

MISSOURI.

Harvey B. Garver to be postmaster at Fulton, in the county of Callaway and State of Missouri, in place of William W. Arnold. Incumbent's commission expired May 8, 1906.

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

John B. Cooper to be postmaster at Newport, in the county of Sullivan and State of New Hampshire, in place of Elisha H. Carr. Incumbent's commission expires June 5, 1906.

John A. Spalding to be postmaster at Nashua, in the county of Hillsboro and State of New Hampshire, in place of John A. Spalding. Incumbent's commission expires June 25, 1906.

NEW JERSEY.

James P. Van Schoick to be postmaster at Manasquan, in the county of Monmouth and State of New Jersey, in place of James E. Cook, removed.

NEW YORK.

Alton C. Bates to be postmaster at Springville, in the county of Erie and State of New York, in place of Alonzo E. Hadley, deceased.

Albert E. Bonesteel to be postmaster at Troy, in the county of Rensselaer and State of New York, in place of Joseph A. Leggett. Incumbent's commission expires June 10, 1906.

John P. Herrick to be postmaster at Bolivar, in the county of Allegany and State of New York, in place of John P. Herrick. Incumbent's commission expires May 27, 1906.

NORTH CAROLINA.

Thomas F. Seehorn to be postmaster at Lenoir, in the county of Caldwell and State of North Carolina, in place of Thomas F. Seehorn. Incumbent's commission expired March 1, 1906.

PORTO RICO.

Robert A. Miller to be postmaster at Ponce, in the county of Ponce, Porto Rico, in place of Robert A. Miller. Incumbent's commission expired March 2, 1905.

TENNESSEE.

Reuben Hurtt to be postmaster at Harriman, in the county of Roane and State of Tennessee, in place of Isaac A. Hill. Incumbent's commission expires June 9, 1906.

TEXAS.

Theodore Ray to be postmaster at Midland, in the county of Midland and State of Texas, in place of Theodore Ray. Incumbent's commission expired February 17, 1906.

VIRGINIA.

John M. Sloan to be postmaster at Chase City, in the county of Mecklenburg and State of Virginia, in place of John M. Sloan. Incumbent's commission expires June 24, 1906.

CONFIRMATIONS.

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate May 16, 1906.

ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF GENERAL LAND OFFICE.

George F. Pollock, of North Lawrence, Ohio, to be Assistant Commissioner of the General Land Office.

REGISTER OF THE TREASURY.

William T. Vernon, of Kansas, to be Register of the Treasury.

PROMOTIONS IN THE ARMY.

Infantry Arm.

Lieut. Col. James E. Macklin, Third Infantry, to be colonel from May 8, 1906.

Maj. Lea Febiger, detailed inspector-general, to be lieutenant-colonel of infantry from May 8, 1906.

Corps of Engineers.

Lieut. Col. James B. Quinn, Corps of Engineers, to be colonel from May 5, 1906.

Maj. George McC. Derby, Corps of Engineers, to be lieutenant-colonel from May 5, 1906.

Capt. Clement A. F. Flagler, Corps of Engineers, to be major from May 5, 1906.

First Lieut. Gustave R. Lukesh, Corps of Engineers, to be captain from May 5, 1906.

Second Lieut. Robert P. Howell, jr., Corps of Engineers, to be first lieutenant from May 5, 1906.

POSTMASTERS.

INDIAN TERRITORY.

William H. Hilton to be postmaster at Durant, in district 25, Indian Territory.

IOWA.

Hans Keiser to be postmaster at Elgin, in the county of Fayette and State of Iowa.

KANSAS.

William E. Menoher to be postmaster at Lincoln, in the county of Lincoln and State of Kansas.

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

John A. Spalding to be postmaster at Nashua, in the State of New Hampshire.

NEW YORK.

Reuben F. Hoff to be postmaster at Union Springs, in the county of Cayuga and State of New York.

J. Fenton Olive to be postmaster at Cuba, in the county of Allegany and State of New York.

David O. Williams to be postmaster at Mount Vernon, in the county of Westchester and State of New York.

OHIO.

James D. Carpenter to be postmaster at Lodi, in the county of Medina and State of Ohio.

Eliza B. Lockwood to be postmaster at Bedford, in the county of Cuyahoga and State of Ohio.

James H. Rabbitts to be postmaster at Springfield, in the county of Clark and State of Ohio.

TEXAS.

George W. Hill to be postmaster at Saratoga, in the county of Hardin and State of Texas.

William M. Nagle to be postmaster at Denison, in the county of Grayson and State of Texas.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

WEDNESDAY, May 16, 1906.

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

Prayer by the Chaplain, Rev. HENRY N. COUDEN, D. D.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read.

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I move that the Journal be approved.

The motion was agreed to.

WITHDRAWAL OF PAPERS.

Mr. JOHNSON asked leave to withdraw from the files of the House, without leaving copies, papers in the case of Sarah Young, H. R. 19098, first session, Fifty-ninth Congress, no adverse report having been made thereon.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I object.

Mr. JOHNSON. I move, Mr. Speaker, that the request be granted.

The motion was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Chair directs the Clerk to read section 7, Rule XIV.

The Clerk read as follows:

While the Speaker is putting a question or addressing the House no Member shall walk out of or across the Hall, nor, when a Member is speaking, pass between him and the Chair; and during the session of the House no Member shall wear his hat, or remain by the Clerk's desk during the call of the roll or the counting of ballots, or smoke upon the floor of the House; and the Sergeant-at-Arms and Doorkeeper are charged with the strict enforcement of this clause. Neither shall any person be allowed to smoke upon the floor of the House at any time.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk has instructed the Sergeant-at-Arms and Doorkeeper to see that the rule is enforced.

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the naval appropriation bill.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. WILLIAMS) there were—ayes 115, noes 12.

Mr. WILLIAMS. No quorum, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. The Chair will count. [After counting.] Two hundred and twelve Members present—a quorum. The ayes have it, and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. CRUMPACKER] will take the chair.

The Clerk read as follows:

One first-class battle ship, carrying as heavy armor and as powerful armament as any known vessel of its class, to have the highest practicable speed and greatest practicable radius of action, and to cost, exclusive of armament and armor, not exceeding \$8,000,000: *Provided*, That before approving any plans or specifications for the construction of such battle ship the Secretary of the Navy shall afford, by advertisement or otherwise, in his discretion, a reasonable opportunity to any competent constructor who may desire so to do, to submit plans and specifications for his consideration, for which said plans, should the same be used by the Department and be not submitted by or on behalf of a successful bidder for the contract, such compensation shall be paid as the Secretary of the Navy shall deem just and equitable out of the amount herein appropriated under the head "Contingent, Navy."

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the paragraph beginning on line 25, page 71, and ending with line 14, on page 72.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Beginning on line 25, page 71, strike out line 25 and all of lines 1 to 14, inclusive, on page 72.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be again reported, as there was so much confusion in the House we could not hear it.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the Clerk will again read the amendment.

The Clerk again read the amendment.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest to the gentleman from Ohio that we agree upon a time for debate for and against this amendment, and I would suggest that we have forty minutes on each side.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. As far as I am concerned, I shall not require any considerable amount of time, but there are other Members who desire to speak.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment to the same section, and I would like to ask whether the forty minutes would include my amendment?

Mr. TAWNEY. Oh, no; the time suggested is for this amendment alone.

Mr. SLAYDEN. I would like to ask the chairman of the committee to be a little more generous; I would like to have ten or twelve minutes myself.

Mr. SULZER. I suggest to the gentleman from Illinois that he make it one hour on each side.

Mr. FOSS. I suggest that there are other propositions in this bill that immediately follow which I think will consume the rest of the day.

Mr. SLAYDEN. But this is the most important proposition in the bill.

Mr. FOSS. We are only seeking to limit the time upon this amendment. Of course there will be other amendments offered to this paragraph.

Mr. SLAYDEN. This, I will say, is the most important amendment, and I think that we ought to have an hour on each side.

Mr. RIXEY. I think the debate on this amendment will do away with other amendments to the same paragraph.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that the sentiment here seems to be that we have debate of an hour on each side, I will modify the request and ask that debate be allowed on each side, one hour to be controlled by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON] and the other hour to be controlled by myself.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois asks unanimous consent that debate upon the pending paragraph be continued for one hour on a side, two hours in the aggregate, one half to be controlled by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOSS] and the other half to be controlled by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON].

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman, I understood the request was on the pending amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understood it to be on the paragraph.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I understand it to be on this amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio.

The CHAIRMAN. The request will be modified accordingly. Is there objection?

Mr. HEPBURN. Mr. Chairman, before I consent to that, I would like to know from the gentleman who has charge of this bill how much more time will probably be consumed.

Mr. FOSS. Well, following this, Mr. Chairman, is the provision with reference to torpedo-boat destroyers and also submarine boats. It is quite likely that that would take an hour or perhaps longer, and then in connection with this paragraph of the increase of the Navy comes the provisions increasing the limit of cost on colliers and training ships and on the battle ship *Connecticut*, and I should say that that is likely to take an hour. Then comes the armor-plate proposition, and it was in view of this fact that I desire to limit this debate at the start to forty minutes on a side, if I could, in order to get through to-day.

Mr. HEPBURN. Mr. Chairman, we have an excellent rule for limiting debate on this question. We have had general debate, and the gentlemen who seem to be most anxious for the extension of this time have each of them had an hour or more in the discussion of this subject. I desire to remind the gentlemen that there are a number of important bills waiting the removal of this one from the consideration of the House, and up to this time I have not noticed that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOSS], who has charge of this bill, has sought in any way to limit or terminate this interminable debate. I therefore object.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Iowa objects. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, in support of the motion to strike out the provision for this battle ship, I desire to present in the first instance several practical considerations.

The first one is this, that we have now a programme for the construction of battle ships which will not be completed before the 1st day of January, 1910, so that already provision has been made for the construction of battle ships for nearly four years to come; and, as was conceded in the general discussion, the average delay on ships of this class is at least two years, and it will therefore be January 1, 1912, before the battle ships now provided for, all but two of which are under construction, will be completed. No man can tell what changes there will be in naval architecture during that time. Even more important, no one can tell what changes there will be in the relations of nations of the earth in the settlements of disputes in that time. If the cause of arbitration, if the making of arbitration treaties, continues at the same pace as from the beginning of the century, we may indulge the hope that by January 1, 1912, there will be a general agreement on the part of the strongest nations to suspend further increase of their navies and armies. The next point to which I wish to call attention is the fact that we are making provision for a battle ship the plan of construction of which, the efficiency of which, I may say the success of which, is altogether uncertain and problematical. Skillful naval architects have said that a boat of this size would merely afford a greater amount of surface to shoot at, and that it would be of no substantial advantage over the smaller boats now under construction and in use. Another practical point to which I call attention is this, that in our programme for construction we are altogether outstripping the provision for manning the boats. According to the report that is filed here, the Navy lacks 5,500 men. What is the sensible course to pursue under the circumstances? Is it to go on and on increasing the number of battle ships, or is it to stop a while and get sailors, gunners, and mechanics to man them? Nothing could be more expressive on this subject than the message of President Roosevelt as presented to us last December. He said:

Modern war ships are most formidable mechanisms when well handled, but they are utterly useless when not well handled; and they can not be handled at all without long and careful training.

Again he says:

To put a new and untrained crew upon the most powerful battle ship and send it out to meet a formidable enemy is not only to invite but to insure disaster and disgrace. To improvise crews at the outbreak of a war, so far as the serious fighting craft are concerned, is absolutely hopeless. If the officers and men are not thoroughly skilled in, and have not been thoroughly trained to, their duties, it would be far better to keep the ships in port during hostilities than to send them against a formidable opponent, for the result could only be that they would be either sunk or captured.

Whether it is because the genius of our people is not such that young men desire to enlist in the Navy, or what it may be, we are very much short of men, but here, with this unequal pace, we are maintaining construction altogether out of proportion with the essential service of manning the boats. I desire to call attention to the report of the Committee on Naval Affairs upon the tonnage of war ships, the construction of which is under way. I will concede that in some small degree that is explained by the slower construction in this country, but it appears by the programme here filed with the report, that on November 1, 1905, there was building of tonnage for war ships in Great Britain, 234,600 tons; of France, 181,000 tons, and Germany, 121,000 tons, and in the United States, 313,000 tons.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio has expired.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. I ask unanimous consent for one minute.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio asks unanimous consent to continue for one minute? Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. Thus it appears that there is already under construction in this country—and there are two battle ships not yet contracted for—nearly 80,000 tons more than in Great Britain, and 10,000 tons more than in Germany and in France combined. Is it not time, gentlemen of the committee, to call a halt in this ambitious naval programme of construction? [Applause.]

Mr. VREELAND. I desire to ask the gentleman a question, if he will yield.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. My time has expired.

Mr. VREELAND. I ask that the time of the gentleman from Ohio be extended for one minute.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from New York.

Mr. VREELAND. I rose for the purpose of asking a question of the gentleman from Ohio.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman can ask it in his own time.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. It is immaterial to me.

Mr. VREELAND. I want to ask the gentleman from Ohio if he thinks he was entirely fair to use the old figures of the

amount of construction in the United States as compared with Great Britain or France or Germany, when he knows that we have now ships not yet launched authorized six years ago; when he knows that any one of the three nations, counting the vessels that they have finished in this time as well as what has been authorized in this time, in the case of Great Britain will show three times the amount that they have now building compared with the United States?

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. If the gentleman had done me the honor to listen to what I said, the gentleman would have heard me say it was to be conceded that the ships in those countries were constructed more rapidly than in ours; but I want to say to him further, in answer, that this slowness in our programme is the very strongest argument why we should not authorize this battle ship, because no one can tell what changes in naval architecture will occur between now and the time the battle ships we provide for are finished.

Mr. VREELAND. Is not the fact we are building so slowly rather a reason why we should at least keep authorizing one ship to be built each year?

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. By no means. When the construction of that boat will not commence for five or six or seven years after the date when we authorize it? Let us wait until we are near the time for beginning, and then we can settle the question wisely.

Mr. VREELAND. The gentleman knows the plans for building the great ship we authorize this year must be commenced at once, and that it may be a year and a half before the Navy Department is prepared to contract for building that ship.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. It seems to me that in prompt and efficient methods of administration there would not be so great a delay, but even if that is the case, there is ample time after this session or after this Congress to decide that question in time to commence when the present programme for battle ships is completed.

Mr. VREELAND. We are not obliged to wait and start this ship until the others are completed. We have plenty of yards where work can be commenced.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. Ah, as the gentleman and members of his committee have been stating to us, there was to be an abatement of the naval programme. If they intend to double by building this ship contemporaneously with the others, I think the committee should know it. If we intend to carry on the construction of this boat contemporaneously with the building of the other battle ships, that, of course, is an argument why you are not expecting to abate your naval programme, but to increase it.

Mr. VREELAND. I desire only to say in reply to the gentleman from Ohio that the building operations authorized this year, as he must know if he has given it attention, at the end of twenty years will leave the American Navy less strong than it is to-day. That is the programme, and it is a programme of moderation. It does not contemplate an increase in the Navy, but contemplates the building of such ships as will keep it up to its present strength only.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I believe it is in order to consider, first, amendments to perfect the bill or perfect the clause before amendments to strike out. With that idea in view, I wish to offer an amendment, which I shall read:

Insert, after the word "Navy," in line 14, page 72, the following: "Provided further, That whereas the British sea monster which we are imitating has been named the Dreadnaught—an archaic name—this man-of-war is hereby named the Skeered o' Nothin' as an expression of our true American spirit: Provided further, That it is hereby made the duty of the first captain who shall command her to challenge, in the nation's name, the so-called 'Dreadnaught' to a duel à l'outrance, to take place upon the sea somewhere in sight of Long Island, and that upon the occasion of the combat the President and his Cabinet, except, of course, the Secretary of Agriculture, who is ex officio a non-combatant, being all of them fond of a strenuous life, shall be entertained on the quarter-deck as guests of the ship and of the nation."

My object in offering this amendment, Mr. Chairman, is—

Mr. OLMSTED. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order.

Mr. WILLIAMS (continuing). To emphasize to all the world our courage and our new national spirit—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania makes the point of order against the amendment.

Mr. WILLIAMS. A point of order? Upon what ground? It is perfectly germane. It does not change existing law. It is not new legislation. The amendment is a mere expression of the true American spirit as we have lately discovered it. Now, to go on from point to point conquering the world as a true imperial power we ought to serve notice upon the nations of the world that we are not only ready to meet them, our Navy with their navy, but our big sea monster against their big sea monster. We have the men prepared to man her, we have the officers prepared to command her, and we have the Chief of the

nation and the Cabinet ready and anxious to be on the quarter-deck while the fun is going on. [Laughter and applause.]

Mr. OLMSTED. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WILLIAMS] is not discussing the question.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania makes the point of order that the gentleman from Mississippi is not discussing the question.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I am discussing the amendment itself.

The CHAIRMAN. The question before the committee is the question of order. The Chair is prepared to rule.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Upon what ground does the gentleman base his point of order?

Mr. OLMSTED. Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the gentleman from Mississippi is a plain violation of the rule of this House. There is an act of Congress providing how vessels shall be named. The whole amendment is in the form of legislation and in plain violation of the rule and requires no discussion.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, this is rather a critical and acute sort of stage of naval procedure at which we have arrived. We are starting now on a new line of departure, to which the old law does not apply, as I think the Chair will readily see.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no provision of law to meet these new and acute exigencies that the gentleman speaks about. The amendment is clearly out of order. The Chair sustains the point of order.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Such is my respect for the bona fides and good faith of the Chairman that I will not appeal from the decision of the Chair. But, it seems to me, this amendment ought to be considered. [Applause.]

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to correct, at this stage of the debate, one impression which the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON] has evidently made to this House.

Without debating the question at this time, I wish to state that the impression which the gentleman has given the committee is one as to present construction. I submit that it is hardly fair, as the gentleman from New York [Mr. VREELAND] has stated, to take the amount of tonnage which we are building at the present time and compare it with what England is building at the present time, or France or Germany, in a single year. The only fair statement to make is to take it for a number of years. For instance, take it for five years upon the amount of tonnage authorized by the different nations. Now, during the last five years England has authorized 663,990 tons of ships; the United States, 339,648.

That is all I desire to state at this time.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. May I ask the gentleman to state what the authorization is in France and Germany, if he has that information at hand?

Mr. FOSS. Germany, 284,589; France, 230,868; Japan, 206,593—during the last five years.

Mr. TAWNEY. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Debate on the amendment is exhausted.

Mr. TAWNEY. Mr. Chairman, in speaking in favor of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON] striking from this bill the provision authorizing a \$10,000,000 battle ship, I do so not because I am opposed to building and maintaining a navy of sufficient size to meet all the necessities of the Government under any and all conditions, nor because I believe we have reached the era of universal peace. I do so, Mr. Chairman, because I am not in sympathy with the policy just announced by the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs or the policy advocated by the Administration. Under their policy the size of our Navy is to be determined relatively by the size of the navies of other countries regardless of our own necessity. I do not believe that the American Congress is justified in proceeding upon the theory that, because other countries have authorized so much naval construction this year or last year, we should authorize a like amount. The policy implies a total disregard of necessity or expense and that, like children competing for the most glittering and expensive toys, we must compete with the nations of the world in the construction of the largest and most expensive battle ships in order to satisfy our national pride—vanity. [Applause.]

Mr. FOSS. May I interrupt the gentleman?

Mr. TAWNEY. I have only a few minutes.

Mr. FOSS. The question of comparison was brought up by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON] and not by "the gentleman from Illinois."

Mr. TAWNEY. The gentleman from Illinois gave that as one of the reasons, and so did the gentleman from New York [Mr. VREELAND], for the necessity for this battle ship of unprecedented size. Neither of them, however, mentioned the fact that only recently England condemned seventy of her naval vessels

and sent them to the scrap pile; nor did they mention the extent to which this competition with the principal nations of the world is to be extended. We have under construction to-day thirty-eight vessels of all classes, with a displacement of 384,780 tons. We have constructed, all told, 270 vessels, with a displacement of 711,262 tons. In other words, we have to-day in course of construction more than 50 per cent of the total tonnage of our present Navy. These thirty-eight vessels will not all be completed until 1910, and possibly not until 1912. Before that, the plan of naval construction, judging by the past, will have so changed that the plan of this battle ship will be comparatively obsolete, and, like the vessels of the English navy, will be on the way to the scrap pile.

Mr. Chairman, I insist that because of the large number of vessels now under construction, with an aggregate tonnage of more than half of our present Navy, there is no necessity for Congress at this session to authorize the construction of a naval vessel which it is popularly claimed will cost \$10,000,000, or twice the cost of any battle ship we now have or that we have heretofore authorized. [Applause.]

THE COST OF MAINTENANCE.

But, Mr. Chairman, will the people be as unmindful of or as indifferent to the cost of maintaining the Navy when the vessels now authorized are completed and in commission as they are to-day? Do they now know, do the Members of this House know, what it will cost every year to maintain our Navy when in 1910 all the vessels now authorized are completed? Based on the present cost, the estimated cost will then be not less than \$76,091,000 annually. This is merely for maintaining the Navy; it does not include construction or reconstruction. Think of it, Mr. Chairman. That amount is almost as great as the total expenditure of the Government this fiscal year for all governmental purposes outside of the expenditures on account of previous wars and the cost of preparing for wars we anticipate.

The total cost of maintaining a first-class battle ship is, in round numbers, including everything, almost a million dollars annually. We are also told that the life of a battle ship is not to exceed sixteen years. In view of these facts, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully submit that if it is not advisable to halt in our ambitious naval policy, it would at least be wise to mark time for a year or two, or until we can ascertain with some certainty the extent to which we are creating permanent burdens that must be met by taxes collected from the people. [Applause.]

The following statement will show in detail the cost of maintaining our Navy:

Vessels of all types in process of construction	38
Displacement of same	384, 780 tons
Vessels in navy June 30, 1905	270
Displacement of same	711, 262 tons
Present estimated cost of maintenance	\$60, 000, 000
Estimated cost of maintenance when vessels in process of construction are completed	\$76, 591, 000

Statement showing cost of maintenance of a vessel of each type during the fiscal year 1905.

First-class battle ship	\$634, 255. 54
Second-class battle ship	468, 729. 31
Armored cruiser	489, 206. 27
Protected cruiser	395, 624. 97
Monitor	209, 273. 56
Gunboat (1,710 tons)	175, 429. 43
Gunboat (1,177 tons)	133, 314. 46
Gunboat (1,000 tons)	117, 860. 89
Torpedo-boat destroyer	81, 674. 90
Torpedo boat (estimated)	34, 000. 00
Submarine torpedo boat	29, 879. 36

THE EXPENSE OF THE NAVY COMPARED WITH THE COST OF THE PANAMA CANAL.

But, Mr. Chairman, I want to call attention, by comparison, to the rate at which we are annually, in consequence of our ambitious naval policy, expending money. We talk about the Panama Canal being the greatest undertaking any nation on earth has ever attempted. We speak of the cost of that great project almost in a whisper for fear that we may create an impression throughout the world that its enormous cost may impair our national credit or ultimately bankrupt the nation; and yet it may be of interest to Members of this House and to the people of the country to know that the Fifty-seventh and Fifty-eighth Congresses appropriated more than twice as much money for the Navy as it will cost to build the Panama Canal, according to the highest estimate that has yet been submitted. Let me give the exact figures.

Appropriations for the Navy, Fifty-seventh and Fifty-eighth Congresses.

Fifty-seventh Congress, first session:	
Regular appropriation bill	\$78, 101, 791. 00
Deficiency appropriations	6, 280, 760. 80
Total	84, 382, 551. 80

Fifty-seventh Congress, second session:	
Regular appropriation bill	\$81, 876, 791. 43
Deficiency appropriations	2, 795, 257. 30
Total	84, 672, 048. 73
Total, Fifty-seventh Congress	169, 054, 600. 53
Fifty-eighth Congress, second session:	
Regular appropriation bill	97, 505, 140. 94
Deficiency appropriations	6, 127, 974. 46
Total	103, 633, 115. 40
Fifty-eighth Congress, third session:	
Regular appropriation bill	100, 336, 679. 94
Deficiency appropriations	15, 084, 317. 81
Total	115, 420, 997. 75
Total, Fifty-eighth Congress	219, 054, 113. 15
Total regular appropriations and deficiencies, Fifty-seventh and Fifty-eighth Congresses	388, 108, 713. 68

From these figures we see how insignificant is the cost of the Panama Canal when compared with the cost of our Navy, for which, in the Fifty-seventh and Fifty-eighth Congresses, we appropriated \$388,108,713.68. These two Congresses appropriated, therefore, twice as much money for the Navy as the highest estimated cost of the Panama Canal.

Mr. COUSINS. Will the gentleman allow me to ask him a question?

Mr. TAWNEY. I have not the time to yield.

Mr. COUSINS. I was only going to ask the gentleman a question. How much did they appropriate for the Army during the same time?

Mr. TAWNEY. I am about to give the total cost for both establishments.

Mr. Chairman, we have had wars in the past and we are to-day appropriating money in consequence of that fact. I trust, sir, the Members of this House will carefully note the amount we are expending this fiscal year to meet the cost of wars in the past and the amount we are spending this year in anticipation of war. The total amount we are expending on account of previous wars is \$175,957,638, and in anticipation of war \$190,702,081.44. This includes both the naval and military establishments. The total, therefore, expended this fiscal year for previous wars and wars for which we are now preparing is \$375,659,719. Our total revenues for this fiscal year, excluding postal receipts, will not exceed \$589,093,000.

What, then, does this expenditure mean to the people? It means, Mr. Chairman, that we are expending this year for war and in preparation for war 63½ per cent of the total revenue of the Government outside of postal revenues. It means an expenditure this year on account of war \$28,000,000 greater than our total revenue only nine years ago. In other words, 63½ per cent of our entire revenue, exclusive of postal receipts, will be paid this fiscal year on account of our military and naval establishments maintained in anticipation of war and for objects the result of wars in which we have heretofore engaged.

Mr. VREELAND. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. TAWNEY. I have no time.

Mr. VREELAND. The figures you have just given to the committee—

Mr. TAWNEY. I think it would be of interest to the committee to have an itemized statement of these general facts, and I think also that it would be of interest to the country.

Mr. VREELAND. I desire to ask the gentleman if the figures he has just given include pensions?

Mr. TAWNEY. With the permission of the committee, I will give the several items which go to make up this startling total.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will suspend until order is secured.

Mr. TAWNEY. If the committee will extend my time five minutes, I will give all the details.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Mr. VREELAND. I ask unanimous consent that the time of the gentleman be extended five minutes when his time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. TAWNEY. Now I will answer the gentleman from New York by giving the detailed statement.

Mr. VREELAND. Now, I want to ask the gentleman if the figures he has given to the committee include pensions? And I will ask him further if he does not consider that the pensions this nation has paid is on account of lack of preparedness for war?

Mr. TAWNEY. I do not. For the information of the House and the country, let me read the statement I have referred to.

Appropriations for fiscal year 1906 on account of wars.

Pension appropriation	\$138,250,000.00
Board of Pension Appeals	64,500.00
Pension Office, salaries	1,937,210.00
Pension Office, special examiners, salaries and per diem	512,500.00
Pension Office salaries, deficiency	2,650.00
Deficiency, Army and Navy pensions	4,500,000.00
Artificial limbs	425,000.00
Soldiers' Homes (including State Homes)	4,988,253.00
Deficiencies, Soldiers' Homes	175,609.03
Back pay and bounty	200,000.00
Arrears of pay, etc., war with Spain	100,000.00
National cemeteries	303,810.00
Interest on the public debt	24,500,000.00
Total	175,957,638.02

Appropriations, 1906, in preparation for war.

Army appropriation act	\$70,396,631.64
Deficiencies, military establishment	935,609.16
Deficiencies, War Department (specific)	581.05
War Department, salaries	1,799,356.00
Naval appropriation act	100,336,679.94
Deficiencies, Naval Establishment	14,962,466.77
Navy Department, salaries	739,660.00
Fortifications appropriation act	6,747,893.00
Military Academy act	673,713.38
Arming and equipping the organized militia	1,000,000.00
Military posts	1,200,000.00
Military parks and other miscellaneous objects under War Department	578,480.50
Armories and arsenals	331,000.00
Total	199,702,081.44

Total appropriations for 1906 on account of and in preparation for war 375,659,719.46

But let me give you a few more facts in the hope that I may induce this House to at least mark time for a year in the further accomplishment of our present ambitious naval policy. A comparison of the total expenditures this year on account of war and anticipated war shows that they are in excess of the total annual receipts of the Government each year from 1880 to and including 1897.

The statement is as follows:

Estimated receipts for 1906	\$589,093,000
Percentage of appropriations and expenditures for the fiscal year 1906 on account of and in preparation for war	63%

Total appropriations for 1906 on account of and in preparation for war exceeded receipts of the Government, as follows:

1880	\$42,133,108.48
1881	14,877,426.89
1884	27,139,849.54
1885	51,969,013.08
1886	39,219,992.40
1887	4,256,441.80
1892	20,721,935.22
1894	77,937,700.21
1895	62,269,644.35
1896	48,683,519.08
1897	27,938,014.30

In other words, Mr. Chairman, I repeat that we are this year expending on account of war and in preparation for war almost \$28,000,000 more than the revenues of the Government amounted to only nine years ago, or in the fiscal year 1897, just before the Spanish-American war.

Mr. LOUDENSLAGER. Does the gentleman consider the care of cemeteries a proper charge in anticipation of war? [Laughter].

Mr. TAWNEY. I did not include the care of cemeteries in the amount appropriated in anticipation of war. I said national cemeteries cost \$303,000—that is, on account of war, and the item is stated under that head.

Now, Mr. Chairman, my purpose in calling attention to these facts and these expenditures during the current fiscal year is in the hope that I may arrest the attention of the House and of the people to the fact that if we are to give the interior of our country the appropriations that are demanded, that are required, that are necessary for river and harbor improvement, for Government buildings, and for other governmental purposes, it will be absolutely necessary for Congress very soon to do one of two things: Either commence curtailing expenditures in preparation for war or increase the taxes of the people for the purpose of meeting those expenses and the current expenses of the Government. [Applause.]

I maintain that we can very safely dispense with the authority for the construction of this battle ship at this session of Congress at least. We have thirty-eight vessels that are to-day in course of construction and will not be completed until 1910. Congress will be in session every year, and if the necessity arises no question will be made in favor of authorizing another battle ship, or two more if necessity requires it. But at this time, in view of the enormous expenditure of the Government on ac-

count of wars past and anticipated, I submit in all fairness and in the interest of the people that we ought to postpone authorizing this battle ship for at least a year, and thus delay carrying out this ambitious naval policy, which has been carried on during the last nine years far in excess of what was ever expected or contemplated when that policy was adopted in 1883. [Applause.]

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman, when the war with Spain began we had 55,000 tons of battle ships. When the battle ships now authorized are completed we will have 350,000 tons of battle ships. In other words, we have already authorized more than six times as many tons of battle ships as we had during the Spanish war.

Another thing. When the Spanish war began we had authorized 200,000 tons of all classes of war ships under the new naval policy. To-day we have authorized more than three and one-half times that. We have authorized now 730,000 tons of war ships. The amount of tonnage of battle ships already authorized and in course of construction is nearly twice that of the completed battle ships. The table attached to the report of the chairman of the committee on this bill says that there are 196,000 tons of battle ships in the course of construction, and to that amount must be added the ships that were authorized during the last session of Congress, 16,000 tons each, which are not yet in the course of construction. If you add those ships you will find that it will increase the tonnage considerably. Of all classes of war vessels we have unfinished ships to the amount of 345,000 tons, including those authorized last year.

So, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the remarks by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations and by the chairman of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors are especially appropriate at this time. We have, in my judgment, authorized the most effective navy in the world except one, England alone surpassing us. Our meats and our wheat and corn fields and the Dominion of Canada are perpetual guaranties of peace with England. For our purposes, in my judgment, the American Navy is more effective than the navy of France is for her purposes. France is surrounded by nations that have animosities against the French people. The European nations stand with imaginary lines only between them. There are more opportunities for war between European nations with each other than between us and any other country or all other countries.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman a question. I rather infer from the tenor of the gentleman's remarks that he thinks it is desirable that we should have a navy as efficient as that of any large nation in the world.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. We ought to have a navy sufficient for our purposes. We ought to have a navy sufficient to meet any other country, and I think we have a navy sufficient to meet any navy with which a possible conflict can be expected.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Should not the units be fairly comparable with other units of large nations?

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. I will inform the gentleman now that we have a greater navy in tonnage than any other nation in the world except England and France, and, if you will eliminate from the French navy those vessels laid down prior to 1890, we have a greater tonnage than France.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Then, as I understand the gentleman, the total that the committee gives in its report, so far as France is concerned, should be minimized to the extent that the gentleman suggests.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. There are deductions that should be made from it, in order to compare ships of what we call "the new Navy," or the up-to-date ships of efficiency.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. In order to make it an effective and efficient navy.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. But I wish to call the attention of the gentleman to the fact that the President of the United States, in his last annual message, said that we had a sufficient number of units in our Navy to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina asks unanimous consent to proceed for five minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman, the President takes the position that we have already a sufficient number of units. Why should we proceed to build other units when we have one-half of our authorized units still unfinished and incomplete?

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. I suppose the gentleman will agree to

this, that it is not altogether a question of units so much as it is the efficiency of the unit.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. That is right.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. If it be true, and that I am not entirely advised about, that two or three or four of the great leading nations of the world have battle ships that are vastly superior to ours, in order to make our Navy equally efficient and effective, isn't it really necessary to have at least one that will compare with the ships of that character, I would ask the gentleman?

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman, the same argument would require the gentleman from Maine [Mr. LITTLEFIELD] to advocate a complete revolution of our Navy and the building of every one of our ships upon the greatest scale. Why have only one mammoth battle ship? It can not cover all the waters of the sea. Suppose we come in conflict with another nation, this particular ship can be in but one place at a time. I desire to say there is very grave difference of opinion among naval experts as to what is the best type of battle ship.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. That raises another question.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Yes; a question that I will perhaps raise later by an amendment.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will pardon me, is it not true, doesn't he think it is true, that one ship, say, of 20,000 tons is not equal in fighting capacity to two ships of 10,000 tons each, for the reason that the one ship is not divisible? It is the old lesson of the Spanish Armada and Drake's ships, is it not?

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. I will state in reply to the gentleman from Mississippi, that here are two things to be considered. In an actual battle there is an opinion that one immense battle ship of 20,000 tons would be as effective and perhaps more effective than two of the smaller ships whose tonnage together would amount to that. Then there is this other idea, that while the one ship of 20,000 tons can be put at only one place at a time, the two ships, together amounting to 20,000 tons, could be at two different places at the same time. Mr. Chairman, I take it there is not a man in this House who does not desire when a ship is constructed that it shall be of the very best type and of the greatest effectiveness for all practical naval purposes. There are many things to be considered in determining upon the type of battle ship. We must necessarily to a great extent yield to the opinions of naval experts, but as has been asked, why should we deem it so very important to authorize an immense ship now, the exact character of which no man knows? The gentlemen who appeared before our committee have no well-defined plans in their own minds, as I recall it, of the kind of ship that they desire. This great battle ship of the English navy, the *Dreadnaught*, recently launched, and the two great ships of the Japan navy, the *Satsuma* and the other, whose name I do not now recall, are of immense tonnage, about 19,000 tons each, but exactly how the *Dreadnaught* is constructed, the location of her turrets, the location of her guns, the details of construction, we do not know. Indeed we do not know that these great tonnage ships are the formidable instruments of war that they are reputed to be. Let us see how that great ship *Dreadnaught* behaves herself when in service before we authorize the Navy Department to build some ship of equal tonnage to imitate her when we know so little about the detailed parts that will determine her efficiency as a machine of war. I would be very glad to see the Navy Department instructed to prepare the plans of what, in its opinion, is the best type of modern battle ship and submit those plans to Congress at the next session. I have prepared an amendment looking to that end, which I shall later submit if the motion of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON] shall be defeated, which, however, I hope will not be the result. I am in favor of striking out this provision, but in case we fail in that, then I believe it will be the part of wisdom to call upon the Navy Department to make a thorough investigation as to all the characteristics and necessities of modern battle ships, considering all the disputed points and to then report to Congress at its next session the best type of battle ship. We can then adopt such type, and authorize the construction of one, or as many as we see fit. [Applause.]

Mr. HULL. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the figures of the gentleman from Minnesota should not be sent to the country without some explanation. If I understand him correctly, he made a charge that this nation has gone to the limit of the greatest extravagance, beyond the limit of prudence, in providing for its defensive branches of the service. In his figures he includes—

Mr. TAWNEY. If the gentleman will pardon me—

Mr. HULL. I have only five minutes.

Mr. TAWNEY. Inasmuch as you are imputing to me some-

thing I did not say I want to correct it. I did not say it had gone to the limit of the greatest extravagance.

Mr. HULL. When it goes to 63½ per cent of the entire revenues for the defensive branches of the service then I am correct in my statement.

Mr. TAWNEY. That is your conclusion; that is not mine.

Mr. HULL. The gentleman includes in those figures about a hundred and forty millions for pensions. He includes in those figures several million dollars for the maintenance of the National Homes and national cemeteries. I want to submit to this House and the country that there is no other nation on earth that pays more in pensions for a war that has passed more than forty years than the combined expenses of the army and navy except the United States of America. It is not a question of defense in paying these large sums; it is a question of gratitude of the people of the United States to the men who made it possible for us to have a great, united, free, and prosperous country, and it is not fair to charge them up to current cost of national defense. [Applause.] Take the naval appropriation this year, with its \$100,000,000; take the Army appropriation for this year, with \$70,000,000, and we are paying more of what the gentleman from Minnesota calls war expenses for our pensions, our national cemeteries, and our National Homes than the combined appropriations for this year for the defense of the country. I want to say to you gentlemen who are opposed to this ship one other thing. In my judgment this great, strong, rich, prosperous country, with over 4,000 miles of seacoast, with our possessions in the West Indies and on the China Sea and in the Pacific Ocean, that one battle ship a year is an exceedingly moderate programme. We do not propose to build it now, and we will never propose to build it the same year that we pass its authorization. It is extending over a period of years. These gentlemen seem to believe that France and Germany and the other nations will stop building ships because they have not authorized as far ahead as we. That will not be true. By the time their programme now authorized by law is carried out they will have gone on beyond what they are to-day, and if this great people that I hope in the near future will dominate the seas, if it is to maintain its prestige, if it is to maintain its greatness, it can not afford at this time to stop and say we have called a halt in rebuilding the new navy of the United States. Mr. Chairman, I represent in part a State in the heart of the country. No invasion can come to us from any foreign foe; but I represent a people who believe that this Government is strong enough and great enough and patriotic enough to go on with the work in the moderate way proposed of building up the American Navy so that every nation on earth may know that we will maintain our prestige at home and abroad. [Applause.]

Mr. RIXEY. Mr. Chairman, I favor the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio. He has possibly an additional reason for opposing a ship which, when built, may not be able to use our harbors. He is chairman of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, and perhaps fears that this great ship of 20,000 or more tons will have the experience that three or four of our present 16,000-ton battle ships have recently had in the harbors of New York and Norfolk. The battle ships *Kentucky*, *Kearsarge*, and *Rhode Island* have all been aground recently. If sufficient depth of water is not found in the harbors of New York and Norfolk, it can not be found on the Atlantic coast.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. You do not understand the chairman of that committee expends all of this money in deepening harbors?

Mr. RIXEY. No; but he is to some extent responsible for their deepening.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. I desire to assure the gentleman that my views on this subject are entirely uninfluenced by anything I have to do with rivers and harbors.

Mr. RIXEY. Now, Mr. Chairman, as I understand the provision for this battle ship, it is not a business proposition. Heretofore the naval bills have provided for ships and limited them in size and cost, the provision being for so many thousand tons' displacement. The provision in this bill is without limit, the requirement being—

One first-class battle ship, carrying as heavy armor and as powerful armament as any known vessel of its class.

England is building an 18,500-ton ship. It is stated that Japan is building one which will be of twenty or twenty-two thousand tons. According to this bill the battle ship is to be as great as the greatest.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. May I ask the gentleman a question?

Mr. RIXEY. Yes.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. If the indefiniteness of the provision is the criticism, does the gentleman propose to limit it by an

amendment, or does he oppose it on that ground and then declare it should limit it?

Mr. RIXEY. One objection to the provision is that there is no limit of size placed on this vessel.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. What should be the limit of size?

Mr. RIXEY. I think I can show the gentleman before I get through, if the ship is to be authorized at all at this time, that it is the opinion of the Secretary of the Navy and the opinion of the Bureau of Construction and Repair that the ship ought not to exceed 16,000 tons.

In reply to an inquiry as to what the cost of this ship would be, I received the following letter from the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE,
Washington, D. C., March 30, 1906.

MY DEAR MR. RIXEY: Replying to your letter of March 29, I have to say that the following are the estimates of the cost of a battle ship approximately 20,000 tons, said battle ship to carry twelve 12-inch guns and twenty-six 3-inch guns:

Hull and machinery	\$6,000,000
Armament	2,600,000
Armor	2,050,000
Total	10,650,000

Yours, sincerely,

N. E. MASON.

Hon. JOHN F. RIXEY, M. C.,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Chairman, no recommendation came to the Naval Committee for a battle ship of this kind. The Secretary of the Navy in his report expressly recommended only 16,000 tons. The Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the Bureau which is most intimately concerned in the building of the ship, recommended only 16,000 tons, and stated there was not sufficient depth of water in some of the harbors, and gave other reasons. There was no evidence before the Naval Committee for a provision of this kind.

The following from The Scientific American of April 21, 1906, seems to be well considered.

UNIFORMITY IN BATTLE SHIPS.

It has long been recognized by naval men that a fleet which is made up of heterogeneous types of ships—that is, of ships of different size, speed, armament, and protection—is at a great disadvantage from a tactical point of view when it encounters a fleet of the same total displacement whose ships are arranged in groups of identical vessels. Recent naval operations have emphasized very strongly the truth of this principle, and the best organized navies of to-day are building their ships in groups or classes of four, six, or eight. Ships of such a group have the great advantage that their speed, their coal endurance, and their turning diameter are identical, and that in the various evolutions the vessels will, in their new positions, find themselves at all times grouped symmetrically.

It is earnestly desired by our Navy Department that when new ships are authorized they shall conform to some existing design until they have been brought up to the proper number of units to form a class, say, of half a dozen; and they are naturally opposed to the construction of any new type of vessel which is not likely to be repeated sufficiently often to form a new group.

The decision of the House Committee on Naval Affairs to recommend an appropriation for the construction of a battle ship which in size and power will surpass any ship at present under construction has naturally appealed to the nonprofessional world, or rather to that section of it which believes that there is a certain national prestige conveyed by the possession of a "world beater;" but our naval constructors, who have learned to subordinate sentiment to reason and cold facts, look very unfavorably on the proposition. They are well aware that, although we are perfectly well able to build a 20,000-ton ship of 20 knots speed, such a vessel would be in a class all by itself, and when maneuvering in the company of smaller, slower, and less powerful ships would have to accommodate herself to their limitations, and therefore would be unable to realize in action her full efficiency. The plans proposed for our latest ships, the *Michigan* and *South Carolina*, will give us a magnificent ship, of which we ought to build at least half a dozen before launching out into new types.

Although our earlier battle ships differ widely in type, our later ships resolve themselves into classes: each composed of about five or six units. Thus, the three ships of the *Maine* type and the three of the *Illinois* type give us a class of six approximately similar ships. In the *Virginia* class we have five ships absolutely identical; in the *Louisiana*, *Vermont*, and *New Hampshire* classes we have six practically identical battle ships, in which the *Mississippi* and *Idaho*, were it not for their low speed, might possibly be included, bringing the number up to eight; while in the *South Carolina* and *Michigan*, our latest designs, we have a class which, as we have said, should be extended until it includes five or six identical vessels. By the time Congress has made sufficient appropriation for this purpose, the Navy Department will have formulated its ideas as to the best type of vessel to build, if we decide to construct ships of 18,000 to 20,000 tons displacement.

But it will be an unhappy day for the Navy Department if the Bureau of Construction is to be controlled by any popular "whip creation" theories of war-ship construction.

Mr. DAWSON. Will the gentleman allow me to ask a question?

Mr. RIXEY. I will.

Mr. DAWSON. Has he not overlooked the statement of the Secretary of the Navy before our committee, in which he said:

I would prefer to see two 16,000-ton battle ships built rather than one larger one. If we have to come down to one battle ship, then I recommend that it shall be the largest and strongest battle ship that is yet known to be afloat.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Virginia has expired.

Mr. RIXEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask for five minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Virginia asks unanimous consent to continue his remarks for five minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. RIXEY. I will read from the report of the Secretary of the Navy. Referring to the Japanese-Russian war, he said:

As a matter of fact, no battle ship of as much as 16,000 tons displacement was used by either belligerent, and while, on the one hand, at least one great power has determined upon the construction of an 18,000-ton battle ship, and others are reported to have in contemplation vessels of from 20,000 to 22,000 tons, on the other, some authorities think these leviathans will prove less formidable and more vulnerable than battle ships of 16,000 tons, such as our contemplated *South Carolina* and *Michigan*.

The Department has been caused serious concern by the conflicting advice on the last-mentioned question, tendered it by its authorized expert advisers. The general board recommended some time since that the two last-mentioned vessels be increased in displacement from 16,000 to 18,000 tons. The board on construction dissents from this recommendation. The general board has further recommended the authorization of three battle ships, to cost approximately \$8,250,000 each, and to be of such tonnage as will suffice to secure an armament that the two last-mentioned vessels be increased in displacement from this recommendation likewise, and advises instead three battle ships at an estimated cost of \$7,500,000 each, with an anticipated armament of eight 12-inch guns and substantially the same tonnage as is contemplated for the *South Carolina* and *Michigan*.

After very carefully weighing these divergent views, I feel that it is not as yet sufficiently clear that the larger and more costly battle ships would have such increased efficiency in battle as to justify the certain addition to the public burdens involved in accepting the views of the general board.

Then on page 21 he says:

The same reasons which lead me to think it inexpedient to enlarge the dimensions of the *South Carolina* and *Michigan* lead me to advise that the battle ships to be authorized be of the type recommended by the board on construction. Should professional opinion become substantially unanimous in advocating larger vessels before the construction of these ships is actually commenced, their plans can be, of course, remodeled.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. May I make an inquiry?

Mr. RIXEY. You may.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Does the gentleman from Virginia controvert the fact stated by the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. DAWSON] that, notwithstanding the report of the Secretary of the Navy, he stated before the committee on his examination what has been quoted by the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. DAWSON]?

Mr. RIXEY. I do not know that it was so stated by the Secretary of the Navy before the committee; it may have been.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. It comes a long way from sustaining your assertion.

Mr. RIXEY. I think it does sustain every assertion. The recommendation of the Secretary, after reviewing the whole subject, after stating that there were two opinions—one in favor of the larger ship and the other in favor of the 16,000-ton ship—was that he favored and recommended the 16,000-ton ships.

Mr. DAWSON. What report was that which the gentleman was reading from?

Mr. RIXEY. The report of the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. DAWSON. As submitted to Congress last December?

Mr. RIXEY. Yes.

Mr. DAWSON. May I call the attention of the gentleman to the fact that the statement which I read was made by the Secretary of the Navy before the House Naval Committee on March 22, 1906, several months after this report was written?

Mr. RIXEY. I understand; but let me ask the gentleman if the Secretary did not, in the same hearing before the Naval Committee, adhere to his recommendation in the report?

Mr. DAWSON. He recommended two battle ships.

Mr. RIXEY. And only 16,000 tons.

Mr. DAWSON. But if he could not get the two, then he recommended the provision which I formerly read.

Mr. RIXEY. And of only 16,000 tons.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. The gentleman does not want to be understood as saying that the Secretary confined himself in case of one battle ship to one of 16,000 tons?

Mr. RIXEY. No; I do not.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. I thought your statement would bear that construction.

Mr. RIXEY. But the Secretary was very emphatic before the committee, as he was in his report, that he favored and recommended the programme of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, which was for the 16,000-ton ships.

Let us consider, Mr. Chairman, in the first place, the necessity for this battle ship costing nearly \$11,000,000. The Secretary of the Navy, in his report, on page 23, says, as I understand it, there is no necessity for enlarging the Navy at this time.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Notwithstanding the fact that he had recommended two additional battle ships?

Mr. RIXEY. I will read you what he states. He says:

If circumstances remain as they now are I see no reason to suppose that the number of ships in our Navy need increase; on the contrary, it is reasonable to anticipate that their number will be reduced, and even reduced materially, within the next five years.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. As I understand it, notwithstanding that statement in the same report he recommends and insists on two new battle ships of 16,000 tons. Is that what the gentleman means?

Mr. RIXEY. He recommends the two battle ships in the same report.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. What statement does the gentleman think he ought to take?

Mr. RIXEY. I shall take the one that there is at this time no necessity for an increase.

Mr. DAWSON. Will the gentleman just as lief read the statement in the report of the Secretary of the Navy, contained in the last paragraph, on page 23?

Mr. RIXEY. I am going to read that now—the last portion of that same paragraph. I have not time to read it all.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. DAWSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may have five minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. DAWSON] asks unanimous consent that the gentleman from Virginia may have five minutes more in which to continue his remarks. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. RIXEY. In the same paragraph is the statement:

In other words, the aggregate of our battle ships, armored cruisers, and coast-defense vessels built, building, or authorized would seem, according to present indications, sufficient to provide for any contingencies within the limits of probability.

I suppose that is what my friend refers to.

Mr. DAWSON. No; the sentence I referred to is the one which just follows.

Mr. RIXEY. In the next paragraph?

Mr. DAWSON. The next two sentences.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. The gentleman did not have time to read them.

Mr. RIXEY. He says in his opinion practically what the President stated in his message. He says the number of units was sufficient at present for the Navy.

Mr. DAWSON. Does he not say in the next sentence that it should not be understood?

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Misunderstood.

Mr. DAWSON (reading):

This statement, however, must not be misunderstood. It does not at all mean that we should give up building new ships; on the contrary, the necessity for vessels of an improved type to take the place of those now recognized as obsolete, or evidently destined to become such, has grown plain and urgent.

Mr. RIXEY. I understand. We have got to replace these ships as they become obsolete. Nobody questions that. The question is about adding new ships to increase the Navy. There are no battle ships of the United States Navy that are obsolete. Not one. There is one now in the second class of battle ships, but even that is in use.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. I am assuming that the Secretary of the Navy is an intelligent man and familiar with the Department under his charge, and that he estimates that in order to maintain the existing efficiency of the units, by reason of the fact that vessels are growing obsolete; that vessels must now be authorized in order to maintain practically the existing units in the Navy; and his advice is to have two battle ships of 16,000 tons each, or, in default of two, one, the largest that floats. Now, the committee have recommended one instead of two. Am I correct?

Mr. RIXEY. Yes.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Then in order to maintain the existing efficiency of the Navy and its units intact, in the opinion of the Secretary they have got to have built this large battle ship. Is not that correct, from his standpoint?

Mr. RIXEY. I do not know that that is his opinion. If it is, I do not think it well founded.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Is not that a fair statement?

Mr. RIXEY. Possibly, of his opinion, but not of the necessity. He recommended two battle ships, and he placed it on the ground, largely, that a number of the monitors were old and ought to be replaced with battle ships.

Now, Mr. Chairman, as I said a moment ago, there is no contention but what battle ships and armored cruisers and other ships of war, as they become obsolete, must be replaced. We have built and are building twenty-eight battle ships, and we have built and are building twelve armored cruisers. These

twenty-eight battle ships and twelve armored cruisers make forty of the largest war ships. The life of a battle ship is, according to naval experts, about twenty years. Therefore these ships have to be replaced every twenty years. With forty ships, that is an average of two ships a year; and as soon as they become obsolete we have, therefore, got to continue our building programme at the rate of two great war ships each year.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. How long has the programme been going on?

Mr. RIXEY. In the neighborhood of twenty years.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Then from your argument we ought to have two battle ships in this bill now.

Mr. RIXEY. No, because the present ships are not obsolete. New ships can certainly wait until we pay for what we have contracted for and are now building. We still owe about \$50,000,000 on ships already authorized.

The President in his annual message to Congress in December, 1905, stated:

It does not seem to me necessary, however, that the Navy should—at least in the immediate future—be increased beyond the present number of units.

The Secretary of the Navy in his report also stated, "If circumstances remain as they now are, I see no reason to suppose that the number of ships in our Navy need increase. On the contrary, it is reasonable to anticipate that their number will be reduced, and even reduced materially, within the next five years." This is rather more than I have ever contended for. Let us omit the building programme for two years, pay off what we now owe on ships, and then go on and proceed to replace the ships as they become obsolete.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. I ask that the gentleman may have five minutes longer.

Mr. RIXEY. I will only take about two minutes.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. The gentleman has been interrupted a good deal.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Maine asks unanimous consent that the time of the gentleman from Virginia be extended for five minutes. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. RIXEY. Mr. Chairman, in addition to this the statement has been made, and is not questioned, that we are now building more battle ships than Great Britain, and, while the navy of France is placed in the table here as being superior to that of the United States, the fact remains that we have more tonnage in battle ships than she has. The statement was made before the Naval Committee that in time of war the strength of the nation was really measured by battle ships and not by smaller craft.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Is it not true that the Secretary of the Navy and the President of the United States, when they make their estimates on the present size of the Navy, estimate the vessels under construction as a part of the units, and that they recommend their programme upon the basis of these vessels when they are completed?

Mr. RIXEY. Yes.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. If that is true, and we have been building ships for twenty years, and vessels have been going out of commission, by reason of becoming obsolete, two every year, is it not true that we have to have two vessels every year to maintain the existing number of units?

Mr. RIXEY. I have just stated that we will have to provide two ships a year, and will have to begin that programme in a few years.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. But this bill only provides one.

Mr. RIXEY. Yes; but there is now no necessity for any. We have forty new battle ships and armored cruisers, about half of which are not yet completed, and they are not paid for by \$50,000,000.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. That is a matter of no concern.

Mr. RIXEY. Yes; but the gentleman must realize that it is a matter of considerable concern. It is time enough to replace them when they become obsolete.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. I suppose I fully realize the fact that a battle ship that is not now completed is not 20 years old. I suppose I realize the further fact that we began twenty years ago to build the Navy, and there are some ships now 20 years old. Those are the ships that are to be replaced by building new ships every year. Now, if my statement is correct, we ought to have two vessels in this bill to maintain the existing units. If the 20-year-old ships go out at the rate of two every year, then we ought to put in two ships. It is not a question of whether they are paid for.

Mr. RIXEY. The gentleman's premises are entirely wrong. Our ships are comparatively new, the oldest not over 15 or 16 years, and one-half not yet completed.

Mr. TALBOTT. But they were not all authorized at once.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Of course not.

Mr. RIXEY. They could not be built at one time. We have not a battle ship that is obsolete.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. What about the *Texas*?

Mr. RIXEY. I will say that I understand the *Texas* is yet a good ship. She never was a first-class battle ship.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. How old is she?

Mr. RIXEY. I do not know. I understand it was authorized in 1886. It was probably completed within four or five years after that date. It is probably 15 or 16 years old and I believe is the oldest ship in the Navy. We owe \$50,000,000 on those already authorized, and we ought to divide it up and pay \$25,000,000 a year until it is paid, and we can then appropriate \$25,000,000 every year to take the place of the obsolete vessels. If the naval bill is to be kept within the limit of \$100,000,000 annually, we should only replace obsolete ships.

Mr. TALBOTT. Do we owe \$25,000,000 or \$1,000,000 on a completed war vessel?

Mr. RIXEY. I do not suppose that we owe anything on a completed war vessel.

Mr. TALBOTT. The gentleman means that we shall stand obligated to pay \$25,000,000 when the vessels already authorized are completed?

Mr. RIXEY. Yes; we owe on contracts already let and to be paid when the vessels are completed \$50,000,000, which will go to the shipbuilders and for armor and armor plate.

Mr. TALBOTT. They are contracts under existing law and existing appropriations, and some of them will not be completed for three or four years.

Mr. RIXEY. Yes.

Mr. TALBOTT. When we authorize this vessel there will be a time limit, and the next year the gentleman will make the same argument that on uncompleted vessels we owe so much money. We do not owe the money until the vessel is completed.

Mr. RIXEY. It is not to be paid except as the vessels are completed, but the contracts are made and we are obligated for the money. We are building thirteen battle ships and six armored cruisers, and we owe \$50,000,000, and we can apply that money for the next two years and then there will be plenty of time to authorize new ships. We have not the men now to command the ships that are already in commission. The condition will probably be worse when the thirteen new ships are added to the Navy.

Why not look to the question of providing officers and men for the new ships? Not much pressure for that, but unlimited pressure for new ships, costing nearly \$11,000,000 each, the money for which goes almost entirely to the shipbuilders and the armor-plate trust. Little wonder at the never-ceasing demand for the authorization of more ships.

The two battle ships authorized in the last naval bill, a little over twelve months ago, are not yet contracted for; and yet we are now urged on, as if the safety of the country depended on it, to authorize the Navy Department to contract for another ship to cost nearly \$11,000,000. If this is done, then the Navy Department will be authorized to make contracts for three battle ships, costing over \$25,000,000. In my judgment there is no justification for this condition.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. DAWSON. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY] has called attention to the real point at issue in this debate. The question is not, as some gentlemen seem to think, a question of the increase of the Navy; it is simply a question of maintaining the present efficiency of the Navy. As the President said in his annual message to Congress last December:

We have most wisely continued for a number of years to build up our Navy, and it has now reached a fairly high standard of efficiency. This standard of efficiency must not only be maintained, but increased. It does not seem to me necessary, however, that the Navy should—at least, in the immediate future—be increased beyond the present number of units. What is now clearly necessary is to substitute efficient for inefficient units as the latter become worn out or as it becomes apparent that they are useless. Probably the result would be attained by adding a single battle ship to our Navy each year, the superseded or outworn vessels being laid up or broken up as they are thus replaced.

The Secretary of the Navy in his last annual report to Congress has this to say of our naval policy:

The aggregate of our battle ships, armored cruisers, and coast-defense vessels built, building, or authorized would seem, according to present indications, sufficient to provide for any contingencies within the limits of probability. * * * This does not at all mean that we should give up building new ships; on the contrary, the necessity

for vessels of an improved type to take the place of those now recognized as obsolete, or evidently destined to become such, has grown plain and urgent.

Our programme of naval construction for the future, in so far as it relates to our fighting fleet alone, should consist in substituting five new battle ships and two new armored cruisers for the oldest vessels of these types on our register, and five more battle ships for the ten coast-defense vessels of the monitor type, and that these substitutions should be made, at latest, within the next six years.

Now, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY] states that he is in favor of maintaining the present efficiency of the Navy. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON] has called attention to the fact that if the battle ship proposed in this bill is authorized it could not be built until 1910 or 1912, and possibly later. Before that time shall have arrived there will be at least four of the present battle ships and two armored cruisers which, in the opinion of the Secretary of the Navy, should be replaced by new and efficient ships. The battle ship *Texas* was authorized by Congress in 1886, and, as the gentleman from Virginia states, the average life of a battle ship is twenty years.

Mr. RIXEY. When was that battle ship completed?

Mr. DAWSON. I could not tell. I do not know when it went into commission; but it seems to me it is fair, inasmuch as we are only making an authorization in this bill, to compare the dates of authorizations. In 1890 the *Indiana*, the *Massachusetts*, and the *Oregon* were authorized; so that in three years from this time twenty years will have expired since their authorization. Now, as everyone knows, the strength of the Navy is represented by the strength of the ships that can take their places in the line of battle. The lesson of the war between Russia and Japan was that the Russian navy was crushed by the concentration of the fire from the heavy guns on the Japanese ships. The lessons of modern warfare have proved that efficiency in the line of battle rests with the big guns, and it rests in concentration of fire. The 16,000-ton ships which we are now building contain four turrets, with two 12-inch guns in each turret. Subsidiary batteries have been dispensed with to a large degree. Other nations appear on the sea with vessels of greater speed and better protection, carrying ten 12-inch guns, with turrets so arranged that they can point six of those guns straight ahead or six on a broadside. An enlightened naval policy dictates that in point of efficiency our Navy should be up to the highest standard.

The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY] has stated that we are building more battle ships than England is. I have here the report of the Board of Admiralty of the British nation, submitted by them to Parliament and through Parliament to the public.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. RIXEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman's time be extended for five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Virginia asks unanimous consent that the time of the gentleman from Iowa may be extended for five minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. DAWSON. Mr. Chairman, I have heard it said that England and the other great nations have decided not to build any more battle ships until the question of international disarmament is settled by the next Hague conference. The report of the Board of admiralty in this particular may be of interest. Here is what they say:

At the present time strategic requirements necessitate an output of four large armored ships annually, and unless unforeseen contingencies arise, this number will not be exceeded. The period of building is to be two years, and therefore four ships will be laid down each year, and there will be eight ships in course of construction in any one year either in the dockyards or by contract. While the board anticipates at present that the output of four large armored ships a year should suffice to meet our requirements, there would be no difficulty whatever in increasing this output to whatever extent may be necessary in consequence of any increase of naval power abroad.

Mr. RIXEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DAWSON. Yes.

Mr. RIXEY. The statement I made was based upon the report of the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs. It is headed "The strength of the principal naval powers," and under the head of "Great Britain, battle ships, first class," he has the statement that they are building 99,050 tons; that France is building 89,190 tons; that Germany is building 78,000 tons, and the United States 196,200 tons, which is nearly twice what Great Britain is now building in battle ships.

Mr. DAWSON. I do not see any conflict between that statement and the statement that I made. Here is England building four battle ships a year.

In the face of the recommendation of the President and the Secretary of the Navy as to the need of new vessels of an improved type to replace obsolete ships, opposition arises in this House to the construction of a single battle ship, and a battle

ship simply to replace one of those which is now or must soon be put into the reserve.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. Does the gentleman from Iowa think that we should measure our Navy by that of Great Britain?

Mr. DAWSON. No; I do not.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. What share of its navy does he think we ought to have in the United States?

Mr. DAWSON. I do not know as I would care to go into proportions, but I do not think it is necessary for us to maintain a Navy equal in size to that of Great Britain.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. Then is not the comparison based on the statement that they are laying down four battle ships a year fallacious?

Mr. DAWSON. No; but when you come to compare four to nothing, it has a part in this debate.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. But it is not four to nothing.

Mr. DAWSON. But if the amendment of the gentleman from Ohio prevails it will be four to nothing.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. But there are ships under construction, finished year by year. One other thing, I would like to ask the gentleman from Iowa, what is the date of the document from which he read?

Mr. DAWSON. This is dated November 30, 1905, and was submitted to Parliament December last.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. Is it not true that the chancellor of the exchequer has said since that time that the reason for carrying out certain recommendations was simply because it was a legacy from the preceding ministry and that he favored a substantial abatement of the naval programme?

Mr. DAWSON. I have not seen that statement. I did, however, see a statement, carried in the Associated Press dispatches of last evening, that England was putting into her reserve a large number of ships and supplanting them with active fighting ships—fighting vessels of new and improved types. This dispatch states that since 1902 forty battle ships and cruisers have been removed from the active list and placed in the reserve.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. That pertains, however, to the removal of those that have become useless or worn out. Is there any promise in that paragraph or in any programme presented to Parliament that they are to be replaced by new ships?

Mr. DAWSON. I will ask to insert the dispatch, as follows:

LONDON, May 15.

The rapidity with which Great Britain is removing from the navy all but her really efficient war ships was evidenced by a statement presented to Parliament to-day, showing that no less than forty battle ships and cruisers have practically been removed from the list since 1902.

The exact figures are: Eight battle ships, ten armored cruisers, and three protected cruisers removed from the fighting effective, while three battle ships and sixteen protected cruisers were reclassified, placing them on the list of ships of the smallest fighting value. During the same period the construction of thirteen new battle ships, eighteen armored cruisers, and four protected cruisers was commenced.

If we are to maintain our Navy on a comparative basis to the navies of the world we must pursue the same policy that they are pursuing—that is, when a battle ship becomes out of date, put it into the reserve, for coast defense or harbor defense, and replace it with a modern, up-to-date fighting machine, and that is all this committee proposes to do.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. VREELAND. I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman's time be extended one minute.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York asks unanimous consent that the gentleman's time may be extended for one minute. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. VREELAND. I want to suggest to my colleague on the committee that his statement of England's building operations, as I understand it, is entirely too modest. As I understand it, England in the last three and a half years has authorized thirteen battle ships and eighteen armored cruisers, vessels which cost as much as a battle ship, in addition to the great building of torpedo boats, submarines, and cruisers of different types.

Mr. DAWSON. I thank you for the information.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

On page 72, line 4, after the word "dollars." insert the following: "Provided, however, That if at the second Hague conference any measure should be adopted for the limitation of the naval forces of the great powers, or for the settlement of international controversies by judicial decision and by means of arbitration treaties, the Secretary of the Navy shall have discretion to defer the construction of the ship herein provided for."

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry. Does not the amendment to strike out the paragraph take precedence? Ought not that first to be voted upon?

The CHAIRMAN. The rule is that an amendment calculated to perfect a section or paragraph has priority over an amendment to strike out or substitute for a paragraph.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. Is this really an amendment to perfect the paragraph?

The CHAIRMAN. It is an amendment offered to perfect the paragraph, and it has priority over the motion to strike out.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. For the information of my friend from Ohio, I will say I made sure by consulting the Chairman before I offered this amendment, and this is the only way for it to be considered, because in case the gentleman's amendment should be adopted, there would be no chance for my amendment to be voted upon at all; hence I offer it at this time.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. In that case I will say to the gentleman there would be no occasion to offer the amendment of the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. There might be.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. The rule is that a motion to perfect the paragraph always comes before a motion to strike out.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Mr. Chairman, this is the amendment of which I gave notice in the course of general debate, and which I am happy to say the American press has generally indorsed since it has been printed in the RECORD. I offer it in good faith and in the hope that it may be adopted, believing as I do that a great majority of the constituency of every Member on this floor will favor my proposition if it is properly explained to them.

My position is different from the position of those who are opposing this battle ship for financial or other reasons. To the men interested in the movement for international arbitration or peace it is immaterial how many battle ships the different nations are constructing to-day, and I, for one, shall not antagonize this battle ship. I shall vote, if considerations of patriotism demand, if the national safety demands, if considerations of patriotism demand it, for ten or twenty more battle ships. I shall do it, of course, with all the scorn that is in me, because I abhor the system which makes them necessary. But the peace movement should not be confounded with any movement or any attempt to decrease naval expenses or military expenses here and there. If that movement succeeds, if there will be an agreement at The Hague this fall in favor of international arbitration, or in favor of some more civilized method by which to settle international difficulties than by war, why, then, the battle ships we are constructing now and which other nations have constructed will become absolutely unnecessary. They will be thrown in the junk shop. So I consider, Mr. Chairman, every addition to the Navy and every addition to the Army will not defer but will hasten the moment when nations will be compelled to come to an agreement of that kind. If nations go on at the present rate, the time is near when they will have reached the point of exhaustion, when they will be compelled to meet around the green table and discuss measures for the settlement of international difficulties by resorting to arbitration instead of resorting to war.

This amendment, as I said, does not antagonize the naval programme, but its effect will be to leave to the Government of the United States a free hand, so that if at The Hague an agreement should be reached, the President and the Secretary of the Navy will have discretion to construct or not to construct this battle ship. If an agreement is reached, of course, the construction will be unnecessary. If no agreement is reached, the naval programme as outlined in this bill will be proceeded with and a ship will be constructed. But the amendment serves another purpose. It is the only chance, my friends, for this House and this Congress to go on record as saying to the other nations that we are in sympathy with the efforts being made all over the world to reach an international agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the gentleman have five minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GRAHAM] asks that the gentleman from Missouri continue his remarks for five minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. In this connection I desire to call to the attention of the House the action recently taken by the House of Commons of England. It appears from press dispatches that a member moved a resolution calling on the Government to take drastic steps to reduce the expenditures for armament, and press for a resolution of armament reduction by international agreement at The Hague conference. This resolution was discussed, and finally the representative of the Government, Sir Edward Grey, the foreign secretary, was called upon for an expression of opinion. He said he believed the declaration which was contained in Mr. Vivian's motion was worth having for the

effect it might have on other nations. There was a growing disposition, he said, in other countries for some reduction. He thought the question should be discussed at The Hague, but it would depend upon the responses of other nations. The Government welcomed the motion. He hoped the other nations would regard it as an invitation from the British House of Commons to respond to their feelings in the matter. And then the report goes on to say that the motion was adopted. Since the counter motion has been withdrawn, I take it, Mr. Chairman, that that motion was adopted unanimously by the House of Commons of England.

My amendment, gentlemen, gives you an opportunity to accept that invitation extended by England. It gives you a chance to say to the world that the American Congress, too, is ready to countenance the efforts which are being made in behalf of international peace.

Mr. GILBERT of Kentucky. Is it not absolutely certain that a battle ship will be built if your amendment passes and you leave it to the discretion of the President?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. It is not; because the amendment says if an agreement is reached as to the limitation of armament or an international agreement to settle difficulties by arbitration, in that case the Secretary of the Navy shall defer the construction of the battle ship.

Mr. COCKRAN. I should like to ask the gentleman from Missouri a question.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Certainly.

Mr. COCKRAN. I recognize him as a great authority on this question of international arbitration. Is it his idea that by facilitating the construction of this ship and thus increasing our armament we will contribute to a universal conclusion in favor of disarmament? Do I understand him correctly?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. No.

Mr. COCKRAN. I understand the gentleman is going to vote for this particular ship upon that ground?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. No; not entirely upon that ground.

Mr. COCKRAN. I would like to know—

Mr. BARTHOLDT. I stated, as a general proposition, Mr. Chairman, that the increase of armament all over the world will have the effect of hastening the day when an international agreement will be reached.

Mr. COCKRAN. I understand the gentleman abhors the appropriation of money for these engines of destruction; but, nevertheless, will vote in favor of this particular one under the impression that by exhibiting this tendency to huge military establishments in its fullest development the world will become disgusted with it. Am I right?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. I am very glad the gentleman asked this question, because it gives me an opportunity to emphasize what I had forgotten.

The position of the friends of arbitration and peace upon this question is this: We say that as long as there is no international agreement, as long as nations must be ready to defend their rights by armament, just so long will the friends of arbitration and peace be ready to vote for such armament as may be deemed necessary by the Government for the national defense. They will not go further. They will not authorize armament for an aggressive war. But if the Government in its responsibility says to me that this battle ship is absolutely necessary for the defense of American interests, I am willing to vote for it.

Mr. COCKRAN. I will ask, is the gentleman voting for this battle ship because somebody else has told him it is necessary to our defense, or because in the exercise of his own judgment as a Member of this House, as well as an illustrious apostle of arbitration, he considers it necessary? Is he voting in favor of building this ship on his own judgment or on the judgment of somebody else?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. I am voting on my own judgment.

Mr. COCKRAN. On his own judgment. I would like to ask the gentleman if on his own judgment he believes the construction of this ship is necessary to our defense?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. I am not clothed with the authority or with the responsibility—and I am glad I am not—to say whether or not this battle ship may become necessary for the defense of our interests; but the gentleman will admit that it might. It might become necessary as long as there is no international agreement between the nations, as long as present conditions exist.

Mr. COCKRAN. I can not see upon what ground it can be considered necessary, according to the gentleman's own statement. But I ask the gentleman again, is he voting in favor of this measure upon somebody else's responsibility or his own?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. COCKRAN. I trust the gentleman's time will be extended a few minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the time of the gentleman being extended for two minutes? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Mr. Chairman, I take it that when a naval bill is proposed here containing a provision for a new battle ship that that naval bill has not only the earmarks of the experts of the Navy Department, but that it has the approval of the officials of our Government who are responsible for conducting the Government's affairs. I take it that the President, the Cabinet, and all the powers that are conducting our Government to-day have been consulted and earnestly believe that battle ship to be necessary.

Mr. COCKRAN. Why does the gentleman, whom we all admire so much, exclude himself from the number of those powers?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Because this is a question which belongs to diplomacy and not legislation.

Mr. COCKRAN. Then I understand the gentleman to say that in voting for this battle ship he is voting for it because he considers the House of which he is a Member has nothing to do with it, but outside parties think its construction advisable?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Not at all.

Mr. COCKRAN. If the gentleman is voting for this battle ship because he, exercising his own judgment, believes it is necessary to our defense, then I would like to ask him from whom we are to apprehend danger, in order that I in my uninformed condition may get the benefit of his information in reaching a just conclusion. In discussing the advisability of constructing this huge battle ship, the gentleman says he will vote for it because it is necessary for defense, and then he adds that he has not reached this conclusion upon his own judgment, but on that of somebody else. Now, I ask if it be his conception of his duty as a Member of this House that he should cast his vote for the construction of this battle ship on somebody else's judgment?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Now, I want to say to the gentleman, as one who has been to some extent identified with the movement for international arbitration and peace—

Mr. COCKRAN. That is the reason I asked the question.

Mr. BARTHOLDT (continuing). That I do not want to expose this movement to the charge of it being actuated by unpatriotic motives, nor do I want to lose, for the purpose of attaining my object, the support of those who are now clamoring for a new battle ship.

Mr. COCKRAN. The gentleman surely does not intend to vote for the construction of a battle ship in obedience to the clamor of its advocates in order to promote the reign of peace?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. I simply do not want to sacrifice the interests of the cause I have at heart in taking the position I take.

Mr. COCKRAN. Which cause? The cause of duty as a Member of this House or some other cause, supported by somebody outside the House?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. The cause of arbitration.

Mr. COCKRAN. Do I understand the gentleman to say that he is proposing to vote for this battle ship on this floor, not because he believes it necessary, but in order to win the favor of its supporters for a general scheme of arbitration?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Oh, no; and the gentleman himself knows better.

Mr. COCKRAN. That is what I understood from the gentleman's statement.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. I stated my position fairly.

Mr. COCKRAN. I would like the gentleman to correct me if I am in error.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. If the gentleman had only honored me with his attention—

Mr. COCKRAN. The closest. The gentleman does me but faint justice when he suggests that I did not listen closely to every word of his.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Mr. Chairman, all I can add in answer to the gentleman's question is to repeat what I said before—that the men who are responsible for the conduct of our Government are the best judges as to what armaments we need, and I take it that the legislative branch of the Government has but little connection with diplomacy. I take it—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, concerning the relative merits of two battle ships of 16,000 tons each and one of twenty or more thousand tons I have nothing to say. Concerning the purely technical questions of the manner of construction and type of ships and of their relative fighting value I say nothing,

because I know nothing. My observations will be addressed solely to what I conceive to be the proper policy for this Government with relation to the Administration idea of developing a large and aggressive navy, and particularly along the lines which I think will and should lead to international agreements for arbitration.

Mr. Chairman, what I have to say and the way I shall vote will be found entirely consistent in that matter. I do not see how gentlemen can speak one way and vote another. It is impossible to follow the reasoning of Members who preach peace and feverishly prepare for war. To support the ideas of The Hague tribunal with mere lip service is not an important contribution to the cause of peace. A reduction in the world's armament is the chief purpose of The Hague court of peace, and this is an opportunity for the American supporters of that exalted idea to stand up and be counted on the side of righteousness.

The spirit of arbitration appears to be more in evidence in Europe, where one would expect to find greater difficulty in its execution, than here in America, where obstacles in the way of its application are so few and insignificant as not to be worth consideration.

In the United States we have no disputed boundaries. The last we had was with the powerful British Empire. It was submitted to arbitration and satisfactorily adjusted. The history of neither country suggests that a peaceful solution of the question was secured because either was afraid of the issue of war. A native of one and descended from the other, I am proud of the fact that both possess a high order of physical courage. I am still prouder of the fact that in a great crisis both have shown high moral courage also.

The outcome of that case ought to be an inspiration for the submission of all international quarrels to a court of arbitration.

Before the last general election in Great Britain Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, now prime minister, in an eloquent speech at Albert Hall, in London, said:

I rejoice that the principle of arbitration has made great strides, and that to-day it is no longer counted weakness for any of the great powers of the world to submit those issues which once would have been referred to the arbitrament of self-assertion and of passion to a higher tribunal. But it is vain to seek peace if you do not also ensue it. I hold that the growth of armaments is a great danger to the peace of the world. A policy of huge armaments keeps alive and stimulates and feeds the belief that force is the best, if not the only, solution of international differences. It is a policy that tends to inflame old sores and to create new sores; and I submit to you that as the principle of peaceful arbitration gains ground it becomes one of the highest tasks of a statesman to adjust those armaments to the newer and happier condition of things. What nobler rôle could this great country assume than at the fitting moment to place itself at the head of a league of peace, through whose instrumentality this great work could be effected?

Gentlemen who advocate a large and warlike navy in this country may question the sincerity of the prime minister's speech, because the British naval budget again provides for an increase of the sea power of Great Britain; but they are only casual students of the European situation who do not understand that the Liberal Government in England is driven, against its will, into these extravagant military expenditures.

Trade and political jealousies between England and Germany and the steady development of the sea power of the German Empire compel the British, who want peace and disarmament, to continue in a course which their better nature abhors and their judgment holds unnecessary if arbitration can be agreed upon. But these conditions do not vex the United States, and need not keep us out of the paths of peace, wisdom, and economy. The geographical isolation of our country, its vast population, and exhaustless resources put us into a class by ourselves. We have no neighbors who are dangerous, unless we except the Japanese, who are near the Philippines, and who, if they are half as clever as we have been led to believe, wouldn't take the islands if we offered them as a gracious gift.

Menaced by no one, endangered from no source whatever, why should we commit the folly of undertaking this mad ship-building competition with Great Britain? Even if England were not, as I firmly believe she is, our sincere friend, Canada, which we could easily invade from the land side and no doubt capture, is a hostage which she would not sacrifice. Canada is England's pledge of peace with us. But I do not like to even consider our relations with Great Britain from the point of view of possible hostilities. England is governed by enlightened statesmen and controlled by public opinion, which in all intelligent and free states is a higher and greater power still. Public opinion in England would not tolerate the thought of a war with the United States. It would be justly condemned as a crime, and any government which even coquetted with the idea of war with this country would be kicked out of Parliament House by an indignant public. Then, this being true, British naval

development is not aimed at this country. Her statesmen do not want to commit suicide. They appreciate the importance to their own people of keeping the sea open to the great Anglo-American trade. Their people must be fed and clothed, and the grain and cotton of the United States are essential. Idle Lancashire looms and a hungry mob in London are more to be dreaded than a war with any power of continental Europe. English naval growth may be viewed as a suspicious and warlike circumstance by Russia, Germany, or France, but for this country it can only mean the certainty that we will continue to send cotton to Manchester and corn to London over a sea kept open mainly by British taxpayers.

All we need to do, Mr. Chairman, to maintain peaceful relations with the rest of the world is to adhere to the traditional American policies and stay at home and mind our own business. We ought at once to agree to treaties of arbitration with every civilized government on earth. We ought to begin by making such treaties with all the other American republics.

It would be an act of generosity and justice from a great, strong government to weaker states that are sincerely trying to develop the same political ideas. For great states with undisputed reserve military force to suggest such treaties to smaller and weaker ones would be an act of grace that would command the applause of just and peace-loving men throughout the world. Such treaties will surely come. A growing public sentiment will demand them. Shall we not secure for our country the honor of leadership in a cause so glorious? Shall we not secure the peace and happiness of America by doing this righteous and reasonable thing? It can not be denied that all the Central and South American countries view us with a certain degree of alarm. Ought we not to allay their apprehension by giving them the assurance of solemn treaties of arbitration that will evenly match the smallest and weakest nation against the strongest? Let us put this great Republic at the head of the league of peace.

THE LARGEST BATTLE SHIP.

Now comes our Committee on Naval Affairs and asks this House to authorize the construction of the largest and most formidable battle ship afloat. The fierce spirit of the committee is shown in the language of their bill, which asks for "one first-class battle ship, carrying as heavy armor and as powerful armament as any known vessel of its class." But as extreme as this language is, it is mild compared to that used by gentlemen in their speeches. They say that we must have a ship which will steam faster and farther and be altogether a more powerful engine of war than the new British ship, the *Dreadnought*. Does this suggestion grow out of the fact that our liberty or the integrity of our soil is threatened by any power on earth? Surely, sir, the most unblushing jingo will hardly have the presumption to say so. Is it merely to gratify national vanity? And if so, is it worth while putting our people to this great expense just to have the privilege of boasting that the greatest fighting machine afloat sails under the American flag? It is a sad commentary on the wisdom of our legislation that we can go on increasing commerce destroyers—for battle ships, in the last analysis, are essentially commerce destroyers—while our merchant marine does not grow.

It is generally understood that this unmatched battle ship will cost about \$11,000,000 and that it will take nearly a million dollars per year to maintain and operate it.

To my friends from the South I want to suggest that the prime cost of the vessel represents the value of 220,000 bales of cotton at the rather high price of 10 cents a pound. Your constituents and mine will have to produce 20,000 bales of cotton each year just to meet the operating expenses of the ship.

One of the Representatives from Iowa [Mr. DAWSON], I believe, made an interesting speech here the other day in which he told of the bucolic glories of his State. Horses, cattle, sheep, and swine were eulogized for their contributions to the comfort and happiness of the human family. He grew most eloquent in telling how the barnyard fowls of Iowa preserved the balance of trade.

Even the wonderful fertility and industry of the Iowa hen will be worked overtime to meet these augmented and increasing expenses. At \$1 per bushel, a price which is rarely received, it will take 11,000,000 bushels of wheat to pay for this one vessel that will certainly be worthless in twenty years, and may be obsolete even before it is finished. The farmers who are to earn this ship along with their daily bread by moistening the earth with the sweat of their faces will have to make an extra million bushels of wheat to pay for its operation for a single year. It will cost four or five million dollars more than we appropriate each year for our great Department of Agriculture. Yet we expect the Department to endure forever, and we know the ship will be in the scrap heap in a few years. I hope these

facts will be well considered by the man who makes the wheat and the cotton.

HOW IT MAY BE USED.

The only possible reason I can see for this departure from our heretofore relatively peaceful programme is that the great ship may be used in the Philippines. It will be so powerful in its armament and have guns of such wonderful range that even the most remote mountain fastnesses of the Philippines will very likely be in the zone of danger. It will be a useful ally of Governor Curry, of Samar, in his proposed war of extermination against the Pulajanes. After a little target practice the smallest band of these naked savages hidden away in the coast ranges will make an unavoidable target.

In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I want the attention of the committee to the remarkable suggestion recently made by this same Governor Curry. It is taken from the Associated Press reports in the New York World of May 13:

WEYLERISM FAVORED BY OFFICIALS IN PHILIPPINES—"EXTERMINATE THE BREED" IS THE WATCHWORD BORROWED FROM SPANISH GENERAL.

MANILA, May 13, 1906.

Superintendent of Schools Hoover, of Samar, and several native officials of that island have arrived here on their way to Baguio, Province of Benguet, the summer capital, to visit Governor-General Ide. Mr. Hoover says:

"Ninety-five per cent of the natives of Samar are anxious to have the fanatics exterminated and absolute peace established. The native officials are organizing volunteers, who are scouring the mountains, guarding trails, and capturing or killing outlaws. It is estimated that 300 Pulajanes still remain in the mountains."

Governor Curry, of Samar, has proposed to turn over the Pulajane districts to the Federal authorities, have martial law proclaimed, and the fanatics exterminated. If General Wood agrees, he will put two regiments, backed by naval gunboats, on the island and in the adjacent waters, to keep the outlaws from escaping to neighboring islands.

Governor-General Ide has reached no decision in the matter. The Pulajane leader is 64 years old, and has been in the mountains forty years.

It will be observed that this wonderful school superintendent, Hoover—his name deserves to be embalmed on the roll of infamy—says that "95 per cent of the natives of Samar are anxious to have the fanatics exterminated and absolute peace established." This report goes on to say that "Governor Curry has proposed to turn over the Pulajane districts to the Federal authorities, have martial law proclaimed, and the fanatics exterminated." There it is again, Mr. Chairman. Extermination is what they want.

No doubt this little plan of the worthy governor and his Christian superintendent of schools will bring peace to the Pulajanes, but it will be the peace of the grave. Not one of these savages is to be left alive if the governor, engaged in "benevolent assimilation," and the school superintendent, engaged in the spread of Christian civilization, are to have their way. And who can doubt, after Mount Dajo, that they will be given their way? Against that, Mr. Chairman, I protest in the name of all true sportsmen and in the name of science. I demand, sir, that Governor Curry be compelled to give the Pulajanes the same periodical immunity we give to birds and other game in this country. If the governor were a true sportsman, he would surely make provision for a close season. Even Filipinos should not be killed out of season. They ought to be given an opportunity to restock the preserves. But he advocates a war of extermination, unremitting and unrelenting. It is unsportsmanlike and will destroy the game.

When these unhappy islanders have gone the way of the buffalo, when only a few specimens remain alive, confined in some corral in the Philippines for the entertainment of tourists or exhibited in a dime museum in New York, students of ethnology will regret that the ardor of Governor Curry was not stayed somewhere short of extermination. Then, sir, while it is yet time, in the name of science and of sport I ask that a few specimens of the Filipino savage be kept alive, even if this great battle ship should never be put into commission. [Loud applause.]

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to perfect my amendment by inserting three words.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri asks unanimous consent to amend his amendment. Is there objection?

Mr. COCKRAN. Mr. Chairman, I will ask if the correction is ready?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. It is.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read the proposed amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Insert after the words "Hague conference" the words "to be held within the next twelve months."

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. VREELAND. Mr. Chairman, I sympathize entirely with the purpose of The Hague conference. I sympathize entirely

with the efforts of the gentleman from Missouri who will be one of the representatives in that conference from this country, to impart to representatives of other great powers the knowledge that the United States of America stands to-day, as it has stood throughout all its history, in favor of a peaceful means of settling difficulties.

But, Mr. Chairman, I can not support the amendment which is offered to this bill. I do not believe that by adopting this amendment the House would select the best means of conveying through our representatives to The Hague conference the sympathy of the American Congress to the object of that conference. Mr. Chairman, the American people do not need to say to the nations of the earth that they are in favor of peace and in favor of arbitration. Through all our history we have taken the lead in settling great questions of national concern by submitting them to arbitration. We all remember the *Alabama* award. We remember the depredations of vessels built in England to prey upon the American merchant marine during the war between the States.

We remember that at the close of the civil war the United States demanded damages of Great Britain for the depredations of those vessels. We know, and all the world knows, that we were in shape to enforce our claims. We had a million and a half of the seasoned veterans of Grant's army. The iron ships which had been invented during that war had made useless the wooden vessels of the world. We were hardened by four years of warfare, we were flushed by victory, and yet under all those circumstances, with national pride and the national feeling aroused and indignant, we went into the treaty of Geneva and submitted that question to arbitration, out of which came the *Alabama* award. So that the American people do not need to convey to the world a new message, that they sympathize with the doctrine of arbitration.

Mr. Chairman, we all know that these commissioners who meet at The Hague next year are clothed with no power. We know that they can resolve, but they can not bind the nations which they represent. We know that in every case they must go back to the nations from which they come to secure from them approval of any action that is taken there. We know from past experience that it may be one, two, three, or even five years before the last of the nations that take part in that conference shall have acted upon and either approved or disapproved of the resolutions adopted in that peace convention. In the meanwhile, what is the Secretary of the Navy to do about this ship that we authorize? How long would he wait under the amendment offered to this bill? Why, it proposes that in two cases the building of this great ship shall be suspended. If that conference shall resolve to curtail armaments, then in that case the Secretary of the Navy must suspend. In case they resolve that all future questions shall be submitted to arbitration the Secretary of the Navy is directed, in his discretion, to suspend the operations of building this ship. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that it would put the Secretary of the Navy in position where he would be criticised whatever he did, where he would be unable to know, as a practical proposition, what he should do. Mr. Chairman, I stand strongly in favor of sending our able representative to The Hague clothed with whatever authority the American Congress can give him, showing the sympathy of the American people toward the peaceful settlement of difficulties.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. VREELAND. Yes.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. The gentleman seems to be laboring under the misapprehension that I am to be a delegate to The Hague conference. That is not the case.

Mr. VREELAND. Well, I am sorry that my friend is not to be a delegate, if that is true.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. I want to call the attention of my friend to the fact that after the first Hague conference every government signatory to The Hague convention within a reasonable time ratified the action of that body.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. VREELAND. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for one minute.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York asks unanimous consent to proceed for one minute. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. VREELAND. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry that the gentleman from Missouri is not to be a representative from this country in that conference. If he were, I should feel that our interests were left in safe and able hands, but let me suggest to the gentleman that instead of pressing this amendment upon the committee, instead of seeking to tie up and embarrass the building operations of the Navy, let him bring before this House

a joint resolution declaring the sympathy of the American Congress with the efforts of their representatives in The Hague conference to obtain peaceful methods of settling difficulties among nations. I would almost guarantee that unless objection is made by the leader of the Democratic side such a resolution would go through by unanimous consent.

Mr. WALDO. Mr. Chairman, there seem to be only two objections made here to the authorization of this large battle ship—one made by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. TAWNEY] that we have not the money to expend, and one made by the gentleman who put in the last amendment, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BARTHOLOMT], and by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON], that we ought to disarm in order to be leading the way toward the peace of the world.

Now, in the first place, in regard to the objection made by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, it seems to me that he is a little unfair in charging up to the Navy all the expenditures that have come as a result of the great civil war and of all the wars and troubles that we have since had.

Mr. TAWNEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will pardon me, the gentleman from Minnesota made no such charge. I did not charge this expenditure to the Navy, but I said that on account of these things we were this year expending 63½ per cent of the total revenue of the Government.

Mr. WALDO. Mr. Chairman, I decline to yield to the gentleman. I think he made that same statement four or five times during his speech, but he did make the objection that because of the large expenditure we were now making as a result of the civil war we ought not to authorize this battle ship, and it amounts to the same thing in whatever words he sees fit to put it. When we appropriated one hundred and thirty-nine millions here for pensions, that met with the universal approval of everybody in the House. I do not recollect that the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. TAWNEY] objected. We were all in favor of it. That expenditure is a necessary and proper one and has nothing to do with the question as to whether we ought to keep up our Navy.

In the first place, this authorization of a new battle ship does not call for the expenditure of any money at this time. It is left in the discretion of the President as to when it shall be built. No money is appropriated at this time and will not be before next year or some later time. If, as has been suggested here, the gentlemen who are interested in rivers and harbors are opposed to any further expenditure for the Navy until they can get a large appropriation for the improvement of their rivers and harbors will wait until next year, they can then present those considerations to Congress and have it then decided whether any money shall be expended for the further construction of the Navy.

It is objected by several gentlemen upon the floor of the House that there should be no further increase of our fleet; that, on the contrary, our naval power should be decreased; and that we should commence disarmament as an example to other great naval powers of the world, and that such a step on our part would be a direct advance toward the arbitration of all disputes between nations and tend to general peace throughout the world.

It seems to me that this is a mistaken view of the situation. No step toward disarmament can be taken by us until there is some general agreement to that end by the great powers of the world. No other great power is now taking any step toward a reduction of its navy. On the contrary, the navies of Italy, France, Germany, Japan, and especially Great Britain are being greatly increased both in number of vessels and number and weight of guns. We can not continue to be classed among the great world powers unless we not only keep our present Navy in repair and condition for service, but also largely increase our present fleet. We need a great navy, not for the purpose of menace or war, but for purposes of peace, to defend the Philippine Islands and our other insular possessions, to protect our citizens in all parts of the world from insult and oppression.

The question, then, is whether the American people desire to continue the policy of this Government which was commenced in 1883, to build and maintain a powerful and efficient navy. That is the real question. The Secretary of the Navy and the President have both stated that in order to keep the Navy up to its present efficiency, not to increase it, but to keep it up to its present efficiency and strength, there ought to be one battle ship at least authorized each year, and that is all this provision attempts to do. It still leaves it in the hands of Congress to decide next year whether we have sufficient money to go on with its construction. I believe that our country ought to lead in the way toward peaceful solutions of international

disputes and differences, but the only influence that the United States has in that way is on account of its power, on account of its powerful Navy and great naval victories of late years. It is only a few months since our President received the congratulations of the world upon his success in bringing about peace between Japan and Russia. The reason that he had the power and influence to do that, that he was called upon to do it, was because we had become one of the great naval powers of the world. If our Navy had gone to ruin, if we were then disarming, we would have had little to say—

Mr. JOHNSON. May I interrupt the gentleman—

Mr. WALDO. I refuse to yield; I have only a minute or so, and the gentleman can take his own time later.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. PRINCE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the time of the gentleman be extended five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. WALDO. I do not intend to say that we menaced Russia and Japan into making peace. Nobody believes that for a moment; but we all know that the peacemaker in the neighborhood is the strong man—among nations, the strong nation. It is not the weakling who has influence in the council of men or the council of nations.

Mr. COCKRAN. Will the gentleman allow a question?

Mr. WALDO. I can not yield; I have only a few moments. This is one of the reasons why, if we desire to keep up the power and influence of our country, we ought to keep up the Navy at least to its present efficiency. There is another reason why we who live on the coasts, both the east and west coast of our country, think that there ought to be an efficient Navy. It is not a great while since people on the Atlantic coast were in great fear of having their cities destroyed by the Spanish fleet. If the Spanish admiral had sailed to this country instead of to the West Indies, the damage to our seacoast would have been many times the cost of our whole Navy. Those people who lived directly upon the coast remember that time very well—that there was a general fleeing from all exposed quarters, and the harbor lights were put out on our Atlantic coast from Florida to the northern point of Maine. That recollection is something that appeals to us on the seacoast. I suppose those gentlemen who live on the prairies of Minnesota or other parts of the West two or three thousand miles from either coast never felt that fear; but it was not an idle fear by any means.

Another reason, it seems to me, why we ought to keep up our Navy is because we are now considering the question of the great increase of our merchant marine. Because we had no Navy at the beginning of the civil war, our merchant marine was practically wiped off the sea. We have never been able to get it back, because there was such an impetus given to the English trade that we never have recovered, and never will recover until Congress does something to that end.

We have before us a great measure looking toward the creation of a great merchant marine. There is little use in attempting to cover the seas again with American merchant vessels if we have not a powerful navy to protect our merchant ships in all parts of the world. We have to-day the largest commerce of any country in the world, but it is carried almost exclusively by foreign ships. You may sail the world over and scarcely see an American flag in a foreign port, except upon one of our war vessels. We are paying yearly an immense tribute in freight to England, Germany, and other foreign countries to transport our goods to the world—an immense sum that ought to support a great fleet of American deep-sea going ships, enrich our country, and keep always in existence a great force of experienced and hardy sailors to man our Navy and defend our coast and interests in case of war with any foreign power. It is impossible, no matter what pains we may take or money we may spend, to have any great merchant marine without a great navy to protect it. The two must go hand in hand. It is not properly a warlike measure, but a measure that tends to peace for our country, protection of its interests and its citizens in the farthest parts of the world, and gives to us a great voice and influence in promoting the peace of the world.

The American people will never consent to the dismantling of our fleet and the abandonment of our great navy-yards. It is a beautiful and iridescent dream to think that peace is to reign continually throughout the world, and that we shall be respected at home and abroad without the power and the Navy to enforce respect and peace. We shall have peace ourselves, and can aid greatly in enforcing general peace throughout the world only so long as we are armed and able to command it. I believe that

the increase of our Navy must go on, and that the repair and building of war ships will and must continue until our nation is ready to fall into decay.

The gentleman from Ohio has referred to the fact that our war ships had been from two to four years behind in building, and gave that as one reason why we ought not to build any more naval vessels. If he will look at the paper he had before him at the time he will see that all of those ships that were two to four years, or even six years, behind in their date of completion were constructed in private shipyards of the country. There never has been one ship constructed in a private shipyard until the last—the *Louisiana*—that was constructed within the time limit of the contract. This is no reason why the building of war ships should be abandoned; it is no reason why we should abandon our Navy. But it is a very strong reason why we should keep our naval construction going on in the navy-yards, to compel private shipyards to complete their war ships on time and for reasonable prices.

It is, then, only a question of policy as to whether the new ships shall be built and repairs on the old ones be made in private or Government yards. The only objection made to the building of a proportion at least of the new war ships in our

navy-yards is the claim that it will cost the Government more in its own yards than to have the ships built by private contract. If this were so, which, to say the least, is very doubtful, that reason would not be enough to overcome the many strong and cogent reasons for building in Government yards. In the first place, the excess of cost of the *Connecticut*, being built at the New York Navy-Yard, according to present figures, will not be over 9½ per cent over the cost of the original estimate. The alterations in the Government yards have been very much less than the alterations on the *Louisiana* at the Newport News yard. It is not known whether the private yard will not bring in a bill for loss in the construction of the *Louisiana* on the ground that she has cost more than they expected when they took the contract. Such claims have been made against the Government in the past, and are very likely to be in the future should it be found when the ship is completed that she has cost more than was expected when the contract and original estimates were made.

Naval Constructor Albert W. Stahl, at the hearing of the Naval Committee of the House, submitted the following table relative to certain private-built ships, showing that the total cost of such ships is considerably in excess of the contract price:

Comparison of contract price with total cost of certain ships.

	Monterey.	Olympia.	San Francisco.	Oregon.	Massachusetts.	Indiana.
Payments on account of contract	\$1,647,728.64	\$1,796,000.00	\$1,423,231.50	\$3,272,403.99	\$3,045,576.48	\$3,055,272.39
Extra to contractors for authorized changes	107,093.02	103,831.30	47,739.94	205,862.69	171,111.12	149,960.42
Work done by Government plans, inspection, etc	73,588.03	70,878.67	141,840.16	248,165.75	203,293.32	257,032.19
Hull armor	237,730.26			828,468.34	828,929.74	837,884.62
Armor for gun protection	190,534.38	141,522.62		1,029,591.42	1,030,651.58	977,134.02
Speed premiums		300,000.00	100,000.00	175,000.00	100,000.00	38,500.00
Trial-trip expenses	11,547.42	39,207.09	25,446.32	22,913.99	16,822.73	17,324.41
Care and preservation, insurance, etc		32,525.86		71,615.72		
Total cost	2,268,281.75	2,484,027.54	1,738,257.82	5,914,021.90	5,401,844.97	5,353,708.05
Contract price	1,674,839.60	1,796,000.00	1,428,000.00	3,301,510.00	3,000,000.00	3,000,000.00
Excess of total cost over contract price	593,442.15	688,027.54	310,257.82	2,612,511.90	2,311,844.97	2,243,708.05

The navy-yard at New York had to be prepared for the construction of its first battle ship, the *Connecticut*. Many delays occurred in getting together the necessary plant, in obtaining the necessary force of experienced men. There were delays in obtaining material, while the private yards obtained their material with less delay. The men at the navy-yard worked eight hours per day, while at the private yards they worked from nine to ten hours. The pay at the navy-yard has been as much or more for eight hours' work than was received at the private yards for nine or ten hours' work. With all these difficulties, the excess of cost is only 9½ per cent at the Government yard.

There is little doubt that hereafter, provided work is continued, that ships can be constructed at less expense than was the *Connecticut*, so that on the question of cost there can be little or no advantage with the private yards. If we may take the experience of England, where shipbuilding has been continuous in public yards, the cost will be somewhat less in our navy-yards, if we keep sufficient construction work there to keep the plant in condition and a sufficient force of experienced men constantly together.

It is absolutely necessary that we should have one or more navy-yards on the Atlantic and on the Pacific coast constantly ready with a sufficient plant and a large and efficient body of experienced workmen to make the large repairs that are necessary to keep our great fleet in seagoing condition and ready for service. Such repairs must be made at once, whenever the fleet or any of its ships go into harbor from a voyage. It can be done much better in the Government yards and will cost only a fraction of the charges at private yards. The difference in this item alone will make up many times any difference in excess of constructing the vessels at the private yards, and that must be done in order to keep a force on hand to make repairs on ships whenever they come into port, so that the force of men may be diverted from construction work to repair work.

A war ship constructed at Government yards under the immediate direction and supervision of the officers of the Navy will be better built than a ship constructed at a private yard. There would be the same difference as between a house constructed by day work under the direction and supervision of a competent builder for his own use and a house built by a contractor only interested in building the structure as cheaply as possible so long as a sufficiently fair exterior is shown to secure a ready sale. A ship built at the Government yard would practically be worth from 15 to 20, probably 25, per cent more than one constructed at a private yard, and the difference in expenses for repairs would more than equal the 10 or 15

per cent difference which it is now claimed would be the additional cost.

The Government plants for shipbuilding at the navy-yards have cost millions of dollars. If shipbuilding is discontinued at the yards these plants will deteriorate and become practically valueless and the Government would be without means to construct or repair ships in case of war or other great necessity.

Until the Government started into the construction of ships itself the private yards have been from six months to forty-six months behind in the completion of ships, so that the loss of interest in the money invested has greatly exceeded any difference now claimed in the cost of construction at Government yards.

The Government ought to be prepared and able to construct new torpedo boats, submarines, or war ships generally, with such new and secret improvements as may have been or are likely to be made in her yards if constantly engaged in construction, so that such new inventions and secrets may not become the property of other nations.

Lastly, it is absolutely necessary that the Government should have a certain amount of construction in the Government yards in order that its officials and constructing engineers may have any real knowledge of the construction of war ships, of the best means, appliances, methods of building, of the cost, and of the time of construction. Such knowledge can not be obtained from books or the casual supervision of construction as the Government gives to ships constructed for it at private yards.

If the merchant-marine bill, which has already passed the Senate, should pass the House and become a law, there would be such an immediate increase in shipbuilding for the merchant service that all of the private yards of this country and many more new yards would be overloaded with work for private persons and corporations. It is not proposed to abandon the building of war ships in the private yards, but under such circumstances as these the Government would be obliged to abandon the building of ships in private yards unless at a largely increased expense of cost of building at Government yards.

It is urged that only a small proportion of the Government shipbuilding should be done in the Government yards; a sufficient proportion to keep the Government shipbuilding plant in repair and order and to keep together a sufficient body of experienced and skilled men to be ready for repair work or for especial construction work that might be necessary in case of war.

There are now under construction in private yards some twenty-seven naval ships of various kinds, the total contract price for which is nearly \$80,000,000. Of this \$80,000,000 there

still remains to be expended over \$30,000,000. Certainly, under these circumstances at least, one ship ought to be kept under construction in each of the Government yards which is now prepared to do such work.

This country can not continue to be prosperous without great foreign commerce. It can not be assured that its commerce will not be swept away from the seas at any moment without a powerful navy. Congress has adopted the policy of sustaining and increasing the power of the Navy. The people have supported them in that policy, are supporting them, and will continue to support them. Such a Navy can not be maintained and kept properly equipped without great Government yards for the construction and repair of its ships. The Government can not now abandon the policy of building a portion of the ships to be added to the Navy in the Government yards without great loss in its shipbuilding plants and great detriment to its policy in maintaining and increasing its present naval force.

Mr. ROBERTS. At the opening of this debate the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. TAWNEY], the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, pointed out to the committee the great, and what I understood him to characterize extravagant, appropriations of the Fifty-seventh and Fifty-eighth Congresses along the lines of naval construction. Now, the gentleman from Minnesota was a Member of both of those Congresses, and I have no recollection whatever of his rising in his seat and calling the attention of either of those Congresses to the great folly upon which they were embarking. Yet to-day he rises and by inference, if not by direct charge, warns this committee that we are following in the footsteps of those two Congresses.

What are the facts? Why, Mr. Chairman, the programme recommended by the Naval Committee this year, of about 20,000 tons of new construction, is the smallest programme, with but one exception, that has been recommended since the second session of the Fifty-third Congress, in 1894, that exception coming in the first session of the Fifty-fifth Congress, in 1897. And I want to call the attention of the committee and of the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. TAWNEY] to a fact which seems to have escaped his observation, that the two Congresses which he has criticised for extravagant appropriations for war ships were on the down-hill side in the matter of appropriations. The high-water mark in the building up of our Navy was reached in the third session of the Fifty-fifth Congress, when there was authorized over 105,000 tons of new construction. And since that time, down to and through the Fifty-seventh and Fifty-eighth Congresses, there has been a marked and steady decline in the number of tons that has been authorized, with the exception of the second session of the Fifty-seventh Congress, where there was a slight increase over the preceding Congress. But the next Congress after that reduced the tonnage so much that the average of reduction remained the same. Now, we are asking but 20,000 tons of new construction, and in this connection, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me the Committee on Naval Affairs has been somewhat unfortunate in the use of language in framing the bill. They say that, "For the purpose of further increasing the naval establishment." It seems to me we should have said: "For the purpose of maintaining the present efficiency of the naval establishment."

And I think I am warranted in that statement when we consider the message of the President of the United States and the Secretary of the Navy, both submitted to this Congress, in which they emphasize the fact that we should maintain the present efficiency of our Navy, and make no recommendation for further increase. I think I am fairly voicing the sentiment of the President, of the Secretary of the Navy, and of the members of the Naval Committee when I say that the recommendations this year are not along the lines of further increase of the Navy, but merely to maintain the present efficiency of the Navy we now have. That, I believe, is the policy of the committee and of the Administration, and I believe it should be the policy.

Not many years ago it was thought that we should build up a great Navy, that we should have at least forty-eight or fifty battle ships and armored cruisers and other craft in that proportion, but now the sentiment is that the Navy is large enough in the number of its units, but those units should be kept to the highest state of efficiency.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have five minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts asks unanimous consent that he may continue his remarks for five minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROBERTS. Now, what does the Secretary of the Navy say along those very lines:

I think it may be safely said that if the situation was not complicated by any unforeseen development, the programme of naval construc-

tion for the future, in so far as it relates to our fighting fleet alone, should consist of substituting five new battle ships and two new armored cruisers for the oldest vessels of these types on our register, and five more battle ships for the coast defense vessels of the monitor type, and these substitutions should be made at latest within the next six years.

Now, it seems to me the Committee on Naval Affairs can not be charged with extravagance in following the recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy, who asks this House to provide for only one new battle ship.

And why do we ask for one new battle ship when the recommendation of the Secretary was for two? Why, the testimony before our committee, uncontradicted, was that the battle ship now provided for in this bill would be the equal of any two battle ships now afloat, and any two battle ships now afloat, of the class last authorized by Congress, would cost \$15,000,000, and yet we have, if this bill becomes a law, one battle ship at a cost of \$10,000,000, which is the equal of any two that would cost together \$15,000,000. During the general debate on this naval bill the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KEFFER], himself a gallant soldier and an ex-Speaker of this House, made use of a gem of thought which it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, should be emblazoned in letters of gold and spread over the desk of the Speaker of this House, where Members not only of this, but of all future Congresses might constantly have it before their eyes. He said, referring to that great saying of the immortal Washington, "In time of peace prepare for war;" he would amend it by saying, "In time of peace prepare to maintain it."

And that, Mr. Chairman, is the very purpose of the recommendations of this year, not to enlarge the size of the present Navy, but to have every fighting unit in that Navy of the latest and most improved type. And the time has come, Mr. Chairman, as anybody can see by looking at the ages of our present battle ships, when Congress must devote itself to a serious consideration of that point. Otherwise we shall see our present Navy deteriorate from year to year. And I do not believe it is the wish or desire of any Member on this floor, or of the American people, that the present Navy, in which they take so much pride, shall be allowed to deteriorate from its present standard.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE.

The committee informally rose; and Mr. OLMSTED having taken the chair as Speaker pro tempore, a message from the Senate, by Mr. PARKINSON, its reading clerk, announced that the Senate had passed bill and joint resolution of the following titles; in which the concurrence of the House of Representatives was requested:

S. 6128. An act to authorize the construction of a bridge across the Pend d'Oreille River, in Stevens County, Wash., by the Pend d'Oreille Development Company; and

S. R. 59. Joint resolution relative to the appropriation for the native schools and reindeer enterprise in Alaska.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION REFERRED.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, Senate joint resolution of the following title was taken from the Speaker's table, and referred to its appropriate committee, as indicated below:

S. R. 59. Joint resolution relative to the appropriation for the native schools and reindeer enterprise in Alaska—to the Committee on the Territories.

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

The committee resumed its session.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. GILLESPIE] is recognized for ten minutes.

Mr. GILLESPIE. Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the item in this bill providing for an additional battle ship, calling for an expenditure of probably \$10,000,000. I am opposed to it because I believe it is unnecessary and, therefore, will be an unjustifiable burden placed upon our people. Every right-thinking American citizen believes in this country's having an adequate Navy, but in considering the adequacy of our Navy there are two points from which to view it. One is a navy sufficient for purely defensive operations and the other not only for defensive, but for aggressive operations as well.

I insist that in view of our history and the general American spirit that a navy strong enough for our self-defense is all that we ought to have. Our people are now burdened with an annual naval expenditure exceeding \$100,000,000, a sum much too large, in my opinion. It is a folly scarcely short of madness for us to enter the list with European nations in the struggle for the largest, most destructive, and expensive navy. They, at least, can appeal to the virtue of necessity behind their programme. England, France, and Japan can reasonably say: "Our foreign trade must continue or our people starve," but the United States can put up no such plea. Our country, compared to theirs, is but in its youth. We have vast acres of undeveloped territory. Our boundless resources have scarcely been

touched. Our energies, properly organized and distributed, can find employment at home for a century to come.

Besides, Mr. Chairman, in every true sense, the American idea of commerce is based upon the idea of peace and not war. Trade arrangements between nations, as between individuals, are the result of agreement, where the minds of the contracting parties must come together by mutual consent, and I insist that it is wholly un-American, it is un-Christian, it is against the boasted civilization that we claim, to look upon commerce as any other than the product of peace, and he who views it from any other standpoint has his face turned to the setting rather than the rising sun.

Mr. Chairman, it strikes me as a cold, inhuman, dollar-blinded policy that would throw this nation of ours backward and call forth its lower rather than its higher virtues; that would place before us the dollar and say to us: "Sacrifice all to get this."

I call attention to an able speech delivered on the floor of this House on Saturday, May 5, 1906, by a Member of this House from Massachusetts, Mr. WEEKS, a gentleman for whom I have the very highest regard from a personal standpoint, and whose ability and patriotism none can dispute. I think this speech furnishes the keynote to the naval programme which is being, with great adroitness, placed before the American people. The fundamental idea is commerce—an extension of our commerce through the power of our Navy.

Mr. Weeks says:

The wars of the future will be waged for commercial or humane reasons, as have nearly all wars since the time of the first Napoleon. We, in common with all the great nations of Europe, have reached a condition where we produce more manufactured goods than we consume. We are all looking for markets. To insure our having a fair chance to trade with the whole world the open-door policy must be maintained, especially in the Orient; but if we were lacking in physical power, it is safe to say that the door to our trade in many localities would be closed. Gentlemen speak of the triumphs of diplomacy as indicating the folly of maintaining a large navy, but diplomacy would lose many of its laurels if a navy did not exist to insure a hearing and compel a respectful consideration of our demands.

Again:

Our trade commenced to increase about the time our Navy commenced to develop. Our Navy is our one advertising medium in the Orient. The fact that we showed great strength during the Spanish-American war, great physical power, appeals to those people. They buy goods of nations which show to them that they have physical strength.

Again:

But the fact is, Mr. Chairman, we need a navy large enough to meet the commercial rivals whom we would have to meet in case of difficulty. In other words, our building policy, in my opinion, should be placed upon what our rivals are doing.

Mr. Chairman, while this picture drawn by the gentleman from Massachusetts to my mind has its cold, compassionless eye fixed upon the dollar, blinded to all else; while no impulse of our higher Christian civilization stirs its features; while its ears appear to be deaf to the calls of the higher and nobler works of humanity, yet I must confess that the picture is true.

Mr. Chairman, let us consider for a moment how much heartlessness, cruelty, and audaciousness, not only to our people, but to the peoples upon whom we depend for our foreign trade, are involved in this proposition. This is a demand of the manufacturers of this nation. Only yesterday, in New York, the manufacturers' association with a whoop indorsed ship subsidy. They long ago said to our consuming masses:

Pay to us more for our products than you can get them for in the world's markets with free competition. Let us build up a great American manufacturing industry, and through home competition you will get manufactured products as cheaply as you can in the open world market.

They appealed to our patriotism, and we acceded to their demands, and we have borne the burden through the heat of the day. The time came when, through home competition, our people were getting cheap home-manufactured goods. The home market was preserved to our manufacturers.

Then these same manufacturers made new demands upon our people. They said to us:

You have given us aid. This aid is expressed in the increased capital represented by our stocks and bonds. We can not submit to home competition. It means our destruction as surely as foreign competition. Therefore you patriotic Americans who wish to keep up your American industries must permit us to consolidate and combine our industries so as to throttle home competition.

By word, expressed in the Sherman antitrust law, we have repudiated this demand, but by acts in letting this law remain a dead letter we have acceded to the demands of our manufacturers. We have permitted this consolidation and combination to grow and spread rapidly until no part of our country and no industry is free from its blighting touch. Home competition is practically destroyed, tariff duties are at their highest point, and just to the extent that home competition has been destroyed our people have been forced to pay higher prices for home-manufactured articles.

Now the proposition is submitted to us:

You Americans, through your patriotism, have poured your money into our coffers. We have denied you the benefit of home competition, which we promised you; you have acceded to our demands and are paying the additional heavy bonus to us. We still appeal to your patriotism and say to you the whole industrial fabric of America will tumble to ruins if you do not agree to still keep out foreign competition and submit to our trust prices. It is true we have not complied with our promises; we are making more than you can consume, but it is not wise for us to increase your consumptive capacity by lowering to you the cost of home-manufactured articles; we must keep the home market up, and therefore our surplus must go to the foreign consumer. You just be good Americans and submit to our programme as to the foreign market, and here it is: It is true the foreigner is willing to send his ships to our shores and take our products to foreign markets cheaper than we can carry them in our own ships, but we want our ships to act as commercial agents and find new fields and enlarge old ones for our products, but our ships can not compete with foreign ships; with your aid we have forced them to pay more for construction, more for labor. They require a bonus, a subsidy, and we, the manufacturers of America, want you good Americans not only to submit to what you have already submitted to with a patience that is a supreme wonder, in view of the American spirit of fair play, but we want you, the great mass of consumers of America, to pay, for our benefit, this additional bonus to American ships. It is true this will have a tendency to drive foreign ships off the seas, and it is true these same foreigners are the largest consumers of the great agricultural surplus of this nation, but we are not looking after the interests of agriculture.

Further, when we go to extend the market for our manufactured products and drive the foreign manufacturers from these fields, and the foreign manufacturer begins to look toward the source of strength of his new competitor and sees the immense tariff wall that keeps him out of the American market, he is liable to become irritated and realize the sense of injustice to him. He is apt to try to raise a tariff wall against us, and thus shut the door of trade against us as we have against him. To overcome this, we require a navy as strong as the strongest of our competitors, but you good Americans must furnish us the navy. Tax yourselves as you are already doing, at an annual rate of over \$100,000,000; continue to build immense battle ships; furnish us the bravest of your sons to man these battle ships; give them freely as an offering to our greed. You good Americans, sacrifice them upon the altar of your country. Let American mothers suffer in silence at the loss of loved ones. Why should we stop to consider that when it stands in the way of extending our foreign markets?

Mr. Chairman, this whole programme is full of impudence, injustice, and cruelty as against the great agricultural interests of this country especially, and also in every other respect. The agricultural interests have too little regard paid to them on the floor of this House. The banking interests of this country have able champions here, the manufacturers have able champions here, the railroads have able champions here; but, I ask, where is the committee of this House that stands here and demands and insists upon the rights of agriculture, not only in spending a few paltry thousands in the distribution of seeds and the establishment of experimental stations here and there; but where is the committee of this House that takes care of the interests of agriculture in this country in the way of securing cheaper implements, cheaper machinery and tools, lower taxation, something that is a positive and direct benefit to the American farmer? Look the situation over, and the answer comes back to you: "There is no such committee in the great American Congress." Every other interest is taken care of here. Direct and specific measures tending to promote them come before this House and are ably advocated by members from the committees having these interests in charge.

It is true we all profess great interest in the American farmer—and this is not a mere profession; it is a genuine feeling—but I ask the practical question, What committee of this House has the interest of the American farmer directly under its care and is here insisting upon those measures that will make his burdens lighter by taking off him unjust and unreasonable restrictions and by giving him the privilege to buy what he must consume and use at a better advantage?

We say the American farmer has no right to ask direct aid at the hands of the United States Government. This is true; but also the one eternal truth remains, so far as national legislation is concerned, that the farmer has the right to demand of the Federal Government that the heavy burdens placed upon him by the selfishness of other interests, which has found expression in legislation, be lifted from his shoulders. I long for the day to come in the American Congress when the Committee on Agriculture will be so organized that it will be composed of able, patriotic men who will look at all legislation affecting the agricultural interests of this country from the standpoint of agriculture—men who will insist upon the rights of the American farmer, so that we will no longer present to the world the shameful spectacle of putting the American farmer in the background and letting all the benefits that we would have flow to him first pass through the hands of other interests that are organized and stand next to the seat of power.

Mr. Chairman, the American farmer is organizing, and he ought to organize. There is no other way to force the organization of such a committee in this House. We tax ourselves, we endure heavy burdens, we sacrifice the lives of our sons, and make heavy the hearts of our mothers, all in the interest

of the American manufacturer, but what have we done to protect the American farmer?

In his name and in the name of the highest and best interests of the American people, in the name of the Christian civilization which we claim, I object to this increase of the American Navy.

Mr. COCKRAN. Mr. Chairman, for various reasons, amongst which my physical condition is the strongest, I did not intend to participate in this debate. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON], however, involves so much that is essential, in my judgment, to the credit of this Republic, the welfare of this people, and, indeed, the prospects of humanity that I can not allow this discussion to close without doing all that may be in my power to impress its importance on the committee.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset I ask attention to the extraordinary position assumed by the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BARTHOLDT]. He proposes to vote in favor of constructing this enormous battle ship, not because he favors extensive armaments, but because he professes a desire for general disarmament. If I understand his argument, he proposes that we increase our armaments to such an extent that in time the waste will become so enormous and so obvious that we ourselves and all the world will recoil from it. Surely, sir, this means that in his opinion, the virtuous end at which he aims must be reached through immediate profligacy. For my part, I believe that vice should be cured by abstinence, not by satiety; by refraining from it altogether, not by indulging it until the capacity for indulgence shall be exhausted. I do not think the gentleman from Missouri will make as creditable an appearance before the next session of the International Peace Congress as his friends would wish, and as many of his admirers may expect, having supported by his vote the very policy of which he expresses abhorrence so eloquently upon this floor and elsewhere.

Mr. Chairman, I have looked through all this debate for a single ray of light on one aspect of this proposal to construct a battle ship larger than any in existence, which seems to me the crux of the entire question. Gentleman on the other side all say we must have an "adequate" Navy, but not one has told us what he means by that qualification. To the direct question what kind of a navy is an adequate navy, the answer is always evasive though seldom temperate. When members of the Naval Committee are asked, "Must we have a navy as large as that of Great Britain?" they answer, "No;" "Must we have a navy as large as that of Germany?" gentlemen become vague, but vehement; "Must we have one as large as France?" they become still more indistinct in meaning, though much more sonorous in rhetoric. If that word "adequate" could be defined, then we might at least have a basis of intelligent discussion.

While no one among the supporters of this proposal will tell us just what, in his opinion, constitutes an adequate navy, they are all unanimous and vociferous in saying they want a navy, a great navy, solely for defense—not to make war, but to maintain peace. This phrase seems to have soothed consciences naturally averse to violence and to have converted advocates of peace into supporters of huge armaments. The gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BARTHOLDT], for instance, seems to have persuaded himself that it is consistent to vote for armaments while advocating disarmament; that in voting to retain this section he is yet animated by an abhorrence of the very thing for which it provides. The gentleman from Missouri may not suspect it, but when he professes to be animated by a desire for peace while voting preparations for war he is not by any means original. He is using the language by which every invader, every aggressive conqueror, every land pirate, every disturber of the peace of the world since the beginning of time justified his violences. Did Napoleon Bonaparte ever admit that he wantonly disturbed the peace of nations for the mere love of war? Did not every proclamation by which he began a contest, even that against Russia, declare it was undertaken for the sole purpose of establishing peace and making it permanent? On that pretense, with that avowed object, did he not compel more than once all the nations of Europe to take up arms and engage in struggles which their own interests would have led them to avoid? Has the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BARTHOLDT] forgotten that when Napoleon III strangled the French Republic and established on its ruins his empire of corruption and aggression he launched that enterprise of treason, of bloodshed, and of violence with a declaration that "The Empire is peace?" Yet, with this unbroken record of men the most prone to war, the most lustful of conquest, the most reckless in aggression, the most pitiless in plunder, always professing love of peace while planning schemes

of violence, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BARTHOLDT] believes that he can bear an effective part in promoting general disarmament and establishing the reign of peace throughout the world while he comes in here and votes for an increase of armament by adding to our Navy the largest battle ship ever constructed in the world, apparently under the impression that engines of war and carnage and destruction are effective implements of peace.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Of course, the gentleman does not desire to misrepresent me.

Mr. COCKRAN. It is the last thought in my mind.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. In one word I can definitely state my position.

Mr. COCKRAN. With the understanding, of course, that it will not be taken out of my time, I yield the floor for as long as the gentleman may desire.

Mr. BARTHOLDT. I do not go as far as some who are insisting that we shall have a navy as big and as powerful as would be strong enough to enforce the peace of the world, as, for instance, our friend Captain Hobson.

Mr. COCKRAN. How far in that direction does the gentleman from Missouri go?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. But on the other hand I do not want to go to the other extreme and deny to the Government that which it says it must have for defense.

Mr. COCKRAN. How far will the gentleman go in voting moneys to build naval vessels professedly for defensive purposes? My object in taking the floor is to get light on that particular point. What does the gentleman fix as the limit of his complaisance?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. I am willing to trust to the judgment of the Government on that.

Mr. COCKRAN. There I differ with the gentleman radically and irreconcilably. I believe that he and I and every Member of the House have taken an oath each one to exercise his own judgment on every proposition involving the expenditure of public money. There is but one way by which a dollar of the public treasure can be spent, and that is through an appropriation made by a vote of this House. There is but one excuse for an appropriation, and that is a conscientious belief by the House that it is necessary to provide for some public requirement. On the existence and sufficiency of that requirement each Member of this House must exercise his own judgment, under the dominion of his own conscience. No Member of this House can conscientiously vote for any disposition of public money on any judgment but his own. He can not accept the judgment of another, for that would be to abdicate his own functions, which would be a renunciation of his duty and a violation of the oath which he has taken to discharge it.

I do not think the gentleman from Missouri is in a creditable position at home or abroad when he stands on this floor and announces that he will vote an enormous sum out of the Treasury of the United States for the construction of a battle ship, not because he who is charged with the duty of guarding the public funds believes that the expenditure is necessary, but because it is judged advisable by somebody else upon whom the Constitution places no responsibility for public expenditures and in whose hands it places no authority over them.

Mr. Chairman, we are not trusted with the public purse to dispose of its contents as a matter of courtesy between departments. Before that trust was reposed in us we were required to give our solemn oath that we would exercise it for the highest interest of the American people according to our own conception of what is most likely to promote their well-being. Neither the gentleman from Missouri nor any other Member has any right to open the doors of the Treasury and allow one dollar to be withdrawn from it unless he is satisfied, according to his own judgment and his own conscience, that the appropriation is essential to the public welfare. The surrender of his authority by a Member of this House into the hands of any other person, whoever he may be, whether an officer of the Government, however exalted, or a suppliant for its favor, is an evasion of duty, and that is not a creditable attitude for the gentleman whose fame is dear to the people of Missouri, and whose intelligent exercise of his own judgment on the propriety of every expenditure is due to this House, of which he is a Member, and to the country, whose interests this House is bound to safeguard.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from New York have time to conclude his remarks.

Mr. FOSS. I think, Mr. Chairman, that we ought to fix the time.

Mr. COCKRAN. I will not be very long—not over ten minutes.

Mr. FOSS. I will not object to ten minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York asks that his colleague's time be extended ten minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. COCKRAN. Mr. Chairman, let us see whether the gentleman from Missouri and the other gentlemen on that side do not deceive themselves utterly and egregiously when they tell us that they favor the construction of this enormous ship, this huge engine of destruction, solely as a precaution for preserving peace.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] published a speech in the RECORD of the 10th, which had for its caption: "The man with the gun; is he an evil?" where, in rhetoric that is almost rhapsodical, he is painted as the hope of progress, the rampart of peace, the bulwark of civilization.

Reading that interesting effusion, I was struck with what seems to be a glaring injustice perpetrated, though quite unconsciously, by the gentleman from Pennsylvania. Why has he lavished all his praises on one exponent of force while excluding from the scope of his panegyric all other agents of violence? While he rejoices in the activity and hopes for the permanence of the man at the gun, why does he not lament the disappearance of "the man with the tomahawk," who may have been of less actual efficiency, but who was certainly of equal enthusiasm in the destruction of human life? Why does he begrudge a word of praise to "the man with the bludgeon," whom people less enlightened than the gentleman from Pennsylvania send to jail or the scaffold when in the exercise of his activities he beats or kills a traveler on the public highway? Why is the gentleman forgetful of "the man with the brass knuckles," who, though he does not rise to the dignity of homicide, is yet deeply convinced that peace is demoralizing, and who, though he does not often destroy his neighbor's life, yet always does his humble but diligent best to reduce the pulchritude of his neighbor's countenance? [Laughter and applause.]

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that notwithstanding the carefully studied language employed by its supporters it is the spirit of savagery that has been let loose in support of this proposal to construct the biggest engine of destruction in the world. Not one single argument has been advanced to the reason or intelligence of this House. There is but one redeeming feature in all this rhetoric. It shows that this country is still governed by a strong love of peace, since the men who favor building this battle ship pretend it is intended not for aggression, but for defense. But, sir, this assertion is more creditable to their ingenuity than to their candor. Defense against whom? Where is the foe that menaces us? The transparent character of this pretense becomes obvious the moment we examine it. In the face of this action, any attempt on our part to take the lead in a movement for peace becomes extravagant and farcical. How can we pretend to be sincerely desirous of peace while we are taking the lead in constructing machinery of war? The gentleman from Missouri apparently believes that we can establish peace upon the basis of eloquence; that while we are multiplying the engines of war we can become effective agents for peace merely by professing attachment to it. If peace can be established upon the basis of eloquence, we have but to send him to attend an international conference and the white dove will spread her wings over this continent and all the civilized world. [Laughter and applause.]

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Oh, Mr. Chairman, I would substitute for myself there the gentleman from New York [Mr. COCKRAN].

Mr. COCKRAN. If I had the same faith as the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BARTHOLDT], I would be glad to accompany him as his humble acolyte. But I do not mind now taking the House into my confidence and saying that in my judgment there is but one way to secure peace throughout the world, and that is to make justice its basis. All the arguments for arbitration, all the treaties that can be put upon paper will not make men submit to injustice. While one single element of injustice enters into the government of men, there will be resistance, and that resistance will cause either redress or war.

Mr. Chairman, the whole civilized world was once under the dominion of a single government. There was no organized power on earth to dispute its authority. But it was built upon injustice, on conquest, on servitude, on plunder; it depended on force and coercion, and although there was no organized government anywhere to resist it, from the depths of the forest savage tribes emerged in swarms, swept across its plains, devastated its fields, burned its villages, sacked its towns, scattered its legions, razed its very foundations, so that not a fragment of that vast empire remains in existence to-day. And if peace could not be maintained upon wrong, though one government exercised all the power of the world, do you suppose

it can be made permanent on such a foundation now through a combination of independent governments each inflamed by jealousy and anxious to share the plunder which any one of them has been successful in levying?

Mr. Chairman, peace will be established throughout the world, and will be permanent, when all the nations agree that the moral law is binding on governments no less than on individuals. The moral law of nations is embodied in our own Declaration of Independence, in the principle there for the first time formulated that the sole, legitimate basis of government is the consent of the governed. When that principle is universally applied, no disturbance of international peace will be possible. Not merely has this country, in proclaiming its own independence, announced the doctrine which must for evermore be the moral law of nations, and therefore the sole foundation of peace, but it has preached the most forceful lesson of peace for a hundred years when, though it remained almost wholly unarmed, it proved itself the most powerful in war and the most fruitful in industry—the most influential member in the family of nations, not through the size of its armaments, but through the virtue of its people and the splendor of their achievements. What people has ever been so potent in their influence or so prosperous in their possessions? Is any gentleman here ashamed of our history? Is any gentleman here ashamed of the record that we made in 1812, when, with not 10 per cent of the tonnage which we faced, we overthrew the supremacy of our foe upon the sea and wrote a new and glorious chapter in the annals of nations battling for the right and triumphing in the struggle?

Is any gentleman ashamed of the record we made in more recent years when we accomplished the first great triumph of arbitration by compelling submission to the Geneva tribunal of questions between England and this country growing out of the civil war? And at that time I do not think we had a single vessel that could be called a first-class battle ship. When have we enjoyed greater consequence in the estimation of the world than when we were practically unarmed? But gentlemen will say that times have changed; that we are now a world power, and as the scope of our influence has widened sources of attack have multiplied. This vagueness of speech is one of the disguises behind which vicious proposals become formidable.

If gentlemen be sincere in the statement that they favor constructing this ship as a precaution against attack, why do they hesitate to point out the direction from which they expect it to come? Where is this enemy whom we fear? Where is this foe that threatens us? Against whom are we arming?

Human nature has not changed since those ancient days pictured so eloquently by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER]. Men still pursue profit as they pursued it then, except that they have become more intelligent as to the way by which it can be reached most rapidly and gathered in greatest abundance. If we had anything that another nation desired, if we held anything to which another nation could make a reasonable claim, I would acknowledge there is but one way to keep it, and that is by arms. But what have we that any nation covets? What have we that any nation would take, even if we offered it? Does anyone here believe that we could make a present of the Philippines to any other country, even if we gave along with the islands \$2 in cash for every one of their inhabitants? [Laughter and applause.] There is no gentleman on either side of this Chamber who does not admit the taking of these islands was a national calamity. Some of us believe it was a grievous error, for which there is no excuse or palliation. Others tell us it was a visitation of Providence; that this country obeyed the will of Heaven when these brown men were forced into subjection; that our military forces were agents of progress when they fired civilizing bullets into the bodies of natives who would not accept the lessons of civilization through their intellectuals. But we all are agreed that the acquisition of the archipelago was not a national benefit, but the assumption of an onerous national burden.

Does anyone suppose that in view of our experience any nation of the world would take these islands from us as a gift? If they ever do go to another power, then I pray it may be to mine enemy. [Laughter.] What else do we possess which any other power would accept even as a free gift? Does anyone suppose that if we offered to present a State of this Union, or one of our Territories, to any nation in the world, the offer would be accepted? And if there be nothing on the surface of this globe which we possess that any other nation desires, is there anything possessed by any other nation that we covet, that we would take by force of arms, or that we would be willing to accept? About what, then, can we ever go to war? On what ground can anyone assail us, or are we likely to attack any other power? What, then, in the name of common sense, be-

comes of the pretense that this increase of armament by the addition of an enormous battle ship is necessary to our defense? I admit a certain force in the appeal to imagination and national pride when we are urged to place among our possessions anything which is the biggest of its kind on earth. Mr. Chairman, I am somewhat sensible to an appeal of that character myself. This is the biggest country in the world, and the biggest things proper to the sphere in which she moves are her natural possessions and her suitable adornment.

I want the biggest things on earth in every field where our history, our tradition, our civilization invites us to compete for preeminence. I would like to see the largest engine of production developed by American genius. I abhor the thought that we would engage in a competition to produce the most effective engine of destruction. [Applause.] What is there that would justify us in arming against our neighbors? I ask once more, gentlemen on the other side, especially the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BARTHOLDT], since there is no thirst for territory on our part to gratify or on the part of any other nation that we are concerned to resist. I pause for an answer. There is none and there can be none. Some gentlemen talk vaguely about an open door in China, as though we could institute an active and prosperous commerce with a 12-inch gun. Some gentlemen seem to think that if we want to sell goods in the east an American war ship must be near by, but I don't think anyone seriously believes war ships can be turned into vessels for transporting freight.

Does anybody believe that force can play any part in peaceful commerce? Do not gentlemen realize that to the extent we waste our national treasure in constructing these destructive engines we withdraw it from the productive enterprises which are the legitimate fields of peaceful and profitable competition between civilized men?

Before sitting down I ask any gentleman on the other side to point out one single tangible, comprehensible reason why our Navy should be increased. Now, Mr. Chairman, I believe that we have to-day a navy far in excess of our needs; certainly a navy far in excess of any need that has been pointed out upon that side. I would like to know if there be any reason which this debate has not disclosed that could justify such an increase as the one proposed by this bill in our naval armament?

Mr. CHARLES B. LANDIS. May I interrupt the gentleman?

Mr. COCKRAN. Certainly.

Mr. CHARLES B. LANDIS. In view of the fact that in 1898 the gentleman's constituents in New York City demanded that the entire American Navy be sent to New York City and to Boston to defend the metropolis of the Republic against the Spanish fleet, does he not think that a navy large enough for the rest of the country ought to be established in case we have the same sort of a situation again? [Applause.]

Mr. COCKRAN. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to welcome that applause. Fairy tales well told always amuse the thoughtless. [Laughter.] I never heard any such demand made by anyone in New York City. I myself live on Long Island in the summer time, between the place where a hostile squadron approaching New York by the Sound would be most likely to anchor, and Willets Point, which is one of the main defenses of the city on that side. Had the Spanish war ships ever attempted such an attack, my house would have been exactly in the line of all the shots exchanged between vessels and ports. Any missiles that fell short of their objective would in all probability have rained on my roof, yet I never thought of moving. I never asked for protection. I never lost a minute's sleep by mistaking peals of thunder for the roar of cannon. And I don't believe anybody was more disturbed than I, unless he was moved by hope of an appropriation. That always intensifies terror or at least quickens expression of apprehension. [Laughter and applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. COCKRAN. I ask for five minutes more.

Mr. TALBOTT. Will the gentleman permit a question?

Mr. COCKRAN. I shall be glad to answer a question.

Mr. TALBOTT. Do you know what brought about the war between England and the United States in 1812?

Mr. COCKRAN. Yes, sir; I think I do. I think I am not utterly ignorant of my country's history.

Mr. TALBOTT. Was it not because we denied the right of the British navy to search and impress seamen from our vessels?

Mr. COCKRAN. Certainly.

Mr. TALBOTT. Do you believe that if we had a navy to compare with that of Great Britain at that time they would have dared to do that or attempted to do that?

Mr. COCKRAN. I know that we made Great Britain sorry that she ever attempted it, and I know this much—

Mr. TALBOTT. Do you think the English Government would have attempted to take what they claimed were their citizens from our vessels of the American Navy—

Mr. COCKRAN. I have never been able to fathom the intentions of the English Government. When the gentleman asks me to explain what the British Government would have done in a certain case, he manifestly asks me to enter a domain of speculation where I could accomplish no useful result. I do know that with an armament not 10 per cent so strong as that of Great Britain we drove her forces from our shores and upset her supremacy on the seas. In the light of that history I would rather stand upon the resources of American valor whenever danger may arise than adopt a policy through which the treasure of the country must be wasted in enormous amounts every year under a groundless apprehension.

Mr. TALBOTT. There is no trouble standing upon the history of that question. Does not the gentleman think we could have stopped the impressment of American seamen on a merchant vessel if we had had a navy then in comparison with the one we have now?

Mr. COCKRAN. Mr. Chairman, there is no prouder page in American history than the page that tells the story of that insult and the way it was avenged. It was wiped out most completely and effectually by a people who armed themselves when occasion for using arms arose, and who proved themselves invincible in war, though they had not previously spent years wasting their treasure in ridiculous and unnecessary armaments.

Mr. CHARLES B. LANDIS. I would like to ask the gentleman if he does not think, if we had had a larger navy, an adequate navy, that this Republic would have been protected against the humiliation of seeing its Capitol burned in 1812?

Mr. COCKRAN. Mr. Chairman, again I can not undertake to say what might have happened if something else had occurred. I decline to enter into that domain of speculation. [Laughter.] But this I do say, that we have spent upon these perfectly useless and senseless preparations for events that can in all human probability never occur more than enough to build a capitol as fine as this in every State of the Union, and to establish broad and easy highways between all of them for the benefit of the American people and the promotion of intercourse and commerce between the States. [Applause.]

Mr. SLAYDEN. I would like to ask the gentleman what he thinks would be the result if Great Britain would undertake with the Navy that we now have to enforce any demand?

Mr. COCKRAN. Into that speculation I decline to enter. I have never had any confidential relations with the British Government which would justify me in speaking with authority of its aims or proposals. [Laughter and applause.]

Mr. COCKS. I would like to ask the gentleman, my distinguished colleague, if we did not have some fear at the time of the Spanish war?

Mr. COCKRAN. I can not answer for the gentleman, but looking at him here now as he appears on the floor of the House, I must say if he ever was afraid he has recovered from the fright so completely that by this time he must have forgotten it. [Laughter.] And after all, when it comes to paying \$100,000,000 or \$150,000,000 a year—I think we have spent about a billion since the Spanish war for naval purposes—to keep the roses of confidence in the gentleman's cheeks, it is rather a large price even for such a valuable result. I think it would be the part of patriotism to seek some other and less costly method for preserving his happiness. [Applause.]

Now, Mr. Chairman, there has been one valuable suggestion running through all these interruptions, and I desire to submit it to the sober judgment of this committee. There might have been plausible excuses for huge armaments in the past when the questions to which gentlemen have referred were still pending, but when, nevertheless, we managed to sustain our dignity and protect our interests successfully without a big or, to use the euphonious term now current, an adequate navy. It is but a few years ago since we had several—I will not say burning, but certainly pressing—questions in different directions. The existence of Cuba as a Spanish possession at our doors was such a serious and constant menace to our peace that it might have justified extensive military establishments. With Canada we had a series of disputes touching boundaries and fisheries. Of these the most important are all now settled. We have not to-day with any nation in the world a single serious question undecided that I know of. And at this moment, when there is less occasion for a navy than ever in our whole history, this House is invoked in the sacred name of patriotism to

establish a bigger navy than we found necessary in the midst of distracting complications. Against that course of folly and extravagance I protest. [Applause.]

Mr. VREELAND. I desire the gentleman to state during the remainder of his time how large a navy, in the opinion of the gentleman, the United States ought to maintain, if any.

Mr. COCKRAN. I will answer very frankly, Mr. Chairman, that a navy equal to that which was strong enough to force arbitration upon reluctant England after the close of our civil war, when our credit was so low that gold commanded a high premium in our currency, would be, in my judgment, a big enough navy now, when we have no question to settle and no powerful country to coerce, either by moral or physical force.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has again expired.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. COCKS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the time of the gentleman may be extended.

Mr. GOLDFOGLE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the gentleman have leave to conclude his remarks.

Mr. COCKRAN. I am practically through, but I am ready to answer any question that may be asked. [Applause.] As no one answers, Mr. Chairman, I will not detain the committee further. [Applause.]

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, just a word in answer to the gentleman from New York. In 1890, sixteen years ago, the Congress of the United States authorized the building of three first-class battle ships. Their names were the *Indiana*, the *Massachusetts*, and the *Oregon*. Within the next two years Congress authorized the building of two cruisers and a battle ship, the *Minneapolis*, the *Brooklyn*, and the *Iowa*. Those vessels were all authorized within three years—six first-class battle ships and cruisers within three years and in time of profound peace. And they had scarcely been in commission, they had not more than learned their way through the waters, when events broke out which made the names of those battle ships and cruisers household words. I would like to ask the gentleman from New York [Mr. COCKRAN] if he or any other American became ashamed of the names of the *Indiana*, the *Massachusetts*, the *Oregon*, the *Minneapolis*, the *Brooklyn*, and the *Iowa*, and the deeds of valor performed by them in a war for humanity in which this Government and this country engaged?

Mr. COCKRAN. Does the gentleman wish me to answer that?

Mr. BATES. Yes; if you please.

Mr. COCKRAN. Why, Mr. Chairman, I think I was the first in this country, at the first public meeting ever held in this country, before the close of Mr. Cleveland's Administration, to urge intervention in Cuba to stop the fusion of bloodshed and the perpetration by the Spanish Government of the very outrages that government is organized to prevent. But I was careful then to say that this country would be glorious in interfering for liberty and justice, but if she undertook to make that intervention the excuse for perpetrating conquests herself, our position would be indefensible. And I believe so yet. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

Mr. BATES. Yes; the gentleman was very eager for war then in spite of his pacific remarks to-day; but could we, would we have dared to have entered into that war in 1898 had we not with forethought and prudence authorized, six and eight years before, the very ships which, when once engaged, shed so much luster on the American Navy and the American name? In his former remarks he used the words "a useless and senseless event which never can occur." I would like to ask the gentleman from New York how he knows now, in the year of grace 1906, what may occur in the next few years any better than he could have known when these battle ships and cruisers were authorized by Congress merely on the assumption that something might occur in the future which never then was dreamed of? [Applause.]

Mr. COCKRAN. The gentleman, I suppose, desires me to answer. I have endeavored to point out that every question about which there was any possibility of foreign complications has been settled. We, to-day, have nothing that anybody covets and nobody has anything we covet, and so long as there is no possible ground for war I do not believe that this country should rush in and make it for the mere fun of doing it.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I remember that as late as the winter of 1898 some able writer in one of the great magazines in this country wrote a series of articles with splendid irony on "Our late war with Spain," treating as absurd the idea that it could ever occur, and within ninety days this country, impelled by the wishes and demands of all our people, without regard to party, was engaged in a foreign war. What, I ask, Mr. Chairman, would have been our chances in the waters

of the Atlantic Ocean that summer had we not had faith in the efficiency of those vessels which I have just named?

I desire also to call the attention of the gentleman from New York to another fact.

Mr. COCKRAN. I would like to ask the gentleman a question.

Mr. BATES. I would ask the gentleman if he is mindful of the fact that the life of one of these battle ships is only about twenty years, and that twenty years has now passed since the authorization of the Texas and of these battle ships and cruisers which I have named, or will before any ship we can to-day authorize can be taken from the docks or be available?

Mr. COCKRAN. Does the gentleman ask my opinion as a naval expert?

Mr. BATES. I merely call the attention of the gentleman to this fact.

Mr. COCKRAN. I beg to say there might be some doubt as to whether I could qualify as a naval expert, but the gentleman can tell us whether these ships and cruisers are out of service or in service.

Mr. BATES. Why, Mr. Chairman, they are still in service, but their time is drawing to a close.

Mr. COCKRAN. Who fixes the time?

Mr. BATES. The naval constructors of the Navy Department of this Government give it as their opinion that the average life of a battle ship or cruiser is about twenty years, and before a ship that we would authorize to-day could be finished the life of these battle ships and these cruisers will practically have come to an end.

Mr. COCKRAN. I would like to ask the gentleman what sized navy he thinks we ought to have in order to make our defense perfect?

Mr. BATES. I will answer the gentleman. I believe that the naval establishment of this country ought to be carried on along the lines which were adopted in 1883, 1884, and 1885, when we first decided that we would have a first-class modern navy. In time of profound peace, before any excitement caused by the Spanish war had arisen or before public opinion had been especially aroused on this subject, from 1885 up to the time of the Spanish war, one ship annually on the average was authorized by Congress, and that is what we favor now.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. COCKRAN. I ask that the gentleman have another minute.

Mr. MAHON. Regular order!

The CHAIRMAN. This is the regular order.

Mr. BATES. I ask unanimous consent that my time may be extended one minute in order that I may answer the question of the gentleman from New York.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

Mr. COCKRAN. Make it five minutes for the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair hears no objection.

Mr. COCKRAN. I ask the gentleman now if he can tell us what he considers a proper navy, not in general terms, but how many ships he thinks we ought to have and of what tonnage?

Mr. BATES. In a day of profound peace sixteen years ago, in 1890, we authorized a tonnage of 38,000 tons. In 1895, in a day of profound peace, when no war was dreamed of, we authorized a tonnage of 29,000 tons.

Mr. COCKRAN. Is the gentleman speaking of the total tonnage in existence during those years or of the new ships added each year?

Mr. BATES. I am giving the total in tonnage authorized each year—that is, battle ships, cruisers, gunboats, etc.

Mr. COCKRAN. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that the gentleman and I are talking at cross purposes.

Mr. BATES. The total can be easily ascertained. In 1896 35,000 tons were authorized, about as much as we authorized last year. Now, in answer to the question what is a sufficient navy for this country, I believe that the efficiency of the present Navy ought to be maintained. To do this it is necessary to add one or two ships each year to replace those which become obsolete and are laid aside.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BATES. The country at large, the people who send us here, desire a strong Navy, and I believe it should be kept up to its present efficiency, and that we ought to authorize at least one of the largest class of fighting machines this year. [Loud applause.]

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I think we have had a very full debate upon this proposition, and I move to close debate on the paragraph and amendments thereto in fifteen minutes. I desire to state that of that time I want ten minutes myself. [Cries of "Vote!"]

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois moves that all debate upon the pending paragraph and amendments thereto be closed in fifteen minutes.

Mr. TAWNEY. I trust that out of that time the author of the amendment may have the other five minutes.

Mr. FOSS. I desire to make a few remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Illinois, which is not debatable.

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Division! Divide the time equally.

The committee divided; and there were—ayes 136, noes 42.

So the motion was agreed to.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I now yield three minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. VREELAND].

Mr. VREELAND. Mr. Chairman, the associations in opposition to the building of a battle ship in this House to-day must excite considerable interest among the Members on account of their seeming incongruity. I have no fault to find with the gentleman from Minnesota for opposing this bill. The position of chairman of the Committee on Appropriations in this House during my membership in it has carried great weight on this floor. But that, Mr. Chairman, has not been because of any power conferred upon the chairman of that committee by the rules of this House. That great power and authority has come to the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations by reason of the great power and knowledge, the fairness and candor in debate by that man who during my term here was chairman of that great committee and who to-day is the Speaker of the House of Representatives. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the gentleman who succeeded him, my friend from Minnesota [Mr. TAWNEY], has in him the material to make a great chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, but I believe he never will be able to exert the influence in this House to which he has a right to aspire, except by proceeding in debate with candor, with strict accordance to the facts, and with accuracy of statement, which attributes, I am sorry to say, did not characterize him, in my judgment, in the attack he made on the bill before the committee.

I believe the statement of the chairman of that committee going out to the country conveys a false impression. It conveys an impression of extravagance in naval expenditure under cover of facts presented by him which does not exist. I believe it is unfair to state to the country that expenditures for pensions, expenditures for care of parks, expenditures for cemeteries are made necessary by the present military programme being carried out for the United States.

I asked the gentleman the question if he did not consider pensions rather the result of lack of preparedness on the part of the nation than as a result of preparation for war. Why, Mr. Chairman, suppose we had not been prepared for the war with Spain?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, while I believe the adoption of the amendment of the gentleman from Missouri would place the naval programme in a better position than the adoption of the provision in the pending bill, I can not see my way clear to support it. It would leave the decision as to whether we should proceed with the battle ship to the result of The Hague conference. One of the chief glories of a nation, as well as to an individual, is to be a leader, to do something decisive. Why need we wait for The Hague conference? We are strong enough with the nations of the world to take this stand right here to-day that we will not proceed with this colossal battle ship. [Applause.] But it is said that the building of the proposed battle ship is merely maintenance; that it is not extension. Can you call the building of a ship greater than any ever constructed on this side of the Atlantic, as large as any ever constructed, maintenance of the Navy? What will be the result when this ship is built? On the one hand it may prove to be a failure, but if it is a success every influence will be brought to bear to substitute for every other battle ship in our Navy one of the same type.

And so I say the construction of two battle ships, or three battle ships, might not mean as much for the enlargement of the Navy and for the continuation of this ambitious naval programme as does this one ship which is provided for in the bill. I trust that the House may to-day strike out this provision and proclaim thereby that this country stands for peace, and that in this great progressive era we are ready and willing to run the risk of war, provided we are able to take the leadership for a time when the disputes between nations shall be settled as those between individuals—by peaceful methods. [Applause.]

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, as I understand the question before the committee, the vote will come first on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri to postpone the completion of this battle ship until we hear from the peace conference. We had the first meeting of the conference in 1899. It was called by the Czar of Russia, and in that call special emphasis was laid upon the question of the disarmament of the military forces. What was the result? After a resolution had been passed by that peace conference the nations of the world started in to build their naval establishments larger than ever before. France has authorized 340,000 tons of ships since the peace conference of 1899; England has authorized 662,000 tons; Japan, 191,000 tons; Germany, 350,000 tons; and, in addition to that, the United States, Russia, and Italy, nearly 600,000 tons of ships: in all 2,000,000 tons of ships since the last peace conference, or what is equivalent to 100 battle ships of 20,000 tons each.

Not only that, but the Czar of Russia has been at war with Japan in one of the greatest conflicts of the ages, where the men engaged in battles on the land numbered more than perhaps any previous battles in the history of the world. And in that war there occurred the greatest naval engagement the world has ever seen, where there was the greatest tonnage of ships and the deadliest instruments of warfare. So I say, Mr. Chairman, if that has been the result of the last peace conference it is ridiculous to postpone the building of this battle ship until the next peace conference meets. In this connection I would like to read the call for this next peace conference, issued by the Czar of Russia. It is as follows:

The Imperial Government, believing that it is necessary only to examine questions which press with particular energy, inasmuch as they arise from the experience of recent years, and without touching on those which belong to the limitation of military and naval forces, proposes therefore as a programme for the conference the following points.

Mr. Chairman, the Czar of Russia in his call for the second peace conference eliminates the whole question of the disarmament of nations. Now, if under the first peace conference the result was that the nations of the world built larger naval and military establishments than ever before, when the Czar of Russia called them together to determine upon that question, what will be the result now that he has eliminated that whole question from the second peace conference?

Mr. BARTHOLDT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FOSS. I must decline to yield, for I have only just a moment.

It is very amusing to hear gentlemen on this floor talking about peace, wonderful words of peace, beautiful words of peace, lovely words of peace. I wish that some of these distinguished gentlemen who talk about peace in times of peace might be permitted to go out on the firing line and meet the enemy in time of war and deliver these magnificent eulogies on peace, beautiful peace, lovely peace!

Mr. COCKRAN. Does the gentleman apprehend war?

Mr. FOSS. I do not believe in that kind of peace, Mr. Chairman. I do not believe in that sickly, sentimental kind of peace that is not backed up by preparation for war. [Applause.] That is the kind of peace that surrenders upon first demand. But the kind of peace that I believe in is the peace for which our fathers always stood—that peace that is honorable among men and justifiable of God; that peace that never makes surrender of national duty or of national obligation or of national honor; that peace, in other words, that is always backed up by preparation for war. [Applause.]

There are other questions that have been introduced into this debate. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON] the other day impressively raised his hand and said, "Who would fight us?" and the gentleman from New York [Mr. COCKRAN] asked that same question upon this floor to-day. One month before the Spanish-American war broke out the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON] might have raised that same hand and with the same emphasis asked that same question, yet one month later he himself voted for war upon this floor. [Applause.]

The gentleman from Ohio has spoken of the size of ships. Of course there are arguments on both sides.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AGAINST BIG SHIPS.

I. GREATER TARGET AREA.

True, and by this much:

The length of the *Connecticut*, of 16,000 tons, is 450 feet; her beam, 77 feet.

The length of the *Dreadnought*, of 18,500 tons, is 500 feet; her beam, 82; which figures exceed the *Connecticut* by 50 feet and 5 feet, respectively.

This makes a greater target area of about 250 square feet, not a very serious matter. There would be some increase due to extra height, but it would be as unimportant.

2. DECREASED HANDINESS DUE TO SIZE.

While if the *Dreadnought* had a single rudder she would not turn so well as a smaller ship, yet even then that fact is not of great importance, since in fleet actions ships follow each other, as did the Japanese battle ships, and there is not the same necessity for great handiness as there was in the old days of single-ship actions.

It happens, however, that the *Dreadnought* is to have double rudders, and these, with her four screws, are expected to give her much greater handiness than is possessed by the present battle ships. The advantages of double rudders have been demonstrated and no doubt is felt that the *Dreadnought* will have great handiness.

3. INCREASE IN DRAFT WITH REFERENCE TO DRAFT OF HARBORS, AND IN BEAM, BOTH AFFECTING SIZE OF DRY DOCKS.

The *Dreadnought* will draw 23 feet, which is a few feet more than our deepest battle ships and armored cruisers. We already have merchant ships entering our principal harbors drawing over 30 feet, and steps are in progress which will give us deep-water channels for any vessels which enter our principal harbors.

DEPTHS OF VARIOUS HARBORS, EXISTING AND PROJECTED—REPORT OF CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, FOR 1905.

Boston.—The river and harbor act of June 13, 1902, provides for 35 feet depth at mean low water from Charleston Navy-Yard to the sea. June 30, 1905, the channel was dredged to 27 feet and more at mean low water. Twenty-seven feet draft can be carried at low water and any draft at high water.

New York.—Gedney channel to be 30 feet at mean low water. June 30, 1905, channels navigable at mean low water by ships drawing 30 feet. Mean rise of tide 4½ feet. Project adopted 1899 to make East channel 40 feet deep at mean low water.

Delaware.—River and harbor act of March 3, 1899, provided for a 30-foot channel from Philadelphia to the sea. June 30, 1905, at mean low water and at shoalest part of river 22 feet draft could pass.

Baltimore.—Thirty-foot draft at mean low water can now be carried to this city.

Norfolk.—June 30, 1905, at mean low water vessels of 23 feet draft can go to navy-yard. Rise of tide about 3 feet.

Charleston.—The depth of 27 feet at mean low water has been secured. The freight steamer *Manhattan*, drawing 26.5 feet, entered the port during 1904, and was the largest vessel which ever entered the port. Rise of tide 5.2 feet.

Key West.—Key West Harbor accommodates vessels drawing about 27 feet. Rise of tide 2.6 feet.

Tampa Bay.—Project of 1899 contemplates channel from sea to Port Tampa of 27 feet; so far secured 24 feet at mean low water. Rise of tide 1.5 to 2 feet.

Galveston.—Harbor has in part 30 feet depth. Depth on outer bar 27.25 feet.

Pensacola.—Thirty-foot channel to city and bay.

Mobile (Ala.).—About 25 feet draft can be carried.

Mississippi Passes.—At present 30-foot depth, work going on to secure 35 feet.

It must not be forgotten that our battle fleet is not expected to enter many of our ports. Its work is on the high seas, and only the principal harbors should be visited by them. This is really the case now, because, except to give liberty, the battle ships are kept where drills and exercises can be carried on.

Necessity really only exists for our battle fleet to visit strategic points of importance, such as dockyards and naval stations or possible naval bases.

As far as dry docks go, our best docks are of 32 feet depth.

4. The greater fineness of hull necessary for high speed makes it difficult to carry heavy end weights. Probably quite true.

5. It is stated that there would be a serious decrease of structural strength if important structural members are damaged owing to heavy end weights and great length.

Perhaps true; but greater protection gives less likelihood of such damage. In any event, it is an architectural question, like the building of a bridge, and it would seem that the strength would increase with size.

6. The results due to disabling motive power or steering gear of a big ship would be more serious than for a smaller ship, as there would be fewer big ships than small ones; but the chance of such disabling would be very much less, owing to the greater invulnerability of the bigger ships in these details.

7. *Increased cost.*—Seven million five hundred thousand dollars for 16,000 tons to \$10,000,000 for 20,000 tons.

True, but you get more in proportion; and if it is necessary to win, the cost will not count.

The claim that a greater number of small units was better than fewer large vessels was not difficult to sustain when the small battle ships carried practically the same number of big

guns as the larger ones; but now we propose a step which has so much gain in big guns and so little further liability to damage on account of size that it becomes worth while. The increase from the *Iowa*, of 12,000 tons, to the *Connecticut*, of 16,000 tons, was not accompanied by an adequate increase of battery power, though other less important gains were made.

It is true that any considerable increase in size should be accompanied by some material gain in battle power sufficient to justify the increased cost. The *Michigan* and *South Carolina*, of 16,000 tons, while not throwing any more metal than the *Connecticut* class of the same size, yet will be militarily more efficient, because they carry a uniform number of 12-inch guns; having eight of these, they have twice as many as the *Connecticut*. The *Dreadnought*, of 18,500 tons, carries ten, giving the same broadside of eight as the *Michigan* class, and our proposed battle ship of about 20,000 tons should carry twelve 12-inch guns.

As to when we have reached the point where increase in size involves too large a loss in proportion to the whole by losing one unit, that is a question for most serious consideration. While all advantages lie with a fleet of the largest battle ships, there is yet a limit to size, determined by the loss which one unit would be to the whole force, and the effect this might have on the conduct of the war. At the beginning of the Japanese-Russian war the loss of two Japanese battle ships—which was such a large proportion of their whole force of battle ships—was a source of much embarrassment to the Japanese, and materially modified their plans.

What the limit of size must be, due to this consideration, is yet to be determined, and it must principally be left to experts to decide; but it may be stated that so far we have not yet reached it since the greater naval powers are agreed on a general increase in size. Of them all, the only one with modern war experience, Japan, builds the largest, one of 19,400 tons. It is evident she has no doubts.

ARGUMENTS FOR BIG BATTLE SHIPS.

1. By a considerable increase in displacement such as we contemplate, we obtain a substantial increase in battery power, which more than doubles the fighting efficiency of our battle ships. The *Maine*, *Kearsarge*, and others of about 12,000 tons had four 12-inch guns, the 16,000-ton *Michigan* and *South Carolina* will have eight 12-inch, while the 18,500-ton *Dreadnought* carries ten 12-inch, and a 20,000-odd tons, if authorized by the House, may be expected to carry twelve 12-inch. What is possible on the limit of cost fixed by this House has not been fully worked out, but it is certain that the battle ship produced under this appropriation will not be surpassed in efficiency by anything which floats.

The *Dreadnought*, of 18,500 tons, and our 20,000-ton ship, could, with her enormous battery and greater speed, take their own position away from a half dozen or more *Kentuckys* or *Maines* and destroy them in detail, the bigger and newer vessels' heavier armor protecting them at the greater range they would choose from the few 12-inch carried by the smaller vessels.

2. For a given efficiency as a fighting vessel, we build cheaper in large vessels than in a number of smaller ones; we also decrease materially the cost of maintenance and operation per ton of displacement.

Mahan says:

It is much more expensive to put the same aggregate tonnage into two ships than in one. You get less military efficiency at higher cost. You need two captains for one, nearly twice as many officers, and crews which, while they may not be double of the one ship, will exceed it by a very large percentage.

He uses this argument in favor of the survival of the battle ship, though personally he is in favor of small or medium battle ships.

3. In big ships we are able to secure a more stable gun platform, and carry the heavy guns higher, thus being able to fight the battery in weather which smaller vessels would be seriously hampered by. The *Indiana* class and the *Iowa*, and, indeed, the later battle ships of this size, are really "coast-line battle ships," as they were called, which carry their guns so low that they are seriously hampered in anything of a sea.

It must be borne in mind that the ship is of no importance except to carry guns which are able to fire in all weathers.

4. Since the weight of hull for the same strength is relatively less in the larger ship, there is more margin of weight for additional speed or coal. By the ability to carry more coal, the bigger ships are less dependent on colliers and coaling stations and more able to keep the sea and pursue their legitimate functions.

The greater displacement provides greater engine weight, which, combined with the increased fineness of the ship's hull, gives a considerable increase in speed from 18 to 20 or 21

knots. This means a considerable strategic advantage in being able to reach a given locality or scene of action quickly and an increased tactical ability to maneuver on the day of battle, which enables an admiral commanding such ships to get the advantage of position and destroy his enemy ship by ship.

In the battle of the Sea of Japan the Russian battle ships at the head of the column were driven out of the firing line one after the other by the Japanese battle ships of greater speed, while those Russian battle ships that were opposed by the Japanese armored cruisers escaped any serious injury. The big guns on the big ships did the work.

5. The same tonnage in big ships, giving better sea speed, better protection, and more big guns, would triumph over the same tonnage in a greater number of smaller vessels.

6. A fleet of big battle ships occupies less sea room than the same tonnage of smaller speed and is more easily controlled, especially in smoke or fog.

By concentrating big guns in big ships we can have much closer formations—a short line or column—permitting more rapid maneuvers, far more effective fire at long range, and more perfect control by the flag officer over his command. This last is of prime importance, since successful signaling can not be accomplished at long distances.

This ability to maneuver with facility, combined with the greater speed in big ships, enables the admiral to concentrate his fire on and destroy a portion of the enemy's ships to the exclusion and isolation of the others—where the enemy's fleet is composed of smaller battle ships.

7. The bigger battle ship has stronger hull, thicker armor, and better all-around protection to vital parts. She can therefore continue fighting long after receiving a fire which would disable smaller and not so well protected vessels. She has an all-around armor belt, and practically all her men are behind armor, so that she is not so likely to suffer disastrous losses in personnel as smaller ships would of the present-day type, and as the Russians did.

8. By having a uniform battery of big guns much space is saved in storing ammunition, more can be carried, and greater speed made in getting charges to the guns, owing to greater simplicity of apparatus and less confusion.

9. Handiness, which was formerly such a great factor in single-ship actions, can no longer be considered of importance, as ships now fight in fleets and do not require close maneuvering and quick turning.

10. The Japanese have the advantage, which no other nation with a strong fleet possess, of practical experience with battle ships in an important sea fight; for this reason, the decision of Japan—and her ally England, who alone of other nations has been given the benefit of her experience—for big battle ships must carry exceptional weight.

WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES ARE BUILDING IN THE WAY OF BIG SHIPS.

England.—The *Dreadnought*, of 18,500 tons, and ten 12-inch guns (authorized 1904).

Germany.—Two battle ships of about 19,000 tons, carrying either fourteen 11-inch or sixteen 11-inch guns; speed about 21 knots. One armored cruiser of 15,000 tons, with eight 11-inch guns and six 6.7-inch guns, and ten destroyers of 570 tons.

France.—Six battle ships of about 18,000 tons, with 21 knots speed, four 12-inch and twelve 9.6-inch and sixteen 5-inch guns; ten destroyers of 490 tons; twenty submarines of 398 tons.

The programme given above for France is to be supplemented in 1907 by a seventh battle ship of 18,000 tons, and this will be followed by laying down six battle ships of 20,000 or 21,000 tons, with speed of 19 knots and batteries of six 12-inch and eight 9.4-inch guns. This programme will provide France, by about 1913, with fourteen first-class battle ships of from 18,000 to 21,000 tons.

Russia.—The Czar has approved the following programme, spread over nine years: Twelve battle ships of not less than 17,000 tons, four cruisers of 12,000 tons, seven cruisers of 12,700 tons, four cruisers of 6,700 tons; forty-six destroyers of 400 tons; eighteen torpedo boats of 300 tons; ten submarines; seven gunboats of 100 tons; nine monitors for home ports; one mining vessel. Total cost of programme, about \$190,000,000.

EXPERT OPINION ON WAR LESSONS AND BIG SHIPS.

French naval experts say the battle ship must be more prominent than ever in the navies of the future, and are loud in their denunciation of their past policy which has resulted in a lack of battle ships in the French navy, and a predominance of small vessels and torpedo and submarine craft. They are resolved now to lay down and build as quickly as possible six of the largest size, like the *Dreadnought*. The authorities who voice this opinion are M. Pelletan, the present minister of marine;

M. Lockroy, former minister of marine; M. Bertin, chief naval constructor; Admiral Fournier; Admiral Gervais, and M. Charles Bos.

Secretary of the Navy Bonaparte has announced himself in favor of the big-gun big ship, going so far, indeed, on the advice of the Chief Constructor of the Navy, as to advocate a battle ship larger than any now building; i. e., of about 20,500 tons, to carry twelve 12-inch guns.

Admiral Dewey is strongly in favor of big battle ships, carrying a uniform battery of heaviest guns, and has advocated one of about 18,600 tons trial displacement, to carry ten 12-inch guns.

In an interview last September, in the *New York Herald*, Admiral Dewey was asked what lessons the American Navy has learned from the Japanese-Russian war, and he replied:

More big ships, more big guns, and good shooting. The American Navy needs, more than anything else, battle ships of 18,000 tons, carrying 12-inch guns, with a few—like 3-inch—for defense against torpedo-boat attacks.

The Admiral further said:

I have changed my mind on this subject. When the *Oregon* came out, I agreed with a great many other naval officers that it was an ideal craft, ready to meet the enemy at each and every range, but I now realize that the modern battle is fought at a range of 3 or 4 miles, and at that range your 8-inch guns are nothing but so much dead weight on the ship. You might as well be firing with a pistol. No; it is the big ships, such as the English are building, and the big guns that decide the battle.

The results of the discussion of Admiral Dewey's views in favor of big battle ships in England show that there is practical unanimity of opinion among naval officers as to the necessity for big guns and big ships, in England, France, Germany, and the United States.

Count E. Reventlow, a well-known German naval expert, stated that he entirely concurred with Admiral Dewey's views as to the lessons to be derived from recent naval actions in the Far East. In doing so he stated that he voiced the opinion of a majority of German naval experts, who believe that in future naval battles will be decided by heavily armored battle ships possessing primary batteries of 12-inch guns and secondary batteries of small, quick-firing guns to repulse torpedo boats. Count Reventlow believes a new type is to be built for Germany of at least 18,000 tons. The question of larger ships, with heavier armor and guns, has passed, as settled, from the field of naval experts.

OUR NEED OF A STRONG NAVY.

No nation can exist commercially and exert its proper political influence among the nations of the world without a navy strong in proportion to its wealth and the ambitions and commercial necessities of its population.

The United States for years has been in an agricultural period, but it is now getting deep into a manufacturing age. So involved is the country now in manufactures that it is already beginning to make more than can be sold at home and is seeking foreign buyers.

The time is near when we must turn our serious attention to the capture of the trade of the undeveloped countries and there compete in safety with the commerce of other nations. With expanding foreign commerce we can no longer afford to pay out freight charges to foreign shipowners, so that building up of a new commercial fleet will be a necessity. This fleet and this trade will lead our citizens in the different parts of Africa, South America, and the Far East, where American commerce has not yet made much impression, and in the struggle which will ensue no weapon which will advantage our trade should be withheld. Our business men, our consular and diplomatic officers can not do without that security and backing which is afforded by our flag floating over a fleet of adequate strength. In the comparatively uncivilized regions where our trade must seek customers, our men-of-war must accompany the merchant and protect him and the American interests which he represents. Besides the American goods which are introduced in foreign countries to our interest, there is the vast volume of American capital seeking profitable investment—all of which must be adequately protected by our men-of-war. American money is constantly looking for opportunities to build railroads, establish steamer lines, engage in building operations of all kinds, and compete in such enterprises with enterprising foreigners. This money will not be risked unless security for it is certain. To-day American capital is hesitating on account of the unsettled conditions in China, and it will not be invested there until reasonable security is assured.

The Navy is the long arm of the nation, the force which it is able to swing to any given locality to enforce its policy and guard its commercial and political interests.

Our foreign commerce is growing, and a navy is needed to protect it; and even without an increasing carrying trade our

foreign interests require and must be given complete protection. History shows that no nation has had a large fleet of merchant vessels for any great length of time without a corresponding naval force for its protection. The merchant fleet may rise before or fall after the naval fleet, but its existence is short in the absence of a strong naval fleet. In the history of nations the decay of commercial power and wealth may be generally seen to have been due to loss of naval power, though occasionally it has been due to other causes; but it is certain that the existence of one is a sure sign of the existence of the other. Carthage, Athens, Venice, and Holland all had at one time large naval fleets and great commerce, which fell together. Holland's trade was destroyed after the defeat of De Ruyter by the English, and what little she has since regained has been under the tolerating protection of stronger nations possessing navies.

DEFENSE OF OUR COASTS.

We have an enormous extent of coast line, we have Alaska, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and we have the obligation to guard and protect Cuba and maintain her neutrality. To satisfactorily perform these obligations we must have a strong sea-going fleet; we can not have a fort at every important point on account of the cost in money and men, even if forts were an absolute defense, which Port Arthur shows they are not. Forts are very necessary to us for the partial protection of our richest cities, behind which lie our navy-yards and supply stations. If we have a strong, efficient navy our forts will probably not have to fire a gun.

It must be ever remembered that the only sure defense of any country, and the only permanent assurance of peace, is for the fleet to seek out its enemy on the high seas and cripple or destroy it, so that the offending country can be placed under adequate bonds to keep the peace. It does not suffice to simply drive the enemy a few miles away from our coast and then wait in uncertainty for another attack, for during that period of anxiety commerce is paralyzed and the business of the country is held up. Safety can only be assured by the destruction of the enemy's fleet, and such victory can only be accomplished by concentration of the fighting fleet and its efficient use against the enemy. We can not afford to scatter our fighting vessels along our coasts in response to the ignorant demands of frightened towns and cities. We must keep our ships together and get out and fight on the high seas to properly defend our coasts and our homes.

MONROE DOCTRINE.

The humorist of the House has said that "the Monroe doctrine is as big as the Navy and no bigger," and that is a truism we may easily forget.

PANAMA CANAL.

While the Panama Canal will strategically give us a great advantage in that we can move our battle fleet from one coast to the other, and thus meet an enemy from any direction, yet owing to the great volume of trade which will flow through it and the consequent increased responsibilities we will confront, our need for a very strong navy will not, in my opinion, be lessened in the least. With the opening of the Panama Canal the trade routes of the world will instantly readjust themselves, and the Caribbean will become a scene of great activity and commercial strife. The islands and ports of the West Indies will assume greater importance and our dominant influence of right must be maintained by sea strength. We will have such fortifications at the ends of the canal as will enable us to temporarily stand off an enemy until the fleet can arrive, but our fleet must be able to defend that canal and maintain its neutrality. We have guaranteed its neutrality and must be prepared to maintain it. We have a treaty with England which gives us reasonable security in that quarter, but with no other power. We do not want to spend two hundred millions for a canal which could be destroyed in twenty-four hours by a nation having a navy superior to our own. We must have an adequate fleet to defend it and keep it open. We need a navy to back up our foreign policy and protect our growing interests the world over. [Applause.]

APPENDIX.

OUR NEED OF A STRONG NAVY.

[By Benjamin S. Baker.]

The chief functions of our Navy are:

- (1) To prevent war—
 - a. By making other nations fear to attack us.
 - b. By giving weight to our diplomacy through which the causes of war may be avoided.
 - (2) To wage war successfully when a conflict is decided upon.
 - (3) To redress isolated violence to our citizens or trade by show of force or actual use of force. Our dealings with Turkey and the Algerine pirates are examples.
- Our Navy is already large enough to protect our citizens. It is conceivable that some isolated hostile act or acts might precipitate a war, but that possibility is slight and wholly overshadowed by other considerations demanding a strong fighting force.

Trade is the source from which the cause of future wars are likely to spring. International law, with regard to private, individual rights has made armed redress in the case of other first-class naval powers unlikely. There are, however, possibilities of serious trouble when the commercial interests of two nations clash.

The attitude of other powers toward our commercial interests abroad will be largely influenced by their feeling that we are able and ready to protect those rights by naval force. This is a mere truism, but will bear restating. The views on certain topics of a physically big man command a respect that is due as much to his size as to the justice of his opinions; this, of course, in instances when one side or the other believes in fighting for his views. The Chinese boycott is an example. If China had our present naval power and we her lack of it, the Peking Government could, with perfect safety, have given official encouragement to the recent attacks on our trade and forced us, by means of damage to our business, to change our exclusion laws. The result of even the unofficial boycott shows how our foreign trade is our chief vulnerable point. Another instance was provided by the Russo-Japanese war. If Japan's navy had been overwhelmingly superior to Russia's at the beginning of the negotiations of 1903, there would have been no war. Had Japan been too weak in her navy, Russia would either have won the war or secured full control in Manchuria and Korea without a war. In that event the threat and probability of commercial exclusion from Manchuria, in defiance of treaty, would have been transferred to the United States and other powers.

If we alone should choose in such a case to urge our rights under treaty with China, only superior naval force, or better, adequate naval force, at our disposal could make Russia respect our rights. Other instances within the range of possibility can easily be imagined.

Trade as the subject-matter of war not merely involves national prestige and self-respect, but it concerns the very essence of national prosperity. It is obvious that the greater our foreign trade the greater is our stake in its security, the greater the possible damage to us of hostile action, and the greater the need of guarding against that damage by the only possible instrument—a strong fighting Navy. Here the matter of isolated injury comes into the chief category, for violence to our merchants or their goods and ships abroad means a lessening of prestige that carries money loss, unless a navy is available to force a fighting of the wrong. If trade is to be safe, the flag must be ready to follow trade wherever trade is threatened with unjust treatment.

Great Britain furnishes an example which the United States will soon parallel. The prosperity of the British Empire is absolutely dependent on the security of her seaborne commerce. That security has been obtained by her great navy, the cost of which has been in the strictest sense an insurance cost, an outlay absolutely effective and as obviously needed. The United States will not parallel the opium coercion of China, but it will use every fair means to increase its foreign trade, and with every increase it will become more vulnerable through that trade.

"Commerce insurance" is therefore a perfectly sound term to apply to the cost of our naval establishment.

The need of this insurance may be questioned. But no folly can be more complete than reliance on the idea that there can never be another war.

With the possibility of war in the future, it is easily demonstrable that the prevention of war through possession of a strong navy is cheaper in dollars and cents than the cost of even a brief war. A calculation of the cost to America of the war with Spain—counting as cost the direct outlay on Navy and Army, destruction of material, pensions, damage claims, and the disturbances to business—will show that a navy of such strength as to have prevented Spain from going to war would have been far cheaper than the war. This is regarding only the financial side and omitting entirely human misery and suffering.

A strong navy is additionally necessary through the tendency, for which the United States is largely responsible, to make private property not meant for use by the belligerents exempt from capture. Commerce destruction is one of the most effective forms of naval warfare, and most quickly and surely disastrous to the losing side. We have tried to do away with that, and the end will probably be soon reached.

But in narrowing thus the area of attack, we have intensified the process of waging a naval war. In confining the outcome of wars to the armed navies of the belligerents, we have made war far more critical. When once a war might be spread over the whole sea, it is now restricted to the issue of a very few great combats. We have put all our eggs in one basket, and staked everything, so to speak, on one chance. The improvidence of taking chances under such an arrangement is too obvious to require argument.

With the issue of wars narrowed to relatively so small a question, and with a growing foreign trade making us more vulnerable, it is the part of prudence to make our naval provision with reference to conflict with such powers as may most possibly come into serious conflict with us. While we do not need to follow the British two-navy standard, we ought to remember that the geographical situation which gives us immunity from land invasion enlarges our naval needs.

We must have an Atlantic fleet strong enough to cope with any possible attack on this side of the continent, and we must have a Pacific fleet strong enough to strike a decisive blow in the Far East, when every power strong enough to engage us in war has interests through which it is peculiarly assailable.

China, also, is a coming problem. She will one day have a navy, and that navy could do us the gravest harm without taking the trouble to visit our Pacific coast.

Our possession of the Philippines is a point of the greatest importance in our favor. An adequate fleet based there will not only smooth the way of our diplomacy in the Far East, but in the event of war would enable us to deal a decisive blow at any European power. Every European power would appreciate that fact. With reference to conflict with any European power in the East, our Philippine fleet should have measurably the advantages that Togo's fleet had over the Russian.

In regard to commerce destruction, we must consider the temptation an adversary would have to destroy or capture our goods in transit, even if it had already pledged itself to their immunity. The fortune of some future war might easily be determined by commerce destruction. It is unreasonable for us to rely on our enemy's regarding his pledge not to destroy commerce if he should think himself able to win the war by violating his pledge.

The precedent of the *Alabama* arbitration is not really in conflict with this supposition.

If it be urged that an enemy who destroyed our commerce might be forced to arbitrate afterwards, the answer is that the only adequate force would be an American Navy strong enough to have defeated him in the first place.

This brings up the value of a strong navy in promoting interna-

tional arbitration as a substitute for decision by means of war. Abundant precedent shows that it is the strong power, not the weak one, that secures arbitration. A big navy justly used is like the policeman or the civil process that brings the delinquent into court.

WHY WE NEED A BIGGER NAVY.

[By Walter Scott Meriwether, in Harper's Weekly, March 10, 1906.]

According to a recent estimate by Representative GEORGE E. FOSS, chairman of the House Naval Committee, our naval appropriation act for the current year carried \$100,000,000, and yet, on the basis of per capita, this is a little more than \$1 for each man, woman, and child in the country. It is only about 4 per cent of our foreign trade during the past year, which amounted to about \$2,500,000,000. It is 14 per cent of our annual governmental expenditures, a less percentage than was expended upon the Navy one hundred years ago. It is only one-tenth of 1 per cent of our national wealth. It is about one-third of what this country annually expended in premiums on fire insurance, yet one hostile ship of war winning to New York's harbor approaches could start a work of destruction that would bankrupt every insurance company here and abroad, while the amount of damage she could cause would be more than sufficient to maintain for more than one hundred years a navy thrice as big as the one we now possess.

There will be many to assert that this is inconceivable, many to contend that no nation has fleets powerful enough to force an entrance past the batteries which guard New York. Thanks to the panic which the Spanish-American war brought to the seaboard citizen and which was reflected in the halls of legislation, that is doubtless true, but what if there should be a coalition of powers against this Republic? That is not inconceivable, and, according to one well-known English observer, not even unlikely.

"It is only the knowledge that the sea barrier is impenetrable," writes Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, of the royal navy, "which will effectually prevent the expanding Teutonic, Slavonic, and Latin races of Europe from contemplating aggression on the American continent. If unable to do so singly, nothing but sea power will prevent them from trying to effect their purpose in combination."

To the credit of our own Navy men, it may be said that they long ago urged this type; long before the eastern war had proved in practice what they had so long asserted in vain. They had also insisted that small ships are bad economy, for the reason that the smaller the tonnage the greater the cost of fitting out. In illustration of this, it may be said that for their size torpedo boats are the most expensive vessels afloat.

"There was," says the admiral (Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge), "not a single Russian ship attacked, much less destroyed, by torpedo boats until she had been seriously maltreated by the Japanese guns, and it is perfectly true that if there had not been a single Japanese torpedo craft within 500 miles of the scene of action not one of the Russian ships which were destroyed would have got away. All such probably would have been added to the number of prizes taken into Japanese ports if no torpedoes had been fired at all."

DISARMAMENT.

[From Arbitration and The Hague Court, by John W. Foster.]

In the circular letter of the Russian minister of foreign affairs of January 11, 1899, following the rescript convoking the conference, the subjects to be submitted for consideration were set forth in detail, and the first of these was as follows:

"1. An understanding not to increase for a fixed period the present effective of the armed military and naval forces, and at the same time not to increase the budgets pertaining thereto, and a preliminary examination of the means by which reduction might even be effected in future in the forces and budgets above mentioned."

In a conference with the British ambassador, following the rescript, the Russian minister of foreign affairs said that the Emperor, although deeply impressed with the desirability of a general disarmament, did not look for an immediate realization of the aims he had so much at heart, but he desired to initiate an effort, the effects of which could only be gradual.

When the conference came to consider the question, while there was much sympathy felt with the noble ideas entertained in the Czar's rescript, it was found that the subject was of a very complex character, and that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to reach any agreement which would meet the Czar's desires. The long discussion which ensued is of much interest, but I can indicate something of its spirit by extracts from the speeches of the representatives of Germany and France. General von Schwarzhoff, in the course of a discourse of some length, said:

"I can hardly believe that among my honored colleagues there is a single one ready to state that his sovereign, his Government, is engaged in working for the inevitable ruin, the slow but sure annihilation, of his country. I have no mandate to speak for my honored colleagues, but, so far as Germany is concerned, I am able to completely reassure her friends and to relieve all well-meant anxiety. The German people is not crushed under the weight of charges and taxes; it is not hanging on the brink of an abyss; it is not approaching exhaustion and ruin. Quite the contrary; public and private wealth is increasing, the general welfare and standard of life are being raised from one year to another. So far as compulsory military service is concerned, which is so closely connected with those questions, the German does not regard this as a heavy burden, but as a sacred and patriotic duty to which he owes his country's existence, its prosperity, and its future.

"I return to the propositions of Colonel Gilinsky (Russian) and to the arguments which have been advanced, and which, to my mind, are not quite consistent with each other. On the one hand, it is feared that excessive armaments may bring about war; on the other, that the exhaustion of national wealth will make war impossible. As for me, I have too much confidence in the wisdom of sovereigns and nations to share such fears. On the one hand, it is pretended that nothing is asked but things which have existed for a long time in some countries, and which, therefore, present no technical difficulties; on the other hand, it is said that this is truly a very difficult question, the solution of which would require a supreme effort. I am entirely of the latter opinion. We shall encounter insurmountable obstacles, those which may be called technical in a somewhat wider sense of the term. I believe that the question of effectives can not be regarded by itself alone, disconnected from a number of other questions to which it is quite subordinated.

"Such questions, for instance, as the state of public instruction, the length of time of active military service, the number of established regiments, the effectives of each army unit, the number and duration of the drills or military obligations of the reserves, the location of the

different army corps, the railway system, the number and situation of fortified places. In a modern army all of these belong together and form the national defense which each people has organized according to its character, its history, and its traditions, taking into account its economical resources, its geographical situation, and duties incumbent upon it. I believe that it would be very difficult to substitute for such an eminently national task an international convention. It would be impossible to determine the extent and the force of one single portion of this complicated mechanism."

He then proceeded to amplify the reasons mentioned and to maintain that in order to preserve the equilibrium as to armaments governments must be left free to choose the means best suited to their requirements.

Notwithstanding the support given to the Russian proposition by France, one of the most martial of the nations, and by various other governments, the objections voiced by the German delegate were too serious to be overcome. The sentiment of the members was that the conference should avoid forming majority and minority parties, and hence nothing should be put forth as its action which could not command a practically unanimous support. The most that could be accomplished, therefore, was a general expression of sentiment on the subject in the following declarations, which were unanimously adopted:

"The conference is of opinion that the restriction of military changes, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind.

"The conference expresses the wish that the governments, taking into consideration the proposals made at the conference, may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea and of our budgets."

While there was much regret felt at the failure to adopt some initiative for the limitation of armaments, it was something gained that a public declaration by such a body was made that the present military establishments are a heavy burden on the world, which it is extremely desirable, in the interest of the material and moral welfare of mankind, should be restricted, and that it is the duty of the governments of the earth to seek to reach an agreement to that end.

Tonnage of vessels authorized since Hague Conference.

France	340,344
England	662,797
Japan	191,443
Germany	350,445
Total	1,545,029

For which money is appropriated. This does not include the German programme, which is outlined and authorized until 1917. The money for the ships is appropriated from year to year, and the programme is subject to change—such as the recent change to 18,000-ton battle ships.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, March 7, 1906.

Tonnage of ships authorized from 1900 to 1906.

FRANCE.	
1900.	
Armored cruisers:	
Condé	10,000
Jules Ferry	12,550
Léon Gambetta	12,550
Destroyers, 6 of 300 tons	1,800
Torpedo-boat destroyers, 11 of 40 tons	440
Submarines, 6 of 48 tons	228
Total	37,628
1901.	
Battle ships:	
Patrie	14,865
République	14,865
Armored cruiser—Victor Hugo	12,550
Torpedo-boat destroyers, 10 of 305 tons	3,030
Torpedo boats, 12 of 88 tons	1,058
Submarines, 8 of 106 tons	848
Total	47,216
1902.	
Battle ships:	
Démocratie	14,865
Liberté	14,865
Justice	14,865
Verité	14,865
Armored cruisers:	
Jules Michelet	12,550
Ernest Rénan	12,550
Destroyers:	
Stylet	320
Tromblon	330
Torpedo boats, 16	800
Submarines, 13	871
Total	86,891
1903.	
Armored cruiser Edgar Quinet	13,700
Destroyers, 4, each 350	1,400
Torpedo boats, 25, each 80	2,000
Submarines, 19, each 301	5,719
Total	22,819
1904.	
Armored cruiser, 1	13,644
Destroyers, 2, at 355	710
Torpedo boats:	
1 at 86	86
50 at 26	1,300
Total	15,740
1905.	
Armored cruiser, C 17, Waldeck Rousseau	13,700
Destroyers, 4, each 340	1,400
Torpedo boats, first class, 20, each 80	1,600
Submarines, 16, each 301	4,810
Total	21,510

1906.	
Battle ships, 6 at 18,000 tons	108,000
Submersibles, 20 (400 to 500 tons)	480

SUMMARY FOR FRANCE.

1900	37,628
1901	47,216
1902	86,891
1903	22,819
1904	15,740
1905	21,570
1906	108,480
Total	340,344

ENGLAND.

1900.	
Battle ships:	
Albermarle	14,000
Montagu	14,000
Armored cruisers:	
Monmouth	9,800
Bedford	9,800
Cruisers and scouts: Challenger	5,880
Sloops and gunboats:	
Espiegle	1,070
Fantome	1,070
Torpedo boats:	
No. 98	128
No. 99	128
Total	55,876

1901.

Battle ships:	
Queen	15,000
Prince of Wales	15,000
Armored cruisers:	
Cornwall	9,800
Suffolk	9,800
Berwick	9,800
Cumberland	9,800
Donegal	9,800
Lancaster	9,800
Cruisers and scouts: Encounter	5,880
Sloops and gunboats:	
Odin	1,070
Merlin	1,070
Teal	1,070
Moorhen	1,070
Torpedo boats:	
No. 107	128
No. 108	128
Total	99,216

1902.

Battle ships:	
King Edward VII	16,350
Dominion	16,350
Commonwealth	16,350
Armored cruisers:	
Devonshire	10,700
Hampshire	10,700
Argyll	10,700
Roxburgh	10,700
Antrim	10,700
Carnarvon	10,700
Cruisers and scouts:	
Amethyst	3,000
Topaze	3,000
Sloops and gunboats:	
Clio	1,070
Cadmus	1,070
Destroyers:	
Derwent	534
Eden	527
Exe	540
Erne	550
Etrick	540
Ribble	550
Usk	550
Teviot	550
Itchin	550
Foyle	550
Torpedo boats:	
No. 109	194
No. 110	194
No. 111	194
No. 112	194
No. 113	194
Submersines, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, each 120 tons	600
Total	128,401

1903.

Battle ships:	
New Zealand	16,350
Hindustan	16,350
Armored cruisers:	
Duke of Edinburg	13,550
Black Prince	13,550
Cruisers:	
Adventure	2,940
Forward	2,945
Pathfinder	3,000
Sentinel	2,940
Diamond	3,000
Sapphire	3,000
Torpedo-boat destroyers, 9	5,084
Submersines A1, A4	720
Total	83,429

1904.	
Battle ships:	
Africa	16,350
Brittania	16,350
Hibernia	16,350
Swiftsure	11,800
Triumph	11,800
Armored cruisers:	
Achilles	13,550
Cochran	13,550
Natal	13,550
Warrior	13,550

Cruisers:	
Attentive	2,940
Foresight	2,945
Patrol	3,000
Skirmisher	2,940
1 (not built)	3,000
2 (not built)	3,000
3 (not built)	3,000
Torpedo-boat destroyers, 16	9,600
Submersines A5, A14	3,000
Total	100,275

1905.

Battle ships:	
Lord Nelson	16,500
Agamemnon	16,500
Armored cruisers:	
Minataur	14,600
Defence	14,600
Shannon	14,600
Torpedo-boat destroyers, 14 at 550 (not built)	7,700
Submersines, B1, B10	3,000
Total	102,100

1906.

Battle ship Dreadnought	18,500
Armored cruiser Invincible	15,000
Torpedo-boat destroyers:	
Five ocean torpedo-boat destroyers	—
One special type torpedo-boat destroyer	—
Twelve coastal	—
Submersines, 11	—
Total	33,500

SUMMARY FOR ENGLAND.

1900	55,876
1901	99,216
1902	128,401
1903	83,429
1904	160,275
1905	102,100
1906	33,500
Total	662,797

JAPAN.

1901.

Armored cruisers:	
Nissiu	7,294
Kosuga	7,294
Protected cruisers:	
Mitaka	3,365
Tsushima	3,365
Otowa	3,000
Torpedo-boat destroyers, 8 at 375	3,000
Torpedo boats:	
6 at 150	900
5 at 120	600
15 at 85	1,275
Total	30,093

1903.

Battle ships:	
Kashima	16,000
Katori	16,000
Satsuma	19,000
Armored cruisers:	
Kurama	15,000
Tsukuba	13,500
Protected cruiser Tone	4,800
Dispatch boat Yodo	1,200
Destroyers, 25 at 310	8,050
Submersines, 5	1,000
Total	94,550

1904.

Battle ship Aki	19,000
Armored cruisers:	
Ibuki	14,000
Protected cruisers:	
—	5,000
—	5,000
—	150
River gunboat	4,000
Repair ship	4,650
Destroyers, 15, at 310	4,650
Submersines	1,000
Total	66,800

SUMMARY FOR JAPAN.

1901	30,093
1903	94,550
1904	66,800
Total	191,443

GERMANY.	
1900.	
Battle ships	
Mecklenburg	11, 530
Schwaben	11, 530
Armored cruiser Prinz Adalbert	9, 050
Protected cruisers:	
Medusa	2, 660
Amazone	2, 660
Gunboat Panther	977
Torpedo-boat destroyers, S102 to S107 (400 tons each)	2, 400
Total	41, 407
1901.	
Battle ships:	
Braunschweig	13, 200
Elsass	13, 200
Armored cruiser Friedrich Carl	9, 050
Protected cruisers:	
Frauenlob	2, 715
Arcona	2, 715
Undine	2, 715
Torpedo-boat destroyers G 108 to G 113 (400 tons each)	2, 400
Total	45, 995
1902.	
Battle ships:	
Preussen	13, 200
Hessen	13, 200
Armored cruiser Roon	9, 500
Protected cruisers:	
Hamburg	3, 250
Bremen	3, 250
Berlin	3, 250
Gunboat Eber	977
River gunboat Tsingtau	168
Torpedo-boat destroyers S 114 to S 119 (420 tons each)	2, 520
Total	49, 315
1903.	
Battle ships:	
Lothringen	13, 200
Deutschland	13, 200
Armored cruiser Yorck	9, 500
Protected cruisers:	
München	3, 250
Lübeck	3, 250
Torpedo-boat destroyers S 120 to S 125 (420 tons each)	2, 520
Total	44, 920
1904.	
Battle ships:	
Pommern	13, 200
Hannover	13, 200
Armored cruiser "C"	11, 600
Protected cruisers:	
Leipzig	3, 250
Danzig	3, 250
Königsberg	3, 250
Training-ship tender	(?)
Surveying vessel Planet	650
Torpedo-boat destroyers S 126 to S 131 (420 tons each)	2, 520
Total	50, 920
1905.	
Battle ships:	
"Q"	13, 200
"R"	13, 200
Armored cruiser "D"	11, 600
Protected cruisers:	
"O"	3, 420
Ersatz Wacht	3, 420
Ersatz Blitz	3, 420
River gunboat	168
Tender Ersatz Hyäne	(?)
Surveying vessel "B"	650
Mining steamer "A"	(?)
Torpedo-boat destroyers G 132 to G 137 (485 tons each)	2, 910
Total	51, 988
1906.	
Battle ships:	
Ersatz Bayern	* 18, 000
Ersatz Sachsen	* 18, 000
Armored cruiser "E"	* 14, 500
Protected cruisers:	
Ersatz Pfeil	* 3, 500
Ersatz Comet	* 3, 500
Mining steamer "B"	(?)
Torpedo-boat destroyers, 12 (700 tons each)	* 8, 400
Total	* 65, 900
SUMMARY FOR GERMANY.	
1900	41, 407
1901	45, 995
1902	49, 315
1903	44, 920
1904	50, 920
1905	51, 988
1906	65, 900
Total	350, 445

* Probable displacement.

Shipbuilding programme of 1906 to 1917.

Year of first installment.	Naval programme of 1900, and new estimates.			Torpedo-boat destroyers.	Cost, including armament (million marks).
	Battle ships.	Large cruisers.	Small cruisers.		
1906	2	1	2	12	117
1907	2	1	2	12	131
1908	2	1	2	12	136
1909	2	1	2	12	148
1910	2	1	2	12	148
1911	1	2	2	12	147
1912	1	2	2	12	144
1913	1	1	2	12	137
1914	1	1	2	12	126
1915	1	1	2	12	119
1916	1	1	2	12	112
1917	2	2	2	12	113
Total	a 18	b 13	c 24	144	-----

* Including one battle ship of former naval programme.

* Including six under new estimates.

* Including one of former naval programme.

This increases the force of 1917 by six armored cruisers (first class), forty-eight torpedo-boat destroyers, submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri.

The question was taken; and the amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The question now is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio, to strike out the paragraph.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. BURTON of Ohio) there were—ayes 93, noes 129.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered.

Mr. BURTON of Ohio and Mr. Foss were appointed tellers.

The House again divided; and the tellers reported—ayes 103, noes 135.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment, which I send to the desk and ask to have read:

The Clerk read as follows:

Strike out, on page 71, in line 22, all after the words "United States" down to the end of line 14, on page 72, and insert in lieu thereof the following: "In accordance with the latest improvements in the construction of ships and the production of armor and armament, the Secretary of the Navy is hereby directed to prepare plans and specifications for the best type of seagoing battle ships, carrying the most suitable armor and armament, and to submit to Congress a general description of such type of battle ship on the first Monday in December next; and said Secretary, in preparing said plans and description, shall review and further consider what should be its displacement, what should be the form and location of its turrets, what should be the number and kind of its guns of various sizes, what torpedo tubes, if any, it should contain, to what extent electricity should be used for auxiliary purposes, and all other questions which have arisen and are now pending among naval architects and ordnance experts concerning the construction of battle ships under modern conditions; and the said Secretary shall, to such an extent as he may deem expedient, report to Congress in connection with said description his opinion upon the foregoing questions."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from North Carolina.

The question was taken; and the amendment was rejected.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment, which I send to the desk and ask to have read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 71, strike out all, commencing with line 25, page 71, down to and including line 14, page 72, and insert: "One first-class battle ship, carrying the heaviest armor and most powerful armament for a vessel of its class upon a trial displacement of not more than 16,000 tons, to have the highest practicable speed and great radius of action, and to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not exceeding \$4,400,000."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York.

The question was taken; and the amendment was rejected.

The Clerk read as follows:

Three torpedo-boat destroyers, to have the highest practicable speed, and to cost, exclusive of armament, not to exceed \$750,000 each.

Mr. MUDD. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amend by inserting, after line 12, page 72, as follows:

"One steel floating dry dock, to be so constructed as to serve the purpose of a repair ship and capable of being propelled or towed to any place that may be necessary for the use of the fleet, or any part thereof, for such purpose, to cost not exceeding \$1,250,000, of which amount the sum of \$100,000 is hereby appropriated."

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order on that.

Mr. TAWNEY. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that that is a violation of clause 2 of Rule XXI.

Mr. MUDD. I do not disguise the fact, Mr. Chairman, that this amendment is substantially a reinstatement, if it should prevail, of the provision in the bill that came from the committee, and it is in the nature of a committee amendment for that purpose, and I offer it by authority of the committee. Mr. Chairman, this amendment occupies a somewhat different footing under this paragraph than it did under the paragraph of which the original provision was a part. The beginning of this section reads as follows:

That for the purpose of further increasing the naval establishment of the United States, the President is hereby authorized to have constructed by contract or in navy-yards as hereinafter provided.

My contention is that anything that by fair intendment can be said in pursuance of this language to constitute a part of the naval establishment or be considered a natural necessary incident thereof, is in order under this paragraph. Now, Mr. Chairman, the amendment upon its face states in effect that the dry dock shall be capable of following the fleet anywhere for the purpose of repairs to ships, and it is to be especially so constructed as to serve the purpose of repair of ships. In that connection, in addition to the observations I made the other day, I want to call attention to one decision. It is not for the Chair to inquire now whether what I state in the amendment be accurate in point of fact or not. The amendment on its face states that the dock shall be so constructed as to be in fact, a repair ship, and a ship capable of being propelled or towed to follow the fleet. Now, to read from Hind's Precedents:

Mr. TAWNEY. What page?

Mr. MUDD. It is 355 of the Manual; not the Parliamentary Precedents. Mr. Chairman, I read from the Manual, which was prepared by the same gentleman who prepared the Parliamentary Precedents, on page 355, as follows: "The admissibility of an amendment should be judged from the provision of its text rather than from the purpose which circumstances may suggest." I refer also to a decision made by the gentleman from New York [Mr. SHERMAN] in the Fifty-seventh Congress. I think it was on page 889 of the RECORD of the Fifty-seventh Congress, first session. The present Speaker of the House, who was then chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, offered a provision for the establishment in the vicinity of Manila of a military post, including construction of barracks and quarters for officers, hospitals, etc. The point of order was made against it, and the chairman of that committee admitted that the point of order would lie. Immediately the chairman of the committee, the present Speaker of the House, changed his amendment to the following form: "For the proper shelter and protection of officers and enlisted men of the United States lawfully on duty in the Philippine Islands, to be expended in the discretion of the President, \$500,000." It was admitted in the debate that the amendment was for the same purpose as the amendment that had been previously offered, to which the point of order it was admitted would lie. I will read the language of Mr. Richardson, of Tennessee, upon page 889, in which he said:

This is simply an indirect effort to carry his point and accomplish that which the gentleman could not accomplish directly.

That was admitted to be the fact, but the ruling of the Chair, which is found on page 895 and from which I read briefly, is to the following effect:

It is for the Chair to look . . . at the text of the amendment and not at the purpose of the amendment. That idea of the Chair is strengthened by rulings of former occupants of the chair.

In the last Congress, when the amendment for irrigation was proposed, amendment after amendment was ruled out of order by the then occupant of the chair, the committee understanding all the time that each preceding amendment was intended for the same purpose as the preceding was, until finally an amendment was proposed in such form that the Chair ruled it in order, holding at that time that it was the text that must govern the Chair rather than the purpose back of the amendment.

It seems to the Chair that the question to be determined here is whether this amendment as it appears, as it reads, regardless of the purpose that may be back of it, is an appropriation provided for by existing law. It is not for the Chair to determine what is the privilege of the amendment. Jefferson, in his Manual, says, "It is not for the Chair to draw the question of consistence within the vortex of order."

Mr. Chairman, I could read from several competent expert authorities to convince the Chair that the floating dry dock of the character that we are now building, and propose to build with further improvements in the future, can be fairly considered as one of the boats of the fleet, but I do not have to prove that because, according to the ruling which I have just read, if the amendment upon its face is regular and within the rule, the Chair can not look behind that into its purpose or to discover a contrary purpose, and that amendment practically is for the purpose of including in this bill a repair ship for the use of the fleet and to follow the fleet wherever it goes, and comes properly under the head of increase of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is prepared to rule. The

authorities are in harmony upon the proposition that dry docks are not an essential part of the equipment of the Navy proper. The present occupant of the chair so held a few days ago, and this amendment, the Chair thinks, is within the principle laid down by the Chair in that decision. The Chair sustains the point of order.

Mr. MUDD. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. MUDD] offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amend by adding after line 17, page 72, as follows: "One large steel vessel, capable of lifting, receiving, and docking the largest battle ship afloat, to be so constructed as to answer the purposes of a self-docking dry dock and repair ship, to cost not exceeding \$1,250,000, of which amount the sum of \$100,000 is hereby appropriated."

Mr. TAWNEY. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against that amendment. It is the same amendment, and offered for the accomplishment of the same identical purpose as the amendment which the gentleman offered a moment ago contemplated.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is of the opinion that the amendment is obnoxious to the rule, and sustains the point of order.

Mr. MUDD. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully appeal from the decision of the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Maryland appeals from the decision of the Chair. The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the judgment of the committee?

The question was taken; and the decision of the Chair was held to be the judgment of the committee.

The Clerk read as follows:

And the contract for the construction of said vessels shall be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to the lowest best responsible bidder, having in view the best results and most expeditious delivery; and in the construction of all of said vessels the provisions of the act of August 3, 1886, entitled "An act to increase the naval establishment," as to materials for said vessels, their engines, boilers, and machinery, the contracts under which they are built, the notice of any proposals for the same, the plans, drawings, specifications therefor, and the method of executing said contracts shall be observed and followed, and, subject to the provisions of this act, all said vessels shall be built in compliance with the terms of said act, and in all their parts shall be of domestic manufacture; and the steel material shall be of domestic manufacture, and of the quality and characteristics best adapted to the various purposes for which it may be used, in accordance with specifications approved by the Secretary of the Navy; and not more than one of the vessels provided for in this act shall be built by one contracting party: *Provided*, That the Secretary of the Navy may build any or all of the vessels herein authorized in such navy-yards as he may designate, and shall build any of the vessels herein authorized in such navy-yards as he may designate should it reasonably appear that the persons, firms, or corporations, or the agents thereof, bidding for the construction of any of said vessels have entered into any combination, agreement, or understanding the effect, object, or purpose of which is to deprive the Government of fair, open, and unrestricted competition in letting contracts for the construction of any of said vessels: *Provided*, That the limit of cost, exclusive of armor and armament, of the battle ship Connecticut, authorized by the act of Congress approved July 1, 1902, be increased to \$4,600,000, and that the limit of cost, exclusive of armor and armament, of each of the two training vessels authorized by the act of Congress approved March 3, 1903, be increased to \$410,000: *And provided further*, That the limit of cost, exclusive of armor and armament, of each of the two colliers authorized by the act of Congress approved April 27, 1904, be increased to \$1,550,000.

Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

On page 72, line 21, after the words "expeditious delivery," insert the following:

"*Provided*, That any bid for the construction of any of said vessels upon the Pacific coast shall have a differential of 4 per cent in its favor, which shall be considered by the Secretary of the Navy in awarding contracts for the construction of said vessels."

Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, this is the provision that has been in nearly all naval appropriation bills for some years, and it is necessary in order to permit the institutions engaged in the building of ships on the Pacific coast to have opportunity to secure some of these contracts. This differential is rendered necessary on account of the higher price of wages on the Pacific coast and the high price of material, and the fact that freight must be paid from the East on the armor plate and all heavy material used in the construction of these ships. Heretofore, I believe, this House has pursued this policy, because it has been thought wise to maintain upon the Pacific coast, or to enable private persons to maintain plants where large ships of this kind may be constructed. As before stated, I believe that this is substantially the same provision as has been incorporated in most of the naval appropriation bills for many years.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I would state that for a number of years this preferential was allowed, but during the last few years, or since the bidding on the part of some of the ship-building companies on the Pacific coast, they have demonstrated

that they could build as cheaply there as they can on the eastern coast. There was one case that I recall where their bid was less than that of the eastern shipbuilders. And I say that, in view of this fact, the Department has not in the last few years recommended this differential.

Mr. GILLETT of California. Mr. Chairman, in relation to this amendment I desire to say only a few words. A few years ago a differential of 4 per cent was allowed to ships built on the Pacific coast. I understand also there was a bid made independent of such a differential, for which a loss was suffered. Now, it seems to me that the policy of maintaining a navy-yard on the Pacific, a yard in which war ships can be constructed and repaired, is a wise one and should be encouraged. There are thirty-eight vessels in the course of construction today, as I understand it, in the United States. Of these there are but two in the course of construction on the Pacific slope. They are about completed. In a month or two the work will be done. Therefore we ask Congress at this time, considering the conditions existing there in San Francisco, to extend to the coast this favor. It is true that we can not build vessels on the Pacific coast as cheaply as they can be built in the East, on account of wages being higher there and on account of the expense in transporting material to so great a distance; but we can build as good ships on the Pacific coast as can be constructed in any yard in the world, as was evidenced by the construction of the great battle ship *Oregon*. But the people of San Francisco, the mechanics and laborers resting there now within their tents and huts, are seeking a job. They want employment and are deserving of it. We want to keep the mechanics and laborers of the Union Iron Works employed, and therefore we ask that we have a chance to bid on this battle ship. I do not believe that the Government will lose much in doing it, because let it once be known that this differential is given in favor of the Pacific coast, and it will force down bids on the eastern coast. Leave out of the bill the differential we ask for, and the bids will be high; but if eastern builders must bid against the coast, knowing we have the advantage in the bidding by reason of this differential, it will force their bids down, and if the Pacific coast does not secure the prize the Government will get the advantage of lower bids. We ask the Members of this House to do what has been the practice in the past, allow this differential, and give our mechanics and laborers on the coast a chance to get a job at this time, when their necessities are so great. We have only two vessels on the coast being constructed, against thirty-six now being constructed in the East. The East will furnish the material, the laborers in the East will make the material, and all that is asked is to permit our laborers to build the ship, and thus secure their share of what it costs to construct the magnificent ship which this bill calls for and which will be the greatest war ship in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. HAYES].

The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the yeas seemed to have it.

Mr. GILLETT of California. Division, Mr. Chairman.

The House divided; and there were—ayes 74, yeas 86.

Mr. HAYES of California. Tellers, Mr. Chairman.

Tellers were ordered; and Mr. FOSS and Mr. HAYES of California were appointed tellers.

The House again divided; and there were—ayes 78, yeas 76.

So the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. TAWNEY. Mr. Chairman, I want to offer an amendment at the end of line 10, page 74.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. TAWNEY] offers an amendment, which the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

At the end of line 10, on page 74, insert: "Provided, That no part of this appropriation shall be expended for armor for vessels herein authorized, except upon contracts for such armor when awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to the lowest responsible bidder, having in view the best results and most expeditious delivery."

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the point of order.

Mr. TAWNEY. The amendment is a limitation upon the appropriation, or so much of the appropriation as carried here for armor to be used in connection with the construction of the vessels authorized.

Mr. FOSS. I want to say to the gentleman that the amendment should be offered to the paragraph down below, I think, headed "Armor and armament." The paragraph above is exclusive of armament.

Mr. TAWNEY. I withdraw the amendment until we reach the bottom of page 74.

Mr. DUNWELL. Mr. Chairman, as a Member of this House I have the honor to represent in part that noble metropolis which comprises in its citizenship one-twentieth of the popula-

tion of this great nation, and a more enlightened, broad-minded, intelligent community does not exist on the globe. It is in their name and in their interest that I desire to say a word regarding these battle ships and their construction. Within the confines of the great city from which I come is located the most important navy-yard in the United States. A few years ago it was determined by Congress in its wisdom to provide for the building of one of the new United States battle ships at that yard. Accordingly the order was issued; the yard was furnished with machinery and the other essentials of construction; a force of men the equal of any ever assembled was called together, and the great work began. It is now practically finished. The ship is named the *Connecticut*, after a glorious State—one of the original thirteen. There she sits on the placid waters of the bay, the pride of modern naval architecture, the grandest ship the American Navy has ever known, the noblest specimen of the shipbuilder's art now floating on the waters of the world.

Mr. Chairman, we want more ships like her. We want some of them constructed, as she has been, in the navy-yards of the United States. We do not consider that it would be wise or just or creditable to the country to permit that splendid body of American artisans to disperse, never to come together again; that wonderful machinery, procured and constructed at so much expense and with so much care, to rust away and decay.

The plant and equipment of the Brooklyn Navy-Yard are among the very best in the country, manned by upward of 2,000 of the best shipbuilders in the world.

The time allowed for the building of the *Connecticut* was forty-one months, and she will be in commission before the expiration of that time. Never before has this happened since our modern naval programme began.

It is claimed by some of those who oppose the Government's building its own ships that the *Connecticut* has cost 9 per cent more than her sister ship, the *Louisiana*; but, considering the average amount of time over the time limit consumed in the construction of ships heretofore built in private yards, which is fully two years, and computing the interest on the contract price of these two ships, we have these results:

Cost of <i>Connecticut</i> in excess of cost of <i>Louisiana</i>	\$378,000
Interest on \$8,400,000 for two years.....	1,008,000

It is an acknowledged fact that the construction of the *Louisiana* would have been delayed to the extent that every other battle ship has been heretofore, had it not been for the splendid work and hustling powers of the builders of the *Connecticut*.

Leaving all the various indirect benefits of this description, and they are many, out of the consideration, we claim that the vastly superior construction of the *Connecticut* and the fact that she will not so soon or as often need repairs, makes her worth at least \$500,000 more than her sister ship.

One of the principal causes, moreover, of the increased cost of the *Connecticut* over the *Louisiana* lies in the fact that the working day in the navy-yards of the Government is eight hours long, while ten hours represents the day in private yards. The Government day is fixed by law made by the Government. Would it be just, then, think you, for the Government after fixing the working day's duration, to deprive its citizens of the privilege of working for their bread because they enjoy the benefit of this benign Government regulation regarding labor?

There can be no doubt, in my judgment, that if the construction of battle ships is continued in the navy-yards there will be a still further reduction of time consumed in their building, and, besides that, a great additional reduction in cost, and that a still further advance will be made in the perfection of their sea power.

We believe that the work is better and more carefully done, and that the difference in the merit of the work is parallel to the difference between building houses by contract and by days' work. It would be far better, it strikes me, for the Government to pursue a generous policy toward their own shops and their own men than to shut them out entirely from any competition and permit all the work of the Navy to be done by the contract labor of the private yards.

Many gentlemen on this floor are advocates of the betterment of American labor. Here is an opportunity to prove our good faith in this matter and to sustain the eight-hour day, which the Government has prescribed, by causing the building of one of the three great battle ships already provided for in one of the navy-yards of the United States.

I am willing that it be put down as a part of my creed that I believe in peace, that I also believe in a great American navy as a conservator of peace. I believe, too, that the more powerful the nation is, the more it can command peace. Our noble country is now the wealthiest and most powerful on earth

and able to take the position which of right belongs to her. "Where Macgregor sits, that is the head of the table." Let us remember that and take Macgregor's place at the board of the nations, for of right it is clearly ours.

[Mr. GOLDFOGLE addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

Mr. RIXEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY] asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read as follows:

The Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to contract for or purchase subsurface or submarine torpedo boats, to an amount not exceeding \$1,000,000, after such competitive tests as he shall see fit to prescribe, to determine the comparative efficiency of the different boats for which bids may be submitted: *Provided*, That such competitive tests shall take place within six months from the date of the passage of this act.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I desire to amend this section by striking out the proviso, in lines 16 to 18, on page 74, that reads, "*Provided*, That such competitive tests shall take place within six months from the date of the passage of this act," and offer the following proviso in lieu thereof.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Strike out the proviso, in lines 16, 17, and 18, page 74, and insert: "*Provided further*, That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to consider designs for improved submarine torpedo boats presented by any individual or corporation who may have patented or designed or built submarine torpedo boats; and if, after careful consideration, the Secretary is of the opinion that any of said designs embody features which indicate clearly the development of greater efficiency in actual service than has been or probably can be obtained in submarine boats hitherto built or in course of construction for the United States Navy, then in such case the Secretary of the Navy is authorized, in his discretion, to have constructed by contract or in navy-yards, under such conditions as he may prescribe, one or more submarine boats upon such designs hereinbefore mentioned as fulfill the foregoing requirements as to superior efficiency; and the Secretary of the Navy is furthermore authorized to purchase said designs at such reasonable compensation as may, in his discretion, appear suitable, if said purchase is considered to be necessary for the best interests of the naval service; and in the event of said purchase of designs by the Secretary of the Navy, the designer shall specifically guarantee the Navy Department, by suitable bond or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Navy, against all liability for the use of any and all patents which are embodied or used in said designs."

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, I raise the point of order on the amendment, that it is clearly legislation.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Can I have order so that I can hear the gentleman's point of order?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts raises the question of order that the amendment changes existing law.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, in reference to the point of order I will state that the object of this amendment is to open wide the door of competition for building submarine torpedo boats. The section to which the amendment is offered provides that a million dollars shall be appropriated for the purchase or contract for of subsurface or submarine boats. The section further provides that competitive tests of these different boats shall be made—that is, of boats already built a test shall take place within six months after the passage of this act.

Now, the result of the passage of this section of the bill without amendment would be this: There are but two companies that build boats and have got submarine boats built to-day in the United States. One of those companies is known as the Electric Company, which builds what was formerly known as the Holland boat. The other, the Lake Company, builds what is known as the Lake boat. They both have boats that could enter this competition. But the Navy Department takes into consideration the question of speed in considering these boats; and, as I understand it, it is generally conceded that the old Holland boat, built by the Electric Company, can make 7½ knots an hour of speed, while the Lake boat, although a very useful boat for submarine diving and some other purposes, as at present built, is generally conceded to have a speed limited to 5 knots an hour; and that would be considered in the test. The effect of this section as it appears in the bill would limit the competition to the boat of the Electric Company and eliminate all other competitors. In other words, the effect of this section, if you pass it as it stands to-day, is a provision that we shall appropriate a million dollars to buy boats from the Electric Company.

Now, they are good boats; they are effective boats; I believe in building submarine boats. I believe it is an evolution in naval affairs. I believe an effective submarine boat will in the future be the greatest protection to the shores of America from

a foreign enemy; but I believe it is an evolution. It is simply in its infancy to-day. I do not believe it has reached the period where it has passed beyond the experimental stage. And I believe every opportunity should be given the Navy Department and its officers to test the efficiency of such boats.

Mr. ROBERTS. I make the point of order that the gentleman is not talking to the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts makes the point of order that the gentleman from Alabama is not confining his remarks to the point of order.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am trying to explain what the section provides, and then what my amendment will provide, and see whether it is existing law or whether it is not under the amendment.

Mr. ROBERTS. Well, Mr. Chairman, the argument of the gentleman is in favor of the amendment if he gets by the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will address himself to the point of order and continue in order.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I am trying to continue in order, and I do not see how I can show that it is not contrary to existing law unless I can first show what is the provision of the section. But I will try to observe the admonition of the Chair.

Now, as I stated, Mr. Chairman, this provision before the committee provides for these submarine torpedo boats. It provides how this competition shall take place; and in my judgment limits the competition to one company. That being the case, and believing that we ought to open the door to a wider competition, I have prepared for the purpose of offering here an amendment that would open the door of competition wide to the world.

Now, the question of order is as to whether this amendment is applicable and germane to the section. No point of order has been made against the section of the bill. Therefore, an amendment that is germane and a limitation, a proper limitation, on the section of the bill must be in order, because no point of order has been made against the provision of the bill; and I will not, without the Chair desires me to do so, continue the argument on that point.

Mr. BOWIE. Mr. Chairman, I have another point of order—the House is not in order.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. Does the gentleman from Massachusetts desire to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. ROBERTS. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama is clearly legislation, in that it permits and authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to purchase plans of boats. There is no law to-day allowing the Secretary of the Navy to purchase the plans of any boat. That point of order on that part of the amendment is clearly good; and if one part of the amendment is subject to the point of order, the whole amendment is bad.

The CHAIRMAN. The paragraph authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to contract for the purchase of subsurface or submarine torpedo boats to an amount not exceeding \$1,000,000, and provides for a competitive test to determine the better type of boat. It is probable, although the Chair does not undertake to decide that question, that the provision for competitive tests is not in order, but no point of order having been made to it, that provision is subject to amendment by any proposition that is germane to the idea of competition; and the Chair construes this amendment to mean the elaboration of that proposition, and therefore holds it in order.

Mr. ROBERTS. If the Chair will pardon me, the provision in the bill provides for a competitive test of boats, not of designs or plans, but actually constructed boats, and it seems to me that the Chair can not fairly hold that plans can be put in fairly with that language in competition with the constructed boat.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair holds that the purchase of plans may be an incident to the element of competition, and overrules the point of order.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the courtesy of the committee for ten minutes to explain the amendment.

Mr. FOSS. I would like to finish this bill to-night, and I think we can do so, for we are practically at the end of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama asks unanimous consent that he may proceed for ten minutes in discussing his amendment.

Mr. FOSS. I will not object to five minutes.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Oh, I am entitled to five minutes.

Mr. BUTLER of Pennsylvania. I dislike very much, Mr. Chairman, but I think I must object. I am a member of the Naval Committee, and have not asked the attention of the House for five minutes this afternoon.

Mr. COCKRAN. That is the loss of the House.

Mr. BUTLER of Pennsylvania. Rather the relief of the House.

Mr. COCKRAN. It is the loss of the House, I insist.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, if the House will listen to me, I will try and explain the substance of my amendment in the five minutes that I am entitled to. In the first place, I want to say the amendment was not prepared by myself, but was prepared by the Navy Department at my request. The Navy Department is taking no part in this matter, but they prepared an amendment at my request that would open this question of competition to everybody. This amendment was prepared by the Navy Department so that competition will be open to anybody who wanted to submit plans.

Now, I understand that there are gentlemen who have boats, who desire to enter into this competition, boats that they claim will produce a speed of 25 knots an hour. I am reliably informed that one of these boats has been tested, in miniature boat, and the report is on file in the Navy Department showing a production of 22 knots of speed an hour. Now, if that is the case, and I understand it is a fact, that there is a miniature boat that has been tested that will produce 22 knots an hour, isn't it folly for this House to tie the hands of the Navy Department and say that we shall not have any competition, that you shall only buy the old boats, boats we have tried before, that have only shown a speed of $7\frac{1}{2}$ knots an hour, when it is possible to produce a boat that will bring the speed up to over 20 knots an hour, that can run down a battle ship in the offing? I think it would be folly for us to make such a limitation on the bill.

The only provision in this amendment I offer, the only desire I have is to open the matter to fair competition to every one, so that everybody may have a fair test and that there shall be no monopoly in the building of these boats.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I will.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. Does the gentleman inform the House that there is no competition in this matter?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I stated that this competition as it stands limits the competition to boats that are built and to plans and specifications as we usually build ships. My understanding is that there are but two companies that could compete within the six months. One is the Lake and the other is the Electric. I am further informed, and I believe from a reliable source, that the Holland boats show a speed of $7\frac{1}{2}$ knots, and the Lake boat only about 5 knots, and as the Navy Department construes the speed as an element in the competition, it practically limits the competition to the Holland boats, and therefore there is no competition.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. And the gentleman seeks to open the door of competition wider?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. So wide that these men who claim that they have a boat—they may not have it—may enter the competition. Give them a chance to demonstrate whether they have a boat that can make 22 knots an hour.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. And the gentleman anticipates that the Government will thereby probably get a better boat at less cost?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. That is what I hope to do.

Mr. MUDD. I understand that there is another boat that can get ready for the test in six months.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I don't think it could.

Mr. SULZER. Why not make it twelve instead of six months?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Because it has been customary to build ordinary boats—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. ROBERTS].

Mr. SULZER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the time of the gentleman from Alabama be extended for one minute.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has already recognized the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, I will yield one minute out of my time that the gentleman may ask a question.

Mr. SULZER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know why twelve months would not be long enough.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Twelve months might be long enough, but it is customary in building ships of the Navy to take competitive plans as well as competitive boats. As a matter of fact, the taking of competitive boats is a new departure in building a navy.

Mr. SULZER. These boats can be built very quickly.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I will say to the gentleman that the

form of this amendment is not mine. It was prepared in the Navy Department. It is what the Navy Department think would bring about the proper thing.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, I can not yield any longer. Mr. Chairman, there is one thing I wish to call to the attention of the committee with regard to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama. This matter of plans being submitted to the Navy Department has been thoroughly gone over in the committee, and it was decided that that was not the proper thing to do, and for this reason: When the Government started out on the development of submarine boats it advertised for plans and it got plans, and the result of that advertisement was universal disapproval by those whose plans were not accepted, and the plans that were accepted turned out to be a failure; so that the boat built under them was not a success and the parties who built it had to refund to the Government its money. In view of the trouble the Department has had heretofore in this matter of plans, the Department prefers now that we should have boats, and when anybody has an idea that is of any value it is desired that they shall incorporate that into a concrete form and bring it to the Department, and within the provisions of a bill reported by the committee there is scope enough to give the most complete competition and the widest latitude tests possible.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. ROBERTS. If I can have my time extended I will, but I must decline to yield under the circumstances. If we are to go back after thirteen years of progress in the development of submarine warfare to the first principles of considering plans, then we are practically at a standstill in this important arm of national defense, and I submit that the Department should keep advancing in this matter.

I want to call attention to one point in the amendment of the gentleman from Alabama, which provides that the men submitting plans shall furnish a bond to the Government to protect the Government from any infringement suits. The gentleman says his amendment was drawn up by the Department. As a matter of fact, that amendment was suggested by the attorney of a man who has a submarine boat in his head, and he admits and has admitted to the Committee on Naval Affairs in a communication over his own signature that he was tied up in lawsuits; that he is being sued for infringements and for failure to comply with his contracts, so that if this provision were adopted the result of it would be to bring the Government into a lawsuit over certain patents which may or may not have any effect on the matter of the development of these submarine boats. I believe if anybody has a boat built we should try that boat. I want the broadest competition.

Mr. UNDERWOOD rose.

The CHAIRMAN. Debate on the pending amendment is exhausted.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I call for a vote.

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. I would like to ask the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD] what he knows with reference to the statement made by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. ROBERTS] that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama was prepared by an attorney in this city.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman asks me whether this was prepared by an attorney of another boat company.

Mr. ROBERTS. Not of another boat company.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I will state that an attorney in the city of Washington who wanted to come into competition in this matter presented an amendment and asked me to offer it. I told him that I would not offer it until I had submitted it to the Navy Department. I did submit it to the Navy Department. It was not satisfactory to them and they returned the amendment that I have offered—not the one the attorney presented me—as one which they said would open this question to competition, and which the Navy Department sent back to me. Now, if they had some attorney in the Navy Department who prepared this plan I do not know about it, but I received this amendment back in a letter under the signature of the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. ROBERTS. May I ask the gentleman a question? Does the gentleman wish the committee to understand that the Navy Department approves of this amendment?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. No; I do not. I did not say so.

Mr. ROBERTS. Did not the Secretary of the Navy send another letter to the gentleman expressly disapproving or rather withdrawing any supposed approval of this?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I have not said that the Secretary of the Navy approved this amendment.

Mr. ROBERTS. That was the impression the gentleman sought to convey when he said the Department prepared it.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I did not seek to give that impression at all. I simply said that I asked the Navy Department to prepare an amendment that would open this whole question to competition of everybody, and they sent back the amendment that I have sent to this desk, and I did not say that they approved it or that they would disapprove it.

They sent me that amendment as one that would open this question to fair competition.

Mr. ROBERTS. Now, is it not a fact that amendment was prepared by the bureau chief and not by the Secretary or Assistant Secretary?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I do not know as to that; it came in the letter.

Mr. ROBERTS. Does not your letter expressly state so?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I think not.

Mr. ROBERTS. I have a copy here.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. It came in the letter, and whether it was prepared by a bureau chief, an attorney in the Department, or the Secretary himself, I do not know, but it came to me from the Secretary of the Navy, and I wish the House to understand that I do not say that the Secretary is taking any active part in this one way or the other, that he is in favor of the proposition or against it, but I say he is authority for the fact that if you pass that amendment you will give free competition to everybody and not create a monopoly in passing this proposition.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I desire to address the committee briefly, and I move to strike out the last two words. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the Committee on Naval Affairs is taking an extraordinary interest in the apparent attempt to shut out competition in the purchase of submarine boats. I am a good deal of a landlubber, and do not know anything about submarine boats, but I understand the application of the principle of competition, and the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama is to provide competition, so that the United States may buy better boats at less cost, and I do not understand how gentlemen of the committee can defend a proposition that seeks to exclude competition, to keep the Government in the clutch of a monopoly, and provide, possibly, inferior boats and increase its bill of cost for that item. I have not heard any clear explanation yet of the extraordinary attitude of the Committee on Naval Affairs, and I will say that since I have been a Member of this Congress my mails have been flooded with literature pointing significantly to a state of affairs in connection with submarine boats that needs something more than a mere glossing over by this House. I believe it needs to be looked at beneath the surface; that Congress itself should conduct a little submarine investigation of this question. [Applause.] Now, the gentlemen says that the House ought not to provide a means of competition in order to give good boats at a fair price, and he bases that argument upon this fact and this fact alone, that thirteen years ago, forsooth, plans were submitted and the scheme went awry, and because there was failure thirteen years ago to provide an effective means of competition, that the Naval Affairs Committee shall turn its face forever against all plans for providing competition.

It seems to me that, after the lapse of thirteen years in the progress of time and in the march of invention, some means must have been found to provide boats better than those that were designed and constructed thirteen years ago, and the Government ought not to deny to itself the benefit of the march of science and the progress of invention. But if it follows the lead of the Committee on Naval Affairs it will do so. We ought to give to the Secretary of the Navy, what obviously he would be glad to have, the means of getting competition upon these submarine boats, so as to give the people of the United States all that they can get for their money and the very best article that that money would purchase. I say I am a stranger to the subject, but it has a most sinister aspect, it seems to me, and I say it boldly, and I ask that some gentleman give a better explanation of the attempt to exclude competition than has so far been given by the Committee on Naval Affairs. [Applause.]

Mr. GREGG. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last three words. The chief argument of the gentleman from Massachusetts is that this committee by the provision in its bill is trying to cut off competition. Now, such is not the case. When this matter was up before the committee it was understood that there was a wrangle between two institutions which make the submarine boats—that is, the Lake Torpedo Boat Company and the Electric Boat Company. We understood that the Lake Torpedo Boat Company contended that it had not heretofore had a fair chance in the competition, and the provisions of this bill

were submitted to two gentlemen of the committee for the purpose of preparing it and so wording it that both concerns should have a fair chance and a square deal in the competition. At that time we did not know of any other concern in this country proposing to build submarine boats.

Mr. HILL of Connecticut. May I ask the gentleman? I have understood there were no hearings before the committee on this subject. How could it be possible for them to be heard? I never heard of them asking to be heard.

Mr. GREGG. The matter was discussed—that is, the complaint of the Lake Torpedo Boat Company.

Mr. HILL of Connecticut. By whom?

Mr. GREGG. By the committee.

Mr. HILL of Connecticut. But I understand that hearings were not held on the subject.

Mr. GREGG. That matter was up, and we understood that the Lake torpedo-boat people claimed that they had not had a fair show, and it was referred to two gentlemen of the committee, and they worded this provision in the bill so as to meet the criticism that had been made upon the Navy Department before.

Mr. PARSONS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GREGG. I have but five minutes, and the gentleman can talk after I get through. It is not a question of opening up competition by this amendment at all; but the effect of this amendment, if adopted, would be to prevent the construction of any torpedo boats at all. There has sprung a "new Richmond in the field." It is the J. P. Holland Torpedo Boat Company, which does not propose to offer a boat for competition, but only plans for a boat.

The Government tried accepting plans once and got badly left. Since then its policy has been to make anybody that wanted to sell the Government a torpedo boat build a boat and present it to the Government, and the Government would then test the different competing boats and decide which one they wanted. This provision as drawn in the bill is in conformity with that adopted plan.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. Just a moment.

Mr. HILL of Connecticut. Will the gentleman permit a question?

Mr. GREGG. I have said I could not yield, and I can not. I only have five minutes, and it is so late I could not ask an extension of time. If we adopt this amendment it will be a backward step, and if we go to experimenting with plans again we will meet another failure, as we did with our first experiment, which will discourage the buying of such boats, and will, in my judgment, amount to our having no more for some time at least.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. How do you know that?

Mr. GREGG. I judge by our past experience.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. You are making a prediction.

Mr. GREGG. If these people want to build a boat, and come up and present it to the Government and have it compete with other boats, they can do it under the provisions of this bill. It is claimed that they can not build one in six months. Mr. J. P. Holland, in a letter to the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee [Mr. Foss], says that his boat can be built in six months. If they can do so why do they not build their boat and come up and compete with other boats? The fact is that they simply want to build a paper boat instead of an actual boat. They want to sell to the Government their plans—their boat on paper—and have the Government take all the chances on the boat being a success. I want us to buy a boat and not ideas as to how to make a boat.

Mr. PARSONS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last three words. I wish to call the committee's attention to the fact that the proviso providing for a competition of boats states that the competition must take place within six months, and not even six months from the time the appropriation takes effect, but six months from the date of the passage of the act. From the Navy reports it requires eighteen months to build a submarine torpedo boat; consequently this proviso for competition among boats provides only for a competition among boats that are practically already constructed. [Cries of "Vote!"]

Mr. COCKRAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last four words. I would like to ask the chairman of the Naval Committee what objection there can be to accepting the amendment of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD]? What is the objection that swayed and governed the committee in excluding competition by Mr. Holland, who is himself the original inventor of the boat which will be built under the operation of this provision?

Mr. FOSS. I would rather the gentleman would ask the question of the gentleman from New York [Mr. VREELAND], who

had charge of the framing of this provision. I must confess, so far as I am concerned, that I have very little faith in submarine boats, anyway.

Mr. COCKRAN. The million dollars, then, it seems, would go where the gentleman has no faith. It is evident money travels much more swiftly than faith.

Mr. FOSS. The committee, however, saw fit to put it in, and I shall stand by the action of the committee.

Mr. COCKRAN. A million dollars is a very substantial monument to faith, Mr. Chairman. Those of us who do not have that faith now, for lack of information, surely have the right to ask for enlightenment. What is the objection, I want to ask some gentleman on the committee, to giving the Secretary of the Navy discretionary power to avail himself of such improvements and inventions as may be made in this field, which is admittedly novel, by adopting the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD]?

Mr. VREELAND. When the gentleman has concluded his remarks, I will answer.

Mr. COCKRAN. I have no remarks to make. I merely wanted to put a question.

Mr. VREELAND. The gentleman seems to be making remarks.

Mr. COCKRAN. I am merely propounding a question.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. Does not your proviso exclude competition from everybody but two concerns?

Mr. VREELAND. I have not the floor at present. When I am recognized, I will answer the question.

Mr. COCKRAN. I have submitted the question. I have only taken the floor for the purpose of asking information.

Mr. VREELAND. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last five words.

Mr. Chairman, it is true that I helped to frame the provision on submarines that has gone into the bill, but I do not want the House to assume too much on that account. I am not strongly attached to submarines upon their performances to date. There was no desire on the part of the Committee on Naval Affairs to shut out competition. They desired the most open and free competition. My personal wish was to turn the whole subject over to the Secretary of the Navy without reserve, and to turn over to him \$500,000 or \$1,000,000, and leave it absolutely at his discretion as to where it should be spent if he should think best to spend it. We have no facilities for testing submarines in our committee rooms; there are no facilities in this House for testing them. I therefore desired to turn the subject over to the Secretary of the Navy, where it could be treated upon its merits.

Mr. TAWNEY. Will the gentleman from New York permit a question, just for information?

Mr. VREELAND. Yes.

Mr. TAWNEY. What information did the committee have to justify it in fixing the limit of time to six months? That is the thing that is bothering me.

Mr. VREELAND. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. GREGG] has stated the reason why the committee finally put in the provision as to six months' time. We all remember the controversy between the Lake and Holland people a few years ago, when Members of Congress were ready to exclaim: "A plague on both your houses." We remember the recriminations that were thrown out each side, and we remember the dark hints as to what they could tell to the country if they wished. We desired to avoid that. We knew that there were only two submarine establishments at present building boats in this country. Our judgment is that if there is any other firm that wants to build a submarine boat it has ample time to build it before the time limit in this bill expires. But we were not willing, Mr. Chairman, to leave it open until another year, and for the benefit of some man who has no yard in which to build boats, who has simply plans to sell to the Government from which the Government could build a boat and test it at its own risk and its own expense. We have all received this literature from these different interests.

Mr. COCKRAN. I merely wish to ask a question. This amendment of the gentleman from Alabama does not make anything incumbent upon the Secretary of the Navy, as I understand it, but it leaves him free to accept these plans, if, in his judgment, they embody a distinct improvement upon the submarine boats now in existence. Does the gentleman's understanding of the amendment concur with mine?

Mr. VREELAND. I would say, Mr. Chairman, it is not the purpose or intention of the Committee on Naval Affairs to have the Government buy plans. None of these boats that have been bought by the Government at a large expense have been any too satisfactory. We do not want to buy the plans and the imaginations of the inventor as incorporated in the plans, but

we want him to put his own ideas and his own money into that boat and present it to the Government and submit it to such tests as the Government shall see fit to prescribe. Then, if it comes up to those tests, the Secretary of the Navy is authorized to pay out the money of the Government in purchasing it.

Mr. COCKRAN. On that status, if the plan for a boat is vastly superior to any now in existence and the inventor does not happen to have the means to construct that boat himself, the gentleman's policy would be to deny the Government the chance to get the benefit of it?

Mr. VREELAND. I think the gentleman from New York [Mr. COCKRAN] will acknowledge that he never met an inventor in his life who did not have plans for something superior to anything else.

Mr. COCKRAN. That is not my question. Will the country be denied the benefit of the invention even if the Government be convinced of its merit?

Mr. VREELAND. I have stated to the gentleman that we do not desire to have the Government purchase plans even if indorsed by the inventor and by the gentleman from New York.

Mr. COCKRAN. But I speak of the approval of the Navy Department.

Mr. VREELAND. We want those plans to be incorporated in the vessel and that vessel tested according to tests prescribed by the Government, and then we are willing to say that the Government shall pay out a million dollars for it if it comes up to the ideas of the inventor.

Mr. COCKRAN. I will ask the gentleman this question, and see if I am correct in my interpretation of his position: However perfect the invention may be according to the plans, however satisfactory it may be to the Navy Department, the policy of the Naval Committee is to prevent the Department from getting the advantage of that invention, unless the inventor builds a boat himself?

Mr. VREELAND. That is it; unless the man who proposes this submarine were to put up his own money or the money of somebody else whom he can interest—perhaps the gentleman from New York [Mr. COCKRAN]—and test these boats before they are purchased by the Government. That is precisely the opinion of the committee.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VREELAND. I would be glad if the gentleman would permit me to complete another paragraph.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. Just a simple question I desire to ask the gentleman.

Mr. VREELAND. Very well.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. Suppose we bought the plans of the inventors and after accepting them, construction began. Would not the Government have the right to reject the finished work if it did not stand the test, just the same as if the Government did not buy the plans originally?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. VREELAND. I ask five minutes more.

Mr. BOWIE. I object.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GARDNER] is recognized.

Mr. GARDNER of Massachusetts. I desire to offer an amendment, which I wish to have considered pending until this amendment is disposed of.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts will be recognized at the proper time to offer his amendment.

[Mr. GARDNER of New Jersey addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] has an amendment to offer.

Mr. GARDNER of Massachusetts. I offer an amendment which I desire to be pending.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 74, line 17, strike out the word "six" and insert the word "twelve."

Mr. GARDNER of Massachusetts. I offer this with the understanding that it is to be pending.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is entitled to the floor to discuss the amendment.

Mr. FOSS. I desire to move that all debate on the paragraph and amendments thereto end in five minutes.

Mr. SULLIVAN of Massachusetts. Regular order, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GARDNER of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I offer that

amendment, which strikes out the word "six" in the words of the proviso and inserts the word "twelve," for this reason: I have been very much impressed with the statement of the gentleman from Texas to the effect that a competition of a paper plan is not what we want, but a competition of real boats. That, I think, is very forceful, and for that reason I would rather see that these vessels practically should be stricken out and then receive something in construction rather than pencil and paper and submit those boats to a test. But, on the other hand, I am very much impressed by the argument that six months is too short a time to give to Mr. J. P. Holland, or any other inventor, in which to prepare a boat for that sort of competition.

Mr. FOSS. I will say to the gentleman that I am willing to accept the amendment as far as I am concerned.

Mr. GARDNER of Massachusetts. On the statement of the chairman of the committee, who says he is willing to accept the amendment, I will yield the floor.

Mr. FOSS. Now, Mr. Chairman, I move that debate on the pending paragraph and all amendments be closed.

Mr. GARDNER of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the motion.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is not debatable. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Illinois that all debate on the pending paragraph and amendments be closed.

The question was taken; and the motion was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question now is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts.

The question was taken; and the amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question now is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. UNDERWOOD) there were—ayes 84, noes 90.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I ask for tellers.

Tellers were ordered. The Chair appointed as tellers Mr. VREELAND and Mr. UNDERWOOD.

The House again divided; and the tellers reported—ayes 80, noes 92.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. GARDNER of New Jersey. Now, Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 74, strike out all from line 11 to line 18, inclusive, and insert the following:

"For purchase of the even-keel submersible torpedo boat Lake \$275,000 is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated; and, further, the Secretary of the Navy may contract for the purchase of submersible, submarine, or subsurface torpedo boats to an amount not exceeding \$725,000: *Provided*, That the Secretary of the Navy shall, in contracting for the expenditure of this amount, provide for one cruising even-keel submersible torpedo boat to have an actual radius of action of 1,000 miles."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey.

The question was taken; and the amendment was rejected.

The Clerk, proceeding with the reading of the bill, read as follows:

Armor and armament: Toward the armament and armor of domestic manufacture for vessels authorized, \$15,145,000.

Mr. TAWNEY. Mr. Chairman, I now offer the amendment which the gentleman in charge of the bill has agreed to accept.

The Clerk read as follows:

After the word "dollars," in line 25, page 74, insert:

"*Provided*, That no part of this appropriation shall be expended for armor for vessels herein authorized, except upon contract for such armor when awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to the lowest responsible bidder, having in view the best results and most expeditious delivery."

Mr. FOSS. I understand the gentleman only seeks to get open, free, and fair competition?

Mr. TAWNEY. That is all.

Mr. FOSS. I will accept the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota.

The question was taken; and the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. RIXEY. Now, Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment in the very words of the last appropriation bill. That provision directs the Secretary of the Navy to cause a thorough inquiry to be made as to the cost of armor plate and of an armor plant, the report of which shall be made to Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will send his amendment to the desk.

The Clerk read as follows:

Add as an independent section, after line 25, page 74, the words:

"*And provided further*, That the Secretary of the Navy shall cause a thorough inquiry to be made as to the cost of armor plate and of an armor plant, the report of which shall be made to Congress."

Mr. DALZELL. I make a point of order against that that it is new legislation.

Mr. RIXEY. Mr. Chairman, this provision was carried in the bill which was passed about a year ago, and is the present law. When the Secretary of the Navy was before the committee he stated that he had not made the investigation, that his attention had not been called to it.

I suppose it is conceded that there is not time to make the investigation between this and the 1st day of July, and this amendment is for the purpose of giving the Secretary further time. The amendment is drawn in the identical words of the provision carried in the last appropriation bill, and is the law now. I suppose if it was proper a year ago it is proper now, especially as the Secretary of the Navy has not made that report. He has not the time to make it before the 1st of July, and this is to give him the opportunity to do what he was ordered to do a year ago.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is prepared to rule on the point of order. The Chair is of the opinion that the amendment involves new legislation, and the point of order is sustained.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word of the paragraph of the bill last read. It seems to me remarkably strange that the Navy Department has not made investigation into the cost of armor plate and an armor plant, and has not made report to Congress as the law of Congress directed it to do. That law was enacted on the 3d day of March over a year ago. Over fourteen months have elapsed since that law was approved, and yet the Navy Department, one of the executive branches of this Government, has apparently treated this mandate of Congress with contempt, and ignored its provisions.

The price of armor plate is a question that has been vital in every Congress for many years. It has been charged repeatedly, and as I believe truly, that the Government has been held up by these armor-plate companies, and that these companies have charged the Government exorbitant prices. The Rohrer board some years ago reported to Secretary Herbert that the cost was less, as I recollect it, than \$250 a ton. In the Fifty-sixth Congress some of us filed our views in which we discussed this question. For years we paid \$545 per ton. We made a fight against it. Then the price came down about \$100 a ton. Last year the Midvale Company bid \$398 a ton, which was more than \$50 less per ton than the Carnegie and Bethlehem armor-plate factories bid for Class A armor. With that low bid the Midvale Company got the contract for only about one-third of the armor needed—the old companies getting the balance at the higher prices. Congress, after much discussion of that question for years, writes into the statute books a requirement that the Secretary of the Navy make investigation of the cost of armor and an armor plant and report to Congress, but our law is treated, as I have said, with apparent contempt. What excuse has been given for it? What defense can any Member on the other side give for this neglect of the Navy Department? Did we not have a right to make that requirement? Were we not within our constitutional powers when we called upon an Executive Department to make this investigation and to report? Will any dispute our right to do it? Can any deny that we did it according to law? Yet this great body that holds the purse strings of the nation will remain silent at this failure to observe the law. When this law is attempted to be rewritten into the statute the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. DALZELL] raises a point of order against it.

It seems to me the gentleman from Pennsylvania would be glad to again write this into the law and to again call the attention of the Navy Department to this omission on its part. [Applause.] Why should anybody object to again calling for this information? Is there anybody that will say that we do not want it? Is there anybody who will say that this Congress is not entitled to have the information sought? Is there anybody who will say that these great armor-plate companies are above and beyond the right of Congress to investigate? Are they only to be considered? Are the people of this country to have no rights in regard to armor plate? I will be glad, Mr. Chairman, to hear some defense of this Department and to hear some reasons from any advocate on this floor why this requirement should not have been obeyed by the Navy Department. I shall be glad to learn the objections to this plain provision of the law and why it has been ignored. [Applause.]

Mr. BUTLER of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I would like in reply to the gentleman from North Carolina, my colleague upon the committee, to promise here to join him in obtaining an answer from the Department to that resolution, which was appended to this bill last year. I agree with him that the Navy Department should have answered it. The only excuse for failing to answer lies in this statement, that the Secretaries have changed. Mr. Paul Morton was Secretary of the Navy

when this resolution was directed to the Department. Mr. Bonaparte is now the Secretary. The law exists, and the passage of this bill will not repeal the amendment made to the bill last year. I will join with the gentleman in the request that the Navy Department answer that resolution, so that we may have the facts inquired for. [Applause.]

Mr. RIXEY. Mr. Chairman, I desire to know if an amendment to the section last read—armor and armament—is now in order?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state that we have not yet passed that paragraph, and an amendment to it is in order.

Mr. DALZELL. Mr. Chairman, I desire to say one word in response to the gentleman from North Carolina, as to the information sought to be had by reason of the resolution to which he refers. There are on file now a number of reports upon this identical subject, made by the Navy Department in pursuance of resolutions of Congress, and I have in my hand a letter which is addressed to the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations by the Secretary of the Navy, which I will read. It is as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, April 11, 1906.

SIR: Replying to your letter of the 4th instant, in which you refer to the provision in the current naval appropriation act to the effect "that the Secretary of the Navy shall cause a thorough inquiry to be made as to the cost of armor plate and armor plant, the report of which shall be made to Congress," and request to be advised whether any investigation has been made under this direction, and, if so, that a copy of the report be sent you, I have the honor to inform you that no investigation has as yet been undertaken under the above-mentioned direction, in which, as you will observe, Congress fixed no time for the presentation of the report.

Attention is respectfully invited to the exhaustive investigations into these matters which have been made in prior years by Congress and the Navy Department. The results of these investigations are shown in the following public documents: Senate Report No. 1453, Fifty-fourth Congress, second session, February 11, 1897; Senate Document No. 147, Fifty-fifth Congress, first session, June 9, 1897; House Document No. 154, Fifty-fourth Congress, second session, January 5, 1897; statements before the Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, May 19, 1897; Senate Document No. 127, Fifty-fifth Congress, second session, February 8, 1898; House Document No. 95, Fifty-fifth Congress, second session, December 7, 1897.

Attention is further invited to the fact that since the dates of these prior investigations the Midvale Steel Company has entered as a competitor in the field of armor manufacture, and is now supplying armor at a lower price than are other companies.

Very respectfully,

CHARLES J. BONAPARTE,
Secretary.

Hon. J. A. TAWNEY,
Chairman Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives.

In addition to that, I desire to say that we have the cheapest armor in the United States that is furnished to any nation in the world. We have the best armor-plate factories in the United States that exist anywhere in the world, and there is no monopoly. On the contrary, there is very active competition.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania has clearly shown that the Secretary of the Navy treated the request of Congress with just sufficient respect to write a letter to the chairman of some committee referring Congress to some investigations that had taken place away back in 1897. Everybody knows that the cost of making armor plate has changed very much from that time, and that American manufacturers can make it very much cheaper now than they could at that time, and it seems to me that what the gentleman from Pennsylvania has said and what he has read does not at all answer what has been said by the gentleman from North Carolina. It remains true that the Secretary of the Navy has treated a solemn resolution of request passed by this body with more than contempt. He not only has not answered it in the authoritative and official manner in which he should have answered it, but he has treated it cavalierly and as a matter that he could dismiss by writing a letter to the chairman of some committee of this House. It seems to me that the gentleman from Pennsylvania, his colleague [Mr. BUTLER], is right, and that the Secretary of the Navy owes it to the House to answer its request. The gentleman does not contend that there has been any specific reply to this specific resolution. [Applause.]

Mr. RIXEY. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer an amendment to the paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the same.

The Clerk read as follows:

Add after the word "dollars," in line 25, the following: "Provided, That no part of this appropriation shall be used for armor for the battle ships South Carolina and Michigan to cost over \$398 per ton."

Mr. RIXEY. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, all the armor plate which is necessary for ships under contract has been contracted for, and the contracts given to the Bethlehem and Carnegie and Midvale companies. The last contracts agree-

gated about 16,500 tons. On that proposition the Midvale Company bid \$398 and the Bethlehem and Carnegie companies bid identically the same amount, \$445.

Mr. TAWNEY. If the gentleman will permit, he is mistaken about the last contract. The amount was 3,676 tons, and for the next to the last contract the amount was 14,420.

Mr. RIXEY. Perhaps the quantity was divided. I do know this, that there has been no good reason shown why the contract for all was not given to the Midvale Company. Admiral O'Neal, one of the best bureau officers of ordnance that we have ever had, stated that the Midvale Company was prepared to make as good armor plate as either the Carnegie or the Bethlehem companies; but the Navy Department only gave 6,000 tons of the 16,500 tons quantity to the Midvale Company, and gave the balance of the contract, about 10,000 tons, to the Bethlehem and Carnegie companies, at \$55 a ton more.

Mr. TAWNEY. Will the gentleman permit another interruption?

Mr. RIXEY. I will.

Mr. TAWNEY. The amendment which I had the honor to offer a few moments ago, and which was accepted by the gentleman in charge of the bill, I think will correct the evil of which the gentleman from Virginia is complaining, which is of not heretofore accepting the lowest bid when that bid was made by a responsible bidder, willing and capable of complying with the plans and specifications submitted by the Department.

Mr. RIXEY. I was in favor of the amendment which the gentleman from Minnesota offered, but the impression has recently gotten out that the Midvale company is now in the same combination with the Bethlehem and Carnegie companies.

Mr. DALZELL. I deny that.

Mr. RIXEY. I do not assert it as a positive fact, but you admit that the Bethlehem and Carnegie companies have an agreement on prices.

Mr. TAWNEY. I will say to the gentleman from Virginia my information, and I get my information not only from Members of Congress, but from people interested in the subject, is that there is absolutely no combination between those two concerns and there can not be under present conditions.

Mr. RIXEY. If there is no combination it would not take them long possibly to make one. Now, this fact remains: In the last two contracts the Midvale company offered to furnish as good armor plate at \$398 as the Government was buying of the other companies for \$445. If the Midvale company can make as good armor plate and can furnish it for \$398, then we should not pay beyond that for what is needed, and this amendment should be adopted.

Mr. DALZELL. Mr. Chairman, just one word. I entirely agree with the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY] that the United States ought to get its armor plate at the very least possible cost, and there ought to be competition. And that there is a very bitter competition is a conceded fact at this time. It seems to me, with the provision that was put on this paragraph by the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. TAWNEY], that these armor-plate contracts shall not be let except after competition and at the lowest and best bids. It will be very foolish for us, purely as a business matter, to say that the Secretary of the Navy shall not be able to make a contract unless at a certain specified figure. It does not seem to be a particularly good business proposition.

Mr. RIXEY. Does not the gentleman remember that two years ago we paid this Bethlehem company and the Carnegie company \$545 a ton?

Mr. DALZELL. I do.

Mr. RIXEY. We then put a limitation on that. We would not pay over \$445, and this provision is simply in line with the policy that was adopted at that time.

Mr. DALZELL. It seems to me the Government is perfectly protected by the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota, and, as I said, it is not a good business proposition to say that the Secretary of the Navy shall not contract for armor plate unless at a specific sum named by Congress.

Mr. OLMSTED. Is it not a fact that at one time when Congress put a limit on armor plate the Secretary of the Navy was unable to get any?

Mr. DALZELL. That is true.

Mr. TAWNEY. I move to strike out the last two words. I offered the amendment requiring the Department to accept the lowest bid for armor plate, with knowledge of the fact that there is active competition between the manufacturers of armor plate in this country. And, believing that that competition must necessarily and will continue, I am satisfied the Government will get its armor plate at the lowest possible cost if we require the Department to avail itself of this competition and accept the lowest bid. I will state, Mr. Chair-

man, why I believe this. The Bethlehem and Carnegie companies, which now belong to what is known as the "steel trust," use the Krupp process in the manufacture of armor plate. The Midvale people use their own process, which is the only American process. The Krupp process is owned by an international trust, of which the Bethlehem and Carnegie companies are constituent parts.

Mr. BUTLER of Pennsylvania. Only the Carnegie.

Mr. TAWNEY. The Carnegie Company. My purpose in offering that amendment was this: I do not think that the Navy Department has treated the manufacturer of armor plate by the American process with fairness in the past, because, after giving them a contract for 6,000 tons in 1900, when it came to bid on the next contract they were refused the contract, although their bid was very much below the other bidder. Finally, the Secretary of the Navy bet the Midvale Company a thousand tons of armor that it could not complete the contract it then had. That the then Secretary said to the Midvale people, "If you will manufacture and deliver the armor you now have a contract for, you can then have a contract for a thousand tons of armor." The Midvale people accepted this condition. They proceeded with the manufacture of the armor included in their first contract. That armor made by an American company with the only known American process has proved under the most severe tests to be equal, if not superior, to the armor made with the Krupp, or foreign, process, and the Midvale people have won the bet by getting the contract for the insignificant amount of 1,000 tons.

Believing that this company can manufacture an armor equal to any manufactured in the world, and the competition between the manufacturers using these two different processes will continue, I think it is better to have the price of armor plate to be determined by competition which, in my judgment, will result in securing armor plate at a lower cost than if we fix as the limit of cost the lowest amount bid on the last contract.

Mr. FINLEY. Has the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. TAWNEY] any doubt that the Government will be able to obtain armor plate at \$398 a ton?

Mr. TAWNEY. I have. The Midvale Steel Company's last bid was \$398 a ton. It was not known, however, at that time—and I will say in justification of the action of the Department—to a certainty that the Midvale company would be able to produce this armor. They have since that time produced it. It has stood the test and they are fulfilling their contract. There is no reason therefore why their bids in the future should not be considered, and if the lowest, that their bid should not be accepted.

Mr. FINLEY. I think the gentleman misunderstands my question. I asked him if he had any doubt that the Government would be able to obtain armor plate at \$398 a ton?

Mr. TAWNEY. Class A armor plate at \$398 a ton, and Class B armor plate at \$393 a ton.

Mr. FINLEY. Then, if it is a fact that the Government can obtain armor plate, is there any good reason why it should not do so?

Mr. TAWNEY. I think there is. I believe they are capable and will be able to produce armor plate at less than \$398 a ton, and if this limitation is on you will never get it for less than that amount. But if you will continue the provision and leave the matter of price to be determined between these two competitive manufacturers, you will get armor plate at a lower price than \$398 a ton.

Mr. FINLEY. Just there, if that is true, is it not a fact that this limitation will prevent the Government paying more than \$398 to the Bethlehem Steel Works?

Mr. TAWNEY. It would certainly prevent the Government from paying more than \$398 a ton.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to close the debate on this paragraph.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Before that is done, I would like to ask the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Foss] a question. It will not take over a minute or two. I would like to ask the gentleman whether he knows why the Secretary of the Navy did what the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY] has shown that he did, to wit, that notwithstanding the fact that armor plate was priced to him at \$398 a ton, he bought armor plate from others at \$55 a ton more than that? Has any explanation come from the Department about that?

Mr. FOSS. I will say to the gentleman that when those bids were made the Navy Department looked into the capacity of the plant, and at that time they gave to the Midvale Steel Company as much armor as they were capable of making.

Mr. WILLIAMS. In the opinion of the Midvale Company or in the opinion of the Navy Department?

Mr. FOSS. Of the Navy Department. The Navy Department investigated the capacity of this company.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Did the Midvale Company say that that was all they were capable of manufacturing, or did they contend that they could manufacture it all?

Mr. TAWNEY. The capacity of the Midvale Steel Company plant is equal to the demand of the Government, if that company was required to furnish all of the armor plate at the present time, but it was not in 1903.

Mr. FOSS. At that time the Midvale Company had just erected the armor plant and had just gone into the manufacture of armor plate.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I wondered if there was any good excuse or reason for the conduct of the Department. I wanted the country to know the facts.

Mr. FOSS. There was a good reason.

Mr. WILLIAMS. The Midvale Company at that time admitted it could only manufacture a thousand tons?

Mr. FOSS. In the first contract that they got the Secretary of the Navy, as I recall it, advertised for 16,000 tons, and the Midvale Company got 6,000 tons, and the 10,000 tons remaining was divided between the Bethlehem Company and the Carnegie Company. That is as I recall it now. That was done after an investigation into the capacity of the Midvale plant. The Navy Department were willing to give the Midvale Company all they could take and manufacture within the required time.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Did the Midvale Company bid only for 6,000 tons?

Mr. FOSS. I think they bid for more. I am not sure.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I hear the suggestion here that they bid for all of it and offered to give the Department a bond to deliver it. Now, does the gentleman know whether that is true or not? And if it is true, then what reason had the Navy Department for spending any more money for armor plate than was required?

Mr. FOSS. I do not know whether that is true or not, but I do know at the time the Navy Department made a very careful investigation into the capacity of the Midvale Company to carry out their contract, and gave them what they believed they were capable of manufacturing, so as not to delay the construction of our ships.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I will move that the debate on this paragraph and amendments be closed.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois moves that the debate on the pending paragraph and all amendments thereto be now closed.

The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Foss].

The question was taken; and the motion was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia.

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. RIXEY. Division!

Mr. WILLIAMS. I suggest that the committee rise.

Mr. FOSS. I will say to the gentleman that this is practically the last paragraph in the bill; the next is simply the totals.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, all right.

The committee divided; and there were—ayes 58, noes 116.

So the amendment was rejected.

The Clerk resumed and concluded the reading of the bill.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee rise and report the bill, with the amendments, to the House.

The motion was agreed to.

The committee accordingly rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. CRUMPACKER, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the naval appropriation bill and had directed him to report the same back with amendments, with the recommendation that the amendments be agreed to and that the bill as amended do pass.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the bill and amendments to its final passage.

The previous question was ordered.

Mr. ROBERTS. Now, Mr. Speaker, I wish to ask a separate vote on the amendment on page 15 of the bill, and I propose to ask a roll call. I suggest to the chairman of the committee that he move the House adjourn.

Mr. FOSS. I would say to the gentleman from Massachusetts—

The SPEAKER. Is there a separate vote asked for upon any other amendment?

Mr. ROBERTS. None other that I care to ask for.

The SPEAKER. Does any other gentleman desire a separate vote on any other of the amendments? If not, the question will be taken on the other amendments in gross.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Speaker, I ask the attention of the gentleman from Illinois. The understanding was that at this stage of the proceedings a motion was to be made to adjourn.

Mr. FOSS. I am about to make the motion.

Mr. WILLIAMS. The Speaker was about to put the question on the adoption of the other amendments. I suggest that we adjourn now and take the matter up to-morrow.

Mr. FOSS. There is no opposition to these other amendments, I will say to the gentleman from Mississippi. The previous question has been ordered.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I understand that; but the Chair, before I interfered, was just about to put the motion to the House on the other amendments, when I objected.

The SPEAKER. That is correct.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Now, that is what I do not want done this evening.

Mr. FOSS. Is there any objection to these other amendments?

Mr. WILLIAMS. That is what I do not know. That is what I want to find out. [Cries of "Regular order!"] I hope the gentleman will move to adjourn now. That was our understanding. [Cries of "Regular order!"] I move that the House do now adjourn.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I call for a division, Mr. Speaker.

The House divided; and there were—ayes 60, noes 113.

Mr. WILLIAMS. There is no quorum present.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Yeas and nays!

The SPEAKER. It does not require a quorum on a motion to adjourn.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I beg pardon.

Mr. PAYNE. Regular order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. I call for the yeas and nays.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I shall now call for a separate vote on each amendment.

Mr. PAYNE. The demand is too late.

The SPEAKER. We will first dispose of the motion to adjourn.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. I am still trying to ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I call for a vote on the first amendment, and following that on each amendment.

The SPEAKER. A demand for a separate vote, in the opinion of the Chair, is in time upon each amendment.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The SPEAKER. One moment.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. I renew my demand for the yeas and nays.

The SPEAKER. One moment. The Chair is trying to ascertain the facts. The Chair takes the word of the gentleman from North Carolina that he was on his feet demanding the yeas and nays on the motion to adjourn.

Mr. WILLIAMS. The parliamentary situation now. I hope the Speaker will not forget that the demand has been made for a separate vote on each amendment.

The SPEAKER. The fact will dwell in the memory of the Speaker.

Mr. PAYNE. I hope the Speaker will not forget that the demand was made after the motion had been made to adjourn.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I beg the gentleman's pardon.

The SPEAKER. Both gentleman happen to be at this time out of order.

The question was taken on ordering the yeas and nays.

The SPEAKER. A sufficient number—

Mr. BUTLER of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, will it be in order for the House to adjourn?

The SPEAKER. Well, there is nothing in order, the yeas and nays having been ordered under the Constitution; but it would be—

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. I ask unanimous consent that the call of the roll be dispensed with, and that another vote be taken on the motion to adjourn.

Mr. FOSS. If the gentleman will just withdraw his demand for the yeas and nays.

The SPEAKER. The Chair will state the question. The gentleman asks unanimous consent to vacate the order for the yeas and nays, and that a vote may be taken de novo on the motion that the House adjourn.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Reserving the right to object, I would like to ask the gentleman from Illinois in charge of the bill a question. If the unanimous consent is granted which is now asked, will the gentleman himself move to adjourn?

Mr. FOSS. I will.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. FOSS. I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to.

And accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 8 minutes p. m.) the House adjourned.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, the following executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a copy of the journal of the executive council of Porto Rico for the second session of the third legislative assembly—to the Committee on Insular Affairs.

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, with a copy of a letter from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, a protest of Sac and Fox Indians relating to readjustment of certain annuities—to the Committee on Indian Affairs, and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the assistant clerk of the Court of Claims, transmitting a copy of the findings filed by the court in the case of T. B. Norman, administrator of estate of William B. Irwin, against The United States—to the Committee on War Claims, and ordered to be printed.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions of the following titles were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several Calendars therein named, as follows:

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin, from the Committee on Insular Affairs, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 17293) to authorize the leasing of the Batan Island Military Reservation for coal-mining purposes, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 4214); which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 17661) providing that the inhabitants of Porto Rico shall be citizens of the United States, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 4215); which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 18206) to provide for the exemption from taxation of all bonds issued by the government of Porto Rico for the construction of public highways, bridges, and other public improvements, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 4216); which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. CUSHMAN, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 19108) to authorize the construction of a bridge across the Pend d'Oreille River, in Stevens County, Wash., by the Pend d'Oreille Development Company, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 4217); which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin, from the Committee on Insular Affairs, to which was referred the bill of the Senate (S. 5512) defining the qualifications of jurors for service in the United States district court in Porto Rico, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 4218); which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. ALEXANDER, from the Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill of the Senate (S. 5533) to appoint an additional judge for the southern district of New York, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 4221); which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. HEDGE, from the Committee on Coinage, Weights, and Measures, to which was referred the bill of the Senate (S. 6022) to amend section 6 of an act entitled "An act to define and fix the standard of value, to maintain the parity of all forms of money issued or coined by the United States, to refund the public debt, and for other purposes," approved March 14, 1900, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 4222); which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, private bills and resolutions of the following titles were severally reported from committees, de-

livered to the Clerk, and referred to the Committee of the Whole House, as follows:

Mr. GRAHAM, from the Committee on Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 7548) for the relief of Mary V. Shaw, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 4219); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. DAWES, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 3507) to correct the military record of George H. Keating, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 4220); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials of the following titles were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. JENKINS: A bill (H. R. 19371) to authorize the purchase of portraits of certain ex-Chief Justices of the United States Supreme Court—to the Committee on the Library.

By Mr. HINSHAW: A bill (H. R. 19372) to authorize and instruct the Secretary of the Treasury to pay for paving the street in front of lots 12, 13, 14, and 15, in block 51, in the city of York, Nebr.—to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. SMITH of Arizona: A bill (H. R. 19373) permitting the Secretary of the Interior to lease certain mineral lands—to the Committee on the Public Lands.

By Mr. MORRELL: A bill (H. R. 19374) to prohibit shanghaiing in the United States—to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. FOWLER: A bill (H. R. 19375) to increase the efficiency of the classified civil service of the Government, for the retirement of superannuated and disabled employees therein, and to create a retirement fund therefor at the expense of the employees thereof—to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

By Mr. SHERMAN: A bill (H. R. 19376) to confirm the boundary line between the Creek Nation, Indian Territory, and Oklahoma—to the Committee on Indian Affairs.

By Mr. NEEDHAM: A bill (H. R. 19377) to create a United States court of customs appeals and to define and regulate in certain cases the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, and for other purposes—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SHERMAN: A bill (H. R. 19378) to amend section 7 of the act of Congress approved May 27, 1902—to the Committee on Indian Affairs.

By Mr. ANDREWS: A bill (H. R. 19379) providing for the manner of selecting and impaneling juries in the United States courts in the Territories of the United States—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SCOTT: A joint resolution (H. J. Res. 156) providing for the purchase of material and equipment for use in the construction of the Panama Canal—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. MILLER: A joint resolution (H. J. Res. 157) permitting the waiving of the alien immigration law in the case of Anna Margaret Zeigler—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. BOWIE: A resolution (H. Res. 523) asking the Speaker to appoint a committee to investigate the existing tariff schedules—to the Committee on Rules.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ACHESON: A bill (H. R. 19380) granting an increase of pension to Nancy A. Trover—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19381) granting an increase of pension to Samuel R. Caldwell—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. AIKEN: A bill (H. R. 19382) granting a pension to Charles J. Tribble—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19383) granting an increase of pension to Lucy Tucker Catlett—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19384) granting an increase of pension to Susan E. Hernandez—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19385) granting an increase of pension to Agnes E. Calvert—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. ANDREWS: A bill (H. R. 19386) granting an increase of pension to Robert Stewart—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19387) granting an increase of pension to John N. Eneari—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BEALL of Texas: A bill (H. R. 19388) for the relief of the estate of Zachariah Leatherman—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. CHAPMAN: A bill (H. R. 19389) granting an increase of pension to Lewis Marquis—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. DAWSON: A bill (H. R. 19390) granting an increase of pension to William R. Sears—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. DENBY: A bill (H. R. 19391) granting a pension to Margaret A. Murrihy—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. EDWARDS: A bill (H. R. 19392) for the relief of James H. C. Mann—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19393) for the relief of Milton Minor—to the Committee on War Claims.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19394) granting a pension to Ephriam D. Prewitt—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19395) granting a pension to Nimrod Nelson—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19396) granting a pension to Columbus Johnson—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19397) granting an increase of pension to Benjamin Roberts—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19398) granting an increase of pension to Counsel F. Dye—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19399) granting an increase of pension to Charles B. Love—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19400) granting an increase of pension to Washington M. Brown—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19401) granting an increase of pension to Campbell Cowan—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19402) granting an increase of pension to Benjamin J. Bowman—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19403) granting an increase of pension to Serena Johnson—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19404) granting an increase of pension to Elias S. Falkenburg—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19405) granting an increase of pension to John Sadler—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19406) granting an increase of pension to John W. Sexton—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. FASSETT: A bill (H. R. 19407) to correct the military record of James Hoffman—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. FLETCHER: A bill (H. R. 19408) granting an increase of pension to Elisha Brown—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. FOWLER: A bill (H. R. 19409) granting an increase of pension to William Phipps—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GARDNER of Massachusetts: A bill (H. R. 19410) granting a pension to Lydia A. Patnaude—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GARDNER of New Jersey: A bill (H. R. 19411) granting an increase of pension to James L. Estlow—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GARRETT: A bill (H. R. 19412) granting an increase of pension to Jefferson K. Smith—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HARDWICK: A bill (H. R. 19413) granting an increase of pension to Sarah A. Allen—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. HASKINS: A bill (H. R. 19414) for the relief of Frances A. Bliss—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. HOUSTON: A bill (H. R. 19415) granting an increase of pension to Sara Ann Revis—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. KNOWLAND: A bill (H. R. 19416) granting an increase of pension to Antonio Macello—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Mr. LILLEY of Pennsylvania: A bill (H. R. 19417) for the relief of Charles N. Warner—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19418) granting a pension to Eleanor J. Bell—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19419) granting an increase of pension to Walter Reynolds—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19420) granting an increase of pension to Eliza A. McKean—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. MEYER: A bill (H. R. 19421) granting an increase of pension to Ella A. Hodges—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19422) to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to refund certain moneys collected by the United States—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. PATTERSON of South Carolina: A bill (H. R.

19423) for the relief of Bethesda Baptist Church, of Bamberg County, S. C.—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. SMITH of Arizona: A bill (H. R. 19424) granting a pension to Alice I. Simpson—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SMITH of Iowa: A bill (H. R. 19425) granting an increase of pension to Henry C. Tucker—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SPERRY: A bill (H. R. 19426) granting an increase of pension to George N. Griffin—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SPIGHT: A bill (H. R. 19427) for the relief of the heirs of Nancy Baker, deceased, of Senatobia, Miss.—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. STANLEY: A bill (H. R. 19428) for the relief of John Anderson—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. STEPHENS of Texas: A bill (H. R. 19429) providing for the restoration to the rolls of the Klamath Agency, in the State of Oregon, of certain Modoc Indians in the Indian Territory—to the Committee on Indian Affairs.

CHANGE OF REFERENCE.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXII, the Committee on Pensions was discharged from the consideration of the bill (H. R. 10394) granting an increase of pension to John Behymer, and it was referred to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, the following petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By the SPEAKER: Petition of Wadsworth Post, Grand Army of the Republic, Rocky Ford, Colo., against the proposed monument to Captain Wirz, executed for cruelty to prisoners at Andersonville, and calling for legislation prohibiting display of the Confederate flag—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ACHESON: Paper to accompany bill for relief of George W. Trover—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. AIKEN: Paper to accompany bill for relief of Lucy Tucker Catlett—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, paper to accompany bill for relief of Agnes E. Calvert—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. BARCHFELD: Petition of the Leader, of McKees Rocks, and the Signal, of Carnegie, Pa., for an amendment to the post-office regulations to make legal all paper subscriptions—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

Also, petition of the Patriotic Order Sons of America, favoring bill H. R. 18673, favoring restriction of immigration—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. BATES: Petition of Grange No. 1034, of Saegertown, Pa., for the Heyburn pure-food bill—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. BURKE of Pennsylvania: Petition of the Patriotic Order Sons of America, favoring bill H. R. 18673, favoring restriction of immigration—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, petition of Walter M. Booth, of Pittsburg, Pa., against subsection 3 of section 7 of the pure-food bill—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. BUTLER of Pennsylvania: Petition of E. F. Firth, master of Grange No. 1085, and C. P. Barnard, master of Grange No. 1263, for the Heyburn pure-food bill—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. DAWSON: Petition of Germania Kranken Unterstuetzungs Verien, of Davenport, Iowa, for bill (H. R. 18024) for preservation of Niagara Falls—to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors.

By Mr. DUNWELL: Petition of the American Humane Society, against bill H. R. 47, relative to continuous time limit of live stock on cars in transit—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. FULLER: Petition of the Building Contractors' Council of Chicago, against the anti-injunction bill (H. R. 18171)—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GARRETT: Paper to accompany bill for relief of Jefferson K. Smith—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GRAHAM: Petition of Elmer L. Coombs, 1311 Wesley street, Wilkingsburg, Pa., favoring restriction of immigration—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, petition of the Patriotic Order Sons of America, headquarters of the national committee, favoring bill H. R. 18673, favoring restriction of immigration—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, paper to accompany bill for relief of James R. Mullen—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HARDWICK: Paper to accompany bill for relief of Sarah R. Allen—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. HENRY of Connecticut: Petition of the Northeast Hardware Dealers' Association, for a parcels-post system in the United States—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

By Mr. HINSHAW: Petition of citizens of York, Nebr., for an appropriation for laying a sidewalk in front of the Government property and paying for paving in district No. 1 the sum of \$2,500—to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. HOWELL of New Jersey: Petition of H. E. Pickersgill, of Perth Amboy, N. J.—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

By Mr. KNOWLAND: Paper to accompany bill for relief of Antonio Macells—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. LACEY: Petition of 68 citizens of Newton, Iowa, against all liquor selling in Government buildings—to the Committee on Alcoholic Liquor Traffic.

By Mr. LAMB: Petition of citizens of Third Congressional district of Virginia, for Sunday closing of the Jamestown Exposition—to the Committee on Industrial Arts and Expositions.

By Mr. LEGARE: Paper to accompany bill for relief of Susan E. Hernandez—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. LILLEY of Pennsylvania: Paper to accompany bill for relief of H. W. Bardwell—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. LOUD: Petition of citizens of Michigan, against the ship-subsidy bill—to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. MCKINLEY of Illinois: Petition of Decatur Council, No. 219, United Commercial Travelers of America, against passage of bill H. R. 4549, for consolidation of third and fourth class mail matter—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

By Mr. MACON: Paper to accompany bill for relief of estate of E. A. Mays—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. PATTERSON of South Carolina: Paper to accompany bill for relief of Bethesda Baptist Church—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. ROBINSON of Arkansas: Paper to accompany bill for relief of W. D. Barnett—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. SHERMAN: Petition of the wholesale grocers of Oneida County, N. Y., for bill H. R. 18279, relative to 10 per cent on teas and coffee from Canada—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. STEPHENS of Texas: Petition of Childress Lodge, No. 146, International Association of Machinists, for bill H. R. 10069, relative to pay of mechanics of the first class in the Gun Factory of Washington Navy-Yard—to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

By Mr. SULZER: Petition of the national committee of the Patriotic Order Sons of America, favoring bill H. R. 18673, favoring restriction of immigration—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, petition of General William F. Barry Garrison, Regular Army and Navy Union, No. 30, against House joint resolution 31, relative to changing the name "Regular Army and Navy Union of the United States" to "Army and Navy Union, United States of America"—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of the American Federation of Labor, favoring full representation of the Federal Government at the Jamestown Exposition—to the Select Committee on Industrial Arts and Expositions.

Also, petition of the National Business League, of Chicago, Ill., for the merit system in appointments to the consular service—to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of William J. Mallory, for the Calder bill, relative to compensation of employees in navy-yards who have lost arms or legs by accident through no fault of their own—to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

By Mr. THOMAS of Ohio: Petition of the United Presbyterian Church and the Presbyterian Church of Northfield, Ohio, for an amendment to the Constitution abolishing polygamy—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. TYNDALL: Paper to accompany bill for relief of F. V. Le Sieur—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. VAN WINKLE: Petition of Prosperity Council, No. 250, Junior Order United American Mechanics, of West Hoboken, N. J., favoring restriction of immigration—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. WEBB: Paper to accompany bill for relief of James Waldrup—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, paper to accompany bill for relief of Nancy Baker—to the Committee on War Claims.