Calendar No. 1237, H.R. 17654, to improve the operation of the legislative branch of the Federal Government, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from West Virginia?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the bill.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, as the majority leader stated a little earlier today, it is the intention of the leadership to discuss Senate Joint Resolution 1 throughout Monday next, but if perchance it appears feasible later in the day on Monday to take up some other measure, it will be the Legislative Reorganization Act.

The purpose of laying H.R. 17654 before the Senate today is to be sure to put Senators on notice that it may be considered if the situation on Monday next should develop wherein action on Senate Joint Resolution 1 were completed at a reasonable hour.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL NOON MONDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1970

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon on Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 4 o'clock and 15 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until Monday, October 5, 1970, at 12 o'clock noon.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate October 2, 1970:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Richard J. Borda, of California, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force.

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

George Frank Mansur, Jr., of Texas, to be Deputy Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Willard J. Smith, of Michigan, to be an Assistant Secretary of Transportation.

IN THE COAST GUARD

The nominations beginning Michael J. Schiro to be lieutenant commander and ending Roy E. Henderson to be lieutenant commander, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on Sept. 24, 1970.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

SUBVERSION BY THE NUMBERS BY ORDER OF SECRETARY RESOR

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, October 1, 1970

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, for those Members who do not understand the revolutionary changes and attitudes on our military posts one need only examine the "Guidance on Dissent" regulations issued May 28, 1969, by the Department of the Army by order of the Secretary of the Army, Stanley Resor.

Mr. Resor's "Guidance on Dissent" rationalizes that the question of soldier dissent is linked with the constitutional right of free speech. Further, that "complaining personnel must not be treated as 'enemies of the system'."

Since Mr. Resor's guidance on dissent establishes "the mission of the Army is to execute faithfully, as ordered, policies and programs established in accordance with law by duly elected and appointed Government officials" we may wonder if the new army of dissent was Mr. Resor's idea or if he has proselyted the New Mob's petition for grievances.

Many of us so-called out-of-step Americans who are accused of living in the past, which includes, by the way, most workers and taxpayers, have always understood that the prime mission of the Army was to maintain a well-disciplined force of men to preserve and defend our Constitution and to protect our people from all enemies, both foreign and domestic, from within and without.

Now we learn of an additional accommodation to the dissidents and defectors through an alteration of AR 840–10, paragraph 105, with regard to the display of the U.S. flag on military installations. The headquarters, Fifth U.S. Army letter—ALFGA–SP—dated July 30, 1970, refers to the display of the U.S. flag during "incidents." The order authorizes that during any threatened invasion or activities by antimilitary mobs, the commander or senior officer present may remove the U.S. flag to prevent desecration or violence.

We know who Mr. Resor is, but his mission as Secretary of the Army appears to foster insubordination if not subversion.

Mr. Speaker, I ask that the "Guidance on Dissent" letter and the April 3, 1970 Herald of Freedom follow my remarks.

The items follow:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D.C. 20310

AGAM–P(M) (27 May 69) DCSPER–SARD
28 May, 1969.

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON DISSENT

See distribution

1. In the past few weeks there have been press reports suggesting a growth in dissent among military personnel. Questions have been raised concerning the proper treatment of manifestations of soldier dissent when they occur. The purpose of this letter is to provide general guidance on this matter. Specific dissent problems can, of course, be resolved only on the basis of the particular facts of the situation and in accordance with provisions of applicable Army regulations.

2. It is important to recognize that the question of "soldier dissent" is linked with the Constitutional right of free speech and that the Army's reaction to such dissent will—quite properly—continue to receive much attention in the news media. Any action taken at any level may therefore reflect—either favorably or adversely—on the image and standing of the Army with the American public. Many cases involve difficult legal questions, requiring careful development of the factual situation and application of various constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions (See Appendix A). Consequently, commanders should consult with their Staff Judge Advocates and may in appropriate cases confer with higher authority before initiating any disciplinary or administrative action in response to manifestations of dissent. The maintenance of good order and discipline and the performance of military missions remains, of course, the responsibility of commanders.

3. "Dissent," in the literal sense of disagreement with policies of the government, is a right of every citizen. In our system of government, we do not ask that every citizen or every soldier agree with every policy of the Government. Indeed, the First Amendment to the Constitution requires that one be permitted to believe what he will. Nevertheless, the Government and our citizens are entitled to expect that, regardless of disagreement, every citizen and every soldier will obey the law of the land.

4. The right to express opinions on matters of public and personal concern is secured to soldier and civilian alike by the Constitution and laws of the United States. This right, however, is not absolute for either soldier or civilian. Other functions and interests of the Government and the public, which are also sanctioned and protected by the Constitution, and are also important to a free, democratic and lawful society, may require reasonable limitations on the exercise of the right of expression in certain circumstances. In particular, the interest of the Government and the public in the maintenance of an effective and disciplined Army for the purpose of National defense justifies certain restraints upon the activities of military personnel which need not be imposed on similar activities by civilians.

5. The following general guidelines are provided to cover some of the manifestations of dissent which the Army has encountered.

(a) *Possession and distribution of political materials.*—(1) In the case of publications distributed through official outlets such as Post Exchanges and Post Libraries, a commander is authorized to delay distribution of a specific issue of a publication in accordance with the provisions of para. 5–5 of AR 210–10. Concurrently with the delay, a commander must submit a report to the Department of the Army, ATTN: CINFO. A commander may delay distribution only if he determines that the specific publication presents a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of his troops.

(2) In the case of distribution of publications through other than official outlets, a commander may require that prior approval be obtained for any distribution on post. Distribution without prior approval may be prohibited. A commander's denial of authority to distribute a publication on post is subject to the procedures of para. 5–5, AR 210–10, discussed above.

(3) A commander may not prevent distribution of a publication simply because he does not like its contents. All denials of permission for distribution must be in accordance with the provisions of para. 5–5, AR 210–10. For example, a commander may prohibit distribution of publications which are obscene or otherwise unlawful (e.g., counselling disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty). A commander may also prohibit distribution if the manner of accomplishing the distribu-

tion materially interferes with the accomplishment of a military mission (e.g., interference with training or troop formation). In any event, a commander must have cogent reasons, with supporting evidence, for any denial of distribution privileges. The fact that a publication is critical—even unfairly critical—of government policies or officials is not in itself, a grounds for denial.

(4) Mere possession of a publication may not be prohibited; however, possession of an unauthorized publication coupled with an attempt to distribute in violation of post regulations may constitute an offense. Accordingly, cases involving the possession of several copies of an unauthorized publication or other circumstances indicating an intent to distribute should be investigated.

(b) *Coffee Houses.*—The Army should not use its off-limits power to restrict soldiers in the exercise of their Constitutional rights of freedom of speech and freedom of association by barring attendance at coffee houses, unless it can be shown, for example, that activities taking place in the coffee houses include counselling soldiers to refuse to perform duty or to desert, or otherwise involve illegal acts with a significant adverse effect on soldier health, morale or welfare. In such circumstances, commanders have the authority to place such establishments "off limits" in accordance with the standards and procedures of AR 15–3. As indicated, such action should be taken only on the basis of cogent reasons, supported by evidence.

(c) *"Servicemen's Union".*—Commanders are not authorized to recognize or to bargain with a "servicemen's union." In view of the constitutional right to freedom of association, it is unlikely that mere membership in a "servicemen's union" can constitutionally be prohibited, and current regulations do not prohibit such membership. However, specific actions by individual members of a "servicemen's union" which in themselves constitute offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or Army regulations may be dealt with appropriately. Collective or individual refusals to obey orders are one example of conduct which may constitute an offense under the Uniform Code.

(d) *Publication of "Underground Newspapers".*—Army regulations provide that personal literary efforts may not be pursued during duty hours or accomplished by the use of Army property. However, the publication of "underground newspapers" by soldiers off-post, on their own time, and with their own money and equipment is generally protected under the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Unless such a newspaper contains language, the utterance of which is punishable under Federal law (e.g., 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2387 or the Uniform Code of Military Justice), authors of an "underground newspaper" may not be disciplined for mere publication. Distribution of such newspapers on post is governed by para. 5–5, AR 210–10, discussed in para. 5a above.

(e) *On-Post Demonstrations by Civilians.* A commander may legally bar individuals from entry on a military reservation for any purpose prohibited by law or lawful regulation, and it is a crime for any person who has been removed and barred from a post by order of the commander to re-enter. However, a specific request for a permit to conduct an on-post demonstration in an area to which the public has generally been granted access should not be denied on an arbitrary basis. Such a permit may be denied on a reasonable basis such as a showing that the demonstration may result in a clear interference with or prevention of orderly accomplishment of the mission of the post, or present a clear danger to loyalty, discipline, and morale of the troops.

(f) *On-Post Demonstrations by Soldiers.*—AR 600–20 and 600–21 prohibit all on-post demonstrations by members of the Army. The validity of these provisions is currently being litigated. Commanders will be advised of the results of this litigation.

(g) *Off-Post Demonstrations by Soldiers.*—AR 600–20 and 600–21 prohibit members of the Army from participating in off-post demonstrations when they are in uniform, or on duty, or in a foreign country, or when their activities constitute a breach of law and order, or when violence is likely to result.

(h) *Grievances.*—The right of members to complain and request redress of grievances against actions of their superiors is protected by the Inspector General system (AR 20–1) and Article 138, UCMJ. In addition, a soldier may petition or present any grievance to any member of Congress (10 U.S.C. Sec. 1034). An open door policy for complaints is a basic principle of good leadership, and commanders should personally assure themselves that adequate procedures exist for identifying valid complaints and taking corrective action. Complaining personnel must not be treated as "enemies of the system." Even when complaints are unfounded, the fact that one was made may signal a misunderstanding, or a lack of communication, which should be corrected. In any system as large as the Army, it is inevitable that situations will occur giving rise to valid complaints, and over the years such complaints have helped to make the Army stronger while assuring compliance with proper policies and procedures.

6. It is the policy of the Department of the Army to safeguard the service member's right of expression to the maximum extent possible, and to impose only such minimum restraints as are necessary to enable the Army to perform its mission, in the interest of National defense. The statutes and regulations referred to above (as well as some other provisions of law and regulations) are concerned with these permissible restraints and authorize a commander to impose restrictions on the military member's right of expression and dissent, under certain circumstances. However, in applying any such statutes and regulations in particular situations, it is important to remember that freedom of expression is a fundamental right secured by the Constitution. Furthermore, it is important to remember that the Commander's responsibility is for the good order, loyalty and discipline of all his men. Severe disciplinary action in response to a relatively insignificant manifestation of dissent can have a counter productive effect on other members of the Command, because the reaction appears out of proportion to the threat which the dissent represents. Thus, rather than serving as a deterrent, such disproportionate actions may stimulate further breaches of discipline. On the other hand, no Commander should be indifferent to conduct which, if allowed to proceed unchecked, would destroy the effectiveness of his unit. In the final analysis no regulations or guidelines are an adequate substitute for the calm and prudent judgment of the responsible commander.

7. The mission of the Army is to execute faithfully, as ordered, policies and programs established in accordance with law by duly elected and appointed Government officials. Unquestionably, the vast majority of service members are prepared to do what is required of them to perform that mission, whether or not they agree in every instance with the policies the mission reflects.

By order of the Secretary of the Army.

KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, USA,
The Adjutant General.

(Sent to Commanders in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, U.S. Army, Pacific; Commanding Generals, U.S. Continental Army Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command, U.S. Army Air Defense Command, U.S. Army, Alaska; Commander, U.S. Army Forces Southern Command; copies furnished to Commanding Generals, CONUS Armies, Military District of Washington, U.S. Army.)

(The Herald of Freedom, Box 3, Zarephath, N.J., April 3, 1970)

OFFICIAL SANCTION OF SUBVERSION

In spite of years of conditioning and brainwashing, a majority of Americans, we believe, are still unwilling to surrender their country to the world government which the planners have been developing and expanding behind their United Nations screen. Scientific, economic and technological cooperation has moved ahead quite nicely for the internationalists but politically the world still remains divided. To unite the world politically will require a United Nations police force to coerce those nations and individuals within nations who will refuse to surrender their sovereignty and nationalistic feelings. While the average American does not realize it, our country has been acting under orders from the U.N. for many years. The implementing of "civil rights" legislation was probably in response to a U.N. directive while seemingly brought about by pressure from "below" in the form of the various "civil rights" organizations and their much publicized leaders. Other strange U.S. activities are also undoubtedly as a result of U.N. orders.

World government has been the goal of important and powerful individuals and groups for many years. It would have been further developed had the original instrument through which it was to operate (League of Nations) been joined by the United States. Woodrow Wilson dedicated himself to that project but failed. His mentor, Col. E. Mandel House, was a persistent man, however, and finally saw elected the man who laid the foundation for America's participation in the new edition of the League, the United Nations. House wrote a book outlining his political plans which were carried out by the hero, "Philip Dru, Administrator." It may be a bit far-fetched but we can't help but notice some significance in the name since House had already become interested in F. (Ilip) D. R. (u) and had long been a friend of his mother. Franklin D. Roosevelt may have been selected for his job of leading our country into socialism and world government many years before he was presented to the American public as their saviour after the planned Wall Street "crash" and depression.

While the net of the United Nations has been lying quite loosely over the world for many years and we have begun to think of it as "ineffective," the fact is that not too many more strings have to be pulled to tighten the net. Quiet studies of the number of men needed to subdue South Africa and to disarm and cope with uncooperative persons have not been made simply as an intellectual exercise. Only last year a panel, headed by Dr. Kingman Brewster and including Cyrus R. Vance, Gen. Mathew B. Ridgeway, Charles Yost, J. Irwin Miller, Najeeb Halaby and Joseph Block, suggested a U.N. army and detailed its number and groups of approximately 5,000 men each, of which 3,000 would be active ground forces with 2,000 men in air, naval, logistics and staff support. The large powers would be expected to supply to aircraft, ships and communications facilities. It would seem that our peaceful world republic will be kept "peaceful" only with the use of force. In his introduction to the report of the Brewster panel, Arthur Goldberg stated that the lack of "a more vigorous peacemaking machinery (army) has been one of the main impediments in the peacekeeping process."

Many informed observers believe that it is the mission of President Nixon to allow the net of the United Nations to tighten once

and for all over the United States, without upsetting and arousing the American public, of course. His administration is heavily weighted on the world government side with smooth operators who know enough not to "upset the apple cart." One official whose lack of concern for American interests is becoming a bit too apparent is reportedly on the way out, however. He is Stanley R. Resor, the hold-over Johnson appointee as Secretary of the Army. Although appointed by Johnson, Resor is a Republican but one who supported Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton for the 1964 presidential nomination as opposed to Goldwater. Resor has come under criticism from the House Armed Services Committee for his over-zealous desire to prosecute in the alleged Green Beret and MyLai incidents as well as a 1969 directive which "invited dissent" among the military personnel. When Defense Secretary-designate Melvin Laird announced on January 6, 1969 that Resor had been asked to remain as Secretary of the Army, an article in the Washington Post stated that some Army officials "privately doubted how strong an advocate he was for their pet causes before the civilian hierarchy." His subsequent actions would seem to have made these doubts most legitimate.

Stanley Rogers Resor was born in New York City December 5, 1917, the son of Stanley Burnet Resor and the former Miss Helen Lansdowne. His father was the head of the J. Walter Thompson Advertising Agency and a pioneer in modern market research methods. The elder Resor was a graduate of Yale University as was his son who continued his education at Yale Law School, obtaining his L.L.B. in 1946, after having served in World War II. He left the service January 16, 1946 and, resuming his studies, graduated from Yale Law School in June 1946. He then joined the New York law firm of Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons and Gates, becoming a partner in the firm in 1955.

On April 4, 1942 Resor married Jane Lawler Pillsbury, daughter of John Pillsbury, former board chairman of the Pillsbury Flour Co.; they have seven sons.

On February 1, 1965 Resor resigned from his law firm to become Under Secretary of the Army, an appointee of President Johnson who crossed party lines to nominate the Republican Resor. Shortly after he was sworn in on April 5, 1965, the Secretary of the Army resigned and Resor was selected to replace him. After having been confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 1965, Resor was sworn in as Secretary of the Army on July 6 by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

By coincidence one of Resor's immediate predecessors as Secretary of the Army was Cyrus Vance who had been his roommate at Yale Law School. Vance had been picked by the Adam Yarmolinsky screening group at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration to be General Counsel for the Department of Defense and then hand-picked by McNamara to be Secretary of the Army. Vance went on to assist Averell Harriman at the Paris Peace Talks with the North Vietnamese until a change of administration caused the substitution of Henry Cabot Lodge for Harriman. Vance and Resor are both members of the Council on Foreign Relations as is Resor's brother-in-law, Gabriel Hauge.

Hauge is married to Resor's sister, Helen Lansdowne Resor, and is a top world planner. He met with a secret group at Buxton, England in 1958 which included Dean Acheson and George Ball; during the Eisenhower Administration he was a top assistant to Eisenhower in the White House. Resor's other sister is married to James Laughlin whose interests are also international.

After the Nixon Administration decided to retain Resor as Secretary of the Army his name became much more well known to the general public than during the Johnson era when he had worked quietly behind the scenes and avoided press conferences. About the only thing he had made headlines with in his pre-Nixon days was his announcement that the Army would not take part in the 1969 national rifle matches which had been heavily subsidized by the military since 1903. This was interpreted by observers as a political move to chastise the National Rifle Association, sponsor of the matches, because of its opposition to Administration-sponsored gun control legislation. Being the son of an advertising man, Resor was well aware of the publicity value of such an act.

He is also well aware of the bad publicity now being received by the Armed Forces because of the constant barrage of "massacre," "murder," "dereliction of duty," and other such charges being announced at his press conferences. Although Resor was all for prosecution of the officers involved in the Green Beret elimination of a suspected double agent, the charges had to be dropped because of secrecy surrounding C.I.A. involvement. The incident ruined the careers of the officers involved and called public attention to possible improper actions on the part of the U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam. The Green Beret incident pales, however, before the enormity of the propaganda prospects of the "Songmy Case" or the "Massacre at MyLai 4". Military morale and discipline, already seriously weakened by the peacenik agitators inside and out of the service, will sink to such a dangerously low level that continued fighting in Vietnam by American forces will be rendered almost impossible. This is, of course, what the internationalists, Communists and revolutionaries want. Their activities will be aided by the "massacre" scandal now drawing in high Army officers, as they were by directive of Secretary Resor last May ordering special attention to the "constitutional rights" of dissenters and agitators. The ability of commanding officers to cope with "dissent" problems was seriously hampered by the receipt of the memorandum on Guidance on Dissent (dated 28 May 1969).

With this kind of "guidance" Army officers will be having an upsurge of complainers and dissenters as they have had of "conscientious objectors." In 1969 34 officers asked for discharge as conscientious objectors as did 943 soldiers, while 924 more asked for noncombatant status. There has been a ten-fold increase in such applications in the last five years and the other services show a similar increase. A new procedure has been instituted to handle discharge applications from soldiers who become "conscientious objectors" because the former low rate of acceptance had come under criticism from such organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union. As the number of draft-dodgers, objectors, complainers, dissenters, etc. keeps increasing, the effectiveness of our Armed Services will keep decreasing.

The decision of the top Army echelons to take action against Maj. Gen. Samuel W. Koster, who commanded the American Division in Vietnam at the time of the "Songmy Massacre," as well as a brigadier general, three colonels, two lieutenant colonels, three majors and four captains, was announced at a Pentagon news conference on March 17, 1970. Participating were Army Secretary Resor, Army Chief of Staff, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, and Lieut. Gen. William R. Peers, who headed a panel which investigated the incident. The charges against the officers included dereliction of duty, failure to obey lawful regulations and false swearing. Previously the number of accused had been expanded from the original two (Lt. William Calley, Jr. and Sgt. David Mitchell) to include Capt. Thomas K. Willingham, Capt. Eugene M. Kotouc and Capt. Ernest L. Medina (all charged with murdering two or more "civilians") as well as other sergeants and privates charged with varying acts such as rape, murder, assault, etc. Clearly the "My Lai Hoax" is getting official sanction.

The N.Y. Times of March 22, 1970 contained a long analysis of the situation by Edward F. Sherman, asst. professor of Law at the University of Indiana Law School, who noted that this was "clearly a serious blow to the Army whose image is already tarnished," and stating:

"The Army's decision to take this action, despite the adverse effect it will probably have on the military image and morale, indicates its concern over the enormity of the alleged massacre and the breakdown in proper command reporting procedures. The failure of so many high-ranking officers to investigate and report possibly the most serious atrocity ever committed by American troops strikes at the foundation of the military command system. . . . The decision last week was a hard one to make, for there is little precedent for the prosecution of one's own servicemen for criminal acts against foreign civilians in a combat zone, and the few cases in which countries have undertaken to punish their own servicemen for combat crimes have not been successful in the past."

The professor seemed to have hope that this prosecution of "war crimes" would be more successful and was obviously unhappy that the officers charged only with "dereliction of duty," etc., had not been charged as accessories. He stated:

"Since it appears that some of the 14 officers may have had direct knowledge of the massacre and either intentionally suppressed it or made false statements intended to cover it up, the question arises as to why they have not been charged as accessories after the fact to the murders. Military law gives a broad application to the offense of being an accessory . . . From a legal point of view those who 'wittingly' suppressed information would appear to come dangerously close to being accessories, particularly if the suppression took place shortly after the murders and was aimed at shielding offenders from detection. Filing of accessory charges against high-ranking officers who did not participate in the crime would be an even greater blow to military morale, but if the evidence supports such charges, the decision to charge only these lesser offenses may be viewed as something less than a genuine attempt by the Army to clean its own house."

This guy is really out for blood and the blood of the top officers. He makes it clear that they have no out, at least on the lesser charges: "Although the charges against the 14 officers are connected with the actions of other defendants being tried for murder, conviction of the murder defendants is not necessary for the cases to stand against the 14." This is the type of "brilliant mind" which is at work night and day to undermine the U.S. military as a prerequisite for our withdrawal from Vietnam in defeat and entrance into the world "community of nations" as just another unimportant (as well as immoral and evil) country:

"Breathes there the man, with soul so dead,
Who never to himself hath said,
This is my own, my native land . . .?

Unfortunately today the answer is "yes, there are lots of them." But we must mark them well and see that they go down, "Unwept, unhonour'd, and unsung."

SERIOUS CONDITION IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

HON. BARRY GOLDWATER

OF ARIZONA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Friday, October 2, 1970

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, Mr. Nick Thimmesch, who writes for Newsday, has written a column entitled "The

Military's Troubled Soul," which, in my opinion, describes a very serious situation existing in the military in a very understandable way.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Extensions of Remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE MILITARY'S TROUBLED SOUL

(By Nick Thimmesch)

WASHINGTON.—An Army General assigned to the White House told me that one of the reasons President Nixon visited the Sixth Fleet was to take soundings on the morale of officers and seamen. The President, I was told, wanted to make sure that our men felt a sense of purpose and had good spirit.

Well, every Commander-In-Chief hopes for such feeling in the military, and President Nixon, with his questions about sports and hometowns, makes an earnest, if transient effort to probe morale, and by his visit, tries to improve it. But if the President had the time and opportunity to make a deeper study, he would learn that, at this point in history, the American military has a troubled soul.

The U.S. has the best fed, best clothed, best housed and best equipped military in the world. A long discussion would result from considering whether it is the best trained. But superlatives don't insure quality in the military; morale and esprit d'corps do.

Today, officers and men are scorned by most of the public and taunted by youth. Publicity-seeking politicians whack away at the military as mindlessly as jingoists worship it. Senior officers fearful of the times, retreat to the old concept of military bearing which bespeaks *duty, honor,* country. Younger officers and service academy cadets have increased misgivings about the military, and retention of career people is a serious problem. Discipline among enlisted men is only fair. The A.W.O.L. rate is high. Draftees run to Canada and Sweden. Military bases are assaulted by half-witted protestors, and anti-war coffee houses lure soldiers and sailors.

This is a bad period for the military, and many professionals feel disgust and resentment over the way they have become the fall guys. Now we have Ward Just's brilliant article in the current *Atlantic* to bolster the conclusion.

Just spent many months interviewing an entire range of Army men, from West Point cadets to those hapless soldiers (some with I.Q.'s of 80) who seemed destined to become Vietnam "cannon fodder." He learned that cadets on leave sometimes lie about where they go to school; that there are no heroes or crusades to inspire cadets and young officers and fewer and fewer decide to become career men; that the military is now confronted by the same problems afflicting other young people—drugs, racial conflict, dissent, aimlessness; that once college-boy draftees arrived in Vietnam, battlefield dissent developed, some of it televised for the whole nation to see as though it were some student protest; and that most professionals and cadets as well believe the Vietnam war turned out to be a bad job for the military, largely because civilians ran it. There is a good case to be made that "Nam," as the Vietnam war is called, has not only corrupted West Point and the other service academies, but the whole military as well.

When I was a boy in World War II, Purple Heart veterans came home to respect, compassion, some breaks, and free drinks in the bars. Today the wounded veteran feels a rejection worse sometimes than his physical pain. He is surrounded by anti-war movies, rock music, literature, pictures, and sometimes even by hostile draft-exempted youths.

It wasn't that way eight years ago, when the Kennedys, in their smart, hairy-chested way, hooked onto the dashing General Maxwell Taylor and his notions of anti-guerrilla warfare. That was new and lively and so were the Peace Corps and the space program pushed by JFK and the clean-cut astronauts. So President Kennedy put 18,000 green berets into Vietnam, and the New Frontiersmen thought it marvelous that a new way had been found to deal with Communism that was more imaginative than want the Eisenhower administration and John Foster Dulles had practiced.

One of the best witnesses to the popular wisdom about Vietnam in the early sixties is Daniel Patrick Moynihan, one of the bright young New Frontiersmen who in 1967; said: "The Vietnam war was thought up and is being managed by the men John F. Kennedy brought to Washington to conduct American foreign and defense policy. They are persons of immutable conviction on almost all matters we could consider central to liberal belief . . . men of personal honor and the highest intellectual attainment."

Today, some of those same people major and minor, can be heard at cocktail parties hollering about militarism and a war they didn't fight in, but have many opinions on. Last week, I had one tell me that he couldn't understand why a $70 billion a year Defense Department was so inept that it couldn't put planes into Jordan to rescue Americans there. Had American military intervened in Jordan, the fighting would have spread over the Arab world. But my friend will stomp on the military, no matter what.

The sick feeling in the American military today reflects the sick feeling in the nation. Hard-hats angrily emerge in civilian life, and seasoned officers corps types take the hardline in the military. When the quality of national morale improves, so will the quality of military morale. In actuality, the United States is healthy economically and militarily though both the civilian population and the military feel a case of the blahs.

AIR POLLUTION

HON. JOHN J. RHODES

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 2, 1970

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, the following article appeared in the Phoenix, Ariz., Gazette of August 4, 1970. Since air pollution is such a serious problem to all of us, I felt the suggestion in the article that all of us must share in its solution would be of interest to my colleagues.

The article follows:

"THEY" ACTED—NOBODY CARED

Could it be that the American people have had things done for them for so long that they can no longer act of their own volition?

When a greasy smog settled over Phoenix last year, the cry was heard, "'They' ought to do something about it!" The same outcry for the "theys" to act was heard last week from an obliterated New York and other cities on the eastern seaboard.

One of the "theys" heeded the cry. General Motors Corp. developed a used-car pollution-control kit and made Phoenix the test market, spending $50,000 in our Valley for advertising.

GM says the kit can reduce emissions from older cars by as much as 50 per cent. It sells for $9.95 and requires about an hour of a mechanic's time to install, which brings the total outlay to about $20. It is estimated that there are some 334,000 pre-1968 cars in the Valley, and those are the cars without smog control.

So what happened when "they" acted? Practically nothing. The kits went on sale at GM dealers and in many other places on May 15, and at last count owners of only 528 autos had bought the device. This means that it cost General Motors almost $100 for every one of the kits it sold when all expenses are figured. The Wall Street Journal quotes a GM executive as saying, "It's discouraging."

GM, naturally, has a decision to make: whether to continue to manufacture and promote the sales of the kit—or to forget about it. Most states have no laws concerning emission-control equipment on the pre-1968 cars, so nobody's being forced to buy it. Other auto manufacturers who have announced the manufacture of similar devices face the same decision. The Phoenix test was a flop, and our city is considered to be a prime testing area.

This piece is not a pitch for GM products; just a reminder that when "they" did something to help control smog—almost nobody cared.

MCNAMARA ON DEVELOPMENT

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 2, 1970

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, Robert S. McNamara, President, World Bank Group, in his address to the Board of Governors at Copenhagen on September 21 concluded:

If there were only a 5-percent shift from arms to development we would be within sight of the Pearson target for official development assistance.

Having recently received the President's message on foreign aid and shortly being called upon to consider the fiscal 1971 defense appropriation bill, I commend Mr. McNamara's address to my colleagues:

ADDRESS TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS BY ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, PRESIDENT, WORLD BANK GROUP, COPENHAGEN, DENMARK, SEPTEMBER 21, 1970

The year that has passed since we last met has been a pivotal one. It marked the beginning of the second quarter-century of the Bank's existence, and prefaced the opening of the Second Development Decade. In our meeting twelve months ago I sketched out our plans for maintaining the momentum of the Bank Group's accelerated activity, stressed the need for fashioning a more comprehensive strategy for development, and welcomed the publication of the Pearson Commission Report.

Today, I would like to:

Report to you on the Bank Group's operation in the fiscal year 1970.

Review progress toward meeting the projected goals of our Five-Year Program.

Discuss the responses to the key recommendations of the Pearson Commission.

And comment upon the objectives of development in the Seventies.

I. THE BANK GROUP'S OPERATIONS IN FISCAL YEAR 1970

Let me begin by touching upon our operations during the past fiscal year. For that period, new loans, credits, and investments totalled $2.3 billion. This compares with $1.88 billion in 1969 and $1.0 billion in 1968.

The Bank's cash and liquid security bal-

ances continued to rise and on June 30 of this year totalled $2.1 billion, up $250 million from June 30, 1969 and $700 million from June 30, 1968.

As I indicated to you at our last meeting, we believe that our plans for expanded operations—particularly at a time of uncertainty in the world's capital markets—ought to be backed by a high level of liquidity. This provides greater flexibility in our financing, and enables us to ride out market fluctuations over which we have no control. We propose to continue that policy.

The Bank's administrative expense are, of course, rising as operations expand and as price inflation continues. But despite increases in operating costs, profits in FY 1970 amounted to $213 million: the highest in the Bank's history, and up 25% over 1969. Approximately one-half of the net income is to be retained in the Bank to support future concessionary lending and $100 million is recommended for transfer to the International Development Association.

II. THE FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM

The Bank's Group's performance in 1970 was that of a vigorous and growing organization. But as I stressed last year, I believe the organization should hope its strategy to a longer time frame than year-to-year planning can provide. For that purpose, we have developed a Five-Year Program and in measuring any given year's performance, we should look to the larger framework of that Plan to assess our progress.

One objective is to double the Bank Group's operations in the five-year period 1969–1973, as compared with the period 1964–1968. Should we succeed, it will mean that we will have approved loans, credits, and investments during these five years that aggregate $12 billion for high-priority development projects—projects whose total cost will approximate $30 billion.

We have now completed the first two years of that Five-Year Program, and I can report to you that we are on schedule, and that I remain confident that we can reach our goals, formidable as they are.

They are formidable not merely, or even mainly, because of their quantitative magnitude, but because of their qualitative character. The Bank Group over the past two years has not simply been trying to do "more"—but to do more of what will best contribute to the optimal development of the developing nations.

Over the past 24 months we have made specific and significant shifts in that direction:

We have intensified our efforts in the agricultural sector—to guarantee more food for expanding populations, to promote agricultural exports, and to provide a necessary stimulant to industrial growth. Our agricultural projects in 1969 and 1970 alone totalled half as many as in the entire previous history of the Bank.

We have substantially increased our financing of education projects—projects designated to reduce the drag of functional illiteracy on development. Lending for education in these past two years was more than the total of all prior years put together.

We have broadened our geographical scope considerably so that we could be of service to more developing countries and in particular to more small and very poor countries. In each of the years 1969 and 1970 we lent to a total of 60 countries, 75% more countries in each year than in the average year 1964–1968. Further, in the same two-year period, we have served 14 countries (including such very poor countries as Indonesia, Rwanda, Chad, Dahomey, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Nepal) which had received no loans or credits in the previous five years.

We have begun work in the field of population planning—admittedly more modestly than the urgency of the problem demands—at the specific request of countries such as India, Indonesia, Jamaica, and Tunisia.

We have made a start at broadening the concept of development beyond the simple limits of economic growth. The emerging nations need, and are determined to achieve, greater economic advance. But as I will state more fully later, we believe economic progress remains precarious and sterile without corresponding social improvement. Fully human development demands attention to both. We intend, in the Bank, to give attention to both.

We have initiated a new and expanded program of Country Economic Missions in order better to assist the developing nations in their formulation of overall development strategies, and at the same time to provide a foundation for the donor nations and international agencies to channel their technical and financial assistance in as productive a manner as possible. Practical planning in the development field calls for current and comprehensive socio-economic data. The World Bank Group will gather, correlate, and make available this information to the appropriate authorities. As this program gains momentum we will schedule regular annual reports on the 30 largest of our developing member countries—we recently issued the first in this new series—and biennial or triennial reports on another 60 countries.

III. THE PEARSON COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

I want to turn now to the attention given to the recommendations of the Pearson Commission. As you know, the Commission's work was financed by the Bank, but with the stringent safeguard that it should be completely independent in its investigations, and that its conclusions should represent the candid consensus of the Commissioners themselves, speaking their minds frankly. The Report was addressed not to the Bank itself, but to the world at large, and its purpose was to take a fresh and impartial look at every significant factor in the global development scene.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING SPECIFICALLY TO THE BANK

At our last annual meeting, which coincided with the publication of the Report, I indicated that we in the Bank would undertake a thorough analysis of each of the Commission's recommendations that touched upon our own activities. There were 33 such recommendations. After giving the most careful consideration to these proposals, I have so far submitted to the Executive Directors detailed memoranda on 31 of them for discussion and review. In the great majority of instances, I expressed agreement with the Commission's recommendations.

The Commission, for example, recommended that the policies of the International Finance Corporation should be reoriented to give greater emphasis to the development implications of its investments, and should not simply stress their profitability. I fully agreed with that viewpoint, and, after review by the Executive Directors, the IFC issued in January a new Statement of Policies which reflects the recommended shift in emphasis.

The Commission was concerned, as well, over the danger of the excessive use of export credits—a practice that has led a number of countries to assume external debt of unmanageable proportions. To guard against this hazard the Commission recommended that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Bank develop what it termed "a strong early warning system" which can help developing countries avert sudden debt crises. We agree that there is a role here for the Bank: we are working, therefore, with the OECD to improve the scope and quality of information on external debt and with the International Monetary Fund to identify debt problems and help developing countries work out solutions.

Another recommendation dealt with the issue of establishing new multilateral groupings which could provide for annual reviews of the development performance of recipients and help to assure that external aid is closely linked to their economic objectives. I concur, and with the approval of the governments concerned, we are currently organizing new groups for the Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and the Philippines, and reactivating the groups for Thailand and Nigeria.

The Commission felt that the Bank should participate in discussions of debt-servicing problems, with a view to searching out new solutions to that increasingly complicated question. We agree and have initiated a series of studies of the debt-servicing difficulties facing a number of our member nations. The external public debt of developing countries has increased fivefold since the mid-1950s, and debt-service payments have grown at a rate of 17% annually while foreign exchange receipts from exports have risen only 6% per year. Obviously such trends cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely.

The Commissioners, in another proposal, suggested that international centers should be established within developing countries for essential scientific and technological research that could be practically applied to urgent problems. The case of agriculture is particularly important, since the work on new wheat and rice strains, for use on irrigated land, has dramatically demonstrated what can be achieved. But as encouraging as these discoveries have been, it is clear that a food crisis in the 1980s and 90s is unlikely to be avoided unless additional research is devoted now—in the 70s—to the improvement of rain-fed cultivation of rice and wheat, as well as to other essential food resources such as sorghum, maize, oilseeds, grain legumes, and livestock.

What we require is not simply incremental improvements in agriculture, but whole new technologies adaptable to the conditions of the developing countries. The Bank is seeking to find ways in which it can assist in stimulating and supporting such a program.

Among the very few recommendations of the Commission with which I disagreed, there is one on which I should comment. This was the suggestion that the International Development Association may require reorganization. By implication, the Commission appeared to be saying the Bank would operate as a bank and not as a development agency, and therefore IDA should be set up independently to go its separate way.

Such a conclusion appears to reflect the view that because the Bank obtains its funds by borrowing in the world's capital markets whereas IDA is financed by appropriations from governments, the two will of necessity follow different lending policies. But this is not the case. Subject only to creditworthiness considerations, I believe the two organizations should lend on the basis of identical criteria. The source of the funds to be lent is irrelevant to the economic case for their investment. *What contributes most to the development of the borrowing country should be the decisive factor in both Bank and IDA operations.*

If the Bank were in fact subordinating the development interest of its borrowers to other considerations, the proper solution, in my opinion, would be to change the Bank's policies—not to reorganize IDA. Any policy which can be justified for IDA as consistent with its development function can, I believe, be equally justified for the Bank, and the Bank should adopt it.

There is occasional criticism of both our Bank loans and IDA credits because of the stringent conditions on which they are negotiated. But those very conditions are specifically designed to assist the borrowing

country. Their purpose is to insure that the Bank Group's resources are used for the optimum development of our borrowers. Economic losses and financial waste are, after all, of no benefit to any country's development. Our standards of prudence and performance should be just as strict for IDA credits as they are for Bank loans. Indeed, it is the poorest countries, those who benefit most from IDA, who can least afford losses or waste.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO OTHERS

As I have noted, the Pearson Commission Report was addressed not specifically to the Bank, but to the world at large. And it is clear that three of its most far-reaching recommendations dealt with:

Establishing and meeting a realistic target for the flow of external assistance to the developing countries.

The design of better criteria and the creation of new machinery to measure and assess the performance of both donor and recipient nations in the development field.

And the urgent need to find acceptable and effective measures to reduce excessive rates of population growth in those countries where the promise of a better future is being swept away by a tidal wave of unwanted births.

The first of these recommendations—the formulation and achievement of a realistic target of development assistance—is making encouraging progress. Action by the development community on the other two issues is far from satisfactory.

Let me discuss for a moment the first.

C. THE AID TARGET

Not only is the Pearson Commission's proposal on the matter one of its most important recommendations for the 1970s, but the whole background of the question is worth recalling.

In 1960 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to the effect that "the flow of international assistance and capital should be increased substantially so as to reach as soon as possible approximately 1% of the combined national incomes of the economically advanced countries." The concept was elaborated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, and was endorsed as well by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. At the second meeting of UNCTAD in 1968 the target was reformulated to call for 1% of Gross National Product, and was adopted again by resolution.

As the Pearson Commission points out, the irony is that although the 1% target was in fact exceeded during the five years prior to its formal adoption by the DAC in 1964, it has not been fully met in any year since.

What is perhaps not fully understood by the public is that the target of 1% of GNP has not, in the strict sense, been an aid target at all. In practice, it has described the total flow of financial resources from the richer nations to the poorer nations, and has not distinguished between conventional commercial transactions, and concessional, development-oriented aid as such. Commercial transactions can contribute to the development process. But private capital flows are simply not available on the terms required for many of the priority projects—schools, for example, or roads, or irrigation—which the developing countries need so badly. The Commission concluded, therefore that the flow of official development aid was indispensable. And yet in relation to GNP in the developed world, official development aid fell by a third during the 1960s.

It was for these reasons that the Commission strongly recommended that a separate target be established for official development assistance—a target equivalent to 0.7% of GNP—and urged that this target be reached by approximately the middle of the decade, but in no case later than 1980.

This is a target calling for a very substantial effort. Since the total official development aid of the member governments of DAC amounted in 1969 to 0.36% of their combined GNPs, the Commission was in effect recommending that government aid, in relation to GNP, be doubled in the Seventies.

What has been the response to this recommendation?

To the surprise, perhaps, of the skeptics, it has on the whole been very positive. With but a single exception, no member government of DAC has rejected the target, and several—including Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden—have fully accepted it. Canada and the United Kingdom have agreed in principle on the size of the commitment, but have not set a firm date for its achievement. France is already meeting the target, and both the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan have stated they will move toward it.

Among the first consequences of the decisions of governments to increase their official development aid, and reflecting their concern over the growing burden of debt, was their agreement to support a Third Replenishment of IDA, for the years 1972, 1973, and 1974 at a rate of $800 million per year, as compared to $400 million per year in the previous period.

Though it is true that the United States has noted that it cannot commit itself to specific quantitative aid targets, the U.S. Administration provided strong support to the substantial increase in the replenishment of IDA and has stated it intends to propose expanding the flow of U.S. aid from the present low levels.

In 1949, at the beginning of the Marshall Plan, American economic aid amounted to 2.79% of GNP and 11.5% of its federal budget. In 1970, the AID programs constitute less an 0.3% of GNP, and less than 1% of the budget. The United States now ranks eleventh, among the 16 DAC members, in the proportion of GNP devoted to aid.

No one can question that American domestic problems—particularly in the social and economic fields—require increased attention and financial support. But it is wholly unrealistic to suppose that this can only be achieved by cutting off aid to desperately poor nations abroad. Economists have pointed out that in the next ten years the U.S. will increase its income by 50% and that the GNP in 1979, at constant prices, will be $500 billion greater than in 1969. It would appear that the country is wealthy enough to support a just and reasonable foreign aid program, and at the same time deal effectively with domestic needs. And to me it is inconceivable that the American people will accept for long a situation in which they—forming 6% of the world's population but consuming almost 40% of the world's resources—contribute less than their fair share to the development of the emerging nations.

As I have noted elsewhere, the decision to respond both to the pressure of domestic problems, and the urgency of essential foreign assistance, will in the end be dependent upon the response to a far more basic and searching question—a question that must be faced not in the U.S. alone, but in every wealthy, industrialized country of the world. And that question is this. Which is ultimately more in a nation's interest: to funnel national resources into an endlessly spiraling consumer economy—with its by-products of waste and pollution—or to dedicate a more reasonable share of these same resources to improving the fundamental quality of life both at home and abroad?

Following the end of World War II, the world witnessed a massive transfer of resources from the wealthy nations to both the war-torn and the less-developed countries. This began as an unprecedented act of statesmanship. Over the years, however, this capital flow was increasingly influenced by narrow concepts of national self-interest. Some nations saw it as a weapon in the cold war; others looked upon it mainly as a means to promote their own commercial gain.

Today these narrow views are waning. More and more, the concept of economic assistance is being accepted as a necessary consequence of a new philosophy of international responsibility. It is a philosophy which recognizes that just as within an individual nation the community has a responsibility to assist its less advantaged citizens, so within the world community as a whole the rich nations have a responsibility to assist the less advantaged nations. It is not a sentimental question of philanthropy. It is a straightforward issue of social justice.

A growing number of governments are accepting this conclusion and there are, therefore, solid grounds for concluding that the decade of the Seventies will witness a substantial increase—both in absolute amounts, and in proportion to the GNP—of the critical flow of official development aid from the wealthier nations to the poorer nations.

D. BETTER COORDINATION AND ASSESSMENT OF EFFORT

But as the Commission points out, the global development effort is currently fragmented into an almost bewildering number of overlapping and uncoordinated activities. This leads inevitably to duplication of effort, inefficient planning, and a scattering of scarce resources. What is required is organizational machinery that can effectively and authoritatively monitor and assess the performance of donor and recipient countries alike, reduce the proliferation of unstandardized reporting, and effect more coherent, cooperative and purposeful partnership throughout the entire development community.

This is particularly important if we are to rally the necessary public understanding and support in the industrialized countries for the critical task of global development that lie before us.

The Commission recommended that the President of the World Bank call an international conference on this matter this year. However, within the United Nations system, of which the Bank is a part, these functions are the responsibility of the Economic and Social Council. That body is presently considering proposals for new machinery for review and appraisal of development programs at the national, regional, and international levels. Under the circumstances it would be premature for the Bank to take action at this time. The problem itself, however, remains and we must find ways—and find them soon—to secure a far greater measure of coordinated management of the combined capabilities of the national and international agencies participating in the development process. Such an objective is, in itself, one of the most productive goals we could pursue as the new decade begins.

But if the issues of an official development aid target, and improved management within the development community, are among the most important recommendations of the Pearson Commission for the short-term, the most imperative issue for the long-term is population planning.

E. POPULATION PLANNING

The Commission faced this problem squarely, without hedging its views. "No other phenomenon," it stated flatly, "casts a darker shadow over the prospects for international development than the staggering growth of population. . . . It is clear that there can be no serious social and economic planning unless the ominous implications

of uncontrolled population growth are understood and acted upon."

Are the "ominous implications of uncontrolled population growth" being acted upon effectively? If one is to be candid, the answer would have to be *no*. With the exception of Singapore and Hong Kong, which are special cases, in only two developing countries, Taiwan[1] and Korea, is there clear evidence that the rate of population growth has been significantly reduced by family planning programs.

It is worth asking why.[2]

One prominent authority in the population field has pointed out that the prospects for the success of family planning throughout the world are at one and the same time promising, and dubious: promising if we do what in fact can be done; dubious if in fact we continue as we are.

The task is difficult for many reasons but primarily because of its sheer overwhelming size. Consider the magnitude of the factors involved: there are dozens of countries plagued with the problem—each of them different, each of them possessing their own particular set of social and cultural traditions. There are thousands of clinical facilities to be established; hundreds of thousands of staff workers to be recruited, trained and organized in the administration of the vast national programs; hundreds of millions of families to be informed and served; and well over one billion births to be averted in the developing world alone, if, for example, by the year 2000 the present birth rate of 40 per 1000 population were to be reduced to 20 per 1000. What we must understand is that even if an average family size of two children per couple is achieved, the population will continue to grow for an additional 65 or 70 years and the ultimate stabilized level will be far greater than at the time the two-per-couple rate is achieved.[3]

Thus, even with gigantic efforts, the problem is going to be with us for decades to come. But this fact, rather than being an excuse for delay, is all the more an imperative for action—and for action now. Every day we fail to act makes the task more formidable the following day.

What must we do?

First, we must have a feasible goal. I suggest that goal should be to gain a few decades on what would occur to fertility in the absence of population planning. The achievement of this goal would mean a substantial increase in the quality of life for both the parents and the children of the developing countries—in better health, better education, better nutrition, and in many other ways—as a direct result of populations totalling some 6 billion less than would otherwise be the case.

And what must be done to achieve this goal? Five ingredients are needed:

1. The political will to support the effort.

2. The required understanding and the willingness to act on the part of the people.

3. The availability of effective, acceptable birth control methods.

4. An efficient organization to administer the program.

5. Demographic data and analyses to evaluate results and point to program weaknesses requiring correction.

Where do we stand on each of these?

To begin with, there has recently been a dramatic increase in political support for population planning. The latest example is the Philippines, a country with a severe population problem, but a country in which it has been understandably difficult to take the open, public decisions that are required. President Marcos faced the delicate issue frankly in his State of the Nation message to his Congress a few months ago:

"With a soaring birth rate, the prospects for a continued economic development are considerably diminished. Indeed, there is a strong possibility that the gains which we have carefully built up over the years may be cancelled by a continuing population explosion. . . . After a careful weighing of factors, I have decided to propose legislation making family planning an official policy of my Administration."

His Minister of Foreign Affairs put the matter with equal candor:

"The control of population is essentially an economic, cultural, and political problem. One of the most hopeful means of bringing the birth rate down to near replacement level is the Department of Education's plan to introduce this entire subject into the curricula of schools and colleges. . . . Underlying this approach is a clear recognition that education has the twofold obligation to reinforce, and where necessary, to help change public mores. Educational institutions, from the elementary to the postgraduate years, can perform no more useful service in the seventies than to illuminate the principles of human survival and to dedicate themselves to preserving and enhancing the quality and diversity of life."

In 1960 only three countries had population planning policies, only one government was actually offering assistance, and no international development agency was working in the field of family planning.

In 1970 (as indicated in the attached table) 22 countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—countries representing 70% of the population of those continents—have official population programs. More than a dozen other countries, representing a further 10% of the population, provides some assistance to family planning, though they as yet have no officially formulated policy. And among the international agencies, the UN Population Division, UNDP, Unesco, WHO, FAO, ILO, UNICEF, OECD, and the World Bank have all stated a willingness to participate in population planning activities.

There are geographical differences (in Asia, some 87% of the people live in countries with "favorable family planning policies," while in Latin America and Africa the figure is only 20%), but political acceptance of family planning programs is widespread. Even where the political support is currently more apparent than real, it is becoming stronger with each passing year.

If, then, the first requirement for the success of family planning is political support at the top—and that is improving—where are the roadblocks?

The first is that the citizenry lacks access to the information and assistance required. Surveys indicate that the interest in family planning among people everywhere is high, but that their understanding is often tenuous at best and tragically erroneous at worst. Millions of parents, even in remote areas of the world, want fewer children, but they simply lack the knowledge to achieve this. Programs must be developed to provide them with the information they seek.[4]

But political support and widespread knowledge are still not enough. The techniques of family planning must, themselves, be adequate, appropriate, and available. The means we currently have at hand are much better than those of a decade ago, but are still imperfect. They can be used to accomplish much more than has been already achieved, but concurrently a massive program to improve them must be initiated. Our knowledge in this field is so incomplete that though we know that certain techniques do work, we still do not completely understand how or why they work. The fact is that compared to what we need to know, our knowledge remains elementary, even primitive.

The clear consequence of this is that there must be a greatly expanded research effort in basic reproductive biology. At present, I know of only seven locations in the world in which as many as five full-time senior researchers are working in this field. Some $275 million a year is spent on cancer research. But less than $50 million a year is spent on reproductive biology research, and this includes all the funds allocated, worldwide, by public and private institutions alike. The estimate is that an optimal program of research and development in this field would require $150 million a year for a decade. That is an insignificant price to pay in the face of a problem that—if left unsolved—will in the end exact social and economic costs beyond calculation.

Finally, a population planning program to be successful requires a strong administrative organization and a comprehensive data analysis and evaluation service. With but one or two exceptions, none of the developing countries has established adequate support in either of these areas. I know, for example, of only one location in the world where as many as three senior researchers are working full-time on the evaluation aspects of population planning. A number of governments have made a start at strengthening the organizational structure of family planning, but progress is thwarted by bureaucratic difficulties, lack of technical assistance, and inadequate financial support. It is in these areas that the international institutions can be most effective. Additional effort is required from all of us, including the Bank. Many of our members are appealing for greater support. They want our advice as well as our financial help, and I propose to organize our capability to provide them with more of both.

The additional funds required to attack the population problem on all fronts—for reproductive biological research, for social science research, and for better organization and administration—are relatively small, less than 50¢ per capita per year. But the time that will be required to achieve results will be greater than many have realized. This is all the more reason for accelerating our pace. An OECD study concluded that in 1968 family planning programs in developing countries accounted for only 2½ million averted births, compared to the total of over one billion that must be averted in the next three decades if the rate of growth is to be reduced to 1% by the year 2000. If we are to achieve an average fifteenfold increase in the effectiveness of the program over the next 30 years, we must accelerate our efforts now.

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[1] Even Taiwan, which through a most effective population planning program has reduced its growth rate from 2.8% in 1965 to 2.3% in 1969, will—if it succeeds by 1985 in reaching a point where couples only replace themselves—see its present population of 14 million rise to 35 million before it becomes stationary.

[2] I am indebted to Bernard Berelson, President of the Population Council, for a number of the points in this section.

[3] If, for instance, by the year 2000, the developed countries were to reach the point at which couples only replace themselves, and the developing countries were to reach that point by the year 2050—and both these achievements appear unlikely—the world's present population of 3.5 billion would not become stationary before the year 2120, and would then stand at fifteen billion.

[4] In only a handful of developing countries is there a significant percentage of women of reproductive age following fertility control practices. The percentage of women in developed countries who are doing so is six times as great.

The Pearson Commission emphasized that the population problem will not go away. It will be resolved in one way or another: either by sensible solutions or senseless suffering. If we want a sensible solution, with the corresponding enhancement of the quality of life for hundreds of millions of children, as well as for their parents—all of whom clearly have the intrinsic right to something more than a degrading subsistence—then we must get on with it.

IV. THE OBJECTIVES OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE SEVENTIES

I want to emphasize the last point and relate it to the objectives of development in the Seventies. The profound concern we must feel for the rapid growth of population stems precisely from the menace it brings to any morally acceptable standard of existence. We do not want fewer children born into the world because—to quote the more extreme critics of population policy—we do not like their color, or fear their future enmity, or suspect that they will in some unspecified way encroach upon the high consumption standards of already industrialized lands. This is not, as is sometimes claimed, an exercise is concealed genocide, perpetrated by the already rich on the aspiring poor. It has one source and one only—the belief that without a slowing down and control of the population explosion, the life awaiting millions upon millions of this planet's future inhabitants will be stunted, miserable, and tragic or, if you prefer the hackneyed but fitting phrase of the philosopher Hobbes, "nasty, brutish and short."

This fact takes us far beyond the population explosion. We have to see population as part—a vital, critical part but still only a part—of a much wider social and political crisis which grows deeper with each decade and threatens to round off this century with years of unrest and turbulence: a "time of troubles" during which the forces of historical change threaten to disintegrate our frail twentieth-century society.

We cannot divert these forces. They are an essential part of the process by which mankind is adapting the whole of its life to the advances in science and technology. About one-third of humanity has moved far in the transfer toward modernization and relative affluence. Now the rest of the human species jostle behind. They certainly have no intention of renouncing or missing the wealth and prosperity, above all, the power locked up in modern technology.

"Modernization" is a central thrust throughout the still-developing lands, but they are seeking to modernize under quite unprecedented conditions. Technological and scientific modernization is now more complicated, more hazardous than it was for the industrial nations a century ago. This is in fact the real root of the crisis.

Mr. Lester Pearson in a speech at the Columbia University Conference in February this year, gave a cogent and relevant résumé of the historical differences between nineteenth- and twentieth-century development. He emphasized the contrast between the balanced and fundamentally progressive character of economic, social, and technological change in the nineteenth century, and the growing evidence of fundamental imbalance and hence regressive forces at work in the unfolding of the same processes of modernization today.

In the nineteenth century, population—held down by epidemics and poor public health—caused the work force to grow by less than 1% per year. This was just about the amount which the technology of the times could usefully absorb and employ. Agricultural productivity rose and temperate land was opened up for European use all around the globe. The cities grew as centers of manufacturing, and by the time technology demanded fewer and more sophisticated workers, and public health had lowered the death rate, education and city-living had produced a more stable population. In addition, the vast migration of Europeans to new lands was a further safety valve.

Today, every one of the nineteenth-century conditions is reversed.

Just as the censuses of the 1950s first alerted the world to the scale of the population explosion, so today surveys made in the 1960s of unemployment, of internal migration, of city growth, begin to lay bare for us a new world topography of vast social imbalance and deepening misery.

Advances in public health have resulted in a growth of population which increases the work force by at least 2% per year. At the same time technology becomes steadily more capital-intensive and absorbs steadily fewer men. Although agricultural productivity is now on the rise, the new techniques are destablizing in the sense that they widen income inequities and release still more workers from the overcrowded land.. And where today can the rural migrants go? The world is already allotted, the land occupied by the nineteenth-century modernizers.

So the cities fill up and urban unemployment steadily grows. Very probably there is an equal measure of worklessness in the countryside. The poorest quarter of the population in developing lands risks being left almost entirely behind in the vast transformation of the modern technological society. The "marginal" men, the wretched strugglers for survival on the fringes of farm and city, may already number more than half a billion. By 1980 they will surpass a billion, by 1990 two billion. Can we imagine any human order surviving with so gross a mass of misery piling up at its base?

Let us for a moment look at this misery in the developing world in the realities of human suffering and deprivation:

Malnutrition is common.

The FAO estimates that at least a third to a half of the world's people suffer from hunger or nutritional deprivation. The average person in a high-standard area consumes four pounds of food a day as compared with an average pound and a quarter in a low-standard area.

Infant mortality is high. Infant deaths per 1000 live births are four times as high in the developing countries as in the developed countries (110 compared with 27).

Life expectancy is low. A man in the West can expect to live 40% longer than the average man in the developing countries and twice as long as the average man in some of the African countries.

Illiteracy is widespread. There are 10 million more illiterates today than there were 20 years ago, bringing the total number to some 800 million.

Unemployment is endemic and growing. The equivalent of approximately 20% of the entire male labor force is unemployed, and in many areas the urban population is growing twice as fast as the number of urban jobs.

The distribution of income and wealth is severely skewed, and in some countries becoming more so.

In India, 12% of the rural families control more than half of the cultivated land. In Brazil, less than 10% of the families control 75% of the land. In Pakistan, the disparity in per capita income between East and West, which amounted to 18% in 1950, became 25% in 1960, 31% in 1965, and 38% in 1970.

The gap between the per capita incomes of the rich nations and the poor nations is widening rather than narrowing, both relatively and absolutely.

At the extremes that gap is already more than $3,000. Present projections indicate it may well widen to $9,000 by the end of the century. In the year 2000, per capita income in the United States in terms of today's prices is expected to be approximately $10,000; in Brazil, $500; and in India, $200.

At least a quarter of the human race faces the prospect of entering the twenty-first century in poverty more unacceptable by contrast than that of any previous epoch. Frankly I do not see this as a situation in which any of our shared hopes for a long peace and steady material progress are likely to be achieved. On the contrary, I agree with Lester Pearson's somber belief that "a planet cannot, any more than a country, survive, half-slave, half-free, half-engulfed in misery, half-careening along towards the supposed joys of almost unlimited consumption." In that direction lies disaster, yet that is our direction today unless we are prepared to change course—and to do so in time.

How then should we react to these deepening risks? I must assume that we will react, for to carry on any of our activities as political leaders, government officials, business and labor leaders or responsible citizens, we must take for granted a certain minimum rationality in human affairs. And it is not rational to confront historical pressures on a far greater scale than those of the revolutionary periods of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries without accepting the consequences.

So I would like to end my report to you with four possible points for your agenda.

The first is that we accept the full scale of the world crisis. Over the last decade the developing nations have achieved the historically unprecedented rate of growth of 5% a year. This has been made possible in part by a reasonably sustained level of external assistance. Yet as the 1970s open, the evidence accumulates that economic growth alone cannot bring about that steady social transformation of a people without which further advances cannot occur. In short, we have to admit that economic growth—even if pushed to the 6% annual rate proposed as a target for the '70s both by the Pearson Commission and by the United Nations Committee on the Second Development Decade—will not, of itself, be enough to accomplish our development objectives. Growth is a necessary but not a sufficient cause of successful modernization. We must secure a 6% growth rate. We must deploy the resources necessary for it. But we must do more. We must ensure that in such critical fields as population planning, rural renewal, fuller employment, and decent urbanism, positive policies support and hasten the social transformation without which economic growth itself becomes obstructed and its results impaired.

This brings me to my second point. I have already discussed at some length the difficulties attendant upon any strategy for family planning. I think we have to admit that in other equally critical fields as well we still lack the necessary understanding and expertise. It must be our prime purpose in research and analysis to close these gaps.

We do not want simply to say that rising unemployment is a "bad thing" and something must be done about it. We want to know its scale, its causes, its impact and the range of policies and options which are open to governments, international agencies and the private sector to deal with it.

We do not want simply to sense that the "green revolution" requires a comparable social revolution in the organization and education of the small farmer. We want to know what evidence or working models are available on methods of cooperative enterprise, of decentralized credit systems, of smaller-scale technology, and of price and market guarantees.

We do not want simply to deplore overrapid urbanization in the primary cities. We want the most accurate and careful studies of internal migration, town-formation, decentralized urbanism and regional balance.

These issues are fully as urgent as the proper exchange rates or optimal mixes of

the factors of production. The trouble is that we do not know enough about them. As we enter the '70s we have in field after field more questions than answers. But this only adds to the urgency and determination with which we must intensify our intellectual attack.

This urgency in turn is related to my third point. I need not belabor it. It is simply that we cannot allow the fundamental task of developing the undeveloped nations of this planet to fail for lack of resources—both the resources needed for research and experiment, and the much larger resources needed to back the policies which we already feel to be successful.

Let us look for a moment at this question of resources. For the so-called security of an ever spiraling arms race, the world is spending $180 billion annually and the figure steadily goes up.

Four years ago in a speech in Montreal, I tried to point out that more and more military hardware does not provide more and more security. There is a point of diminishing returns beyond which further financial expenditure on military power does not yield increased returns and does not provide greater strength. I believed then, and I believe today, that most of the nations of both the developed and the developing world are beyond that point of diminishing returns.

If that is true, it is tragic that for the fundamental security of societies progressive enough not to explode into lethal revolution, the developed nations hesitate to maintain even the present $7 billion of public aid expenditure. That twenty times more should be spent on military power than on constructive progress appears to me to be the mark of an ultimate, and I sometimes fear, incurable folly. If there were only a 5% shift from arms to development we would be within sight of the Pearson target for official development assistance. And who among us, familiar with the methods and audits of arms planning, would not admit that such a margin could be provided from convertible waste alone?

This brings me to my last point. There are really no material obstacles to a sane, manageable, and progressive response to the world's development needs. The obstacles lie in the minds of men. We have simply not thought long enough and hard enough about the fundamental problems of the planet. Too many millennia of tribal suspicion and hostility are still at work in our subconscious minds. But what human society can ultimately survive without a sense of community? Today we are in fact an inescapable community, united by the forces of communication and interdependence in our new technological order. The conclusion is inevitable: we must apply at the world level that same moral responsibility, that same sharing of wealth, that same standard of justice and compassion, without which our own national societies would surely fall apart.

Thus the challenge of the scientific revolution is not a tremendous technological conundrum like putting a man on the moon. It is much more a straightforward moral obligation, like getting him out of a ghetto, out of a favella, out of illiteracy and hunger and despair. We can meet this challenge if we have the wisdom and moral energy to do so. But if we lack these qualities, then I fear, we lack the means of survival on this planet.

CLASSIFICATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN RELATION TO GOVERNMENTAL POPULATION PLANNING POLICIES [1]

Population size (millions)	Governments with official population policy	Governments providing assistance to family planning but without an official population policy	Governments with no population planning policy and no assistance to family planning
400 and more	India (27), Mainland China (35).		
100–400	Pakistan (21), Indonesia (24).		
50–100		Nigeria (27)	Brazil (25).
25–50	Philippines (21), Thailand (21), Iran (24), UAR (25), Turkey (26), South Korea (28).		Mexico (21), Burma (31).
15–25	Morocco (21)	Colombia (21)	Sudan (22), Afghanistan (28), Congo (DR) (32), Ethiopa (33), North Vietnam (33), South Vietnam (33).
10–15	Kenya (23), Malaysia (25), Ceylon (29), Republic of China (31), Nepal (32).	Venezuela (21)	Algeria (22), Peru (23), North Korea (25), Tanzania (27).
Less than 10	Dominican Republic (21), Ghana (24), Tunisia (24), Mauritius (28), Singapore (29), Jamaica (33).	Costa Rica (19), Ecuador (21), El Salvador (21), Hoduras (21), Panama (21), Nicaragua (24), Dahomey (27), Hong Kong (28), Chile (31), Botswana (32).	Kuwait (9), Iraq (21), Jordan (21), Paraguay (21), Syria (21), Libya (23), Cambodia (24), Guatemala (24), Guyana (24), Lebanon (24), Niger (24), Rwanda (24), Zambia (24), Saudi Arabia (25), Yemen (25), Madagascar (26), Togo (27), Uganda (27), Haiti (28), Laos (28), Malawi (28), Bolivia (29), Chad (29), Ivory Coast (29), Mali (29), Senegal (29), Somalia (29), Burundi (31), Guinea (31), Sierra Leone (31), Cameroon (32), CAR (32), Congo (B) (32), Mauritania (32), Upper Volta (33).

[1] Only developing countries with population growth rates in excess of 2.0 percent are listed on this table. The number of years in which their population will double, at current growth rates, is indicated in parentheses after each country. Since the growth rates for most of these countries are not known with great precision, the "doubling times" are necessarily approximations.

MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN—HOW LONG?

HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 2, 1970

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, a child asks: "Where is daddy?" A mother asks: "How is my son?" A wife asks: "Is my husband alive or dead?"

Communist North Vietnam is sadistically practicing spiritual and mental genocide on over 1,500 American prisoners of war and their families.

How long?

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—*Monday, October 5, 1970*

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them.—Matthew 18: 20.

O merciful God, give to us quiet minds and loving hearts as we wait upon Thee in this our morning prayer. Grant us wisdom as we seek to solve the problems that confront us, courage to do what we believe to be right, and the faith to keep us faithful in the performance of our duties.

In these days when the souls of men are tried and tempted, when so much is demanded of those who would lead our Nation, grant us courage in serving this present age that we may prove worthy of the positions we hold and ready for the tasks committed to us.

Guide our Nation and all nations into the ways of justice and truth, and establish among us all that peace which is the fruit of righteousness: To the glory of Thy holy name. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, October 1, 1970, was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 18104. An act to amend section 15d of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 to increase the amount of bonds which may be issued by the Tennessee Valley Authority.

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 1933) entitled "An act to provide for Federal railroad safety, hazardous materials control, and for other purposes."

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 2264) entitled "An act to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide authorization for grants for communicable disease control and vaccination assistance."

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 17123) entitled "An act to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1971 for procurement of aircraft, missiles,