

## EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

YAF SPONSORS SEMINAR ON THE  
VOLUNTEER ARMY

HON. PHILIP M. CRANE

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 18, 1970

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, on August 12, 1970, Young Americans for Freedom conducted a symposium on the voluntary military for a group of Congressmen. The symposium featured such outstanding speakers as Dr. Milton Friedman, Dean William Meckling, the Honorable BARRY GOLDWATER, the Honorable MARK HATFIELD, and Gen. Thomas Lane.

I would commend the remarks of these distinguished men to my colleagues and all interested Americans.

The articles follow:

SPEECH BY DR. MILTON FRIEDMAN

I have been connected with a great many controversial issues for quite a long time and the issue of the voluntary military has one characteristic that I have never observed in any other interest issue: that is, I have yet to see anybody who went carefully into the subject of the voluntary military, whatever his initial position, who has not increased his support for it. I have yet to see a single person who undertook to examine the evidence who moved, for example, from support for a voluntary military to support for the draft, not a single person. I have observed many people of various backgrounds and interests move the other way, and I think that speaks something for the evidence. I was particularly impressed with this in the connection with our Commission, the Gates Commission, of which I was honored to be a member. That Commission had people on it from a very wide range of backgrounds—some military people, some business people, academic people, and others. I would say at the outset when we met at our first meeting probably there was about a 50/50 split between pro-volunteer military and anti-volunteer military. By the time we completed our deliberations and after extensive examination of the evidence we had a completely unanimous report. There was not a single person on the other side. This was not an isolated experiment; I saw exactly the same thing happen at Draft Conference held in Chicago four or five years ago. I have seen it happen over and over again. The one thing I would really urge on anybody interested in this subject is to look at the facts, look at the evidence, because on the basis of my past experience, there is only one way you can move.

Now let me discuss the particular topic I was assigned, the economics of the volunteer military is to distinguish between the real cost to the country, the real economic cost of different methods of manning the armed forces in different ways on the one hand, and the budgetary impact of manning the army and armed forces in different ways on the other. To look at the real cost of the country, you want, for a moment, to pull away the veil of money which tends to conceal to some extent what's really going on. What are the real factors? It is the number of people who are involved in various activities, what they do with their time and with their efforts, and the amount of resources used trying to reach a certain degree of military effectiveness—and people can differ widely about that—but whatever degree of military effectiveness being sought, whatever degree of preparedness, the question

arises: what is the most efficient way to reach preparedness from the point of view of the economic resources it absorbs.

Now one of the oldest findings from history is that slave labor is inefficient labor: forced labor is not efficient labor. You get far better service, far better and more efficient use of resources if people are voluntarily engaging in an activity. And that is no different for the military than it is for anything else.

In the first place, in order to man an armed force of a given size with a mixed force of conscripts and volunteers a larger total number of people is needed. Why? A man drafted for two years spends the first six months or so in training. The last three months of his service he is being processed for discharge. You are lucky if you get one year of service out of the man for two years that he is in the armed services. In addition there must be people on hand to train him, to move him about from one place to another, to process those papers for discharge and the like. The result is that, of a given total number of people in the armed forces, the number of people in an effective position is decidedly smaller in a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts than in a force of all volunteers. Now this shows up dramatically in the kind of figures the Gates Report produced and that Bill Meckling will talk about later.

To maintain a middle range mixed force of volunteers and conscripts, each year about 440,000 young men must be recruited for the enlisted forces leaving aside the officers corps. Under a completely volunteer army the number of people needed is 325,000. So each year there is an additional 115,000 people or so who have to be put through the mill of going into the service and coming out of the service. So clearly, just from the point of view of the military operation itself, a conscript force involves the use of more men more man-hours and thus waste resources for the same military effectiveness. But that is only part of the story. In addition to the waste of people in the excessive turnover in the military itself, there is the waste of people in the civilian side because of the activities young men and other people engage in as a result of the draft. As we said in our report there are not only draft-induced volunteers in the armed forces, there are draft-induced ministers, there are draft-induced graduate students, there are draft-induced deportees. Young men all over understandably, because of the existence of the draft, engage in activities they would not otherwise engage in. Employers are hesitant to recruit people for particular jobs because they may be subject to the draft and employers lose them. Consequently, you have inefficient use of the young men. You have the disturbance and the cost imposed on the college campuses. I think there is little doubt that a major source of the disruption on the campuses has been the draft. It has brought to colleges and universities hundreds of thousands of young men who would not otherwise be there. Their major interest has not been in education as a result they have denied places on the campuses to others who would have a stronger interest in education, and they have changed the character and the tone of the discussion. And moreover, because they felt guilty about being there while their friends were escaping they have tended to retreat to an irrational approach to great important issues. The issues of what our foreign policy should be is an extremely important issue, but it ought not to be considered in the kind of irrational, emotional tones that have dominated campus discussion, and I am sure a large part of that is indirectly a reflection of the existence of the draft.

So in terms of the real cost of the society,

a volunteer military is a more efficient way of providing a given degree of effectiveness. It requires fewer people in the armed forces on the one hand, and it does less disturbance and harm to the rest of the society on the other. Now we turn from the real cost side to the budgetary cost. If you look at the problem of achieving a voluntary army, there is only one simple problem and that is, we are currently underpaying drastically people who are in the first term of service. A young man who is drafted in his first term of service receives on the average something like 60% of the income which he can earn in civilian life. I think it is an enormous tribute to the patriotism of our young people that so many people already volunteer under those circumstances no one is going to volunteer and enter the armed services for pay alone. But it certainly is true that bad pay can discourage a man from entering that might not otherwise enter. That is the fundamental problem.

The fundamental function of the draft is not to get men for the armed forces, make no mistake about that. The reason we have conscription is to reduce the tax load on tax payers in general, and instead impose a tax on the young people who serve. And nobody will put it that way. But if you look at it objectively, that is the essence of the situation. A young man who would be willing to serve in the armed forces for \$5,000 a year who receives in the armed forces \$2500 a year is paying a tax of \$2500. However, it is a tax in kind. Its a kind of forced levy that we thought went out with the Middle Ages, the elimination of which was one of the great steps forward in the freedom of human beings from bondage. But that is what it is: a forced levy, forced service on people. A tax in kind. Our books are not kept well, our governmental books do not show as a receipt the tax in kind from the people who are serving compulsorily. Our governmental books do not show as an expenditure the true cost of manning the forces. If we were to adopt this procedure in general, we could reduce the book expenditures of the federal government very drastically.

If you simply drafted all people who are used in government construction or all of the civil servants who fill the buildings in Washington—if you required each and every one of them to serve at half his present pay, under penalty of being sentenced to jail if he didn't, recorded government expenditures would go down drastically. But I think no one would say that was a real saving. Well, that is the situation. Under present circumstances we are financing the armed forces in considerable part by a tax in kind on the young men who are required to serve and on those people who are induced to volunteer in order to avoid the draft. The essence of a shift to a volunteer armed force is a substitution of tax for a tax in kind. It does not, in fact, involve an increase in total government expenditures properly measured. It involves a reduction in total government expenditures properly measured. It involves a reduction in total government expenditures properly measured. But it does involve shifting from a tax in kind, shifting from requiring services through a forced levy, to a buying it on the market. And as a result, the recorded bookkeeping expenditures of the government will run higher. The estimates we made in the Gates Commission Report, and that Bill Meckling will perhaps develop further if anyone is interested were that the actual budgetary expense of shifting to a voluntary army force would be roughly of the order of something like 2½ billion dollars a year for a stable force mid range force of the side that is considered. And I may say, that that force is roughly that kind of force that is being contemplated, now that we are moving out of the Vietnam situation.

Now I have no doubt that from an immediate governmental point of view—from the point of view offered in the government—the need to spend 2½ billion dollars more. Out of pocket expenses that do have to be raised in cash taxes raises a problem, a political problem. You know there is the saying "an old tax is a good tax" in the sense that people get accustomed to it and any new tax is difficult tax. But it so happens that I think this political difficulty in the present instance a mixed one and much less serious in general and that is because the draft tax is so unpopular. It is hard to think of any other tax that we have that is not labeled a tax and has produced such a degree of taxpayer resistance. Maybe there are other taxes that are evaded to a greater extent. It is very hard to believe that there are.

It is hard to think of any other tax that costs so much to collect. In our report of the Gates Commission Report we made an estimate of the cost imposed on the rest of the community in order to get the dollar services collected in the tax in kind, it costs the country a dollar and a half to collect it. That is, a dollar and a half represented a rough estimate of the cost imposed on other people to evade the tax—the cost imposed on the people who went into one exempt occupation or activity or other for the purpose of evading the tax. So, in this case I think you have a situation where simultaneously a very bad tax can be repealed; in effect 2½ billion dollars more must be collected in dollar taxes in order to finance the budgetary outlay for this purpose. What you have is a shift of tax burden from the backs of the young men to the public at large.

Now, one other, most governmental expenditures that you consider are exhaustive expenditures; they involve using additional resources. If, for example, there is an extra \$500 million voted to subsidize the SST, that will involve hiring engineers, using materials, in other ways reducing a volume of real resources available for other purposes. That is not true in this case. If in fact the Congress votes to have a volunteer military and this involves an additional dollar expenditures of 2½ billion dollars a year, that will be accompanied by a reduction in the amount of resources, manpower, and etc. that you absorb from the civilian economy. Because it is a rearrangement of the tax burden and not a net addition, this case, unlike the SST, will make more men available to the civilian economy, more material available because this will produce far more efficient use of the military. I have tried to stick so far as I could to the economics of it. I hope it will stimulate you to ask questions because it is much better to answer. Let me only close by saying that I think the basic issue involved in the voluntary army goes much beyond the economics of it, and I would not myself, although I am a professional economist I would not myself be so concerned with the issue if all involved were the economic resources. What is fundamentally involved is the fundamental principles and beliefs of this country and of this nation. We are free people. Then we should individually, as free people have control of our lives. It is fundamentally incompatible that a society of free men to have a system under which people are compelled to render specific services at penalty of incarceration and of imprisonment than it is perfectly feasibly, perfectly possible to hire those services on the open market to get voluntary arrangements that will serve that purpose. Thank you.

SPEECH BY DEAN WILLIAM MECKLING, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH FOR THE GATES COMMISSION

Milton has suggested that I might correct David in regard to that last statement about my influence on the Commission report, and make it clear it was the facts that were responsible and not me that was responsible

for the outcome. I had an interesting experience which I thought I would relate to you on the way down this morning on the plane that I think merits some attention. I was reviewing our Commission report on the way down and one of the stewardesses noticed I was looking at it and asked me what I was doing reading that book and I said I had some effect on what was written in those pages, and I have some interest in that. She was quite interested and said she and the other stewardess the night before had discussed the new Women's rights amendment and had suddenly discovered, or then felt they discovered that perhaps they'd be subject to the draft if the women's rights amendment really was enacted and they were quite concerned. So that I got attention all the way down from Rochester from the stewardesses this morning in an unusual way on an unusual subject. Now that is the first case that in the time we spent working with the Commission that I found young women really vitally interested in the draft issue in a direct sense, that is, they thought they might be affected by this.

I'd like to start from where Milton left off talking about the real reasons for objections to the use of conscription and it is basically a question of human freedom I think and not a question of economics. But much of the discussion that goes on about the draft involves questions which are essentially questions of fact and much of the Commission staff effort in any rate went into trying to cover as much as we could about the fact with respect to the use of conscription. One of the major objections that occurred then and occurs now really revolves about the feasibility of a voluntary force. Many people say that an all volunteer force is not feasible. In regard that statement convicts the issue because I think it is quite clear to most people if you ask whether at \$50,000 a year for first-term servicemen we couldn't have a volunteer force. Most people, not all I might say, agree that at \$50,000 a year for first-term servicemen we could have a volunteer force, and that the real issue is not of what we are going to have to pay that is the pay levels are going to have to be in order to achieve an all-volunteer force.

That is one of the things that the Commission spent a great deal of time on and a lot of people have raised questions on our estimates there, and those estimates are uncertain it is not possible to make certain estimates about that. I want to go back to that later, but I will say now that we made an honest effort to get the best kind of estimates we could for what it would take in terms of pay level to achieve terms of a transition problem. The feasibility question breaks down when you address it into two parts. One is I think a more extreme form of statement and that is that it is not feasible in the long run. Most people do not hold that position that is to say they will say that the all volunteer force is a good idea and that is what we should have in the long run but we can not have it now so that the issue results itself to one of the transition. And in fact, the staff of the Commission addressed itself not to just the long run problem but to the transition problem as well. I personally believe am convinced that the pay scales we suggested in the report would enable us to have an all-volunteer force. Even in the short run, that is to say, we can safely allow the present draft to expire next year, now that was not the position of the Commission on this was quite clear. The Commission members were concerned about precisely the problem that Mr. Teague mentioned, that is to say, that the President would find himself in a position where the draft would legally be abolished, and he had no alternative in terms of preserving the defense of the Nation. In fact, the steps we recommended were not as effected as we estimated they would be. So, the Commission's recommendations were directed to the question to

the transition period as well as the long run stable situation. The Commission recommended the pay increase to be effected July 1, of this year precisely because they wanted a year of experience before the draft expires. So that the President and the Congress in a sense is not put in a box in the spring of next year where the law is extended and we don't have the information in terms of some experience with the new pay scales and the attempt to improve the conditions of service in the military so that an all volunteer force is possible. Let me get on to some of the data, about the feasibility issue because I think most people when they talk about the feasibility have, I think this is made perhaps most obvious and explicit case what Professor Friedman mentioned earlier, that when people begin to look at the facts on this question they always tend to move in the direction of being more favorably disposed to an all volunteer force.

On the feasibility issue one of the main facts, I think that is ignored generally is not understood is people making total objections about how difficult it would be to have a volunteer force they do not realize how many volunteers are in the military today. There are in the military today 1¼ million people beyond the first term of service, there can be no question that those people are true volunteers. That is, they are there because they chose to be there, they are not there because they are forced to be there by being provided the alternative of that or facing the judge. A million and a quarter people in the military today are volunteers, that was true in 1965, before the present rule. In addition to that, however, there are many volunteers in the first term of service. The number of not all those volunteers are true volunteers, some fraction of those people are induced to volunteer because they can get terms of service if they volunteer which they prefer to being drafted, that is to say, many of them prefer say three years in the Air Force as a technician, to two years in the ground forces in the Army is what is more likely they will find happen to them if they wait to be drafted. So they elect to enlist in order to avoid the draft. Because they have preference in terms of the service. We on two occasions had the military conduct surveys to look at the question of how many of those people volunteer are true volunteers. I might say it is not just those who volunteer it is also the inductees. We have done a survey with the first term servicemen to discover how first-term servicemen would have enlisted in the absence of the draft. In its estimates of the number of true volunteers the Commission used those studies.

There were two ways we could have gone about this. One was on the basis of these surveys; the other was directly from data on enlistment and how enlistments varied as a function of how many people were being drafted. Over time the number of draftees in a given year change. As draft pressure goes up this would have the effect of inducing more volunteers. The numbers we used in our study were the most conservative estimates of true volunteers. That led to a number on the order of 800,000 more true volunteers in the first term of service in 1967 and a similar number really in 1965 before we were involved in Vietnam. So that the Commission's estimates were about 2¼ million or 2 million in terms of the number of true volunteers that exist today and existed in 1965.

When you are talking about armed forces of the size of 2 to 2½ million you are really not talking about many more volunteers than we have now. And the problem there is essentially the problem that Professor Friedman had mentioned; that is we have to get the pay increased enough to encourage additional volunteers in that first-term to fill out this difference and that is not a very large number even if we go to the largest force conceivable, which is 2½ million. In that connection, I should add since the Com-

mission study it has become clearer and clearer that the size of the force that will in fact exist as a permanent peacetime force is likely to be on the smaller side of the estimates we used and not on the larger side. That will make it even easier to achieve the all volunteer force.

Similarly, in the transition period the announcement has already been made that draft calls for the rest of this year will be reduced to 10,000 a month. If that level of draft calls is continued for the next year you are talking about drafting 125,000 in a year. There will be over 2 million who turn 19 next year, so you are talking about drafting 1 in 10 males. The situation also gets worse as time goes on. The number of 19 year olds will be close to 2½ million by 1980. By that time if we continued the draft we will be probably drafting something on the order of one out of 15 or 20 males. So the discriminating form of tax that Milton talked about will become more discriminatory over time as the male population in this age category increases.

Another important fact that I think people are not aware is that a military of a size of 2½ million in 1975 will be the same size of the one and a half million manned force in 1950—relative to the male population of males who are eligible for military service.

I might add one other thing: The number of volunteers that are now in the military, has an important implication for the allegation that Senator Hatfield mentioned about a mercenary force. The fact is that the mixed force we now have is largely mercenary, to mean by mercenary the people are there voluntarily. The present force, especially the officer corps, are virtually entirely mercenary. No one would really claim I think that somehow that is immoral that the majority of our officers and non-commissioned officers are there on a volunteer basis.

I'd be glad to answer any other question you have in respect to the Commissions report. The Commission staff is publishing very shortly—I hope by the middle of August—a thick volume of about 1200 or 1300 pages of backup studies, which led to many of the figures in the Report itself. The papers which were done by various people around the country. The Report will be included that backup study

#### SPEECH BY SENATOR HATFIELD

I'd like to extend to you a word of greeting, as you undertake this conference on the draft. A subject which has been dear to my heart for many years. There is really little that I could add to this as far as the rationale for developing the volunteer military than what already has been offered by the brilliant discourse of Dr. Friedman. I can only indicate that since the years that I filled out hundreds of SS forms 109 for the male students on the University campus where I was serving as dean, I was made much aware of the inequity of the so-called student deferment part of the SS program. The variations that occurred there within the different majors and yet that was not a part of the consideration given to the position that the males found themselves in grade averages whether you were a physics major or a music appreciation major made little difference or whether you came from High School that had great demands upon academic achievement or little demand. And so from those days back in the 50's on through, I have been, as I say deeply involved in the equities that were so apparent in the Selective Service System. In fact, I think the very title itself indicates the discriminatory character of the system. I want to say this morning that there has been very few people who influenced me more than Dr. Friedman's very outstanding participation in this discourse for these many years, because when I came to the Senate in 1967 I introduced the first bill for the repeal of the Selective Service program. And then followed that with another bill in 1969 but

now we have behind us and undergirding our efforts the Gates Commission Report which was unanimous as you know and which will be given in greater detail I suppose as you go throughout the day by the gentlemen present. With this Gates Commission, we introduced a new bill to incorporate the exact language as we could and to translate that Commission Report's recommendation into legislative language. I say it was unanimous and this included not only the civilian members but General Gruenther and General Norstad as well. I think sometimes we find ourselves in this basic argument today or debate with the echelons of politics as sort of the old conundrum we hear so often about the military-industrial complex that it is the military versus the civilian. Well, this of course is a very superficial observation if one makes that because we find that really some of the greatest support for a voluntary military comes from within the military organization, and military leadership.

Navy Magazine talked about personnel turbulence upon occasion which they indicated was the single most important problem they faced as a military organization, because of the high rate of turnover they found was part of their problem. I would say today that the prestige of the military is greatly called into question and I think it is unfairly attacked from many quarters. I decry those who use the military as the scapegoat for many of their differences about political issues or political policies. I think one of the things we can do most significantly of all is to restore the military as the rightful arm of the defense of this nation. And to establish it on a voluntary basis. I think by removing one of the most important of all the targets of attack, mainly the draft, we could do the most to reestablish the rightful prestige the military should have in our country. I reject totally those who fear the military elitism which a so-called professional mercenary army, they like to phrase it, would bring about. I reject that not upon an opinion only but upon the history of this country, upon the Constitution the way this Constitution guarantees our civilian control. Now we have the problem of the ROTC today which I think is often brought into focus, which I feel again is one of the most important parts of our military training program. The same people who fight ROTC are contradicting themselves when they say we want less militarism in this country. While the more we have of civilian involvement in civilian exchange and civilian environment, the greater we will find the military integrated into our total society. I have absolutely no fear, after all, we do have the records of our history of this country to point to as the reasons why we need not fear the military in this country. I think that we have to face up to the reality that the draft will expire in June 1971. We are going to be pushed up against the wall if we do not have any alternative program to present to the Congress and to adopt by the Congress before we face that deadline. If we do nothing in the Congress at this point we will find ourselves in with the only proposition presented to us and that is to extend the draft for another period of time.

So, I say that this is the time, this is the moment when we as a Congress should be undertaking an action which will provide us with other than up against the wall situation of extending the draft for another two years.

I think your conference and the understanding and the knowledge that you will gain from this conference by your distinguished panel members will be very important to our efforts on the Congressional side. Senator Goldwater is the main co-sponsor of my amendment and together we will wage this battle as we have waged battles together on previous occasions and the thing that I think is most interesting about this particular situation is it transcends all political

philosophies, all political labels. We have one common cause here and that is for the basic freedom of this country, that we believe in and for an efficient military organization, which Professor Friedman has indicated already, cannot be efficient or effective under the present system of conscription. I would close my comments to you this morning by merely saying that I am most pleased to be able to be here this morning, to welcome your efforts and to ask for your support. We need your help. We will take this as an amendment procedure, directly to the floor of the Senate and I think when young people have involved themselves within the processes of Government which you have to intelligently and peaceably go about making your voices heard. It will be very effective influencing and creating interest on the part of those in the so-called establishment, and I commend you therefore on establishing the means of communication and of expressing your opinions and moving those opinions into action. I am grateful to have a chance to be here this morning and thank you very much for your invitation.

#### SPEECH BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER

Mr. Chairman and distinguished guests, I'm here today to tell you that the voluntary military proposal will definitely be brought to the Senate in this session. And what's more I think it has an excellent chance of passing. Now it may not stay in the bill as it comes from conference with the House. But the advantage of having one house act on it is that when it comes up again we know the position of the upper house and that helps a lot.

This plan now has fifteen votes that we can count on. We have that many Senators who are sponsors of the bill. We added Senator Proxmire just a little while ago. And I know several more that have the position for it, but they've not taken it publicly.

I want to make it clear that we are serious about this effort. It is not just something that we're trying to do to placate or trick the young people of this country. It is being done because we feel it is in the best traditions of our country. And it's a normal way of life under our system of government. In fact, up to the time of the Civil War there had never been a compulsory system of military service, in the United States. I might add that Napoleon was the rascal who dreamed this all up in the last of his wars. He conscripted everything in France, including horses and women.

The involuntary draft first appeared in this nation in 1863. After that it was dropped and didn't show up again until 1917, when it was used and then, of course, it was dropped after the war. In 1940, the draft came again; it was allowed to expire in 1947. But one year later the Congress passed a draft law and that one is still with us. It stays until the end of June next year, at which time if it is to be renewed, the Congress will have to do it.

I think in the brief history you can see that the fact that the draft has continued since 1946 is contrary to the entire past history of the United States. This practice that has no place in our system of freedom except as a temporary expedient.

Now when the law is used to tell a young man how he shall spend several years of his life, this causes an invasion of the most precious and fundamental of human rights, the right of each citizen to live his own life, or as you young people say today to do your thing. And to do this as you may choose. This is why as a conservative I am so strongly and emotionally committed to the voluntary military approach. Not only do I believe that the draft is wrong, but I also believe it is ignorant to assume that free men have to be forced to fight for their country. I'm just old fashioned enough to believe that there is still a great many Americans among us who think enough of their

freedom that they are willing to fight for it. Furthermore, I think the rest of the Americans are willing to pay those who serve in the military a good and ample wage with fringe benefits for shouldering the task.

I would remind you this morning that this is not a new cause to me. I might say that I came to the conclusion to support this position during the last five years of my military service of 37 years as a reserve officer, during which my assignment was Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel for the Air Force. As I watched the inefficiency of maintaining the draft I became convinced that we had to institute a different system. In acting on this belief I helped to draft the Republican National platform in '64, which pledged to end the draft altogether and as soon as possible. Also, I remember the very first speech of that cliff-hanging campaign I was engaged in in 1964, when I strongly endorsed the Voluntary system.

Since then we have heard a lot of talk about the plan, but all too often its been discussed in only an academic way. Now in 1970 the picture has changed. The opportunity for dismantling the draft is a real one. Now, all of you here I believe have heard of the findings of the Gates Commission—that is the Commission that was organized under the direction of the President to reach some conclusions on this issue. Their conclusion—to put it briefly—is that a Voluntary system will work.

In fact, it is not all that drastic a change in the system that we have right now. The truth is that our current military forces are made up predominantly of Volunteers. This is something that many people don't realize. We have in my state of Arizona for example such a large number of Volunteers that our draft call in many months has practically been non-existent.

According to the Gates Commission the great majority of servicemen are either individuals who have reenlisted after their original obligation had ended, or first-term enlistees who say they would have enlisted even had there been no threat of the draft looming over their heads. The existing base of volunteers is so large that the Gates Commission found, and I quote, "A fully Volunteer Force of 2.5 million men can be achieved by improving pay and conditions in service sufficiently to induce approximately 75,000 additional young men to enlist each year." Now let me repeat, all it would take to put a fully Volunteer Military force into operation is an additional 75,000 volunteers each year. And I feel this can be achieved.

I disagree somewhat with the cost estimates, the cost estimates say here it would cost no more than 3.2 billion in the first few years and would soon drop to 2.1 billion, once a voluntary force began operating on a continuing basis. Really the reason I was originally interested in this proposal was during my annual tours of duty with the Air Force in Personnel in the Pentagon. I was astounded at the amount of money that it cost just the Air Force alone each year to retrain a man for a slot that had been vacated by another man. This training in a four year term can run as high as \$250,000 in the case of enlisted men. In the case of officers it can be double that amount. In fact, you may not know it but in a B-52 first-term pilot we have invested about a million dollars in training. The average enlistee or draftee that goes through let's say training in electronics at Klesler Air Force Base has over \$80,000 invested in him. Now if he dropped out somebody has to fill that slot and the estimate that I came up with, just looking at the figures that I had available was that it would save the Air Force alone about 2 billion dollars a year, if we could have men that we could keep. We have to note that the Commission study doesn't

fudge at arriving at its estimates. Contrary to what some critics have said the Commission took full account of the problem which the army had in staffing itself in competition with the other services. The Commission wisely set its compensation tables at levels high enough to provide the army with the quantity and quality of volunteers required by it. The Commission noted "The evidence is overwhelming that if compensation is set at levels which satisfy army requirements, the other services will be able to attract enough qualified volunteers to meet their respective requirements."

Now another misleading question that you will hear raised by critics is "What happens in case of a national emergency?" Of course, the answer is that the first recourse will be to the ready reserves, including the National Guard. I have to say in a rather critical way that both of these sources of manpower have not been completely used in the Vietnam situation. Some Air National Guard groups have served in Vietnam, and some Reserve Air Lift Forces have helped, but there are literally hundreds of thousands of people who could have been used, who wanted to be used, but were not called up.

In the event of a national emergency of course we can always go back to the draft system. It takes just an act of Congress to set it in motion. But conscription cannot provide emergency forces, it never has, and I see no way, after 37 years of Reserve service that it can. We can have a sufficient existing reserve to meet any National Emergency. Thus it will be the Reserve forces which will provide immediate support to the active forces. Like the active duty forces the reserve forces will be recruited on a Voluntary basis.

The legislation which we have sponsored will automatically increase the drill pay for reserve participation, at the same time that it provides pay increases for the active component. In my view, this increase will be sufficient to encourage reserve enlistments adequate to maintain a voluntary reserve force which is large enough to support a Voluntary active duty force. Furthermore, our proposal takes the common sense approach of providing for a stand-by draft, in the case of an emergency. Conscription could be reinstated by an act of Congress, almost immediately, because our plan provides for the continued registration of all young men in the United States even though the draft itself will be done away with.

In closing I want to repeat that the Voluntary Military Proposal is sensible and morally justified. Next week the members of the Senate will have the opportunity to stand up and be counted on this issue. I believe it will be successful. This is a cause whose time has arrived and for those of you who are staff members of either Senators or Congressmen, I think it would be very helpful if you, after listening to these remarks today, and having studied it, to counsel with them. Not too many people, unfortunately, in the Senate understand the draft or how it works—or even why we have it. While many of them have gone through the experience of being drafted, once they are here they forget about it, and depend on the Armed Services Committee, and unfortunately in the Armed Services Committee we don't have real high excitement about even hearings on this Bill. That is why we are going to try the amendment route and if we fail then we have the recourse to the Committee.

SPEECH OF MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS LANE,  
RETIRED

I, in a sense, have been called off the bench to substitute for General Alfred Gruenther who was a member of the Gates Commission. He was unable to be here for personal

reasons. So I come to you not as a supporter of the Gates Commission, not as a supporter of the Hatfield Amendment, not as a supporter of the YAF position on a Volunteer Army. I'm a retired Army officer, presently occupied as a newspaper columnist, writing on Public Affairs, so I come to give you my own personal views on the Volunteer Army. I do come before you as a supporter of the Volunteer Army. I've had some personal experience with the draft. From 1957 to 1960 I commanded Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, which is one of the big training centers, receiving draftees from the North Central part of our country. More than that, I'm old enough to have served in the volunteer army which we had before World War II. So I've had experience both with the draft and with the volunteer army.

While I was at Fort Leonard Wood I saw the inequities of the draft, which Professor Friedman and others have noted. At that time, the Army Field forces at Fort Monroe were studying personnel problems in the military services, including the draft, and I forwarded the study to the Board of Officers with my recommendation for ending the draft or at least changing it very drastically. At that time, the military had set very high standards for the qualification of men to serve in the military. We were screening out the poorer specimens from the bottom. This gave us good material with which to work. We had intelligent young Americans who could learn what they had to learn in the military service, and this made the training problem much easier and in a sense less expensive. This was a beneficial aspect of the draft which it seemed to me induced into the military services a certain complacency with its continuation.

I also saw the other aspects of the draft. The effect of the draft when you are taking only a small part of the eligible age population is to build up a popular escape mentality. People start figuring out how they can avoid the draft, the ways in which they can escape military service. It seems to me that this ultimately was building a poor mentality among the youth in the country. What we had done was to take a draft system designed for a general mobilization in World War II and to apply it in peacetime when we were taking a very small part of the eligible age population. Therefore the law operated so that the young man who accepted this military obligation and went into service, in a sense, had the penalty of losing two years of his civilian life (if you regard military service as a penalty), and the man who evaded that obligation in some way or other, escaped the draft. So the law operated to reward the people who avoided public obligation and service. In other words, it rewarded what you might say would be a selfishness and avoidance of public service, and it penalized those who accepted these obligations. I thought this had a very bad effect on our whole population, and I thought we should put an end to it. But at that time, as I say, the way the system was working, it was very hard to change it.

Another aspect of the draft, part of the holdover, was that while we were taking a small part of the population, and could get out of those coming of age each year enough to man the military forces, we continued the World War II requirement of eligibility up until the age of twenty-six. I saw young men who simply hadn't been called when they were younger, who then were called to active duty when they had families, when they were established in their work and in their business, and at the least opportune time. I saw no necessity at all for the operation of a draft in that manner in time of peace. These were the factors which, I say, affected the decision, and it seemed to me the military made a very bad decision in continuing the draft in peace

time, I tried to persuade them to change it, but had no effect.

The role of the draft as I see it is to provide an equitable distribution of the goods of war in time of a general mobilization. Without some such mechanism it is very difficult to mobilize a total population in time of general war, to have everybody go to his best slot, to make best use of the people you have. But I see the draft as having no place in our society in time of peace. I see no excuse for it at all.

Now when you talk about a draft you have to talk about force requirements—Dean Meckling has mentioned some of these—the problem of manning military services. The question of whether we need a draft at all is very intimately related to the kind of national policies we have and the way in which we use our military power. I have felt throughout these years since the end of WWII, that there has never been any need for a draft at all, that it is only the bad military policies which we have followed which have required the kind of manpower mobilization which we have actually had. If you take the situation in Vietnam, and Southeast Asia, you have some 20 million North Vietnamese who were lost to the Communists in 1954. You have among the Thais, the Laotians, the Cambodians, and the South Vietnamese 60 million people who want to be free. It seems to me obvious that those 60 million can beat the 20 million if the U.S. will simply support them. The real history of the war in Vietnam is that we have failed to support the people in South Vietnam and Southeast Asia who wanted to be free and have intervened ourselves in mistaken notions about how to preserve peace; we have caused the war in Vietnam. I see no excuse for ever having any commitment of men to Vietnam. If our power had been used properly there would never have been a war in Vietnam. Now a similar situation exists in Europe. The protection of Free Europe has been achieved by the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

There has never been any danger since the end of WWII that Russia would invade and conquer Western Europe, not while our military deterrent was committed to the defense of Western Europe. We lost Czechoslovakia in 1948. Thereafter the countries of Western Europe formed in the Brussels pact, a self defense organization. We then joined up in NATO and committed our power to the defense of Europe. Now the building of NATO forces which followed was in large measure window dressing. It did a lot to introduce dollars, but from the military point of view it was absolutely unnecessary to protect Europe. Our allies in Western Europe already had, under the Brussels Pact, ample military power to protect themselves. With the American deterrent Europe was secure. So I have felt in the intervening years there has never been any need for the 5 divisions which we sent to Europe in 1950. Those decisions were authorized by the Congress to be sent there only temporarily, to be replaced as fast as possible by divisions of four European Allies. By 1958 the need for those divisions even on that basis had lapsed. They could have easily been returned but then we were embroiled with the politics of Europe and no politician in Europe, of course, would like to increase his military appropriations and divert funds from social purposes when he can get the United States to provide the troops instead. And so we have played along with the politicians of Europe and allowed our men to stay in Europe.

Well, what I'm coming to, on this question of force requirements is that when you add it all up there's no need for the manpower we have in Europe and no need for the manpower the United States has in Vietnam, and that if we use our power properly we can

reduce our forces and get well within the limits set by the Gate Commission. The effect of our overcommitment of manpower and the waste of our substance in this kind of war of attrition which we fought in Korea, which we have fought again in Vietnam, is to undermine our confidence and national confidence in the U.S.A. We have the spectacle now of senators saying well you can't win this war there. But how ridiculous it is to say the United States can't win this war. We never had a president who wanted to win the war in Vietnam. They've all said they didn't want to win the war. Of course we can win the war when we have the will to do it. And we have Senators now who are saying that, well, we can't afford to protect the free world. We have to withdraw from our outposts. Of course we can protect the free world. The free world has two thirds of the world's people, it has five sixths of the world's industry, and to say that the free world can't protect itself is utterly ridiculous. But there is a question of how you do it, and we've been doing it the wrong way.

Now if we're going to change and reduce our force requirements as they should be reduced, you then enter upon a question of timing. I say there's no need for this manpower we have in Southeast Asia and in Europe today. It could be brought back, but it takes time to do these things. In Southeast Asia, what we should do is go into Laos and knock the North Vietnamese out of Laos. That will secure the western border of South Vietnam, put an end to the attacks on that country and you'll have peace. In Europe we have to give the countries there whom we have been protecting a chance to build their own military forces to replace our forces which are being withdrawn, and this may take a little time. So there's a question whether we can do all this within the next year, or whether, perhaps, we should delay the time for the establishment of the volunteer army beyond the first of July, perhaps until the first of January, 1972.

About the bill itself, a lot of details have been taken, as Senator Hatfield said, from the Gates Commission. It would seem to me better simply to make in the bill a statement of policy for the volunteer army and put an end to the draft. Then we should call on the Defense Department to propose the amendments to law, which are required to restore the volunteer army. One point about the draft which I think is important is this: we have had a lot of discussion about the division of powers. How far may the president go in the use of the military forces which we have mobilized in time of peace, in defending the interests of this country around the world without committing us to war? There's been great concern about the buildup in Vietnam. It seems to me the draft can be a very useful instrument in this respect. I would think the draft . . . the provision for the stand-by draft should be this: the draft may be invoked by the President only in time of a war declared by Congress. The President, in time of peace should be limited to the volunteer force which he has and can maintain. In time of war, when he needs a greater mobilization, he must go to the Congress for a declaration of war in order to invoke a draft. I think in this regard the draft would be helpful in drawing that line between the presidential authority and the congressional authority.

One other aspect of this that should be considered in a volunteer army is the question of family allowances. As had been pointed out, the problem of getting volunteers for an army is not unrelated to the economic situation in the country. One of the bad aspects of the draft, I think, is that

in continuing the war-time provision whereby everyone taken into service was given family allowances, regardless of his age, we have in these years, tended, I think, to promote child marriages. Young people who felt they were in love while the young fellow was going off into service would get married so the wife would get some income. The British, I think, at the time that I was at Fort Leonard Wood, had a different provision. They had a draft law. They said that anyone who was drafted did not get family allowances until he reached the age of 23. A man was presumed not to be married up to the age 23, and if he got married before that time and was then drafted, he got no family allowances while he was in the British Army. In the volunteer army before WWII we had no family allowances except for what we call the top three grades of the seven enlisted grades. So that a young man had to come into the army and had to work his way up through the lower four grades to the third grade from the top before he could draw family allowance. I think its important that in time of a mobilization under a draft that you have family allowances for everyone who is called a servant. In peacetime armies that is not required. I would think it would be very important not to have any such provision.

What we want in a peacetime army are young men who are looking for adventure and want to go out and see the world and learn a trade, find out what's going on in the world, and who are going to come back and get married after they've had their military service. The only provision for family allowances in a career army should be for those who are committed as career men and are going to spend their lives in the military service. This normally will be those in the upper grades. Well, that's the general picture of the draft from the military viewpoint as I see it. My only counsel at this point would be to do it.

DEEP EAST TEXAS DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, ITS DIRECTOR C. A. "NEAL" PICKETT DEMONSTRATE EFFECTIVE METHOD FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

HON. RALPH YARBOROUGH

OF TEXAS

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, August 18, 1970

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, for regional development to succeed, there must be cooperation and coordination among all the governmental units, communities, and people involved. It takes a man of great organizational skills to keep a regional development program moving forward and to pacify the natural and historic civic rivalries within a region.

The Deep East Texas Development Council, encompassing 13 counties, is a fine example of a regional development council at its best. Much of this credit, of course, goes to all the people of the 13 counties, who realize that their best interests are served by working through and with the development council.

However, much credit, too, must be given to C. A. "Neal" Pickett, the executive director of the Deep East Texas Development Council.

A former mayor of Houston, Mr. Pickett became director of the Deep East Texas Development Council in October 1967.

Mr. President, the East Texas Eye, in its July 23, 1970, issue, paid tribute to Mr. Pickett, traced his varied and outstanding career, and told of his work with the Deep East Texas Development Council. I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "Neal Pickett is Mister Deep East Texas Development Council," written by Calvin Oates, be printed in the Extensions of Remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**"NEAL" PICKETT IS MISTER DEEP EAST TEXAS DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL**

(By Calvin Oates)

C. A. "Neal" Pickett wears the title of Executive Director of the Deep East Texas Development Council as casually as most persons do a pair of old shoes that have long since reached the stage of being the most comfortable pair of shoes they own.

To those who know him, "Neal" is the Deep East Texas Development Council.

One comes away from the first meeting with "Neal" Pickett with the feeling that this young man of boundless energy and a quick, sincere smile must stand over six feet tall. It is necessary to force ones self to realize that he will soon be 68 years of age and that in cowboy boots he'd stand about 5'6".

He not only possesses the energy and stamina of a young man, he has that rare ability to make the person with whom he is speaking, feel that he is the most important person present and that what he is saying or is about to say is the one thing that he (Neal) has been waiting to hear!

To those involved in local government in the 13 county area of the Deep East Texas Development Council, "Neal" Pickett is a constant source of information and assistance in the involved and complex workings of the numerous state and federal programs whereby local government can secure financial assistance in providing for their citizens.

To comprehend the extent to which "Neal" Pickett can and does assist local governmental agencies, one must realize that by State order, after September 30, 1969, it was decreed that any agency of State or local government, or any organization or individual, which plans to apply for assistance to a project under any of the fifty-one programs listed in A-95 (A Budget Circular which covers any type project that a local government could or would use) must notify the regional clearinghouse (D.E.T.D.C.).

It was recognized that the success of any local program would be dependent upon the early contact between applicants for assistance and the governmental agency (state or federal) which has or control the funds.

This is the point where "Neal" Pickett begins to stand out like the evening star in the galaxy of East Texas.

A born organizer (and educated as one also) "Neal" informs each member of the executive council of the impending request, (each county in the council has one or more members on the executive council) the agency to which the request will be channeled, (state or federal) and to any other agency which may have an interest in the project.

He determines the need for the project, the availability of funds and in untold ways shortens the often lengthy process of some rural area having an adequate water supply or some small town an adequate sewage system.

The magnitude of work channeled through "Neal's" office in Diboll is astounding when one realizes that during the first half of 1970 more than 37 projects were worked through that office.

The projects cover the spectrum from a poultry processing plant, roads, recreational facilities, water systems, sewage disposal to air pollution problems.

Most everyone at one time or another has had to deal with the government in preparing forms, etc., so it can be readily understood how high a stack of papers 37 projects would make.

All this has been accomplished with one assistant and one secretary.

You may wonder, how did Texas manage to coax this man away from some fabulous position in the East. Texas didn't, she raised him!

C. A. "Neal" Pickett was born December 22, 1902 in the City of Houston, a city which he later served as Mayor.

He graduated from Brazoria and Beaumont High School; attended the University of Texas and Northwestern University.

He began to put his formal education of organization and government to practical use upon completion of college by serving as a chamber of commerce manager; then manager of the Insurance Exchange of Houston.

He moved to the position of Executive Vice President of the Lumberman's Association of Texas, the oldest and largest trade association in Texas. There he engaged in selling the FHA to the Lumbermen and Bankers of Texas.

In 1941, "Neal" was elected Mayor of the City of Houston.

1943 saw "Neal" join the Military Welfare Department of the American Red Cross and 30 months overseas in England and Belgium.

After the war years he served as Civil Defense Coordinator of Houston, moving to the position of Director of The Federal Housing Administration of the Houston District. A position he filled until he took the reins of the Deep East Texas Development Council in October of 1967.

"Neal" Pickett has received much recognition and many awards during the years he has devoted to public service.

To name a few, he was awarded the Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award for his wartime service. He was honored with The Luther Halsey Gulick Award by the Camp Fire Girls, Inc., the Outstanding Young Man Award of Houston, the International Order of The Lion by Lions International (Neal has been an active Rotarian for 41 years).

He is married to the former Margaret Yarborough and they have three children as well as a number of grandchildren. The Picketts are active in the Methodist Church. Did I just meet "Neal"?

**MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN—  
HOW LONG?**

**HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE**

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 18, 1970

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, a child asks: "Where is daddy?" A mother asks: "How is my son?" A wife asks: "Is my husband alive or dead?"

Communist North Vietnam is sadistically practicing spiritual and mental genocide on over 1,500 American prisoners of war and their families.

How long?

**DOMESTIC PRICE OF SCRAP  
GREATLY AFFECTS THE ECONOMY**

**HON. JAMES G. FULTON**

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 14, 1970

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to place in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the excellent letter sent to me by Allison R. Maxwell, Jr., Chairman, Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. concerning the problem of ferrous scrap exports. With the worldwide demand for ferrous scrap increasing, exports have risen and in consequence, driven up the domestic price of scrap.

As ferrous scrap is necessary in making steel, the inflation resulting from the rising domestic price of scrap greatly affects the economy, and it is the U.S. taxpayer who suffers.

As Mr. Maxwell points out, if the U.S. Department of Commerce would impose general export licensing requirements on ferrous scrap exports, the steadily rising prices on domestic ferrous scrap would stop.

The letter follows:

WHEELING-PITTSBURGH STEEL CORP.,  
August 5, 1970.

HON. JAMES C. FULTON,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR JIM: Because of your constituency, I am appealing for your help and support in a matter of most urgent direct consequence to American steel producers, and therefore, to all those who depend on the process which insures a strong and stable domestic steel supply.

The U.S. Department of Commerce has failed to exercise its legal authority to impose general export licensing requirements on ferrous scrap exports from United States to foreign mills. Because of a growing worldwide shortage of iron units in the face of an expanding global demand for steel, scrap exports from the United States have been displaying a dangerously upward trend line in recent years.

In the five years from 1964 through 1968, U.S. Exports of ferrous scrap ranged from a 5.1-million ton low in 1964 to 1967's high of 7.6-million net tons. Annual average for the three-year (1966-68) period was about 6.7-million net tons. But in 1969, this average jumped to 9.2-million tons, up 40 percent over prior year, and second highest on record. During the last 12-month reporting period—June 1969 through May 1970—total ferrous scrap exports were 10.9-million net tons. Current annual rate is still higher at 12-million net tons. There have been two immediate results of this:

1. American steel producers have had to dig into their scrap reserves to the extent of 1.5-million tons;

2. The scrap deficit has driven scrap prices up sharply, threatening financial well-being of American companies and stability of employment in American mills, as well as contributing to inflation already rampant throughout our economy.

The Iron Age composite index tells the price story. At the end of June, this year, the Pittsburgh-Philadelphia-Chicago price of No. 1 heavy melting scrap was \$41.17 per gross ton. This was an increase of 41 percent over the same period a year earlier. Composite price of No. 2 bundles was \$30.83, up 33 percent over the prior year.

I need not remind you that we cannot make steel without using scrap. In 1969, American steel production by means of the Open Hearth and Bessemer Processes totaled 60,934,000 tons. Scrap makes up from 40 to 60 percent of the Open Hearth materials charge. Basic Oxygen Furnace steel production in 1969 totaled 60,212,000 tons. Scrap makes up 30 percent of the materials charge into the BOF. Electric furnace steel production in 1969 was 19,924,000 tons. Scrap makes up 30 percent of the materials charge into the BOF. Electric furnace steel production in 1969 was 19,924,000 tons. Scrap makes up well over 95 percent of the electric furnace charge.

In all, during 1969, scrap steel consumption by American steel producers totaled 76.7 million tons. To demonstrate the cost effect of scrap price increases during 1969, alone, we need only consider that in 1968, approximate cost of the 3,489,000 tons of No. 2 bundles purchased by steel producers was \$80.9 million; in 1969, 3,707,000 tons of No. 2 bundles were purchased at an approximate cost of \$114.3 million, an increase of some \$33.4 million.

As serious as this added financial pressure is, it is only part of the problem. We are now concerned about maintaining adequate reserves of this vital material.

Currently, we are at that time of year when our domestic scrap supplies should be building. Yet, they are not. We now have dropped to a scrap-inventory position of just 5 million net tons, a 3½-week supply. I leave to your appreciation what effects an unexpected interruption—a transportation strike, or a processors' strike, or an auto strike—could have on this scrap position. I need not remind you that we can't make steel without scrap. So, inadequate scrap supplies jeopardize both the jobs of people who make steel, and steel supplies on which our basic domestic and military positions both depend.

It was to insure adequate scrap supplies that basic criteria were set forth on the Export Administration Act of 1969. Three of these were:

A. to alleviate current shortages of basic raw materials, particularly ferrous scrap;

B. to reduce inflationary pressures on the domestic economy; and

C. to protect jobs of employees in steel plants and foundries.

I feel strongly that the time has come for the Department of Commerce to apply provisions of this act. Specifically, my company shares the industry conviction that Commerce immediately impose controls on export of all grades of iron and steel scrap for a minimum period of one year. These controls should limit monthly exports approximately the 1966-68 annual averages of 6.7-million net tons.

Since the need is so pressing; since the authority wisely has been provided in prior legislation—we feel most justified in asking that you urge Secretary Stans and Chairman Paul W. McCracken, Council of Economic Advisors, to review and without delay act, upon industry recommendations.

I recognize that America's international trade position must always be considered. But at the same time, I feel a 6.7-million net ton level would serve realistic requirements of that position without imposing undue hardship on American companies, their employees and their customers.

Further, I recognize the pressures upon your time, especially at this point in the session, but a solution to this problem is too necessary for me to avoid the risk of imposing on your time. With best personal regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,  
ALLISON R. MAXWELL, Jr.,  
Chairman.

#### TRIBUTE TO VINCE LOMBARDI

#### HON. WILLIAM T. MURPHY

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 13, 1970

Mr. MURPHY of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, it gives me great pleasure to join with my

colleagues in paying tribute to Vincent Lombardi, coach of the Washington Redskins and a great American. Throughout his association with football Mr. Lombardi has displayed the qualities of excellence, courage, discipline, and dedication that are so important not only on the football field but in every aspect of life.

Vince Lombardi first came to public attention as one of the "Seven Blocks of Granite" at Fordham University. He later served as assistant coach to Col. Earl "Red" Blaik at West Point and then as offensive line coach with the New York Giants. In 1958 he left New York to become head coach of the Green Bay Packers and this was where the "Lombardi legend" really began.

Vince Lombardi has become renowned not only for the winning record he compiled as head coach at Green Bay but also for the way in which his players were willing and eager to play their best to win for him. In just one season as head coach of the Washington Redskins, he was able to inspire this same feeling in the players on the Redskin team and give new hope and pride to football fans in Washington. As one who has been a fan of the National Football League since its very early days I know that he is loved and respected by players and fans, no matter where their team loyalties may lie.

Mr. Lombardi is now in the hospital resting after two serious operations. I know that his courage and faith will help him win this battle as they have helped him win so many before.

The thoughts and prayers of both Mrs. Murphy and myself are with him for a fast recovery.

## SENATE—Wednesday, August 19, 1970

The Senate met at 9:30 a.m. and was called to order by the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. METCALF).

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Let us pray this morning in the words of the late Reverend Frederick Brown Harris:

"O merciful God, whose law is truth and whose statutes stand forever, we beseech Thee to grant unto us, who in the morning seek Thy face, the benediction which a sense of Thy presence lends to each new day. Unite our hearts and minds to bear the burdens that are laid upon us.

"In the vast difficulties confronting the makers of peace in these days so full of tension, restore and strengthen and sustain our souls and lead us in the paths of righteousness; for Thy name's sake.

"We seek in Thy presence a saving experience of inner quiet and certainty.

"With clear eyes, may we see Thee as our Father, our fellows near and far as our neighbors, and ourselves as our brothers' keepers. In that vision splendid of divine fatherhood and of human brotherhood, may we dream our dreams, fashion our lives, enact our laws, build

our Nation, and plan our world until this shadowed earth, which is our home, moves in the orbit of Thy redeeming love.

"We ask it in the hallowed name of Him for whose coming kingdom we pray. Amen."

#### THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Tuesday, August 18, 1970, be dispensed with.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Sen-

ator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN) is recognized for not to exceed 30 minutes.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGOVERN. I yield.

#### THE STANDING ORDER ON CALLING OF THE CALENDAR

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, Senators will note that the Daily Digest does not state with regard to the program, in accordance with the standing order of Monday, that the call of the calendar of any unobjected-to bills which have been cleared on both sides would be undertaken on each legislative day prior to the recognition of Senators pursuant to special orders.

I want to explain this as an inadvertence on my part and as being due to force of habit. On yesterday, when I asked for a special order for recognition of the able Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), I failed to recall that the Senate had entered into a standing agreement on Monday under which the call of the calendar of unobjected-to bills would occur immediately after the disposition of the reading of the Journal