policies to increase the reward to
work by reducing the amount by which benefits are reduced when a family
receives additional earnings. Increasing the amount of earnings disregarded in
calculating welfare benefits lowers the implicit tax rate faced by recipient
families. However, the bulk of empirical research on the effectiveness of work
incentives for both increasing work and reducing welfare receipt was
discouraging. Increasing earnings disregards raises the level of income at
which a family loses eligibility for benefits. This keeps more families on
welfare and could actually decrease work, through reductions in work effort that
are at least partially offset by the welfare payment. The increased length of time
allowed for families with earnings also has implications for welfare time limits.
Programs that combine financial incentives and mandated participation in
work or job preparation have produced some of the highest positive impacts on
employment and earnings among those programs that have been evaluated.
Financial incentives alone, without a participation mandate, tend to produce
smaller or no impacts on employment and often no impacts on earnings. For
example, in evaluations of both the Minnesota Family Investment Program
(MFIP) and Connecticut's Jobs First program, the combination of financial
incentives and mandated participation produced fairly large employment
impacts. The final report on MFIP showed a 35 percent increase in employment
and a 23 percent increase in earnings among long-term, single-parent recipients
9 quarters after the program began. Connecticut's Jobs First evaluation showed
a 10 percent increase in the employment rate and an 11 percent increase in
earnings over the 30-month follow-up. The impacts of both programs were
sustained over time. Additionally, both programs had large impacts on the most
disadvantaged participants: those without a high school degree, without work
experience, and with long spells on welfare. However, evaluations of both
MFIP and Connecticut's Jobs First program showed that increases in
employment and earnings were accompanied by increases, not reductions, in
welfare payments and receipt of assistance.
Some evaluations of State programs that combined enhanced earnings
disregards with mandated participation yielded different results from those
found in Minnesota and Connecticut. Increased cash assistance payments were
not found in the Florida Family Transition Program (FTP), the Vermont Welfare
Restructuring Project (WRP), or the Virginia Initiative for Employment Not
Welfare (VIEW) program. Florida and Virginia pay lower benefits than do
Minnesota and Connecticut, and the Vermont earnings disregard is less generous
than those found in Minnesota or Connecticut. Further, in Connecticut and
Minnesota, the cash and food stamp earnings disregards were both changed,
while the food stamp program in Florida, Vermont, and Virginia operated under
Federal food stamp earnings disregard rules.

"Work-First" Versus Education-First Strategies
Under TANF, most States have developed "work-first" programs that
emphasize rapid entry into a job. Under the "work-first" program model, the
first and most common activity for unemployed recipients is job search. Job
search may be supplemented by other strategies if that initial job search is
unsuccessful. The TANF "work-first" approach contrasts with the pre-1996
welfare law Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) training program, which
emphasized an "education-first" strategy for those determined in need of
additional education and training.
Higher earnings are associated with both higher levels of formal education
and training and job experience. Though the welfare population is quite
diverse, the most disadvantaged recipients tend to have relatively low levels of
schooling as well as relatively little work experience. Higher earnings capacities
can be expected to make work more attractive than welfare. However, there has
been an ongoing debate about which of the following policies are more likely to
move and keep people off welfare by enhancing their earnings capacity:
? "Work-first" programs that quickly move recipients into work to
acquire work experience by emphasizing immediate job search, often
by forgoing formal education and training;
? "Education-first" programs that encourage recipients to acquire
education and skills, often by deferring work and acquisition of job
experience; or
? "Mixed" approach programs that provide a mix of services, with the
first activity determined by an assessment of individual skills and
needs.
The JOBS program was created by the Family Support Act of 1988,
which also mandated an evaluation of alternative welfare-to-work strategies.
That evaluation, known as the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work
Strategies (NEWWS) was completed in late 2001. NEWWS included a direct
comparison of work-first versus education-first strategies as these two types of
programs, and a third without mandated participation, were operated side-by-
side in the same places (Atlanta, Georgia; Grand Rapids, Michigan; and
Riverside, California).
Work-First -- The findings of the NEWWS evaluation confirmed those of
previous research which showed that work-first programs increase employment
and reduce welfare receipt relative to not having such a program in place.
Further, work-first programs often have immediate impacts, reflecting the focus
of such programs on rapid entry into the workforce. However, the major effect
of these programs is to speed entry into a job. Over time, the effects of work-
first programs tend to fade. Employment rates for those not subject to the
program (the control group) tend to catch up with the rates found in the work-
first program. Note that the fading of the impacts over time is not an
uncommon finding in evaluations of social programs. Moreover, in the time-
limited setting of TANF, speeding entry into the labor force and off of welfare
might be seen in and of itself a positive impact as families accumulate less time
toward their potential limit.
Though the evidence is that work-first programs can achieve certain
policy objectives -- raising employment and reducing the welfare rolls -- the
policy successes from them have been limited. In particular, the evaluations
show that a work-first strategy alone is unlikely to raise the income of the
average participant. Studies of such programs show that increases in earnings
generally offset but did not exceed reductions in cash benefits and food stamps.
Under TANF, the work-first focus on job search is generally supplemented by
"make work pay" policies. Such policies, and their effects on income, will be
discussed below.
Education-First -- The NEWWS evaluation also found that education-
first programs increase employment and reduce welfare receipt relative to not
having such a program in place. That is, programs that provide up-front
education to those determined in need of such services also can help achieve
policy goals of increasing employment and reducing welfare receipt. However,
the impacts on employment and welfare receipt come later under an education-
first strategy than they do under a work-first approach. While a recipient is in
education, she is more likely than those in a work-first program to remain on
welfare and not be working in a job. The policy question of interest is whether,
on average, the long-run benefits of investing in education-first outweigh its
costs.
Table L-6 provides a comparison of earnings in both the work-first and
education-first programs operated under the NEWWS evaluation in Atlanta,
Grand Rapids, and Riverside over 5 years. Where there were differences in
impacts, the work-first programs increased work and earnings and reduced
welfare receipt by more than the education-focused programs. However, for
many programs and groups, there was no difference in the impacts between
work-first programs and education-focused groups. It also should be noted that
none of the education-first programs increased incomes.
In interpreting the findings comparing work-first and education-first
programs, it should be noted that they do not measure the effect of education per
se on a recipients' earnings. They measure the effects of programs focused on
education on recipients' earnings. Many recipients further their education with
or without the aid of a program. Education-first programs tended to raise
participation in adult basic education for those recipients without a high school
diploma or equivalent. However, not all such programs raised participation
rates in either vocational education or in post-secondary education beyond those
that would have prevailed in the absence of the program.
"Mixed" Approach Program -- Among the programs in the NEWWS
evaluation, the one with the greatest increase in earnings and decrease in cash
assistance was in Portland, Oregon. Over the 5-year period, the Portland
program produced an increase in earnings of 25 percent (over that in the control
group without the program) and a decrease in cash assistance of 24 percent.
The Portland program is considered a mixed approach program,
incorporating some education into a work-first program. Its focus and message
was employment, but it was distinguished from other work-first programs
evaluated in NEWWS in a number of ways. Portland gave its case managers
discretion in making short-term education a first activity assignment. Case
managers also tended to encourage recipients to look for "good jobs" and even
to delay entry into the workforce until they obtained such a job.
An earlier evaluation of California's welfare-to-work programs (Greater
Avenues for Independence, or GAIN program) also found relatively large
impacts in a mixed approach program. GAIN was California's JOBS program,
which had a greater emphasis on education than do today's TANF programs.
However, the GAIN program in Riverside, compared with GAIN programs
evaluated elsewhere in the State, was notable for its strong message that the goal
of GAIN was to get employment. Over a 3-year period, the Riverside program
produced a 49 percent increase in earnings and a 15 percent decrease in cash
assistance benefits. These impacts were larger than for other GAIN programs.
However, despite the relatively large earnings increases and decreases in
receipt of cash assistance in both the NEWWS Portland and GAIN Riverside
evaluations, neither of these programs produced an increase in incomes. Here
too, increases in earnings generally offset but did not exceed reductions in cash
benefits and food stamps.

TABLE L-6 -- NATIONAL EVALUATION OF WELFARE-TO-WORK
STRATEGIES COMPARISON OF EMPLOYMENT, EARNINGS, AND
WELFARE RECEIPT IMPACTS OF EMPLOYMENT-FOCUSED WITH
EDUCATION-FOCUSED PROGRAMS IN ATLANTA, GRAND RAPIDS,
AND RIVERSIDE
Site
Average Quarters Employed
Total 5 Year Earnings
Total Welfare Receipt
Full impact sample
Atlanta
No impact.
No impact.
No impact.
Grand
Rapids
Increase of 0.4 quarter in work
first over education program.
No impact.
Decrease of $785 in work
first program compared to
education program.
No high school diploma or GED
Atlanta
Increase of 0.7 quarters in work
first over education program.
No impact.
Decrease of $531 in work
first program compared to
education program.
Grand
Rapids
Increase of 0.9 quarters in work
first over education program.
Increase of $1,945 in
work first over
education program.
Decrease of $905 in work
first program compared to
education program.
Riverside
Increase of 0.5 quarters in work
first over education program.
No impact.
No impact.
With high school diploma or GED
Atlanta
No impact.
No impact.
No impact.
Grand
Rapids
No impact.
No impact.
Decrease of $737 in work
first program compared to
education program.
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Education (2001).

The Importance of the "Message"-- As noted above, both the NEWWS
Portland and the California GAIN programs imparted a strong message to
recipients that the purpose of their participation in the program was to find a job.
The employment-focused message of both programs was considered an
important part of the program, even though both programs allowed for up-front
education or training for some participants.
Program messages, or the strength of the messages, often vary from site
to site. For example, all California GAIN programs in the late 1980s and early
1990s operated under the same statewide rules. However, the Riverside
program projected a strong message that its purpose was for recipients to get
employed quickly. Probably as a result of this message, the Riverside program
also had some of the largest employment and earnings impacts of evaluated
welfare-to-work programs.
The program message might also affect how participants respond to time
limits (see discussion below). Because of the variation in program messages,
even among programs with the same rules, it is difficult to generalize evaluation
findings from a specific site to other programs that might nominally have similar
rules. However, the fact that messages are important has policy implications in
and of itself: one avenue to a program that moves recipients from welfare to
work is to convey to participants the expectations of the program and their
ultimate goals.
Time Limits, Stronger Sanctions, and Other Policy Initiatives -- Three
evaluations are available on the possible effects of benefit-termination time
limits on welfare-to-work outcomes: Florida's FTP program, Connecticut's
Jobs First program, and Virginia's VIEW program. These were evaluations of
pre-1996 law waiver program, that combined time limits with other welfare
reform initiatives such as enhanced earnings disregards. Most State TANF
programs are operating under policies that combine increased earnings
disregards with time limits.
Generally, there is little evidence that anticipation of time limits spurred
recipients to leave welfare early. No change in cash assistance receipt was
recorded before participants reached the time limit in Florida or in two of the
three sites evaluated in Virginia. Receipt of cash assistance increased in
Connecticut. It is possible that the behavioral effect of time limits, which serve
as a spur to leave welfare early, and the enhanced earnings disregards, which
permit working recipients to stay on welfare longer, cancel each other out. In
Connecticut, the effect of the very generous earnings disregard might have
overwhelmed the effect of the short time limit.
One site in Virginia (Petersburg) did show reduced cash assistance receipt
after recipients became subject to time limits. In Petersburg, program staff
actively encouraged working participants to leave welfare, and save months of
eligibility for future use. In other Virginia sites and in Connecticut and Florida,
evaluators noted that staff did not actively encourage participants to save
remaining months of eligibility. These results are further evidence that the
program message conveyed by local administrators affects participant behavior.
The evidence from other initiatives begun under waiver programs that
tested various policy changes such as stronger sanctions for refusal to work and
limited exemptions from work, suffer from some of the same issues that make it
difficult to interpret results from programs with time limits: it is not possible to
separate the effects of the "package" of reforms initiated under the waiver into
its component parts. Moreover, unlike the NEWWS and some earlier
evaluations, the control groups for the studies of waiver programs were already
subject to a mandatory participation requirement.
Some waiver programs did have considerable effects; they increased
employment and earnings and reduced welfare receipt (Delaware and Indiana).
Delaware's ABC program increased the employment rate of participants by 20
percent and increased earnings by 16 percent in the first year. Delaware also
reduced cash assistance receipt by 5 percent in the first year. Indiana increased
employment by 2 percent over 2 years and earnings by 5 percent. Indiana's
program also cut cash assistance payments by 20 percent, with impacts growing
in the second year. However, a number of the waiver evaluations (Arizona,
New Jersey, Texas) failed to find consistent impacts on employment, earnings,
and welfare receipt.

IMPACT ON INCOME

Though raising a family's income and reducing poverty are not explicit
TANF goals, Federal law requires TANF State plans to outline how the States
intend to provide needy parents with services to enable them to "leave the
program and become self-sufficient." Attainment of self-sufficiency implies a
rise in family income. Additionally, other sections of TANF law (besides its
explicit goals) reflect interest in the overall economic well-being of TANF
families or families with children in general. For example, States are required to
report on their child poverty rate, and if their child poverty rate increases by
more than 5 percent over a year as a result of TANF implementation, the State is
required to file a "corrective action" plan with the Federal government. TANF
also requires HHS to include information on average income in its annual report
to Congress on families that reached the TANF time limit or had teen parents.
Impact of Requiring Work Participation -- As discussed above, programs
that require participation in work or job preparation alone tend to increase
employment and reduce welfare receipt. However, even among the programs
with the greatest increases in earnings and decreases in cash welfare receipt
(NEWWS Portland, Oregon and California GAIN Riverside programs), earnings
generally offset but did not exceed reductions in cash benefits and food stamps,
leaving total incomes unchanged. While some evaluated programs increased
incomes, generally they did so by increasing rather than decreasing welfare
receipt.
Making Work Pay -- TANF programs are work-first programs in that the
most common activity for unemployed recipients is job search. However, it is
just as apt to describe State TANF programs as work support programs, which
offer both cash welfare benefits and supportive services such as child care for
some recipients who go to work (and supportive services for other low-income
families as well). In their cash welfare programs, most State TANF programs
have expanded eligibility for working families by enhancing their cash welfare
earnings disregard. The earnings disregard is the amount of earnings not
considered (deducted from gross income) when a family's eligibility and cash
benefits are determined. The increase permits recipients to continue to receive
cash aid at higher levels of earnings than they could under previous policies,
thus supplementing earnings with a continued cash benefit.
As discussed above, the increase in earnings disregards is sometimes
viewed as a financial incentive to work. Evaluated programs that combined
financial incentives with a participation requirement had some of the largest
increases in employment and earnings. Among the evaluated programs
discussed in this appendix, Connecticut's Jobs First program; Florida's Family
Transitions Program (FTP); and Minnesota's MFIP program did report
increased incomes. All three of these programs had enhanced earnings
disregards as part of their program. In two of these three programs,
Connecticut's Jobs First and Minnesota's MFIP program, cash welfare payments
were increased by the program, rather than reduced.
Minnesota's MFIP program is notable because it had explicit goals to
increase incomes and reduce poverty among families with children. MFIP
showed a 15 percent increase in combined income for single, long-term
recipients. During the period that MFIP was evaluated, there was no time limit
on cash assistance benefits. Connecticut's Jobs First and Florida's FTP
programs also raised incomes, but the increase was smaller than that shown for
MFIP. Both Connecticut and Florida's programs had relatively large impacts on
income before families reached their time limit. However, once families could
begin reaching the time limit and began to be removed from the rolls, the
average income impact began to fall until there was no difference between
program and control groups.

CHILD WELL-BEING

Most Federal and State welfare policies apply directly to parents, not
children. They are aimed at promoting mothers' work and reducing their
dependence on welfare. Research has illustrated that poverty is associated with
unfavorable development of children. Poor children generally score lower on
assessments of health, cognitive development, school achievement, and
emotional well-being. Poor children are more likely to be raised by a single
parent, to be raised in neighborhoods with higher rates of crime, and to attend
schools with fewer resources. These findings have led many to contend that
programs that raise the income of families may positively affect child well-
being. However, requiring mothers to work reduces their time to nurture
children and requires them to find other caregivers.
Under TANF, States have designed programs that directly target outcomes
for adults such as employment and receipt of cash assistance through work
requirements, work incentives, and time limits on assistance. Measuring the
impact of these welfare reform initiatives on children requires a look at the
pathways through which they might indirectly affect child well-being. This is
difficult, as these pathways may be directly or indirectly affected by policy.
Mandatory Work and Development of Young Children -- Most programs
that required work increased employment but not incomes. These programs
have not produced either consistently favorable or consistently unfavorable
impacts on the development of young (pre-teen) children. Therefore, it has not
been shown that requiring participation in welfare-to-work programs either
systematically harms or helps children. For this age group, evaluations of
welfare-to-work programs that included a child development study have found a
smattering of impacts either favorable or unfavorable on measures of behavior,
academic achievement, and health and safety. However, few patterns if any are
discernable in the existing research.
Increasing Incomes -- As noted above, few welfare-to-work programs
succeeded in raising combined incomes. The Minnesota MFIP program did
increase incomes, and produced favorable impacts on both behavior and
academic achievement. Connecticut's Job First program also had some positive
impacts on the behavior of young children. However, the Florida FTP program
had mixed impacts (some positive and some negative). As discussed above,
both Connecticut and Florida's program included time limits, and the positive
income impact of the program faded away with families reaching the time limit;
Minnesota's program did not have a time limit.
Adolescents -- One finding that has appeared in several studies is
unfavorable impacts on school outcomes for adolescent children. Two of the
four NEWWS evaluation sites that conducted a child outcome study (Grand
Rapids and Riverside), as well as evaluations of Connecticut's Jobs First,
Florida FTP, and Vermont's welfare restructuring project, all reported a negative
effect on adolescents' academic performance or behavior in school.

FAMILY FORMATION AND THE PROMOTION OF MARRIAGE

Two of the objectives of TANF are to "prevent and reduce the incidence
of out-of-wedlock pregnancies" and to "encourage the formation and
maintenance of two-parent families." Since the 1970s, the overall birth rate for
married women has declined, but the number of nonmarital births has
substantially increased. This increase in nonmarital births has been attributed to
women's delaying the decision to marry, but not the decision to have a child.
Growth in the welfare caseload, to an historic peak in 1994, was driven in part
by the increase in the number of single female-headed households.
Economic models of marriage decisions contend that single people marry
if the marriage provides a benefit to both individuals. For couples to remain
married, both individuals must continue to benefit from the union. Welfare
programs that provide a means for single mothers to live independently may
serve as a disincentive to marriage. It should be noted that employment of
mothers also provides the means to live independently. Additionally, welfare
programs that pay larger families bigger benefits are seen by some as an
incentive for nonmarital child-bearing.
The bulk of post-Family Support Act research has focused on broader
efforts to alter welfare, especially by increasing work, and the impact of these
efforts on earnings and employment (as discussed in the previous section). In
recent years, the impacts of welfare reform efforts on family formation has
received more attention. The "family cap," a policy that denies a benefit
increase for the birth of a child while on welfare, has been evaluated. In
addition, some evaluated State programs have included the elimination of
special eligibility restrictions for two-parent families. However, these policy
initiatives were part of broader welfare reform efforts, and the evaluations
provide evidence on the whole package of reforms - not just family caps or
reducing eligibility restrictions for two-parent families.
Family Caps -- The most noted study on family caps is the evaluation of
the New Jersey Family Development Program (FDP). New Jersey was the first
State to institute the family cap policy and it conducted both a traditional
experiment (program and control group) and a statistical analysis for its impact
evaluation [Camasso, M., Harvey, C., Jagannathan, R., and Killingsworth, M.
(1999b)]. Evaluators found that the New Jersey program decreased births and
increased abortions. Both the experimental study and the statistical study had
the same findings lending support to the impacts reported for the program.
However, the New Jersey findings study one program in one place at one
time. These findings have not been replicated elsewhere. A family cap program
in Arkansas was also evaluated, and no impacts on births were found. The
programs in Arizona and Connecticut included family caps, but no impact on
births was found. (Some other pre-1996 waiver programs also included family
caps, but impacts on births were not reported.)
Promoting Marriage -- There has recently been a great deal of attention
on promoting marriage. None of the programs discussed in this appendix
focused on promoting marriage. Some programs included eliminating special
eligibility restrictions that applied to 2-parent families under pre-1996 welfare
law. Other welfare-to-work programs might have had indirect effects on marital
outcomes.
Minnesota's MFIP showed an increase in marriage for some groups. For
long-term single parent families, there was an increase in the percent who were
married three years after entering the program, though the percent married in the
MFIP programs was still rather low (11 percent). However, for some subgroups
MFIP showed no impact on marriage. For example, the MFIP program was
associated with no increase in marriage among long-term single parent families
in urban counties who were subject to mandated requirements. On the other
hand, long-term single parents who were given financial incentives but not
subject to a work requirement did have an increase in the percent married after 3
years. Other welfare-to-work programs that reported marital outcomes produced
no impact on marriage.

Future Directions in Welfare Research
Much has been learned about the impact of welfare to work programs,
with post-1996 welfare reform trends consistent with the findings of impact
evaluations that show that work-first programs can be effective in moving
families from welfare to work. This has been done without any systematic
evidence of harm to the development of their children. However, the available
research also shows the limits of the policy successes of current welfare reform
programs. Only those programs that provide government-funded earnings
supplements through continued welfare checks for working families have been
found to raise incomes.

State and Local Area Indicators: The American Community Survey
The information in the appendix which examines trends in welfare, work,
and economic well-being among the broader population of single mothers comes
from national household surveys. The main survey for examining these trends is
the March Current Population Survey (CPS), a national household survey
conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. While providing a broad overview of
trends for the nation as a whole, the March CPS is very limited in providing
State-specific information. State-specific information is obviously of interest in
assessing welfare reform, which devolved a great deal of responsibility for
designing welfare programs to the States.
The American Community Survey (ACS) was designed to help provide
more timely information specifically for State and local areas than available
through other Census surveys. Its sample design and size is to be sufficient for
making annual estimates of income, poverty, and welfare receipt for all 50
States and the District of Columbia, as well as for cities, counties, metropolitan
areas, and population groups of 65,000 people or more.

Studies of Programs for Specific Subgroups of Recipients
The bulk of the evidence on the impacts of welfare-to-work programs
comes from broad-based programs that covered large numbers of recipients.
Research has shown that the welfare population is diverse: some recipients leave
the rolls quickly while others might take a longer time to move to self-
sufficiency. Though some of the evaluated programs did do individual
assessments of employability and needs, and tailored activities to individualized
needs, they still tended to be programs intended for the welfare population as a
whole.
Some of the research underway is intended to address the special needs of
specific groups of recipients. HHS is currently fielding an experimental study of
programs that provide special services for the "hard-to-employ," including
services for adults with substance abuse and/or mental health problems,
disabilities, and women who had been the victim of domestic violence. Another
study currently underway will address employment strategies for families in
rural areas.
HHS is currently funding the Employment Retention and Advancement
(ERA) Project, a major multi-site experimental evaluation of numerous
strategies to assist welfare recipients and low-income persons in the workforce.
Some sites in the ERA project provide services for specific groups of recipients.
One of the ERA demonstrations in New York City is a program (called the
Personal Roads to Individual Development, or PRIDE program) that provides
vocational rehabilitation and work-based education to recipients with physical or
mental health problems.

Post-Employment Services
Most of the evaluated welfare-to-work programs provided pre-
employment services; that is, they were programs for adult recipients who were
not working and required of them job search or provided them with education or
training to increase their chances of finding work. Many programs also
provided work supports such as continued cash assistance and child care. These
supports would not in themselves help a recipient acquire additional job skills
and increase their earnings potential. However, such work supports might assist
in helping a recipient retain a job and acquire additional work experience.
A post-employment services demonstration experiment was fielded in the
1990s. This program focused primarily on continued case management (e.g.
contact with the welfare office and provision of supportive services), but the
experiment did not increase employment and earnings or raise incomes.
The Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) Project, discussed
above, includes several sites that provide post-employment services. For
example, one of the two experiments conducted in Riverside, California as well
as the Jacksonville, Florida site will test alternative strategies for promoting
education and training for working parents.

Family Formation
For the most part, the existing research does not address the impact of
programs on TANF's family formation goals of reducing out-of-wedlock births
and encouraging two-parent families. Most of the programs were welfare-to-
work programs and relatively few of their evaluations even reported family
formation impacts. Further, the program interventions that could be considered
as seeking to further a family formation goal (e.g., eliminating stricter eligibility
standards for two-parent families) tended to be only a part of a package of policy
interventions and, therefore, their independent impacts are difficult to assess.
HHS is currently funding a number of initiatives assessing programs that
aim to directly affect family formation outcomes. It is funding an experimental
evaluation examining programs to help low-income couples who have a child
out of wedlock who wish to marry and sustain their marriage. It is also funding
a number of different projects to help inform policymakers and researchers of
the types of programs that might further TANF's family formation goals.

Developing New Types of Program
In many of these projects the development of new program models is an
important component of the demonstration or evaluation. Unlike the pre-
employment, welfare-to-work programs, in which basic components such as
requiring participation or promoting job search or education activities are well
known, new program models to provide post-employment services for job
retention and advancement as well as programs to address family formation
issues are in the process of being developed.
Table L-7 summarizes major HHS-funded ongoing research and
evaluation projects related to welfare reform. The table is organized by subject
area (e.g., employment-related and family formation topics) and provides
tentative data for the publication of project findings.

TABLE L-7 -- SELECTED ONGOING FEDERALLY FUNDED
RESEARCH PROJECTS
Project
Description
Project coordinator
Impact findings due
Employment Strategies for Special Populations
Services for the
hard-to-employ
An experimental evaluation of
strategies to help the "hard-to-
employ" find and sustain
employment and improve
family and child well-being.
Populations of interest includes
adults with substance abuse
and/or mental health problems,
physical and developmental
disabilities, low basic skills,
and women who had been
victims of domestic abuse.
MDRC
Interim Report: Late
2007

Final Report: Early
2010
Rural welfare-to-
work strategies
demonstration
An experimental evaluation of
strategies to improve
employment and family well-
being for rural populations.
The evaluation is being
conducted in two sites: Illinois
and Nebraska.
Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc.
Interim Report: Late
2005

Final Report: Late
2006
Employment Retention and Job Advancement
Employment
Retention and Job
Advancement
(ERA) Evaluation
Experimental evaluation of
post-employment and pre-
employment strategies to
promote job retention and/or
advancement. Strategies to be
tested in 15 sites.
MDRC
Interim Report: Mid
2004/2005

Final Report: 2007
Family Formation and the Promotion of Marriage
Building Strong
Families
Experimental evaluation of
strategies to help low-income,
unwed new parents improve
their relationships and for
those who wish to marry to
gain the knowledge and skills
necessary to enter and sustain
healthy marriages. The
experiment will focus on
improving child and family
well-being.
Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc.
Interim Early
Implementation
Report: 2005

Interim Impact
Report: 2007

Final Report: Late
2011
Evaluation of
Community
Healthy Marriage
Initiative
Non-experimental evaluation
of effectiveness of community
level demonstrations to
promote healthy marriages.
RTI International
Interim Report: Late
2006

Final Report: Late
2010

TABLE L-7 -- SELECTED ONGOING FEDERALLY FUNDED
RESEARCH PROJECTS- continued
Project
Description
Project coordinator
Impact findings due
Strengthening
Families with
Children Born
Out-of-Wedlock
A review of research literature
and field experience to
develop a conceptual
framework for intervention
and design for evaluating
relationship and marriage
services to low-income
couples who have a child born
out of wedlock.
Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc.
Interim Report: NA

Final Report: January
2003
Supporting
Healthy Marriage
Experimental evaluation of
strategies to help low-income
couples who are married or
planning to marry, who are in
their childrearing years, to
gain the knowledge and skills
necessary to sustain healthy
marriages. The experiment
will focus on improving child
and family well-being.
MDRC
First Interim Report:
Late 2008

Follow-up Report:
Late 2010

Final Report: Late
2012
Service delivery
and evaluation
design options for
promoting healthy
marriages
Project to inform developing
demonstrations and
evaluations of services to
promote healthy marriages.
This project examines existing
and potential service delivery
systems and settings and the
implications for evaluation.
The Urban Institute

Interim Report: NA

Final Report: Mid
2004
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on information provided
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

Detailed Table on Welfare-to-Work Impact Evaluations
Table L-8 details impact findings of welfare reform program evaluations
undertaken since the passage of the Family Support Act of 1988. It includes
information on the population that was studied (universe), the time period when
persons were assigned to experimental and control groups (random assignment),
the number of months or years following random assignment for which data
were collected (followup), and the source of the information used in the
evaluation (data type).
The table also provides information on the policy changes tested in each
of the evaluations. These policy changes are categorized in the table using
standardized terminology. However, it should not be assumed that all programs
are identical to one another. Rather, there are likely numerous design and other
differences among programs that all tested the same general policy approach.
In the national NEWWS evaluation, the policies examined were either
employment-focused programs (programs emphasizing job search), education-
focused programs (programs emphasizing up-front education), or Portland,
Oregon's "mixed" employment/education program. These evaluations
examined mandated programs compared with recipients who were not subject to
a participation mandate.
Evaluations of individual State programs (often under waivers of pre-
1996 welfare law) also included a package of policy changes that represented
deviations from programs then in existence. These include:
- Earnings disregard enhancement: In determining financial eligibility
and benefit amounts, these initiatives disregarded more earnings than
allowed under pre-1996 Federal welfare rules. Some States also
allowed families to accrue more assets and remain eligible for
benefits than allowed in pre-1996 law through the Asset Limit
Increase.
- Time Limit: The time limit ends benefits (either to the adult or to the
entire family, depending on the program) when assistance has been
received for a specified period. In some of the earlier welfare reform
experiments, the time limit did not specify a date the benefits would
end; it specified when a family had to be engaged in work in order to
continue to qualify for benefits. This type of time limit was called a
Work-Trigger Time Limit.
- Work requirements/younger child: Pre-1996 law permitted States to
exempt mothers with children under the age of 3 from participation in
work or training. Some States experimented with requiring mothers
of younger children to participate in activities.
- Work Sanctions: Pre-1996 law sanctioned families in breach of
participation requirements by ending the adult portion of the welfare
benefits. Some States experimented with different sanctions for
failure to comply with work participation requirements.
- Family Cap: States with "family cap" policies do not increase the
family's benefit for a new baby conceived or born to a mother already
on welfare.
- Two-parent eligibility: Pre-1996 welfare law had special restrictions
on eligibility for two-parent families. As part of their welfare reform
experiments, some States eliminated all or some of these restrictions.
- Transitional Benefit Extension: Federal law allows transitional
Medicaid for one year; pre-1996 law allowed transitional child care
for up to 1 year. Some States experimented with longer periods for
these transitional benefits.
The table shows impacts for welfare-to-work outcomes (employment,
earnings, and welfare receipt) and, for those evaluations that reported them,
impacts on income, family formation, and child well-being measures. Unless
otherwise noted, the outcome shown is as measured over the entire followup
period. The outcomes are displayed as percentage changes. Some percentage
changes reported in this table may differ if calculated based on the reported
findings, due to rounding. The percentage changes reported in the table reflect
the percentage changes as reported in the individual evaluation. Additionally,
the actual levels (e.g., earnings amounts, employment rates) are shown in
parentheses (outcomes for the experimental group versus outcomes for the
control group) as reported in the individual evaluations. The table's earnings
data represent earnings over the entire research sample and group, and include
zero earnings for individuals for whom no work is reported. This illustrates the
impact of the program on average earnings. (Average earnings for only those
who actually did work would be higher.)

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies: How Effective Are Different Welfare-to-Work
Approaches? Five Year Adult and Child Impacts for Eleven Programs, December 2001.
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation under contract for the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Education.
Sites: Atlanta, GA; Grand Rapids, MI; Riverside, CA; Portland, OR; Columbus, OH; Detroit, MI;
Oklahoma City, OK.
Atlanta Employment-Focused
Policy Changes: Employment-focused program.
Universe: JOBS mandatory
population (parents of children
age 3 or older).

Random assignment: 1/92-1/94.

Follow-up: 5 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.

Universe: JOBS mandatory
population (parents of children
age 3 or older).
Earnings: Increase of 14% ($19,838 vs. $17,380).

Employment: Quarters employed -- Increase of 10% (worked in 8.5
vs. 7.8 out of 20 potential quarters).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 9% ($9,064 vs. $9,946).

Combined income: No impact.

Family structure: No impact.

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts for academic
functioning for adolescents; unfavorable impacts for health
outcomes for children of preschool age at random assignment.
Favorable impacts for development of social skills for young
children; unfavorable impacts for health for young children;
increase in days late to school for children in special child
outcomes sample (age 8 to 10 at follow-up).

Atlanta Education-Focused
Policy Changes: Education-focused program.
Universe: JOBS mandatory
population (parents of children
age 3 or older).
Earnings: Increase of 12% ($19,397 vs. $17,380).

Employment: Quarters employed -- Increase of 7% (worked in 8.3
vs. 7.8 out of 20 potential quarters).

Random assignment: 1/92 -
1/94.

Follow-up: 5 years.

Data type: Administrative data
survey.
Cash assistance: Decrease of 7% ($9,236 vs. $9,946).

Combined income: No impact.

Family structure: No impact.

Child well-being outcomes: Unfavorable impact for health and
outcomes for children of preschool age at random assignment.
Favorable impacts for development of social skills for young
children; unfavorable impacts for health of young children;
increase in days absent from school for children in special child
outcomes sample (aged 8 to 10 at follow-up).

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Grand Rapids Employment-Focused
Policy Changes: Employment-focused program.
Universe: JOBS mandatory
population (parents with children
age 1 or older).

Random assignment: 9/91 -
1/94.
Earnings: Increase of 8% ($22,322 vs. $20,770).

Employment: Quarters employed -- Increase of 8% (worked in 9.8
vs. 9.1 out of 20 potential quarters).

Follow-up: 5 years.

Data Type: Administrative Data
Survey.
Cash assistance: Decrease of 20% ($10,414 vs. $12,966).

Combined income: Decrease of 3% ($40,739 vs. $42,172).

Family structure: Decrease in percent separated, divorced, or
widowed.

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts on school
attendance for young children. Unfavorable impacts on academic
outcomes for school-age children and adolescents. Favorable
impact on health for preschool children. Unfavorable impacts for
social skills outcomes, academic functioning and health (though
one favorable impact on academic achievement) for children in
special child outcomes sample (age 8 to 10 at follow-up).

Grand Rapids Education-Focused
Policy changes: Education-focused program.
Universe: JOBS mandatory
population (parents with children
age 1 or older).

Random assignment: 9/91 -
1/94.

Follow-up: 5 years.

Data type: Administrative
survey.

Earnings: No impact.

Employment: Quarters employed -- Increase of 4% (worked in 9.5
vs. 9.1 out of 20 potential quarters).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 14% ($11,199 vs. $12,966).

Combined income: No impact.

Family structure: No impact.

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts for school
attendance for young children; unfavorable impacts on health for
children of preschool age; unfavorable impact on academic
function for adolescents. Unfavorable impacts on social skills
development and academic functioning for special child outcomes
sample (aged 8 to 10 at follow-up).

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Riverside Employment-Focused
Policy changes: Employment-focused program.
Universe: JOBS mandatory
population (parents of children
age 3 or older).

Random assignment: 6/91 - 6/93.

Follow-up: 5 years.

Data Type:
Administrative data Survey.
Earnings: Increase of 17% ($17,438 vs.
$14,889). Increase for those without a high school diploma or
basic skills of 21% ($13,193 vs. $10,912).

Employment: Quarters employed--Increase of 20% (worked in 6.8
vs. 5.6 out of 20 potential quarters). Increase for those without a
high school diploma or basic skills of 27% (worked in 6.0 vs. 4.7
out of 20 potential quarters).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 15% ($15,584 vs. $18,294).
Decrease for those without a high school diploma or basic skills of
15% ($17,171 vs. $20,126).

Combined income: No impact.

Family structure: Increase in percent cohabiting. Increase in
percent with a new baby for those without a high school diploma
or basic skills.

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts for academic
functioning for groups other than adolescents; unfavorable impact
on adolescents academic functioning. Favorable heath impact for
children of preschool age and those who were adolescents at
random assignment. Unfavorable impacts for social skills and
behavior and mixed impacts for academic functioning for children
in special child outcomes sample (aged 8 to 10 at follow-up).

Riverside Education-Focused
Policy Changes: Education-focused program.
Universe: JOBS mandatory
population (parents of children
age 3 or older) without a high
school diploma or basic skills.

Random assignment: 6/91 - 6/93.

Follow-up: 5 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey
Earnings: Increase of 13% ($12,273 vs. $10,912).

Employment: Quarters employed--Increase of 17% (worked in 5.5
vs. 4.7 out of 20 potential quarters).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 15% ($17,176 vs. $20,126).

Combined income: Decrease of 6% ($35,924 vs. $38,311).

Family structure: No impact.

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts on academic
functioning for young children and school age children;
unfavorable impacts on academic functioning for adolescents.
Favorable impact on health for young school-aged children and
adolescents. Favorable impact on social skills development but
unfavorable impacts on school attendance and health and safety for
special child outcomes sample (aged 8 to 10 at follow-up).

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Columbus Integrated Case Management
Policy Changes: Education-focused program.
Universe: JOBS mandatory
population (parents of children
age 3 or older).

Random assignment: 9/92 -
7/94.

Follow-up: 5 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Earnings: Increase of 8% ($27,621 vs. $25,566).

Employment: Quarters employed--Increase of 4% (worked in 10.2
vs. 9.8 out of 20 potential quarters).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 17% ($7,481 vs. $9,005).

Combined income: No impact.

Family structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

Columbus Traditional Case Management
Policy Changes: Education-focused program.
Universe: JOBS mandatory
population (parents of children
age 3 or older).

Random assignment: 9/92 -
7/94.

Follow-up: 5 years.
Earnings: Increase of 6% ($26,977 vs. $25,566).

Employment: Quarters employed--Increase of 3% (worked in 10.1
vs. 9.8 out of 20 potential quarters).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 12% ($7,899 vs. $9,005).

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Combined income: No impact.

Family structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

Detroit
Policy Changes: Education-focused program.
Universe: JOBS mandatory
population (parents
with children age 1 or older).

Random assignment: 5/92 -
6/94.

Follow-up: 5 years.

Earnings: Increase of 7% ($21,968 vs. $20,508).

Employment: No impact.

Cash assistance: Decrease of 4% ($15,686 vs. $16,247).

Combined income: No impact.

Family structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Oklahoma City
Policy Changes: Education-focused program.
Universe: New applicants in
JOBS mandatory population
(parents with children age 1 and
older).

Random assignment: 9/91 - 5/93.

Follow-up: 5 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.

Earnings: No impact.

Employment: No impact.

Cash assistance: Not reported.

Combined income: Not reported.

Family structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

Portland
Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program.
Universe: JOBS mandatory
population (parents
with children age 1 and older).

Random assignment: 2/93 -
12/94.

Follow-up: 5 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.

Earnings: Increase of 25% ($26,041 vs. $20,891).

Employment: Quarters employed--Increase of 21% (worked in 9.4
vs. 7.8 out of 20 potential quarters).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 24% ($8,940 vs. $11,686).

Combined income: No impact.

Family structure: No impact.

Child well-being outcomes: No impact.

New Chance Demonstration
New Chance: Final Report on a Comprehensive Program for Young Mothers in Poverty and Their
Children, October 1997.
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
Sites: 16 sites in 10 States: California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania.
Policy Changes: 1) Child care; 2) Enhanced family planning services; 3) Parenting workshops;
4) Required participation in education-focused program (first-year) then employment.
Universe: Mothers 16 to 22 years
old who
(1) had first given birth age 19 or
younger,
(2) were receiving AFDC,
(3) did not have a high school
diploma or GED, and (4) were
not pregnant when they entered
the program. Participation in the
New Chance demonstration was
voluntary.

Random Assignment:
8/89 - 7/91.

Earnings: No impact over 42-month follow-up period.
Months 1-6: Decrease of 27% ($263 vs. $358).
Months 7-18: Decrease of 17% ($1,096 vs. $1,323).
Months 18-42: No impact.

Employment rate: No impact over 42-month follow-up period.
Months 1-6: Decrease of 26% (15% vs. 20%).
Months 7-42: No impact.

Cash assistance: Percent who ever received AFDC over 42-month
period: Increase of 1% (99% vs. 98%).

Income: No impact.

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988 -
continued

Follow-up: 42 months.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.

Family structure: Marital status not reported. Decrease in number
of months between last terminated pregnancy and onset of next
pregnancy. No impact on pregnancies, births or abortions.

Child well-being outcomes: Unfavorable impacts on behavior
measures and academic functioning. Teachers report favorable
impacts for boys on social competence and behavior. Teachers
also report favorable impacts for behavior of girls, but unfavorable
impacts for girls' school readiness.

Parents' Fair Share (PFS) Demonstration
Working and Earning: The Impact of Parent's Fair Share on Low-Income Fathers' Employment,
October 2000.
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
Sites: Los Angeles, CA; Jacksonville, FL; Springfield, MA; Grand Rapids, MI; Trenton, NJ; Dayton,
OH; Memphis, TN.
Policy Changes: 1) Enhanced child support establishment; 2) Mixed employment/education program;
3) Promote parent interaction.
Universe: Noncustodial parents.

Random assignment: 4/94 -
6/96.

Follow-up: 2 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Earnings: Administrative data show no impact for 7 (combined)
sites. Survey data show increase of 24% ($7,150 vs. $5,779) in
year 2. Administrative data also show increases in some quarters
for Dayton and Grand Rapids, but a decline in earnings in a single
quarter in Trenton.

Employment rate: Administrative data show no impact for 7
(combined) sites. Survey data show a decrease of 7% (75% vs.
81%) for year 2. Administrative data show employment rate
increases in Dayton in some quarters, but decreases in Trenton.

Income: Not reported.

Cash assistance: Not reported.

Family formation: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD)
Moving Into Adulthood: Were the Impacts of Mandatory Programs for Welfare-Dependent
Teenaged Parents Sustained After the Programs Ended?, February 1998.
Author: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Sites: Chicago, IL; Camden, NJ; Newark, NJ.
Policy Changes: 1) Child care; 2) Mixed employment/education program; 3) Provide for work-
related expenses.

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988 -
continued
Universe: Teenagers who were
first-time parents receiving
AFDC.

Random assignment: 7/87 - 4/90.

Follow-up: 6 years.

Data Type:
Administrative data
Child development assessments
Survey.
Earnings: No impact.

Employment rate:
Camden: Increase of 8% (75% vs. 70%).
Newark: Increase of 7% (75% vs. 70%).
Chicago: Increase of 4% (78% vs. 76%).

Cash assistance:
Camden: No impact.
Newark: No impact.
Chicago: Decrease of 5% ($11,645 vs. $12,216).

Income:
Camden: Increase of 8% ($840 vs. $778)
Newark: No impact.
Chicago: No impact.

Family structure: Marital status not reported. No impact on births.
Increase in percent who reported an abortion within 78 months of
entering the program in Chicago of 23% (23% vs. 19%). No
impact on abortions in other sites.

Child well-being outcomes: Unfavorable impacts in Newark for
behavior and academic achievement outcomes. Favorable impact
in Chicago on percent of parents who report their children do "very
well" in school.

Alabama: Avenues to Self-Sufficiency through Employment and Training Services (ASSETS)
Evaluation of the Alabama ASSETS Demonstration, January 1997.
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sites: Three Counties in Alabama: Clarke, Limestone, and Madison.
Policy Changes: 1)Applied AFDC Child support cooperation requirement to food stamp only
households; 2) Asset limit increase; 3) Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant (food stamp
cashout); 4) Mixed employment/education program; 5) Personal responsibility sanctions.
Universe: AFDC and Food
Stamp cases. Focus
on participants age 16 to 59 for
employment and training
services.

Study Duration: 7/90 - 6/94.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Earnings: Year 3 impacts-
Clarke County: Decrease of 11% ($2,758 vs. $3,096).
Limestone County: No impact.
Madison County: Decrease of 5% ($2,925 vs. $3,076).

Employment rate: Percent employed in 12th quarter:
Clarke County: Decrease of 11% (37% vs. 41%).
Limestone County: Decrease of 8% (36% vs. 39%).
Madison County: Decrease of 5% (36% vs. 38%).

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued

Cash assistance: Year 3 impacts-
Clarke County: Increase of 9% ($1,930 vs. $1,779).
Limestone County: Decrease of 9% ($1,107 vs. $1,222).
Madison County: Increase of 3% ($1,446 vs. $1,409).

Income: Not reported.
Family structure: Not reported.
Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

Arizona: Employing and Moving People Off Welfare and Encouraging Responsibility (EMPOWER)
Evaluation of the Arizona EMPOWER Welfare Reform Demonstration, May 1999.
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sites: Three sites in Phoenix and one site on the Navajo Reservation.
Policy Changes: 1) Family cap; 2) Personal responsibility sanctions; 3) Required participation in
employment and training services for minor parents; 4) Required unwed minor parents to live with
parent or responsible adult; 5) Time limit (adult-only; 6) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid); 7)
Two-parent family eligibility.
Universe: Ongoing recipients as
of 10/95.

Random assignment: 10/95.

Follow-up period: 3 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Earnings: No impact.

Employment rate: No impact.

Cash assistance: Decrease of 6% in average monthly cash benefit
($137 vs. $146).

Income: No impact.

Family structure: No impact on marriage. Decrease of 60% (2% vs.
4%) in births to unwed minors. No other impacts on child-bearing.
No impact on abortions.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

California: Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN)
GAIN: Benefits, Costs, and Three-Year Impacts of a Welfare-to-Work Program, September 1994
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
Sites: Six Counties in California: Alameda, Butte, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, and Tulare.
Alameda
Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program.
Universe: Long-term recipients
who were GAIN mandatory (for
single parents, child age 6 or
older).

Random assignment: 7/89 -
5/90.

Follow-up: 3 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Earnings: Increase of 30% ($6,432 vs. $4,941).

Employment rate: Increase of 20% (49% vs. 41%).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 4% ($17,593 vs. $18,375).

Income: No impact.

Family formation: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Butte
Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program.
Universe: GAIN mandatory
recipients (for single parents,
child age 6 or older).

Random assignment: 3/88 -
3/90.

Follow-up: 3 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.

Earnings: No impact.

Employment rate: No impact.

Cash assistance: No impact.

Income: No impact.

Family formation: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.
Los Angeles
Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program.
Universe: Long-term recipients
who were GAIN mandatory (for
single parents, with children age
6 or older).

Random assignment: 7/89-3/90.

Follow-up: 3 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.

Earnings: No impact.

Employment rate: Increase of 13% (39% vs. 35%).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 6% ($17,314 vs. $18,319).

Income: No impact.

Family formation: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.
Riverside
Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program.
Universe: GAIN mandatory
recipients (for single parents,
with child age 6 or older).

Random assignment: 8/88 -
3/90.

Follow-up: 3 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Earnings: Increase of 49% (9,448 vs. $6,335).

Employment rate: Increase of 26% (67% vs. 53%).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 15% ($11,284 vs. $13,267).

Income: No impact.

Family formation: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
San Diego
Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program.
Universe: GAIN mandatory
recipients (for single-parent
families, with child age 6 or
older).

Random assignment: 8/88 -
9/89.

Follow-up: 3 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.

Earnings: Increase of 22% ($9,786 vs. $8,014).

Employment rate: Increase of 10% (62% vs. 57%).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 10% ($13,283 vs. $14,419).

Income: No impact.

Family formation: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

Tulare
Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program.
Universe: GAIN mandatory
recipients (for single parents,
with a child age 6 or older).

Random assignment: 1/89 -
6/90.

Follow-up: 3 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Earnings: No impact.

Employment rate: Increase of 8% (60% vs. 55%).

Cash assistance: No impact.

Income: Quarter 13: Increase of 8% ($2,014 vs. $1,865)

Family formation: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

California: Los Angeles Jobs-First Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN)
The Los Angeles Jobs First-GAIN Evaluation: Final Report on a Work First Program in a Major
Urban Center, June 2000
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Site: Los Angeles County
Policy Changes: Employment-focused program.
Universe: JOBS-First GAIN
mandatory recipients (for single
parents, caring for a
child age 3 or older).

Random assignment: 4/96 -
9/96.

Follow-up: 2 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Earnings: Increase of 26% ($8,012 vs. $6,385).

Employment rate: Increase of 17% (67% vs. 58%).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 10% ($9,092 vs. $10,064).

Income: No impact.

Family structure: No impacts on marital status or births. Abortions
not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Unfavorable impacts on measures of
behavior and academic achievement for children aged 5 to 7 at
follow-up. Unfavorable impacts on percent attending a special
class for a physical, emotional, or mental condition for children
aged 8 to 11 at follow-up. No impacts for adolescents.

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Connecticut: Jobs First
JOBS First: Final Report on Connecticut's Welfare Reform Initiative, February 2002.
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
Sites: New Haven and Manchester.
Policy changes: 1) Employment-focused program; 2) Asset limit increase; 3) Child support
liberalization; 4) Earnings disregard enhancement; 5) Family cap; 6) Time limit; 7) Transitional
benefits extension (Medicaid and child care); 8) Two-parent family eligibility; 9) Work requirement:
younger child; 10) Work sanctions.
Universe: Jobs First enrollees.

Random assignment: 1/96 - 2/97.

Follow-up: 4 years.

Earnings: Increase of 7% ($26,673 vs. $24,861).

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment rate-increase of
15% (56% vs. 49%).

Cash assistance: No impact.

Income: Increase of 6% ($43,870 vs. $41,506).
Participation in welfare-to-work
requirement:
For experimental group, parents
with child age 1 or older. For
control group, parents with child
age 2 or older.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.

Family Structure: No impacts.

Child well-being outcomes: Positive impacts on behavior of young
children. Negative impact on academic outcomes of adolescents.
Reduction in adolescent encounters with police.

Delaware: A Better Chance (ABC)
The Early Economic Impacts of Delaware's ABC Welfare Reform Program, December 1997.
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sites: 5 of 13 Delaware welfare offices: Carroll's Plaza, Georgetown, Hudson, Thatcher, and
Williams.
Policy Changes: 1) Earnings disregard enhancement; 2) Enhanced family planning services;
3) Family cap; 4) Personal responsibility sanctions; 5) Required minor parent to live with adult
guardian; 6) Time limit; 7) Two-parent family eligibility; 8) Work-trigger time limit.
Universe: Ongoing cases and
new applicants.

Random Assignment: 10/95 -
9/96.

Follow-up: 1 year.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.

Earnings: No impact over 1-year follow-up period. Increase in
average total earnings only in quarter 4 (for those enrolling during
ABC's first 6 months of operation 11/95 -3/96) of 16% ($1,214 vs.
$1,047).

Employment rate: Increase of 20% (57% vs. 48%).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 5% ($2,775 vs. $2,930).

Income: No impact.

Family structure: No impact.

Child well-being outcomes: No impact.

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Florida: Project Independence
Florida's Project Independence: Benefits, Costs, and Two-Year Impacts of Florida's JOBS Program:
April 1995.
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
Sites: Nine Counties in Florida: Bay, Broward, Dade, Duval, Hillsborough, Lee, Orange, Pinellas,
and Volusia.
Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program.
Universe: AFDC parents (child
age 3 and older).

Random assignment: 7/90 - 8/91.

Follow-up: 2 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Earnings: Increase of 4% ($5,766 vs. $5,539).

Employment rate: Increase of 4% (66% vs. 64%).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 6% ($4,028 vs. $4,293).

Income: No impact.

Family formation: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.
Florida: Family Transition Program (FTP)
FTP: The Family Transition Program: Final Report on Florida's Initial Time-Limited Welfare
Program, December 2000
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Site: Escambia County
Policy Changes: 1) Child care; 2) Earnings disregard enhancement; 3) Education-focused program;
4) Time limit.
Universe: Single parents subject
to FTP work
requirements (not disabled,
caring for a child age 7 months
or older).

Random assignment:
5/94 - 10/96.

Follow-up: 4 years.

Data Type:
Administrative data Survey.

Earnings: Increase of 17% ($16,666 vs. $14,288).

Employment rate: Increase in average percent employed per
quarter of 10% (48% vs. 44%).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 15% ($3,987 vs. $4,698).

Income: Increase of 5% ($26,744 vs. $25,606).

Family structure: No impact.

Child well-being outcomes: Unfavorable impacts on behavior but
favorable impact on health for children aged 5 to 12 at follow-up.
Unfavorable impacts on percent ever suspended from school and
academic achievement for adolescents.
Illinois: Community Group Participation and Housing Supplementation Demonstration
Community Group Participation and Housing Supplementation Demonstration. Final Report, June
1995
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Site: West Garfield Park neighborhood in Chicago, IL
Policy Changes: Provision of services by community-based organization.

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Universe: Volunteers living in
severely distressed
neighborhoods.

Random Assignment: 7/88 -
8/91.

Follow-up period: Varies from
35 to 54 months (analysis ends
6/94).

Data Type: Administrative Data
Survey.

Earnings: No impact.

Employment rate: Decrease of 15% (22% vs. 26%).

Income: No impact.

Cash assistance: No impact.

Family structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.
Indiana: Welfare Reform Evaluation
The Indiana Welfare Reform Evaluation: Program Implementation and Economic Impacts After
Two Years, November 1998
Author: Abt Associates Inc. and the Urban Institute
Policy Changes:1 ) Asset limit increase; 2) Family cap; 3) Mixed employment/education program; 4)
Personal responsibility sanctions; 5) Required minor parent to live with adult; 6) Time limit (adult-
only); 7) Two-parent family eligibility; 8) Work requirements: younger child; 9) Work sanctions.
Universe: AFDC recipients and
applicants.

Random Assignment: 5/95 -
12/95.

Follow-up: 2 years.
Earnings: Increase of 5% ($7,344 vs. $6,967).

Employment rate: Increase of 2% (79% vs. 77%).

Cash assistance: Decrease of 20% ($2,339 vs. $2,921).

Income: No impact.
Participation required in welfare-
to-work program: For
experimental group, changed in
6/97 from parents with children
age 3 or older to parents with
children age 2 or older.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.

Family structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.
Iowa: Family Investment Program (FIP)
The Evaluation of Welfare Reform in Iowa: Final Impact Report, June 2002
Author: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Sites: Nine counties in Iowa: Black Hawk, Linn, Polk, Pottawattamie, Woodbury, Clinton, Des
Moines, Jackson, and Jones.
Ongoing cases
Policy Changes: 1) Earnings disregard enhancement; 2) Work requirements: younger child; 3) Asset
limit increase; 4) Benefit determination the same for parents and stepparents; 5) Personal
responsibility sanctions; 6) Required participation in employment and training services for both
persons in two-parent family; 7) Transitional benefits extension (child care); 8) Two-parent family
eligibility.

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Universe: Cases active in
September 1993.

Random assignment: 10/93.

Follow-up: 5 years.

Participation in welfare-to-work
requirement: For experimental
group, parents with a child age 3
months or older. For control
group, parents with a child age 3
or older.

Data type: Administrative data
Survey.

Earnings: Year 1-5, No impact. (Increase in earnings during years
1 and 2).

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment rate-Increase of
4% (52% vs. 51%).

Cash assistance: Average quarterly benefit amount-Decrease of
4% ($499 vs. $521).

Income: No impact.

Family structure: No impacts.

Child well-being outcomes: No impacts.
Applicant Cases
Universe: Cases that applied
between September 1993 and
March 1996 in three cohorts.

Random Assignment:
Cohort 1: 10/93-9/94.
Cohort 2: 10/94-9/95.
Cohort 3: 10/95-3/96.

Follow-up:
Cohort 1: 4 years.
Cohort 2: 3 years.
Cohort 3: 2 years.
Survey conducted -1998 and
1999.
Earnings:
Cohort 1: No impact over years 1-4. Increase in year 1.
Cohort 2: No impact over years 1-3.
Cohort 3: No impact over 2 years. Decrease in earnings in year 2.

Employment rate:
Cohort 1: Increase of 6% over years 1-4 (56.6% vs. 53.5%).
Cohort 2: No impact.
Cohort 3: No impact.

Cash assistance:
Cohort 1: No impact.
Cohort 2: Average quarterly benefit--Decrease of 7% ($240 vs.
$258).
Cohort 3: Average quarterly benefit-Increase of 22% ($268 vs.
$219).

Participation in welfare-to-work
requirement: For experimental
group, parents with a child age
3 months or older. For control
group, parents with a child age 3
or older.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.

Income:
Cohort 1: No impact over 4 years. (Increase in years 1 and 2.)
Cohort 2: No impact.
Cohort 3: No impact.

Family Structure:
For applicants 27% increase in percent never married (30% vs.
24%).

Child well-being outcomes:
For children age 5 to 12: Increases in school absences. For all
children, small increase in children in foster care.

Michigan: To Strengthen Michigan Families (TSMF)
Final Impact Report: The Evaluation of To Strengthen Michigan Families (TSMF), September 1997
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sites: 4 local office: Kalamazoo (Kalamazoo Co.), Madison Heights (Oakland Co.),
McNichols/Goddard (Wayne Co.), and Schaeffer/Six Mile (Wayne Co.)
TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Earnings disregard enhancement; 3) Mixed employment/
education program; 4) Personal responsibility sanctions; 5) Two-parent family eligibility; 6) Work
sanctions.
Universe: Three cohorts.

Ongoing cohort: Random
assignment: 10/92
Follow-up: 4 years .

Middle cohort:
Random assignment: 10/92 -
9/94.
Follow-up: 2 years.

Earnings:
Ongoing cohort: Increase of 7% ($3,343 vs. $3,120).
Other cohorts: No impact.

Employment rate:
Ongoing cohort: Increase in average quarterly employment rate of
4% (37% vs. 36%).
Other cohorts: No impact.

Cash assistance: All cohorts- No impact.

Income: All cohorts- No impact.

Family structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: No impact.

Last cohort:
Random assignment:
10/94 - 9/95
Follow-up: 1 year.

Data Type: Administrative data

Minnesota: Family Investment Program (MFIP)
Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: Final Report on the Minnesota Family Investment
Program, September 2000
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Sites: Seven counties in Minnesota: Hennepin (Minneapolis), Anoka, Dakota, Mille Lacs, Morrison,
Sherburne, and Todd
Long-term single- parent families
Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Direct child care paid to provider; 3) Earnings disregard
enhancement; 4) Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant; 5) Work requirements: younger
child; 6) Work-trigger time limit.
Universe: Single, long-term
recipients in urban and rural
counties

Random Assignment: 4/94 -
3/96.
Earnings: Increase of 23% ($955 vs. $779).

Employment rate: Increase of 35% (50% vs. 37%).

Cash assistance: Increase of 11% ($1,745 vs. $1,569).

Follow-up: 3 years.

Participation in welfare-to-work
requirement: For experimental
group, parents with a child age 1
or older (on welfare rolls for 2
years). For control group,
parents of child age 3 or older.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.

Income: Increase of 15% ($2,700 vs. $2,348).

Family structure: Increase of 51% (11% vs. 7%) in percent
currently married. Births and abortions not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

Long-term single- parent families - urban counties
Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Direct child care paid to provider; 3) Earnings disregard
enhancement; 4) Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant; 5) Work requirements: younger
child; 6) Work-trigger time limit.
TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Universe: Single, long-term
recipients in urban counties

Random Assignment: 4/94 -
3/96.

Follow-up: 3 years.

Participation in welfare-to-work
requirement: For experimental
group, parents with a child age 1
or older (on welfare rolls for 2
years). For control group,
parents of child age 3 or older.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Earnings: Quarterly earnings-
Year 1: Increase of 30% ($699 vs. $537).
Year 2: Increase of 24% ($1,129 vs. $913).
Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 11% ($1,441 vs. $1,298).

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment rate-
Year 1: Increase of 41% (46% vs. 33%).
Year 2: Increase of 35% (53% vs. 39%).
Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 26% (56% vs. 45%).

Cash assistance: Average quarterly benefits-
Year 1: Increase of 9% ($1,946 vs. $1,810).
Year 2: Increase of 10% (1,627 vs. $1,484)
Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 13% ($1,380 vs. $1,227).

Income: Average quarterly income- Year 1: Increase of 14%
($2,663 vs. $2,346)
Year 2: Increase of 15% ($2,756 vs. $2,396)
Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 12% ($2,822 vs. $2,525).

Family structure: No impacts on marital status. Births and
abortions not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts on behavioral and
academic achievement. Unfavorable impact on percentage of
children who had an accident and required a trip to the emergency
room.

Long-term single-parent families - urban counties: Without mandated participation
Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Direct child care paid to provider; 3) Earnings disregard
enhancement; 4) Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant.
Universe: Single, long-term
recipients in urban counties.

Random Assignment: 4/94 -
3/96.

Follow-up: 3 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Earnings: No impact.

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment rate-
Year 1: Increase of 21% (40% vs. 33%).
Year 2: Increase of 9% (43% vs. 39%).
Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 8% (48% vs. 45%).

Cash assistance: Average quarterly benefits-
Year 1: Increase of 13% ($2,035 vs. $1,810).
Year 2: Increase of 20% ($1,774 vs. $1,484).
Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 24% ($1,518 vs. $1,227).

Income: Average quarterly income-
Year 1: Increase of 12% ($2,621 vs. $2,346)
Year 2: Increase of 10% ($2,636 vs. $2,396)
Year 3: Increase of 10% ($2,769 vs. $2,525).

Family structure: Increase of 89% (11% vs. 6%) in percent
married. Impacts on births and abortions not reported.

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued

Child-well being outcomes: Favorable impacts on behavioral and
academic achievement. Unfavorable impact on percentage of
children who had an accident and required a trip to the emergency
room.

Recent single-parent applicants - urban counties
Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Direct child care paid to provider; 3) Earnings disregard
enhancement; 4) Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant; 5) Work requirements: younger
child; 6) Work-trigger time limit.
Universe: Single applicants
(short-term recipients) in urban
counties.

Random Assignment: 4/94 -
3/96.

Follow-up: 3 years
Participation in welfare-to-work
requirement: For experimental
group, parents with a child age 1
or older (on welfare rolls for 2
years). For control group,
parents of child age 3 or older.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Earnings: No impact.

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment rate:
Year 1: Increase of 6% (52% vs. 49%).
Year 2: Increase of 7% (57% vs. 53%).
Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 5% (58% vs. 55%).

Cash assistance: Average quarterly benefits--
Year 1: Increase of 26% ($1,289 vs. $1,024).
Year 2: Increase of 26% ($907 vs. $722).
Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 26% ($709 vs. $561).

Income: Average quarterly income-
Year 1: Increase of 9% ($2,434 vs. $2,467)
Year 2: Increase 7% ($2,562 vs. $2,547)
Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 6% ($2,740 vs. $2,578).

Family structure: No impact on marital status. Births and
abortions not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

Long-term single-parent families - rural counties
Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Direct child care paid to provider; 3) Earnings disregard
enhancement; 4) Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant; 5) Work requirements: younger
child; 6) Work-trigger time limit.
Universe: Single, long-term
recipients in rural counties

Random Assignment: 4/94 to
3/96.

Follow-up: 3 years.

Earnings: No impact.

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment rate:
Year 1: Increase of 37% (44% vs. 32%).
Year 2: Increase of 13% (50% vs. 45%).
Year 3 (quarter 10): No impact.

Cash assistance: Average quarterly benefits:
Year 1: Increase of 16% ($1,915 vs. $1,646).
Year 2: Increase of 33% ($1,583 vs. $1,192).
Year 3 (quarter 10): Increase of 37% ($1,345 vs. $983).

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Participation in welfare-to-work
requirement: For experimental
group, parents with a child age 1
or older (on welfare rolls for 2
years). For control group,
parents of child age 3 or older.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Income: Average quarterly income:
Year 1: Increase of 18% ($2,579 vs. $2,182).
Year 3 (quarter 10): Increase of 20% ($2,563 vs. $2,143).

Family structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

New Jersey: Family Development Program (FDP)
A Final Report on the Impact of New Jersey's Family Development Program: Experimental -
Control Group Analysis, October 1998.
Author: Rutgers University
Sites: Ten Counties in New Jersey: Atlantic, Camden, Cumberland, Essex, Hudson, Mercer,
Middlesex, Monmouth, Passaic, and Union.
Policy Changes: 1) Continued benefits to families with stepfathers as long as family income below
150% of state's need standard; 2) Family cap; 3) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid); 4)
Work requirements: younger child.
Universe: AFDC families.

Random assignment: 10/92 -
12/94

Follow-up: Varies. Up to 17
quarters (for cases ongoing
10/92).

Participation in welfare-to-work
program: For experimental
group, parents of children age 2
or older. For control group,
parents of children age 3 or
older.

Data Type:
Administrative data
Earnings: Ongoing cases: No impact over 4-year follow-up
period.
Year 1: Decrease of 25% ($522 vs. $695).
Year 2: Decrease of 18% ($1,522 vs. $1,848).
New cases: No impact over 4-year follow-up period.
Year 3: Decrease of 13% ($2,953 vs. $3,407).
Year 4: Decrease of 14% ($3,966 vs. $4,605).

Employment rate: No impact.

Cash assistance: No impact.

Income: Not reported.

Family structure: Decrease in births. For new cases an increase in
abortions and in use of contraception. Marital status not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

New York: Child Assistance Program (NY CAP)
The NY CAP: Five-Year Impacts, Costs, and Benefits, November 1996
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sites: Three Counties in New York: Monroe (Rochester), Niagra (Niagra Falls) and Suffolk (Long
Island).
Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase (no resource limit); 2) Earnings disregard enhancement; 3)
Food stamp cash out; 4) No child support pass-through.
Universe: Single-parent AFDC
cases.

Random Assignment: 4/89 -
3/90.

Follow-up: 5 years.

Earnings: Increase of 20% ($15,882 vs. $13,268).

Employment rate: Increase of 13% (29% vs. 26%).

Cash assistance: No impact.

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Income: Not reported.

Family structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.
Ohio: Transitions to Independence Demonstration (Ohio JOBS)
JOBS Assignments in Ohio: Patterns and Impacts, December 1994
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sites: 15 counties in Ohio: Brown, Champaign, Clermont, Franklin, Lake, Lawrence, Montgomery,
Perry, Pickaway, Richland, Seneca, Stark, Summit, Trumbull, and Wyandot
Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program.
Universe: JOBS mandatory
adults (for single parents, child
age 6 or older, after 6/91, child
age 3 or older).

Random Assignment: 1/89 -
12/91.

Follow-up: 3 years (early
cohort), 2 years (later entrants).

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.
Earnings: 12th quarter impacts for those assigned to -
Basic education: Decrease of 34% ($410 vs. $624).
Post-secondary education: No impact.
Job club: Increase of 22% ($991 vs. $811).
Job readiness: No impact.
Community Work Experience: No impact.

Employment rate: Employed in 12th quarter for those assigned to:
Basic education: Decrease of 17% (24% vs. 29%).
Post-secondary education: No impact.
Job club: Increase of 28% (42% vs. 33%).
Job readiness: Increase of 14% (39% vs. 34%).
Community Work Experience: No impact.

Cash assistance: Not reported.

Income: Not reported.

Family Formation: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

Ohio: Final Impacts for JOBS and Work Choice, December 1994
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sub-State: Fifteen counties in Ohio for JOBS Demonstration: Brown, Champaign, Clermont,
Franklin, Lake, Lawrence, Montgomery, Perry, Pickaway, Richland, Seneca, Stark, Summit,
Trumbull, and Wyandot; One County for Work Choice: Montgomery County
Ohio Transitions to Independence: Final Impacts for JOBS
Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program.
Universe: Mandatory JOBS
adults (for single parents, caring
for a child age 6 or older).

Random Assignment: 1/89 to
12/91.

Follow-up: Successive cohorts
assigned to treatment and control
groups, beginning in 1989, and
followed for 1, 2, or 3 years.

Earnings: Early entrants: No impact.
Later entrants-
Year 1: Decrease of 14% ($2,003 vs. $2,322).
Year 2: Decrease of 14% ($2,939 vs. $3,421).

Employment rate: Early entrants: Increase of 8% (61% vs. 57%).
Later entrants: No impact over follow-up period.
Year 2: Decrease of 7% (46% vs. 49%).

Cash assistance: No impact.

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Data Type: Administrative data.
Income: Not reported.

Family formation: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.
Ohio Transitions to Independence: Final Impacts for Work Choice
Policy Changes: 1) Mixed employment/education program.
Universe: AFDC
recipients with young children
(1-5 years old).

Random Assignment: 1/89 -
3/90.

Follow-up: 18 months for early
entrants; 1 year for later cohort.

Data Type: Administrative data.

Earnings: Early entrants: Increase of 14%
($1,484 vs. $1,307).
Later entrants: Decrease of 19% ($800 vs. $$922).

Employment rate: Early entrants: Increase of 9% (41% vs. 38%).
Later entrants: No impact.

Cash assistance: No impact.

Income: Not reported.

Family formation: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.

Ohio: Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP)
Final Report on Ohio's Welfare Initiative to Improve School Attendance Among Teenage Parents:
Ohio's Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) Program, August 1997
Author(s): Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Policy Changes: 1) Personal responsibility sanctions; 2) School attendance bonus.
Universe: Pregnant teenagers
and custodial teen parents who
were on AFDC.

Earnings: No impact over 4-year follow-up period.
Increase in quarters 3-4 of 25% ($315 vs. $252).

Random Assignment: 8/90 -
9/91.

Follow-up: 4 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Survey.

Employment rate: No impact over 4 year follow-up period.
Increase in percent ever employed quarters 5-8 of 8% (44% vs.
41%).

Cash assistance: Years 3 and 4: Decrease of 5%
($5,185 vs. $5,459).

Income: No impact.

Family formation: No impact on births or marital status.
Among teens who were applicants, decrease in pregnancy
(8% v. 15%).

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.
Texas: Achieving Change for Texans (ACT)/TANF
Achieving Change for Texans Evaluation: Net Impacts Through December 1997, August 1998
Author: Texas Department of Health and Human Services
Texas ACT: Time Limits
TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Personal responsibility sanctions; 3) Time limit (adult-
only); 4) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and child care); 5) Two-parent family eligibility.
Universe: TANF recipients.

Random assignment:
6/96 - 12/97.

Follow-up: Varies.

Earnings: No impact.

Employment rate: No impact.

Cash assistance: No impact.

Income: Not reported.

Family structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.
Participation in welfare-to-work
requirement:
For experimental group, parents
of child age 4 or older (5 in some
cases). For control group,
parents of child age 3 or older.

Data Type: Administrative data.

Texas ACT: Responsibilities, Employment, and Resources in Choices Counties
Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Personal responsibility sanctions; 3) Transitional benefits
extension (Medicaid and child care); 4) Two-parent family eligibility.
Universe: TANF families.

Random assignment: 7/96 -
12/97.

Follow-up: Varies.

Participation in welfare-to-work
requirement: For experimental
group, parents of child age 4 or
older (5 in some cases). For
control group, parents of child
age 3 or older.

Data Type: Administrative data.

Earnings: No impact.

Employment rate: No impact.

Cash assistance: Decrease in time on TANF. The proportion of
time spent on TANF out of the maximum possible was 55% for
the experimental group, 57% for the control group.

Income: Not reported.

Family formation: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not
reported.

Vermont: Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP):
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Sites Statewide (VT) with detailed focus on 6 of Vermont's 12 districts: Barre, Burlington,
Newport, Rutland, Springfield, and St. Albans .
Single-parent families
Policy Changes: 1) Work-trigger time limit (30 months work or community service); 2) Earnings
disregard enhancement; 3) Asset limit increase; 4) Child support pass-through (only first $50
disregarded); 5) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and child care).

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Universe: Families applying for
and receiving assistance.

Random assignment: 7/94 -
6/95.

Follow-up: 6 years (Family
structure and child well-being
outcomes at 42 months).

Data Type: Administrative Data.
Earnings: Average annual earnings-- Increase of 9% ($6,005 vs.
$5,497).

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment-Increase of
12% (52% vs. 47%).

Cash assistance:
Average annual cash benefits-Decrease of 12% ($2,310 vs.
$2,609).

Income: No impact.

Family structure: No impact.

Child well-being outcomes: Reduced school absences for children
age 10 to 13. Increase percent of adolescents that had trouble with
the police.
Single-parent families: Without mandated participation
Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Child support pass-through (only first $50 disregarded);
3) Earnings disregard enhancement; 4) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and child care).
Universe: Families applying for
and receiving assistance.

Random assignment: 7/94 to
6/95.

Follow-up: 6 years (Child well-
being outcomes at 42 months.

Data Type: Administrative Data.
Earnings: No impact.

Employment rate: No impact.

Cash assistance: No impact.

Income: No impact.

Family Structure: Increase in likelihood of being married and
living with a spouse. No impact on childbearing.

Child well-being outcomes: Increase in absenteeism from school
for adolescents. Increase in percent of adolescents having trouble
with the police.

Virginia: Independence Program
Impacts of the Virginia Initiative for Employment, Not Welfare, January 2002
Author: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Sites: Three counties in Virginia: Lynchburg, Prince William, and Petersburg (VIEW counties).
Lynchburg
Policy Changes: 1) Work requirements: younger child; 2) Work-trigger time limit (Work or
community service after 90 days); 3) Asset limit increase; 4) Earnings disregard enhancement; 5)
Employment-focused program; 6) Family cap; 7) Personal responsibility sanctions; 8) Required
minor parents to live with an adult; 9) Time limit; 10) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and
child care); 11) Two-parent family eligibility; 12) Welfare diversion.
Universe: AFDC cases that
were on the rolls as of 7/95 and
were Virginia Initiative for
Employment Not Welfare
(VIEW) mandatory (able-
bodied, child 18 months or
older.)

Earnings: Quarter 9-No impact.

Employment rate: Quarter 9-Increase of 9 percentage points or
16% (65% vs. 56%).

Cash assistance: Quarter 9-No impact. (Statistically significant
reductions in cash receipt in quarters 12-14 as recipients began
reaching the time limit.)

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Random Assignment: 7/95.
View implemented in 10/95.

Follow-up: 3 � years from
random assignment. Control
group subject to VIEW rules
beginning quarter 10.

Participation in welfare-to-work
requirement: Applies to all
VIEW mandatory recipients (full
study sample).

Data Type: Administrative Data.
Income: Quarter 9- No impact. (No impact in later quarters even
after application of the time limit.)

Family structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.
Prince William
Policy Changes: 1) Work requirements: younger child; 2) Work-trigger time limit
(Work or community service within 90 days); 3) Asset limit increase; 4) Earnings disregard
enhancement; 5) Employment-focused program; 6) Family cap; 7) Personal responsibility sanctions;
8) Required minor parents to live with an adult; 9) Time limit; 10) Transitional benefits extension
(Medicaid and child care); 11) Two-parent family eligibility; 12) Welfare diversion.
Universe: AFDC cases that
were on the rolls as of 7/95 and
were VIEW mandatory (able-
bodied, child 18 months or
older).

Random Assignment: 7/95.
VIEW implemented 4/96
(Quarter 4).

Follow-up: 3 � years from
random assignment. Control
group subject to VIEW rules
beginning in quarter 10.

Participation in welfare-to-work
requirement: All VIEW
mandatory recipients (full study
sample).

Data Type: Administrative Data.

Earnings: Quarter 9-No impact.

Employment rate: Quarter 9-Increase of 5 percentage points or 9%
(58% vs. 53%).

Cash assistance: Quarter 9- No impact.

Income: Quarter 9-No impact.

Family structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.
Petersburg (Post VIEW)
Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Earnings disregard enhancement; 3) Employment-
focused program; 4) Family cap; 5) Personal responsibility sanctions; 6) Required minor parents to
live with an adult; 7) Time limit; 8) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and child care); 9)
Two-parent family eligibility; 10) Welfare diversion; 11) Work requirements: younger child; 12)
Work-trigger time limit.

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-
continued
Universe: AFDC cases
that were on the rolls as
of 7/95 and VIEW
mandatory (able-bodied and
child 18 months and older).

Random Assignment: 7/95.
VIEW
implemented 1/97 .
(Quarter 7)

Follow-up: 3 � years
from random assignment.
Control group subject to VIEW
rules beginning in quarter 10.

Data Type: Administrative data.
Earnings: Quarter 9- Increase of 17% ($1,394 vs. $1,191).

Employment rate: Quarter 9-Increase of 12 percentage points or
23% (65% vs. 53%).

Cash assistance: No impact.

Income: No impact.

Family structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported.
Wisconsin: Milwaukee's New Hope Demonstration Project
New Hope for People With Low Incomes: Two-Year Results of a Program to Reduce Poverty and
Reform Welfare, April 1999
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Site: Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Policy Changes: 1) Paid child care; 2) Paid health insurance; 3) Wage supplementation.
Universe: Low-income adult
volunteers (below 150% of
poverty) living in two high-
poverty neighborhoods in
Milwaukee.

Random Assignment: 8/94 -
2/95.

Follow-up: 2 years.

Data Type: Administrative data
Ethnography
Survey.
Earnings: Full sample: No impact over 2-year follow-up period.
Year 1: Increase of 9% ($6,833 vs. $6,250).
Employed full-time entering program: No impact.
Not employed full-time entering program: Increase of 13%
($11,898 vs. $10,509).

Employment rate: Full sample: Increase of 6% (96% vs. 90%).
Employed full-time entering program: No impact.
Not employed full-time entering program: Increase of 7% (94%
vs. 87%).

Cash assistance: Full sample: No impact.
Employed full-time entering program: No impact over 2-year
follow-up period.
Year 2: Decrease of 38% ($736 vs. $1,181).
Not employed full-time entering program: No impact.

Income: Not reported for the full sample.
Employed full-time entering program: Decrease of 8% ($14,146
vs. $15,294) in year 2.
Not employed full-time entering program: Increase of 13%
($11,213 vs. $9,915).

Family Structure: Not reported.

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts on some behavioral
measures from both parents and teachers, though teachers reported
unfavorable impacts on aggression and frequency of disciplinary
action for girls. Favorable impact on academic achievement
reported for boys.
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
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A comparison of AFDC/TANF administrative statistics and CPS-estimated caseload counts
suggests that the CPS undercounts actual cases, and that the CPS undercount has worsened in recent
years. From 1987 to 1991, the CPS accounted for roughly 80 percent of the AFDC administrative
caseload count, but by 2001 the CPS was capturing only about 60 percent. Worsened reporting of
cash welfare on the CPS makes it difficult to gauge how much of the drop in welfare receipt among
single mothers represents eligible families who do not receive assistance, rather than families who
do not report actual welfare aid on the CPS. To at least some extent, the declining welfare
recipiency rates discussed in this section are likely due to increased underreporting of cash welfare
on the CPS. See Bavier (2000) for a detailed discussion of cash welfare underreporting on the CPS
and other surveys.
Note that the value of the EIC on the CPS is based on U.S.Census Bureau imputations, rather than
actual reported tax credits. Also, the EIC is different than most sources of income, as most families
receive the EIC as a lump-sum refund
In addition to the analysis which follows, see: Primus et al. (1999); Bavier (1999); and Haskins
(2001) for other research discussing recent declines in income among the poorest families.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001).
For a policy to have an impact, it must be determined that the impact was not simply a chance
occurrence. That is, the difference must be determined to be "statistically significant." Differences
between experimental and control groups that pass statistical significance tests are reported as policy
impacts. Whether a difference is determined to be an impact generally depends on two factors: the
size of the difference between the experimental and control groups, and the size of the sample in the
evaluation. Impact evaluations with smaller research samples tend to report fewer impacts. In these
smaller samples, the difference may need to be substantial in order to pass tests of statistical
significance. On the other hand, impact evaluations with larger research samples tend to report more
policy impacts.
A few evaluations used more than one "experimental group" to attempt to disentangle the effects of
a package of policy initiatives. For example, in the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP)
and the Vermont Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP), participants in a third comparison group
(besides the regular experimental and control groups) were subject to the same policy initiatives as
the experimental group, but were also subject to an additional policy initiative (for example, a
requirement to work after 6 months of assistance). With the same random assignment and basic
assumptions, any observed differences between the two experimental groups may be attributed to the
additional policy initiative. In the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS)
evaluation, the control group was not subject to a work requirement, one experimental group was
subject to a package of work first initiatives and a second experimental group was subject to a
package of basic education initiatives. Any observed differences between each of the experimental
groups and the control group could be attributed to the different package of initiatives. The goal of
this evaluation design was to measure the effect of a program that stressed work-first versus a
program that focused more specifically on education.
Danziger, S., Haveman, R. & Plotnick, R. (1981) How income transfer programs affect work,
savings, and the income distribution. Journal of Economic Literature, 29, 975-1028.
For an overview of theoretical issues of the labor supply of women, see: Killingsworth, M. &
Heckman, J. (1986). Female labor supply: A survey. In O. Ashenfelter & P. Layard (Eds.),
Handbook of Labor Economics (Volume 1). New York: North Holland. For a discussion of theory of
the allocation of time between market activities (work) and domestic activities, see: Becker, G.
(1965). A theory of the allocation of time. Economic Journal, 75, 493-517.
Ibid. See also Moffitt, R. (1992). Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review. Journal
of Economic Literature, 20, 1-61. (Hereafter cited as, "Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare
System.")
Moffitt, Incentive effects of the U.S. welfare system.
See: Willis, R. (1986). Wage Determinants: A Survey and Reinterpretation of Human Capital
Earnings Functions. In O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics
(Volume I). New York: North Holland. Earnings and earnings capacities of individuals are usually
analyzed using "human capital theory," which relates to wages to the skills individuals bring to a
job. See Becker, G. (1964). Human Capital. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. The most
common empirical model of wages was developed by Mincer and Polachek (1974), with earnings
estimated as a function of schooling and job experience. See: Mincer, J., & Polachek, S. (1974).
Family investments in human capital: Earnings of women. Journal of Political Economy, 82, S76-
S108. For estimates of earnings capacities for single women with children, see: Haveman, R., &
Buron, L. (1993). Escaping poverty through work: The problem of low earnings capacity in the
United States, 1973-88, Review of Income and Wealth (Series 39), 141-157.
Brooks-Gunn, J., Duncan, G., & Maritato, N. (1997). Poor families, poor outcomes; The well
being of children and youth. In G. Duncan and J. Brooks-Gunn (Eds.), Consequences of Growing
up Poor. New York: Russell Sage.
Child Trends. (1999). Children and welfare reform: A guide to evaluating the effects of State
welfare reform policies. Washington, DC: Author.
Bachrach, C. (1998). The changing circumstances of marriage and fertility in the United States.
In R. Moffitt, (Ed.), Welfare, the family, and reproductive behavior: Research perspectives.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Becker, G., Landes, E., & Michael, R. (1977). An economic analysis of marital instability.
Journal of Political Economy, 85(6), 1141-1188.
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