

voluntary basis shall be permitted in public schools and educational institutions; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. NICHOLS:

H.J. Res. 793. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution requiring that Justices of the Supreme Court be reconfirmed by the Senate every 10 years; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROGERS (for himself, Mr. SATTERFIELD, Mr. KYROS, Mr. PREYER of North Carolina, Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. ROY, Mr. NELSEN, Mr. CARTER, and Mr. HASTINGS):

H. Con. Res. 370. Concurrent resolution to express the sense of Congress relative to certain activities of Public Health Service hospitals, outpatient clinics, and clinical research centers; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. MATHIS of Georgia:

H. Res. 552. Resolution to express the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States maintain its sovereignty and

jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Zone; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

#### MEMORIAL

Under clause 4 of rule XXII,

246. The SPEAKER presented a memorial of the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Virginia, ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States extending the right to vote to citizens 18 years of age and older, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

#### PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. HOGAN:

H.R. 9939. A bill for the relief of Donald T. Pidgeon; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 9940. A bill for the relief of Henry P. Seufert; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

#### PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

107. By the SPEAKER: Petition of the Collective of the Haberdashery Factory, Romny, Sumskoi, UkrSSR, relative to treatment of Soviet citizens in the United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

108. Also, petition of a Dr. Dubo, Crimean astrophysical observatory of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Nauchnyl, Krymskoi, UkrSSR, relative to treatment of Soviet citizens in the United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

109. Also, petition of Zarko Rudjanin, Karlsruhe, West Germany, relative to redress of grievances; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

## EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

### FEDERAL CONTRACT GOES TO PHILADELPHIA HEALTH DEPARTMENT

#### HON. JOSHUA EILBERG

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, Mayor James H. J. Tate today announced that the Philadelphia Department of Public Health has been named one of 13 agencies in the Nation—and the only municipal health department—to receive a contract from the Federal Government to develop an experimental health services planning and delivery system.

A \$1,225,000 2-year contract has been awarded the health department by the Health Services and Mental Health Administration, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Nearly a hundred proposals from throughout the country were originally submitted for funding, of which 46 received serious consideration prior to the final 13 awards, totaling \$10 million.

Mayor Tate hailed the contract—a major accomplishment for the health department—calling the Federal support “great assistance to Philadelphia in developing a comprehensive health care delivery system, foundations of which have been underway for some time in the city.”

City Health Commissioner Dr. Norman R. Ingraham said the contract permits the health department to intensify its work with all segments of the community interested in health care:

Our aim is to develop a partnership between public and private sectors to provide a complete array of personal health care services throughout the city. We anticipate that continuing to work together great strides will be made to improve the health care delivery system in Philadelphia during the next two years.

Dr. Joanne E. Finley, planning director for the city health department, will be coordinator of the program. Dr. Fin-

ley is currently staff director for the master planning effort for the Philadelphia health care system, which includes construction of the new Philadelphia General Hospital. Earlier, she was staff director for the mayor's committee on municipal hospital services.

Dr. Ingraham explained that a community health services planning and delivery system should contain the following elements: A defined population to be served; explicit performance standards as to access to service, equity of care, containment of costs, and management of quality of service; a planning system with technological capability including an organized health planning information system; the availability of such resources as facilities and programs, manpower, and operating and capital finances; plus a continuing, management mechanism to interrelate all of the above. He said:

Many of these elements and resources exist now in Philadelphia, but in isolation or segmentation, serving only parts of the city. A coherent, effective, and efficient health services system does not exist. Our goal is to work towards this end, in various ways, each inter-relating with each other.

The program will have two major facets. The first will establish a health management mechanism in partnership between the Department and community groups and agencies. This eventual agency will manage health funds from all sources—Federal, State, and local—for all parts of the health care system in the city. The agency's actual establishment will come through deliberations by the Philadelphia Health Forum and its related task force. Two-thirds of the participants in this planning process will be consumers, Dr. Ingraham stressed.

The program's second part will develop four specific technical information packages: A redefinition of health service area boundaries within the city; the development of a health services data system; the economic analysis of all funds coming into the Philadelphia community for personal health services, in-

cluding a special study of the feasibility of a citywide public health insurance program; and a central inventory of health manpower resources information.

Dr. Ingraham said that an initial step to be taken under the contract will be an open public meeting convened by the health commissioner. Invited to participate will be consumers, providers, payors, political representatives, representatives of State agencies with direct relationships to Philadelphia health services, and the members of the already organized Philadelphia Steering Committee of the Regional Comprehensive Health Planning Agency.

Those in attendance will form the membership of the Philadelphia Health Forum. Meeting once a month in public session, the health forum will have the responsibility of establishing the permanent health services management structure.

The health forum itself will then establish a task force which will have the operational responsibility for developing a proposal for this health management mechanism. Such a proposal would be submitted to the health forum for final approval. The 25-member task force will be formed by the health forum electing the first six members—four consumers elected by the consumers in attendance at the forum meeting, and two providers elected by the health care providers in attendance. These six, plus the health commissioner as the seventh member, will then appoint 13 additional consumer and five additional provider members.

Dr. Ingraham noted that the following groups had formally endorsed the program in the contract proposal submitted to the Federal Government: Model cities program, regional comprehensive health planning advisory committee, Greater Delaware Valley regional medical program, Philadelphia County Medical Society, Delaware Valley Hospital Council, South Philadelphia Health Action, Inc., Inter-County Health Insurance Plan, Inc., Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital, comprehensive

services for children and youth of the Delaware Valley, and the Philadelphia Forum of Mental Health/Mental Retardation Centers.

PROPOSED CUTS IN FEDERAL AID  
FOR SOCIAL WORK

HON. BELLA S. ABZUG

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, I am most concerned about the proposed cuts in Federal aid for social work education now being considered in the HEW appropriations bill.

The poor, the mentally ill, disturbed and neglected children, the elderly, and the unemployed are in desperate need of more expanded social service programs and Federal assistance. The Nixon administration is planning to economize by reducing by more than half, from \$39,600,000 in 1970-71 to \$20,500,000 in 1971-72, the funds appropriated for student stipends and teaching grants. Instead of increasing the training of social workers and research in the problems confronting these people, Mr. Nixon proposes to set back the program drastically. This would result in a crippling blow to social work training, to the many important community health and welfare programs and to the plight of the many millions in need; the effect would be similar to that of hospitals cutting their intern programs in half. Black and other minority students and faculty who depend on Federal aid would lose their opportunity to obtain graduate education and to return to their communities as effective, trained social workers, and urgent human needs would be left unmet.

The New York City chapter of the National Association of Social Workers has attempted repeatedly and without result to voice its concern to HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson. I am inserting here the very fine analysis which NASW has made on the proposed cuts as well as their correspondence with Secretary Richardson:

HUMAN RESOURCE SERVICES AND SOCIAL WORK  
TRAINING: THE CASE FOR CONTINUED FEDERAL SUPPORT

IN SUMMARY

The quality of any service depends upon the personnel who plan, administer and provide it.

The President's Budget (for 1971-72) cuts \$19 million in student stipends and training grants currently provided by the Social and Rehabilitation Service of HEW.

The proposed cuts will seriously affect the availability of competent social work personnel needed by the nation now and in the future.

Social work provides services to: the aged, children, the ill, the unemployed, the disabled, the mentally ill. Private and public agencies provide social services to families and communities.

Social work education has changed to meet new social problems and has developed new programs to train professional, paraprofessional and technical personnel.

Social work education trains a large number of persons from minority groups—who need financial assistance to stay in school.

The proposed budget cuts will seriously affect the ability of social work education to prepare the quantity and quality of manpower required to provide basic essential social services.

In the long term, the proposed budget cuts will be costly economically and socially.

I. The President's budget proposals

For a number of years, the Federal government has recognized the need to provide a base of support for the training of social workers. This year, however, the President's budget proposes drastic reductions in this support. These cuts are both unexpected and abrupt and can only result in confusion and uncertainty among students and faculty, and, in the long run, serious harm to people and the nation.

These cuts are described in the *Appendix to the Budget, Fiscal Year 1972*, in the section on the Social and Rehabilitation Service beginning on page 457. In this budget, a new consolidation of research and training items is described on pp. 466-67. This consolidated approach obscures the real magnitude of the cuts. A cut of \$19,100,000 in the training grants of the Social and Rehabilitation Service of HEW is proposed: from \$39,600,000 available in 1970-71 to \$20,500,000 for 1971-72. The cuts affect the Rehabilitation Services Administration (teaching grants and student stipends provided under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act); the Community Services Administration (child welfare, student stipend and faculty grants under Section 426 of the Social Security Act, and graduate and undergraduate faculty and curriculum grants under Title VII, Section 707 of the Social Security Act); and the Administration on Aging (under Title V, Older Americans Act). While these proposed cuts of training grants for all fields in SRS average 48 percent, preliminary HEW plans for future support of social work education suggest an even greater reduction.

The cuts in the Rehabilitation Services Administration are scheduled to become effective July 1, 1971. This would provide very short notice to educational institutions which have already made commitments to faculty and to students who are in the middle of their education and had assumed that support for their second year of graduate study was assured. The cuts in training grants of the Community Services Administration and the Administration on Aging will not become effective until July 1, 1972, since funds in the 1970-71 budget are used to make grants in June 1971 for the new academic year beginning July 1, 1971.

II. The importance of social work education

Most people growing up, going to school, working, marrying, raising families and growing old—at some point in their lives—find they need some form of help. They become ill, encounter financial difficulties, or develop family or other personal problems. The need for medical, counselling, rehabilitation and other services is not restricted to persons with little or low income.

But, programs need staff to plan, administer and provide services. And the people who do this need to be trained. Without enough trained people, neither existing social services nor future innovations and improvements can be effective or economic. Social work education is the basic source of those people.

Social work staff today require much knowledge and a great variety of skills to deal with many problems of increasing complexity. Graduate schools of social work and undergraduate programs in social welfare have demonstrated their capacity to adapt to the changing times. By providing training

geared to today's problems, they are contributing, together with other professions, to the national objectives of reducing the economic and human costs of a host of social problems, such as drug abuse, alcoholism, discrimination, and poverty. More and more, social workers are integral parts of the professional teams which are attempting to deal with juvenile delinquency, crime, and rehabilitation. Social work is a key element in caring for the disabled, the young and the aged and in programs dealing with family breakdown. The increase in population, its urban concentration, the rise and intensification of social problems, all indicate the need for more people with even better training in the helping professions.

III. Human needs and social work manpower

Social services are concerned with the entire spectrum of human needs as experienced both by individuals or families and by communities. Sometimes in collaboration with other professions, sometimes carrying primary responsibility, the social services are directed toward rehabilitation and care of vulnerable population groups, toward prevention or reduction of social problems and toward change and improvement in dysfunctional systems.

Social workers are involved both in the direct delivery of social services and in the planning, administration and coordination of these services. Programs in graduate schools of social work have sharply increased their emphasis upon preparation for administration, supervision, and other leadership roles. The level of education, however, does not necessarily determine the nature of a social worker's job assignment. Direct services can be provided by a technician without an academic degree or by a social worker with a baccalaureate or a master's degree. The latter is, of course, likely to be doing the diagnosing of the problems and providing highly specialized service in complex situations.

Social work education, on all levels, prepares practitioners who can function in a wide variety of settings. Though the examples cited refer to particular programs, social work training is geared to provide social workers with the basic skills necessary to provide the help needed.

*Physical illness:* social workers, working together with other health personnel participants in developing national and regional policies and programs for the physically ill; administer and plan programs designed to cope with the immediate and long-term problems of the physically ill; help the patient or his family make the kind of plans and obtain the necessary resources to manage while he is hospitalized; help with plans for discharge including specific arrangements for after-care or long-term living arrangements in sheltered settings; supervise direct service personnel in aftercare institutions.

*Children:* social workers plan and administer institutional and community-based programs to cope with immediate and long-term needs of children; design and program a range of services to provide equalization opportunities for disadvantaged children, including pre-natal and post-natal services for their mothers; participate in the development of national and regional policies and programs for children; supervise caretakers in institutions for delinquent and neglected children; provide foster home placement and supervision service; undertake investigation of child abuse and recommendation to courts concerning removal of abused children; work for rehabilitation of families in order to protect children from serious and irreparable damage; supervise and train a variety of child care personnel.

*Mental illness:* in addition to the roles described above for the physically ill, social workers head, or serve as key staff, for, com-



munity mental health centers; carry responsibility for working with family members so that they may aid in, or at least not interfere with, treatment efforts; locate and supervise foster homes for patients who are to live in the community; train and supervise caretaker personnel; develop alternate facilities for the long-term care of those not ready for independent life.

**Aged:** social workers participate in the development of national, regional and local policies and programs for the aged; assist the aged person or his relatives in defining the problem for which help is needed and in locating or developing suitable resources; recruit, train and supervise personnel to work with the aged, both in the community and in institutions; plan and administer a variety of different programs, both in the community and in institutions, to cope with the varied problems of older people who no longer are able to care for themselves.

While the specifics of what the social workers do in relation to any given population group may differ, their responsibilities and tasks follow, in general terms, the examples cited.

The majority of social workers with graduate education are employed in planning and policy development, administration and supervision, teaching and research. It has always been the typical employment found among master's degree holders within a period of three to five years after receiving the degree. Increasingly, however, students are entering such positions immediately upon receiving their master's degree.

Direct services are provided by social workers from all levels of educational preparation. Broadly speaking, their efforts may be classified along several dimensions. In terms of goal, social workers provide services which are designed (1) to effect a reasonably satisfactory adjustment of the person in the community, thus minimizing the cost and trauma of institutionalization, (2) to rehabilitate the person so that he can lead an independent and productive life, or (3) to provide long-term care in as humane and effective a way as possible for those who cannot be expected to function on a more autonomous level. In terms of target the efforts of social workers are generally directed at the victim or clients, but frequently their work is primarily with others, such as, members of the family, employers or potential employers, school, police, etc.

Different kinds of preparation and education are needed for workers at different levels of work. For many of the problem areas in which social workers are active, a degree of expertise is needed that requires intensive study and the development of a high degree of skill. Though social workers with a minimum of education or with only agency training can successfully function at an appropriate level of service, all fields require some personnel with a high degree of expertise to plan and administer services. There is a particular and continuing need for social work personnel at the highest policy development level and at the middle management level.

#### IV. Social work and public assistance

One of the most critical issues facing governments in 1971 is the ever growing welfare cost. Many people regard "welfare" or "relief rolls" as synonymous with social work. There is a distinction between provision of social services and provision of income maintenance. No amount of professional service—social work, medical, nursing, or education—can provide the dollars needed to pay rent or buy food or have prescriptions filled or buy the shoes needed for a child to go to school. The necessity of meeting basic economic needs must be distinguished from those needs that require additional care and service and use of a variety of resources to help people who can, to become self main-

taining. It must also be recognized that many of the aged, some of the ill, and all of the children (until they grow to adulthood) on public assistance cannot become self-sufficient.

#### V. Social work education produces needed personnel

Qualified social work personnel required to plan, administer and provide social services are prepared through various educational programs. The social work education system in the U.S. consists of: 70 graduate schools of social work in major universities which grant 5,000 master's degrees and about 90 doctoral degrees each year; over 200 undergraduate baccalaureate programs in social welfare with over 7,000 graduates; close to 100 two-year community college programs offering associate degrees which prepare community and social service technicians; and hundreds of continuing education programs conducted by educational institutions and agencies which reach thousands of social workers each year.

There is general agreement in social work and in most other professions that there is need for training programs to prepare professional, paraprofessional and technical personnel. The challenge is to identify and distinguish tasks so that manpower with different levels of education will be effectively used. Social work education has played an active leadership role in this effort. In the past few years, social work education has developed new programs at the baccalaureate and associate degree levels in addition to existing master's and doctoral degree programs.

#### Innovative Curriculum Developed to Deal with Contemporary Problems

During the past decade social work training has been making a major shift in the focus and content of its curriculum. Changes were made to respond to new and persistent problems, to the needs of specific population groups and to the shifts that were occurring or were being planned in the organization of services. Schools developed new courses related to certain population or problem groups, the aged, the mentally retarded, the juvenile and adult offender, the physically handicapped. Major changes in social work education also occurred with changes in the organization of services, e.g., the emphasis upon community mental health programs, service to residents in public housing projects, multiservice centers in local neighborhoods, and "grass-roots" community groups. These changes reflected a growing concern for inner city populations, the rural and urban poor, and the major ethnic minorities.

In the past few years there has been a major shift in social work education toward the preparation of generalists as well as planners and administrators. The generalist social worker is equipped to deal with a variety of tasks at the neighborhood and community level. The proportion of graduate students training for administrative and organizing tasks has also increased. Undergraduate programs have begun to prepare their graduates for beginning practice in a variety of settings instead of only serving as aides in specific fields. The preparation of technicians at the community college level is a recent development but already growing rapidly.

People trained in social work are employed by public and voluntary agencies to provide needed social services. About 90 percent of master's degree graduates enter full-time employment, the majority in public agencies and mostly in child welfare and mental health. About two-thirds of the baccalaureate degree social work graduates enter employment mostly in the public social services in their local area. Over 10 percent go on directly to graduate education. It is rare for social workers to leave human services. Women do leave employment for marriage

and motherhood, but large numbers later return to full-time work.

#### Social Work Training Offers Special Opportunities for Minority Groups

The proportion of minority groups is greater in graduate social work education than in any other discipline or professional educational program. Social work education has been in the forefront of efforts to open opportunities for minority groups. In the 1970-71 academic year over 25 percent of master's degree students and 10 percent of doctoral students in graduate schools of social work were from the following five major ethnic minorities: American Indians, Asian Americans, Chicanos (Mexican Americans), Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Also about 20 percent of all faculty in graduate schools of social work are non-white. The social work curriculum, at all levels, is being enriched to help all students to learn more about the life styles, strengths and problems of minority groups and to be able to work more effectively with them.

#### VI. The cost of reducing Federal support

Continued federal support for social work education is necessary:

The proposed cuts will cause serious and irretrievable damage. Many graduate schools and undergraduate programs will be forced to reduce radically or to discontinue their educational efforts.

During the past decade the capacity of the social work education system expanded rapidly and decisively at the request of the federal government to meet urgent human needs. Cutting support now will undermine our nation's capability to meet its social goals.

Currently, more than fifty percent of all graduate students in social work receive stipends funded directly or indirectly by the federal government; in awarding these stipends emphasis is given to students coming from low socio-economic, disadvantaged and minority groups. Cutting support now will hurt these groups especially since neither they nor universities they attend have access to alternate support sources.

It has taken the better part of a decade, with the help of federal funds, to build up the kind of quality facilities found in graduate and undergraduate social work programs today. Cutting support now will reduce the schools' ability to maintain quality education and develop innovative educational programs. The consequences will be felt in fewer students, less adequately prepared to face the tasks of the future.

Since the alternate support sources for social work education from local and state government and individual or corporate giving are not available, the consequences of reducing federal support will be disastrous. The cost incurred by providing fewer trained social workers will surely be far greater than any economies achieved through the proposed reductions:

Needs are met best and with least expense when they are identified early; unmet and unserved "little" problems soon develop into more expensive "big" problems. Trained social workers, educated at various levels, are needed to identify problems, develop strategies and deliver the intervention services necessary to counteract these problems or reduce their impact.

Unless those who man direct service positions receive training and on-going supervision, costly mistakes resulting in more expensive service will be made. A reduction in the number of social work students now, predictably will make available fewer, not more trainers and supervisors for the public service in the next decade.

The reduction of federal support for social work education will hinder, not help, the development of new and more effective social service delivery systems necessary to help children, adults, and families to be-

come self-sufficient, healthy, and productive citizens.

FEBRUARY 18, 1971.

Mr. ELLIOT RICHARDSON,  
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,  
U.S. Department of Health, Education &  
Welfare, Washington, D.C.

The New York City Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers representing 5,000 social workers, is seriously distressed by projected cut-backs in teaching grants and student stipends for social work education provided by the Social and Rehabilitation Service, HEW.

These cuts will seriously impair the wherewithal to maintain opportunities for professional education for less affluent candidates, especially poor Blacks and Puerto Ricans. It will curtail quality field training and have detrimental consequences for services to people most in need.

This reduction of funds further exacerbates a crisis situation in which vitally needed health and welfare programs are being gradually vitiated by withdrawal of Federal financial support.

We strongly urge that projected budget cuts in social work education be rescinded.

CHARLES H. KING,  
President, N.Y.C. Chapter, NASW.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,  
Washington, D.C., April 20, 1971.

Mr. CHARLES H. KING,  
President, NYC Chapter National Association  
of Social Workers, New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. KING: Secretary Richardson has asked me to reply to your letter concerning the budget cuts in educational training grant programs for social work. The Administration has been working toward the goal of financing new programs in the 1972 budget. Some of this success in financing new programs has been achieved by reducing certain ongoing activities. One area in which reductions are being made involves direct Federal support for several types of training including social work. There is interest in the redirection and use of training funds to achieve the most effective results in obtaining needed manpower.

We are developing new legislative proposals that will enable us to better provide social and rehabilitation services. These proposals will request funds to support training programs directed toward providing personnel to perform new roles in the delivery system.

You may be sure that your suggestions and comments will be taken into consideration as we work further on the development of social services and related manpower proposals.

Sincerely yours,  
FRANK S. CARACCILO,  
Assistant Administrator, Office of Manpower, Development and Training.

MAY 19, 1971.

Mr. ELLIOT RICHARDSON,  
Secretary, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: On April 20th, Mr. Frank S. Caracciolo responded to our February 18th communication to you expressing our deep concern about the proposed severe cutbacks in funds for social work education and the effect of such cuts on delivery of much needed programs of social service.

In the interim, we had made several unsuccessful efforts to obtain an appointment with you so that we and the Deans of the six graduate schools of social work in New York might have an opportunity to point out the very harmful effect of these budget cuts and try to persuade you, as the spokesman for social welfare in this administration, to take a stronger stand in its behalf. We also telephoned Mr. Caracciolo after receipt of his

letter and talked with him at some length in an attempt to clarify the very general statements in his reply, again with no satisfactory result.

In view of the inadequate response to our efforts, must we assume, Mr. Secretary, that there is nothing we can do to intervene with you on a matter which vitally affects the future of our profession and the programs and people we are pledged to serve?

In terms of the overall Federal budget, the sums involved in social work education are miniscule. We cannot believe that such savings are necessary while enormous sums continue to be spent on the Indo-China War, on advanced weaponry and supersonic transport of disputed value, on balling out industrial giants like Lockheed Aircraft and the Penn-Central Railroad, and so on. We note also that while social work education is being cut, grants for education of police officers and for equipping local police departments with sophisticated enforcement and surveillance equipment are being substantially increased. The choice of priorities, to us, is ominous. In all frankness, Mr. Secretary, we must tell you that the administration's indifference to social services leaves us little choice but to conclude that there is an intention to wipe out most of the social welfare gains of the last thirty years.

We are the largest local Chapter of the national professional organization of social workers. A substantial number of our 5,000 members are faculty and graduate students of social work who are being vitally affected by the decisions on social work training which your department is now making. We believe we have a responsibility to intervene and a right to be consulted in these matters. We are ready to discuss this subject with you whenever you see fit.

Sincerely,

CHARLES H. KING,  
President.

#### OBSERVATIONS ON THE GENERATION GAP

#### HON. BOB CASEY

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mr. CASEY of Texas. Mr. Speaker, my constituent, Dr. J. Ernest Hill, has made some rather provocative observations on the generation gap, which I think are worthy of notice:

LET US LOOK OBJECTIVELY AT ANOTHER FACET OF THE GENERATION GAP  
(By J. Ernest Hill)

First, we must, without a doubt, admit the accomplishment of some scattered good, resulting from activities, approvals and criticism, of those youth of today, who in their most fantastic terminology, try to repress the proven and in their acts of violence, some with their long hair and bearded faces, make excessive use of narcotics.

These accomplishments, of whatever good, appear to a large majority of the adult population and nonparticipating youth, to be trivial in stature, when related to the destructive forces that have been set in motion.

It is inconceivable to believe that minds not yet moulded by the pattern of experience can, through self-appraisal, want to seize the helm of the ship of destinies and expect, or be expected, to avoid the shoals of disaster, as they endeavor to negate the effective chartered course lighted by the brilliance of the best productive minds of past centuries.

Seemingly, a large number of those who loudly proclaim their virtues as revolution-

ary Messiahs, seeking radical changes in our human relationships, come from backgrounds with financial and family affluence; without which they would have neither food, nor base, principally our schools, from which they operate.

It is difficult to understand why some seeking an education, while accepting the gratuities of our tax sponsored and endowed schools, are so willing to destroy that which gives them the privileges and benefits that are the end results of the spending of literally billions of dollars and generations of planning and effective effort.

One cannot help but wonder if these Artists, of rapid change, have ever given thought to the possibility that they, too, may have to live with the aftermath of their poorly founded, reckless and badly planned policies and objectives.

It may well be that some of these very ones will some day be successful, in the same sense as we have, heretofore, evaluated success.

Here, it may well be asked to whom will they turn for protection of their coveted possessions, their loved ones and themselves, when they must deal with their pernicious "brain child's".

This colossal menace, this ecological Frankenstein, fully developed, destructive and unmanageable, could well be their nemesis.

Would it not be so much better, if those with so much energy and "spunk" could, early in life, develop a large degree of acceptance and belief that all should strive to become a beneficial contributing and peaceful living part of the whole of us, instead of becoming a "spin-off" of minority disruption?

Someone has said "trees supply the handles for the axes that destroy them". This analogy might well be prophetic in application to that in mention.

How can we sanely accept so many projected theories, diluted with inexperience and think, for one moment, the basic mechanics of our growth are old fashioned, as we continue to progressively improve the ways of living and adding strength to strength.

It is evident that brains and brawn are kinetic, each to the other. Proper use of both of these has developed a workable symphony of harmonies that has resulted in the continuous changing of ideas into realities to make our God given country the greatest.

May the wrath of God be avoided and in its stead, praise be to him in prayer that he continue to help and bless America.

FLAG DAY—1971

#### HON. LOUISE DAY HICKS

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mrs. HICKS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I would like to share with my colleagues in the House, a very timely story about our American flag, which was given to me at recent Flag Day ceremonies in Boston, by Mrs. Marjorie M. Rooney of Natick, Mass.

I am sure that my colleagues will feel as I did when I read the same:

HELLO, REMEMBER ME?

Some people call me Old Glory, others call me the Star Spangled Banner, but whatever they call me, I am your Flag, the Flag of the United States of America. . . . Something has been bothering me, so I thought I might talk it over with you . . . because it is about you and me.

I remember some time ago people lined up



on both sides of the street to watch the parade and naturally I was leading every parade, proudly waving in the breeze, when your daddy saw me coming, he immediately removed his hat and placed it against his left shoulder so that the hand was directly over his heart . . . remember?

And you, I remember you. Standing there straight as a soldier. You didn't have a hat, but you were giving the right salute. Remember little sister? Not to be outdone, she was saluting the same as you with her right hand over her heart . . . remember?

What happened? I'm still the same old flag. Oh, I have a few more Stars since you were a boy. A lot more blood has been shed since those parades of long ago.

But now I don't feel as proud as I used to. When I come down your street you just stand there with your hands in your pockets and I may get a small glance and then you look away. Then I see the children running around and shouting . . . they don't seem to know who I am . . . I saw one man take his hat off then look around, he didn't see anybody else with theirs off so he quickly put his back on.

Is it a sin to be patriotic anymore? Have you forgotten what I stand for and where I've been? . . . Anzio, Guadalcanal, Korea and now Vietnam. Take a look at the Memorial Honor Rolls sometimes, of those who never came back to keep this Republic free. . . . One Nation Under God . . . when you salute me, you are actually saluting them.

Well, it won't be long until I'll be coming down your street again. So, when you see me, stand straight, place your right hand over your heart . . . and I'll salute you, by waving back . . . and I'll know that . . . You remembered!

#### PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT

#### HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, the political involvement of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat spans the last 30 years and today President Sadat is one of the most important politicians in the Middle East. Edward Sheehan's article in the July 18 issue of *New York Times Magazine* offers a good study of this complicated man and I commend his essay to my colleagues:

[From The New York Times Magazine,  
July 18, 1971]

THE REAL SADAT AND THE DEMYTHOLOGIZED  
NASSER

(By Edward R. F. Sheehan)

CAIRO.—For much of his early life, Mohammed Anwar el Sadat was a most unsuccessful conspirator. Many of his conspiracies were directed against the British, and there was good reason for that. As a boy of 10 in his village of Mit Abu al Kom in the Nile Delta, he had discovered the works of Mahatma Gandhi; soon he could recite chapter and verse of British despotism not only in Egypt but eastward across the Euphrates to beyond the Hindu Kush.

"When he was still in primary school," recalls his sister Sekina, "Anwar began dressing up in a white sheet like Gandhi, and he would walk through the village leading a goat on a string. Then he would go and sit under a tree, pretending he did not want to eat."

Later, the Sadat family moved to the Kubri el Kubbeh quarter in Cairo, and by that time Anwar had turned to violence—he was

on the run as a terrorist. "In the middle of the night," Sekina remembers, "British troops and King Farouk's political police came crashing into our house, hurling us out of our beds, breaking furniture and crockery, tearing the place to pieces. They weren't at all nice. They were looking for Anwar."

That was during World War II. Sadat had graduated with Gamal Abdel Nasser from the Egyptian Military Academy in 1938; but if Nasser was cautious and brooding, Sadat was impulsive and bloodthirsty. They served together, upon graduation, at the same military post at Mankabad on the banks of the Upper Egyptian Nile, and nourished a common dream of a modern Egypt free of British bondage and a corrupt King. By 1941, Sadat was concocting elaborate plots to expel the British Army from Egypt.

In Cairo, he fell in with the anti-British Sheik Hassan el Banna, Supreme Guide of the fanatical Moslem Brotherhood, and Gen. Aziz el Masri, the former chief of staff of the Egyptian Army who had been sacked by Winston Churchill. Twice, Sadat tried to smuggle General Masri through to the German lines in the Sahara (where Masri was to advise the Germans how to outflank the British), but on the first endeavor the general's car broke down, and on the second his airplane crashed at takeoff. Sadat's subsequent intrigues with a pair of German spies in Cairo were betrayed by a belly dancer. (Sadat himself was never particularly "pro-Nazi," as some of his critics still claim. He was an anti-British Egyptian nationalist—period). He was court-martialed in 1942, cashiered out of the army, and dispatched to a prison camp in Upper Egypt.

He escaped, demanded an audience with the King, was recaptured, and escaped again—hiding out all over Egypt and in the teeming mosques of Cairo till the termination of the war. By that time he was demanding that Nasser's clandestine Free Officers movement adopt terrorism as a political tool. As Sadat later confessed in his writings, he pleaded with Nasser for permission to blow up the British Embassy and everybody in it, including the ambassador.

Nasser refused, but to keep Sadat happy he appointed him the head of a civilian auxiliary. Sadat then plotted to assassinate several pro-British politicians. He bungled an attempt on the life of Mustafa Nahas Pasha in 1945, but a year later some of his companions did assassinate Amin Osman Pasha, a former Minister of Finance, for declaring that the bond between Britain and Egypt was "as unbreakable as a Catholic marriage." Sadat was arrested for complicity, but was eventually acquitted and released in 1948. He hacked at several menial jobs, including journalism, but rapidly became destitute. One of the stories he wrote then was called "The Prince of the Island"—an allegory of a prince, surrounded by malevolent advisers, who eventually gets rid of them and establishes his own supremacy. The story was never published, but the plot was eventually to reappear in Sadat's real life.

Through the intercession of King Farouk's physician, Sadat's army commission was restored in 1950. He was ordered to act as a palace spy against suspected revolutionaries in the army, and gleefully he became a double agent, telling everything he knew not to the palace but to Nasser. By 1951, he was a lieutenant colonel and (so British intelligence has claimed) embroiled in yet another bungled plot—a mine was planted in the middle of the Suez Canal, but failed to explode when a British ship bumped into it. In 1952, on the epochal night of the July 22-23 revolution, he was supposed to cut army communications in Cairo, but the signals got crossed; he took his family to the movies, and at the crucial moment Nasser could not find him. From that moment on, though he held a succession of prestigious titles including that of Vice President until

Nasser died last September, Sadat's power in Egypt was far more nominal than real.

How then are we to explain the metamorphosis of this callow conspirator into the adroit empiricist of power who is today the President of Egypt? I believe one of the basic explanations is that, though he is not an intellectual and despite his professed distaste for theories, Sadat has long been an omnivorous reader—and his reading has helped focus his insight into the motives that propel men. His literary tastes are more catholic than those of Nasser, who devoured books on history, geopolitics and war but who was beguiled by little else. Sadat systematically educated himself in prison; he learned to speak English, German and Persian fluently, and to read French. Over the years he has doted on the works of Harold Laski, Arnold Toynbee, Lloyd C. Douglas, Somerset Maugham, and has dabbled in the literature of other creeds besides Islam.

His own Islamic ardor runs deep, for half of him will always remain the village son—devoted to those millennial values of the fellah, the Egyptian peasant, rooted in the rhythms of prayer and hardship, of closeness to the earth and of the shrewdness which is the treasure of the poor. Unlike Nasser, who grew up an urban shizoid in Cairo and Alexandria, Sadat not only retained his roots in Mit Abu al Kom, but he returned there often throughout his career to pray in the village mosque and to mingle among the merchants, the butchers, the beasts and toilers of the field. "Those visits home taught me something I never forgot," he told me once. "They taught me how to talk to the people—and how to listen."

There was a curious dualism at work here too, for once the Free Officers were ensconced in power Sadat developed by degrees into an urban, sophisticated and—so his critics say—slightly venal man. Goaded by his elegant half-English wife Gehan, he dressed in suits from Savile Row, sent his daughters to fashionable schools, and honed away at the rough edges of his character without sacrificing any of his earthy charm. He wrote a book, "Revolt on the Nile," an emotional and highly selective account of his personal history as a conspirator. He took pains never to stray too far from Nasser's shadow. Other Free Officers were falling by the wayside because they belonged to cliques and aspired to power for themselves; Sadat never made that mistake. He remained a loner, and—whatever his private reservations—remained totally, blindly loyal to his leader.

True, some of his old recklessness re-emerged from time to time. As head of the Islamic Congress in the mid-nineteen-fifties, his brashness so disenchanted other Moslem powers that Nasser removed him from his Egyptian delegation at the Bandung Conference and sent him home to Cairo. As Speaker of the National Assembly in 1961 he went to Moscow, where he engaged in a shouting match with Nikita Khrushchev when Khrushchev attacked him for Nasser's persecution of Egyptian Communists. He meddled in the Yemen—first urging Nasser to intervene in the civil war, and then opposing the peace settlement he had himself helped to negotiate with Saudi Arabia in 1965. He made demagogic speeches in 1969, vowing that the army would cross the Suez Canal to push the Israelis out of Sinai, and vehemently opposed the Rogers peace initiative before Nasser embraced it in 1970.

And yet, for all that, Sadat mellowed and matured during his long years under Nasser's restraining hand. He traveled widely, all over the Moslem world, to Yugoslavia and Mongolia, and to the United States in 1966. There, as an official guest of the American Government, he met Lyndon Johnson, marveled at Disneyland, and was so fascinated by the open debate procedure in Congress that he introduced it into the Egyptian National Assembly when he returned to Cairo. He visited

so many remote corners of Egypt itself that he came to know his people more deeply than Nasser ever did. He glimpsed the complexities of power, and bided his time.

After the debacle of the 1967 war with Israel and the suicide of Nasser's boon companion Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, Sadat grew closer to Nasser—the better to observe in silence all the errors the President was making, and to remember them for future reference as pitfalls to avoid. "The Revolution," so the saying goes, "devours its own children." Not so with Anwar Sadat, since Nasser rewarded him, not with power, but with longevity. The greatest lesson that Sadat ever learned at Nasser's knee was how to be patient.

But when Sadat succeeded Nasser, almost no one—including this writer—took him seriously. For Nasser had bequeathed to Egypt not only Anwar Sadat, but his goons as well. Nasser's goons—Presidential Affairs Minister Sami Sharaf, Interior Minister Sharawi Gomaa, *et al.*—gripped the rods of power in their own hands, particularly the pervasive intelligence apparatus, and they clearly expected Sadat to do what they told him. Sadat seemed to assent, and again bided his time.

The Sharaf-Gomaa cabal considered themselves the rightful rulers of Egypt after Nasser's death. They were his younger heirs, and they wanted done with the old Free Officers like Sadat. While Nasser lived they were his tools ("Show me 10 men I can trust," he used to say) and he constantly played off one against the other, keeping a black book of their misdeeds (they were nearly all corrupt) and even of their erotic escapades. Sami Sharaf was especially disreputable. Sensual and slightly fat, mustachioed and handsome in a way that exuded bad taste, he loved food, drink and women. An army officer (of course), he had participated in an abortive coup in 1954, but soon betrayed his co-conspirators to Zacharia Mohieddin, then head of the secret police. Mohieddin absolved Sharaf as a witness for the prosecution, and—sensing his utility—appointed him his private secretary. Soon Nasser discovered him, first using him to spy on Mohieddin, then making Sharaf his own private secretary. Eventually Sharaf became the director of Nasser's clearing house for all intelligence affairs. He built his career on spying, on bugging his rivals' bedrooms, on betraying his friends.

Sharawi Gomaa, the burly, India-rubber-faced Minister of the Interior, was only slightly more respectable. An old crony of Sami Sharaf's, he had been scheming with Sharaf for years to take over effective control of the Government, and when Nasser died he was the second or third most powerful man in Egypt. Besides the police and the huge General Investigative Authority, which he controlled outright, he had penetrated most of the other intelligence agencies as well; like Sharaf he was an addict of the most sophisticated snooping devices, which he purchased all over the world at considerable cost and then planted promiscuously in the private chambers of friends and enemies alike. He manipulated large sums of secret monies which he later used to slander Anwar Sadat, and even consulted swamis to divine when he himself would become Prime Minister and President.

From the moment that Sadat succeeded Nasser, Sharaf and Gomaa were resolved to keep the intelligence apparatus out of the President's grasp. In the beginning, Sadat made no serious move to stop them. "My brother is slow in making decisions," says Sekina Sadat. "He has learned to think everything over very carefully, even the smallest decisions concerning his children." With his sly fellah mind, he ignored the intelligence services for the moment, and concentrated instead on building his popular base.

He cut prices, eased numerous restrictions and sought out the civil establishment—the press, the universities, the judiciary—to coax them to his side.

On radio and television, Sadat spoke softly in homely colloquialisms, asserted all of his rustic charm and began to acquire charisma. The values he invoked were not visions of a Marxist utopia but the verities of the Egyptian village—above all, belief in God. In his visits to the army; he refused to do all of the talking, and engaged his officers in dialogue. As he gradually became more popular, he embarked on tiny probing operations of the intelligence apparatus, not daring yet to dismiss Sharaf and Gomaa, but inserting one spy here, another there, the better to be briefed on their machinations. It was all of it a marvel of political craftsmanship, a masterly lesson of how to proceed from quasi impotence toward supreme power, step by modest step.

In the meantime, Sadat was moving rapidly on the external front. He accepted the hitherto unmentionable idea of a peace treaty with Israel, he proposed reopening the Suez Canal, and he invited Secretary of State William Rogers to Cairo. The reasonableness of his strategy won world opinion to Egypt's side, and put Israel on the diplomatic defensive. The architect of the *rapprochement* with Washington was Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, the editor of Al Ahram, Cairo's leading newspaper. Heykal, Nasser's closest confidant, was now ascending to a position of even greater influence with Sadat. The essence of Heykal's argument, which he expounded repeatedly in his column, was that the expulsion of the Israelis from Sinai was probably unattainable unless Egypt first improved its relations with the United States; only then would Washington apply the essential pressure on Tel Aviv. Al Gomhouria, the Government organ controlled by the Arab Socialist Union, replied with violent editorials which accused Heykal of selling out to the Americans; indirectly, the editorials were an assault on Sadat as well.

For the Arab Socialist Union was not merely the country's unique political organization, it was the citadel of Heykal's enemies and of Sadat's rivals for the control of Egypt. It was the power base of Vice President Aly Sabry, Cairo's leading leftist ideologue; it was the darling of the Russians—who hoped it would eventually propel the country from bourgeois socialism to a more authentic dictatorship of the proletariat. I have no evidence of this, but I suspect that the cunning Heykal may have written his editorials not only to improve Egypt's bargaining position abroad, but also to set a trap for his enemies at home. I suspect that with Sadat's consent he was encouraging them to tip their hand, and goading them toward the confrontation that Sadat himself was aching for.

The confrontation with the Arab Socialist Union came, not over the opening to Washington, but over Sadat's proposed federation with Syria and Libya—which Sadat argued would strengthen Egypt against Israel, and protect his flanks against the real radicals of the Arab world, Algeria and Iraq. This issue was almost incidental; for their part, Sabry, Gomaa and their partisans were determined to emasculate Sadat before he acquired too much popularity, and they carefully chose the federation issue because they knew that few Egyptians were eager for more adventures in Arab unity. They outvoted Sadat in the executive committee of the Socialist Union, and rigged the ensuing session of the larger central committee in their own favor. Perhaps sensing that he had gone too far too fast, Sabry tried to mollify Sadat by apologizing for the vehemence of his attacks. Sadat refused the apology, and decided to pursue the power struggle to the end. He swore in a May Day speech that "I am

responsible only to God, to the people and to myself," and—on the eve of Rogers' arrival in Cairo—sacked Sabry from all his major offices.

On May 12, a week after Rogers' departure from Cairo, Sadat visited a group of 170 key army officers at Inshass, near Ismailia in the Suez Canal zone. According to the most knowledgeable Government officials and Western diplomats in Cairo, part of the dialogue went rather like this:

SADAT. My sons, our political and military position is squeezed between the two great powers.

OFFICERS. We accept this, but we insist on a solution—diplomatic or military—one way or the other. We want to set a time limit.

SADAT. I'll give you one, I promise, within a few weeks. By God, I will walk to the ends of the earth to keep Egyptian soldiers from getting killed again, if I can still achieve an honorable solution by peaceful means. But there is another problem, my sons. I will never be able to achieve any solution at all if the centers of power in Cairo keep obstructing me.

OFFICERS. If you have rivals for power in Cairo, then we urge you to get rid of them—all of them. You are the President of Egypt, and they will get no help from us. We have only one battle to fight—the battle with Israel.

SADAT. The centers of power are subverting the home front, and by God, I will cut them to pieces. Look to the Israelis who are facing you, my sons, and leave the home front to me.

Confident of the army's support in the impending power struggle, Sadat returned to Cairo to prepare for the next round of confrontation. It was not long in coming. Briefly—according to Sadat's version—no sooner had he returned from the Suez front than he was visited by a young informer from the Ministry of the Interior who handed him a pair of tape recordings. Listening, Sadat discovered that Interior Minister Sharawi Gomaa had ordered his secret police to surround Cairo Radio in late April—to prevent the President from addressing the population. Thereupon, Sadat sacked Sharawi Gomaa. Thereupon, five other ministers—including the Minister of War, Gen. Mohammed Fawzi, and the shadowy Sami Sharaf—tendered their resignations, expecting that the sheer weight of their defections would cause the entire Government to collapse.

General Fawzi had been well forewarned of Sadat's suspicions—he had attended the meeting at Inshass. He joined the conspirators because he was beholden to Sami Sharaf by tribalistic bonds of blood and marriage, and because he believed the conspiracy would succeed. Once the collective resignations were announced over the radio—with ominous martial music—Fawzi was supposed to lead troops into Cairo, but true to their word, the rest of the army officers refused to follow. Next day, May 14, Sadat named a new Government, composed largely of eminent technicians and university professors, and ordered the conspirators arrested. He dismissed and jailed the leaders of the Arab Socialist Union, turned the intelligence service upside down and purged many other ministries as well.

Sadat's consolidation of power was complete. Whether the conspiracy against him was as real and persuasive as he had claimed—some Egyptians still have their doubts—Sadat had at last proved that he was the master of his own house. He had purchased precious time to pursue his opening to Washington unfettered by his enemies at home, and he had acquired the essential liberty of action to conclude an honorable peace with Israel should that prove possible.

For the next fortnight, the Cairo press overflowed with oaths of fealty to Anwar Sadat, and lurid particulars of the conspiracy.



Sami Sharaf was accused of fomenting public disorders, of organizing a network of rumor mongers and of breaking into Gamal Abdel Nasser's safe. Sharawi Gomaa was accused of burning bundles of incriminating documents and taped telephone conversations. All of all conspirators were accused of "corruption, embezzlement and bribery." Aly Sabry was accused of masterminding everything.

"The most painful thing of all," Sadat declared, "was the discovery that my own house had been bugged." (The most popular rumor in Cairo at this time was that Sadat's "bug" had been discovered by Secretary Rogers. The Secretary, so the story went, came to Cairo wearing a "magic wristwatch"—an electronic device to detect hidden microphones. When he and Sadat sat down in the President's office, the wristwatch began growling, so the two of them took flight to the garden. American diplomats later relayed this typically Egyptian tale to the Secretary; he was said to have been much amused. What is true is that Rogers did bring his own debugging expert with him to the suite at the Nile Hilton—but no microphones were found.)

Forthwith, Sadat ordered an end to all telephone-tapping and other forms of pervasive police surveillance—except when authorized by a court order or required by "the country's external security." The announcement was admirable, but was it intended to mask a deeper motive—the elimination of Sadat's enemies, not because they were domestic despots, but because they had hindered his freedom of maneuver on the diplomatic front? Whatever his motive, Sadat seized upon a truly popular issue in Egypt, and he was too shrewd to let it go. At the end of May, he drove to the Ministry of the Interior to observe a bonfire of thousands of Sami Sharaf's magnetic tapes. "The people must be free of fear," he said, and henceforth the hallmark of the Egyptian state would not be snooping, but "the rule of law."

The rule of law. Where had it been these last 19 years, since the day that Nasser seized Egypt from the King? In all his assaults on the "centers of power," Sadat—the heir of Nasser's mantle, and now the sole acknowledged prophet of his word—had implicitly been indicting Nasser himself. Sami Sharaf, Sharawi Gomaa and the other snoopers had all been Nasser's hand-picked men, and if they snooped on so many it was because Nasser told them to, or allowed them to—that was his way of governing. Sadat's public explanation is that Sharaf and company had got out of hand only after Nasser's death, but this was in large measure a demagogic obfuscation, and it convinced few.

For there is at large in Egypt now a most fascinating phenomenon—the demythologizing of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Though the once ubiquitous photographs of Nasser have largely vanished from Cairo's streets, the demythologizing has not yet deeply touched the common people. Nor, despite some broad hints, has it yet explicitly exploded in the pages of the Cairo press. Among the conversations of the intellectuals, the technocrats, the middle class and even some of the military, however, Nasser's ghost is being dissected with a vengeance. So much so that I found myself exhorting my intellectual friends to retain some sense of balance.

"Look," I said, "I admit that Nasser made some terrible mistakes. But you cannot deny that he gave Egypt the vision of becoming a modern state. He built factories, hospitals and schools, nationalized the Canal and ran it well, erected the Aswan Dam . . ."

"No," my friends replied, "he ruined Egypt. He destroyed all of our democratic institutions, and brought back the despotism of the Mamelukes. Whenever one of his ministers showed signs of independent thinking, Nasser fired him. He led us into the disastrous

union with Syria, gave us an Egyptian Vietnam in Yemen, and—despite all his efforts to blame it on Marshal Amer—marched us to defeat with Israel in 1967. That was the worst defeat in our modern history, and the day will come when every Egyptian will damn him for it."

Perhaps so, but until that day of reckoning—it could tear Egypt apart—President Sadat must drape himself in Nasser's toga. Publicly, he makes a show of his affection for Nasser's family, but privately there are signs of strain. Nasser's widow and his children are said to resent Sadat, much as the Kennedys came to resent President Johnson after his accession. The most widely circulated story in Cairo at the moment—and many distinguished diplomats believe it—is that sometime before he died Nasser deposited \$16-million (the figure varies) in a secret Swiss bank account. Sadat has been trying to persuade the family to return the money to the Egyptian state, but the Nassers have refused, considering it their personal property. I have no way of knowing whether this story is true. If it is true, it does violence to the legend of Nasser's personal incorruptibility. What is significant is that, true or not, so many Egyptians believe it.

The Russians, in the meanwhile, had become terribly alarmed. First, Rogers' visit to Cairo had aroused their fears that Sadat might be concocting a deal with Washington behind their backs; then Sadat purged their closest friends—Aly Sabry, Sami Sharaf *et al.*—and jailed them as traitors. Furthermore they feared that Sadat's purge of the Arab Socialist Union and his plans for new elections (the previous A.S.U. elections had been "fraudulent," he said) would exclude most of Egypt's Marxists from future participation. For instinctively the Soviet leadership has sought to achieve influence in Egypt's internal affairs through the same party-cum-intelligence apparatus that is the foundation of its own power. Some Western diplomats state that a number of the purged Marxists had been on Moscow's payroll.

In fact, the Soviet leaders were so surprised by the purges that they very nearly recalled their ambassador in Cairo, Vladimir Vinogradov, for failing to forewarn them. (The trouble with some governments," Vinogradov lamented later to a Western colleague, "is that they expect their ambassadors to be prophets.") No sooner were the purges consummated than the Kremlin invited Sadat to Moscow to discuss their reverberations. To Sadat, this smacked suspiciously a summons. "I can't come now," he answered. "I'm too preoccupied with internal problems. However, if you wish to send a delegation to Cairo, *ahlan wa sahan*—welcome."

On May 25, a high-level Soviet delegation, headed by President Nikolai Podgorny and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, arrived in Cairo. According to Western and neutral diplomats on the scene, the essence of the Soviet complaint ran like this:

"Look, we're not asking you to reinstate Aly Sabry and Sami Sharaf—they were our friends, but we've written them off. What we do ask of you is an assurance that there will be no more internal surprises. We want to stabilize and formalize our special bond with Egypt—not with one man, or group of men, but with the Egyptian Government as an institution. As you know, we have long been unhappy with Egypt's social policy—it's much too bourgeois. We want to show the world some written evidence of Egypt's permanent attachment to the Socialist camp. We are very concerned with the strengthening of institutions and cadres. We want to increase the contacts between the Arab Socialist Union and the Soviet Communist Party. We are hopeful that you will now make a serious effort to turn the Arab Socialist Union into a vanguard of authentic Socialist transformation."

The result of these discussions was the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of May 27, valid for 15 years and renewable for 10. The treaty duly pledged Egypt to pursue a "Socialist transformation," and included as well the highly interesting assurances in Articles VII and VIII. Article VII pledged both parties to "coordinate their positions" in the event of "circumstances which, in the view of the two parties, constitute a threat to or a violation of peace." Article VIII pledged the Soviet Union to continue its "aid in training the personnel of the [Egyptian] Armed Forces, and in their assimilation of arms and equipment supplied to [Egypt] for strengthening its capability to remove the traces of aggression."

The treaty is unprecedented outside of the Soviet bloc. On its face, it confers considerable blessings on both parties. The Russians extracted assurances in writing of Egypt's permanent fidelity to the "anti-imperialist camp," and that neither the attempted *rapprochement* with Washington nor Sadat's purge of Moscow's friends would subvert the "firm and unbreakable friendship" between Cairo and the Kremlin. Sadat was reassured of continuing Soviet support despite the purges—and he now has a signed commitment that the Soviet Union will help him to regain the Sinai, by diplomacy or by war.

Or has he? The crucial clause is Article VII, and the Soviets seem to have kept it deliberately ambiguous. Western diplomats in Cairo read the clause not as a provocation to the Egyptians to resume war with Israel, but as a restraint. "I've gone over that section carefully with the neutralist and Eastern bloc ambassadors here," one eminent diplomat told me, "and we've all come to the same conclusion. The phrase about 'coordination of positions' means that the Russians will not tolerate any more Egyptian military surprises, either. The Soviets have been sucked into the fighting before, and now they want to be told in advance of any plans to escalate the Suez front—in time for them to impose a veto, if they see fit. In effect, when they accepted Article VII the Egyptians promised not to resume shooting without Russian consent."

But what about Article VIII? This is more menacing, but it is too soon to tell whether it foreshadows major new shipments of Soviet arms to Cairo. The Israelis are insisting that it does, and are already invoking Article VIII as justification for the promise of more American weapons to Tel Aviv—which would escalate the Middle East arms race yet another notch and probably assure a parallel Soviet response.

"We've known for some time," says a prominent American diplomat, "that the Soviets want to reduce their operational role in Egypt—it's terribly risky. We have reason to believe that they've done just that in the Suez Canal zone; most of the missile sites now are probably manned by Egyptians, supervised by some Soviet technicians. So the problem here is not simply one of more Soviet hardware—the Egyptians have already got more of that than they can use. The treaty would really alarm us only if it meant that the Russians were reversing their position and promising the Egyptians a lot more operational personnel—pilots and the rest. In that event, Washington might see the situation as transcending the Arab-Israeli conflict, and worry whether the Russians were outflanking NATO."

For their part, this is precisely one of the fears that the Egyptians wish to inspire in Washington—in the desperate hope that the United States at last will apply strong pressure on the Israelis to evacuate the Sinai before the danger to America's global strategy escalates still more. For despite all of the steadfast American optimism, and despite the Egyptians' own persistent longing for a peaceful settlement if it can be achieved, the Egyptians have despaired of the Rogers initi-

ative. The cautious expectations that President Sadat entertained in early May, when the Secretary was his guest in Cairo, had, by early June, all but vanished in his frustration and impatient anger. "I'm not interested in further questions, notes, or negotiations with the Americans," he says. "We have been doing that for a year, and it's achieved nothing. Rogers himself told me, 'We have nothing more to ask of Egypt.' We've made our own position clear a hundred times—we will not reopen the Canal unless we are sure it will lead to a total Israeli evacuation of our land. All I want to know now is—what are the Americans going to do, and when?"

If the Americans do nothing it is very possible that Sadat will resume some sort of limited warfare along the Suez Canal—with or without Soviet agreement, treaty or no treaty. Again, the Russians might be dragged into the conflict, this time simply to save Sadat from being overthrown by his own exasperated army. The Soviets would still be able to veto any suicidal crossing of the Canal, but they might endorse saturation shelling, pinprick commando raids along the Israeli bank, and limited aircraft bombings deeper into Sinai—all in the hope that the ensuing losses would induce the Israelis to be more tractable about leaving the Arab territories.

The Egyptians unquestionably possess sufficient firepower to make life extremely bloody for the Israelis entrenched in the Bar-Ley line on the Canal's eastern bank. Should the Israelis themselves attempt deep air sorties or a troop crossing westward toward Cairo (as Gen. Ezer Weizmann has suggested they should, in the event of war) they would probably incur heavy losses—because of the pervasive Soviet air-defense system which now extends from the top of the Nile Delta deep into Upper Egypt at Aswan. Conversely, it is doubtful that the Egyptians could inflict major damage on Israeli positions deep in Sinai or in Israel itself unless the Russians abandon their present prudence and consent to fly the planes. "Either Sadat has to get 800 Soviet pilots," says a skeptical Western air attaché in Cairo, "or wait five years to wage a serious war with Israel."

Nevertheless, Sadat keeps talking of "the battle of destiny" and now announces that 1971 will be the "decisive year"—just as Nasser swore that 1968, 1969 and 1970 respectively would be the "decisive year." Much of this may be bluster to frighten the United States into putting more pressure on Israel, but in fact Sadat has little choice. He must indulge in such bellicose pronouncements to buy more time and to convince America, Israel and his own army that he means business. Whether the Egyptian Army itself truly possesses the will to fight a "battle of destiny"—as did the Algerians and the Vietcong—is another matter. I have my doubts, and I wonder whether Sadat does.

And perhaps I am being too logical. The mood in the Middle East is explosive. In such a mood, logic—and all of its restraints—could become the first casualties.

While Sadat broods over his meager options, the Egyptian people are left to wonder what, in the meantime, will happen to them. For example, what of Egypt's "Socialist transformation"? If anything is clear, it is that Sadat has no intention of turning Egypt into a collectivist society after the model of the Soviet Union. The Russians may read the treaty that way, but the Egyptians are as jealous as before of their national independence, and they consider the treaty as a political alliance, not an ideological bond.

Indeed, Sadat knows that if he is ever to achieve his vision of an Egypt founded on "faith and technology," he will more than ever need the skills of his growing managerial class, and the last pill those bourgeois technocrats will swallow is Soviet-style Socialism. Thus, while he has placed

a pair of doctrinaire Marxists in his Government (to impress the Russians?) and while he will ritually repeat the slogans of Socialism in his speeches, in practice his policy will probably creep in the other direction. As he has clearly shown in his decrees and in his leniency toward the private sector, he wants more free enterprise, more personal incentives, more private investment—because he has observed the uneven results of Nasser's nationalization laws and he considers a liberal economy more efficient.

"No efficiency without freedom"—that is the dominant slogan of educated Egyptians now. Whatever his motives for doing so—I surmise they were mixed—Sadat has stimulated an intense thirst for freedom which he will be bound in some measure to satisfy. He is promising his people a permanent Constitution very soon, and has appointed some distinguished jurists to help write it. The jurists are taking him at his word; in some very frank articles in the press, they are insisting that the slogan "sovereignty of law" will remain meaningless if it is not backed up by iron-clad guarantees—of freedom of the press, of *habeas corpus*, of trial by jury, of truly independent courts. Sadat has also appointed the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court in the Arab Socialist Union; the elections will probably be free—or at least freer than the last ones. It is likely that extreme leftists will be encouraged not to run.

I have known Egypt for 15 years, and I have never heard Egyptians express themselves as openly as they do now—though I must emphasize that even during its most repressive moments under Nasser, Egypt was never the kind of grotesque police state we have observed in Eastern Europe. What is more refreshing, however, is the new mood of realism in this quixotic nation. More and more Egyptians are coming to understand that they cannot seriously compete with Israel so long as Egypt itself remains a backward country. And in understanding that, the Egyptians paradoxically are relinquishing their desire to see Israel destroyed. "If only the Israelis would leave Sinai," they say again and again, "then we could turn our faces home, and by God, how we could build this country!"

I am persuaded of Egypt's desire for peace. I am persuaded that Sadat would sign a treaty of peace with Israel, an that his people and his army would accept it, so long as it did not involve the loss of land which has been part of Egypt for millennia. I am persuaded that Sadat has the will to do this, if only because Egypt's internal problems have become so horrendous that peace alone will render them possible to resolve.

Having said this, one is left with the ironies and contradictions of Anwar Sadat's present policies. He has rid himself of Russia's friends, then signed a restrictive treaty with the Russian. He has invoked democracy and the rule of law, then—without too delicate a regard for either—swept all his suspected rivals off to jail. He has promised real power to the people, and gathered most of the Government into his own hands. He is liberalizing the economy in the name of Socialism. He wants peace, but he may go to war.

The armed forces are his strongest pillar—but for how long? He can count on them till autumn anyway, perhaps till Christmas. If by that time he cannot produce a peaceful solution in the Sinai, they may force him to wage a war he will most likely lose. What new upheavals then? Anwar Sadat has a violent past. Beneath his urbane exterior, we must assume that primitive emotions abide. If he were pushed to the wall, would his old brutality erupt? One hopes not, but if it does we can only lament that it is probably the Egyptian people who will have to pay.

## NEED FOR A NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY

HON. J. J. PICKLE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, recently I have addressed this body to remind my colleagues of an impending energy crisis. Some have responded with new concerns; others remain ambivalent. In order to cultivate a greater awareness and concern for this problem, I would like to explore the general nature of energy consumption and its importance to society.

The pioneers that first settled this country relied primarily on human muscles to provide the energy required to sustain an existence in the primitive wilderness; energy to build shelters, till fields, and fabricate clothing. A man's total energy needs amounted to little more than he could himself generate. Since that time, the U.S. per capita energy consumption has steadily risen along with the standard of living.

It is estimated that a full-grown man can sustain an average power output of one-twentieth horsepower—37 watts—during an 8-hour workday. Today a man commands twice that amount every time he flips a light switch, 30 times it when he mows his lawn, and 3,000 times as much power whenever he starts his car. And these are only examples of the ways in which Americans directly consume energy. Few people stop to think that whenever they purchase market goods they are indirectly consuming various forms of energy; energy to extract the raw materials, to manufacture the product, and to distribute it to the retailers. Indeed, energy is an essential ingredient in the conversion of raw resources into man's requirements for food, clothing, and shelter. Thus, there is a direct relation between a country's energy consumption and its standard of living. It is no coincidence that the United States, with less than 6 percent of the world's population, consumes more than one-third of the energy.

It is important, Mr. Speaker, that our colleagues comprehend the full implications of this concept. The progressive social goals which they pursue are, indeed, admirable—admirable but meaningless unless we can generate and sustain the energy levels required by such achievements. For example, the abolition of poverty would add millions of new consumers to the American market. This, in turn, would require a proportional increase in our national energy production to meet inflating market demands. The implication is that we cannot significantly improve the living standards for any segment of our population without simultaneously increasing national energy consumption. Thus, the economic and social well-being of our Nation is directly dependent upon the availability of dependable energy sources. Furthermore, the importance of adequate energy



resources to matters of national security should be self-evident. Thus, to meet the challenge of years to come, and to make real the unfulfilled dreams of millions of Americans, we must first provide fuel to kindle the flame of social and economic prosperity.

Mr. Speaker, I have attempted to establish the dependency of our national well-being on the availability of energy sources. But dependency alone does not merit concern. The energy gap is not a legitimate problem unless the availability of adequate fuel supplies is uncertain. What are our future energy prospects?

Within the last 50 years the United States has witnessed a steady decline in the ratio of energy consumption per unit of economic output. Although both GNP and total energy consumption have continued to rise, the rate of increase for GNP has always exceeded the rate of increase for energy consumption. In a sense, this can be interpreted as a progressive improvement in the efficiency of energy utilization.

Unfortunately, this trend has been reversed in recent years. Since 1966, U.S. productivity has been characterized by increasing energy consumptions per unit of economic output.

This reversal can be attributed to several factors, perhaps the most significant of which is the consumer use of electricity. Many people are not aware that, although most electrical devices operate very efficiently, the electrical generation process is only 30 to 35 percent efficient. This trend is likely to continue until the development of such exotic energy sources as the breeder reactor, nuclear fusion, and MHD—magnetohydrodynamics.

A second factor that has just begun to lower the efficiency of energy utilization is the expanded use of pollution abatement devices. The additional energy expenditures required to operate such devices can be expected to increase as environmental control measures are tightened.

Thus, the energy requirements needed to sustain future economic and social advancements will be significantly greater than our present needs. Many experts estimate that U.S. energy needs will double by the year 1990 and triple by the end of the century. And in the face of this need, U.S. energy reserves are declining at unprecedented rates.

Mr. Speaker, the need is obvious. The realization of our social ambitions; indeed, our very social and economic existence relies upon the success of our energy policy. I appeal to my colleagues to explore this matter. We must take remedial measures now to insure the future adequacy of our energy supplies. I have already introduced legislation designed to mitigate the shortage of natural gas. But this, in itself, is not enough. We must develop a national energy policy and enact the supplementary legislation needed to make it work. Too much is at stake to permit our energy policy to meander along a broken path with no definitive guidelines to chart the way.

### VAST LOCKHEED WASTE CHARGED BY FORMER MANAGER

**HON. PARREN J. MITCHELL**

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Speaker, the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. has asked this Government to cosign a loan to assure the continued existence of the company. The loan is of unprecedented size, and so must lead each Member to consider what the ramifications of this guarantee might be. Mr. Haughton, the chairman of the board of the corporation has cited as precedent such granting activities of FHA and the Defense Department program for defense contractors, but home loans do not amount to \$250,000,000 and the Defense program is limited to \$10,000,000 per loan. It becomes clear that this loan guarantee is a new and dangerous step in governmental subsidization of big business, while neglecting the needs of the poor and unorganized.

There are many issues involved in this proposed guarantee—the economic viability of the plane, the priority deserved by another airplane—not the least of which is the importance and merit of the company to be supported. Mr. Haughton has continually stressed the debt that this country owes to Lockheed for the fine service it has provided on past programs. There is the further contention that the Government has helped bring on the troubles of Lockheed by the implementation of a program within the Department of Defense known as total-package procurement, and the unjust settlement of both the Cheyenne helicopter program and the C-5A Galaxie air transport program.

The settlement does not seem that malevolent, especially in view of the low-interest loan—not demanding repayment until 1974—that the Government so generously gave to Lockheed. But beyond such a judgment, there is a question of how well Lockheed has performed in the Government's service. I wonder just how much special consideration they are entitled. In the Washington Post of July 18, an article by Mr. Morton Mintz sheds much light upon past performance of Lockheed. It shows a very probable source for the overrun, entirely apart from the ramifications of the Defense Department's procurement program; namely, inadequate cost accounting and inventory procedures. Such a failure not only calls into question the debt of the Government to Lockheed for loyal and faithful service, but also casts doubt upon the sagacity of becoming further involved with a company that would neglect the development of such necessary practices.

It is with great pleasure that I introduce Mr. Mintz's article into the RECORD:

VAST LOCKHEED WASTE CHARGED BY FORMER MANAGER

(By Morton Mintz)

MARIETTA, GA., July 17.—A former Lockheed Aircraft Corp. assistant division manager has given The Washington Post voluminous documentary evidence which, he

charges, reveals "disastrously rotten management" that wasted "untold millions of dollars."

Mismanagement was Lockheed's "real problem," accounting for much of the estimated \$2 billion or more in cost overruns on the giant C-5A transport plane, Henry M. Durham said in an interview.

He ridiculed a key argument made on Capitol Hill by Lockheed chairman Daniel J. Haughton in behalf of the pending bill to save the company from bankruptcy with a government guarantee for a loan of up to \$250 million.

"The problem was not so much our ability to manage, but the type of contracts under which we had to operate—contracts that now have been found unworkable and are no longer used on new programs," Haughton told the House Banking and Currency Committee Tuesday.

In contrast, Durham cites examples of inefficient, wasteful and even, he contends, improper practices. His records show that the examples were among those he had provided Lockheed in pressing for reforms.

Durham says he was in charge of major production-control activities for the C-5A program, running "a control and supply organization" that procured, stocked, issued and delivered parts at the Lockheed-Georgia division.

A company spokesman, however, minimized his importance by referring to him as "a supply man" and not an executive.

Initially, in responding to a reporter's inquiry, W. P. Frech, director of manufacturing at Lockheed-Georgia, spoke of Durham as "a good employee who worked hard."

Later in the conversation, however, Frech characterized Durham as "a disgruntled employee" who lacked "justification for his actions" and was "not in a position to know" whereof he spoke.

Durham's charges are "false—all of them, practically," Frech said. "We have minute, functional systems to prove that all systems are 'go'."

The controversy may be clarified on Capitol Hill, where Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), a leading opponent of the loan bill, has asked Durham to testify before the Senate Subcommittee on Economy in Government. No date has been set.

In alleging mismanagement of the C-5A program, Durham cites these examples:

A survey of five C-5As showed that from 65 to 87 percent of the parts issued, and presumably installed before final assembly, in the month ending April 6, 1970, were reported missing. The specific figures, as listed in a memo to Durham from a subordinate, W. T. Garrison:

Ship 0020 (the company's designation for the 20th C-5A), 1,356 parts issued, 893 missing; Ship 0021, 1,533 issued, 1,038 missing; Ship 0022, 1,492 issued, 1,120 missing; Ship 0023, 1,039 issued, 912 missing; Ship 0024, 364 issued, 305 missing.

Trying to find out what lay at the bottom of such problems, Durham, who was with Lockheed for 19 years, and Ron Newberry, of the C-5 Production Task Force, investigated a random sampling of 160 parts listed as "missing" from Ships 0009 and 0010.

Their main finding, made in a report of Oct. 13, 1969, was that 67.5 percent of the parts claimed to be missing actually were—but that Lockheed nonetheless had certified the affected sections of the aircraft to be complete, Durham said.

RECEIVED PAYMENT

By so certifying, Durham contends, the company was able to obtain Air Force payment for work that had yet to be accomplished, and, at the same time, to be credited for an "on schedule" performance.

An additional 16.3 per cent of the parts claimed to be missing actually were not, the report said.

The investigation report also revealed that 8.2 per cent of the parts listed as missing had been installed, but for no recorded reasons and in violation of company rules.

An additional 5.5 per cent of the parts were where they were supposed to be, the report said.

Finally, 2.5 per cent of the parts reported missing should not have been replaced because they were specified by engineering requirements, the report said.

Durham did not so much as hint that a single C-5A was delivered to the Air Force in unsafe condition. His concern, instead, was overwhelmingly with management efficiency in the control of aircraft parts.

Quality-control and production personnel, in reports supposedly reflecting the true condition of Ship 0023, said that 30 parts were missing from the wing of this C-5A when it moved to final assembly on March 11, 1970. But five days later, in a memo to a superior, Durham said that an audit showed the number of parts not actually installed, or not recorded by managers as having been installed, to be 1,084, or 36 times as many as those claimed.

Durham said that Lockheed reordered very small parts (VSPs), costing from 16 cents to \$37.50 each, on the basis of supplies in stores or warehouses rather than on the basis of what he calls "an adequate inventory accountability system." One result, he said, was that VSPs were "scattered on floors, tables, in boxes, heaps—all over the place. They were being swept up and dumped. Finally, somebody caught on . . ."

But as of May 1, 1970, according to a memo he wrote on that date, VSPs that "should cost around \$560,000 per aircraft" are "currently exceeding over \$1,000,000 per ship." On this basis, he calculated, the overrun merely on VSPs for the C-5A program could come to \$30 million.

(The 1965 contract estimate of the price for each C-5A was \$20 million; 115 were to be built. Since then, the price has approximately tripled, and 81 are to be built.)

After Ship 0008 made its first flight, about 2,000 parts previously procured on the basis of being needed were returned to stock as not needed, Durham told V. H. Brady, his immediate superior, in a memo on Nov. 24, 1969. This wasted "thousands and thousands of dollars," he told a reporter. "It happened on all ships, constantly."

When a ship arrives at the flight line, Durham said, it is theoretically in such an advanced state of completion that, apart from engineering changes, only components such as radar gear and flight equipment need be added.

But after Ships 0009 through 0014 arrived at the flight line, calls went out for replacements of 15,291 "missing" parts and 5,294 defective, or "butchered," parts, according to internal reports, Durham said.

When a C-5A moved to flight-test status it was, again in theory, almost ready to be flown, Durham explained. But on the basis of the number of calls made for parts for the first eight C-5As to reach flight test, he calculated that 79,600 items had to be delivered, mostly to replace missing parts.

After Ship 0020 reached final assembly, calls went out on a single day, April 8, 1970, for replacements for 48 parts that previously had been delivered and signed for, Durham's aide, Garrison, told him in a memo. On the same day, 42 similar duplicate part requests were made for Ship 0021, and 27 for Ship 0022, the memo noted.

Once delivered as a result of such duplicate requests, large numbers of parts could not be installed, Durham said in the interview. The reason, he said, was that the com-

ponents to which they were attached were strewn around—"on the floor, on tables, in people's pockets, under tables . . ."

Redundant ordering, he said, frequently occurred because production personnel, impatient with a procedure requiring them to certify, and quality-control specialists to verify, that a part was defective, would additionally invoke a speedier procedure intended exclusively for missing parts. In this way, "thousands of parts were being double-ordered and double procured."

After a wing cracked on a rounded C-5A undergoing simulated flight conditions on July 13, 1969, Lockheed set up a wing-modification program in Palmdale, Calif. Durham said that the Marietta plant then got a "panic" order for kits of two or more parts each. "Thousands of parts" had to be rounded up, packaged and shipped—Air Express—to Palmdale, he said.

In a memo on April 28, 1970, E. V. Shaddix, manager of the modification program, told Durham the kits were not needed and "are being returned to you for re-stocking . . ."

In a memo of Nov. 3, 1969, to Brady, his boss, Durham told of the shipment of numerous parts kits to Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., following a careful inspection to assure that each listed part actually was present. On Oct. 30, 1969, Shaddix phoned from Eglin to tell Durham that several needed parts were missing, the memo related. J. L. Ferrell, manager of the company's flight-test control department, then went to Florida to investigate.

Ferrell found that a root problem was the failure of planning personnel to order all the necessary parts to start with, the memo said. That aside, Ferrell discovered the parts situation to be "out of control." The memo continued:

"For example, some . . . kits were piled under a coat rack . . . All of these kits were partially opened. Blueprints and parts were strewn on the floor, lying on cabinets, . . . stocked up in hallways and on top of desks . . ."

A Lockheed logistics supervisor said that a company flight-test crew, on arriving at Eglin, "demanded all of the kits, removed them from whatever control they were under, broke them open, and started to work," the memo reported.

"He further indicated that since that time he has had no control of the situation at all," the Durham memo continued. "In fact, he said he has accumulated and stored several parts in his hotel room."

At a Lockheed parts plant in Chattanooga, Durham charged, procurement personnel commonly bought items at "premium prices" from outside suppliers, even though the same items were stocked in the company's own "stores" in Marietta, as could be readily determined by "pressing a button" for a computer printout.

An April 2 purchase order shows that, for example, Lockheed ordered a small amount of sheet steel from a frequently patronized supplier, the J. M. Tull Metals Co. of Atlanta. Durham obtained a print-out showing that Lockheed already had similar sheet steel on hand in Marietta, he said. On a square-foot basis, Durham said, Tull Metals' price was \$3.15; Lockheed's was 67 cents, about one-fifth as much.

Numerous aircraft parts must be built to extremely close tolerances or must meet other "exotic" requirements, according to Durham. But Lockheed, at exorbitant cost, sometimes set such requirements needlessly, for noncritical equipment such as a missile dolly used only on the ground, he said.

Durham illustrated his point with a purchase order, dated last Feb. 15, for some rod ends from Southwest Products Co. of Monrovia, Calif. The price was \$437.30 each. Rod ends meeting cruder specifications, but perfectly adequate, would cost only a few dollars each, he said.

Another purchase order shows that a year earlier, Lockheed bought identical rod ends from the same company—but at a unit price of \$336.30, or \$101 less.

At Lockheed's Chattanooga plant, Durham said, he found expensive tools and equipment "rusting away in the back yard." These items included drills, carbide cutters, and 18 castings that were "concealed under scrap metal and other junk." He said Lockheed has paid a total of \$10,488.45 for 13 of the castings.

"Management people walked through this jungle every day but took no action to correct it," Durham said in the interview.

Also at Chattanooga, Durham said, he found that the stockrooms carried 4,894 categories of miscellaneous small parts (MSPs), but that only 813 actually were necessary. Yet, Durham said, "many of the unneeded parts at Chattanooga were critically needed in Marietta . . ."

In a May 8, memo, copies of which he sent to Lockheed chairman Daniel Haughton and to R. H. Fuhrman, president of the Lockheed-Georgia, Durham said that "Ship 0002 was a shell when it was originally delivered to flight test even though it was reported to be in good shape . . ."

"On Ship 0008, . . . over 10,000 parts were delivered and over 4,000 finally returned to normal stock because they were not required to get the ship in a flying condition." (After Ship 008 became airborne, Durham reported that 2,000 more parts were returned as unneeded, as previously noted.)

President Lyndon B. Johnson flew down here on March 2, 1968, for the "roll-out" ceremony for the first C5A, Ship 0001. But major portions of that aircraft, including the nose cap, claimed by the company to be complete, were "window-dressing"—"dubbed" or "faked" units hastily contrived to look impressive but, Durham charged, nowhere near functional.

Ordinarily, engineering changes in the C-5As required parts removal and replacement. Often, this could be accomplished with reworking, or modification, of the originals.

But, Durham said, "millions of dollars worth of purchased parts were erroneously scrapped" and substitutes purchased usually because the Planning Division had called for scrapping rather than reworking. The division was "under great pressure to reduce the number of behind-schedule engineering jobs," he said.

Durham complained about this to Lockheed-Georgia president Fuhrman. Abuses such as this occur "with the full knowledge of many members of management up and down the ranks," Durham said in a memo dated April 17, 1970.

"I have been very disappointed with my superiors for lacking the fortitude and courage to go to the top if necessary to get serious problems corrected," he told Fuhrman.

"I was specifically instructed to direct all reports and comments directly to Mr. Brady (Durham's immediate superior) but could not get him to do anything concrete," the letter said.

"I realize now that it is because certain members of management feel they must conform and not rock the nice, tight little boat they have constructed.

"I believe one cannot afford to jeopardize the company by conforming to such standards. One must operate with directness and integrity in the best interests of the company, not the individual."

#### UNLIKELY CANDIDATE

Henry Durham's 19 years with Lockheed might well have marked him as an unlikely candidate to become a whistle-blower.

Born 44 years ago in Bradenton, Fla., he attended Georgia State and the University



of Georgia for 3½ years, served 3½ years in the Marine Corps and then joined Lockheed as a dispatcher. Moving up through the ranks, he was named an assistant division manager, responsible for all production-control for C-5As moving to flight-line and flight-test status, in October, 1968.

Most of the time at Lockheed, he said, he worked 11-hour days and 7-day weeks, usually without claiming overtime.

His wife, Nan, recalled how it became routine long ago for her to prepare two suppers each day, an early one for their two children and herself and a late one for her husband.

#### A CORPORATION MAN

Durham, not without a touch of bitterness, says he had been a corporation man through and through. "If Lockheed wanted it, I assumed it was good," he said.

He was a hawk on the Vietnam war but now has "sort of moderated my views." Decals of the American Flag and the National Rifle Association adorn the rear window of his jeep-type vehicle.

At Lockheed, where he had as many as 300 employees under him, Durham won lavish praise.

"Among his many qualifications are unquestioned loyalty, energy, initiative, product and corporate knowledge, ambition, and an insistence on a job well done—first of all by himself, and secondly by all reporting to him," R. C. Goddard, who succeeded V. H. Brady as Durham's immediate superior, said in a letter of Feb. 24, 1970.

"It is our unqualified opinion that Mr. Durham would represent a real asset to any organization to which he might be assigned," Goddard added.

Later, in a formal commendation, Goddard said, "For a job well done under adverse conditions, this company expresses its sincere appreciation."

But a few days after signing the commendation, Goddard and Brady told Durham that he must accept either a demotion—to manage the C-5H refurbishment program, with a pay cut of \$20 week—or a layoff.

Durham said the explanation he was given was that only he was qualified to manage the program. He didn't believe it. The real explanation, he insists, had to be his relentless fight against inefficiency and waste.

In the spring of 1970, he carried his case to Lockheed-Georgia president Fuhrman. "He listened, mostly," Durham said of the 1½ hour interview.

#### APRIL LETTER

Following up, he told Fuhrman in the April 12, 1970, memo how he had been disillusioned:

"I expected all concerned to come to the rescue, but, instead, received a very adverse reaction which continues.

"I discussed the problem with my immediate superiors, imploring them to take it up the line, to no avail. . . .

"I was specifically instructed to direct all reports and comments directly to Mr. Brady but could not get him to do anything concrete."

Durham opted for the layoff. "I was going to be my own man," he said in the interview. "You can become a pawn—bent, twisted."

Telling Goddard of his decision, Durham said in a letter, "I do not have the audacity to say I am always right. However, I do plan to always act in accordance with my honest opinions, principles and convictions, regardless of the consequences."

Durham had asked for two weeks to train a successor. But the day after he sent the letter, Goddard startled him by telling him to leave that very afternoon and refusing to explain why.

Durham recalled the episode a week later in a letter to Fuhrman. After "19 years of dedicated service," Durham told him, he was "rushed out" of the plant, with an initial re-

fusal even to let him gather up his personal belongings.

Such treatment usually was reserved for a person who has been fired, the letter said, and it was "monstrous."

A week later, on May 25, Durham chronicled his story to Lockheed chairman Daniel Haughton.

In a 3-page, single-spaced letter supported by copies of documents such as given to The Post, Durham told of a call from V. H. Brady directing him "to keep quiet and hide" a specific missing-parts report; of a dawning "horrible realization" that data were being withheld from corporate management (including Haughton), and of "charts produced to illustrate how beautiful everything was rather than the true facts."

#### PROTECTIVE SOCIETY

Durham also told Haughton of "what I choose to call the Lockheed-Georgia Management Protective Society" . . . To be a member, one must worry more about protecting his hide and the hides of his superiors than working in the best interests of the company and the country."

After he met with Fuhrman, Durham told Haughton, "I was ostracized, criticized, pushed into a corner and eventually downgraded."

Yet, he told the board chairman, he was "not seeking revenge"; neither was he asking for reinstatement or a new job. Rather than work with the people he had been with at Lockheed, Durham said, he would go elsewhere and "dig another foxhole."

Despite all of this, Durham still had faith in the company. "Lockheed management as a whole throughout the corporation is beyond reproach," he told Haughton. "I know the Lockheed Corporation had to be built on integrity to be as large as it is . . ."

Haughton, replying almost at once, said he had read the letter, "perused" the documentation, and planned to talk with Fuhrman and request an investigation.

Once the investigation is complete, Haughton, Fuhrman or the investigator would contact Durham, the board chairman said. (No one ever contacted him, Durham says).

"I hope you find a job that you will be happy with," Haughton's letter concluded.

After leaving Lockheed, Durham looked for a job, painted his house and spent more time with his family than he had for many years.

#### ASKED TO COME BACK

Then Frech, the director of manufacturing at Lockheed-Georgia, asked him to come back. "Not with those people," Durham remembers replying.

A couple of weeks later, Frech phoned again to renew the invitation. This time, Durham accepted—even though it meant a cut of more than \$80 a week below his previous salary, and working 100 miles away in Chattanooga where, at still more cost, he would have to rent an apartment for use during the workweek.

Durham says he took the offer, last August, because he asked for, and got, assurance from Frech that the "mess" at Lockheed would be straightened out, because he still was confident that the investigation Haughton promised would be made, and because he was sure the investigation would vindicate him.

Once in Chattanooga, however, Durham said he found things continuing much as before. Also as before, he protested, again to no avail.

Thus, on August 24, in a detailed memo to C. L. Starnes, manager of the Chattanooga facility, Durham said, "The stock situation is, at the best, intolerable. Parts are crowded, piled and jammed into bins . . . Housekeeping is non-existent.

Last May, Durham, saying he, decided "I couldn't stand it any more," asked again to

be laid off. Frech recalled it differently, saying Durham left after being told that, with employment shrinking, he'd have to "take a little bit of a downgrade."

Before leaving, Durham hand-wrote a 23-page letter to Starnes, including instructions for his successor and "observations and constructive criticism."

The letter included detailed analyses of the familiar problems, reports on such reforms as Durham had been able to achieve, a plea for a crackdown on "shabby performance" and a closing wish for "good luck."

For two months now, Durham has been trying to start a business selling aerosol products to retail accounts in the Atlanta area. His wife has become the breadwinner, working as a caseworker for the Cobb County Family and Children Services.

#### TOP CRITIC OF THIEU REFUSED CANDIDACY

### HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, a report in the Washington Post of July 18, 1971, reveals another instance where the impending elections in South Vietnam are being manipulated by the Thieu government:

#### TOP CRITIC OF THIEU REFUSED CANDIDACY (By Peter A. Jay)

SAIGON, July 17.—President Thieu's most outspoken critic in South Vietnam's National Assembly was told today he will not be permitted to run for a second term because he is considered too sympathetic to the communists.

Ngo Cong Duc, publisher of the antigovernment newspaper Tin Sang and the assemblyman from the Mekong Delta province of Vinhbinh, was disqualified as a candidate by the government-appointed committee on elections from his province.

The provincial committee's decision is not final, and Duc plans to appeal to the Saigon based central elections committee. But an important test of President Thieu's willingness to tolerate open opposition appeared to be in the making.

A few weeks ago, Duc was jailed in Vinhbinh and charged with assaulting a pro-government provincial councilman after the councilman spat beer in his face.

Later, when he went to Vinhbinh to file formally as a candidate for re-election, local officials at first refused to admit him to the province offices. They later relented—perhaps because Duc was accompanied by foreign journalists and photographers.

There is no doubt here that Thieu wants to get rid of Duc, legally or illegally. But any move to do so is sure to meet with strong resistance from the American mission, which is doing its utmost to give the impending elections—both legislative and presidential—at least the appearance of honesty and openness.

Of the hundreds of candidates who have filed for the National Assembly's 152 seats, dozens were disqualified today. But Duc was the only one whose disqualification was obviously political.

Many of the others who were declared unqualified turned out to be deserters from the army, draft-dodgers, or civil servants who had been fired from their jobs.

Former Gen. Tran Van Don, a participant in the 1963 coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem and an opponent of the war, was accepted as a candidate from the strongly anti-government province of Quangngai.

In addition to Duc, one other incumbent assemblyman was disqualified by a provincial elections committee.

He was Nguyen Van Dau of Dinh Tuong province in the delta, a virtually unknown legislator whom the province committee said "has supplied the Vietcong with money." It was not known whether he planned to appeal the local committee decision.

Final results of the qualifying process in all 44 provinces were not yet available in Saigon today. Before the screening began, 1,404 candidates had filed for assembly seats. In the Saigon area, where final figures were available, about 8 per cent of those seeking to run were disqualified.

#### IRRATIONAL FINANCE

### HON. ROBERT N. GIAIMO

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Speaker, hearings conducted by the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations have focused on some of the difficulties Members of Congress have had and may continue to have in guiding the appropriations and overall budgeting processes. At a time when the past and present fiscal years are estimated to be generating a total of \$55 billion in new debt, and when service costs on existing national debt exceeds \$20 billion, it behooves all Members to consider carefully tools which will give us a better grasp on Federal expenditures.

Changing the fiscal year to coincide with the calendar year may be one such tool, as many witnesses, among them representatives of the Committee for Economic Development, have contended. Congress has been and will continue to be critical of many phenomena in the business and industrial worlds, but should also realize that the expertise of those worlds in financial management is considerable, and may provide useful instruction for Federal finances.

The editorial from the Wall Street Journal of July 6, 1971, entitled "Irrational Finance," and inserted below, shows that the eyes of the business world are on the workings of the Federal fiscal process and on the hearings of this embryonic committee:

#### IRRATIONAL FINANCE

As the federal government enters a new fiscal year, its financial arrangements for the 12 months are incomplete. Federal agencies are likely to operate for months on temporary authorizations, pending final Congressional approval of their plans.

That's a sloppy way to run either a government or a business. In recent testimony before the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, the Committee for Economic Development was urging, once again, that the lawmakers do something about it.

Congress plainly should become more efficient. Even if it does, though, the CED is convinced that the lawmakers need more time for proper consideration of the enormous range of federal activities. And they obviously should not be in the ridiculous position of approving spending after the fact.

Postponements of appropriations past the start of the fiscal year "are certainly contrary to the original intent" of the Constitution, said Wayne E. Thompson, chairman of the

CED's Committee for Improvement of Management in Government.

"The final supplemental appropriation for fiscal 1969," he noted, "carried delay to a final extreme. It did not obtain Congressional approval until nine days after the end of the fiscal year. . . . If such actions are not unconstitutional, as we believe them to be, they are surely indefensible."

Under the CED proposal, the fiscal year would be changed to coincide with the calendar year, so that Congress would have the preceding 12 months to do its budgetary work instead of approximately six months at present. As the CED concedes, the change would be no panacea, but at least it would be one step away from the current highly irrational arrangement.

#### ADDRESS BY ANDREW BRIMMER

### HON. JOHN BRADEMAS

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mr. BRADEMAS. Mr. Speaker, inflation and the allocation of our national resources is a subject of continuing concern for us all. Indeed, the Evans-Novak column of July 16, 1971, quotes administration sources predicting a Federal budget deficit of as much as \$35 billion for the coming fiscal year.

In this connection, I believe the remarks of Andrew F. Brimmer at the commencement exercises of Middlebury College at Middlebury, Vt., on May 30, 1971, are valuable. Dr. Brimmer, who has been a distinguished member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System since 1966, spoke on the vital subject of "Inflation, Private Spending, and the Provision of Public Services."

Mr. Brimmer speaks with great eloquence on the need to give public spending priority over private consumption, if we are to prevent a deterioration of those public services which are provided by Federal, State, and local governments. He notes that the competition for national resources will become increasingly severe in the coming decade, and asks the Nation's leaders to give serious consideration to this continuing problem.

Mr. Speaker, I include Mr. Brimmer's remarks at this point in the RECORD:

#### INFLATION, PRIVATE SPENDING, AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES

(By Andrew F. Brimmer)

By tradition, the commencement season is supposed to be a joyful one: it is a time to celebrate accomplishment and a time to look ahead with hope. It certainly is not a time for pessimism and doubt about our goals and purposes as a people. Yet, at this juncture in the life of our nation, there is much doubt about us, and many of our goals are in open conflict. So, the commencement season this year appears to be a good time to stand aside from some of our day-to-day concerns to weigh alternative means of reconciling competing aims and thus enhance the prospects of achieving a more equitable society.

#### COMPETING CLAIMS ON NATIONAL RESOURCES

Unfortunately, the necessity of balancing-off competing claims on our national resources is not always appreciated. This clash of purposes is illustrated nowhere more clearly than in the drive to improve the economic position of the disadvantaged

(whether because of advanced age, race, or urban locality) and the effort to quicken progress in the preservation of our natural resources and to stop the pollution of our air and waterways. At first glance, it might appear to many observers that our abundant resources are large enough to support a faster pace of progress on all of these fronts—to meet our social and environmental needs simultaneously while continuing to improve our general standard of living—especially so since we are reducing the volume of resources set aside for military purposes.

Sadly, however, a careful analysis of the present and prospective claims on our national output suggests that such an accomplishment is likely to be far more difficult than it might first appear. In fact, it is becoming increasingly evident that the people of this nation will have to make an even greater effort to establish—and enforce—a more careful array of priorities than has been made in recent years. Even a cursory review of the competing public and private demands for the goods and services produced in our economy makes it clear that, even with the end of the Vietnam War, the budgets for all levels of government—Federal, State, and local—will be just as tight in 1975 as they are in the current year.

Moreover, while the growth of our population and the campaigns for improvement in public services have placed strains on available revenues, inflationary pressures have also imposed a heavy burden—a burden from which governmental units could not escape readily. And what is even more distressing, the forces which have generated inflationary pressures may persist for some time.

Under these circumstances, I see an inherent conflict among the major competing claims on our future production of goods and services. This competition is not simply between the private and public sectors—but also between sorely needed public initiatives and public programs already in existence, many of which have out-lived their original purposes. Over the next few years, this conflict may be intensified rather than lessened—as the private sector (particularly consumers) strives to expand its relative claims on national production. In my opinion, to help reconcile these conflicting objectives and to help provide the revenue to finance the growing demand for public services, it may be necessary to raise the average level of taxation in the United States—rather than lower it as so many taxpayers hope will be the trend. Consequently, despite the longing on the part of many persons for a lessened role for government, the latter may actually have to assume a proportionally greater responsibility if the expanding demand for public services is to be met.

I would now like to discuss each of these major points more fully.

#### INFLATION AND THE RISING COSTS OF PUBLIC SERVICE

A great deal of concern has been expressed in recent years about the rising costs of State and local government services. Some of this concern undoubtedly can be traced to the greatly increased demand for public services—reflecting larger numbers of children to be educated in the public schools, larger enrollments in publicly-supported colleges and universities, a larger population needing increased medical care, a greater dependence of poor persons on public welfare, more traffic on streets and highways, more crime, more air and water pollution, more parks and recreation facilities—in fact, more of virtually every kind of service provided by States and local jurisdictions. Naturally, to meet these demands, expenditures by State and local governments had to rise. In fact, they more than tripled during the last 1½ decades, climbing from \$39 billion in 1955 to \$132 billion in 1969 (see Table 1, attached). In



terms of purchases of goods and services recorded in the gross national product (GNP) accounts, their spending also more than tripled over this period. In contrast, total GNP and personal consumption expenditures rose about 1½ times, and Federal Government spending expanded about 1¼ times.

#### RISE IN STATE AND LOCAL COSTS

All major State and local functions shared in the increased outlays in the 1955-69 period, but relative rise in expenditures for higher education was especially noticeable. Spending on local schools rose roughly in line with general expenditures as a whole. Public welfare costs increased somewhat more rapidly than total expenditures, and spending on highways lagged appreciably.

But the most dramatic feature of State and local government finances was the significant impact of inflation on their activities. For example, between 1955 and 1970, prices paid by these units rose at an annual average rate of 4.2 per cent, compared with 3.6 per cent for the Federal Government and 2.7 per cent for the economy as a whole.<sup>1</sup> In contrast, the rate of increase was 2.2 per cent for personal consumption expenditures, 2.7 per cent for business fixed investment, and 3.0 per cent for residential construction.

The differential impact of inflation is shown even more clearly by the experience of different sectors during the years 1965-70, the period of the most intense inflation associated with the Vietnam War. Again, State and local governments had to carry the greatest burden of inflation: for them prices rose at an annual average rate of 5.8 per cent, compared with 5.0 per cent for the Federal Government and 4.0 per cent for the country at large. The rate was 3.5 per cent for consumers, 3.4 per cent for business fixed investment, and 4.8 per cent for residential construction.

#### EFFECTS OF INFLATION

The effects of inflation on those units which provide our basic public services have been even more dramatic than is shown by the differential trends in prices. In fact, despite the enormous increase in the volume of services supplied, inflation has been the most important cause of the increase in the level of State and local government expenditures. This conclusion is supported strongly by the evidence in Table 1. An effort has been made to distribute the increase in expenditures, by major function, according to the source, giving rise to the higher level of spending. Three sources are identified: (1) workload (number of people served, number of school-age children, number of automobiles, number of beds in hospitals, etc.); (2) price increases (higher costs for the same volume of service); and (3) increases in scope or quality of service rendered. The contribution of each of these factors was calculated for two periods, 1955-69 and 1965-69.<sup>2</sup>

For all general expenditures combined, between 1955 and 1969, inflation accounted for well over two-fifths of the total increase in outlays—while one-quarter was due to workload, and less than one-third was accounted for by changes in scope or quality of services. The impact of inflation varied considerably among different functions. Higher prices had the most noticeable effect on the growth of expenditures on local schools (52 per cent) and basic urban services (51 per cent). The proportion of the rise in outlays due to inflation was below average in the case of public welfare (30 percent), higher education (36 per cent), and general administration (38 per cent). Only in the area of highways did workload account for a larger share of increased expenditures than did inflation—51 per cent vs 42 per cent. In two functional areas, changes in scope or quality of service outweighed inflation; these were public wel-

fare (70 per cent vs 30 per cent) and general administration (44 per cent vs 38 per cent).

When one looks at the years of the Vietnam War-related inflation, 1965-69, the general pattern is roughly the same—except that the impact of inflation is even greater. For all general expenditures, the proportion of the increase accounted for by inflation climbed to 47 percent. Only in the areas of public welfare and higher education was there a relative decline in the impact of higher prices. In both cases, a considerable expansion in the scope of coverage was more important. The rise in the incidence of inflation was particularly striking in the case of highways and basic urban services.

The reasons why inflation has had a severe impact on State and local governments are readily understood. Well over half of their total expenditures is accounted for by wages and salaries, and they have been under substantial pressure to raise compensation. These pressures in turn can be traced partly to efforts to offset increases in the cost of living and partly to the need to bring traditionally low wage and salary scales into better alignment with those in the private sector. Moreover, the sharp advances in construction costs in recent years have also had a severe impact on these governmental units.

#### INFLATION AND THE RISING COST OF DEBT FINANCING

The above are some of the direct effects of inflation on State and local governments. An important indirect effect is the significant increase in the cost of financing their debts. As is generally known, these jurisdictions rely heavily on the issuance of debt to finance a major share of their capital projects. For example, in the fiscal year 1969, their new debt issues amounted to \$18.9 billion; their capital outlays were \$28.2 billion. Since borrowing usually precedes spending (and since a small proportion of borrowing is for non-capital purposes), debt financing and capital outlays during a given year may not mesh closely. However, over time, capital spending is greatly influenced by the ability of State and local governments to borrow.

Between 1955 and 1969, the outstanding general debt of State and local governments rose from \$44.3 billion to \$133.5 billion, an increase of over 200 percent. During the same period, the Federal Government's debt rose from \$274.4 billion to \$353.7 billion, a gain of about 30 percent. In the later part of the period—in the years 1965-69—State and local indebtedness registered an increase of \$34 billion; an advance of about one-third. The corresponding increase in the Federal debt was \$36.4 billion and 12 percent.

However, the advance in interest cost was even more striking. In 1955, the average interest rate paid by State and local governments was 1.9 per cent.<sup>3</sup> By 1965, the average rate had risen to 2.5 per cent, and it rose further to 2.8 per cent in 1969. The corresponding average interest rates paid by the Federal Government were: 1955, 2.4 per cent; 1965, 2.8 per cent; and 1969, 3.8 per cent. Thus, in the last 1½ decades, the average cost of borrowing by State and local governments rose by almost one-half (although the proportionate rise was less than that experienced by the Federal Government where the increase was nearly three-fifths).

#### \$133 BILLION DEBT IN 1969

Another way to view the effects of higher interest rates on State and local governments is to look at the extra cost of maintaining a given volume of debt. If the average interest rate had remained unchanged between 1965 and 1969, the interest on the \$133.5 billion of debt outstanding in the latter year would have been \$3.3 billion—or nearly \$400 million (12 per cent) less than the \$3.7 billion they actually paid. If the average interest rate paid in 1955 had also been paid in 1969, the interest payments on

the debt outstanding in the latter year would have been \$2.5 billion—a saving of \$1.2 billion, or 48 per cent.

Of course, we know that State and local governments—no more than any other class of borrowers—cannot be insulated from interest rate changes and other conditions in the capital market. We also know that the substantial rise in the general level of interest rates in recent years is a by-product of inflation and the effort undertaken to check the rise in prices. Nevertheless, it is instructive to focus on the rising cost of carrying State and local debt. Moreover, unlike some borrowers in the private sector (particularly business firms), State and local governments cannot recover the rise in interest cost through higher prices or by writing it off against taxes. Thus, these jurisdictions—which bear so much of the burden of providing public services—are particularly exposed to the adverse impact of inflation and the attendant rise in interest rates.

#### COMPETING CLAIMS ON FUTURE OUTPUT

As I indicated above, the major claims on our future production of goods and services that have already been identified—including public programs already in existence—may make it extremely difficult to improve our public services in the years ahead. The severity of the problem we face comes into sharp focus when we try to match the economy's future production with the demands originating in particular sectors.

For this purpose, it would be useful to present rough estimates of the potential output four years from now and to identify some of the more pressing demands that we now foresee. Let us assume that the economy returns to full employment by 1973 (defined as an unemployment rate of 4.0 per cent) and that productivity (or the increase in goods or services produced by a worker in an hour) will grow at an average rate of about 3 per cent a year through 1975—about in line with the long-term trend. If the labor force grows at about 1.8 per cent a year (reflecting both increased population of working age and the rising participation of women workers) and if there is a further slight decline in average hours worked, the potential growth of real GNP in the next four years will average about 4.3 per cent a year. By 1975, with allowance for the present underutilization of resources, this would mean a GNP in 1970 dollars of over \$1.2 trillion—about \$200 billion more than the level of GNP last year.

Large as it may seem, even a GNP of this size will require a careful review of priorities, if the public sector is to meet its responsibilities. The social and environmental improvements desired by so many today must compete for their share of GNP with the strong requirements of consumers and business firms. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 and more liberal depreciation rules both reflect the judgment that—to a greater extent than many observers think was wise—private spending should take priority over public spending. As a result, the automatic expansion of resources available to the government from what economists have defined as the "fiscal dividend" (a gain in revenue that accrues, even with an unchanged tax structure, as the economy generates larger taxable incomes) will be about \$10 billion less in 1975 than without the tax changes.

#### NEW IMPORTANCE OF YOUNG FAMILIES

In the years immediately ahead, a great increase expected in the relative importance of young families will create an urgent need for goods and services. There is also a desperate need to upgrade the currently inadequate stock of housing. Business requirements for expanding investment in plant and equipment—both to add capacity to serve the greater number of people but also to control pollutants—are also likely to be exceedingly intense as the economy returns to

Footnotes at end of article.

full employment. Almost automatic increases in public programs already in existence will also claim significant increments of future GNP as well as most of the funds diverted from Vietnam.

These mounting demands were highlighted in the Reports of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) in 1970 and 1971. In both Reports, CEA presented five-year projections of the competing demands of the private and public sectors for resources. In both years, the Council came to the gloomy conclusion that—without further changes in our tax laws—demands for personal consumption, private domestic investment (including residential construction), and built-in increases in present public programs would absorb most of the increase in real GNP and savings from the Vietnam War in the next few years. Even in 1975, the latest CEA Report suggests that the amount of unallocated resources at full-employment may be only 1 per cent of GNP. The Brookings Institution is even more pessimistic in its estimates of discretionary expenditures possible in the public sector.<sup>4</sup>

The Council's Reports thus suggest, in effect, that we have already mortgaged both our "peace dividend" and our "fiscal dividend" as well. The Tax Reform Act and accelerated depreciation—even with some offsetting increases in Social Security taxes—will reduce the public share of GNP (both direct and including transfers and grants) from 29.6 per cent in calendar 1969 to an estimated 28.7 per cent in 1975. As a result of these tax changes, "built-in" increases in existing Federal programs (because of changes in population, workload, and normal pay increases) and new programs already proposed in the fiscal 1972 budget, all but perhaps \$12 billion of the projected \$57 billion cumulative increases in full-employment Federal revenues between fiscal 1972 and 1975 is already allocated.

#### LITTLE AVAILABLE FOR IMPROVEMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICES

The point which I have been trying to make so far is that in the next few years, without a fundamental change in present private expenditure patterns and in government programs, there will be no large sum of money which the government can easily devote to the expansion and improvement of public services. The small "fiscal dividend" of perhaps at most 1 percent of 1975 GNP could easily vanish with a slower economic recovery than we expect at the moment, or the addition of even \$3 billion a year of other types of new programs. Moreover, the surplus in the Federal budget which is projected for 1975 will accrue mainly to the Social Security trust funds, and in the past when large sums were building up in these funds we have either not gone forward with scheduled Social Security tax changes or liberalized the benefits paid from the trust funds. At present, there is already talk of both possibilities.

#### RE-ORDERING NATIONAL PRIORITIES

It is against this background that we must assess the prospects of meeting the insistent demand that a greater share of our resources be devoted to improvements in education, health, urban services, the environment, and similar areas of public responsibility. Essentially, with virtually all of our resources already committed, we must determine the extent to which resources can be transferred from present—primarily private—uses to alternative—mainly public—purposes. Since the bulk of the actual spending on public services is done by State and local governments (although Federal grants may finance a sizable share of the cost of specific pro-

grams), it would be helpful to look at the problem from the viewpoint of their purchases of goods and services within the framework of the GNP accounts.

The objective would be to obtain a rough indication of the consequences of transferring a given volume of spending from the private sector to State and local governments.

One way to approach the task is to employ the modern, computer-based statistical techniques on which economists are relying increasingly to identify possible solutions to complex issues of public policy. During the last few years, the Federal Reserve Board's staff (with the technical assistance of economists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Pennsylvania) has developed and is now operating such a large-scale, econometric model. With help from the staff, I have employed this computer-based model to pose several questions relating to the reallocation of resources. The results (in constant 1958 dollars) are shown in Table 2.<sup>5</sup>

Essentially, I wanted to know what would be the broad economic effects—both direct and indirect—of allocating a large share of national resources to State and local governments during the period 1970-75. To get an answer, it was first necessary to have an indication of the share which they would have in the absence of special measures to produce such a redistribution. Using the Board's econometric model, a "base projection" of real GNP and principal components in 1975 was prepared.<sup>6</sup> According to these estimates, real GNP might climb from \$724 billion in 1970 to \$893 billion in 1975. Purchases by State and local governments might account for \$97.4 billion (or 10.9 percent) in 1975, compared with \$74.1 billion (10.2 percent) in 1970. The share of personal consumption might rise slightly—from 65.9 percent to 66.6 percent. The Federal Government's share might decline somewhat (from 9.4 percent to 8.8 percent), and so might the proportion going into gross private domestic investment (from 14.1 percent to 13.2 percent). The key point to keep in mind is that the percentage of our resources used by State and local governments would probably rise slightly during the next few years—if the economic forces at work in 1970 were to extend unhampered through 1975.

However, that is the crucial issue. Currently, there is serious doubt as to whether recent trends will continue. To a considerable extent, the relatively rapid expansion in per capita State and local government expenditures in recent years reflects spending for education—which accounts for a large proportion of total outlays by these units. In the years ahead, the school-age population will be growing less rapidly than it did during the last 1½ decades. Consequently, per capita increases in State and local services might be expected to moderate.

Because of these considerations, the Council of Economic Advisers has estimated that real per capita State and local government spending may grow at an annual average rate of 2.6 per cent between 1969 and 1975; this would represent a moderately slower expansion than for total output, and it would be well below the 3.8 per cent growth rate recorded in the period 1955-69. In contrast, the CEA estimates that real per capita consumption will grow at an annual average rate of 3.6 per cent between 1969 and 1975, substantially above the rate of 2.2 per cent recorded between 1955 and 1969. As a result, the consumer sector would raise its share of real GNP (in 1969 dollars) from 62 per cent in 1969 to 64 per cent in 1975. On the other hand, the share of State and local governments would remain virtually unchanged—

moving up from 11.9 per cent to 12.0 per cent.

#### RESOURCES MUST BE REALLOCATED

These estimates by the CEA cast in bold relief the issue of reallocating resources in favor of the public sector. To assess the consequences of a prospective decline in the growth rate of real per capita spending by State and local governments, I made a second projection of real GNP in 1975, using as a guide the Council's estimate that such outlays might grow by 2.6 per cent per year through 1975. The results of this projection are also shown in Table 2 (designated as the "low" projection). These results can be compared with the "base" projection (which, as mentioned earlier, sketches the contours of the economy in 1975 on the assumption that recent trends would continue and in the absence of measures to reallocate resources). Several features should be noted: real GNP would be somewhat higher, and the proportions taken by personal consumption and private domestic investment would also rise.<sup>7</sup> But for our purposes, the most important effect is a cutback of \$7.1 billion in the level of State and local purchases of goods and services in 1975. These would amount to \$90.3 billion, compared with \$97.4 billion suggested by the "base" projection. Their share of total GNP might decline to 9.9 per cent, compared with 10.9 per cent indicated by the "base" projection.

#### PUBLIC SERVICES COULD DETERIORATE

This less rapid expansion in the level of spending by State and local governments would have several side-effects. The level of unemployment might be slightly higher, the pace of inflation might ease somewhat, and interest rates might be moderately lower.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, since population would be higher in 1975, the scope and quality of public services would probably be deteriorating.

If it were thought desirable to check this tendency, an effort would have to be made to reallocate a larger share of real resources to State and local governments. The consequences of pursuing this course are suggested in the final projection shown in Table 2 (identified as the "high" projection). These estimates assume that real per capita spending by these jurisdictions would increase by 3.8 per cent per year between 1970 and 1975. In this case, State and local outlays might be in the neighborhood of \$95.9 billion, or 10.7 per cent of GNP. While this would be \$1.5 billion below the level suggested by the "base" projection, it would also be \$5.6 billion above that indicated by the "low" projection. Thus, compared with the latter situation, in which State and local units would yield to the private sector part of their relative command over resources, the public sector would have that much more (\$5.6 billion) to spend on public services.

However, the real costs of making this transfer would be considerable. To achieve it might require a relative cutback in real consumer spending of \$12 billion, and business fixed investment might also be nearly \$5 billion less. Expenditures on residential construction could shrink by as much as \$1.2 billion. Moreover, reflecting the combined impact of these changes, real GNP might decline by over \$13 billion from the level indicated by the "base" projection. In addition, while the level of unemployment might decline slightly, the pace of inflation would quicken, and the level of interest rates would be somewhat higher.

I personally find the results presented here both illuminating and instructive. While I would not advance the results as definitive, they do point up a central truth: if real resources are to be transferred from private use to the public sector, it will involve a

Footnote at end of article.



real—and perhaps substantial—cost in terms of inflation and the rate of growth of the national economy. In the opinion of many observers, that cost is worth paying.

#### CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

From this review of the effects of inflation on State and local governments—and from this assessment of competing claims on our productive resources—I am personally convinced that we are in considerable danger of seeing a serious deterioration in the scope and quality of our public services. Unless steps are taken before too long to reverse the trend, the situation seems likely to get worse as newer demands (such as pollution abatement) are added to the already inadequate supply of traditional public services.

In my opinion, the issue before us is clear: in the last few years (mainly because of the tax relief provided by the Federal government in 1969), private consumption has been given a much higher priority over public spending than is consistent with our long-run requirements in the area of public services. If this imbalance is to be corrected, these lost tax revenues might have to be recaptured and channeled to State and local governments.

Thus, rather than looking forward to further tax reductions, all of us may have to accept the burdens of paying an even larger share of our already limited incomes in the form of higher taxes. Moreover, despite the

widely-noted longing for a lessened role for government in our society, we may have to be prepared to see the government assume even greater responsibility for the provision of those common services which all of us demand—and which cannot be provided by any other means.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Prices discussed at this point are measured by the implicit price deflators for the GNP.

<sup>2</sup> The percentages attributable to workload, price, scope and quality, 1955-69, were estimated by Robert D. Reischauer for Charles L. Schultze, et al., *Setting National Priorities: the 1972 Budget*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1971, Ch. 6, pp. 138-40. The corresponding figures for 1965-69 were estimated by Paul Schneiderman of the Board's staff, using Census Bureau data and Reischauer's estimating technique.

<sup>3</sup> It should be kept in mind that the income to investors from holding State and local securities is exempt from Federal income taxes. The average rates reported in the text reflect the heavy volume of long-term debt issued at low rates in the decade following World War II. Since then, municipal yields have risen considerably—from 2.48 per cent in 1955 to 3.26 per cent in 1965 and to 5.72 per cent in 1969. Thus, their debt service in the future will be much higher.

<sup>4</sup> Charles L. Schultze, et al., *Setting National Priorities: the 1972 Budget*, Washington, D.C., 1971, Ch. 17.

<sup>5</sup> Mr. Jared J. Ezler of the Board's staff was responsible for the computer simulations of the national economy to obtain the projections.

<sup>6</sup> Key assumptions underlying the exercise were that tax rates were unchanged and that resources were fully utilized, with unemployment in the neighborhood of 4 per cent in 1975.

<sup>7</sup> Throughout this exercise, the level of spending by the Federal government was held constant. The reason for this was the desire to permit the computer simulation to describe the inter-action of State and local spending with spending in the private sector.

<sup>8</sup> For those interested in the technical aspects of the simulation, it should be mentioned that the adverse impact of the slower rate of growth in per capita spending by State and local units was tempered by assuming that monetary policy would be relaxed sufficiently to offset the depressing effects and maintain full use of resources. Otherwise, real GNP would decline by \$2.2 billion (from the "base" projection), the GNP deflator would be 6.8 percentage points lower, and the unemployment rate would climb to 5.3 per cent—nearly 1½ points higher than the estimate in the "base" projection.

TABLE 1.—STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, BY FUNCTION AND PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF INCREASES, FISCAL YEARS 1955, 1965, AND 1969

[Amounts in billions of dollars]

Function	1955-69			1965-69			Percentage of 1955-69 increase in expenditure attributable to increase in—			Percentage of 1965-69 increase in expenditure attributable to increase in—			
	Amount		Percentage increase	Percentage of total increase		Percentage increase	Percentage of total increase	Workload	Price	Scope and quality	Workload	Price	Scope and quality
	1955	1965		1969	1955								
All functions.....	39.0	86.5	131.6	237.4	100.0	52.1	100.0						
General expenditure.....	33.7	74.5	116.7	246.3	85.8	56.6	86.1	26.2	43.8	30.0	14.2	47.2	38.6
Local schools.....	10.1	21.9	33.8	234.7	25.6	54.3	26.4	31.7	52.4	15.9	14.5	57.6	27.6
Higher education and other.....	1.8	6.6	13.5	650.0	12.6	104.6	15.3	25.1	35.5	39.4	25.0	30.3	44.7
Public Welfare.....	3.2	6.3	12.1	278.1	9.6	92.1	12.9	( <sup>1</sup> )	29.7	70.3	( <sup>1</sup> )	19.2	80.8
Highways.....	6.5	12.2	15.4	136.9	9.6	26.2	7.1	50.8	42.3	6.9	40.0	60.0	( <sup>2</sup> )
Hospitals and health.....	2.5	5.4	8.5	240.0	6.5	57.4	6.9	18.8	43.8	37.4	7.7	50.8	41.5
Basic urban services <sup>3</sup> .....	4.3	12.4	14.6	239.5	11.1	17.7	4.9	22.8	50.6	26.6	11.5	88.5	( <sup>2</sup> )
Administration and other <sup>4</sup> .....	5.3	9.6	15.3	188.7	10.8	59.4	12.6	18.5	38.0	43.6	7.2	46.4	46.4
Utility deficit.....	0.4	0.9	1.4	250.0	1.1	55.6	1.1						
Debt retirement and additions to liquid assets <sup>5</sup> .....	3.9	7.3	12.3	215.4	9.1	68.5	11.1						
Contributions to retirement systems.....	0.9	2.3	3.2	255.6	2.5	39.1	2.0						

<sup>1</sup> Workload decreased.

<sup>2</sup> Scope and/or quality decreased.

<sup>3</sup> Includes fire protection, police protection, correction, sewerage, other sanitation, parks, and recreation, housing and urban renewal, and transportation and terminals.

<sup>4</sup> Includes administration and general control, general public buildings, interest on general debt, employment services, and miscellaneous functions.

<sup>5</sup> Excludes social insurance funds.

Sources: Basic data are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Governmental Finances" in selected years.

Note: Percentages attributable to workload, price, scope, and quality, 1955-69, were estimated by Robert D. Reischauer for Charles L. Schultze, et al., "Setting National Priorities: the 1972 Budget," Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1971, Ch. 6, pp. 138-40. The 1969 data were revised since the original publication. The corresponding figures for 1965-69 were estimated by Paul Schneiderman of the Federal Reserve Board's staff, using Census Bureau data and Reischauer's estimating technique.

TABLE 2.—PRINCIPAL CLAIMS ON REAL GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1970 AND ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS TO 1975

[Amounts in billions of 1958 dollars]

Sector	1970 (actual)		1975: Base projection <sup>1</sup>		1975: Low (2.6 percent) growth rate of per capita State and local purchases <sup>2</sup>			1975: High (3.8 percent) growth rate of per capita State and local purchases <sup>2</sup>			Variance from—	
	Amount	Percent of total	Amount	Percent of total	Amount	Percent of total	Variance from base projection	Amount	Percent of total	Base projection	"Low" projection	
Gross national product.....	724.1	100.0	892.6	100.0	907.0	100.0	15.1	894.4	100.0	1.8	-13.3	
Personal consumption.....	477.1	65.9	594.4	66.6	608.3	67.0	13.9	596.3	66.8	1.9	-12.0	
Gross private domestic investment.....	102.8	14.1	117.9	13.2	125.2	13.8	7.3	118.3	13.2	0.4	-6.9	
Producers durable equipment.....	56.1	7.7	63.6	7.1	66.3	7.3	2.7	63.4	7.1	-0.2	-2.9	
Producers structures.....	23.1	3.2	25.8	2.9	27.9	3.1	2.1	25.9	2.9	0.1	-2.0	
Residential construction.....	20.6	2.8	24.6	2.8	26.2	2.9	1.6	25.0	2.8	0.4	-1.2	
Inventories.....	3.0	0.4	3.9	0.4	4.8	0.5	0.9	4.0	0.4	0.1	-0.8	

Footnote at end of table.

Sector	1970 (actual)		1975: Base projection <sup>1</sup>		1975: Low (2.6 percent) growth rate of per capita State and local purchases <sup>2</sup>			1975: High (3.8 percent) growth rate of per capita State and local purchases <sup>2</sup>			
	Amount	Percent of total	Amount	Percent of total	Amount	Percent of total	Variance from base projection	Amount	Percent of total	Variance from—	
										Base projection	"Low" projection
Exports.....	52.1	7.2	62.5	7.0	62.5	6.9	-----	62.5	7.0	-----	-----
Imports.....	49.7	-6.9	58.0	-6.5	57.2	-6.3	-0.8	57.1	6.4	-0.9	-0.1
Net Exports.....	2.4	0.3	3.5	0.5	5.3	0.6	0.8	5.4	0.6	0.9	0.1
Federal purchases.....	67.7	9.4	78.6	8.8	78.6	8.7	-----	78.6	8.8	-----	-----
State and local purchases.....	74.1	10.2	97.4	10.9	90.3	9.9	-7.1	95.9	10.7	-1.5	5.6
Memorandum:											
Treasury bill rate (percent).....	6.37	-----	6.20	-----	5.47	-----	-0.73	6.10	-----	-0.10	0.63
Prices (GNP deflator).....	134.9	-----	160.2	-----	156.2	-----	-4.0	158.8	-----	-1.4	2.6
unemployment rate.....	4.9	-----	3.9	-----	4.3	-----	0.4	4.1	-----	0.2	-0.2

<sup>1</sup> The "base projection" is derived from a simulation of the national economy by using the Federal Reserve Board's econometric model. A key assumption was that resources were fully utilized with unemployment in the neighborhood of 4 per cent in 1975.  
<sup>2</sup> In this projection, it is assumed that real per capita purchases by State and local governments will grow about 2.6 per cent per year in the 1970-75 period. This is the assumption on which

the Council of Economic Advisers based its projection of State and local purchases. (See 1971 Annual Report, p. 98.)  
<sup>3</sup> This projection assumes that real per capita purchases by State and local governments will grow about 3.8 per cent per year in the 1970-75 period—the same rate of growth that occurred from 1959 to 1969.

CONTROVERSY OVER COPYRIGHTS

HON. LAWRENCE J. HOGAN

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Speaker, a significant controversy seems to be brewing in regard to modification of existing statutes concerning copyrights.

A noteworthy article by A. N. Feldzamen concerning this issue has been brought to my attention. I believe it is both an interesting literary piece and, more importantly, an introduction to some of the fundamental arguments in favor of statutory changes.

I insert the full text of this article into the RECORD and commend it to my colleagues' attention:

[From Variety, Feb. 24, 1971]

WHY NOT A FEDERAL COMMISSION TO GOVERN SHIFTING COPYRIGHT VALUES?

(By A. N. Feldzamen)

There now exist two branches of the law that are so specialized, so idiosyncratic, so far removed from the general scope of an ordinary lawyer's background, that the Bar Association has made an exception to its rule forbidding its members to advertise themselves as specialists in a particular field.

One of these is Admiralty law—dealing with ships at sea and on inland waterways, matters about which the average attorney can know very little.

The other is Patents and Copyrights.

The fact that the Bar Association has so singled out patent and copyright matters (there is even a special bar examination for an attorney to qualify for this appellation) is just one more sign that the entire system of law on these matters is absurdly tangled and confused. Actually it is arbitrary, old fashioned, manifestly unfair to many, and often completely unclear.

For example, in the Cassette Symposium in VARIETY's 65th Anniversary Edition, one column by a copyright attorney claimed in the headline, "Content of TV Cassettes Protected by Copyright, Same as Motion Pictures." Actually, in the body of the column, the attorney noted that where copyright did not apply, a claim might have to be filed under,

"among others breach of contract, misappropriation of property, intentional interference with a contract, unfair competition, invasion of right of privacy (or publicity), unjust enrichment and breach of trust." (Whew!)

On the other hand, Sanford I. Wolff, National Executive Secretary of AFTRA, noted that: "It is my personal opinion that the present Copyright Act falls to make any provision for the use of material in videocassettes and that the proposal for a new Act must be amended to include workable and protective provisions."

Edward M. Cramer, president of BMI, was stating that: "Under the current copyright law, writers and publishers of music can collect performance royalties for the use of music only if it is performed publicly for profit. Music performed in the home via videocassettes is exempt just as phonograph records are exempt." John L. Doles, National Executive Secretary of SAG, was stating: "The answer to copyright protection is complex. Domestic copyright law would seem to apply to cassettes as well as to other recorded material. However, many foreign unions and countries rely on the Rome Convention on Copyright Protection. Experts fear that this Convention may cover only audio, not visual, material."

PRINT MATERIAL

These examples could be continued, multiplied ad infinitum, and there is not much point to going on. The present copyright law, written in a pre-electronic era, was really chiefly intended to cover print materials. Things that the eye could see were in the minds of the creators of this legislation, in a horseless carriage age. Who could have foreseen audiotape and videotape, computers and their programs, ultramicrofiche? It would be for their wiser successors to make amendments and modifications, for the social good that is presumably the motive behind copyright protection.

The sorry sequel, especially in recent times, must be somewhat familiar to everyone acquainted with creative activities. Year after year, there is talk of Congressional revision and new legislation. Hearings are often held. Conflicting interests espouse their points of view: publishers, authors, performers, educators, broadcasters, juke-box proprietors, record and tape manufacturers—an unending stream. The publishers and their colleagues wish greater protection, especially against photocopying. Educators and librarians wish an extension of "fair use," so that materials may be more readily available for

educational or "nonprofit" purposes. Broadcasters are naturally disinclined to pay performers for their use of recorded music. Fashion designers seek to "copyright" their designs, so the lower-price dress manufacturers can't copy them! Choreographers seek a system of preserving their rights to a dance pattern. Cable television operators see no reason for paying extra for what they pull in from the airwaves and then sell to consumers at home. Tape and record pirates contend in open court that, after paying composers' royalties, they have no further obligation to the performers or original music producers. One company wishes to protect its "originally expensive" computer programs; another, using them, will claim that the laws of mathematics can not be so restricted.

Is it any wonder that the poor Congressmen are confused? Perhaps it is time to try another approach, based on principle and purpose, rather than on competing interests.

Generally, there is little disagreement about the rationale behind copyright legislation—all agree that it is socially good for (some) works to be protected (financially or intellectually) for some length of time after which they should become public property. But the details are probably too complex and numerous to be handled by any law; a tribe of Solomon's could not fashion and adjudicate a satisfactory and workable copyright law to cover all the cases that do come up, and will come up.

Under similar circumstances in other areas, the usual solution of our Government has been to give up the attempt to deal with every possible case by law, and instead to establish a commission or agency. This then deals by regulation with the separate cases that might arise. A general law, outlining main purposes and methods is enacted to guide the commission. Examples are numerous—the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities & Exchange Commission, and so on. Each of these has its faults, but in general, as watchdogged by the press, they probably work better than age-encrusted legislation leading to innumerable cases in court. Challengers to their decisions can always go to court as a last resort, but this is relatively uncommon. The presumption is that the commission, operating under the gaze of public scrutiny, must attempt to be fair and judicial.



A broadly-powered, publicly observed "Federal Copyright Authority," appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, guided by basic legislation on principle and equity considerations, might be the solution to these vexing problems.

## PROBLEMS OF OUR ARMED FORCES

### HON. LOUIS C. WYMAN

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Speaker, our Armed Forces today face problems that cast disturbing shadows throughout our country. Col. Robert D. Heinl, U.S. Marine Corps, retired, has written a penetrating and thought-provoking article entitled, "The Collapse of the Armed Forces," in a recent issue of the Armed Forces Journal, which merits attention.

The article is not pleasant reading. But, the subject he addresses is important and timely. Thoughtful consideration by the Congress of the points presented by Colonel Heinl may help our country face up to this real danger before it is too late.

The article follows:

#### THE COLLAPSE OF THE ARMED FORCES

(By Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr.)

The morale, discipline and battleworthiness of the U.S. Armed Forces are, with a few salient exceptions, lower and worse than at any time in this century and possibly in the history of the United States.

By every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state approaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or having refused combat, murdering their officers and noncommissioned officers, drug-ridden, and dispirited where not near-mutinous.

Elsewhere than Vietnam, the situation is nearly as serious.

Intolerably clobbered and buffeted from without and within by social turbulence, pandemic drug addiction, race war, sedition, civilian scapegoatise, draftee recalcitrance and malevolence, barracks theft and common crime, unsupported in their travail by the general government, in Congress as well as the executive branch, distrusted, disliked, and often reviled by the public, the uniformed services today are places of agony for the loyal, silent professionals who doggedly hang on and try to keep the ship afloat.

The responses of the services to these unheard-of conditions, forces and new public attitudes, are confused, resentful, occasional pollyanna-ish, and, in some cases even calculated to worsen the malaise that is wracking them.

While no senior officer (especially one on active duty) can openly voice any such assessment, the foregoing conclusions find virtually unanimous support in numerous non-attributable interviews with responsible senior and mid-level officers, as well as career noncommissioned officers and petty officers in all services.

Historical precedents do exist for some of the services' problems, such as desertion, mutiny, unpopularity, seditious attacks, and racial troubles. Others, such as drugs, pose difficulties that are wholly new. Nowhere, however, in the history of the Armed Forces have comparable past troubles presented themselves in such general magnitude, acuteness, or concentrated focus as today.

By several orders of magnitude, the Army seems to be in worst trouble. But the Navy has serious and unprecedented problems, while the Air Force, on the surface at least still clear of the quicksands in which the Army is sinking, is itself facing disquieting difficulties.

Only the Marines—who have made news this year by their hard line against indiscipline and general permissiveness—seem, with their expected staunchness and tough tradition, to be weathering the storm.

#### BACK TO CAMPUS

To understand the military consequences of what is happening to the U.S. Armed Forces, Vietnam is a good place to start. It is in Vietnam that the rearguard of a 500,000-man army, in its day (and in the observation of the writer) the best army the United States ever put into the field, is numbly extricating itself from a nightmare war the Armed Forces feel they had foisted on them by bright civilians who are now back on campus writing books about the folly of it all.

"They have set up separate companies," writes an American soldier from Cu Chi, quoted in the *New York Times*, "for men who refuse to go out into the field. It is no big thing to refuse to go. If a man is ordered to go to such and such a place he no longer goes through the hassle of refusing; he just packs his shirt and goes to visit some buddies at another base camp. Operations have become incredibly ragtag. Many guys don't even put on their uniforms any more . . . The American garrisons on the larger bases are virtually disarmed. The lifers have taken our weapons from us and put them under lock and key . . . There have also been quite a few frag incidents in the battalion."

Can all this really be typical or even truthful?

Unfortunately the answer is yes.

"Frag incidents" or just "fragging" is current soldier slang in Vietnam for the murder or attempted murder of strict, unpopular or just aggressive officers and NCOs. With extreme reluctance (after a young West Pointer from Senator Mike Mansfield's Montana was fraged in his sleep) the Pentagon has now disclosed that fragging in 1970 (209) have more than doubled those of the previous year (96).

Word of the deaths of officers will bring cheers at troop movies or in bivouacs of certain units.

In one such division—the morale-plagued Americal—fraggings during 1971 have been authoritatively estimated to be running about one a week.

Yet fraggings, though hard to document, form part of the ugly lore of every war. The first such verified incident known to have taken place occurred 190 years ago when Pennsylvania soldiers in the Continental Army killed one of their captains during the night of 1 January 1781.

#### BOUNTIES AND EVASIONS

Bounties, raised by common subscription in amounts running anywhere from \$50 to \$1,000, have been widely reported put on the heads of leaders whom the privates and Sp4s want to rub out.

Shortly after the costly assault on Hamburger Hill in mid-1969, the GI underground newspaper in Vietnam, "G.I. Say," publicly offered a \$10,000 bounty on LCol Weldon Honeycutt, the officer who ordered (and led) the attack. Despite several attempts, however, Honeycutt managed to live out his tour and return Stateside.

"Another Hamburger Hill" (i.e., toughly contested assault), conceded a veteran major, "is definitely out."

The issue of "combat refusal," an official euphemism for disobedience of orders to fight—the soldier's gravest crime—has only recently been again precipitated on the fron-

tier of Laos by Troop B, 1st Cavalry's mass refusal to recapture their captain's command vehicle containing communication gear, codes and other secret operation orders.

As early as mid-1969, however, an entire company of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade publicly sat down on the battlefield. Later that year, another rifle company, from the famed 1st Air Cavalry Division, flatly refused—on CBS-TV—to advance down a dangerous trail.

(Yet combat refusals have been heard of before: as early as 1813, a corps of 4,000 Kentucky soldiers declined to engage British Indians who had just sacked and massacred Fort Dearborn (later Chicago).)

While denying further unit refusals, the Air Cav has admitted some 35 individual refusals in 1970 alone. By comparison, only two years earlier in 1968, the entire number of officially recorded refusals for our whole army in Vietnam—from over seven divisions—was 68.

"Search and evade" (meaning tacit avoidance of combat by units in the field) is now virtually a principle of war, vividly expressed by the GI phrase, "CYA (cover your ass) and get home"

That "search-and-evade" has not gone unnoticed by the enemy is underscored by the Viet Cong delegation's recent statement at the Paris Peace Talks that communist units in Indochina have been ordered not to engage American units which do not molest them. The same statement boasted—not without foundation in fact—that American defectors are in the VC ranks.

Symbolic anti-war fasts (such as the one at Pleiku where an entire medical unit, led by its officers, refused Thanksgiving turkey), peace symbols, "V" signs not for victory but for peace, booing and cursing of officers and even of hapless entertainers such as Bob Hope, are unhappily commonplace.

As for drugs and race, Vietnam's problems today not only reflect but reinforce those of the Armed Forces as a whole. In April, for example, members of a Congressional investigating subcommittee reported that 10 to 15% of our troops in Vietnam are now using high-grade heroin, and that drug addiction there is "of epidemic proportions."

Only last year an Air Force major and command pilot for Ambassador Bunker was apprehended at Tan Son Nhut air base outside Saigon with \$8 million worth of heroin in his aircraft. The major is now in Leavenworth.

Early this year, an Air Force regular colonel was court-martialed and cashiered for leading his squadron in pot parties, while, at Cam Ranh Air Force Base, 43 members of the base security police squadron were recently swept up in dragnet narcotics raids.

All the foregoing facts—and many more dire indicators of the worst kind of military trouble—point to widespread conditions among American forces in Vietnam that have only been exceeded in this century by the French Army's Nivelle mutinies of 1917 and the collapse of the Tsarist armies in 1916 and 1917.

#### SOCIETY NOTES

It is a truism that national armies closely reflects societies from which they have been raised. It would be strange indeed if the Armed Forces did not today mirror the agonizing divisions and social traumas of American society, and of course they do.

For this very reason, our Armed Forces outside Vietnam not only reflect these conditions but disclose the depths of their troubles in an awful litany of sedition, disaffection, desertion, race, drugs, breakdowns of authority, abandonment of discipline, and, as a cumulative result, the lowest state of military morale in the history of the country.

Sedition—coupled with disaffection within the ranks, and externally fomented with an

audacity and intensity previously inconceivable—infests the Armed Services.

At best count, there appear to be some 144 underground newspapers published on or aimed at U.S. military bases in this country and overseas. Since 1970 the number of such sheets has increased 40% (up from 103 last fall). These journals are not mere gripe-sheets that poke soldier fun in the "Beetle Bailey" tradition, at the brass and the sergeants. "In Vietnam," writes the Ft. Lewis-McChord Free Press, "the Lifers, the Brass, are the true Enemy, not the enemy." Another West Coast sheet advises readers: "Don't desert. Go to Vietnam and kill your commanding officer."

At least 14 GI dissent organizations (including two made up exclusively of officers) now operate more or less openly. Ancillary to these are at least six antiwar veterans' groups which strive to influence GIs.

Three well-established lawyer groups specialize in support of GI dissent. Two (GI Civil Liberties Defense Committee and New York Draft and Military Law Panel) operate in the open. A third is a semi-underground network of lawyers who can only be contacted through the GI Alliance, a Washington, D.C., group which tries to coordinate seditious antimilitary activities throughout the country.

One antimilitary legal effort operates right in the theatre of war. A three-man law office, backed by the Lawyers' Military Defense Committee, of Cambridge, Mass., was set up last fall in Saigon to provide free civilian legal services for dissident soldiers being court-martialed in Vietnam.

Besides these lawyers' fronts, the Pacific Counseling Service (an umbrella organization with Unitarian backing for a prolifery of antimilitary activities) provides legal help and incitement to dissident GIs through not one but seven branches (Tacoma, Oakland, Los Angeles, San Diego, Monterey, Tokyo, and Okinawa).

Another of Pacific Counseling's activities is to air-drop planeboards of seditious literature into Oakland's sprawling Army Base, our major West Coast staging point for Vietnam.

On the religious front, a community of turbulent priests and clergymen, some unfrocked, calls itself the Order of Maximilian. Maximilian is a saint said to have been martyred by the Romans for refusing military service as un-Christian. Maximilian's present-day followers visit military posts, infiltrate brigades and stockades in the guise of spiritual counseling, work to recruit military chaplains, and hold services of "consecrations" of post chapels in the name of their saintly draft-dodger.

By present count at least 11 (some go as high as 26) off-base antiwar "coffee houses" ply GIs with rock music, lukewarm coffee, antiwar literature, how-to-do-it tips on desertion, and similar disruptive counsels. Among the best-known coffee houses are: The Shelter Half (Ft Lewis, Wash.); The Home Front (Ft Carson, Colo.); and The Oleo Strut (Ft Hood, Tex.).

Virtually all the coffee houses are or have been supported by the U.S. Serviceman's Fund, whose offices are in New York City's Bronx. Until May 1970 the Fund was recognized as a tax-exempt "charitable corporation," a determination which changed when IRS agents found that its main function was sowing dissension among GIs and that it was a satellite of "The New Mobilization Committee", a communist-front organization aimed at disruption of the Armed Forces.

Another "New Mobe" satellite is the G.I. Press Service, based in Washington, which calls itself the Associate Press of military underground newspapers. Robert Wilkinson, G.I. Press's editor, is well known to military intelligence and has been barred from South Vietnam.

While refusing to divulge names, IRS sources say that the Serviceman's Fund has been largely bankrolled by well-to-do liberals. One example of this kind of liberal support for sedition which did surface identifiably last year was the \$8,500 nut channelled from the Philip Stern Family Foundation to underwrite Seaman Roger Priest's underground paper OM, which, among other writings, ran do-it-yourself advice for desertion to Canada and advocated assassination of President Nixon.

The nation-wide campus-radical offensive against ROTC and college officer-training is well known. Events last year at Stanford University, however, demonstrate the extremes to which this campaign (which peaked after Cambodia) has gone. After the Stanford faculty voted to accept a modified, specially restructured ROTC program, the university was subjected to a cyclone of continuing violence which included at least \$200,000 in ultimate damage to buildings (highlighted by systematic destruction of 40 twenty-foot stained glass windows in the library). In the end, led by university president Richard W. Lyman, the faculty reversed itself. Lyman was quoted at the time that "ROTC is costing Stanford too much."

"Entertainment Industry for Peace and Justice," the antiwar show-biz front organized by Jane Fonda, Dick Gregory and Dalton Trumbo, now claims over 800 film, TV, and music names. This organization is backing Miss Fonda's antimilitary road-show that opened outside the gates of Ft Bragg, N.C., in mid-March.

Describing her performances (scripted by Jules Pfeiffer) as the soldiers' alternative to Bob Hope, Miss Fonda says her cast will repeat the Ft Bragg show at or outside 19 more major bases. Although her project reportedly received financial backing from the ubiquitous Serviceman's Fund, Miss Fonda insisted on \$1.50 admission from each of her GI audience at Bragg, a factor which, according to soldiers, somewhat limited attendance.

Freshman Representative Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.) runs a somewhat different kind of antimilitary production. As a Congressman, Dellums cannot be barred from military posts and has been taking full advantage of the fact. At Ft. Meade, Md., last month, Dellums led a soldier audience as they booed and cursed their commanding officer who was present on-stage in the post theater which the Army had to make available.

Dellums has also used Capitol Hill facilities for his "Ad Hoc Hearings" on alleged war crimes in Vietnam, much of which involves repetition of unfounded and often unprovable charges first surfaced in the Detroit "Winter Soldiers" hearings earlier this year. As in the case of the latter, ex-soldier witnesses appearing before Dellums have not always been willing to cooperate with Army war-crimes investigators or even to disclose sufficient evidence to permit independent verification of their charges. Yet the fact that five West Point graduates willingly testified for Dellums suggests the extent to which officer solidarity and traditions against politics have been shattered in today's Armed Forces.

#### THE ACTION GROUPS

Not unsurprisingly, the end-product of the atmosphere of incitement of unpunished sedition, and of recalcitrant antimilitary malevolence which pervades the world of the draftee (and to an extent the low-ranking men in "volunteer" services, too) is overt action.

One militant West Coast Group, Movement for a Democratic Military (MDM), has specialized in weapons theft from military bases in California. During 1970, large armory thefts were successfully perpetrated against Oakland Army Base, Ft. Cronkhite and Ord,

and even the Marine Corps Base at Camp Pendleton, where a team wearing Marine uniforms got away with nine M-16 rifles and an M-79 grenade launcher.

Operating in the Middle West, three soldiers from Ft Carson, Colo., home of the Army's permissive experimental unit, the 4th Mechanized Division, were recently indicted by federal grand jury for dynamiting the telephone exchange, power plant and water works of another Army installation, Camp McCoy, Wis., on 26 July 1970.

The Navy, particularly on the West Coast, has also experienced disturbing cases of sabotage in the past two years, mainly directed at ships' engineering and electrical machinery.

It will be surprising, according to informed officers, if further such tangible evidence of disaffection within the ranks does not continue to come to light. Their view is that the situation could become considerably worse before it gets better.

#### TOUGH LAWS, WEAK COURTS

A frequent reaction when people learn the extent and intensity of the subversion which has been beamed at the Armed Forces for the past three or more years is to ask whether such activities aren't banned by law. The answer is that indeed they are.

Federal law (18 USC 2387) prohibits all manner of activities (including incitements, counseling, distribution or preparation of literature, and related conspiracies) intended to subvert the loyalty, morale or discipline of the Armed Services. The penalty for violating this statute is up to ten years in prison, a \$10,000 fine, or both.

Despite this tough law, on the books for many years, neither the Johnson, nor so far, the Nixon administration has brought a single prosecution against any of the wide range of individuals and groups, some mentioned here, whose avowed aims are to nullify the discipline and seduce the allegiance of the Armed Forces.

Government lawyers (who asked not to be named) suggested two reasons for failure to prosecute. Under President Johnson, two liberal Attorneys General, Messrs. Ramsey Clark and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, were reportedly unsympathetic to military pleas for help and in general to prosecutions for sedition of any kind. Besides, the lawyers said, the courts have now gone so far in extending First Amendment shelter to any form of utterance, that there is doubt whether cases brought under this law would hold.

Whatever the reason—and it appears mainly to be disinclination to prosecute or even test existing law—the services are today being denied legal protection they previously enjoyed without question and at a time when they need it worse than ever before. Continuing failure to invoke these sanctions prompted one senior commander to comment bitterly, "We simply can't turn this thing around until we get some support from our elected and appointed civilian officials."

One area of the U.S. Government in which the Armed Forces are encountering noticeable lack of support is the federal judiciary.

Until a very few years ago, the processes of military justice were regarded as a nearly untouchable preserve which the civil courts entered with reluctance and diffidence.

Plagued by a new breed of litigious soldier (and some litigious officers, too), the courts have responded by unprecedented rulings, mostly libertarian in thrust, which both specifically and generally have hampered and impeded the traditional operations of military justice and dealt body blows to discipline.

Andrew Stapp, the seditious soldier who founded the American Serviceman's Union,



an organization aimed at undermining the disciplinary structure of the Armed Forces, last year had his well earned undesirable discharge reversed by a U.S. judge who said Stapp's right to unionize and try to overthrow the Army was an "off-duty" activity which the Army had no right to penalize in discharging him.

Libertarian Supreme Court Justice W. O. Douglas has impeded the Army in mobilizing and moving reservists, while his O'Callaghan decision not only released a convicted rapist but threw a wrench into military jurisdiction and court-martial precedents going back in some cases nearly two centuries.

In Oakland, Cal., last year, a federal court yanked some 37 soldiers from the gangplank of a transport for Vietnam (where all 37 had suddenly discovered conscientious objections to war) and still has them stalled on the West Coast some 18 months later.

The long-standing federal law against wearing of Armed Forces uniforms by persons intending to discredit the services was struck down in 1969 by the Supreme Court, which reversed the conviction of a uniformed actor who put on an antimilitary "guerrilla theater" skit on the street in Houston, Tex. As a result the Armed Forces are now no longer able to control subversive exploitation of the uniform for seditious purposes.

#### TACTICS OF HARASSMENT

Part of the defense establishment's problem with the judiciary is the now widely pursued practice of taking commanding officers into civil courts by dissident soldiers either to harass or annul normal discipline or administrative procedures of the services.

Only a short time ago, for example, a dissident group of active-duty officers, members of the Concerned Officers' Movement (COM), filed a sweeping lawsuit against Defense Secretary Laird himself, as well as all three service secretaries, demanding official recognition of their "right" to oppose the Vietnam war, accusing the secretaries of "harassing" them, and calling for court injunction to ban disciplinary "retaliation" against COM members.

Such nuisance suits from the inside (usually, like the Laird suit, on constitutional grounds) by people still in uniform, let alone by officers, were unheard-of until two or three years ago. Now, according to one Army general, the practice has become so common that, in his words, "I can't even give a directive without getting permission from my staff judge advocate."

#### RACIAL INCIDENTS

Sedition and subversion, and legal harassment, rank near the top of what might be called the unprecedented external problems that elements in American society are inflicting on the Armed Forces.

Internally speaking, racial conflicts and drugs—also previously insignificant—are tearing the services apart today.

Racial trouble is no new thing for the Army. In 1906, after considerable provocation, three companies of the 25th Infantry (a colored regular regiment) attacked white troops and townspeople of Brownsville, Texas, and had to be disbanded. Among the few pre-World War II War Department records still heavily classified and thus unavailable to scholars are Army documents on racial troubles.

Racial conflicts (most but not all sparked by young black enlisted men) are erupting murderously in all services.

At a recent high commanders' conference, General Westmoreland and other senior generals heard the report from Germany that in many units white soldiers are now afraid to enter barracks alone at night for fear of "head-hunting" ambushes by blacks.

In the quoted words of one soldier on duty in West Germany, "I'm much more

afraid of getting mugged on the post than I am of getting attacked by the Russians."

Other reports tell of jail-delivery attacks on Army stockades and military police to release black prisoners, and of officers being struck in public by black soldiers. Augsburg, Krailsheim, and Hohenfels are said to be rife with racial trouble. Hohenfels was the scene of a racial fraying last year—one of the few so far recorded outside Vietnam.

In Ulm, last fall, a white noncommissioned officer killed a black soldier who was holding a loaded .45 on two unarmed white officers.

Elsewhere, according to *Fortune* magazine, junior officers are now being attacked at night when inspecting barracks containing numbers of black soldiers.

Kelley Hill, a Ft. Benning, Ga., barracks area, has been the scene of repeated nighttime assaults on white soldiers. One such soldier bitterly remarked, "Kelley Hill may belong to the commander in the daytime but it belongs to the blacks after dark."

Even the cloistered quarters of WACs have been hit by racial hair-pulling. In one West Coast WAC detachment this year, black women on duty as charge-of-quarters took advantage of their trust to vandalize unlocked rooms occupied by white WACs. On this rampage, they destroyed clothing, emptied drawers, and overturned furniture of their white sisters.

But the Army has no monopoly on racial troubles.

As early as July 1969 the Marines (who had previously enjoyed a highly praised record on race) made headlines at Camp Lejeune, N.C., when a mass affray launched by 30-50 black Marines ended fatally with a white corporal's skull smashed in and 15 other white Marines in the sick bay.

That same year, at Newport, R.I., naval station, blacks killed a white petty officer, while in March 1971 the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Md., outside Washington, was beset by racial fighting so severe that the base enlisted men's club had to be closed.

All services are today striving energetically to cool and control this ugly violence which in the words of one noncommissioned officer, has made his once taut unit divide up "like two street gangs."

MGen Orwin C. Talbott, at Ft. Benning, has instituted what he calls "race relations coordinating groups" which work to defuse the resentments of young black troopers at a Georgia base.

MGen John C. Bennett, commanding the 4th Mechanized Division at Ft. Carson, Colo., has a highly successful "racial relations committee" which has kept Carson cool for over a year.

At once-troubled Camp Lejeune, MGen Michael P. Ryan, the Tarawa hero who commands the 2d Marine Division, appears to have turned off the race war that two years ago was clawing at the vitals of his division.

Yet even the encouraging results attained by these commanders do not bespeak general containment of the service-wide race problem any more than the near-desperate attack being mounted on drug abuse has brought the narcotics epidemic under control within the military.

#### DRUGS AND THE MILITARY

The drug problem—like the civilian situation from which it directly derives—is running away with the services. In March, Navy Secretary John H. Chafee, speaking for the two sea services, said bluntly that drug abuse in both Navy and Marines is out of control.

In 1966, the Navy discharged 170 drug offenders. Three years later (1969), 3,800 were discharged. Last year in 1970, the total jumped to over 5,000.

Drug abuse in the Pacific Fleet—with Asia on one side, and kinky California on the other—gives the Navy its worst headaches.

To cite one example, a destroyer due to sail from the West Coast last year for the Far East nearly had to postpone deployment when, five days before departure, a ring of some 30 drug users (over 10 percent of the crew) was uncovered.

Only last week, eight midshipmen were dismissed from the Naval Academy following disclosure of an alleged drug ring. While the Navy emphatically denies allegations in a copyrighted article by the *Annapolis Capitol* that up to 1,000 midshipmen now use marijuana, midshipman sources confirm that pot is anything but unknown at Annapolis.

Yet the Navy is somewhat ahead in the drug game because of the difficulty in concealing addiction at close quarters aboard ship, and because fixes are unobtainable during long deployments at sea.

The Air Force, despite 2,715 drug investigations in 1970, is in even better shape: its rate of 3 cases per thousand airmen is the lowest in the services.

By contrast, the Army had 17,742 drug investigations the same year. According to Col. Thomas B. Hauschild, of the Medical Command of our Army forces in Europe, some 46 percent of the roughly 200,000 soldiers there had used illegal drugs at least once. In one battalion surveyed in West Germany, over 50 percent of the men smoked marijuana regularly (some on duty), while roughly half of those were using hard drugs of some type.

What these statistics say is that the Armed Forces (like their parent society) are in the grip of a drug pandemic—a conclusion underscored by the one fact that, just since 1968, the total number of verified drug addiction cases throughout the Armed Forces has nearly doubled. One other yardstick: according to military medical sources, needle hepatitis now poses as great a problem among young soldiers as VD.

At Ft. Bragg, the Army's third largest post, adjacent to Fayetteville, N.C. (a garrison town whose conditions one official likened to New York's "East Village" and San Francisco's "Haight-Ashbury") a recent survey disclosed that 4% (or over 1,400) of the 36,000 soldiers there are hard-drug (mainly heroin and LSD) addicts. In the 82nd Airborne Division, the strategic-reserve unit that boasts its title of "America's Honor Guard", approximately 450 soldier drug abusers were being treated when this reporter visited the post in April. About a hundred were under intensive treatment in special drug wards.

Yet Bragg is the scene of one of the most imaginative and hopeful drug programs in the Armed Forces. The post commander, LGen John J. Tolson, and the 82nd Airborne's commander, MGen George S. Blanchard, are pushing "Operation Awareness," a broad post-wide program focused on hard drugs, prevention, and enforcement.

Spearheading Operation Awareness is a tough yet deeply humane Army chaplain and onetime Brooklyn longshoreman, LCol John P. McCullagh. Father McCullagh has made himself one of the Army's top experts on drugs, and was last year called as an expert witness by Harold Hughes's Senate Subcommittee on Alcohol and Narcotics.

#### NO STREET IS SAFE

One side-effect of the narcotics flood throughout the services is a concurrent epidemic of barracks theft and common criminality inside military or naval bases which once had the safest streets in America.

According to the personnel chief of one of the Army's major units, unauthorized absence, historically the services' top disciplinary problem, is now being crowded by the thefts. Barracks theft destroys trust and mutual loyalty among men who ought to be comrades and who must rely absolutely on each other in combat. It corrodes morale and is itself an indicator of impossible conditions in a fighting unit.

At Ft. Bragg, primarily because of addict thieves, soldiers in many units cannot even keep bedding on their bunks in barracks. After what used to be reveille, they strip their bunks of bedding and cram it away under lock and key with whatever valuables they dare keep on hand.

Radios, sports gear, tape decks, and cameras—let alone individual equipment—are stolen on sight. Unlocked cars, on the manicured streets of this fine old post, are more likely to be stolen than not. Fayetteville, according to soldiers, abounds with off-post fences who will pay pennies for Army blankets and higher amounts for just about anything else.

Unhappily, conditions at Ft. Bragg are not unusual.

Soldier muggings and holdups are on the rise everywhere. Ft. Dix, N.J., has a higher rate of on-post crime than any base on the East Coast. Soldier muggings are reported to average one a night, with a big upsurge every pay-day. Despite 450 MP's (one for every 55 soldiers stationed there—one of the highest such ratios in the country) no solution appears in sight.

Crimes are so intense and violent in the vicinity of an open-gate "honor-system" detention facility at Ft. Dix that, according to press reports, units on the base are unwilling to detail armed sentinels to man posts nearby, for fear of assault and robbery.

#### DESERTIONS AND DISASTERS

With conditions what they are in the Armed Forces, and with intense efforts on the part of elements in our society to disrupt discipline and destroy morale the consequences can be clearly measured in two ultimate indicators: manpower retention (reenlistments and their antithesis, desertions); and the state of discipline.

In both respects the picture is anything but encouraging.

Desertion, to be sure, has often been a serious problem in the past. In 1826, for example, desertions exceeded 50% of the total enlistments in the Army. During the Civil War, in 1864, Jefferson Davis reported to the Confederate Congress: "Two thirds of our men are absent, most absent without leave."

Desertion rates are going straight up in Army, Marines, and Air Force. Curiously, however, during the period since 1968 when desertion has nearly doubled for all three other services, the Navy's rate has risen by less than 20 percent.

In 1970, the Army had 65,643 deserters, or roughly the equivalent of four infantry divisions. This desertion rate (52.3 soldiers per thousand) is well over twice the peak rate for Korea (22.5 per thousand). It is more than quadruple the 1966 desertion-rate (14.7 per thousand) of the then well-trained, high-spirited professional Army.

If desertions continue to rise (as they are still doing this year), they will attain or surpass the WWII peak of 63 per thousand, which, incidentally, occurred in the same year (1945) when more soldiers were actually being discharged from the Army for psychoneurosis than were drafted.

The Air Force—relatively uninvolved in the Vietnam war, all-volunteer, management-oriented rather than disciplinary and hierarchic—enjoys a numerical rate of less than one deserter per thousand men, but even this is double what it was three years ago.

The Marines in 1970 had the highest desertion index in the modern history of the Corps and, for that year at least, slightly higher than the Army's. As the Marines now phase out of Vietnam (and haven't taken a draftee in nearly two years), their desertions are expected to decrease sharply. Meanwhile, grimly remarked one officer, "Let the bastards go. We're all the better without them."

Letting the bastards go is something the Marines can probably afford. "The Marine Corps Isn't Looking for a Lot of Recruits,"

reads a current recruiting poster, "We Just Need a Few Good Men." This is the happy situation of Corps slimming down to an elite force again composed of true volunteers who want to be professionals.

But letting the bastards go doesn't work at all for the Army and the Navy, who do need a lot of recruits and whose reenlistment problems are dire.

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, minces no words. "We have a personnel crisis," he recently said, "that borders on disaster."

The Navy's crisis, as Zumwalt accurately describes it, is that of a highly technical, material oriented service that finds itself unable to retain the expensively-trained technicians needed to operate warships, which are the largest, most complex items of machinery that man makes and uses.

#### NONVOLUNTEER FORCE?

If 45% of his sailors shipped over after their first enlistment, Admiral Zumwalt would be all smiles. With only 13% doing so, he is growing sideburns to enhance the Navy's appeal to youth.

Among the Army's volunteer (nondraftee) soldiers on their first hitch, the figures are much the same; less than 14% re-up.

The Air Force is slightly, but not much, better off: 16% of its first termers stay on.

Moreover—and this is the heart of the Army's dilemma—only 4% of the voluntary enlistees now choose service in combat arms (infantry, armor, artillery) and of those only 2.5% opt for infantry. Today's soldiers, it seems, volunteer readily enough for the tail of the Army, but not for its teeth.

For all services, the combined retention rate this past year is about half what it was in 1966, and the lowest since the bad times of similar low morale and national disenchantment after Korea.

Both Army and Navy are responding to their manpower problems in measures intended to seduce recruits and reenlistees: disciplinary permissiveness, abolition of reveille and KP, fewer inspections, longer haircuts—essentially cosmetic changes aimed at softening (and blurring) traditional military and naval images.

Amid such changes (not unlike the Army's 1946 Doolittle Board coincidences intended in their similar postwar day to sweeten life for the privates), those which are not cosmetic at all may well exert profound and deleterious effects on the leadership, command authority and discipline of the services.

#### SOULBONE CONNECTED TO THE BACKBONE

"Discipline," George Washington once remarked, "is the soul of an army."

Washington should know. In January 1781, all the Pennsylvania and New Jersey troops in the Continental Army mutinied. Washington only quelled the outbreaks by disarming the Jersey mutineers and having their leaders shot in hollow square—by a firing squad made up of fellow mutineers.

(The Navy's only mutiny, aboard USS *Somers* in 1842, was quelled when the captain hanged the mutineers from the yardarm while still at sea.)

If Washington was correct (and almost any professional soldier, whether officer or NCO, will agree), then the Armed Forces today are in deep trouble.

What enhances this trouble, by exponential dimensions, is the kind of manpower with which the Armed Forces now have to work. As early as three years ago, *U.S. News and World Report* reported that the U.S. services were already plagued with "... a new breed of man, who thinks he is his own Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Attorney General. He considers himself superior to any officer alive. And he is smart enough to go by the book. He walks a tightrope between the regulations and sedition."

Yet the problem is not just one of trouble makers and how to cope with them.

The trouble of the services—produced by and also in turn producing the dismaying conditions described in this article—is above all a crisis of soul and backbone. It entails—the word is not too strong—something very near a collapse of the command authority and leadership George Washington saw as the soul of military forces. This collapse results, at least in part, from a concurrent collapse of public confidence in the military establishment.

General Matthew B. Ridgway, one of the Army's finest leaders in this century (who revitalized the shaken Eighth Army in Korea after its headlong route by the Chinese in 1950) recently said, "Not before in my lifetime... has the Army's public image fallen to such low esteem..."

But the fall in public esteem of all three major services—not just the Army—is exceeded by the fall or at least the enfeeblement of the hierarchic and disciplinary system by which they exist and, when ordered to do so, fight and sometimes die.

Take the case of the noncommissioned and petty officers.

In Rudyard Kipling's lines, "The backbone o' the Army is the noncommissioned man!"

Today, the NCOs—the lifers—have been made strangers in their own home, the regular service, by the collective malevolence, recalcitrance and cleverness of college-educated draftees who have outflanked the traditional NCO hierarchy and created a privates' power structure with more influence on the Army of today than its sergeants major.

#### NO OFFICE FOR THE OMBUDSMAN

In the 4th Mechanized Division at Ft. Carson, Sp4 David Gyongyos, on his second year in the Army, enjoys an office across the hall from the division commander, a full-time secretary, and staff car and driver also assigned full time. He has the phone numbers of the general and the chief of staff and doesn't hesitate to use them out of working hours when he feels like it.

Gyongyos (with a bachelor's degree in theology and two years' law school) is Chairman of the division's Enlisted Men's Councils, a system of elected soviets made up of privates and Sp 4s (NCOs aren't allowed) which sits at the elbow of every unit commander down to the companies. "I represent, electively," Gyongyos expansively told this reporter, "the 17,000 men on this post."

The division sergeant major, with a quarter-century in the Army, who is supposed to be the division's first soldier and—non-electively—father and ombudsman of every soldier, has an office which is not even on the same floor with the general (or Sp 4 Gyongyos either). He gets his transportation, as needed, from the motor pool. He does not "rap" freely over the phone to the general's quarters.

The very most that Gyongyos will concede to the sergeant major, the first sergeants, the platoon sergeants—the historic enlisted leadership of armies—is that they are "combat technicians." They are not, he coldly adds, "highly skilled in the social sciences."

The soldiers' soviets of the 4th Division represent an experiment in what the Army calls "better communications". Conditions throughout the rest of the Army do not quite duplicate those at Carson, but the same spirit is abroad. And experienced NCOs everywhere feel threatened or at least puzzled.

Most major units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have some form of enlisted men's councils, as well as junior officer councils. Even the trainee companies at Ft. Ord, Calif. have councils, made up of recruits, who take questions and complaints past their DIs to company commanders and hold weekly meetings and post minutes on bulletin boards. General Pershing, who once said "All a soldier need to know is how to shoot and salute", would be surprised.



## THE VOCALISTS

As for the officers, said a four-star admiral, "We have lost our voice."

The foregoing may be true as far as admirals are concerned, but hasn't hampered short-term junior officers (including several West Pointers) from banding together into highly vocal antiwar and antimilitary organizations, such as the Concerned Officers' Movement (COM). At Norfolk, the local COM chapter has a peace billboard outside Gate 2, Norfolk Naval Station, where every sailor can profit by the example of his officers.

Inspection—one of the most important and traditionally visible tools of command—is being widely soft-pedaled because it is looked on as "chicken" by young soldiers, sailors, and airmen.

In a move "to eliminate irritants to Air Force life" all major Air Force commands got orders last year to cut back on inspection of people and facilities.

"You just damn near don't inspect barracks any more," said one Air Force colonel, "this is considered an irritant." Besides, he added, (partly to prevent barracks theft and partly for privacy) airmen keep the keys to their own rooms, anyway.

Aboard ships of the Navy, where every inch of metal and flake of paint partakes in the seaworthiness and battle readiness of the vessel, inspection is still a vital and nearly constant process, but even here, Admiral Zumwalt has discouraged "unnecessary" inspections.

If officers have lost their voices, their ears have in many commands been opened if not burnt in an unprecedented fashion via direct "hot lines" or "action lines" whereby any enlisted man can ring up his CO and voice a gripe or an obscenity, or just tell him what he thinks about something or, for that matter, someone.

Starting last year at Naval Air Station, Miramar, Calif., sailors have been able to dial "C-A-P-T" and get their captain on the line. The system so impressed Admiral Zumwalt that he ordered all other shore stations to follow suit, even permitting anonymous calls.

At Ft. Lewis, Wash., soldiers dial "B-O-S-S" for the privilege of giving the general an earful.

At the Air Force Academy, cadets receive early indoctrination in the new order of things: here, too, a cadet (anonymously, if he wishes) can phone the Superintendent, record his message and, also by recording, receive the general's personal thanks for having called.

## WORD TO THE WHYS

"Discipline," wrote Sir John Jervis, one of England's greatest admirals, "is summed up in the one word, obedience."

Robert E. Lee later said, "Men must be habituated to obey or they cannot be controlled in battle."

In the Armed Forces today, obedience appears to be a sometime thing.

"You can't give them an order and expect them to obey immediately," says an infantry officer in Vietnam. "They ask why, and you have to tell them."

Command authority, i.e., the unquestioned ability of an officer or NCO to give an order and expect it to be complied with, is at an all-time low. It is so low that, in many units, officers give the impression of having lost their nerve in issuing, let alone enforcing orders.

In the words of an Air Force officer to this reporter, "If a captain went down on the line and gave an order and expected it to be obeyed because 'I said so!'—there'd be a rebellion."

Other officers unhesitatingly confirmed the foregoing.

What all this amounts to—conspicuously in Vietnam and only less so elsewhere—is that today's junior enlisted man, not the

lifer, but the educated draftee or draft-motivated "volunteer"—now demands that orders be simplistically justified on his own terms before he feels any obligation to obey.

Yet the young soldiers, sailors and airmen might obey more willingly if they had more confidence in their leaders. And there are ample indications that Armed Forces junior (and NCO) leadership has been soft, inexperienced, and sometimes plain incompetent.

In the 82d Airborne Division today, the average length of service of the company commanders is only 3½ years.

In the Navy, a man makes petty officer 2d class in about 2½ years after he first enlists. By contrast, in the taut and professional pre-WWII fleet, a man required 2½ years just to make himself a really first-class seaman.

The grade of corporal has practically been superseded in the Army: Sp 4s hold most of the corporals' billets. Where the corporal once commanded a squad, today's Army gives the job to a staff sergeant, two ranks higher. Within the squad, it now takes a sergeant to command three other soldiers in the lowly fire-team.

"This never would have happened," somberly said a veteran artillery sergeant major, "if the NCOs had done their jobs. . . . The NCOs are our weak point." Sp 4 Gyongos at Ft. Carson agrees: "It is the shared perception of the privates that the NCOs have not looked out for the soldiers."

When B Troop, 1st Cavalry, mutinied during the Laos operation, and refused to fight, not an officer or NCO raised his hand (or his pistol) or stepped forward. Fifty-three privates and Sp 4s cowed all the lifers of their unit.

"Officers," says a recently retired senior admiral, "do not stand up for what they believe. The older enlisted men are really horrified."

Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., an ex-company clerk, was a platoon leader who never even learned to read a map. His credentials for a commission were derisory; he was no more officer-material than any Pfc in his platoon. Yet the Army had to take him because no one else was available. Commenting on the Calley conviction, a colonel at Ft. Benning said, "We have at least two or three thousand more Calleys in the Army just waiting for the next calamity."

Albert Johnson, the tough Master Chief Petty Officer of the Atlantic Fleet, shakes his head and says: "You used to hear it all the time—people would say, 'The Chiefs run the Navy.' But you don't hear it much any more, especially from the Chiefs."

## A HARD LOT AT BEST

But the lot of even the best, most forceful leader is a hard one in today's military.

In the words of a West Point lieutenant colonel commanding an airborne battalion, "There are so many ways nowadays for a soldier that is smart and bad to get back at you." The colonel should know: recently he reduced a sergeant for gross public insubordination, and now he is having to prepare a lengthy apologia, through channels to the Secretary of the Army, in order to satisfy the offending sergeant's congressman.

"How do we enforce discipline?" asks a senior general. Then he answers himself: "Sweep it under the rug. Keep them happy. Keep it out of the press. Do things the easy way: no court-martials, but strong discipline."

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, after years of costly, frustrating and considerably less than successful war, Britain's armed forces were swept by disaffection culminating in the widespread mutinies in most of the ships and fleets that constituted England's "wooden walls" against France.

Writing to a friend in 1797, Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty said, "The Channel Fleet is now lost to the country as much as if it was at the bottom of the sea."

Have things gone that far in the United States today?

The most optimistic answer is—probably not. Or at least not yet.

But many a thoughtful officer would be quick to echo the words of BGen Donn A. Starry, who recently wrote, "The Army can defend the nation against anything but the nation itself."

Or—in the wry words of Pogo—we have met the enemy, and they are us.

## KENNEDY'S PRIVATE WAR

## HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, the revelations of the Pentagon papers have alerted the American people and the Congress that we have been ignorant and misinformed about many of the crucial events and decisions that have determined the Vietnam war. The publication in August of the first part of "The Planning of the Vietnam War," a study by members of the Institute for Policy Studies, will provide additional valuable information and analysis.

Drawing on a wide variety of interviews and documents, the Institute for Policy Studies researchers have conceived their task as explaining how the Vietnam disaster happened by analyzing the planning of the war. A part of the broader study, an article by Ralph L. Stavins, "Kennedy's Private War," appears in the July 22, 1971, issue of the *New York Review of Books*. I commend it to my colleagues attention and include the article at this point in the RECORD:

KENNEDY'S PRIVATE WAR

(By Ralph L. Stavins)

The article that follows is part of *The Planning of the Vietnam War*, a study by members of the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington, including Richard J. Barnett, Marcus Raskin, and Ralph Stavins.\* In their introduction to the study, the authors write:

"In early 1970, Marcus Raskin conceived the idea of a study that would explain how the Vietnam disaster happened by analyzing the planning of the war. A group of investigators directed by Ralph Stavins concentrated on finding out who did the actual planning that led to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam, to introduce over a half-million troops into South Vietnam, to defoliate and destroy vast areas of Indochina, and to create millions of refugees in the area.

"Ralph Stavins, assisted by Canta Pian, John Berkowitz, George Pipkin, and Brian Eden, conducted more than 300 interviews in the course of this study. Among those interviewed were many Presidential advisers to Kennedy and Johnson, generals and admirals, middle level bureaucrats who occupied strategic positions in the national security bureaucracy, and officials, military and civilian, who carried out the policy in the field in Vietnam.

"A number of informants backed up their oral statements with documents in their possession, including informal minutes of meetings, as well as portions of the official documentary record now known as the

\*The study is the responsibility of its authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, or fellows.

"Pentagon Papers." Our information is drawn not only from the Department of Defense, but also from the White House, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency."

The study is being published in two volumes. The first, which includes the article below, will be published early in August. The second will appear in May, 1972.

At the end of March, 1961, the CIA circulated a National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in South Vietnam. This paper advised Kennedy that Diem was a tyrant who was confronted with two sources of discontent, the non-Communist loyal opposition and the Viet Cong. The two problems were closely connected. Of the spreading Viet Cong network the CIA noted:

"Local recruits and sympathetic or intimidated villagers have enhanced Viet Cong control and influence over increasing areas of the countryside. For example, more than one-half of the entire rural region south and southwest of Saigon, as well as some areas to the north, are under considerable Communist control. Some of these areas are in effect denied to all government authority not immediately backed by substantial armed force. The Viet Cong's strength encircles Saigon and has recently begun to move closer in the city."

The people were not opposing these recent advances by the Viet Cong; if anything, they seemed to be supporting them. The failure to rally the people against the Viet Cong was laid to Diem's dictatorial rule:

"There has been an increasing disposition within official circles and the army to question Diem's ability to lead in this period. Many feel that he is unable to rally the people in the fight against the Communists because of his reliance on virtual one-man rule, his tolerance of corruption extending even to his immediate entourage, and his refusal to relax a rigid system of public controls."

The CIA referred to the attempted coup against Diem that had been led by General Thi in November, 1960, and concluded that another coup was likely. In spite of the gains by the Viet Cong, they predicted that the next attempt to overthrow Diem would originate with the army and the non-Communist opposition.

"The Communists would like to initiate and control a coup against Diem, and their armed and subversive operations including united front efforts are directed toward this purpose. It is more likely, however, that any coup attempt which occurs over the next year or so will originate among non-Communist elements, perhaps a combination of disgruntled civilian officials and oppositionists and army elements, broader than those involved in the November attempt."

In view of the broadly based opposition to Diem's regime and his virtual reliance on one-man rule, it was unlikely that he would initiate any reform measures that would sap the strength of the revolutionaries. Whether reform was conceived as widening the political base of the regime, which Diem would not agree to, or whether it was to consist of an intensified counterinsurgency program, something the people would not support, it had become painfully clear to Washington that reform was not the path to victory. But victory was the goal, and Kennedy called upon Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to draw up the victory plans. On April 20, 1961, Kennedy asked Gilpatric to:

"a) Appraise the current status and future prospects of the Communist drive to dominate South Vietnam.

"b) Recommend a series of actions (military, political, and/or economic, overt and/or covert) which will prevent Communist domination of that country."

#### THE GILPATRIC TASK FORCE

Gilpatric organized an Interdepartmental Task Force with representatives from State,

Defense, CIA, the International Cooperation Agency, the US Information Agency, and the Office of the President, with Brigadier General Edward Lansdale as operations officer. Their report was to be completed in one week.

The final version, "A Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam," was submitted to Kennedy on May 6. The victory plans recommended by the Gilpatric Task Force called for the use of US ground troops and a bilateral treaty between the US and the GVN. Both proposals stood in direct violation of the Geneva Accords, but were required because "it is essential that President Diem's full confidence in and communication with the United States be restored promptly."

Diem suspected that the United States was wavering in its commitment to the GVN on several grounds, some rational, such as the negotiations for a Laotian settlement, others irrational, such as his belief that the US had played a role in the attempted coup of November, 1960. But it was Diem's suspicions, not the justification for them, that compelled Washington to give serious consideration to using ground troops and to signing a treaty with the GVN, even though Diem's policies were demonstrably bankrupt and the suggested remedies violated international law. The feeling was beginning to take hold in Washington that if the US took over the job, Diem's policies would not matter. This belief was to be reinforced during the crisis in the fall of 1961, when Secretary of State Dean Rusk recommended that the United States simply take over the machinery of government in the South, should ground troops be introduced into the combat theater.

Circumventing international law was viewed by the Kennedy Administration as a problem far less significant than that of building support for a bankrupt GVN. Nevertheless, the question exercised the minds of officials in Washington. In his report to Kennedy, Gilpatric, for example, advanced the following argument to meet the charge that the United States was flouting the law:

"On the grounds that the Geneva Accords have placed inhibitions upon free world action while at the same time placing no restrictions upon the Communists, Ambassador Nolting should be instructed to enter into preliminary discussions with Diem regarding the possibility of a defensive security alliance despite the inconsistency of such actions with the Geneva Accords.

"This action would be based on the premise that such an undertaking is justified in international law as representing a refusal to be bound by the Accords in a degree and manner beyond that which the other party to the Accords has shown a willingness to honor. Communist violations, therefore, justify the establishment of the security arrangement herein recommended. Concurrently, Defense should study the military advisability of committing US forces in Vietnam."

This was the explanation that would be given to the American public: Communist violations of the Accords justified the bilateral treaty and the use of US ground forces. But would this explanation also convince official Washington of the need to deploy troops? Indeed not. In the same report, Gilpatric informed Kennedy why US troops were needed in Vietnam. "US forces are required," Gilpatric wrote, "to provide maximum psychological impact in deterrence of further Communist aggression from North Vietnam, China, or the Soviet Union." They would also serve an additional purpose: "to provide significant military resistance to potential North Vietnam Communist and/or Chinese Communist action" (italics added).

The US public was to be told that Washington had a legal right to deploy troops in response to actual Communist transgressions, while privately Washington would de-

cide to act because of "potential" Communist action. Of course, "further" aggressions from China or the Soviet Union could hardly be equated with past violations, especially since neither country had set foot in South Vietnam. Indeed, Russia had sponsored the two Vietnams for membership in the United Nations as late as 1959. "Further" aggressions from the North, such as reactivating the guerrilla apparatus in the South, an apparatus manned by Southern cadres and fed by Southern peasants, were Hanoi's delayed response to the initial transgression by the GVN, which, in collusion with Washington, had refused to consult with the North or hold elections in the South, as required by the Geneva Accords.

Thus, Washington's reason for deploying combat troops directly contradicted the explanation that would be given to the press and to Congress. Washington had decided that the way to manipulate international law was to fool the American people.

On May 11, President Kennedy, after reviewing the findings of the Gilpatric Task Force, issued a National Security Action Memorandum which contained several important decisions on Vietnam. Such memoranda, written by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, were used to convey Presidential orders to all the agencies that were to carry them out, or needed to know about them. The NSAM of May 11 stated:

1. The US objective is to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam.
2. A further increase in GVN forces from 170,000 to 200,000 is to be assumed.
3. Defense Department is directed to examine the size and composition of US forces in the event that such forces are committed to Vietnam.
4. The United States will seek to increase the confidence of Diem.
5. The Ambassador should begin negotiations for a bilateral arrangement with Vietnam.
6. The program for covert action is approved.

Gilpatric asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff their opinion on the desirability of deploying US forces to Vietnam. They recommended immediate deployment of a sufficient number to achieve the objectives set forth in the Gilpatric report. To set the machinery in motion, the Joint Chiefs added, Diem should "be encouraged to request that the United States fulfill its SEATO obligations. . . . Upon receipt of this request, suitable forces could be immediately deployed."

Vice President Johnson was dispatched to Vietnam to shore up Diem's confidence in the US commitment by "encouraging" him to request US ground troops. Referring to Diem as "the Winston Churchill of the Orient," Johnson asked him to make this request. But much to Washington's chagrin, Diem told Johnson that he did not want foreign troops on Vietnamese soil, except in the event of overt aggression. Moreover, he pointed out, the presence of US troops would contravene and nullify the Geneva Accords. The semblance of legality could be preserved, he added, if American troops were channeled, as "advisers," through the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), which had been in South Vietnam since the mid-Fifties.

After Johnson's visit, Diem sent a letter to President Kennedy expressing gratitude for Johnson's offer of assistance. "I was most deeply gratified by this gracious gesture by your distinguished Vice President, particularly as we have not become accustomed to being asked for our own views as to our needs," he wrote, concluding with the reminder that "we can count on the material support from your great country which will be so essential to achieving final victory." Material support, not US troops, would be furnished by Washington; otherwise Diem



would make himself even more vulnerable to the Communist charge that he was a colonialist.

During the summer of 1961, when the situation in Indochina deteriorated, Diem changed his mind and requested a treaty and troops from the United States. On October 1, the recently appointed Ambassador Nolting reported that Diem wanted a bilateral defense treaty with the US; on the thirteenth, Diem requested ground troops. These requests coincided with the conclusion of Defense Department and JCS studies, both of which advised the President to dispatch US troops to Vietnam, as well as with the announcement of a forthcoming "fact-finding mission" to Vietnam by two White House advisers, General Maxwell Taylor and Walt W. Rostow.

The Defense Department's study of the Viet Cong movement produced the discovery that the men and material originated in the South, not the North. The Department found that although the level of infiltration from the North was increasing, the "vast majority of Viet Cong troops are of local origin." If Hanoi was not furnishing the troops, was it at least furnishing the supplies? "There is little evidence of major supplies from outside sources," the Defense Department study found, "most arms being captured or stolen from GVN forces or from the French during the Indochina war." The North had given moral support to the insurgents, but little else. What should the United States do?

Having determined that the Viet Cong movement was local in origin, the Defense Department recommended that 11,000 US combat troops and 11,800 support troops be deployed to Vietnam for the purpose of sealing the border against any possible future infiltration from the North. But, the Department added, these troops would be insufficient to establish an anti-Communist government in the South. "The ultimate force requirements [for that purpose] cannot be estimated with any precision," the Department stated. "Three divisions would be a guess."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their reply to Gilpatric, reasoned that the North would rely still further upon a policy of infiltration if SEATO and US troops were deployed in the South. The Joint Chiefs speculated that it would be uncharacteristic of the North to respond with an overt invasion of the South, but in the event that it did, the US would have to send in three divisions. If China threw its weight into the struggle, then six US divisions, or a total of 205,000 men, would be required, and the use of nuclear weapons would become a distinct possibility.

The CIA took the Viet Cong threat less seriously than the Defense Department did, and identified the non-Communist (perhaps one should say anti-Communist) South as the immediate danger to Diem. The agency wrote:

"Most immediate threat to Diem is not a military takeover by the Communists but the mounting danger of an internal coup by disgruntled military and civilian members of the government who are critical of Diem's leadership. These critics hold that Diem's heavy hand in all operations of the government is not only hampering the anti-Communist military effort but is steadily alienating the populace."

Should a SEATO task force be dispatched to Vietnam as an alternative to US troops—one of the contingency plans circulating in Washington at the time—the CIA, like the Joint Chiefs, discounted the likelihood of a Northern invasion. Hanoi's strategy, the CIA believed, would be "to play upon possible SEATO weariness over maintaining substantial forces." Once this weariness became evident, "the Asian members would soon become disenchanted and look to the US to do something to lessen the burden and to solve the problem." Whether this something would

be a sizable number of US ground troops, as favored by the Joint Chiefs, or the use of nuclear weapons, as contemplated by Admiral Felt, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific forces (CINCPAC), was left undecided.

If the CIA analysis was correct, the US faced the possibility of a major war on the Asian mainland for the purpose of defending the narrow base of the Diem regime against its own people. Even the anti-Communist opposition in the South was rapidly being transmuted into part of a Communist monolith, located either in Moscow or Peking.

Nevertheless, some advisers began to argue for war. William Bundy, who had recently changed positions from the CIA's Far East expert to Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Defense Department, echoed Walt Rostow's belief that the fall of 1961 was the "now or never" period for the US. If America acted promptly and aggressively, Bundy argued, there was a 70 percent chance that it would "clean up the situation." There was a 30 percent chance that "we would wind up like the French in 1954; white men can't win this kind of war." Having weighed the options, Bundy concluded that a pre-emptive strike was advisable, and recommended "early and hard-hitting operations."

#### THE TAYLOR-ROSTOW MISSION

On October 11, 1961, President Kennedy authorized the Taylor-Rostow mission to Vietnam. Its purpose was to examine the feasibility of dispatching US troops; Kennedy specifically recommended that the mission look into the question of troop requirements. One option would be to send fewer US combat troops than the 22,800 identified in the Defense Department plan, but enough to "establish a US presence in Vietnam." A second dispensed with US combat forces entirely, and envisioned a stepped-up version of what is now called the "Vietnamization" program. According to this plan, the United States would increase its training of Vietnamese units and furnish more US equipment, "particularly helicopters and other light aircraft, trucks, and other ground support transport."

Two days after Kennedy announced the Taylor-Rostow mission, Diem, who had heretofore refused to "request" US combat troops, met with Ambassador Nolting and asked that the US government provide South Vietnam with the aid that had been secretly discussed when the Taylor-Rostow mission was being planned. Vice President Thuan, speaking for President Diem requested an additional squadron of AD-6 fighter bombers, US civilian contract pilots for helicopters, transport planes to be used for non-combat operations, and US combat units to be introduced into South Vietnam as combat-trainer units.

Diem had changed his mind. Originally ashamed to be dependent upon a US presence and afraid to scuttle the Geneva Accords, he set aside these considerations once it became clear that a neutral Laos was about to emerge from the negotiations then under way. According to Diem, a neutral Laos would be useful to the Communists. They could then cross the western border at will, infiltrate into the South, and crush him. The terrain in Laos was more difficult to defend, and the Communists were strong enough there to strike a final blow. Laos, he argued, had been used to trap the Americans into conceding South Vietnam.

Having enticed the Americans into a settlement that made it look as if the Americans had lost nothing, the Communists could concentrate all of their energies on seizing South Vietnam. To counter this strategy, Diem wanted some immediate assurance that the US would remain committed to the South. Such assurance would require a bilateral treaty and the presence of US combat troops. Only this would dissuade the North from pursuing a militant policy and convince those elements in the South that were still

loyal to Diem that a Laotian settlement was not the death warrant for the GVN.

The Kennedy Administration had discovered that it was impossible to avoid war. The only question was where and when. If Laos was not settled quickly, the US would have to pour in troops with small chance of success. But to negotiate a neutral Laos meant that U.S. troops would have to be deployed to South Vietnam, thus increasing the likelihood of a direct confrontation. Washington had painted itself into a corner—either war in Laos now or war in Vietnam in the future. Kennedy chose the latter.

The Taylor-Rostow mission stopped at Hawaii on the way to Vietnam and discussions were held with Admiral Felt, head of CINCPAC. Rostow asked about contingency plans in the event that open warfare broke out with the North. One question in particular concerned the use of nuclear weapons. Felt replied, "Plans were drawn on the assumption that tactical nuclear weapons will be used if required and that we can anticipate requests being made for their use if action expands into a Phase 4 situation." (Phase 4 involved a North Vietnamese and Chinese invasion of the South.)

Once in Vietnam, Taylor and Rostow explored ways of introducing US ground troops. They had decided that Diem needed them to preserve his rule, but they also recognized that such a course would damage America's image as a peacekeeper. The general and professor wondered how the United States could go to war while appearing to preserve the peace. While they were pondering this question, Vietnam was suddenly struck by a deluge. It was as if God had wrought a miracle. American soldiers, acting on humanitarian impulses, could be dispatched to save Vietnam not from the Viet Cong, but from the floods. McGarr, the Chief of MAAG, stated that Taylor favored "moving in US military personnel for humanitarian purposes with subsequent retention if desirable." He added, "This is an excellent opportunity to minimize adverse publicity."

Taylor himself viewed the flood relief task force more ambitiously. It would be the most efficient way to deal with world opinion, assuage Diem's fears, and allay Kennedy's reservations. World opinion would be swayed by humanitarian considerations. The colonial stain would not unduly tarnish Diem's image because the flood relief program clearly was not intended to "take over the responsibility for the security of the country." Finally, and perhaps most important, Taylor's plan contained a built-in excuse to withdraw—a feature intended to overcome Kennedy's objections. The President, it was well known, believed that it was more difficult to remove troops than to introduce them. Taylor wrote to Kennedy, "As the task is a specific one, we can extricate our troops when it is done if we so desire. Alternatively, we can phase them into other activities if we wish to remain longer."

Having invented a scheme that would enable the leaders in Saigon and Washington to placate their respective constituencies, Taylor then turned his attention from his preoccupation with politics to the military consequences. He recommended that the President deploy 8,000 ground troops and acknowledged that most of them would be used for logistical purposes. Such a token gesture could not be expected to have great military significance, but it surely ran the risk, as Taylor put it, of "escalating into a major war in Asia." Even if this danger did not materialize, the initial commitment would make it "difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce." Once the blood of a single American soldier had been spilled the President would assume the role of Commander-in-Chief and would be obliged to discharge his constitutional duty to protect the troops in the field.

This obligation made it unlikely that

troops would be removed and far more likely that additional troops would be sent over. The technical device of a built-in exit might be superseded by the political reality of a built-in escalation. And with the DRV and the Viet Cong committed to a policy of attrition, the United States would then be locked into a long struggle at the edge of the Communist world.

Such a struggle would take place, unfortunately, at a time when "the strategic reserve of the US forces is presently so weak that we can ill afford any detachment of forces." Taylor, in effect, told Kennedy to dispatch a few thousand combat troops which could not turn the tide of military battle, which invited a major war, provoked an indefinite and indecisive conflict, and depleted the US reserve. Why should Kennedy do this? Because, as Taylor said, "I do not believe that our program to save South Vietnam will succeed without it."

The symbolic gesture of stationing a few thousand US troops would save South Vietnam, Taylor argued, because it would inform the Communists of the "seriousness of the US intent to resist" and would raise the "national morale" of the South. Taylor predicted that the North would back down if the United States exhibited a fixed resolve to defend the South. That resolve had to be conveyed in the form of a clear message to Hanoi that the United States would take offensive action against the North if it did not stop supporting the Viet Cong. A small task force was a harbinger of greater devastation. The North would desist once it understood this message because, in Taylor's words, "North Vietnam is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing, a weakness which should be exploited diplomatically in convincing Hanoi to lay off South Vietnam."

The small task force, along with other forms of US-GVN cooperation, not only would alarm Hanoi, but in the South it would "reverse the present downward trend, stimulate an offensive spirit and build up morale." As Rostow commented to Diem at this time, "That secret of turning point is offensive action."

The purposes of discouraging the North and encouraging the South became the strategy that was to be relied upon throughout the Vietnam war. The same arguments that were advanced for the first time in 1961 were repeated in 1965 when Washington made the decision to embark on Operation Rolling Thunder. By the summer of 1965, however, lifting Southern morale was no longer viewed as necessary to win the war. The decision to send in the first 500,000 combat troops was justified solely by the need to convince the Communists that the United States was serious.

The strategy has remained surprisingly constant, guiding American policy for the better part of a decade. The architects of the strategy, Taylor and Rostow, did not envision the small task force of 8,000 men as the "final word." It was simply the first lesson they planned for the leadership in Hanoi.

By its major premise that Hanoi would back down only if it knew the United States was prepared to attack North Vietnam directly—the strategy entailed a built-in escalation. Events had to follow in a monotonous but natural order: increase the size of U.S. support troops in the South; institute covert operations against the North; threaten to bomb the North; bomb the North; pour US combat troops into the South as rapidly as possible; invade Cambodia; invade Laos . . . invade the North? destroy the North? etc.

The strategy required not only that the United States make it known that it would attack the North directly, but also that the United States not obliterate the North. To threaten to destroy the Communist regime in Hanoi would risk a direct encounter with China or Russia, a risk that the national security managers wished to avoid. They did not

want to fight a nuclear war. They wanted to fight a safe war. The strategy therefore demanded a combination of escalation and moderation.

America would exercise its power in a deliberate and calculated manner in order to hold Hanoi hostage. The term "Hanoi" here is to be taken literally: the rest of Vietnam, indeed all of Indochina, was to become a target. One could say that US strategy was to kill the people while preserving the Hanoi government. Once surrounded by devastation, isolated, and abandoned by her socialist allies, Russia and China, Hanoi would be left with no choice but to submit to a "moderate" but triumphant America.

Although the creation of the task force was its most far-reaching recommendation, the Taylor-Rostow report urged the President to adopt a number of other measures. These were mainly of a military and administrative nature. The report recommended that the personnel in the Military Assistance Advisory Group mission be increased from 1,103 to 2,612. Moreover, U.S. aircraft, consisting of several helicopter companies, and U.S. crews for supporting or operational missions were to be introduced no later than mid-November.

The combat troops, the increase in the size of MAAG, and the use of U.S. aircraft and crews were all violations of the limits on troops and armaments set by the Geneva Accords. The International Security Agency, reviewing the legality of these recommendations, noted that the additions to MAAG, although a violation of international law, could not easily be proved: discussions between the International Control Commission, which was charged with enforcing the Geneva Accords, and the Embassy could be extended for months, during which time the value of the increase in MAAG's size would be realized.

The use of U.S. helicopters was of a more serious nature, requiring some groundwork to pacify Congress and the press. But combat troops could not so easily be disguised. Their only justification would be their subsequent success, not prior propaganda, and the International Security Agency viewed them with deep skepticism. It predicted that the North would respond by infiltrating 15,000 men, which would in turn require three U.S. divisions to offset them. Thus an indefinite war of attrition would be ensured.

#### THE "LIMITED PARTNERSHIP"

The administrative recommendations of Taylor and Rostow were designed to place a number of Americans on four specific levels of the South Vietnamese bureaucracy. First, Americans would work as high-level government advisers. Taylor envisioned "a limited number of Americans in key ministries." This would mean that U.S. advisers would, in effect, become cabinet officers in the Diem government. Next, "a joint U.S.-Vietnamese Military Survey, down to the provincial level, in each of three corps areas" would engage in a number of tasks, including intelligence, command and control, the build-up of reserves for offensive purposes, and mediation between the military commander and the province chief. The other two functions would be border control operations and "intimate liaison with the Vietnamese Central Intelligence organizations."

The ostensible purpose of giving Americans critical roles in government was that "Vietnamese performance in every domain can be substantially improved if Americans are prepared to work side by side with the Vietnamese." Taylor designated these administrative changes as representing a "shift from U.S. advice to limited partnership." The concept of "limited partnership," in fact, meant that the GVN had been negligent in reforming itself in the past, and suggested that the only way to reform the GVN in the future would be for the U.S. to take it over. With U.S. ground troops in the field, U.S. aircraft

controlling the skies, and U.S. civilian personnel administering the cities and provinces, Vietnam would be reformed. Only Washington's own people could fulfill Washington's wishes.

The administrative changes meant that the national security managers had decided that the most effective mechanism for processing reforms through the GVN was for America to take over the government. They were also beginning to understand that the surest way to take over a client state was to introduce ground troops who would ultimately become responsible for the defense of the country. Under such circumstances, the native leader no longer serves as a puppet but rather, in the manager's words, as a "platform" upon which the American military and administrative personnel would be able to operate. Reduced from a leader to a platform, the local ruler of the client state is robbed of the last vestiges of his political life. His value to the mother country is no longer measured by the speed and economy with which he is able to bring about the changes suggested by Washington (the core of his bargaining power).

Since the local leader is no longer the source of change, he is not expected to do anything; he is merely expected not to undo anything. The mother country is less interested in gaining than in not losing. That desirable feature of leadership, charisma, gives way to banality. The worth of the leader is now measured by the number of followers he does not lose, the number of riots that do not occur, the number of battles that are not fought.

The leader's role in his own country is purely custodial. His task is to hold things together. To the degree that he performs this function, he has built the platform upon which the troops from the mother country may enter. His obligation to the mother country is to serve as the official greeter of the foreign troops. He is a janitor at home and a master of ceremonies abroad.

The problem with Diem was that he was unable to play a custodial role at home or a ceremonial one abroad. By 1961, he was beginning to lose his followers faster than the United States could increase its personnel in Vietnam. Were this inverse ratio to continue, the moment would come when there would be no platform for American troops to walk on. But this was not clearly perceived in Washington in 1961. When it did become obvious in 1963, Diem was dispensed with. Whereas Ambassador Durbrow had toyed with the idea of eliminating Diem because he was not a reformer, the Kennedy circle would remove him because he had been abandoned by the last of the faithful. Diem's failure to reform would be the alibi for, not the cause of, his downfall.

What was obvious in 1961 was that Kennedy was alarmed about Diem's public image in America. From the point of view of the President of the United States, the local leader must be palatable to the American people if American troops are to be ordered to Vietnam. One explanation for Kennedy's decision to veto the recommendation of all of his senior advisers to send troops to Vietnam was that Diem lacked the image that would qualify him to receive American ground troops. In a discussion of "the famous problem of Diem as an administrator and politician," Taylor suggested three choices that were available to Washington.

The first was to "remove him in favor of a military dictatorship which would give dominance to the military chain of command." The second was to "remove him in favor of a figure of more dilute power who would delegate authority to act in both military and civilian leaders." It was this option that foreshadowed the need for a local leader who could retain a rapidly diminishing constituency, so that the largest number of US troops could be sent. Once the need became apparent, the second choice was axiomatic.



Washington would then require someone to perform custodial services in Vietnam and act as an official greeter for American troops, roles played by General Khanh in 1964 and General Thieu after 1965.

In 1961, however, Taylor opted for the third choice. He wished to retain Diem in order "to bring about a series of *de facto* administrative changes via persuasion at high levels . . . using the US presence to force the Vietnamese to get their house in order in one area after another." In considering the first two choices, Taylor raised the prospect of a coup, but rejected it because "it would be dangerous for us to engineer a coup under present tense circumstances, since it is by no means certain that we could control its consequences and potentialities for Communist exploitation." In other words, the United States had not yet taken over enough of Vietnam to guarantee the irrelevance of the new leader.

The Taylor-Rostow report had a profound influence on Washington's policy toward Vietnam. The report fashioned the strategy of combined escalation and moderation. By establishing the principle of "limited partnership," a euphemism for American control, it resolved the conflict between the need for efficient prosecution of the war and the need for administrative reform. The previous aim of reform had been to broaden the base of the government to include elements of the loyal opposition. The new focus was on the pace at which American troops entered the field and American bureaucrats entered the government.

Broadening the base came to mean turning the reins of government over to the Americans. Once Americans took over, they could manipulate the concepts of warfare and welfare according to their own priorities. The battle between these concepts would be waged within the American establishment, with the pacifiers making feeble attempts to reform the military. Reform ultimately came to mean less indiscriminate killing instead of greater citizen participation. Finally, the report defined the qualities of the ideal leader that America would need in Vietnam after it stationed its troops in the field and its bureaucrats in office, qualities that were to be found eventually in the middling leadership of Thieu.

#### THE RECOMMENDATION OF McNAMARA AND RUSK

While the Taylor-Rostow report was circulating in Washington, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk were writing their own recommendations for Vietnam policy. McNamara picked up the thread of Taylor's strategic analysis and Rusk pondered the need for an American seizure of the Vietnamese bureaucracy.

Rusk believed the President should carefully weigh the decision to send in US troops against Diem's unwillingness to "give us something worth supporting." Diem's failure to trust his own commanders and his obstinate refusal to broaden the base of government made it unlikely that a "handful of American troops can have decisive influence." Rusk noted the vital importance that US policy attached to Southeast Asia, but he cautioned against "committing American prestige to a losing horse." His recommendations, however, also presumed a seizure of the internal bureaucracy, the process described by Taylor as "limited partnership." Rusk directed the State Department to draw up a list of expectations "from Diem if our assistance forces us to assume *de facto* direction of South Vietnamese affairs."

While Rusk was elaborating on Taylor's report from the civil side, McNamara accelerated the recommendations from the military side. He accepted the strategy recommended by Taylor, but criticized him for not putting enough muscle behind that strategy. In McNamara's view, the 8,000-man task

force would help Diem but would not "convince the other side (whether the shots are called from Moscow, Peiping, or Hanoi) that we mean business. Moreover, it probably will not tip the scales decisively. We would be almost certain to get increasingly mired down in an inconclusive struggle."

Since the aim of the strategy was to make the enemy know that the United States would attack directly if it did not disengage itself from the Southern struggle, McNamara concluded:

" . . . the other side can be convinced we mean business only if we accompany the initial force introduction by a clear warning commitment to the full objective stated above, accompanied by a warning through some channel to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet Cong will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnam."

McNamara presumed that the other side would attack, not withdraw, in spite of the presence of US troops and a clear statement of intent. The US would then reply with 205,000 men, or six divisions. Public opinion in American, McNamara believed, will respond better to a firm initial position than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually.

What is striking about recommendations by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense is that each, within his particular domain, went beyond the suggestions made by General Taylor. Whereas Taylor spoke of a limited partnership between the GVN and the United States government, Rusk operate on the assumption of a "*de facto* direction of South Vietnamese affairs."

With respect to military policy, Taylor boldly conceived a strategy that could well lead to genocide, but he was rather timid in applying it. He wanted to avoid the impression that the US would send its troops into actual combat, and urged the flood relief idea upon the President as a cover to preserve a peaceful image. McNamara, however, not only was willing to embrace the need for 8,000 combat troops, but seemed to be devising a pre-emptive strategy by calling on a second strike capability of six divisions as a response to the Northern invasion that would be touched off by the initial force.

While Taylor saw the flood relief task force as a humanitarian cover to avoid a larger war, McNamara viewed it as a way to provoke the North into that larger war. Taylor, moreover, counseled the President on the importance of a peaceful image for domestic public opinion. At best, Taylor reasoned, the American public would have to be led to accept a gradual involvement. McNamara, on the other hand, believed that America would much more likely support a firm hand.

Taylor either eschewed war altogether by projecting such logical incompatibilities as a bold strategy and a quiescent task force, or equivocated by never pulling out or pushing in. McNamara, just recovering from his personal revulsion at the possibility of a nuclear holocaust over Berlin, seemed to be willing to prosecute a large conventional war. In view of the advanced state of US technology, such a war, if carried on for years, could produce effects amounting to nuclear devastation.

#### KENNEDY'S DECISION

In spite of the agreement among his senior advisers that ground troops should be dispatched, Kennedy refused. He could have cited many reasons to support his decision. One was that the introduction of US combat forces in Vietnam would cripple the discussions for a negotiated settlement in Laos. Ormsby Gore the British ambassador, had told Rusk on November 7 that "the introduction of US troops would not only complicate the situation, but make it impossible to get anywhere on Laos." A week later, Ambassador Alphonse de France told Rusk that further escalation would undermine the

Geneva negotiations and compound the risk of "mass intervention" by the Soviet Union. Alphonse also reminded the Secretary of "difficulties for the West of fighting in Vietnam."

Rusk, however, took this to mean that Europe and America might have to part ways. Rusk explained that it "would be difficult for US opinion and friendly countries to accept a repetition of Laos in Vietnam." Southeast Asia, he concluded, was "more important to the United States than to Europe." Indeed, "if the loss of Southeast Asia was at stake, and Europeans did not agree with our policies, there might have to be a divergence."

Rusk's attitude demonstrates a fundamental shift in the direction of American foreign policy. Hereafter the national security managers except for George Ball, were to reject the need for a multilateral response and affirm the will to proceed alone in Asia. The first sign of this shift occurred on January 19, 1961, just before Kennedy's inauguration when, during discussions with the President-elect, Eisenhower told him, "It is imperative that Laos be defended. The United States should accept this task with our allies, if we could persuade them, and alone if we could not. Our unilateral intervention would be our last desperate hope in the event we were unable to prevail upon the other signatories to join us."

Kennedy's advisers wholeheartedly supported Eisenhower's position, but had to wait for Johnson to apply it to Vietnam, not Laos. Kennedy himself, in 1961, seemed to be more impressed with the arguments advanced by the British and French ambassadors than with Eisenhower's position or with Rusk's acceptance of it. Kennedy, it could be argued, was yet to be persuaded that US foreign policy was destined to go it alone in Asia. In addition to shattering the Laotian settlement, the dispatch of troops to Vietnam at a time when the Berlin crisis could again erupt increased Kennedy's "expressed concern over a two-front war." This does not mean, however, that Kennedy was willing to preside over the liquidation of the fledgling American Empire in Southeast Asia. The fear of a two-front war, according to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., would have to be weighed against the fear "that an American retreat in Asia might upset the whole world balance."

Other factors must be considered to explain Kennedy's veto of combat troops. One way to understand the President's motives is to recall the decisions he made and try to discover what light they shed on decisions that he did not make. We do know, for example, that Kennedy sent troops to Vietnam, referring to them as support troops, though their combat role was extensive. Therefore, we can conclude that Kennedy saw the need to disguise their combat function. We also know that the number sent during his administration ultimately doubled the initial figure of 8,000 recommended by Taylor and Rostow. Therefore, Kennedy saw the need to introduce them into Vietnam gradually instead of at one stroke. Finally, we know that Kennedy began a campaign of covert activities against North Vietnam—a campaign that marked the switch to direct offensive actions but was disguised so that Washington could publicly disavow its own role.

Kennedy's policy toward Vietnam, then, was to accelerate the war while denying that he was doing it. His policy was to promote a private war. He was willing to go it alone in Asia, but not to admit it. He disregarded the counsel of his advisers only to the extent that they preferred a public war.

The President, clearly, did not believe that the American people would support him in his decision to escalate the level of combat. This does not mean that Kennedy thought the American people would have been op-

posed to a war in Indochina under any circumstances. It simply means that in 1961 the American public would not support a war whose ostensible purpose was to preserve the Diem regime. The war would be repulsive because the leader was odious. In 1963, when the self-immolation of protesting Buddhist monks became a daily event, Diem's image abroad deteriorated and became incompatible with the American presence. The American people could resign themselves to an indefinite war, but not when the character of the regime, personified by Diem, Nhu, and Madame Nhu, was so obnoxious. Washington concluded that Diem would have to be eliminated before the war could be escalated.

While Diem was too repellent to be given American combat troops, he was not pliable enough to accept American bureaucrats. Rusk, as we have seen, presumed that America would undertake a "de facto direction of South Vietnamese affairs." The Taylor-Rostow report had anticipated a "limited partnership" between the GVN and the United States government. Diem quickly dashed these hopes. Vice President Thuan told Ambassador Nolting that Diem's "attitude seemed to be that the United States was asking great concessions of GVN in the realm of its sovereignty, in exchange for little additional help." When Nolting pressed Diem directly on the need for a close partnership, Diem informed him that "Vietnam did not want to be a protectorate."

By word and deed, Diem demonstrated that he would no more broaden his decision-making councils to include Americans than he would do so to include other Vietnamese. To turn over the internal bureaucracy to the Americans, Diem had told Ambassador Kenneth Young, would "give a monopoly on nationalism to the Communists." The only conditions under which Diem would accept a US directorate were the dispatch of US combat troops and a bilateral treaty. If he was certain that the Americans would openly defend him, then he could afford to come out openly as their puppet. But Washington would not openly defend Diem because he did not seem worth defending in public.

In these circumstances Kennedy made the decision not to send in combat troops, or rather, to fight a private war. In a National Security Council Action Memorandum on Vietnam, NSAM 111, Kennedy, observing widespread criticism of Diem's regime, stated that US support would be conditional upon whether real reforms were instituted by Diem. The President said:

"Rightly or wrongly his regime is widely criticized abroad and in the U.S., and if we are to give our substantial support, we must be able to point to real administrative, political, and social reforms and a real effort to widen its base that will give maximum confidence to the American people, as well as to world opinion that our efforts are not directed towards the support of an unpopular or ineffective regime, but rather towards supporting the combined efforts of all the non-Communist people of the GVN against a Communist takeover."

In the next clause of the NSAM, however, Kennedy made the decision to send US troops and informed the American ambassador that these troops should be seen as the equivalent of combat forces.

"It is anticipated that one of the first questions President Diem will raise with you after your presentation of the above joint proposals will be that of introducing US combat troops. You are authorized to remind him that the actions we already have in mind involve a substantial number of US military personnel for operational duties in Vietnam, and that we believe that these forces performing crucial missions can greatly increase the capacity of GVN forces to win their war against the Viet Cong."

US firepower and US troops would be im-

mediately sent to Vietnam without the necessity for any "real administrative, political, and social reforms." What was desirable was that Diem's image be improved.

In the next clause of the memorandum, Kennedy dispensed with the need for the GVN "to widen its base . . . towards supporting the combined efforts of all the non-Communist people of the GVN against a Communist takeover." Kennedy admonished the ambassador.

"You should inform Diem that, in our minds, the concept of the joint undertaking envisages a much closer relationship than the present one of acting in an advisory capacity only. We would expect to share in the decision-making processes in the political, economic and military fields as they affected the security situation."

Reform, to Kennedy, ultimately meant that Diem needed an attractive image in America, and that Washington needed to seize the bureaucratic machinery in Vietnam. If neither was forthcoming, Diem would be eliminated, and a "genuine and real" puppet put in his place.

The private war required dispatching US combat troops to Vietnam to perform "operational duties" and withholding that fact from the American public. The troops were put under the jurisdiction of the newly organized Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), but their combat role was disguised. The public was told that US personnel would only "advise" the South Vietnamese army.

Another component of the private war was the initiation of covert activities. Begun in the spring of 1961, only six weeks after John F. Kennedy had assumed the Presidency, these continued without interruption up to the launching of Operation Rolling Thunder in February 1965, the beginning of the overt war by Lyndon Johnson.

In March 1961, Kennedy instructed the national security agencies to "make every possible effort to launch guerrilla operations in Viet-Minh territory at the earliest possible time." He directed the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the CIA to furnish plans for covert programs against the North both in the near-term and in the "longer future periods." Two months later, Kennedy approved the program for covert actions that had been proposed by the Vietnam Task Force, a group working out of the State Department, then under the leadership of Sterling Cottrell. Cottrell had accompanied Taylor and Rostow on their mission to Vietnam in the fall of 1961 and had urged the President not to introduce combat troops into the South. In the spring of 1961 he recommended that the President use South Vietnamese troops for commando raids and sabotage in North Vietnam and Laos.

The President agreed. One hundred days after he was elected President, he ordered agents to be sent into North Vietnam who were to be resupplied by Vietnamese civilian mercenary air crews. Special GVN forces were meanwhile to infiltrate into Southeast Laos to locate and attack Communist bases, and other teams trained by the Special Forces were to be used for sabotage and light harassment inside North Vietnam. Finally, Kennedy ordered flights over North Vietnam to drop leaflets. Two days after Kennedy authorized the Taylor-Rostow mission and before the mission arrived in Vietnam, the President ordered guerrilla ground action, "including the use of US advisers if necessary against Communist aerial resupply missions in the vicinity of Tchepone, Laos." In December, immediately after he shelved Taylor's proposal to deploy 8,000 combat troops in the South, Kennedy adopted a CIA-sponsored program to recruit South Vietnamese personnel for the purpose of "forming an underwater demolition team to operate in strategic maritime areas of North Vietnam."

By the end of 1961, the private war consisted of covert operations directed against North Vietnam and Laos, and the concealed use of U.S. air and ground combat personnel against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Each element of the private war increased in tempo and intensity throughout 1962 and 1963. By the time Kennedy was assassinated, the United States had 16,500 troops in South Vietnam pretending they were not fighting, and the Special Forces were executing a host of covert programs in North Vietnam and Laos.

During its thirty-three months in office, the Kennedy Administration managed and directed an illicit war. By sending an additional 1,000 troops to Vietnam in 1961, Kennedy broke through the MAAG ceiling and violated the Geneva Accords. Speaking to Rusk at a National Security Council meeting in November 1961, Kennedy defined the Presidential manner proper to breaching international laws: "Why do we take onus, say we are going to break the Geneva Accords? Why not remain silent? Don't say this ourselves!"

The Accords, of course, had been violated before. But the decision to conceal violations—and the developing war—from the American public was new. That the Bay of Pigs, the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, and attempted coups in various parts of the world has also been covert enterprises does not diminish the special significance of the Vietnam undertaking. Here, for the first time, covert activity no longer crystallized into a single event, as with the Bay of Pigs. In Vietnam, the "black stuff" became the usual way of doing business; the war itself was covert. Nor does it suffice to say that the U-2 flights were stretched out through time. The purpose of these flights was spying; they were repetitions of a single act; and they were placed under the jurisdiction of the CIA, an agency restricted to covert acts. In Vietnam, several covert programs were put together to create a pattern of warfare, not spying, and these programs were instituted and managed by the government.

#### ROOM 303

In 1962 and 1963, two agencies in Washington managed the Vietnam war—the 303 Committee and the Special Group Counter-Insurgency (SGCI).

The 303 Committee, taking its name from the room number at the Executive Office Building where it met once a week, came into being as a direct consequence of the egregious blundering at the Bay of Pigs in the spring of 1961. Kennedy, appalled by the military incompetence shown by the fiasco and embarrassed by the public image it created, was determined to make sure that the covert activities of the CIA did not contradict U.S. foreign policy and that they were not beyond the capabilities of the military.

Thereafter, CIA programs had to be cleared in advance. This was the task of the 303 Committee, whose jurisdiction came to include every important covert programs conducted anywhere in the world, including Vietnam. The membership of the Committee included the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Director of Intelligence of the CIA, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. During the Kennedy years, these offices were held, respectively, by Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Richard Helms, and McGeorge Bundy. The chairman of the Committee was McGeorge Bundy, who had been given his choice between chairing the Special Group Counter-Insurgency and the 303 Committee.

To the extent that Vietnam was a covert war in 1962 and 1963, the 303 Committee managed the war. It did this by approving and revised the programs that defined American covert participation in the war. At least



four major programs were authorized and supervised by the 303 Committee—Operation Farmhand, the training of the Montagnards, DeSoto patrols, and 34a operations.

Operation Farmhand was the first covert program approved by the 303 Committee for Vietnam. Under this program, South Vietnamese personnel were airlifted into North Vietnam in the spring of 1961, to "commit sabotage, spy and harass the enemy." Trained by the army's Special Forces, who were themselves detached and put under the control of the CIA, the commandos were invariably arrested as soon as they landed in the North. In many instances, personnel would have to be conscripted to accept an assignment. Frequently, they would show up drunk or fail to appear at all. In the field, the program was a total failure, but, strategically, it informed the North that direct measures would be taken against it.

The second major program authorized by the 303 Committee was the training of the Montagnards in South Vietnam, who had managed to preserve their ethnic identity over the centuries. These local tribesmen, whose loyalty never extended beyond their own clan, were as opposed to the encroachments of the GVN as they were to the solicitations of the Viet Cong. Because they inhabited an area that bordered an infiltration route from North to South, the CIA believed that they could be trained as a force of warriors to be used in attacks against the Viet Cong.

The CIA felt that the bonds among ethnic minorities could be easily nourished and exploited; that nomadic tribes, rather than landed peasants, could be made into warriors and be moved more easily from one assignment to another. As warriors, the Montagnards took their orders directly from the CIA, in return for which they were liberally paid and promised autonomy from the GVN. The GVN neither consented to nor complied with this promise.

By the end of 1963, 30,000 local tribesmen had been armed and trained. The Special Forces carried out this work for the CIA. Eventually, the Montagnards were formed into units known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). They were used for various types of operations, and were noted primarily for their bravery, brutality, and terrorism. CIDG units were used to repress the Southern peasantry as well as for armed incursions into the North. As soon as the program showed some success, the MACV, attempting to break the autonomy of the Special Forces, removed the program from the CIA and placed it under its own jurisdiction.

CIA training of the Montagnards in South Vietnam had its counterpart among the Meo tribesmen in Laos. The Meo, too, were a local clan whose latent warrior tendencies and antipathy toward central rule were carefully nurtured by the CIA. By training and paying the Montagnards and Meo tribesmen, the CIA, in effect, created a force of warriors directly under its command. The conflict between the local tribesmen and the central government, fostered by the CIA, ran parallel to a larger conflict among American officials—a conflict between the Special Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Just as the local tribesmen were promised their autonomy from the central government by the CIA, so the Special Forces had been established as an autonomous force, to take their command's directly from the President, circumventing the Joint Chiefs. As the Indochina war proceeded, the local tribesmen were eventually reduced to subservience by the central government, and the Special Forces were taken over by the Joint Chiefs. The "guerrillas" within the client state and the "guerrillas" within the American imperial state were broken and absorbed by the client and imperial government, respectively.

But to develop a guerrilla force within the imperial power, an idea originated by the CIA, is a structural change that many pre-

figure the imperial army of the future. For the conflict between the Special Forces and the Joint Chiefs, on the one hand, and the local tribesmen and the central government, on the other, reflects a larger conflict between the client state and the imperial power. The United States has encountered grave difficulties in developing effective and loyal armies within its client states. Neither the Royal Laotian Army nor the ARVN has been able to hold its own against the people's army, the Viet Cong, and the Pathet Lao. It was a direct result of this difficulty that the CIA attempted to build armies of local tribesmen.

These guerrilla armies were an astonishing success when compared to the regular armies of South Vietnam and Laos. When the Joint Chiefs set out to break the autonomy of the Special Forces, they were fortuitously putting under their command a guerrilla army of local tribesmen which they were able to use as the new imperial army. With this one stroke the Joint Chiefs resolved some of the difficulties of relying both upon a client army and upon troops conscripted in the US. Neither American boys nor South Vietnamese boys wished to fight in a people's war. What could be better cannon fodder to use against the people than a pre-people, that is, clansmen? The courage of the local tribes and the technology of the imperial power were combined to do battle with large numbers of Asian people and the guerrilla organizations they were supporting.

The third program begun by the 303 Committee was the use of DeSoto patrols. Originated in 1962 and approved by the President, this program authorized US destroyers to operate along the border of mainland China and the North Vietnamese mainland, to listen to the "military and civil activity of the Asian Communist bloc." In addition to listening, the patrols were ordered to stimulate the radar of the enemy so that the position and type of radar could be identified.

After the DeSoto patrols were approved by Kennedy and the detailed policy for using them was formulated by the 303 Committee, the program was submitted for implementation to the Joint Chiefs, who then put the program under the jurisdiction of the Joint Center for Intelligence at their headquarters in Washington. The Ops Center, as it was called, drew up the tentative schedules and forwarded them to CINCPAC in Hawaii. CINCPAC selected the precise dates for the DeSoto patrols and sent orders to the Seventh Fleet. Copies of these orders were also sent to MACV in Saigon. The question of who selected and kept track of the DeSoto patrols was to assume critical importance in the Gulf of Tonkin incident of August, 1964.

CINCPAC plan 34a, drawn up in the fall of 1963 as an annex to the entire CINCPAC plan for Southeast Asia, was the covert plan directed against the North. It consisted of two parts: psychological operations and hit-and-run attacks. The latter included amphibious raids by the Vietnamese in areas "south of the Tonkin Delta having little or no security." This was subsequently expanded to include the use of swift torpedo boats to shell the Northern mainland and kidnap Northern personnel. Plan 34a, too, was assigned by the 303 Committee to the Joint Chiefs for implementation.

#### THE SPECIAL GROUP FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY

The second agency in Washington that managed the private war between 1961 and 1963 was the Special Group Counter-Insurgency (SGCI). Organized in response to Khrushchev's speech on wars of national liberation, the SGCI was created by President Kennedy in NSAM 124, issued in late 1961. The SGCI, like the 303 Committee, met once a week. In fact, its members included those on the 303 Committee, or their delegates, and met in Room 303 at the Executive Office Building immediately after the Com-

mittee adjourned its meetings. Members of the 303 Committee would complete their discussions, sign orders for the covert programs, and then call the SGCI to order, invite in additional deputies, and turn their attention to the problems of counterinsurgency.

Nevertheless, there were substantial differences between the 303 Committee and the SGCI. The 303 Committee managed the covert operations of the United States government in every area of the world. The programs themselves generally originated with the CIA, although other agencies of government, such as the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the State Department, did submit proposals, many of which were put into operation. The only requirement for a 303 hearing was that the program be significant and covert. When a program was put into operation, it generally used the services of the Special Forces.

The SGCI, on the contrary, never managed covert operations, had only a limited relation to the CIA, and did not employ the services of the Special Forces. It dealt exclusively with the overt programs of the US government in any nation around the globe that was deemed to be threatened by insurgency. These programs were under the special jurisdiction of the several national security agencies, including the Defense Department, AID, the State Department, USIA, and the CIA. The purposes of SGCI were to coordinate the overseas programs of the national security agencies, eliminate duplication of efforts, and ensure that those programs relating to counterinsurgency were completed. The SGCI supervised the overseas programs of each of the national security agencies.

A counterinsurgency doctrine technically known as "The Overseas Internal Defense Policy of the USA" was written in 1962. President Kennedy adopted it as the official policy of the US government in NSAM 182. The main premise of the doctrine was that the counterinsurgents should help themselves, but saving clause was added to the doctrine instructing: "where necessary, introduce US troops."

Thus the 303 Committee was largely responsible for the unofficial policy of the U.S. government toward Vietnam during the private war—the covert activities in North Vietnam and Laos, and the disguised use of U.S. combat troops within South Vietnam. The SGCI, on the other hand, was in charge of the official policy—the policy that was reported in the press and otherwise made known to the American public.

The official policy consisted of a strategic plan which, consistent with the counterinsurgency doctrine, called upon the GVN to defend itself, to win its own war, and to employ Americans as teachers. There were three parts to the plan:

- 1) The U.S. government officially accepted Diem as the premier of South Vietnam, and all aid was channeled through him.

- 2) The strategic hamlet program was devised as the principal means of defending the South against further encroachments by the Viet Cong. Strategic hamlets were supposed to help organize the rural peasants into larger territorial units in order to increase their capacity to defend themselves and to weed out Viet Cong.

As envisioned by the planners, the hamlets were to expand like an oil blot, dense in the center, blurred at the perimeter. Ideally, a second hamlet would not be built until the first was satisfactorily organized and properly defensible. Diem's brother, Nhu, was placed in charge of the program and built the hamlets in total disregard of the oil blot theory. Instead of securing one hamlet before proceeding to the next, Nhu was interested in increasing the number of hamlets, with the result that none was secure. When Diem was assassinated in 1963, thousands of strategic hamlets collapsed overnight.

3) The ARVN was to be built into a powerful army that could take the offensive against the Viet Cong and regain the territory then held by the Communists. The ARVN, trained by MACV and working in conjunction with the strategic hamlet program under the charismatic leadership of Diem, would, it was anticipated, extend the national sovereignty of the GVN throughout South Vietnam.

The national security agencies of the U.S. government devoted all their efforts to this strategic plan. Their programs were supervised by the SGCI and their projects were completed under the direction of a special agency, which ostensibly possessed a blueprint of victory.

The countries under the jurisdiction of the SGCI included Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Iran, and a half-dozen Latin American countries. Vietnam and Laos were at the top of the list. By the end of 1962, entire meetings were devoted to Vietnam alone. The SGCI mainly reviewed weekly reports furnished by the Vietnam Task Force. In time, however, these reports, prepared by Sterling Cottrell and Ben Wood, were considered too meager, and other national security agencies, such as the Pentagon, AID, and the CIA, began to supply supplementary reports on Vietnam.

The reports, whether from the Task Force or the other national security agencies, were discussed at the opening of each meeting. Then, expert witnesses who had just returned from Vietnam would brief the Special Group. Some of the witnesses who regularly appeared before the SGCI were John Richardson, the CIA station chief in Vietnam; General Victor Krulak, the Special Assistant for Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities (SACSA); William Jorden, a former *New York Times* reporter and the author of the two white papers on Vietnam; Ted Sarong, the Australian attache; Robert Thompson, the British expert on counterinsurgency and moving force behind the strategic hamlet doctrine; and one Walton, an ex-marine and head of the police safety division in Vietnam.

The highlights of the discussions of SGCI deserve consideration, since they show the information guiding official Washington during the private war as well as the reaction to that information.

#### THE VIET CONG

The year 1962 has been referred to as the optimistic period in Vietnam. The insurgency was coming under control, and McNamara was persuaded that the US had turned the corner in Vietnam and that American boys would be returning home. On May 3, 1962, Sterling Cottrell reported to the Special Group that the US had "reached the bottom" in Vietnam. Cottrell, it should be recalled, was the head of the Vietnam Task Force, had accompanied Taylor and Rostow on their mission to Vietnam, and had opposed their advice on the question of ground troops. He supported a low-keyed approach to Vietnam and clearly had a stake in the continuation of the current Vietnam policy.

General Lyman Lemnitzer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, reported on May 17, 1962, that the defense build-up was going well. The military seemed unanimous in believing that US policies were having benign effects. On May 31, Cottrell informed the SGCI Group that the GVN was increasing the number of strategic hamlets at an "ambitious and uncontrolled rate."

On June 20, however, John McCone, director of the CIA, warned that the Viet Cong were beginning to fight in larger units. They were using heavier weapons, he added, to wipe out strategic hamlets before help could arrive. On November 5, the Task Force told the Group that Viet Cong forces were as strong as ever. They were able to recruit many new personnel, even though their morale had begun to slip. Cottrell added that the "situation was still in balance."

In 1963, the US tried again to document its charge that the Viet Cong were being aided by heavy infiltration from the North. One task confronting the Special Group was to determine the accuracy of the charge. On January 17, 1963, the Task Force decided that infiltration was less serious than had been thought. It explained that local recruitment and local supplies were being furnished to the Viet Cong in the South; the insurgents had little need to be dependent upon the North for either. Taylor, complying with "higher" orders, said it was important to get information on Northern infiltration and authorized William Jorden to go to Vietnam to study the question thoroughly. Washington was becoming embarrassed over the fact that it was increasingly committing itself to intervention in a civil war.

On April 5, 1963, a famous meeting of the Special Group was held, in which Jorden, after spending three months in Vietnam, reported that "we are unable to document and develop any hard evidence of infiltration after October 1, 1962. Evidence prior to that date strongly indicated the absence of infiltration. At the same meeting, Robert Thompson attempted to counter Jorden's pessimistic appraisal of Viet Cong activity by forecasting that "US forces are adequate. By the end of the year, troops can begin to be withdrawn."

A State Department representative on the Special Group summed up in one sentence the observations of the US army officers who returned from Vietnam in 1962: "If free elections were to be held in South Vietnam in 1962, Ho would get 70 percent of the popular vote." Because of Ho's popularity, he added, wholesale supplies in the South and ready recruitment of personnel were available to the Viet Cong. Only a trickle of supplies in addition to the original covert apparatus had been furnished by the North. The State Department official pointed out that all insurgents receive some outside help. "There has never been a case of an isolated insurgency. Not even the US War of Independence was an isolated insurgency."

This same official was one of the authors of the counterinsurgency doctrine of the US government. He contrasted the doctrine of the Communist Party with that of the US on the question of the necessity of outside help for an insurgency, noting that Communist doctrine . . . emphasizes the fact that the insurgency should be homegrown, and that major communist powers, especially China, do not pour in masses of outside assistance. This enables the insurgents to retain their own independence so that they can sustain themselves over the long haul. Communist Party doctrine stands in radical contrast to the US doctrine of counterinsurgency, which demands massive support by us and which turns the counter-insurgents into our dependents, sapping their morale and capacity to fight."

He supported this comparison with evidence accumulated by the Special Group showing that all weapons captured from the Viet Cong by the US during the period of the private war were either homemade or had been previously captured from the GVN/USA. "Throughout this time," he said, "no one had ever found one Chinese rifle or one Soviet weapon used by a VC." He concluded that the weight of evidence and doctrine proved that "the massive aggression theory was completely phony."

In 1962, Michael Forrestal, a senior member of the National Security Council and a close friend of President Kennedy, confirmed these charges. Returning from a long visit to Vietnam, Forrestal and Roger Hilsman wrote a report to the President that stated that the Viet Cong had "increased their regular forces from 18,000 to 23,000 over this past year." During this period the government of Vietnam had claimed that 20,000 Viet Congs

were killed in action and 4,000 wounded. "No one really knows," Forrestal wrote, "how many of the 20,000 'Viet Cong' killed last year were only innocent, or at least 'persuadable,' villagers."

Forrestal told Kennedy that "the vast bulk of both recruits and supplies come from inside South Vietnam itself." At the "very least," Forrestal concluded, "The figures on Viet Cong strength imply a continuing flow of recruits and supplies from these same villages and indicate that a substantial proportion of the population is still cooperating with the enemy, although it is impossible to tell how much of this cooperation stems from fear and how much from conviction."

Still, Forrestal emphasized that "the Viet Cong continue to be aggressive and extremely effective." It would seem that he had answered his own question. Like many other officials and agencies reporting on the "progress" of the war at this time, he had discovered that the Viet Cong were actively assisted by the rural population and that they fought with dedicated spirit and great effectiveness. It should not have been difficult for Forrestal and Kennedy to see that the rural population cooperated "from conviction" because in fact it made up the Viet Cong.

#### DEFOLIATION

The Special Group devoted part of its attention to some of the programs conducted in the field. As early as 1961, the defoliation program, originally called Operation Hades and subsequently accorded the euphemism Operation Ranchhand, was granted Presidential approval. Limited at first as an experimental measure it soon became an exercise in wholesale crop destruction. The expanded program received strong financial and political support. Discussions of Operation Ranchhand in Washington were instructive, especially since they showed the bureaucrats' lack of any concern whatever for the consequences of their decisions. Indeed, what was most striking about the discussions of the defoliation program at the Special Group meetings was the absence of inquiry into the nature of the program.

No limits on the defoliation program were ever established, no results examined, no damage surveyed. Concern about the program focused on the single question of whether the South Vietnamese military had given their consent. Apparently, if the GVN recommended the program and the ARVN consented to it, bureaucratic responsibility in Washington was believed to have ceased.

The program was the brain-child of ARPA, the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency, and was placed under the command of the US Chemical Corps. It was approved by the highest bureaucrats in Washington, including Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Maxwell Taylor, Robert Kennedy, Michael Forrestal, and Richard Helms, along with a host of their deputies. But after they had approved the defoliation program, these men ignored the forced migration, sterility, and hunger that followed in its wake. Such consequences were left to the concern of the GVN. The policymakers in Washington removed every vestige of personal responsibility from their shoulders and laid it at the door of the GVN officials.

Thus, Washington was able both to authorize criminal programs and evade any responsibility for them. Maxwell Taylor summed up the concern for Operation Ranchhand in these words: "We used it for crop destruction and foliage. It was only useful along the highways. It was not at all criminal. It was simply ineffective. The entire program was irrelevant." Defoliation was indeed irrelevant to Washington, but it was not irrelevant to the peasants who had to migrate, the women who became sterile, the children who were made hungry.



## KENNEDY IN CONTROL

Although the bureaucracy in Washington was not concerned with the fruits of its labor in Vietnam, the President was greatly concerned with his capacity to command the bureaucracy in Washington. In his quest for control, he introduced four structural changes in the office of the Presidency—the Special Group Counter-Insurgency, the 303 Committee, the Country Team, and the Green Berets. All of these were fashioned to meet specific defects in the execution of foreign policy, and in this sense may be viewed as *ad hoc* measures. But an extraordinary pattern emerges when the four are grouped together—an expansion of the war-making powers of the Executive to a degree never before contemplated in the history of the Republic. For the first time, total command over the several national security agencies was concentrated in the office of the President.

The SGCI was a special agency created by Kennedy to supervise the programs of the national security agencies. Kennedy selected Maxwell Taylor, then occupying a special office in the White House as the President's military adviser, to be chairman of the SGCI, and the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, to be co-chairman. The state apparatus was thus centralized by appointing a chairman and a co-chairman whom the President personally trusted and who would report directly to him.

Taylor acted as a broker among the various power blocs to ensure that the agencies responded to the President's bidding. Robert Kennedy was considered the moving force behind the SGCI. He attended every meeting and, by his personal tactics, managed to transform them into courtroom spectacles. Officers of the agencies presented their findings from a witness chair, and Kennedy would zealously and relentlessly cross-examine each witness.

Witnesses were often intimidated by his ferocity. When William Jordan, the author of two white papers on Vietnam, testified about infiltration from the North, for example, he was excused prematurely in order to avoid further embarrassment at Robert Kennedy's hands. Another witness, reminded that the President's brother was simply trying to get the facts, replied that Kennedy was "guilty of over-kill." Kennedy's function, it seems, was to instill some fear into the agencies—to persuade them that they were being watched closely by the President and should act accordingly.

Defenders of the Kennedy Administration contend that the purpose of these exertions was to keep America out of an unnecessary war in Southeast Asia. The Kennedys, it is suggested, believed that the only way to avoid a deepening and perhaps irreversible commitment to Vietnam was to expose the inflated statements offered by officials who wished to draw the nation into a wider war. But these rationalizations do not hold up when it is recalled that the purpose of the SGCI in general, and Robert Kennedy's purpose in particular, was to centralize in the hands of the President control of a national state security machinery which was increasingly committed to war in Southeast Asia.

The CIA had displayed its power to make foreign policy at the Bay of Pigs, forcing the President to assume responsibility for events he had not initiated and could not control. After Cuba, Kennedy fired Allen Dulles and appointed John McCone as director of the CIA, perhaps because McCone was considered more manageable. At the same time, he created the 303 Committee to break the CIA's independent power and place the agency under his own management. From that time on, the CIA had to clear each of its programs in advance and report directly to McGeorge Bundy, the chairman of the 303 Committee and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Bundy, Maxwell Taylor, and Robert Kennedy were trusted lieutenants who took their orders directly from the President and were placed in charge of special agencies to centralize command in the national security apparatus on the President's behalf.

Not only were the 303 Committee and the SGCI designed to unify the state apparatus directly under President Kennedy in Washington, but every effort was made to duplicate this pattern in the field. When Kennedy assumed the Presidency, one of the problems plaguing American foreign policy was the fact that each agency in the field acted as if it were a self-contained system, staking a claim against the Pentagon for its own resources, moving from one part of the globe to the next according to its assessment of where the action was, insulating itself from supervision above, and extending its imperial writ below. The armed services offered the prime examples of separate fiefdoms run wild; but the civil agencies in the field, including the CIA, State, USIA, and others, also made their own rules and circumvented all attempts at direction from above.

The CIA, for example, was assigned a percentage of all shipping to Vietnam, set up its own network of communications in the field, and had its own direct channel back to Washington. Laos simply became competitive turf for the several agencies. Each moved in with personnel and material, then sought a program first to justify its presence and second to expand its domain. Aircraft stationed in Korea were forwarded to Vietnam on Air Force orders which had not been cleared at higher levels, and when such clearance became necessary, dummy committees were created at the Pentagon to clear automatically any material requested. So far as the agencies in the field were concerned, questions of state were politically unreal. The sole reality was the national economy, which was viewed as an infinite source of supply.

The origin of Operation Ranchhand under the expert guidance of William Godell offers a classic example. ARPA appropriated surplus funds to begin the defoliation program, and then, in order to justify an increased budget, bypassed the original guidelines and expanded the program. Much as feudal warlords had waged war against each other within fledgling nations, so the modern agencies looked upon each other as rivals and tried to grab power and resources within the fledgling empire.

To cope with this problem, Kennedy, in 1961, gave US ambassadors full power to control the national security agencies in the field. Thus, all the agencies were required to clear their programs with and be supervised by the ambassadors to the countries in which they were operating. Together they were called the "Country Team," with the ambassador as captain, who received his authority directly from Kennedy and reported directly to him. Just as Kennedy had hoped to bring the national security agencies in Washington under the command and control of the SGCI, so he relied upon the concept of the Country Team to achieve the same control in the field.

## THE JOINT CHIEFS

But the Joint Chiefs of Staff—in contrast to the other national security agencies—have independent support both in Congress and in the country. Working through the chairmen of key Congressional committees, the Chiefs have automatic access to one branch of government to articulate the proposals they deem important, regardless of whether they have the support of the President or his senior advisers. Once these proposals are made public, the Chiefs can count on the right-wing constituency in the country to support them. Since the Chiefs formulate, express, and then personify the national interest on any issue concerning national security, they rival the President's claim to sovereignty. By virtue of their sup-

port in Congress, their political constituency, and their claim upon the flag, the Chiefs, unlike other government groups, can even charge the President with treason. Because of their formidable power, the President must respond to any proposal they put forward.

The President, of course, can command his own resources to persuade the Chiefs to champion his causes. But he must always bargain with them and grant them certain concessions if they oppose him or if he needs their public support. Once the state embarks on war, this uneasy balance between the President and the Chiefs gradually tips on the side of the Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, not the Commander-in-Chief, are presumed to know how to manage a war. The President who opposes their programs lays himself open to the charge that he is playing with American lives.

Thus, when the President expands a war on the grounds that he is protecting the lives of U.S. troops in the field he either has, in effect, borrowed the Chiefs' argument and is announcing for all to hear that his policies are in full accord with those of the military or he is anticipating just such a challenge by the Chiefs and is preparing his own defense. The policies of the Chiefs, moreover, invariably extend the zone of combat until victory is achieved. The Chiefs also depart from civilian leaders in being willing to wage nuclear war, if that is considered necessary to avoid defeat.

But if a war can be presented as a police action, or can proceed under cover as a private matter, then the power of the Chiefs can be sharply limited. Thus, Kennedy had an obvious stake in keeping the war private. But he was not passive. During the period of the private war Kennedy set about building the elite corps of the Green Berets. In Kennedy, Sorenson write:

"But the President's pride was still the Army Special Forces, rapidly growing to a level some five or six times as large as when he took office, although still small both in total numbers and in relation to the need for more. The President directed—again over the opposition of top generals—that the Special Forces wear Green Berets as a mark of distinction."

Kennedy wanted to carry on the Vietnam war exclusively through the Special Forces, which would enable him to seize command of the national military apparatus. He seems to have had a vision of the Green Berets as a Praetorian Guard, an elite army directly under the command and control of the President. The Green Berets represented Kennedy's attempt to curb the power of the Chiefs and institutionalize the military directly under the Presidency.

Edward Lansdale, a devout believer in the Special Forces and in the concept of counterinsurgency, was quietly assigned an office under McNamara in 1961 and given the power to keep Vietnam under Presidential control. This was a mistake. The Joint Chiefs immediately perceived Lansdale as a potential threat and they set up their own counterinsurgency agency by creating a Special Assistant for Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities (SACSA). Victor Krulak, the first "SACSA," a former Marine Corps general and an astute politician who was referred to as "the brute," undercut Lansdale at every turn until Lansdale was called a "paper tiger."

Once he gained control over counterinsurgency, Krulak was able to restore some of the power of the Chiefs. The military first employed the concept of counterinsurgency as a cover to gain control over part of the plans for covert operations, then expanded it to include conventional warfare, which the military was organized to pursue. In this respect, there was an implicit accord between the military and civilian leadership.

Every one of Secretary McNamara's famous visits to Vietnam was a guided tour carefully

stage-managed by the Joint Chiefs. McNamara would stop off at Hawaii and pick up a briefing book, prepared by Krulak, which contained brilliant charts and graphs displaying the progress of the war. McNamara would scan the book to obtain the information he needed for press conferences to be held in Saigon. After the trip, the information would be converted into a hard-cover volume containing references to McNamara's recent findings in Vietnam, but again written by Krulak. This book would then be handed to the President as the final report. The book had been written in advance of the trip just as the trip itself had been planned in advance.

With counterinsurgency in their pockets, the management of some of the covert operations well in hand, and McNamara under close scrutiny and partly under their guidance, the Joint Chiefs turned their attention to the thorny problem of the Special Forces. Under the supervision of the CIA, the Special Forces had been successful in training the Montagnards. In 1964, Operation Switchback was approved in Washington to break up the autonomy of Special Forces, remove them from the CIA's direction, and place them under the command of MACV.

In one stroke, the Joint Chiefs picked up control of both the Special Forces and the local tribesmen. The state had spread its power over the ancient tribes of Indochina and its own elite warriors. The central state apparatus was concentrated in the hands of the Chiefs and the President. The rest of the national security machinery received its orders from their combined command. The question left open—and still unanswered—was whether the Chiefs and the Commander-in-Chief would share that immense power equally, or whether one would make a claim against the other.

Centralization of the state bureaucracy—except for the Joint Chiefs—directly under the command and control of the President greatly enhanced the power of the President. The effects of this transfer of power were profound. Through the 303 Committee and the mobilization of the Green Berets, the President could now make the decisions on matters of espionage and military strategy. To the extent that he has control over the CIA and shares the power of the military, he is in effect both a superspy and a field marshal. The time and energy he is normally expected to devote to his duties as Chief Executive are now absorbed by these new offices. How much time Kennedy actually devoted to supervising covert activities and personally managing the activities of the Special Forces remains unclear, but it is certain they made large claims on his working day.

Though the 303 Committee and the Special Group successfully centralized the powerful government agencies under the Executive, the Green Berets and the Country Team were much less effective in centralizing the field operations. Nevertheless, the concept of centralizing the state apparatus was advanced by Kennedy and the reality almost measured up to that concept. During the thirty-three months of his Presidency, Kennedy was creating the elements of a totalitarian state structure which carried on a private war.

The fact that the war was private meant that it was not the main preoccupation of the nation, but rather the chief task of the Executive; that it was conducted not in the interests of the nation, but in the interests of the state. Indeed, one could now say that it was conducted against the interests of the nation, because it destroyed the orderly processes of government.

#### WOULD KENNEDY HAVE WITHDRAWN?

American national security was never at stake. Through the Special Group, Kennedy knew well that there was no serious infiltration from the North, nor any Chinese or Soviet support for the southern struggle.

Kennedy knew therefore that the war in South Vietnam was a civil war. How was American national security threatened by the outcome of their civil war? The likely impact of a Viet Cong victory on the international interests of the United States was never systematically studied during the Kennedy years, notwithstanding the casual talk about dominoes. Whenever that issue was raised, the CIA fudged its assessment. For example, if South Vietnam went Communist, the CIA suggested, Southeast Asia would be demoralized and this demoralization might even spread to India. But what is demoralization? How is it measured? How are its consequences determined for national security? Does demoralization cause a nation to switch sides or does it cause it to attach itself ever more closely to the mother country? Would a Viet Cong victory have created a revolution in Thailand? In India? In Cambodia? In Japan?

According to INR, the intelligence branch of the State Department, "there was no serious analysis of what we could expect throughout Southeast Asia if we failed to support South Vietnam." The state was not in the least interested in determining whether the national security was at stake. One steady feature of US policy in Southeast Asia was the failure to consider why we should be there. Only in 1969 did the intelligence community attempt a detailed study of the consequences if South Vietnam were to become a Communist nation. According to INR, this estimate, prepared by the CIA and only recently made public, concluded:

"We would lose Laos immediately. Sihanouk would preserve Cambodia by a straddling effort. All of Southeast Asia would remain just as it is at least for another generation. Thailand, in particular, would continue to maintain close relations with the US and would seek additional support. Simultaneously, Thailand would make overtures and move toward China and the Soviet Union. It would simply take aid from both sides to preserve its independence. North Vietnam would consume itself in Laos and South Vietnam. Only Laos would definitely follow into the Communist orbit."

This estimate suggests that if the United States were defeated in open warfare by a "fourth rate nation," there would be no international consequences to US interests. Is it not then reasonable to assume that if the United States had not fought and had not been defeated, its stock of good will might have risen? The principal effect of American intervention is the carnage and devastation of Southeast Asia.

The events of the early 1960s strongly suggest, however, that had John F. Kennedy, lived, he would not have pulled out of Southeast Asia. He would more likely have taken any steps necessary to avoid an ignominious defeat at the hands of the Viet Cong. In a nationwide interview on NBC television two months before his assassination, when asked whether the US was likely to reduce its aid to Vietnam, Kennedy replied:

"I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was lost—a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want that."

"What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the Government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw."

A week earlier in another nationwide interview with Walter Cronkite, Kennedy said: "But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. . . . We took all this—made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia."

Kennedy would not withdraw, but he was troubled by the prospect of public disapproval of his decision. To stay in Vietnam without arousing public opposition, he waged the war as privately as possible.

#### THE "BRUSH-FIRE WAR"

The counterargument to this interpretation of Kennedy's Vietnam policy advances the premise that Vietnam was an example of a new concept of carefully limited action in support of local allies which was officially and publicly described as "brush-fire war." Congress openly debated this policy and appropriated huge sums of money in support of it. The war, then, was a public, not a private matter. Under Kennedy, American manpower in Vietnam never exceeded 16,000, a figure clearly within the bounds of a brush-fire war.

The problem with this argument is that there was only a handful who seriously propounded the brush-fire war doctrine in the highest councils of the state. Roger Hillsman and Robert Thompson come to mind as officials closely associated with a counterinsurgency strategy for Vietnam; but the dominant positions in the Kennedy Administration were held by exponents of conventional war, whose recommendations were withheld from the public. Walt Rostow, who publicly enunciated the doctrine of brush-fire war in behalf of the Administration in 1961, was privately recommending "offensive action" and aerial strikes against the Northern mainland. McNamara, also, called for public support of brush-fire wars and simultaneously urged privately that the U.S. be fully prepared to use 260,000 troops in a conventional war. The public statements of the Kennedy Administration invited public support for a brush-fire war, but the private recommendations presupposed the use of heavy firepower.

This does not necessarily mean that the officials were deliberately deceiving the public. To some extent, they were also deceiving themselves. The contradiction between their public rhetoric and their private recommendations was blurred, at the time, both by their language and by the kinds of military technology available to them.

It became fashionable in the early 1960s, for example, to speak of "surgical air strikes," a phrase coined by Walt Rostow. Aerial warfare is, of course, the apex of conventional warfare. To speak of air strikes is to evoke the bombing of London, Dresden, and Hiroshima. Brush-fire war, on the other hand, is described by the rhetoric of limited hostilities, pacification of insurgents, and nation building. To talk of a "surgical air strike," then, tends to blur the distinction between conventional and brush-fire warfare. It implies that friend can be distinguished from foe when seen from the air and that conventional weapons can be used selectively to wage brush-fire war. It suggests a lower level of violence than conventional warfare, a means of protecting our friends while destroying our enemies.

When asked to comment on the feasibility of using "surgical air strikes" within the limits of brush-fire war, McGeorge Bundy called the question "naive." "Professors know that bombs kill people," he said. Yet such naivete helped to preserve an appearance of innocence, permitting the decision-makers to believe that they had not embarked on a course of systematic deception.

The type of ordnance financed during the Kennedy period also encouraged the policy-makers to blur the distinction between the two types of war. Preparations for both con-



ventional warfare and brush-fire war simultaneously made dramatic advances. Within two years there was a 600 percent increase in counterinsurgency forces and a 45 percent increase in the number of combat-ready Army divisions. Hence the managers were equipping the state to fight either kind of war. This produced an element of doubt and ambiguity over which kind of war the US was fighting and would continue to fight. Since a brush-fire war signified a lower level of involvement and could be prosecuted without interfering with the normal business of everyday life, the security managers could point to the counterinsurgency preparations as consistent with Kennedy's Vietnam policy. The capability of carrying both kinds of defense could be cited as justification for both the public rhetoric and the private recommendations.

What becomes clear when one examines the over-all changes introduced by Kennedy's managers at the Pentagon is that they decided to prepare for waging any type of war, at any place, at any time. Not only did the brush-fire and conventional capabilities make giant strides in a period of peace, but the nation's strategic and tactical nuclear capabilities were similarly expanded. Strategic nuclear weapons were increased 100 percent, and tactical weapons 60 percent. The capacity to fight any type of war was called the doctrine of "flexible response."

Not only was a conventional war anticipated and recommended within the state, but Kennedy himself authorized the first use of heavy firepower when he sent the newly armed helicopters to Vietnam in 1962. The MAAG mission, moreover, had trained the ARVN to prosecute a conventional war. Would the Americans, when need beckoned and opportunity knocked, renounce their own training, firepower, and private urgings?

The United States proceeded one step at a time, and Kennedy took the first giant step. If the Viet Cong could not be defeated at a lower level of violence, why not proceed to the next level? That was the precise purpose of flexible response. Kennedy, as we have seen, publicly stated that he would not withdraw. His policy clearly was one of gradual escalation which set the US on the course followed by Johnson, and, in revised form, by Nixon. As Maxwell Taylor said when he was asked what Kennedy would have done in Vietnam had he lived: "Far be it from me to read the mind of a dead man, but let me just say this, Kennedy was not a loser."

#### DEPLOYMENT OF MIRV'S AND ABM'S

### HON. DONALD M. FRASER

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, July 13, Paul C. Warnke appeared before a Senate subcommittee. He made an excellent, concise statement on the arms control implications of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles—MIRV's—and Anti-ballistic missiles—ABM's.

Mr. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, points out that—

The case for MIRV as a critical element of our deterrent is even weaker than safeguard. We made the decision to deploy MIRV's in the late 1960's when we feared that the Tallinn System was a large area Soviet ABM deployment. There is now no question that it is an air defense system. The primitive Soviet ABM system around Moscow has

grown very slowly and could easily be overcome by our existing forces. Thus we do not need MIRV's now to penetrate Soviet defenses. If we later saw signs of a new massive Soviet ABM system, we could begin to deploy the MIRV's we have tested and we could have them in place long before the Soviets had an operational ABM system.

The complete statement follows:

STATEMENT OF PAUL C. WARNEKE

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before your Subcommittee on the subject of the arms control implications of deploying MIRV's and ABM's. There are no more important decisions facing Americans, and people throughout the world, than those that affect the relative likelihood of strategic nuclear war or peace. The objective of preventing nuclear war is the controlling issue of our time. In our concern with other questions it is necessary that we keep in the forefront the fact that all of civilization can be destroyed within an hour if we fail in that objective.

We have come far I believe toward a national consensus—and indeed an international consensus—as to the key elements of the stable strategic relationship that can deter nuclear war. There appears to be considerable agreement that "nuclear superiority" has become a meaningless and irrelevant criterion in designing strategic forces. Beyond that, both the Nixon Administration and its critics emphasize that effective deterrence requires that we not seek to take away the Soviet retaliatory capability. A first strike capability on our part could impel a Soviet preemptive launch in a time of crisis. The differences in view arise when we seek to apply these insights to specific decisions including ABM and MIRV and to the general question of what posture is likely to facilitate the negotiation of an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.

In considering the possible deployment of any weapons system, therefore, the first question is to assess its impact on the deterrence of nuclear attacks on the United States. In doing so we need to remind ourselves of the awesome destructive power of the nuclear weapons which we and the Soviets have fully operational. The American arsenal already includes over 1,600 ballistic missiles each with warheads larger by far than the bombs which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Three per cent of these missiles is enough to destroy the 50 largest Soviet cities. It is difficult to conceive of any national goal that could lead a decision-maker in any country to put so large a part of his society at risk. We have in addition hundreds of bombers. In fact, at the present time the United States has three separate strategic forces each capable of destroying the Soviet Union. There are also over 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, many capable of reaching Soviet territory. A Soviet leader not deterred by this awesome array could not be deterred by any constellation of military forces.

I have, Mr. Chairman, been unpersuaded by the analysis put forward from time to time that the MIRV and ABM deployment is necessary to maintain this deterrent. In this regard, it is perhaps significant that more recent emphasis has been placed on arguments related to negotiating tactics. I will return to this in just a moment. But first I would like to briefly examine the relationship of ABM and MIRV deployment to the critical question of deterrence.

The proposed ABM deployment has had so many different rationales that it is hard to know where to begin. The Senate, wisely in my view, last year rejected any area ABM defense. The system currently up for approval thus is limited to the so-called Minuteman defense. The two questions raised are thus (1) whether there is a threat to Minuteman to which we now need to respond and

(2) whether the Safeguard system is a reasonable and effective response to whatever threat may exist now or in the future.

At the present time, the Soviet Union lacks the capability to destroy any substantial portion of our Minuteman force. It is true that if the Soviets deploy about one hundred additional SS-9's and if they test and deploy MIRV's for these missiles and if they can make these MIRV's very accurate then they would pose a threat to much of our Minuteman force. Even in this contingency either our submarine-based force or our bomber force would still be capable in itself of destroying the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, we would not want to have even one of our strategic systems highly vulnerable and we should continue actively to seek agreements at SALT that would prevent this threat from materializing.

But whatever the uncertainty as to the threat, the evidence is overwhelming that Safeguard is the wrong system to defend our Minuteman ICBM's. The initial concept and component design was to protect American cities against a large Soviet attack. It would be an incredible accident if this proved to be the optimum system to defend our missiles. Testimony presented before this and other Congressional Committees establishes beyond any doubt that Safeguard is poorly designed for this purpose and could be easily overwhelmed by a determined Soviet attack. All that would be required to nullify Safeguard is the deployment of another increment of MIRVed and accurate SS-9's.

The case for MIRV as a critical element of our deterrent is even weaker. We made the decision to deploy MIRV's in the late 1960's when we feared that the Tallinn System was a large area Soviet ABM deployment. There is now no question that it is an air defense system. The primitive Soviet ABM system around Moscow has grown very slowly and could easily be overcome by our existing forces. Thus we do not need MIRV's now to penetrate Soviet defenses. If we later saw signs of a new massive Soviet ABM system, we could begin to deploy the MIRV's we have tested and we could have them in place long before the Soviets had an operational ABM system.

Thus it is difficult for me to imagine that the requirements for deterrence go beyond our present forces. The Administration has, however, suggested several additional criteria for strategic forces that do go beyond the basic requirements for deterrence. These criteria are damage limitation, relative advantage, crisis stability and war-fighting capability. While the Administration has not to date tried specifically to justify MIRV and ABM deployments in terms of these additional factors, their very statement does raise questions about possible other purposes which MIRV and ABM might be designed to ought to tell the Congress and the American people what these criteria mean and how they may be related to the deployment of MIRV and ABM.

When we consider the impact of possible U.S. deployments we need to recognize that the Soviets can and will respond to what we do. The case against a large area ABM system stated by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967 was precisely that the Soviets could and would act completely to nullify the effects of any ABM system designed to protect our cities.

The Nixon Administration has accepted this logic as it affected area defense against a Soviet attack. But it has failed to recognize that it applies to Minuteman defense as well. The Soviets, as I have noted, could easily nullify the proposed Safeguard system by expanding their offensive force. Similarly, if Soviet leaders came to fear that our MIRV deployment threatened their land-based missiles, they could respond by deploying a new offensive system. I believe that it is

important that we avoid deployments which can easily be overcome by the Soviets and which can only serve to motivate them to increase their offensive capability.

Finally, let me touch briefly on the implications of MIRV and ABM deployment for securing an early arms control agreement. The experience with SALT to date suggests how difficult it will be to secure agreement to dismantle any existing systems. Because of this any deployments which are not necessary to maintain a deterrent should be avoided in the interests of preserving the chance for effective strategic arms control.

The Administration has been arguing that we need to deploy ABM as a "bargaining chip." This seems to me to be a self-defeating motion. If the existence of SALT is used to justify deployments which otherwise would not be made, then SALT simply becomes an occasion for an expanded arms race.

What provides the opportunity for a SALT agreement is the mutual desire to avoid a new, costly and risky round of arms deployments. It is the possibility that the U.S. might otherwise proceed with a large area ABM system or the deployment of accurate MIRV's that will lead the Soviets to negotiate seriously. The actual deployment of unneeded capabilities, which we will then be reluctant to dismantle, will impede rather than advance the prospects for an effective and broad agreement.

For many years, the claimed need to negotiate from strength meant no negotiations at all. For the last few years, negotiation from strength has seemed to mean keeping whatever either side has built or desires to build. What negotiations should mean, I believe, is not the chimera of unilateral superiority, but the mutual wisdom that can bring about the control and end of the strategic arms race.

#### UNITED NATIONS DAY, 1971

### HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, the President of the United States has now used the Federal Register for July 13, 1971, to proclaim U.N. Day, 1971 and "urge the citizens of this Nation to observe that day with community programs—express realistic understanding and support for the U.N. and its associated organizations."

Nowhere in our President's proclamation does he advise the American people that the U.N. is the most illegal, undemocratic, atheistic trap that has ever been set for free men and which continues to be financed by U.S. tax dollars.

In his proclamation, President Nixon refers to "we the peoples of the United Nations who ordained the U.N. Charter and charged it with man's highest hopes, have the power to make it succeed."

I charge that the same small band of wealthy, financial-industrial, and intellectual one-worlders who devised and instituted the U.N. still run it for their imperialistic gains.

How could the U.N. speak or represent the peoples of the world when first there is not an elected representative in the U.N., and second, over two-thirds of the votes of the U.N. General Assembly do not

even represent 10 percent of the peoples of the world? The U.N. remains firmly entrenched in control of a minority.

Peace—what peace we Americans have had in the 25 years since the establishment of the U.N. Tower of Babel has been in spite of, and not because of, the U.N. More than 50,000 young men killed in Vietnam—33,629 in the U.N. war in Korea. Americans have paid dearly for peace which has been denied them because of the U.N.

The manifest illegality in the U.N. is obvious to any observer. It is wantonly misapportioned and could not pass the "one man, one vote" legal formula under which the Members of this House must comply.

The population of the United States is over 200 million, yet 70 member states, or well over one-half of the 127 votes in the U.N., do not have the total population of the United States of America, which has one vote and pays most of the bills. How undemocratic and ill-informed can our leaders be?

The President's home State of California is more populous than 99 voting members of the U.N. Yet Californians are not represented by population for their State.

The District of Columbia, with a 1970 census count of 764,000 people, is larger in population than each of 14 voting members in the U.N., and the District of Columbia citizens talk about being a colony within our country when we of the United States are but a colony of the U.N.

In 1970, the census counted 668,700 American Indians, of which 468,700 live on reservations. Twelve voting members of the U.N. do not represent the population of American Indians who have no vote.

In the United States, there are estimated to be 20 million Negroes, who are constantly being told about the power of voting, yet have never been told that of the 41 votes the African Continent controls in the U.N., only four of the 41 represent people surpassing the American Negro population; that is, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, and United Arab Republic. Yet the American Negro has no U.N. vote except the U.S. vote for 205 million Americans.

The Jewish population in the United States exceeds 5,800,000, while the population of Israel is but 2,900,000. Yet Israel gets a vote, while America, who pays most of the bills, gets but one vote for 205 million people.

United Nations advocates who call for the "one-man, one-vote" principle to be applied in Southern Rhodesia, are silent with regard to the abuse of this same principle in the United Nations.

For example, of the member nations of the U.N., only India and the U.S.S.R. exceed the United States in population. Yet, the United States has one vote, as do all the other nations, while Soviet Russia has three votes. The United States, which has approximately 2,000 times more people than Maldives Islands, has a vote in the General Assembly that can be canceled by the one vote of the Maldives Islands.

The undemocratic voting apportionment in the United Nations is manifested by the following comparisons:

Asia, with about 10 times the population of the United States, has 26 votes to our one vote—a voting advantage of 2.6 to 1.

Africa, whose total population is about twice that of the United States, has 41 votes to our one vote—a voting advantage of approximately 20 to 1.

Europe, with a population about 2.5 times that of this country, has 21 U.N. votes, or a voting advantage of about 8 to 1.

South America, with a population approximately 10 percent less than that of the United States, has 13 votes to our one for a voting advantage of about 15 to 1.

It is incredible that this great Nation, whose taxpayers foot a larger share of the U.N. bill than any other country allows its people to be discriminated against in such an unfair and undemocratic manner.

It is significant that the President referred to the American commitment deeper than the words of the U.N. Charter. For the Charter itself would prohibit admission of Red China to the U.N.—the same Red Chinese dictatorship that the U.N. condemned as an "aggressor vote" in 1951 and which condemnation has never been recalled inasmuch as there has been no peace in Korea—only an uneasy cease-fire with Americans still becoming casualties whenever the Reds desire propaganda fodder.

The roots of American commitment referred to by the President were not to the U.N., but to man's eternal quest and hunger for peace—which has been skillfully exploited by the U.N. and some politicians in pursuit of their careers.

With our longtime traditional free ally Nationalist China—one of the organizers of the U.N.—soon to be betrayed a third time by our ruling class, it would seem that the date of October 24, 1971, could be better served by the American people and free men everywhere as a day for expressions of disapproval of the U.N. and its continued usurpation of the constitutional rights of free people.

And what better time to express opposition to the seating of the Red Chinese U.N. delegation. Or perhaps the day should be observed as U.N.-Red China day—not to give Red China to the U.N., but to give the U.N. to Red China with U.N. headquarters at Peking.

As our President prepares for his visit to dignify the Communist dictatorship lying only 90 miles off the coast of Nationalist China, it is well that we Americans remember another Communist dictatorship only 90 miles offshore our Nation—Castro's Cuba. On U.N. Day, will the President announce his next trip as Havana?

The U.N., instigated and conceived by "Americans," organized by "Americans," and paid for by Americans, is the most anti-American, undemocratic threat to America existing today. With the U.N., as with our State Department's foreign policy, Americans come last.

No thinking American who believes in



democracy or constitutional government could support or honor the U.N. failure.

I insert at this point President Nixon's proclamation from the Federal Register declaring October 24, 1971, "United Nations Day, 1971."

UNITED NATIONS DAY, 1971

(By the President of the United States of America)

A PROCLAMATION

Each year on October 24, the people of America and the world join in the formal observance of a truly global occasion, one that transcends political, cultural, religious, and calendar differences in its promise for all mankind: the anniversary of the United Nations Charter. This fall, as the United Nations completes its twenty-sixth year of service to the world, United Nations Day is an occasion to look back with gratitude and a measure of pride, and to look ahead with determination and hope.

Reviewing the work of the United Nations since 1945, we can see a substantial record of accomplishment in the world body's major areas of endeavor—"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom," as the Charter states them. The United States will continue in the future, as it has in the past, to support the efforts of the UN in these great tasks.

At the same time, this country and its fellow member countries of the UN must act together to meet the new problems this new decade thrusts upon us. Through the UN, we all share stewardship over the planet Earth: together we face the challenges of coordinating measures to heal and protect the world's fragile ecosystems; of ensuring that the resources of the sea are developed for the benefit of all mankind; of promoting international cooperation in the use of outer space. Through the UN, we all share responsibility for making the human community more humane: together we face the challenges of curbing such vicious international crimes as narcotics trafficking, air piracy, and terrorism against diplomats; of moderating explosive population growth; of protecting the human rights of prisoners of war and refugees.

The roots of American commitment to the United Nations go far deeper than the words of a charter signed at San Francisco or the glass and steel of a headquarters in New York—they spring from the hearts of the American people. With the world in urgent need of a dynamic, effective international organization, it is appropriate for us as a people and as individuals to renew our sense of tough-minded dedication to making the UN work. The President's Commission for the Observance of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, recently submitted to me its recommendations for measures to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations and of American participation therein. I am giving this useful report close study, and I commend it to the attention of every concerned citizen. Only "we the peoples of the United Nations," who ordained the UN Charter and charged it with man's highest hopes, have the power to make it succeed.

Now, therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Sunday, October 24, 1971, as United Nations Day. I urge the citizens of this Nation to observe that day with community programs which will express realistic understanding and support for the United Nations and its associated organizations.

I also call upon the appropriate officials to encourage citizens' groups and agencies of communication—press, radio, television, and motion pictures—to engage in appropri-

ate observance of United Nations Day this year in cooperation with the United Nations Association of the United States of America and other interested organizations.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this ninth day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-sixth.

RICHARD NIXON.

I insert at this point in my remarks a chart showing statistics on the continents and the United States, population in thousands to the nearest thousand, and numbers of U.N. votes.

Continents and United States	Population	Number of U.N. votes
Africa	335,916	41
Asia	1,946,812	26
Europe	454,886	21
North America	309,294	12
South America	180,057	13
United States	205,000	1

I insert another chart listing the membership state of the U.N. and population in thousands to the nearest thousand:

MEMBERS OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[Population in thousands]	
Afghanistan	17,000
Albania	2,200
Algeria	14,000
Argentina	24,300
Australia	12,500
Austria	7,400
Barbados	300
Belgium	9,700
Bolivia	4,600
Botswana	629
Brazil	93,305
Bulgaria	8,500
Burma	27,700
Burundi	3,600
Byelorussia (SSR)	9,670
Cambodia	7,100
Cameroon	5,800
Canada	21,400
Central Africa (republic)	1,500
Ceylon	12,600
Chad	3,700
Chile	9,800
China	14,320
Colombia	21,116
Congo (Brazzaville)	900
Congo (Kinshasa)	17,400
Costa Rica	1,800
Cuba	8,400
Cyprus	600
Czechoslovakia	14,700
Dahomey	2,700
Denmark	4,900
Dominican Republic	4,300
Ecuador	6,100
El Salvador	3,400
Equatorial Guinea	300
Ethiopia	25,000
Fiji	527
Finland	4,700
France	51,100
Gabon	500
Gambia	400
Ghana	9,000
Greece	8,900
Guatemala	5,100
Guinea	3,900
Guyana	721
Haiti	5,200
Honduras	2,700
Hungary	10,300
Iceland	200
India	554,600
Indonesia	121,200
Iran	24,400
Iraq	9,700
Ireland	3,000
Israel	2,900
Italy	53,700
Ivory Coast	4,300
Jamaica	2,000
Japan	103,500
Jordan	2,300
Kenya	10,900
Kuwait	700
Laos	3,000
Lebanon	2,800
Lesotho	1,000
Liberia	1,200
Libya	1,900
Luxembourg	400
Madagascar	6,900
Malawi	4,400
Malaysia	10,800
Maldives Islands	107
Mali	5,100
Malta	300
Mauritania	1,200
Mauritius	900
Mexico	50,700
Mongolia	1,300
Morocco	15,700
Nepal	11,200
Netherlands	13,000
New Zealand	2,763
Nicaragua	2,000
Niger	3,800
Nigeria	55,100
Norway	3,900
Pakistan	136,900
Panama	1,500
Paraguay	2,400
Peru	13,600
Philippines	38,100
Poland	33,000
Portugal	9,600
Rumania	20,300
Rwanda	3,600
Saudi Arabia	7,700
Senegal	3,900
Sierra Leone	2,600
Singapore	2,100
Somalia	2,800
South Africa	20,100
Southern Yemen	1,300
Spain	33,200
Sudan	15,800
Swaziland	420
Sweden	8,000
Syria	6,200
Thailand	36,200
Togo	1,900
Trinidad & Tobago	1,100
Tunisia	5,100
Turkey	35,600
Uganda	8,600
Ukrainian (SSR)	43,515
USSR	188,563
United Arab Republic	33,900
United Kingdom	56,000
Tanzania	13,200
United States	204,600
Upper Volta	5,400
Uruguay	2,900
Venezuela	10,800
Yemen	5,700
Yugoslavia	20,600
Zambia	4,300

Source: World Almanac 1971.

THE SLOVAK WORLD CONGRESS

HON. ROBERT TAFT, JR.

OF OHIO

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, recently the American Slovak fraternal and religious organizations were participating in the second Slovak World Congress held in Toronto, Canada, at the Royal York Hotel. I had both the pleasure and honor

to be one of their guest speakers at the banquet Saturday, June 19, together with the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), who gave an outstanding and informative speech on his experiences in the Slovak land when he was heading our consular office in Bratislava.

In these times, when many of us seem to reflect on the place of our origin, it was indeed interesting to see how these Americans, Canadians, and citizens of other free countries, all of Slovak origin, demonstrated their dedication to the cause of peace with freedom in our age. Their dedication was for freedom for their kinfolk in Slovakia, now part of the Communist satellite of Czechoslovakia, who cannot themselves demonstrate their longing for the liberties denied them for 23 years.

The Slovaks are a hardy people who have been seeking the ideals we in our own country so freely enjoy—the right to their own self-determination. And like other nations, captives under Communist domination, the Slovaks know that one day they will join ranks with the civilized world with other free nations. Until then the work of the Slovak World Congress is indeed both most worthy and very necessary and I applaud it.

I ask unanimous consent that the declaration of the Slovak World Congress and other pertinent material be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### DECLARATION

Representatives of Slovak organizations throughout the free world as well as individuals of Slovak origin in the United States of America, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, France, South Africa, Argentina, Germany and Spain assembled in Toronto in order to promote the creation of a world organization of Slovaks hereby declare that:

The struggle for freedom and self-fulfillment has been a continuing process throughout Slovak history. Attainment of this objective in the past has not been without obstacles, or dedicated work and sacrifices of many individuals and groups. Now, when the Slovak nation is unable to determine its own destiny, because it is under a foreign military domination, such efforts, dedication and sacrifices must be increased to help them achieve their freedom once again.

Those of Slovak origin now living throughout the free world, are urged to dedicate themselves to this task. Our obligation will be to present to the free world a true picture of the life under which our brethren are compelled to live, and to seek a change of their plight.

The concepts by which we will be guided in this work will be the traditional values promoted throughout Slovak history which have given vitality to the nation in its growth and acceptance among nations of the western world.

The Congress will continue to adhere to the democratic principles in civil and international relations and considers tolerance in ideological, political and religious matters an expression of maturity for democracy and strongly opposes any tyranny whether it comes from the left, or, from the right.

It has been obvious during the past two decades that the Slovaks living in Slovakia have been unable to determine their own destiny. A number of recent facts attest to this unfortunate reality namely the following:

The basic freedoms of Slovaks, as well as

of other Captive Nations under communism, are still quite limited—travel to Western countries, and press and assembly freedoms have recently been set back to almost the 1948 levels.

The federalization of Czechoslovakia into two equal sectors—the Czech and the Slovak, introduced by the Constitutional Act of October 1948, has been severely circumscribed in recent past and is slowly being replaced by a new centralism;

Religious freedom continues to be restricted to Roman Catholics, Uniates, Lutherans, Jews and to other denominations; and

The present Czecho-Slovak Federal Government has taken no initiative nor has it responded to initiatives suggested by the Holy See in the Vatican to establish a Catholic Province in Slovakia, even though such provinces exist in Bohemia (Czech) as well as in Moravia.

We contend that the issue of the continued existence and recognition of a Slovak nation be duly accepted by all nations, including the records of the United Nations.

The question of the suppressed freedoms of all nations now living under communism must soon be given full airing and remedies instituted. This has been and should not cease to be an issue of interest to all civilized nations. Slovaks call upon them to help in this cause.

We take a positive attitude towards the economic integration in Europe and urge that the Slovak nation be included in this and other unifying processes benefiting their degree of economic and other freedoms.

Viewing the future political situation in Eastern Europe with hope and cautious optimism, we look forward to the day when obstacles which presently prevent cultural and educational exchanges between Slovaks at home and abroad will be removed.

#### RESOLUTION—IN PART—ADOPTED BY SLOVAK WORLD CONGRESS, JUNE 19, 1971

To support the objectives mentioned above, we have established a permanent organization under the name of: Slovak World Congress, which shall embody the spirit of brotherhood and mutual respect. Religious affiliations or political views, insofar as they are not contrary to the spirit of democracy and the objectives mentioned above, will not bar anyone from membership or active participation in our organization. We consider it essential that our goals and methods as well as our activities follow democratic principles.

We shall endeavour to have the Slovak World Congress represent its members at international scientific, cultural, religious or political forums in the interest of the Slovak nation as expressed in the Constitution and the by-laws of the organization.

We urge that the Slovak World Congress devote itself to promoting the spirit of unity among its members and to co-ordinate all its efforts through constant contact with member organizations maintained through central secretariats, regional secretariats, committees and information bureaus in various countries around the world.

We ask the blessing of Almighty God in this undertaking in the firm hope that with the help and co-operation of all those who wish well for the Slovaks we may successfully fulfill our role.

Members of the Committee: Stephen B. Roman, LL.D., President; Rev. Dusan Toth, Secretary General; Dr. J. A. Mikus, Dr. J. Stasko, Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum, Dr. J. Pauco, and Prof. E. Urban.

TORONTO, ONT., June 20, 1971.

#### WELCOME

On behalf of the Executive of the Slovak World Congress I am delighted to extend to each of our delegates, observers and guests a most cordial welcome and sincere thanks for

their attendance at and contributions to this session of the Congress.

The Slovak World Congress, comprising representatives of Slovak organizations, cultural institutions, associations, newspapers and individuals of Slovak origin, was founded one year ago in New York City. There, representatives from 17 countries did much of the preliminary organizational work, but needed time to discuss and put forward concrete programmes for the Congress. For that reason the sessions were adjourned to be reconvened in Toronto.

The Toronto sessions are intended to establish a permanent co-ordinative body representing Slovaks abroad, to have one designated voice to speak out freely on behalf of the Slovak nation's aims, ideals and aspirations.

To this end, the initiators of the idea of a Slovak World Congress feel they have been successful. How successful they have been, however, will depend on each and every person of Slovak origin in the years to come.

May God guide the Congress in the years to come in achieving its goals within an atmosphere of freedom—freedom to promote one's heritage, freedom to live proud of one's heritage.

STEPHEN B. ROMAN,  
President.

JUNE 19, 1971.

#### PROGRAMME

Toasts: Her Majesty The Queen and The President of The United States of America. Grace: Most Reverend Philip F. Pocock, D.D., Archbishop of Toronto.

Introduction of Head Table Guests. Opening address: Stephen B. Roman, K.C.S.G., LL.D., President, Slovak World Congress.

Cello Recital: Prof. Albin Berkey, Antonia Mazan—Accompanist.

Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney-General of the United States of America. Edward J. Behuncik, President, Slovak League of America.

The Honourable Claiborne deB. Pell, United States Senator of Rhode Island.

Candle Lighting Ceremony: To symbolize the unity of Slovaks in preserving their national heritage.

The Honourable Robert Taft, Jr., United States Senator of Ohio.

Guest Speaker: The Honourable William G. Davis, Q.C., LL.D. Prime Minister of Ontario. Slovak Melodies: Ivan Romanoff Male Chorus.

Benediction: Reverend Dusan Toth, Pastor, St. Paul's Lutheran Church, Toronto.

Hej Slovači.  
O Canada.

Master of Ceremonies—Jack Dennett. Dinner Music: John Laciak and His Orchestra.

Slovak Community Sing-Song—1 a.m.

#### MESSAGE FROM GOV. RONALD REAGAN

DEAR MR. ROMAN: You and the Slovak World Congress have won the admiration and acclaim of the free world for the work you are doing in keeping alive the spirit of freedom for the captive nations especially those in Slovakia.

Those who have not known the subjugation of tyrannical rule in Slovakia cannot fully understand how precious freedom is.

You who have come from Czecho-Slovakia or who have friends and family there know well how it feels to be deprived of the basic God-given liberties which we in the free world enjoy.

I am sure your courage and hope will serve as a beacon of hope for those who remain in bondage in your former homeland.

The cause of freedom is the greatest goal for which all men strive. I encourage you to keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN,  
Governor of California.



## MESSAGE FROM SENATOR TOWER OF TEXAS

Please express to all attending the Slovak world congress in Toronto my best wishes for a successful meeting. I recall the privilege of speaking before your group last year and applaud your efforts for a most worthy cause. Please know that your concern for freedom throughout the world and particularly in Slovakia is shared by all of us. No more dire threat exists today than that posed by the Soviet Union and I stand with you against their expansionary policies. Keep up with your good work.

Sincerely,

JOHN TOWER,  
U.S. Senator.

## MESSAGE FROM SENATOR ROMAN HRUSKA OF NEBRASKA

MY DEAR MR. ROMAN: My best wishes to the delegates and members of the Slovak World Congress. May you have a productive Congress. May your efforts help us to attain the goal we all seek—freedom once again for the peoples who suffer the oppression of communist tyranny in Czechoslovakia.

My sincere congratulations.

ROMAN HRUSKA,  
U.S. Senator.

## MESSAGE FROM SENATOR STROM THURMOND

DEAR MR. ROMAN: It has come to my attention that the annual Slovak World Congress is meeting in Toronto this week.

The Slovak World Congress stands for freedom and seeks to preserve the language, culture and national heritage. You are to be commended for your strong anti-Communist stand.

Please express my best wishes to my colleagues the Honorable Robert Taft, Jr., and Claiborne Pell who are speaking at the Congress.

Also I wish to extend my wishes to my good friend John Hvasta and to others present I wish a well spent time.

Kindest regards,

STROM THURMOND,  
U.S. Senator.

## MESSAGE FROM U.S. CONGRESSMAN JOSEPH M. GAYDOS OF PENNSYLVANIA

DEAR MR. ROMAN: I regret that I cannot personally be with you this evening. However, I am with you in spirit and I send to you my congratulations for the wonderful work the Slovak World Congress has done in the past. I wish the Congress much success in the future in all its endeavors to help attain freedom for Slovaks.

God bless you.

I am sincerely yours,

JOSEPH M. GAYDOS,  
U.S. Member of Congress.

## MESSAGE FROM U.S. CONGRESSMAN RAY J. MADDEN OF INDIANA

DEAR MR. ROMAN: I wish to congratulate the Slovak people of our nation for the outstanding fight they have been waging over the years in exposing Communist tyranny which is the most powerful threat to human freedom in the history of the world. If all group of the free world would have the same spirit of opposition and expose the criminality of Communist enslavement methods and Communist living conditions there would be no doubt that this Communist threat to the world would collapse in a very short time.

I greet you, my friends, and wish you well.

Sincerely,

RAY J. MADDEN,  
U.S. Member of Congress.

## THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

(By Robert C. Mardian)

It is a special privilege for me to address this second Annual meeting of the Slovak

World Congress. Although I'm not Slovakian, my Armenian ancestry makes me feel especially akin to you and your organization.

Most all of the people who call North America "home" have European origins. Most of us here today have our origins in European countries that are either nonexistent or communist controlled. This is a special tragedy for those of us who were born in the old country or are the children of those born there. Tragic though it is, each of us has a heritage—a heritage of culture and human dignity rich in spine-structuring history.

That's why I must confess an unseemly pride in three aspects of my heritage: My heritage as a Christian, my heritage as an American and my heritage as an Armenian.

My religion teaches me that when Christ endured the agony of the cross, in warfare against the enemies of the soul, I was there. My national heritage lights my spirit with pride when a fellow countryman walks on the moon, and lifts there the stars and stripes, and, yes, makes me feel as though I am standing there too. And when I hear of people passing through the dark night of suffering, my ethnic origin, my Armenian heritage, stirs in me a pride so strong I sometimes cannot contain it. But with that pride are the memories of the atrocities committed against the Armenian people, and I am there too.

It is a common heritage that binds us together here today. But even more important than this sharing of a common heritage is the goal to which this group is committed. That goal, of course, is the securing of freedom for all of the peoples of the world. I don't have to tell any of you that the most dangerous threat to freedom and human dignity is presented by the de-humanizing, de-moralizing socialist dictatorships which fancy themselves as merely the keepers of power until a true communism evolves. It matters not whether a dictatorship is communist, fascist, or Nazi—all dictatorships are without respect for liberty, dignity, and life itself. The dictatorships which present the current most dangerous threat arose under the guise of social dissent which allowed Karl Marx to fashion an anti-liberal ideology which has resulted in a totalitarian challenge to human liberty. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the destruction of all opposing social institutions and elements, the denial of inalienable rights, and the substitution of economic norms for moral and cultural values—all are principles of Marxism-Leninism and have as their consequences the destruction of freedom and Western culture. Marxism-Leninism promises the world a communist society with economic equality but neglects to mention that the price exacted is the loss of human freedom and the stifling of the individual intellect.

In recent times, the United States has passed through what President Nixon has referred to as a dark night of the national spirit. American involvement in the struggle in Vietnam has been blamed for casting this veil of darkness over our nation. We are told by the communist nations that our motives are imperialistic. We are guilty, we are told again and again, of the most abased atrocities. We are accused of blatant aggression and callous murder.

Our nation's forces have been committed to South Vietnam because of that country's urgent need for assistance against the communist aggressor. American boys are in Vietnam because America honors her commitments, because she keeps her word and because America is a humane nation dedicated to the liberty of those who are willing to fight for freedom. And yet, while we are in the very throes of this deadly struggle with communism we are being constantly subjected to propaganda that the communists are mellowing and have lost the desire to conquer and enslave the World. This prop-

aganda has been spread among our people by ideological wolves disguised in sheep's clothing.

Those of you who have lived under the terror and repression of communism or who have shared the heartache of having families caught in the vicious snare of these dictatorships are only too aware that the communists have not changed and, in fact, continue to be dedicated to the suppression of freedom and liberty. This should have been apparent to all men when in 1956 and again in 1968, Soviet military aggression was necessary to prevent the exposure of the real tyranny which was and still is inherent in the communist dictatorship.

Even within the communist world there is an absolute intolerance for those faithful party members who would put a "human face" on the dictatorship in order to make it more palatable. I speak, of course, of Alexander Dubcek who sought to purify, and reform, but not replace or destroy, communism in Czechoslovakia. Yet even after the true nature of the dictator reared its ugly head and Dubcek's reforms were sacrificed, we still hear the drone of those who would have us believe that the communist dictator has changed. Let no one be fooled—communism is the Number One enemy not only of the Western World, but of humanity itself.

It is a tribute to all of you who have felt the iron hand of the communist dictator that you have brought to the Western Hemisphere an appreciation and understanding of the dangers of communism which is, unfortunately, shared by too few Americans.

It is also a tribute to those of you who have escaped the deathly grip of the communist dictator that you have not allowed yourselves to be intimidated into silence where freedom is the issue. I refer specifically to letters recently sent to refugees from the Czechoslovakian invasion whereby they are informed that they have been charged with criminal violations in Czechoslovakia and are subject to prison terms and confiscation of property. These letters, allegedly sent by attorneys in Czechoslovakia, demand payments for legal services supposedly rendered in the refugee's absence. This childish antic, designed to gain international credits and harass refugees, is but another example of the character of dictatorship. Of course, under the laws of the United States, the refugee has no obligation to pay this alleged debt.

The United States stands in a peculiar position with regard to the international communist apparatus. Because international communism regards our country as the chief barrier to further communist expansion, we are its primary target. Communists everywhere are hostile to the United States and are dedicated to isolating and destroying this nation. The tactics traditionally used by the communists such as subversion, infiltration, insurrection, guerilla warfare, armed aggression, terrorism, murder and espionage are being used increasingly in the attempt to overthrow the United States government.

The communists labor ceaselessly to exploit racial discontent and to incite racial strife in order to create the polarization of conflicting forces on which communism is nourished.

The communists have exploited the so-called "peace movement" by making propaganda use of prominent intellectuals and others to exploit the intense and deep yearning of people everywhere for an end to the war in Vietnam. The real meaning of communist-style "peace" is world communism—not world peace.

The communists have capitalized on the discontent of our youth, who like all children demand instant solutions to all problems, by exploiting their desire for instant peace, instant change and instant utopia.

I do not need to further enumerate here the many other ways in which the commu-

nists have insidiously attempted to gain a foothold in the Western World. Their methods of operation are well known to all of you. But the question is, what do we do about it?

We may win a battle against communist today or tomorrow, but this does not mean that we have won the war. We may become excited and emotional about communist advances, and we may feel frustrated and be "all fired up" for action, but how long can we sustain a purely emotional campaign against a dedicated, calculating world conspiracy? Emotions are notably short-lived, notoriously irrational, and woefully erratic. We cannot depend on them for the sustained, intelligent effort that is demanded of us if we are to meet and to defeat the communist challenge.

No well adjusted person manages his affairs solely by emotion. Instead, he applies his intelligence and ingenuity to life's problems. Through the application of rational thought and hardheaded realism, he properly manages his life. So it must be with the effective counteraction.

#### SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELECTION

### HON. LESTER L. WOLFF

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, as I indicated to my colleagues last week the Department of State has been most derelict in failing to comment on my resolution, which more than 40 Members have sponsored, to send a high level observer team to the South Vietnamese presidential election in October.

There can be no satisfactory excuse for a delay of several months in a matter of such moment. When prompt action is essential it would appear that the Department is suffering from creeping lethargy.

Mr. Speaker, I have again written to the Secretary of State about this matter and request permission to extend my remarks to include in the RECORD a copy of the letter which I sent to the Secretary today and a copy of a relevant article from today's New York Times:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
Washington, D.C., July 20, 1971.

HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,  
The Secretary, Department of State,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: For several months the Department of State has been promising to provide comment on my legislation to send a high level observer team to the South Vietnamese presidential election scheduled for this October. But repeated promises have not helped and the Department's comment still has not been received by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, of which I am a member.

Now, I am enclosing a copy of an article from today's New York Times in which President Thieu is quoted as welcoming foreign observers of the election.

What must be remembered, as the Department delays responding to my proposal, is that if we wait too long before acting, it will be impossible for the observer team and its staff to truly get an accurate view of the extent to which political freedom exists in South Vietnam. Many important factors in regard to the election are being decided now and to send a last minute delegation would make it most difficult to come up with a

reliable assessment of what has taken place during the campaign period.

With time running out, I once again want to urge that the Department respond promptly and favorably on my legislation so that the Foreign Affairs Committee and the full House can move expeditiously in this regard.

Your early reply would be appreciated. Kind regards.

Sincerely,

LESTER L. WOLFF,  
Member of Congress.

#### THIEU TERMS MINH A LIAR AND DEFENDS ROLE IN DIEM COUP

(By Alvin Shuster)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM.—President Ngyuen Van Thieu struck back at his political rivals tonight, calling Gen. Duong Van Minh a "coward and a liar," and insisting that the presidential elections this fall would be fair and honest.

In his first public rebuttal to a series of charges by General Minh, President Thieu accused his most serious potential challenger of irresponsibility for having made "absurd and slanderous statements." He pledged democratic elections on Oct. 3 and said he would welcome foreign observers "who could go anywhere they want in the country."

"It is not easy to rig the elections," the President said.

General Minh, the hero of the 1963 coup d'etat against President Ngo Dinh Diem, and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, both presidential hopefuls, have been accusing the President of planning to fix the elections to insure his re-election. The challengers insist this would be easy for Mr. Thieu because of his control over South Vietnam's administrative and military machinery.

The main purpose of the President's news conference tonight, however, was to rebut a suggestion by General Minh in several recent interviews that Mr. Thieu was responsible for the murder of Mr. Diem at the time of the coup. Mr. Thieu, then a colonel in the Army, was among the officers who overthrew the controversial leader.

"General Minh has slandered me," President Thieu said. "This is underserving of an officer. A military man must have the courage to tell the truth. I challenge him to do so."

It was clear from his comments that "Who killed Diem?" was developing as a campaign issue. Mr. Thieu charged that General Minh was trying to shed responsibility for President Diem's death to win the support of South Vietnam's Roman Catholic minority.

Mr. Diem and his feared brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, who was also killed, were Roman Catholics, as is President Thieu. General Minh, who insists that he did not want Mr. Diem assassinated during the coup, is a Buddhist.

#### SITE OF COUP'S START

Mr. Thieu's news conference, called primarily for Vietnamese reporters, was held in the officers club of the Joint General Staff headquarters, near Tansonnhut Airport. The coup had its origins in those offices on Nov. 1, 1963, and its leaders were in the officers club the next day when President Diem and his brother were murdered after their capture in Cholon, the Chinese district of Saigon.

In discussing the coup, General Minh who retired in 1964, has said that Mr. Thieu was late in bringing his troop to the Presidential Palace the day of the coup, thus enabling Mr. Diem to escape. He said that Mr. Diem and his brother would not have died had General Thieu turned up in time and taken them into custody.

General Minh said that in the midst of the coup, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge called him and asked that the brothers be allowed to leave the country. He said this would have been done if the brothers had not been allowed to escape the palace to a hiding place in Cholon.

#### THE STRENGTH OF A FREE SOCIETY

### HON. LEN B. JORDAN

OF IDAHO

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. Mr. President, there seems to be a tendency when the Nation is faced with troubled times to assume that the present problems are without precedent and practically devoid of reasonable solution. Instead of turning to despair I think it is important that we view our problems in a broader perspective.

While our current problems are great, they are not without precedent. The traditional American spirit has been not to despair at difficulties but to go about finding solutions to them. This is how we have become a great Nation and I am hopeful we shall continue along this path.

On July 4 an excellent editorial along these lines entitled "The Strength of a Free Society" appeared in the Idaho Statesman. I ask unanimous consent that this excellent article, which puts our present difficulties in an historical perspective, be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the (Boise) Idaho Statesman,  
July 4, 1971]

#### IN OUR OPINION—THE STRENGTH OF A FREE SOCIETY

Five years from its 200th birthday the United States offers evidence of being a troubled and divided nation. There are people who despair for the country's future.

This July 4 is an appropriate time to remember that this nation has been troubled and divided before. Also, that political differences and debate are a part of the country's heritage, a way in which it is renewed and refreshed. This is a time of questioning past priorities in government and national life. To some extent, the younger generation is in conflict with its elders. Change is in the wind.

These aren't reasons for despair. For the most part past and present priorities are being reviewed in search of better policies. For the most part, young people don't wish to tear down the system but to reform and improve it.

July 4, 1776 was also a time of trouble, of questioning, and despair in some circles. The colonists divided into revolutionary and loyalist factions. There was uncertainty about the future.

The nation's present situation hardly approaches the crisis of 1776. But some of the same spirit or idealism and hope that marked the patriots of 1776 can be seen today. A recent survey showed Americans troubled about the present, but hopeful for the future.

Consider some of the country's assets:

A constitution and a Bill of Rights that stands intact, though people disagree over its interpretation (as they did in the first years of the new nation), and though it is threatened from time to time. (That's nothing new, either.)

An economic system that is the most productive in the world.

A political system that is still based on the consent of the governed—with an electoral base expanded by extending voting rights to those from 18 to 21.

A population of 200 million people that is better informed and better educated than



any people in history, with greater opportunities for individual achievement and accomplishment.

On the negative side, the minuses should be considered in relation to the pluses:

Although Vietnam has been a disappointing experience it is significant that as a nation we are willing, even anxious, to question and review the record, to see where we went wrong, to avoid mistakes in the future. Any nation makes errors. An ability to assess, recognize and profit from those errors is an asset.

Although there have been rioting and bombings, surveys show that the great majority of young people reject such tactics. Most of the young critics of American society are would-be reformers, not revolutionaries. Reform has been going on ever since the day the constitution was ratified.

The nation has made tremendous progress in recent years on civil rights. It is significant that a survey showing whites feeling the country had slid backwards showed that blacks had a more positive view.

Offered the challenge to stop fouling the land, water and air, the nation has responded at every level—the public, government and industry. Fundamental policy changes have been made.

The country is hardly without troubles: inflation, high unemployment, crime and drugs. Yet the people are optimistic; they demonstrate a willingness to accept and face the challenges of a changing world.

Those who regard Vietnam as a tragic mistake should remember that the country has made mistakes before, and learned from them.

This is a nation whose founders had the courage and the vision to entrust basic power to the people, to insist upon freedom of speech, press and religion—so diversity in thought and expression could flourish.

This is a nation that went through a brutal Civil War after the country divided over the question of slavery.

This is a nation whose idealism helped lead it into World War I, a nation which rescued Europe and part of Asia from tyranny in World War II, and which helped revive and feed the world after that war.

This is a nation whose official aspirations are always out of reach of achievement. Freedom means a freedom to question and criticize. Few countries set the same standards for themselves.

Because of the widespread questioning and dissent, because of crime levels and riots, there are political pressures to reduce the amount of individual freedom—to make compromises with historic principles.

These could be more of a threat to freedom than the small, irresponsible and unpopular revolutionary element.

Individual freedom and the political process allow the country to accommodate and benefit from diversity of opinion, to make orderly and peaceful decisions based on the electoral process. This is the basic source of its strength and durability.

No matter how much we may be inclined to disagree with this policy or that one, to question this officeholder or that one, there is abundant reason to take pride in the country, and to recognize the wisdom of its founders in the power they granted to a free and informed electorate.

#### QUINCY COLLEGE SOCCER TEAM TO TOUR ISRAEL

#### HON. PAUL FINDLEY

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to report to the House that a

delegation from Quincy College in my district departs around August 1 for a tour to Israel to conduct soccer clinics and play exhibition soccer games against Israeli teams.

The good will tour was arranged largely through the efforts of a Quincy College sophomore, Elias Menassah, whose home is in Jerusalem.

The tour is the culmination of several months of preparation by the Quincy College soccer team coached by Jack Mackenzie. Most of the necessary funds for the tour were raised by the team members themselves. In the final month of the school year, the athletes manned the concession stands of the Quincy home show, and the college parents weekend events; they played three benefit "Hoc-Soc" games, held a rummage sale, and conducted a car wash. Also, many private individuals and groups also contributed in a truly community-wide effort.

The group will be housed in the Jerusalem YMCA and hosted by the YMCA soccer team.

During their Israeli tour, the Quincy Hawks will play five soccer games in Jerusalem, Renallah, Nablus, and Beit Jola. Israeli news media reports indicate widespread interest in the visit by the Quincy, Ill., team, which in the past 6 years has won two national championships and twice placed second in U.S. collegiate soccer competition.

Taking part in the tour along with Coach Mackenzie will be assistant coach Frank Longo, and Quincy College athletic director John Ortwerth.

Team members are goalie Ray Remstedt from St. Louis, fullbacks Al Harte, John Schneider, and Joe Serati, all from St. Louis, and Don Schmidt from Belleville, Ill.

Also, halfbacks Tom and Bob Pollihan, and John Borden from St. Louis, Glen Morton from Wilmington, Del., and Joe Buegler from Florissant, Mo.

The forwards are Edmundo and Mario Camacho from Oakland, Calif. Dennis Klosterman, Roger Cerny, and George Eigel from St. Louis, and Elias Manassah of Jerusalem.

These men, along with all those who made the tour possible, deserve special commendation. Good will ambassadors such as these will go a long way in promoting understanding among the people of the world.

#### THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP

#### HON. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, many words have been spoken and written concerning President Nixon's historic announcement that he will visit Peking.

In my judgment, two of the best commentaries on this subject were the lead editorial in the Richmond, Va., Times-Dispatch of July 18, and the lead editorial in the July 19 edition of the Wall Street Journal.

Both are comprehensive and balanced. They express both hope and concern.

I ask unanimous consent that these two editorials be printed in the Extensions of Remarks.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Richmond (Va.) Times-Dispatch, July 18, 1971]

#### THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP

President Nixon's stunning decision to visit Red China arouses contradictory feelings of hope and despair, of relief and anxiety. With the world never more than the push of a button from nuclear holocaust, any reasonable effort to normalize relations between two major powers who are potential antagonists is to be applauded. Yet it is impossible to shake the fear that in the impending talks between Washington and Peking, the United States may give far more than it receives.

Given the realities of international politics, Mr. Nixon's decision probably was inevitable. With a population of more than 740 million, Communist China is a major power whose attitudes and policies can have a profound impact upon world affairs. Whether there is to be war or peace in Asia, for example, depends to a great extent upon which Peking desires. Obviously, the existence of so powerful a nation cannot be ignored.

But in accepting reality the President must not abandon principle. And make no mistake: Principle may be imperilled by the Nixon visit. For it will enhance Red China's international stature, promote its admission to the United Nations and, in the process, help to bolster psychologically at least, Peking's claim to Taiwan.

Taiwan is now the home of Nationalist China, to which the United States is bound by a mutual defense treaty. Red China has consistently refused to consider the possible existence of two Chinas, one on the mainland and the other on Taiwan. With equal determination, the U.S. has vowed never to abandon Nationalist China. But what would happen if Communist China, inspired by its soaring international prestige and by Washington's fervent desire for peace and "normalization," pressed its efforts to annex Taiwan? Faced with such a challenge, would the U.S. choose principle or expediency?

We are convinced that President Nixon would choose principle, that his efforts to establish normal relations with Red China will not be "at the expense of our old friends." Mr. Nixon's admirable reputation as a foe of communism and his failure to falter under searing criticism from Vietnam war critics suggest that he would be no patsy for Peking. No doubt his decision to go to Red China was inspired by the genuine belief that it might be possible, notwithstanding Peking's belligerent rhetoric, to develop relations with the Communists without forsaking the Nationalists.

Mr. Nixon has committed himself to a delicate and difficult mission. He is plunging, to become metaphoric, into treacherous waters, inviting serene on the surface but dangerously turbulent beneath. The rest of us can do nothing but stand on the shore and watch, hoping that he will prove skillful enough to avoid the whirlpools.

#### IS THE WORLD COMING TO ITS SENSES?

President Nixon's plan to visit Communist China within the next several months is being described as astonishing. Indeed, it is all but incredible, after more than 20 years of implacable hostility on the part of Peking, after actual war with China in Korea, after all the opposition in this country to the idea of any normalization of relations with mainland China.

Coupled with a seeming relaxation of tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations, this apparent turnabout regarding China strikes many peo-

ple as hopeful. On balance, we think the portents are in fact hopeful, provided all of us view them with appropriate caution and skepticism.

It must be assumed, most of all, that Peking's fundamental geopolitical concept has not changed. As outlined by Lin Piao a few years ago—much in manner of "Mein Kampf"—it calls for the presumptively pro-Communist "countryside" (the underdeveloped nations) gradually converging on and overwhelming the "cities" (the advanced nations) through so-called wars of national liberation.

While that undoubtedly remains the goal, events may have given Peking a more realistic assessment of the difficulties of its attainment. The Vietnam war has been tragically costly for the U.S. and we have not won it, but it has been costly for the other side too, not only the Vietnamese Communists but Moscow and Peking as well.

Other nations in the area—Indonesia, for example—must look to Peking like far harder nuts to crack than they did only a few years ago. Red China's assiduous efforts to subvert various African countries have not, so far as can be judged, been outstandingly successful. And of course it faces a baleful, powerful Soviet Union. (By the same token, Russia's relative warming to the U.S. may be partly based on fear of China.)

Even if, for reasons of its own, Peking wants something approaching a rapprochement with Washington, the issue of Taiwan appears to be an insurmountable obstacle. President Nixon says a new relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the expense of our old friends. Premier Chou En-lai says if we will just forget Taiwan, they will take care of the matter without difficulty as an internal Chinese problem.

So if a new relationship with Peking depends on resolution of the Taiwan issue, the outlook seems pretty bleak. It is nonetheless possible that a new, improved relationship could come about while leaving the Taiwan issue in limbo, for a while anyway. Nobody knows.

The U.S. must regard its current and prospective relations with the Soviet Union with the same mixture of skepticism and hope. There have been peace offensives emanating from Moscow for years, even—strange as it seems in retrospect—during the dread Stalin's regime. They have never amounted to a great deal.

What is possibly more hopeful now is that for various reasons conceived in its own national interest, Russia may want a substantive relaxation of tensions with the U.S.; the potential threat from China, the enormous and growing economic burden of arms. The latter especially is what makes some people think a meaningful, if limited, agreement may emerge from the SALT talks on curbing the arms race.

Beneath all these considerations, it seems to us, lie more fundamental ones.

Although the U.S. philosophically opposes communism, it never wanted the cold war and the hot ones that also came. After aiding and cooperating with the Soviet Union in World War II, it was prepared to go very far toward cooperating with that nation in building a peaceful world. The Soviets wouldn't have it that way.

Somewhat similarly, the U.S. was amiable toward the Chinese Communists before they took over the mainland. Unwisely as it happened, Washington sought to effect a coalition government including the Communists. Obviously they took advantage of that effort.

In other words, what the U.S. has been opposing and from time to time fighting in the world is not so much the ideology of communism, even though it abhors that system, but Communist belligerence and aggression. Thus there is no inconsistency in rejecting the Communist system and at the

same time trying to have realistically good relations with Communist nations for the sake of peace.

Plainly that is President Nixon's overriding ambition. He wants a generation of peace. He has made numerous initiatives. The present new looks between Washington and Peking are in large part the culmination of overtures on his part extending over the past couple of years.

Maybe this reflects something even deeper. The world is war-weary, sick of actual war and the threat of war. Maybe it is more so than ever before, because for the first time people have instant communication, war in living (dying) color, and because of the new sense of global closeness induced by the explorations of space. The U.S. doesn't want war in any case if it can be avoided, but perhaps this world-wide war-weariness is beginning to penetrate the citadels of our adversaries.

Considering the gory sweep of human history, we are scarcely optimistic about people's propensity for prolonged peace. But for quite practical reasons, mankind's chance of avoiding extinguishing itself does look a little better this morning.

#### THE MYTH OF JEWISH AFFLUENCE EXPOSED

HON. MARIO BIAGGI

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Speaker, today in the United States there are many myths that are totally false yet regarded as pure truth. One of these myths is that all American Jews are wealthy and that there are no poor Jews. However, the opposite is the case. There are more poor Jews per capita than among either Catholics or Protestants.

Over 1 million Jews live at or below the poverty level in the United States. In New York City alone, it is estimated that 250,000 Jews subsist below a level of income of \$58 a week, and another 150,000 live at or near the poverty level. Approximately 65 percent of all Jews living in poverty are over 60 years of age.

An excellent editorial by the Day Jewish Journal of New York City impressively states the case of the poverty struck Jew. I commend this article to my colleagues and will place it in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at this point. I am also including an article carried by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency on the same subject.

Myth or no myth, poverty knows no boundaries between religions, races or ethnic groups. All Americans are subject to poverty, and we must see to it that this shameful situation is corrected.

The articles follow:

[From the Day-Jewish Journal, June 22, 1971]  
ONE MILLION AMERICAN JEWS LIVING IN DIRE POVERTY; MANY MORE ARE HIDING THERE DEPRIVATION; THE MYTH OF JEWISH AFFLUENCE EXPOSED

(By Ernest E. Barbarash)

As far back as two years ago this column had exposed the myth of Jewish affluence in this country, pointing out that at least twenty per cent of the five-and-a-half mil-

lion Jews live at or below the poverty line. We laid particular stress on the tragic and impoverished status of the growing number of elderly whose sole income with which to sustain their body and soul is derived from social security. Attention was also focused on thousands of small storekeepers who were left penniless when they closed their businesses in changing or abandoned neighborhoods. Whether out of a sense of apathy or because of the myth that all Jews are well provided for, or both, the overwhelming majority of these impoverished and elderly Jews were not receiving welfare payments to which they were entitled. The extent of Jewish poverty was particularly noticeable during the weeks prior to the last Passover holidays when I made the rounds of orthodox congregations in various neighborhoods of the metropolitan area and saw long lines of downcast Jewish men and women waiting their turn to register for receipt of Maotz Chittim, food provisions for observance of the holiday. These were in addition to the countless impoverished Jewish families who were the beneficiaries of "Mattan B'Seissor," when food packages were delivered to their homes unbeknown to their neighbors and friends.

It is noteworthy that the existence and desperate situation of vast masses of Jewish poor is now being brought to public attention by such a prestigious organization as the American Jewish Committee. At the recent annual dinner meeting of the A.J. Committee's Chicago chapter, a paper entitled "The Invisible Jewish Poor" was delivered by Mrs. Anne Wolf, a prominent sociologist of its Intergroup Relations and Social Action Department, revealing that nearly one million American Jews live at or near the poverty level. While this disclosure came as a surprise to many, it was noted that the myth of Jewish affluence was perpetuated in part by the Jewish community which until recently (and I would add that the myth is still alive today) has been blind to the large areas of poverty among fellow-Jews all over the country.

Gleaning her information from studies of numerous surveys and statistics compiled over several years by national, loyal and Jewish groups, Mrs. Wolfe's report unfolds the following grim picture of the extent of Jewish poverty in the U.S. today.

There is more poverty among Jews per capita than among either Catholics or Protestants. Something like 60 to 65 per cent of Jews living in poverty (measured by the living standard estimates of The Bureau of Labor Statistics) are over 60 or 65 years of age. The major problem facing the elderly poor is housing and deteriorating neighborhoods from which they are unable to escape and which increases their loneliness, isolation and emotional and physical insecurity.

#### DIRE POVERTY AMONG YOUNGER PEOPLE

"But there are significant numbers of poor," Mrs. Wolfe took pains to point out, "who are not old folk and I think it is important to explode the myth that the Jewish poor are the Jewish old. 30 to 35 per cent of our poverty group is made up of simple, unrelated people or families, many with young children, some headed by one parent. There are Jewish families receiving aid to dependent children (welfare)—a fact that is usually greeted with disbelief. In New York City alone, it is estimated . . . that one quarter of a million Jews subsist below a level of 58 dollars a week, and another 150,000 live at near poverty income . . ."

It is also significant that a large proportion of non-elderly Jewish poor in big cities are Orthodox and Chassidic Jews in New York City, and this group is the third largest group in New York.

The study of Jewish poverty embraced also other American cities, notably Miami and Los Angeles which are attractive to elderly people because of their mild climate, and



Philadelphia. For instance, the files of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services showed about 8,000 elderly Jews receiving public assistance, and more than 10,000 eligible for old age assistance who, for a variety of reasons, did not apply.

"An interesting example of blind spots relates to Miami Beach. In an area of that community called South Beach, it was ascertained in 1969 that 40,000 people were clustered within some 40 square blocks. Of these, 80 per cent are over 65 and 85 per cent are Jews. The average annual income is \$2,460 (about 47 dollars a week); thousands are living on less than \$28 a week for rent and food," Mrs. Wolfe reported.

The aforementioned report as excerpted here contains only bare outlines of the situation of Jewish poor in various parts of the country. There are vast numbers of Jewish poor who successfully hide their actual condition and masquerade as fairly well to do while scrimping on meals, clothing and other essentials.

Vast anti-poverty funds have been allocated in many areas by Federal, State and municipal agencies. The Jewish poor under the laws of the land are entitled to their fair share of these funds. The question is: Who in our Jewish community, on a national and local level, are taking up the cudgels for these poor among our people?

[From the Jewish Press, July 2, 1971]

#### YES VIRGINIA—THERE ARE POOR JEWS

CHICAGO.—The "affluence" of American Jews is to a surprising extent, a myth perpetuated in part by the Jewish community, which until recently has been blind to the large areas of poverty among fellow Jews all over the country. That disclosure was made by Mrs. Anne Wolfe, a sociologist and program consultant in the Intergroup Relations and Social Action department of the American Jewish Committee.

In a paper entitled "The Invisible Jewish Poor," Mrs. Wolfe revealed that nearly one million American Jews live at or near the poverty level. She gleaned her information from studies of numerous surveys and statistics compiled over several years by national, local and Jewish groups.

"We find significant indication of the extent of poverty in the Jewish community from the National Opinion Research Survey on income related to religion," Mrs. Wolfe said, "which ascertained that 15.3 percent of Jewish households had income under \$3,000 a year" compared with 15.6 percent of Catholic and 22.7 percent of Protestant households. "Fifteen percent of six million people is a large number," representing 700,000-750,000 people, Mrs. Wolfe remarked.

She pointed out that if the figures for the "near poor"—those earning under \$4,500 a year—were added, the number of Jewish poor would be much greater, exceeding 900,000. Thus, while surveys continue to find that the median income of American Jews on the whole is higher than the general national median income, there is more poverty among Jews per capita than among either Catholics or Protestants.

Mrs. Wolfe noted that the problem of Jewish poverty was related to the lower death rate among Jews at younger ages and the lower birth rate among Jewish families, which results in a larger number of elderly people in the Jewish population than in the general population. "The community studies reveal that something like 60 to 65 percent of Jews living in poverty are over 60 or 65 years of age," Mrs. Wolfe stated.

"But there are significant numbers of poor who are not old folk and I think it is important to explode the myth that the Jewish poor are the Jewish old," Mrs. Wolfe said. "This other group—30-35 percent of our poverty group—is made up of single, unrelated people or families, many with young

children, some headed by one parent. There are Jewish families receiving Aid to Dependent Children (welfare)—a fact that is usually greeted with disbelief. In New York City alone, it is estimated . . . that one quarter of a million Jews subsist below a level of \$3,000 a year and another 150,000 live at near poverty on income below \$4,500."

Mrs. Wolfe observed that a large proportion of the non-elderly Jewish poor in big cities are Orthodox and Hassidic Jews. "There are 80,000 Hassidic Jews in New York City and this group is the third largest poverty group in New York," she said. Foreign born Jews also account for a large percentage of the Jewish poor.

Mrs. Wolfe's study embraced the Jewish poverty situation in other American cities—notably Miami and Los Angeles, which are attractive to elderly people because of their mild climate. A study of the files of the Los Angeles County Department of Public and Social Services showed about 8,000 elderly Jews receiving public assistance and more than 10,000 eligible for old-age assistance who, for a variety of reasons did not apply. "An interesting example of blind spots relates to wealthy Miami Beach. In an area of that community called South Beach, it was ascertained in 1969 that 40,000 people were clustered in an area of some 40 square blocks. Of these, 80 percent are over 65 and 85 percent are Jews. The average annual income is \$2,460, thousands are living on less than \$28 a week for rent and food," said Mrs. Wolfe.

#### THE PHILIPPINES

#### HON. LLOYD BENTSEN

OF TEXAS

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, the Philippines is one of America's Asian friends, and our relations with that independent nation are generally solid, with some lapses.

One of the best series of articles on the Philippines, and her leaders, was written recently by Kingsbury Smith, and published in the San Antonio Light. So that my colleagues will have benefit of these fine articles, I ask unanimous consent that the series be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MARCOS SEEKS TO SAVE FILIPINO DEMOCRACY—  
PRESIDENT SEEKS PEACEFUL REVOLUTION  
(By Kingsbury Smith)

MANILA.—One of the most remarkable leaders in the world today is striving to save democracy in the Philippines by a peaceful revolution that aims at a major transformation of the social and economic order in this island republic of 38 million people.

President Ferdinand Marcos, whose heroic deeds in World War II and miraculous survival from a dozen close calls with death—five times gravely wounded and repeatedly tortured by the Japanese—have already made him a legendary figure in his homeland, believes that democracy in the Philippines is being endangered by a combination of oligarchism and Communist subversion.

He is risking his political future, his honor and even his life, to carry out reforms he is convinced are necessary to preserve democracy in the Asian nation which, under American guidance, was the first to embrace it.

"If I fail," he told me in an exclusive in-

terview "either the Communists will take over in two or three years or there will be an extreme rightist or military dictatorship."

His plans for restructuring the social and economic order in the Philippines include distribution of land to the peasants, redistribution of wealth through increased inheritance and other taxes, local farm collectivization, family-level producers, improved housing and educational facilities for the poor, rural electrification and strict censorship of pornographic films and literature to protect the youth.

The record of what he has already achieved in five and a half years as president is an amazing one.

Government revenue up 60 per cent. A virtually bankrupt government when he took over now enjoys a balanced budget, a favorable foreign trade balance and a stabilized economy with a growth rate this year of 5.5 per cent. Unemployment down from 8.7 to 6 per cent. Seven million more children in school. The number of schoolrooms doubled. Six thousand miles of new roads. The country, long a big importer of rice, the basic diet, is now not only self-sufficient, but exporting the "miracle rice" his research projects developed.

To spend a few days as the guest of this youthful-looking, 53-year-old crusading leader and his beautiful and talented first lady, who is even more of a political asset to him than Jackie was to the late President Kennedy, is an inspiring experience.

I have seen, interviewed and corresponded with most of the world's leaders, over the past 30 years, including Churchill, Stalin, Khrushchev, Nehru, de Gaulle, Adenauer and every American President since Herbert Hoover. Seldom have I encountered a leader who impressed me as much as this dynamic man of Malay ancestry who combines a charismatic personality with a pragmatic, common sense approach to problems and whose idealism is centered on the betterment of his people's welfare.

It seems fortunate for the Philippines, the United States and the neighboring Asian nations that this man is one of Asia's most outstanding leaders at this turbulent time.

Decorated 28 times for bravery in World War II, one of his heroic deeds was credited with delaying the Japanese capture of Bataan for three months. Although wounded, he survived the infamous death march to lead an underground guerrilla movement that continuously harassed the Japanese during their occupation of the Philippines and helped prepare the way for the return of Gen. MacArthur's Allied Forces.

There is at times a pained expression on the president's face, especially around the eyes, that seems to reflect the suffering he has endured.

Convicted while a college student of a political murder and imprisoned, young Marcos was later offered a presidential pardon but refused it and insisted on a supreme court review. He pleaded his own case and won a complete reversal of the conviction, absolving him of all guilt.

He has been accused by his political enemies of having become the richest man in Asia since he became president. Son of a wealthy land-owning family and one of the country's most successful trial lawyers before he became president, he ridicules the allegations as attempts by the oligarchists and Communists to try to destroy him politically. After his re-election to a second term in 1969, he announced he was disposing of his worldly possessions. He established trust funds for his wife and three children, and willed everything else to the nation.

"When I die," he remarked to me, "I will die a poor man."

A mass media, which he contends is almost entirely controlled by business interests who bitterly resent his efforts to curb corruption and the exploitation of the nation's resources

for their own selfish purposes, has subjected him and his wife to scandalous abuse and slander, accusing them of practically everything from robbing the country to having separate lovers.

Both the president and the first lady speak with frankness about these attempts not only to destroy them politically but to wreck their marital happiness. Both say it only has served to strengthen their love and devotion to one another.

## SEEN MOST

Evidence of the faith the people have in them is clearly apparent in the fact that while the president won his first election to the nation's highest office in 1965 by plurality of 600,000, he was re-elected in 1969 by two and a half million votes.

Following is the condensed text of the first of series of interviews with President Marcos in Malacanang Palace:

Q—What do you consider to be the most important achievements of your presidency?

A—The changing of the mind and heart of our people, more than anything else. What I mean by this is the change from resignation, outright indolence and fatalism. All kinds of suffering and failure were ascribed to some divine judgement that was unchangeable. So much so that impoverishment, illness, and ignorance were considered a part of the dictate of God and therefore should not and cannot be changed.

## NEW ATTITUDE

This had reached such a point that unfinished bridges were allowed to rot, roads, although started, were not finished. It was wrecking the entire economy.

Two thousand of our industries were either closed or closing when I took over. Not a single person offered or worked out a solution.

When I took over as president, I asked our people to think. "Do not accept our misery and deprivation in resignation. Think and your thoughts will make you free. Be discontented." And I got what I asked for. The change of heart and the change of mind of our people. This to me is the most important.

Q—How did you bring this change about?

A—By varied measures. One of the most important was to show them that something could be done. We did it in the most dramatic way possible.

For instance, in the question of rice. We set pilot farms in every municipality. I called in the professionals. I don't mean agriculturalists, but doctors, lawyers and men who understand scientific farming. I told them they could help their country in some other way than just practicing their profession. We showed the people we could harvest three times, four times and more than they were harvesting. Of course, when profit comes in everybody starts noticing.

Another dramatic way was in schools. When I assumed office there were 108,000 classrooms. Today there are 202,000. Seven million more children are attending school today than when I took over.

Q—Where did you find the funds to do that?

A—I tapped our Japanese reparations payments, which used to go to a few privileged, private industries. Then in four years I increased the government's revenue by 60 per cent. I wonder whether any government anywhere in the world has been able to do this.

Q—How did you do it?

A—By sending the crooks to jail and appealing to our people to pay their taxes. I gave a one year tax amnesty to all those who had failed to pay their taxes—one year to pay up and they would not be prosecuted. We doubled the number of people who were paying their income taxes.

We also imposed higher duties on luxuries, and on consumer items, especially items that were being produced here. For example, we imposed a 200 per cent duty on big cars.

Q—How about roads?

A—As soon as I knew I was elected in December, 1965, I called in as many experts as I could from all over the world. I asked them to tell me what was the difference between a modern country, say Switzerland, or Germany or England, and the Philippines. Why do we not move?

The answers were quite obvious. They said we did not have any communications, no effective way of moving our products from production areas to markets. Then we had to build up skilled labor because our target was a balanced agro-industrial economy. Roads became a primary project. This was one of the dramatic things we did.

## NO HIGHWAYS

Here in Manila there wasn't a single modern through road. I built straightaway thoroughfares. I called in the army engineers to do it, and we finished them in record time. Instead of teaching the soldiers merely how to shoot, to destroy, we taught them how to work on such projects as roads.

Another dramatic thing we did was to build schoolhouses quickly. I would bring pre-fabricated schoolhouses to the barrios (rural villages) and we would put them up in five hours. I designed the Marcos pre-fabricated schoolhouse during the war. I just improved on it for our needs today. It is all steel and cement.

Q—What are your ultimate aims and objectives for the country?

A—Fundamentally this country is democratic and its beliefs are democratic. I would like to see this country not threatened by subversion. We have been threatened by subversion since the beginning of our independence, and this has blocked our economic development because the demands of national security always draw funds and resources from economic development.

I would like to eliminate this basic threat not only to our freedom and security, but to our economic, social and political development, and to do so before my term as president expires in 1973. I would like to restructure our society.

Q—How?

A—We want to give full implementation to the meaning of equality. Equality of opportunity. I want to see every child whatever his birth, enjoy the right to develop all his God-given talents. The Filipino is fundamentally an energetic, honest and decent man. He doesn't want to beg and yet many of the Filipinos now are actually beggars, and this I would like to wipe out.

Land reform is part of my program for restructuring the society and increasing the share of labor without eliminating the incentives to capital and investment. This, I know, is a little difficult but we can just about make it because the cost of our labor is not yet too high. This country has one of the world's lowest costs of production. Some of the Japanese are coming here. So are some of the Hong Kong investors, putting up all kinds of factories in our free trade zone.

What I dream of is to see our country, free from the threat of both external and internal aggression of subversion, moving in such a direction and orientation and with such momentum that no matter what happens to the political leadership, the country will move on towards its goals.

Q—What do you foresee happening in the country if your social and economic reforms are not carried out?

A—I foresee the Communists taking over, perhaps within the next two, three years, or at least a revolution. Either the Communists or the rightist will take over. By rightists, I mean either the military or the economic imperialists.

Q—You once described the Philippines as a sick society. Is it now beginning to recover?

A—Yes, it started to recover sometime in 1968, but it is still sick in the sense that many of those in the upper strata still do

not realize the pivotal nature of all the reforms we are trying to initiate.

## DON'T REALIZE

They still do not realize the need for this restructuring, the voluntary giving away of part of their gains in the economic world in order that the lower ranks of our people may realize that they have a stake in democracy.

Q—Do you feel that what you have described as the oligarchs are endangering democracy in the Philippines by providing political ammunition for the Communists and other extremist groups?

A—Yes, they are an opportunist group just like the Communists. Both are trying to utilize the other for their own private purposes. I will be frank with you. The oligarchs think they can handle the Communists and use them as tools. The Communists think they can do the same. I know both of them are planning to liquidate the other the moment there is trouble here in the Philippines.

Q—Why did the oligarchists turn against you?

A—They turned against me because I would not give way to their importunings about further economic opportunities and favors, like grants of licenses, permits for monopolies or exploitation of natural resources at the expense of public welfare.

Q—Are the oligarchists using their control of the mass media to try to destroy you politically because of your reform programs?

A—Yes, the oligarchs are bent on removing me from public office by any means fair or foul.

Q—Have you given any thought to seeking a special mandate from the people through a referendum for your reform programs?

A—I am going to seek a special mandate in the November elections (local and congressional) this year. In fact, I placed my reform programs at issue during the elections last November for delegates to the constitutional convention. Even those who don't like me politically or personally went for the program. Now they claim it as their own.

Q—I have been told that your opponents have sought to destroy your popularity with the people and your reputation abroad by spreading false and malicious rumors concerning you, especially that you greatly increased your personal fortune since you became president.

A—Yes, that was one of their campaign lies. My wealth is a public record. When I leave this office, the presidency of our country, they will realize that all my funds have been put in a foundation which shall be utilized for the welfare of our people. I will die an impoverished man, with the exception of funds set aside for my children's education.

## PEOPLE KNOW

Politics here is so free wheeling that almost any charge is made. But our people are so sophisticated now about politics that they know what is happening. That is why, in the surveys we have found that even the publications that are utilized to attack me personally about my alleged involvement with women and increase in wealth are no longer believed by our people. So all I can say is that I look to history writing the truth about what is happening in the Philippines.

Q—Am I correct in the impression that by your reform programs you are striving to save democracy in the Philippines?

A—Yes, and to protect our people from immediate and future danger.

Q—You feel that you have to risk what in effect is almost character assassination in order to protect and promote the interests of the people?

A—Yes, this is precisely one of the things I have spoken about. I have said in war all



you risk is your life. Here, in the new battles that we have to fight, you risk even your honor and this is something more valuable than even life itself. But I am willing to risk it. My wife and my children have agreed that even if it should mean losing our reputations, we must stand by the principles on which we stood when I ran for public office.

MARCOS SAYS JAPAN COULD TURN TO RED  
CHINA

(By Kingsbury Smith)

MANILA.—If the United States should withdraw militarily from Asia, the small Asian nations and probably Japan would turn to Red China for an accommodation.

This warning was given to me by President Ferdinand Marcos in an exclusive interview in Malacanang palace.

Undoubtedly the most reliably pro-American leader in Asia today, this far-sighted Philippine chief of state is concerned about the American tendency to reduce its commitments and lower its profile in Asia.

UNDERSTANDS REASON

He understands the reasons for it, especially the American people's disillusionment with the Vietnam war, but he fears this is causing the United States to lose sight of its own long-range national interests in helping maintain the independence of the free Asian nations and averting the danger of communist domination of all Asia.

He sees signs already of a shift in the attitude of some nations toward Communist China, and he is convinced it will be accelerated dangerously unless the United States maintains the credibility of its commitments to the free Asian nations.

Marcos also fears if America withdraws too hastily from South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese communists eventually will gain control of the South. If that happens, he foresees the likelihood of Japan seeking an accommodation with China and reviving its own militarism.

"If Japan, the most industrialized nation in this part of the world, develops its militarism, I feel it would be a greater danger to Asia than even Red China," the President said.

"We only hope that if Japan does become a powerful military power, the United States will still be here to neutralize it.

"If Red China and Japan ever tie up in a partnership, then everybody will be in trouble."

Following is the condensed text of the third of a series of interviews with President Marcos:

Q—You have said vast new forces are at work in Asia today which might radically alter the Philippines' traditional view of this part of the world. In what way do you foresee the traditional view being altered?

A—When I referred to the vast new forces at work in Asia, I was thinking of Red China developing its nuclear power and a delivery system for its nuclear weapons. I was also thinking of Japan, which was not inclined to strengthen its armed forces by amending its constitution. I was thinking of Indonesia which, at the time, was in a state of turmoil, and which up to now has not recovered economically from the Sukarno Regime. The British were withdrawing from east of Suez.

Then came the Nixon doctrine which further changed the situation and actually favored a reassessment not only of basic policy but of the comparative importance of factors that we always considered important in decision making in this area.

One of the factors, of course, was the American presence in this area. Now that factor will have to be toned down. Its importance is going down.

We must note also the interest suddenly of Russia in the Indian Ocean and its ap-

parent moves to establish bases there and in the Malacca Straits to the west of Malaysia. The sudden Russia interest in Ceylon, with its participation in the fight against those who would subvert the established government there.

Now suddenly Malaysia becomes a neutral state and even seeks diplomatic relations with Red China. Then the trend in the United Nations to accept Red China as a member.

All of these changes alter the factors that affected decisionmaking here. I said if the United States suddenly withdrew from Asia, it would compel some of the small nations, if not all the Asian nations, to immediately work out some kind of a modus vivendi. I still think so.

Q—How do you plan to seek what you have described as an accommodation with reality?

A—When I speak of an accommodation with reality, I am referring to the changes which are taking place. It is a reality that the United States is a Pacific power. You have Hawaii. You have bilateral defense agreements with various countries in this area, including Japan, Thailand, Korea, the Philippines and now with the Anzus powers—New Zealand and Australia, which, in turn, are tied up with Malaysia and Singapore. This too is a reality.

Therefore, the conclusion is that while you may cut down your presence to an almost innocuous and imperceptible degree, the presence is still there.

We also have the reality Red China has, or possibly soon will have, an intercontinental delivery system for its atom and nuclear bombs. And you have a Japan which while now acting as a trader will not long remain just a trader. These are the realities we have to deal with.

Q—In view of the probability China eventually will have a population of a billion people and in view of the intelligence, energy and adaptability of the Chinese people, do you believe it will be possible to prevent the future domination of Asia by China?

A—Well, I feel the domestic problems of China will take her several decades to settle. The history of most of the big empires in this part of the world, whether it was the empire of Genghis Khan, or Kublai Khan or Tamerlane, or even that of the Chinese dynasties, indicates one thing: They did not fall from external aggression but from internal weakness. This internal weakness always crops up in the early stage of an empire. When that happens, the empire depends on outside allies. If they fail to help, the empire cannot last very long.

I foresee that during the period of the growth of China's population to one billion, she will have to meet many stresses and tensions within her borders which may curb adventurism outside.

Q—What significance do you attach to Peking's so-called ping pong diplomacy?

A—They are playing for time. Time is on the side of Peking, on the side of the Communists. If I were in their place, I would be inclined to do the same thing.

Q—I understand there is a feeling in this part of the world that the United States attempts at times to function in Asia without free Asia's support or approval of American policies. Is that so?

A—Yes, that has been one of the most bitter criticisms of America's Asian policy. I have suggested that Asian leaders and statesmen be consulted more fully, even if it has to be the quiet type of consultation, without publicity. We would be very happy to make our recommendations and suggestions.

Q—Couldn't that be done through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization?

A—SEATO is markedly anti-Communist. What I would like to see is an Asian forum. You have a forum in South America. You have a European forum, an African forum, but we don't have an Asian forum wherein

all countries can meet irrespective of ideology and talk about their problems.

Since the United Nations will ultimately accept Red China as a member, that organization might be the vehicle for such an Asian forum.

Q—What kind of regional cooperation do you consider essential for the security of Southeast Asia?

A—Ultimately, but not immediately, the cultural and economic regional arrangements will gradually progress into military and security arrangements. This may take some time.

Q—If the Communists should gain control of South Vietnam within the next four or five years, will America be blamed for it, and, if so, what will be the effect on the free Asian nations?

A—Yes, you will be blamed. The first effect would be to strengthen the homegrown Communists. Secondly, it would weaken the hands of the United States in convincing the allies of its effectiveness as an ally and partner in security arrangements.

Q—In the light of the importance of Southeast Asia to Japan, what would be the effect on Japan?

A—Japan would immediately start accommodating itself to the situation.

Q—That would mean either an accommodation with China or the revival of Japanese militarism?

A—I suspect both. There would be an interim period in which, while developing their military power, they would be engaged in supposedly exploiting the markets of Red China, but in reality they would be trying to keep China within its own borders.

We do not have any doubt that ultimately, no matter what anybody does, Japan, because of its wealth, will look to protecting itself. Whether the United States encourages it, as it is trying to do now, or not, Japan will ultimately take measures to protect itself.

STRONGER TIES URGED—FILIPINOS,  
UNITED STATES

(By J. Kingsbury Smith)

MANILA.—If the United States will enable the Philippines to strengthen its trade with America and will support by training and equipment an increase in the country's defense forces, this strategically vital island republic can serve as a bastion of freedom in Asia.

A militarily and economically stronger Philippines could relieve substantially the defense burden America is carrying in this part of the world.

If, on the other hand, America pulls out prematurely or precipitates an economic collapse by curtailing the Philippines' access to the American sugar market, then this country could become through massive subversion another Viet Nam.

These points were made by President Ferdinand Marcos in an exclusive interview with the writer in Malacanang Palace.

The almost legendary hero of Bataan and many other battles against the Japanese in World War II, and who has been a crusadingly progressive leader of his country for the past 5½ years, is deeply concerned about pending legislation in the American congress that would reduce the Philippine sugar quota and cost his country, with its millions of impoverished people \$40,000,000 annually.

Not only would this action hurt the Philippine economy, but the president pointed out it would provide propaganda ammunition for the Communists, radicals and other anti-American elements in the Philippines who already accuse him of being the "running dog" of the Americans.

TRADE, NOT AID

"We are not asking for aid," the president said. "What we are asking for is trade.

We are not asking for special favors. What we are asking for is that the relationships between our two countries, especially economic, be not so suddenly disrupted that we are hard put to adjust ourselves to them."

If the 10 per cent cut in the Philippine sugar quota which has already been approved by the House of Representatives and is now before the Senate goes into effect, some Philippine sugar producers will be unable to meet payments on credits granted to them by the government to produce sugar for the American market. The American quota can be reduced at any time without any advance notice to the Philippines, since it is not protected by any specific time period.

With regard to American policy in Asia generally, the president expressed the hope the United States would let the Philippines know what are America's future intentions in Asia.

"We would like to see the United States come out frankly with a definite program on which we, the Asians, can act," he said.

President Marcos also revealed that the South Korean leaders informed him the United States would not have to enter the Korean War and seek United Nations police action there if South Korea had been enabled to prepare itself for defense against North Korean aggression.

"They told me that a short period before the attack, the United States suddenly withdrew armor, heavy artillery and left nothing but guns for the internal police," he added.

"This seems to be one of the basic flaws in American policy. Look at China and Russia. They give equipment. Look how the Chinese and Russian equipment is wreaking havoc in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."

#### FORESAW NEED

The president said he foresaw the need for an American military and economic presence in Asia, "a high or low posture, for the next five or 10 years or perhaps even longer."

Following is the condensed text of the second in a series of interviews with President Marcos:

Q—What could the United States do to be helpful to the Philippines that it is not now doing?

A—There are two aspects. One is security. I have always felt that the United States' presence will be needed here for both security and economic development for the next five or 10 years, perhaps even longer.

I cannot foresee any country alone or jointly with others in Asia capable of balancing the power of Red China. And it is certainly the height of folly to think we can, by supplication, prevent the leaders of any predatory state or nation in our part of the world from any of the designs which have been articulated openly in the past of an Asian hegemony under the aegis, of course, of Mao Tse-tung.

Therefore, we would like to see the United States come out frankly with a definite program on which we, the Asians, can act.

While we do not ask for publication of such a program, we do hope the leaders of America will bring us into the secrets of your policy and tell us exactly when you do intend to pull out, if you do intend to do so, and to what extent.

If we need to prepare to stand by ourselves, then to what extent will you help us prepare? Look at Vietnam. When your government was under pressure from public opinion to pull out, you have been hard-put to train the South Vietnamese, so much so that it was even suggested some of them be trained in the Philippines.

#### NEED TRAINING

Would it not be possible for the United States now to help us train our men to take over some of the burdens you now carry?

For instance—I think I can reveal this to you—the understanding between your coun-

try and mine is that you will prevent any external aggression, but at the moment the enemy comes within our territorial limits we would participate. That is the agreement.

Anything that has to do with internal disorder we will handle. But there may perhaps come a time when your government will not assume the responsibility of defending us against external aggression. When and if that happens, we would require better equipment and better trained troops than we now have. Would it not be better that we prepare for it now while we can, instead of waiting for a Vietnam war and the need that might bring for help of your troops?

Our preparedness would in itself be a deterrent. As General MacArthur said, if we were properly prepared no rational man would think of attempting to conquer the Philippines.

That is one aspect. The other is economic development. You should remember that if we go under because our economy collapses, your military bases here will be useless.

We consider ourselves a somewhat different ally because we did not surrender to the Japanese but fought side by side with you and we suffered a million casualties both military and civilian.

Q—Do you feel the Philippines has not been supplied with the right kind of weapons to defend the nation now?

A—Yes and no. We have the right weapons for internal security. But for other things, no. Well, for instance, we don't have any all-weather interceptors. We are not prepared for anti-submarine warfare. Things like that.

Q—What is your conception of partnership with the United States on security matters?

A—A partnership between two independent countries that recognizes the national interests of both but at the same time is based on feeling, understanding and friendship.

#### FATHER AND SON

When we say we want to be independent, we merely say it in a way of a son who tells his father: "I am 21 now and I would like to go out in the world and find out what it's all about. It doesn't mean I am going to be your enemy."

Q—What are some of the irritants in relation between the two countries?

A—Jurisdiction over military personnel and supposed unequal treatment with respect to American bases.

Q—Do these irritants serve as ammunition for the Communists, and for your political enemies?

A—Yes, very much so. The Communists call me "Tuta Ng Amerikano," meaning the running dog of the Americans. This is because I have said repeatedly, "We need the United States now and we will need them for the next several years." We cannot protect ourselves from external aggression. While there is no such threat now, there would soon be one if the United States was not here, and the time may come when there will be such a threat.

Q—If the Philippines lost the American sugar market could the nation survive economically, could it progress?

A—It would be touch and go as to survival. On progress, you can strike it off as impossible if we lose the American sugar market.

Q—I have been told there is a feeling here that the Philippines has to virtually beg for continuance of access to the American sugar market whereas the Philippines did not resort to any hard bargaining when the military bases were granted to America. Is that so?

A—Yes, that's true, there is such a feeling, and the Communists are making the most of it.

Q—What do you consider the most important thing for the American people to bear in mind about the Philippines?

A—This is that the Philippines is your creation actually because you gave us independence. In giving us independence, you established an example that could not be disregarded by the other nations of the world. That was the start of de-colonialization, of the colonial empires of the world—the French, British, Dutch.

#### RED ONSLAUGHT

Therefore, if this experiment which you started should fail and we should go down before the Communist onslaught, your experiment will have proved a failure.

Q—How can that danger be averted?

A—With two basic policies—trade and security, training our people to be prepared.

Q—Are you concerned at the rate of American withdrawal from Vietnam?

A—Yes and no. I take the word of such men as Adm. McCain, your commander-in-chief in the Pacific, and also of Gen. Abrams, who has briefed me, that the Vietnamization program is succeeding, but I have misgivings, and every leader in Asia has his misgivings, about the capability of the South Vietnamese armed forces to sustain themselves when you have completely withdrawn.

#### FIRST LADY OF PHILIPPINES MAY SEEK HUSBAND'S PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE—POLICIES NEED PROTECTION

(By Kingsbury Smith)

MANILA.—One of Asia's most beautiful, fascinating and politically talented women is being talked about in Manila as a possible future president of the Philippines.

Now First Lady of the island republic, Mrs. Ferdinand Marcos laughs off suggestions that she might seek to succeed her heroic husband when the President's second 4-year term expires in 1973.

The President's supporters are hoping that the constitutional convention, now under way, will recommend an extension of his term for at least another two years so that future presidential elections could be held at the same time as local, regional and congressional elections.

The present popularity of the President is such that if this issue were put to the people in a referendum, there seems no doubt it would be overwhelmingly approved.

#### FOLLOW POLICY

If an extension of President Marcos's term is blocked by his political opponents, of whom there are many, political observers in Manila do not exclude the possibility that the First Lady might be persuaded to run in order to safeguard the social and economic reforms which her crusading husband is striving to carry out in the belief they are imperative to save democracy in the Philippines.

While the President's term is presently limited to two 4-year terms, there is nothing in the constitution to prevent a woman running for the presidency. Women voters outnumber the men, and Imelda Romualdez Marcos is acknowledged to be the most popular woman in the nation's history.

Both the President and the First Lady categorically disclaimed to me any intention of seeking to prolong the Marcos leadership after 1973, but I have the feeling that if it became apparent the candidates for the presidency in 1973 were likely to scuttle the reform programs and restore the oligarchist control the President is convinced would soon lead to armed revolution and dictatorship, he and the First Lady would find it difficult to resist popular appeals that they find some democratic way of remaining in power.

#### PEOPLE LOVE HER

Accompanying the First Lady on a trip to the little village of Calamba, birthplace of the revolutionary hero, Rizal, I witnessed the almost mystical spell she casts over the rural folk. The faces of the people, young and old, light up with a happy smile when they see



her. They look at her with adoration and call out: "Imelda. Beautiful Imelda." And she is beautiful. At 41, she retains much of the beauty of the beauty queen she was at the age of 18. Maturity has, in fact, enhanced her loveliness.

Extraordinarily tall for an Asian woman because of the part Spanish ancestry, she is statuesque, with Patrician grace, long, jet black hair worn in a Burmese bun, large sloe eyes, high cheek bones and a heart-shaped face and softly-rounded chin.

For her public appearances, she dresses romantically in long, brightly colored chiffon gowns or flower embroidered creations.

Moving among the smiling, excitedly squealing peasant teenagers and farmer families who packed the little country square and swarmed around to gently touch her outheld hands, she was obviously their fairy princess.

#### RAPT ATTENTION

When she delivered the principal address devoted to the 110th anniversary of the death by a Spanish firing squad of Rizal, and spoke about the importance of freedom, the crowd listened with rapt attention. Her diction and delivery were near perfection. She did not harangue the audience. She caressed it with words and tone that reflected the lyric soprano she was as a young woman, whose campaign singing later helped elect her husband president.

It is not only in the provinces that the people respond to the magic of Imelda. Walking with her in Manila's department stores, restaurants and theatres, one is astonished at the look of sheer delight that comes over people's faces when they catch sight of her.

It is not only Imelda's beauty that makes her so popular. It is what she has done for the people and the country in the 5½ years she has been First Lady.

An indefatigable worker and organizer, she has personally raised more than \$10 million for her own social welfare, educational, cultural and other charitable programs.

Her achievements have benefited hundreds of thousands of youths, orphans, the handicapped, the aged and the poor.

#### REVOLUTION

She initiated a home growing garden vegetable movement called the Garden Revolution to improve the national diet and stretch the family food budget. Touring the country, she urged the people to plant vegetables in their garden plots instead of flowers. She utilized public squares and other idle government land to plant model miniature vegetable gardens, offering prizes for the biggest tomato. More than half a million packets containing tomato, pepper and eggplant seeds, fertilizer, insecticide and planting instructions were distributed free.

The Green Revolution led to a general drop in vegetable prices of nearly 50 per cent, with the price of some items declining 75 per cent.

She took wayward girls and delinquent boys out of overcrowded city reformatories and placed them in welfare villages, where they were separated from hardened criminals and taught a vocation.

She launched the save-a-life in every barrio (village) program under which thousands of handicapped children were brought to Manila or sent abroad for curative treatment, for which she paid with funds she raised.

#### NEW PARK

On what was virtually a dump-yard in the center of Manila, she built and landscaped a big park: which is guarded and serviced by ex-convicts. Although visitors average several million a week and the well-lit park is open all night, not a single crime has been committed in it since the ex-convicts took over nearly four years ago.

The project of which she is most proud is the Cultural Center of the Philippines. On land reclaimed from Manila Bay, she had built what is now a showcase of Filipino artistic expression and a landmark of architectural beauty.

Although so repelled by her early experience with political life that she had a virtual nervous breakdown which led her to spend three months in the New York Presbyterian Hospital, she steeled herself to overcome the revulsion in order to help her husband's career. She developed the political acumen of a Jim Farley, which, coupled with her beauty, her singing and her electrifying charm, led the newspapers to describe her as her husband's "secret weapons."

With a computer-like mind and do-or-die determination, she became his personal campaign manager. Speaking the three major dialects of the islands, she wooed the crowds and cajoled the local politicians into supporting her husband.

#### TO GAIN VOTE

On one occasion, she traveled 300 miles over mountain country roads to secure one vote that had been pledged to her husband's opponent. During the first presidential campaign, she says she averaged two hours sleep a night for nearly two months.

The personification of femininity, with sensitive, sentimental emotions, she said:

"I told myself that if God granted us victory, I would do something for these people, try to lessen their misery and despair.

"I wanted my husband to win not only because I loved him, but because of the terribly unjust things that were being said about him.

"The impoverishment of the people we came in contact with, especially in the rural areas, also affected me deeply, soon I was praying to win, not just for my husband, my children and myself, but for those poor people who showed such faith in us. I vowed that if we won, I would help them."

#### THEIR ROMANCE

The love of which she spoke had its origin in a romance that might have come from a poet's dream. In the quiet intimacy of an after-dinner conversation in the music room of Malacanang Palace, once the home of the Spanish governor generals and of General Douglas MacArthur, the President and the First Lady told me, with laughter, gaiety and humor, how they met and married.

Within a few minutes after seeing Imelda for the first time in 1954 and being introduced to her in the congressional cafeteria, the then 36-year-old minority leader of the House of Representatives, who had the reputation of being a gay bachelor, told friends he was going to marry her. Eleven days later, he did.

With beauty and brains, an almost mystical hold on the people and a crusading, progressive spirit, President Ferdinand Marcos and First Lady Imelda makes a formidable political team as well as being one of the world's most captivating couples.

#### PHILIPPINES DISLIKES U.S. POLICIES

(By Kingsbury Smith)

MANILA.—American policy towards the Philippines has been marked during the past decade, and is continuing to be affected, by short-sightedness, indifferences and sheer stupidity which is threatening to cost the United States the friendship of what is probably America's most reliable ally in Asia.

A 10-day visit to Manila revealed to the writer that past and present irritants in Filipino-American relations are providing potent propaganda for the Communists and others who wish to turn the island republic against America and destroy its democracy.

These irritants involve chiefly a lack of consideration for the sensitivities of the ex-

remely proud Filipino people. They also affect the development of the country, and especially the social and economic reform programs which progressively-minded President Ferdinand Marcos is endeavoring to carry out.

#### MOST SERIOUS

One of the most serious irritants at the present time is the 10 per cent cut in the Philippine sugar quota which has been approved by the House of Representatives and is now under Senate consideration as part of a plan to give larger allotments to 11 countries, mostly Latin American, as well as giving quotas to two black African nations which have never had them.

If the Philippine quota cut is maintained, it will cost this country, with its millions of impoverished people, \$40 million annually. Filipinos find it difficult to understand why Latin American countries like oil-rich Venezuela and tin-rich Bolivia should have their quotas increased at the expense of a little nation which, because it stood by and fought with America during World War II, was one of the most devastated countries and had its main metropolis, Manila, subjected to more destruction than any other city in the world except Warsaw. Nor do they understand why African nations like Malawi and Uganda, which usually vote against America in the United Nations, should be granted quotas at the Philippines' expense.

#### OTHER IRRITANTS

Other irritants include the whisking out of the country by the American military on separate occasions of two U.S. servicemen who were being charged in Filipino courts with criminal offenses. American Ambassador Henry Byroade is trying to get one of the men returned to stand trial. The other has apparently disappeared.

A much more serious irritant are the special privileges or so-called "parity rights" for Americans which the United States extracted from the Philippines in the 1946 Trade Act as a precondition of independence and American war-damage payments. These privileges give Americans equal rights with Filipinos in business enterprises.

The same agreement also tied the peso to the dollar on a 2-to-1 ratio for a period of 28 years.

Furthermore, the Philippines is committed to purchase some American goods which it could obtain free from Japan as part of the latter's war reparations payments.

The American official rationale for the "parity rights" privilege was that economic rehabilitation of the Philippines depended on the restoration of American investment in the new nations. Parity rights were supposed to encourage this flow of new funds, while the pegging of the peso to the dollar was meant to assure untrammelled and undepreciated repatriation of American capital and profits.

#### LIMITS FREEDOM

The two measures together, by severely limiting the Philippines' freedom of action in fixing its economic policies and by prolonging preferential trade relationships for almost a generation after independence, have maintained the largely quasi-colonial character of the economy.

A further cause of irritation is the propensity of American firms to generate local capital to finance their Philippine operations, and then to repatriate to the U.S. the resulting profits, which since 1965 have totalled more than \$150,000,000.

The U.S. Navy also retains extra-territorial rights on its bases in the Philippines, with special jurisdictional privileges.

These irritants all serve to play into the hands of the Communists and other extremists, who contend that the Americans tend to treat Filipinos as inferior people.

Marcos is assailed as a "running dog of the

Americans" for tolerating irritants. He has replied that he would rather be the running dog of the Americans than the running dog of the Communists.

#### AFFECT ATTITUDE

However, he would like to see some of the unnecessary irritants removed before they seriously affect what he believes is the still strongly pro-American attitude of the overwhelming majority of the Filipinos, especially in the rural areas.

The president assured me there is a deep reservoir of goodwill and warm friendly feelings towards Americans in the hearts of the Filipinos, and this was confirmed by American officials and others with whom I talked.

It is not reflected in the Manila press, which enjoys unbridled freedom, and which, according to the president, is controlled by oligarchists who bitterly resent his reform programs and who, in addition to trying to undermine him politically, are trying to promote anti-Americanism in the hope they can pick up American properties cheaply if U.S. interests are forced out.

#### MANY FACTORS

The friendliness of the Filipinos generally towards Americans is attributed to the following factors:

- 1—Because the United States granted the Philippines complete independence in 1946;
- 2—Because during the almost half a century that it controlled the islands after they were freed from Spain, the United States educated the people and prepared them for self-government;
- 3—Because during World War II Filipinos and Americans became "blood brothers," fighting, dying and suffering side by side during the Japanese occupation and the liberation;
- 4—Because the United States has given the Philippines more than \$4 billion in military and economic aid, loans and grants, since 1946;
- 5—Because the Filipinos are deeply religious and, being the first to embrace democracy in Asia, feel an affinity for American ideals.

It would be an historic blunder of the first magnitude if America lost the confidence and loyalty of the Philippine people because of failure to find a solution to the irritants in relations between the two countries.

#### ACTION NEEDED

Some of the things that could and should be done without delay are:

- 1—Senate rejection of the House move to impose a 10 per cent cut in the Philippine sugar quota;
- 2—A declaration by President Nixon that if he is still in office in 1974, he will not seek to maintain the special privileges for American businessmen in the Philippines. The Philippine government is not going to grant an extension of the privileges anyway, so the United States would not be losing anything by this gesture, but it could gain a great deal of goodwill and offset the Communist propaganda;
- 3—An order by the President that the Philippine flag is to fly side by side with the American flag on every American base in the Philippines. The only place where the two flags fly side by side now is the war memorial on Corregidor—and that was ordered by President Marcos, since the famous rock which held out for more than six months against the Japanese is Philippine territory;
- 4—A higher priority for the training and equipment of the Philippine armed forces, which both Admiral McCaine, Cincpac, and Ambassador Byroade, believe should be granted.

The Philippines can be saved for America if the American government and Congress want to retain that strategically important gateway to Asia as a dependable ally.

MRS. RUTH MACK

HON. JAMES V. STANTON

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. JAMES V. STANTON. Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Ruth Mack will retire at the end of this year after serving as Brooklyn Heights Village clerk since 1945. During those years she has come to appreciate the problems we face in the daily routine of government.

She said:

Working for a government you learn a lot of things you weren't aware of as an average citizen. A city official actually sees the creation of the tax dollar and finds out what a great responsibility he has.

An article describing Mrs. Mack's accomplishments appearing in the Plain Dealer last Sunday as follows:

BROOKLYN HEIGHTS CLERK TO RETIRE AFTER SERVING VILLAGE 27 YEARS

(By Christine Jindra)

When Ruth Mack began her career in Brooklyn Heights government in 1945 as village treasurer she earned \$13.30 a month and could do her work at home.

In 1950 after two terms as treasurer she was elected clerk and her salary went up to \$1,000 a year, but her "office" was behind the village fire truck and when the sirens rang she had to be quick or her paperwork would be caught up in the flurry of the firemen's flight.

In 1971 Mrs. Mack is winding up 27 years—22 as clerk—as a Brooklyn Heights employe and is looking forward to retiring Dec. 31. Her office now is in the addition which was built in 1958, but the village hall soon will be expanded again—this time to facilitate growing police and fire departments.

Mrs. Mack decided a year ago not to run for an 11th term as village clerk and to join her husband, Walter, when he retires from his custodial job with the Cuyahoga Heights School System.

Looking back over the years Mrs. Mack said her job "got under her skin." "Working for a government, you learn a lot of things you weren't aware of as an average citizen," Mrs. Mack said.

"A city official actually sees the creation of the tax dollar and finds out what a great responsibility he has," she said.

Since 1945 Brooklyn Heights has grown from a population of 451 to 1,527. The property tax value has grown from \$1,107,000 in 1945 to \$16,945,000 today, but the tax rate has grown only 47 cents per \$100 valuation—from \$2.37 in 1950 to \$2.84 today.

Mrs. Mack said she can still feel the small-town atmosphere in the village and she "personally likes the closeness," although she admitted no one has any anonymity. When asked if she would reveal her age, she said, "too many people know I'm 63 years old" not to.

As village clerk, which is a part-time position, Mrs. Mack has to function as clerk of council, finance director, auditor and purchasing agent. She does everything from supervising the payroll to writing ordinances dealing with financial matters. Her job requires that she work weekdays from 9:30 a.m. to noon and from 2 to 4:30 p.m.

She has worked under three mayors and has seen the village rise from heavy debts due to sewer and street construction to an actual surplus of funds. When there was enough money in the treasury to make an investment program feasible, Mrs. Mack took on that duty.

Although she has managed to hold her job

to 30 hours a week, she said it could easily become a fulltime position. Mrs. Mack is not going to endorse anyone for the job, which pays \$3,300 a year, but she said she'd be glad to help train a new clerk and help him get through the year-end reports, which can't be prepared until early 1972.

Chances are that the new clerk, after a few days on the job in January, will seek out Mrs. Mack at her home, 427 Tuxedo Road, and ask for her sound advice.

NIXON'S PERSONAL DIPLOMACY WITH RED CHINA

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, the new soft-on-communism policy with regard to Red China received wide public attention with the announcement that Presidential adviser and confidant, Henry Kissinger, had been in Red China and that the U.S. President plans to visit Peiping.

Since the mainland China issue is so much in the limelight today and since this new policy, if fully implemented, will affect the lives of Americans in the years to come, I thought we would talk about China today.

Let me say that I strongly oppose our President dignifying the Communist movement by visiting Red China, increasing trade and travel with, and extending diplomatic recognition to Red China, as well as the possibility of Red China regime being admitted into the United Nations. The new China policy is replete with danger for the American people and is not in the best interests of the United States.

Only 3 years ago, when a candidate for the Presidency, Mr. Nixon stated:

I would not recognize Red China now, and I would not agree to admitting it to the United Nations, and I wouldn't go along with those well-intentioned people that said, "Trade with them," because that may change them. Because doing it now would only encourage them, the hardliners in Peking and the hardline policy they're following. And it would have an immense effect in discouraging great numbers of non-Communist elements in Free Asia that are now just beginning to develop their own confidence.

Many Americans will never understand this complete reversal after Mr. Nixon got to the White House. There is no evidence that Red China is any less tyrannical and imperialistic today than it was in 1968 when Mr. Nixon sought the people's confidence with the promise of continuing a policy of nonrecognition toward Red China.

We are still technically at war with Red China in Korea, in a U.N. engagement where we continue to maintain 43,000 troops to protect South Korea against aggressive attacks from North Korea supported by Red China. American fighting men continue to become casualties in this cease-fire area.

Americans are supposed to believe that over the past 2½ years President Nixon could not sleep nights, worrying over



the 750 million mainland Chinese who were isolated from world affairs. The suggestion of a presidential trip to Red China is reminiscent of an earlier Nixon junket when, as Vice President, he went to Moscow, and after being cursed out by Khrushchev, became a Soviet expert. There was no resulting peace, nor have the Russians taken down the wall, nor should we expect any great results from the trip to China.

And as recently at May Day, 2 weeks after the ping-pong games, the government of Peiping urged "the peoples of the world to support Cuba, the heroic Korean people, and the Indo-Chinese people against American aggression as well as to unite to crush American aggressors and their running dogs."

The new top secret United States-Red China policy imposes not a single concession upon Peiping in return for trade relations and American appeasement. It is Red China who will benefit while the American taxpayers as usual—not the President—who will pay the bill. Yet Mr. Nixon handled the entire Red China policy as "personal diplomacy"—never consulting the Congress, the Senate, or even Vice President Agnew. Mr. Nixon may consider this personal diplomacy as successful hiding behind the popular desire for peace, but most hard-working patriotic Americans realize it is a betrayal of our friends, our people, and of the high principles traditionally applied in the conduct and commitments of U.S. foreign relations. As usual, the Communists knew more of what was going on and taking place than did Americans.

We hear from the present administration much rhetoric about returning power to the people. Yet, I would venture to say that the great majority of American citizens, if given complete facts—not just propaganda to condition them to accept the administration's view—would oppose this revolutionary policy of the administration to dignify Red China. But the American people are only permitted to know what those in power decide is good for them to hear. In the Red China courtship President Nixon decided that no one was to know—except Kissinger and Secretary of State Rogers.

For several decades, a very influential financial-industrial-intellectual aristocracy has laid down policies for the U.S. Government. This same group has also in large degree controlled the "right to know" machinery by censoring news to the public. This affects the reactions as to what is taking place in government. The American public cannot know the truth because they do not hear all sides of any issue.

We are told the Red China contact was 3 months in the making.

A reflection on events over the last 3 months reveals how the American people have been conditioned to mellow in attitude toward Communist China. It is the old defeatist philosophy of surrender—everything has become so bad that nothing can be worse and anything is worth a try.

On April 23-25, the Bilderbergers, international financiers, economists, and

intellectuals, including foreigners and nobility, met in secret session at Woodstock, Vt. Reportedly discussed were "contributions of business in dealing with the current problems of social instability" and "the possibility of a change in the American role in the world and its consequences." Identified as present at the Bilderberg meeting were various oil company officials, Henry Kissinger, and David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank.

Also in early April, reports were leaked concerning rich oil discoveries in the Asian Pacific area, including areas claimed by Red China. Mentioned among the oil exploration companies were those represented at the hush-hush Bilderberger meeting. Then in June, we were advised that Chase Manhattan Bank was ready to invest \$6 billion in oil exploration and predicted \$250 billion in free world investment in the Asian Pacific area up to 1980.

The planning stage of 3 months goes back to the announcement of liberalizing trade and travel with Red China. The preparation period includes the May Day marches and demonstrations, at which posters of Mao and other Communists dictators and idols were publicly displayed. No one would believe that the American people were forced to suffer such indignations simply to show the administration's mellowing toward Communist China. Certainly no one would believe the demonstrations were planned and paid for to develop the impression of a climate of tolerance and understanding.

The preparation period includes the much ado about nothing "ping pong" diplomats, who must have played a role in the well-kept secret, the My Lai trial of Lieutenant Calley—to turn public opinion against the military, the Selling of the Pentagon and then the Pentagon Papers to transfer the blame for the Vietnam fiasco from existing foreign policy to our military.

The day for delivery was then nearly at hand. By July 1, we learned that Vice President Agnew was in Korea, Kissinger in Vietnam, and Helms of the CIA was in Israel. All of the scouts were out. All bases were covered. Any one of these men was in position to have made the contact. But Vice President Agnew had fallen from grace because of this forthright criticism of the conditioning process on which he was apparently not briefed. The Red Chinese, not the President, made the ultimate decision on who would be acceptable to them. They chose the one man who knows all our secrets, and who knows more of what is going on in Washington, D.C., than the President himself—it had to be Henry Kissinger, Nixon's Metternich.

Public reaction reflects the excellent job of conditioning the thinking of our people through the power of suggestion.

Some say they see nothing new in the President's proposed trip to Red China since the ice has already been broken by his alter ego. Some say that we have kept the Red Chinese isolated too long from the world anyway. They have not

been told of Red Chinese revolutionaries in Cuba, Canada, many countries in Europe, many states in Africa, and South America fomenting revolution. Where are they isolated except from the United States? And if they have been fortunate enough to escape from their Red captors and get to Taiwan, they even come here. Any Red Chinese isolation results from their enslavement, not from U.S. action.

Then we hear the dreamers who say the Red China trip may end the Vietnam war and help us regain our POW's; that it is good politics to keep the Russians guessing. They have not been told that the SAM missiles and Mig aircraft used by the North Vietnamese are not Red Chinese but Russian. The figures show over 80 percent of the materiel used in slaughtering our men in Vietnam is supplied by Russia. Red China supplied North Korea, the other U.N. war. If the President's trip to Red China disturbs the Russians how could anyone feel the China junket would relieve the situation of our POW's or stop the war? Red China does have prisoners, but not from the Vietnam war.

Then we hear from the idealist—that we should be friendly with our enemies—that we can not negotiate with people with whom we do not talk.

Are we to love our executioner? How can we negotiate with people who have nothing to negotiate? Past experience from American negotiations with Communists proved not negotiations, but gifts. How much more of what we have got do we have to give?

We hear the cliché that any country with as many people as China cannot be ignored. Who is ignoring China? So long as they were a friend and ally of the West under Chiang Kai-shek, we only heard about their corruption and backwardness. Only after our leaders betrayed a pro-West leadership and started courting a Communist police state have we become considerate of China's existence. Is our renewed interest a result of our compassion for the Chinese or for the type of government under which they are forced to exist? In recognizing the totalitarian leaders and their oppressive system, we do the Chinese people an injustice because we insure the continuation of the Communist Party and perpetuate the Chinese people's enslavement.

Peace. Following Nixon's peace junket to Moscow in 1959, the American people paid dearly for peace, with 50,000 men dead in Vietnam, and peace is still denied, an insult to the memory of every American who died in the U.N. war in Korea because of Red Chinese bullets and manpower. In 1933 we recognized Communist Russia and her peoples have been enslaved ever since. What peace followed this recognition?

The peace Americans seek is freedom. The peace Communists seek is destruction of freedom which they regard as a threat.

Then we hear the economic dreamers—recognition of Red China will be good for trade. Good for whom? The average Red Chinese worker's earns \$30 a month. Our markets may flood with

cheap-wage goods which may prove to be bargains for our consumers—so long as they have income from jobs—but what will the Chinese be able to buy in reciprocal trade? Jet airplanes? Sophisticated machinery? And once industrialization is complete under a government-owned economic system, where will there be any employment for Americans or money for consumers?

To what fate have we abandoned our free world allies, now that the United States has announced its intention to line up with the Communist bloc?

The Captive Nations people are again sold out and our Nationalist Chinese friends are betrayed a second time—awaiting the third, with the upcoming United Nations seating of Red China. Those nations long dependent upon the United States for free world leadership will now be forced into realignment for security and survival. Or they will go the route of the United States and line up with the Communists.

Nationalist China has severed relations with all nations which have lined up with the Communist nations. Now that President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have delivered us to the pro-Communist column, will Nationalist China sever relations with the United States?

This is something to really think about—the United States as a pro-Communist nation.

We used to joke about waking up lest our grandchildren would have to count in rubles. Now we may need to learn to use the abacus and count in yuans.

The great temptation in personal diplomacy—gambling with the lives and liberties of the American people—could not be resisted by President Nixon. His dedicated quest for an image as a peacemaker and the success of his new American revolution to change our country is a real threat to us all. This threat will be further realized by the people when Chairman Mao returns the "compliment."

I insert related clippings at this point:

[From the New York Times, April 10, 1971]

**OIL HUNT OFF CHINA STIRS U.S. WARNING—COMPANIES TOLD THEY RISK SHIPS IN DISPUTE INVOLVING PEKING, TAIWAN, TOKYO**

(By Terence Smith)

WASHINGTON, April 9.—The United States has advised several American oil concerns that they risk seizure of their ships if they continue to explore for oil deposits in a disputed area off the Chinese mainland.

A State Department spokesman, Charles W. Bray 3d, said today that the companies were told that it would be "inadvisable" for them to explore for oil deposits near the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea because of a dispute between Communist China, Nationalist China and Japan over the ownership of the deposits.

In asking the companies to halt their operations, the Nixon Administration appears to be seeking to avoid an incident with Peking. The Administration has been trying for the last two years to improve its relations with Communist China, and State Department officials said privately today that they were determined not to let the dispute over the oil deposits interfere with that effort.

In apparent response to the Administration's warnings, the Pacific Gulf Corporation yesterday withdrew its oil research ship *Gulf Rex* from the disputed area. The ship had been conducting a survey off the northern

tip of Taiwan for the Nationalist Chinese Government. It is now reported en route to Sasebo, Japan.

The territorial dispute over the area dates to 1968, when a geophysical survey indicated the presence of major oil deposits off the barren, uninhabited Senkaku Islands.

#### AFRAID OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS

The discovery reactivated an old argument between Japan and the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan over territorial rights to the islands. Last December Peking asserted its own claim to the area. The Communist claim was backed up by strong warnings against exploration and exploitation of the deposits by foreign oil companies. The most recent and sternest of these warnings came last week and prompted a renewal of concern at the State Department.

Officials here were particularly concerned that the mission of the *Gulf Rex* might be misunderstood because of the sensitive electronic equipment she uses to sound for deposits.

The oil deposits are in no way related to those believed to be present off the coast of South Vietnam, where the Saigon Government is planning to accept bids for concessions. Test drilling and survey work has been under way there for several years.

Pacific Gulf and the other companies that have received concessions from the Chinese Nationalist and Japanese Governments, and from South Korea for exploration in waters farther north, all were advised that the Government would not be able to intercede on their behalf if any ships were seized.

Mr. Bray said that Japan, Nationalist China and South Korea were officially informed of the United States position last month.

The Senkaku Islands have been administered by the United States since the end of World War II as part of the peace treaty with Japan. Along with the Ryukyus chain they are to be returned to Japanese administrative control next year as part of the agreement worked out between President Nixon and the Japanese Premier, Eisaku Sato.

Mr. Bray said that the companies that had been advised were Gulf, Caltex, American Oil Company, Clinton Oil Company and Oceanic Exploration Company.

[From Chicago Today, March 29, 1971]

**OIL FUELS UP INDOCHINA POLITICS—HUGE DEPOSITS ADD NEW ANGLE TO U.S. WAR POLICY**

(Reprinted with permission from Forbes magazine.)

It has passed the rumor stage. Clues are beginning to pile up that there may be huge quantities of crude oil in the waters of the Far East and Southeast Asia. Discoveries by Natomas, Atlantic Richfield, and Union Oil have triggered a frantic exploration race off Indonesia. An optimistic report by a United Nations team about possible oil deposits between Japan and Taiwan is fueling speculation that the entire Far East could contain oil deposits rivaling those of the Middle East.

Some of these deposits would almost certainly lie off South Viet Nam. Nobody yet knows for sure because no drilling has taken place. But preliminary United Nations surveys have given the area good marks. And there are plenty of rumors. One is that a British company has found signs of oil on the prison island of Con Son, east of the southern tip of Viet Nam.

The political implications, of course, are enormous. But if the oil is there, or even probably there, the question of who rules in Saigon takes on a more than political significance. Already, United States antiwar groups are beginning to suggest that a desire to ensure friendly governments in the Indochina area could slow down President Nixon's withdrawal from the war. An organization called "Another Mother for Peace" has flooded the Senate Foreign Relations Com-

mittee with over 10,000 letters calling for public hearings.

Not surprising, the oil companies are less than anxious to discuss the topic. Walter Levy, a New York-based oil expert and consultant to many of the companies, says flatly: "I don't want to comment. It's become a political issue."

"We haven't made up our minds yet," says a spokesman for Mobil Oil, asked whether his company would bid for concessions. Another dodges the question: "Texaco is not participating in exploration in Viet Nam."

Queried about his government's plans, Ngo Thanh Tung, an economist at the South Vietnamese embassy in Washington, says: "Several companies have been sending their proposals, but none of them have yet been considered." But oilmen expect Saigon to ask for bids quite soon.

In a conference last year, Chase Manhattan Chairman David Rockefeller made a little-noticed speech that created a quiet stir among Asia-watchers. By 1980, Rockefeller said, the oil industry could pour \$36 billion of capital investment into the Asian Pacific. This kind of money could give the area the boost it needs to enter the industrial age. It could help make up for the loss of U.S. military expenditures by substituting oil wells for military bases.

To give a sense of proportion, the total, free world investment Chase predicts for 1969-1980 is \$250 billion. But the Asian Pacific share will almost equal the total slated for Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. "The Asian Pacific," commented Petroleum Engineer, a trade journal, "looks like the next big international boom area."

If the oil is there the boom will undoubtedly follow. The Asian area is the fastest-growing oil market in the world. Japan which burns 3.4 million barrels a day, is forecast to consume over 10 million a day by 1980. While Southeast Asia consumes relatively little oil, consumption could rise at a brisk pace if industrialization plans catch hold. "Just think of all those people who are now burning charcoal and using ox carts," sighs one oilman.

Where is all the oil coming from? Southeast Asia may contain enough offshore crude to fuel that growth. Right now its production doesn't come close. Indonesia, the largest producer, turns out only 900,000 barrels a day. Japan must therefore rely on the Middle East for 85% of its oil, but Japan is uneasy at its dependence on this volatile area.

Compared with Middle East oil, moreover, South Asian oil will be close to its markets, reducing transportation costs. Drilling and the production costs are reasonable, because the offshore areas of Indonesia and Viet Nam are relatively calm and very shallow.

Perhaps most important, the oil found so far off Indonesia is exceptionally low in sulphur content, less than 1 per cent compared with the 3 per cent-plus content of Middle East crude. This would give it a major cost advantage in Japan, which is imposing strict pollution controls.

Much of the oil could find its way into the rest of the world market, where more oil will be needed within the next 15 years than has been produced in the history of the oil industry. The low sulphur content could make the oil very attractive to the west coast American market, where pollution is a big issue. The uncertainties of Middle East politics, the higher prices being imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the delay in finding a way to transport crude from the North Slope of Alaska to the 48 states add to the prospects.

A veteran oilman puts it this way: "We don't have the oil in the U.S. to meet our future requirements. Either we are going to have our future committed to those crazy Arabs or we are going to develop Southeast Asia, the West Coast of Africa and the West



Coast of Latin America as alternate sources—and, hopefully, build the Alaskan pipeline."

In any case, mounting U.S. activity in the area raises huge political questions that must be balanced against the economic benefits for Southeast Asia and the U.S.:

Might a discovery lead to pressure for slowing down the pace of P.S. troop withdrawals?

Might oil industry agreements with the present Thieu-Ky regime commit the U.S. even closer to this controversial government?

If the war in Indochina bogs down permanently, won't the oil industry run the risk of being made the scapegoat for whatever goes wrong?

Is a "friendly" regime in Saigon really vital to U.S. access to such oil? After all many Arab countries are rabidly unfriendly to the West but sell their oil there.

What will be the effect on the political and military policies of Japan and China?

Oil seems forever fated to be a political mineral.

[From the (Portland) Oregonian,  
May 1, 1971]

#### U.S.-CHINESE THAW LINKED TO OIL FIND (By Blaine Schultz)

The United States will form a "strange, new partnership" with Red China because of a new economic factor—major oil discoveries off the shores of South Vietnam, a Portland manufacturing executive said Friday.

Monford A. Orloff, president of Evans Products Co., told a shippers' group at the Portland Hilton Hotel the importance of the oil will speed up "the game of musical chairs" between nations.

But he intimated it would be naive to assume that the honeymoon between the United States and mainland China simply grew out of favorable reception in Peking of an American ping pong team.

At first, most of the oil from the new deposits will be delivered to Japan, he said.

"Then China will take more and more of this extremely valuable asset," Orloff said at the closing luncheon of the three-day National Association of Shippers Advisory Boards.

Purposely side-stepping a talk that would deal with transportation alone, Orloff indicated that the "increasing turmoil and unrest which plagues our country" called for openness and that the protests by the younger generation are understandable.

In his talk to businessmen, the Portland manufacturer talked about inflation, the controversial topic of Vietnam, and the new American relationship with Red China.

At the end of the talk, almost the entire dining hall of transportation people and shippers stood to applaud. The gathering, for the most part, was "over forty."

Orloff said he could understand how the nation's leaders would be frustrated by the "rising tide of protest" led by the younger generation against the war.

"Frustrating, yes, but surprising, no," Orloff declared, as he noted that the difficulties arose "because of the insistence of our leaders in applying the panaceas of the Fifties and Sixties to the problems of the Seventies."

By 1966, he said, "we found ourselves engaged in a terrible, costly war, the likes of which were never thoughtfully contemplated and the results of which gave rise to most of the serious problems with which we are confronted today."

He said American involvement in the war "has spawned inflation, civil unrest, unemployment, high interest rates, lower profits, and, possibly, a major shift in the political control of our country."

#### VOTERS AGE CHANGING

By 1972, he said, there will be some 42 million voters between the ages of 18 and 30.

The cure of our inflation, he said, has been a "trade-off" of higher unemployment and lessened profits in return for a somewhat lessened rate of inflation.

But the greatest inequity, he said, "the result of which will be felt for the next decade at least, was the decision to fight the war using almost entirely our young people, and particularly, the less advantaged sector of the younger generation."

He said it was the first war fought by the United States in which participation by the citizenry was "limited to those of us who have not reached the age of 26."

In addition, he said, the citizen army was disproportionately drawn from the nonwhite sector and the non-college ranks.

Because of the latent threat of intervention by Red China and the changing attitude of the American people against the war, the conflict cannot be ended by invasion or destruction of the landscape, Orloff said.

"In the not too distant future," he predicted, "our government will announce a time for final withdrawal."

#### "MACABRE ASPECTS" CITED

And he said there are "macabre aspects" to suggestions that the withdrawal be slowed until the prisoners of war are returned home. He said there are some 1,600 "men missing," but in the meantime, there is a casualty rate of 250 men a week "of whom 50 are killed."

Orloff said he believed that America's initiation of renewed relations with Red China "stems from the fact that the new major oil discoveries off the shores of South Vietnam have introduced a new economic factor which transcends political and social theory and calls for hardheaded realism" in how the oil is to be used.

In the not too distant future, Orloff said, "you will see our relations with Red China improve markedly," and because of the political power of the young voters, he predicted that "the war in Vietnam will quickly and speedily be ended."

[From the Christian Science Monitor,  
June 11, 1971]

#### SOUTH VIETNAM OIL BOOM?

SAIGON.—Thirty foreign oil companies expect to receive permission in the next few days to explore for oil in South Vietnam. The government hopes to receive \$1 million a day in revenue from the activities.

Among the companies that have applied for exploration, prospecting, and exploitation rights are BP, Shell, ELF (French), ENI (Italian), Esso Caltex, Gulf, Mobil, AOC, COC, as well as a Japanese combine comprising Mitsubishi, JPDC, Itoh, and Mitsui.

Most of these companies will probably have their headquarters in Vung Tau (formerly Cap St. Jacques) at the entrance of the Saigon River. Already there has been vigorous speculation in land there.

Pham Kim Ngoc, Minister for Economic Affairs, is expected to announce how the new oil exploration and exploitation law will work on or before June 15. The oil companies are particularly anxious to learn the terms of the standard contract they will have to sign with the government.

The standard contract has been drawn up by the Vietnamese Government with the help of a team of Iranian oil experts who visited Saigon in April and May.

Vietnamese geologists have confirmed that Vietnam possesses an oil potential, and in 1955 traces were found in the Qui Nhon area. In 1968 Amper Corporation, an American consortium, estimated that the shores of Southeast Asia contained oil reserves comparable to those of the Middle East.

Amper Corporation conducted researches on behalf of Standard Oil of New Jersey and Indiana, Mobil Oil, Gulf Oil, Atlantic Richfield, Philips Petroleum, Tenneco, Continental Union Oil of California, Dutch Shell, and British Petroleum.

In December, 1970, explorations by Mandrell tended to confirm the existence of oil on the coast of South Vietnam, especially at the mouth of the Mekong River. Following that report, there was talk in Vietnamese circles that the South Vietnamese offshores may contain as much as 25 percent of the reserves of Southeast Asia, and that the geology of the Mekong Delta was said to be similar to that of the Mississippi and Louisiana.

#### INVESTMENT PROPOSED

Hopes that the discovery of large oil deposits would ease the economic shock of the American withdrawal from Vietnam were heightened by the disclosure that the Chase Manhattan Bank was prepared to invest \$6 million in oil exploration between now and 1978.

North Vietnam became deeply interested. The June issue of the economic monthly published in Hanoi said that the United States wanted to stay in Vietnam because of oil. Soviet propaganda began expounding this "line" a year ago.

The government has decided to allow foreign companies to come in despite charges from militant Buddhist circles that Vietnam's national resources are being turned over to foreign interests. The government is aware of the dangers of losing control over its oil, however, and is using the granting of licenses—which will bring ample revenues in time—to bring pressure on countries, including Japan, which refuse to invest in other fields in Vietnam.

#### 1971 LEGISLATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE

### HON. EDWARD J. PATTEN

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Speaker, knowing the legislative views of constituents is important to me, so I send a legislative questionnaire once a year to every home in the congressional district I represent.

This year, my questionnaire contains seven questions—four on domestic issues and three in the area of foreign affairs. The questions follow:

#### QUESTIONNAIRE

Because of the decline in the economy, are you more concerned about (check only one): Unemployment, Inflation, High interest rates.

Are you satisfied with the progress being made by air and water pollution control programs?

Do you believe that a limit should be placed on campaign spending for candidates running for Federal office?

Would you favor establishment of a comprehensive health insurance program that would cover most medical expenses if the cost is shared by employee, employer, and the Federal government?

Do you support President Nixon's plan to expand American travel and trade with Communist China?

Should import quotas be put on goods that place American products at a severe competitive disadvantage?

Which of the following would you favor for the U.S. position in Southeast Asia? (please check only one)

(a) Continue the Administration's present Vietnamization policy (a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops to be replaced by South Vietnamese troops)

(b) Withdrawal of all U.S. forces in 1971.

(c) Withdrawal of all U.S. forces in 1972.

(d) Undecided

THE FORGOTTEN MIDDLE  
AMERICAN

HON. BILL ARCHER

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. ARCHER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to share with my colleagues a man's letter to his son that portrays so well the frustrations gripping the taxpayers of our Nation. The time has come to reverse a trend in taxation that weighs heavily on the average taxpayer. I believe we should consider very seriously a means by which we can bring some relief to the "forgotten" middle American:

DEAR MIKE: I notice there is growing disenchantment with the system, situation, national condition (or call it by a better name). Even the President has mentioned publicly growing decadence.

The middle class taxpayer continues to get it in the neck, and no relief in sight. And we seem to have no direct control over what our local and national tax dollars are spent for, unless we go through the laborious process of writing our Congressmen and the state Legislature (the latter appears to be a completely fruitless process).

Can you get any high level comments on taxing methods and the mentality behind tax collectors, etc.? We have just been advised by the Spring Branch School District tax collector that our house and lot have been given a much higher market value "in their opinion". The assessed valuation is 70% of the market value, so we will be charged tax at \$1.76 per \$100 assessed value. We voted in a \$27,000,000.00 bond issue in 1970 for land purchases, school construction, major modifications to buildings, etc. This was to add about \$8.40 to the tax bill for a \$30,000.00 home. Now they slap the increased valuation on us, adding \$150.00 more to our school tax. This makes a large additional tax for the Spring Branch District for 1971.

If I sold the house for the new market value, "in their opinion", I would have to report a \$12,000 long term capital gain on Federal Income Tax which would take a large bite of it. The taxing people seem to overlook that we have a thing called depreciation, the shingle roof will need replacing before long, the air conditioner is about due to play out (nearly 10 years old), and we get no credit of any kind for the big maintenance items on the home.

As you know, I'm bitter about the whole thing. The idea of the old American way: work hard, save your money, buy a home is becoming a ridiculous travesty: if the home is worth investing in with the hard-earned money over a period of years, they slap you with taxes, and the middle class works their tails off so some tax-happy bureaucrat can raise their taxes. And it seems we have no control over what the taxing bums will spend the money for.

I've talked to a number of neighboring property owners, and they are all protesting the big valuation raise (mine is about 44%) but they say there is nothing we can do—the tax collector just listens and smiles, etc.

I do plan to attend the next Spring Branch School Board meeting and make some public comments about taxes. I would also participate in a noisy public demonstration against the school, county, and City taxes (all of which are being raised). I begin to understand how frustration could have caused students to riot or to have some big demonstrations in the recent past. I think it's the frustration that does it.

I feel more and more that, if someone doesn't come up with a national "aim", moral

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

direction, or reason for all the gobbledegook we have, that the thing is going to cave in on itself.

Regards from your radical

DAD.

ALL'S WELL ON FISH DIET

HON. HASTINGS KEITH

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 19, 1971

Mr. KEITH. Mr. Speaker, a few months ago the Food and Drug Administration warned the public not to eat swordfish as it exceeded their standard of 0.5 parts per million. All swordfish on the market and in storage at that time was seized for inspection.

These actions signified the end of our swordfishing industry and dealt a serious blow to the entire fishing industry. The public tends to draw the conclusion that since there are harmful amounts of mercury in swordfish, then there must also be proportionate amounts in other species.

I would like to place in the RECORD the following editorial which appeared in the June 29 issue of the New Bedford Standard Times. Basically, the article calls for additional documentation on mercury pollution in swordfish and on the consequences of eating swordfish in normal quantities.

I fully agree with the intent of the editorial. The fishing industries are faced with a myriad of serious problems and will suffer greatly by a reduction in consumer confidence. The editorial follows:

ALL'S WELL ON FISH DIET

A new study, made by the New York City Health Department, declares that persons who have been eating fish four to seven times a week for many years show no more mercury in their systems than those on a "normal" diet.

The report was based on a careful five-month check of a coronary-prone group which has emphasized a fish diet for the past 13 years. The group, the Anti-Coronary Club, of 105 members was, in fact, established in 1957 by the city Health Department to determine whether a diet low in saturated fats could reduce heart disease.

Periodic tests have been made this year to verify that the club has been observing a fish diet. Other tests were made of the subjects' blood and hair, where the human body stores mercury. The mercury content was found to be no higher than in persons eating fish only periodically.

The results further confuse an already confused issue. In January, Dr. Bruce McDuffie, a chemistry professor at the Bingham campus of New York State University, declared that tests of persons who ate fish regularly showed five times as much mercury as in persons who rarely ate fish. In both the McDuffie and New York Health Department studies, the fish most eaten was tuna.

It was Dr. McDuffie's report last December, of having found a can of mercury tainted tuna, that led to a probe by the Federal Food and Drug Administration and the withdrawal from market counters of more than 1,000,000 cans of tuna. Later the FDA said this was only a "precautionary" move and the tuna consumer was safe from mercury poisoning.

The tuna scare is over, but we're wondering, in view of the contradictory findings from New York's Health Department, whether there was substantial grounds for a scare in

the first place. And this leads to questioning of the FDA's newest alarm about mercury poisoning from eating swordfish.

A controlled test case is needed for swordfish like that offered by the Anti-Coronary Club on tuna fish. The one disabling example reported from a swordfish diet was that of a woman who ate two servings (12½ ounces) a day for two years, and thereafter the same quantity every day for approximately half of every year. Even tuna eaters might suffer numbness and tremors on a diet that concentrated.

The FDA is obligated, at the earliest possible time, to furnish a documented report on the consequences, if any, to which someone eating swordfish in "normal" quantities—say once or even twice a week—might be subjected.

PEACE TO THE PEOPLE: REV. UNDERCUFFLER'S SUMMER RECREATION PROGRAM

HON. ROMANO L. MAZZOLI

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Speaker, I would like to recognize the worthwhile efforts of Rev. Robert Undercuffler of the Peace Presbyterian Church to bring meaningful community activities to the youth of the Newburg area of Louisville.

Rev. Undercuffler is reviving in Newburg this summer the role of the community church as a place where neighborhood people can gather and do things together. The recreation and education programs at Peace Presbyterian Church may be fun, but they are also part of a serious effort to help the young people of the Newburg area.

With the assistance and guidance of program director Keith Bertrand and youth directors Chauncey Brummer and Ed Goodwin, the summer recreation program has reached young people with problems and brought potential troublemakers into the program. For many, they have dissolved dangerous summer idleness with fellowship at Peace Church.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert in the RECORD at this point a recent article in the Jefferson Reporter by Jane Wehner, about the efforts of Reverend Undercuffler, Keith Bertrand, Chauncey Brummer, and Ed Goodwin in the peace summer recreation program.

SUMMER RECREATION PROGRAM BRINGS PEACE TO ITS PEOPLE

(By Jane Wehner)

"Peace be with you" is a blessing the Reverend Robert M. Undercuffler takes seriously, and literally.

As pastor of Peace Presbyterian Church in Newburg, the Reverend Undercuffler says Peace Church "has a commitment to the people."

"At Peace it's not a matter of the church being there for the community. It's the church being the community—the community is part of the church and the church is part of the community."

And, according to those who work with him, the Reverend Undercuffler has succeeded in bringing together young people and adults in the area to work for the common good of the community and each other.

Peace Youth Committee, a group of adults and youth, act as the planning council for church programs.



The term "church programs" does not, however, mean programs for the church, but programs for the entire community.

#### RECREATION PROGRAM

This summer, for the first time, an extensive recreation and education program is provided by Peace Church. There are supervised arts and crafts projects for young children, games and sports for any age group, and a black culture program including black history and Negro folk songs.

To help finance the activities, and to provide evening entertainment for area youth, there is a dance each Wednesday and Friday night, often emceed by a well-known DJ, "The Judge" Ervin Hurd of WLOU radio.

Money is also raised by the youth with car washes, paper drives and other such projects. The Youth Council has its own treasury, and screens and hires its recreation supervisors.

This summer, for the first time, a full-time, paid summer program director is being employed. He is Keith Bertrand, originally from Trinidad. There are two other youth directors—Chauncey Brummer, a law student at the University of Kentucky, and Ed Goodwin, called by The Reverend Undercuffler "the sparkplug behind the whole thing."

Along with federally funded Neighborhood Youth Corps workers, these directors supervise programs for as many as 60 children, and help the older youth and adults plan activities.

The Reverend Undercuffler stressed the Youth Council is a year-round organization, and plans programs all during the year.

He also says the programs are not limited to youngsters. He hopes to develop adult-oriented activities to take to the community.

For example, he says he'd like to have volleyball equipment to take to various neighborhoods so the people on the block can get together for games and a good time.

#### BLACK ARTS FESTIVAL

Keith would like to stage a Black Arts Festival, "including a soul supper," and would like to plan tours to places of interest—anyplace from Coney Island to the Louisville Free Public Library.

Bringing meaningful activity—for fun and education—to the community is the important thing to all those involved. And, according to The Reverend Undercuffler, the community has responded well, with parents and friends pitching in to help when possible.

"Still we can always use more volunteers," Keith said.

And the Peace Council could use more money.

"There is really a concern that it (the recreation program) isn't dropped before summer ends. That would cut into the children's programs," The Reverend Undercuffler said.

But with the cost of directors, supplies and equipment, the threat of the cut is there.

The Reverend Undercuffler is doing his best to see that the programs continue, especially for the sake of the youth.

He said church programs are "traditionally very selective about who they let join. The kids are usually the well-scrubbed, obedient to mother ones. The kids who really need the church are written off."

"But here, these leaders (the youth directors) are writing these kids in." He said several potential "trouble-makers" have become hard-working contributors to the programs thanks to the directors' help and direction.

How has this affected his congregation (since church membership is not required for program participation)?

"The breakthrough has been made here. A lot of kids, young men especially, who never come to church have found a broad fellowship here, and acceptance."

And it is through the fun-and-games activities, the sports and dances, that The Reverend Undercuffler has been able to reach

troubled youth—youth who, for example, have a drug problem and need help and counseling.

The Reverend Undercuffler says anyone interested in lending a helping hand to keep the summer program alive can contact him or the youth directors at Peace.

#### "EMPTY SALES BOOKS THREATEN THE UNITED STATES"

### HON. SAM GIBBONS

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues an excellent editorial from the Tampa Tribune, Tuesday, July 6, entitled "Empty Sales Books Threaten the United States."

The Tribune discusses the fact that many people in our country are seeking an easy way out of our complex international economic problems by advocating restrictive quotas, raising tariffs, and otherwise trying to stifle imports. Such methods will not help our trade situation at all. In fact they will severely hamper our general international relations.

The Tribune has recognized the need for positive action by this administration, and I think we will all agree that we must straighten out our world trade posture soon.

[From the Tampa (Fla.) Tribune, July 1, 1971]

#### EMPTY SALES BOOKS THREATEN THE UNITED STATES

The recent warning by Henry Ford II, board chairman of the Ford Motor Co., that the United States is becoming a service nation instead of a producer and exporter was no idle talk intended solely for his stockholders.

Ford's disturbing analysis contains a message for the Tampa dock worker and the Polk County citrus plant employe or phosphate miner whose products compete in the world market. Every American worker and businessman has cause to be concerned about the nation's place in international trade.

Two developments last week support Ford's warning:

In May, for the second consecutive month, the United States imported more goods than it sold abroad. This was the first time this back-to-back imbalance has occurred since 1950. If the trade deficit continues, 1971 will wind up with the first import surplus in 78 years.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a group which studies trade trends of the world's richest nations, reported the United States faces a severe economic crisis because of its deteriorating stature as a world trader. By 1975, the report said, this country might have a trade deficit of \$2-3 billion.

Nor is that all. Fifteen years ago the United States handled one-third of the world trade; now it's down to one-fifth.

Japan has emerged as a traveling salesman which threatens our trade dominance. An aggressive European Common Market is making its wallop felt at the world trading counters.

Unfortunately, as more American firms are forced to shut down from too much foreign competition the U.S. Government

continues to grope for a solution to the problem. President Nixon has created a Council of International Economic Policy to find ways to strengthen our world trading position but there's no curative program in sight.

Behind the gloomy trade outlook a few hopeful signs flicker, but only faintly. The Vietnam war is coming to an end which will reduce the torrents of money spent for foreign military purposes. Japan has agreed to voluntary quotas on textiles and a few other goods. South Korea and Nationalist China are considering the same thing.

But these slight moves do not touch the big problem. It just costs too much to turn out American goods; we're being priced out of the market. The tap root of this dilemma is inflation and a spiraling wage structure which threaten to force us to the sidelines of world commerce.

What's needed is a reshaped foreign policy in which trade plays a greater part. Rapidly changing world conditions require us to replace military weapons, which heretofore have added so much commercial heft, with skillful trade weapons.

The Federal Government must assume responsibility for developing such a policy. It is obvious the government must become a working partner with industry and business. Such a partnership is needed to meet the threat of Japanese and Western European manufacturers who are so strongly backed by their governments:

There are positive steps President Nixon can take:

He must try harder to contain inflation and yet there are signs pointing to another inflationary takeoff. It is up to him to convince labor of its shortsightedness in demanding excessive wages.

Western Europe and Japan must assume more of the defense burdens in their areas. These two world traders also will have to give better breaks to American goods.

The President must reject the expediency of temporary relief by jacking up tariffs or establishing restrictive quotas on foreign goods. Such relief will last only as long as it takes competing nations to install similar trading restrictions against the United States.

Financial assistance in the form of credits should be considered. American industry must be helped to modernize itself and the government and industry together must find ways to alleviate our threatening fuel shortages.

The alternative to an immediate straightening of our world trade posture is more American salesmen returning home with empty sales order books.

#### HOUSE RESOLUTION 319

### HON. ANDREW JACOBS, JR.

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, the following is the language of House Resolution 319, which I introduced on March 17, 1971. I was hoping it might catch the attention of the administration:

#### H. RES. 319

Whereas the President of the United States on March 4, 1971, stated that his policy is that: "as long as there are American POW's in North Vietnam we will have to maintain a residual force in South Vietnam. That is the least we can negotiate for."

Whereas Madam Nguyen Thi Binh, chief delegate of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam stated on September 17, 1970, that the policy of her government is "In case the

United States Government declares it will withdraw from South Vietnam all its troops and those of the other foreign countries in the United States camp, and the parties will engage at once in discussion on:

"The question of ensuring safety for the total withdrawal from South Vietnam of United States troops and those of the other foreign countries in the United States camp.

"The question of releasing captured military men."

Resolved, That the United States shall forthwith propose at the Paris peace talks that in return for the return of all American prisoners held in Indochina, the United States shall withdraw all its Armed Forces from Vietnam within sixty days following the signing of the agreement: *Provided*, That the agreement shall contain guarantee by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of safe conduct out of Vietnam for all American prisoners and all American Armed Forces simultaneously.

**U.S. MANUFACTURERS OF LARGE POWER TRANSFORMERS FACED WITH UNFAIR FOREIGN COMPETITION—WHICH AFFECTS JOBS AND AMERICAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS**

**HON. JOE L. EVINS**

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I am concerned that American manufacturers of large electrical apparatus are being subjected to severe foreign competition over which they have no control.

This situation lessens American jobs and adversely affects substantially our balance-of-payments situation.

Mr. A. L. Bethel, vice president of manufacturing of Westinghouse Electric Corp., told me recently that more than 95 percent of large power transformer purchases by U.S. Government agencies were from foreign manufacturers.

Foreign manufacturers can sell equipment in the United States at prices far below prices charged in their own markets. Imports of foreign-made electrical equipment to this country are encouraged by current U.S. Government policies. However, American-made products cannot be sold in certain overseas markets because of foreign restrictions placed upon such American-made imports.

In these times, when the country is suffering from the highest unemployment rate in many years, when the sluggish economy is struggling to regain some semblance of normality, when the balance-of-payments problem shows little sign of being corrected, when our export trade continues to diminish, there appears to be no greater need than to place our own producers in a fair competitive position both for procurements here at home and sales in foreign markets.

While Westinghouse Electric Corp., is a big business in the best sense of the word, hundreds of small businesses which act as subcontractors and suppliers are affected to a very large degree

by what happens to Westinghouse, and other manufacturers of these items.

I propose to explore this matter in depth with a view of making corrections and improvements. In this connection I have written letters to the Honorable Maurice H. Stans, Secretary of Commerce; the Honorable Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior; and the Honorable Aubrey J. Wagner, Chairman of Tennessee Valley Authority, requesting that this matter be reviewed and asking for comments and recommendations to achieve a more equitable utilization of the Buy America Act and improvement of our balance-of-payments situation.

Because of the interest of my colleagues and the American people in this most important matter I place in the RECORD herewith a letter from Mr. A. L. Bethel, vice president, manufacturing, Westinghouse Electric Corp., Pittsburgh, Pa.

The letter follows:

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.,  
Pittsburgh, Pa., July 8, 1971.

HON. JOE L. EVINS,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. EVINS: As you will recall, at our meeting on June 22 I promised to send you a summary of our views with respect to foreign competition in large electrical apparatus. This letter sets forth those views.

Westinghouse, and other United States manufacturers of large electrical equipment, have become increasingly concerned in recent years over the inroads into the American market being made by foreign competitors. It seems especially ironic to us that TVA, Bonneville Power Administration, and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation have led the way in purchasing foreign-made equipment.

While the dilemma has been pointed out several times in testimony before congressional committees and in public and private discussions with appropriate officials of the executive branch, review, if any, of U.S. international trade policies—not as stated for we support them, but as they are practiced—is too slow to be encouraging. The plight of the makers of products used in the generation and transmission of electrical energy has hitherto become lost at the international trade negotiating table.

"Development of open and nondiscriminatory trade in the free world" is one of the purposes of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. President Johnson's trade message to the Congress in 1968 stated that "A successful trade policy must be built on reciprocity . . ." President Nixon's 1969 trade message expressed the same policy in different terms: "We must insist on fair competition among all countries . . ." If international trade in heavy electrical equipment were practiced in accord with these expressed policies, American manufacturers could be fully competitive. As it is, they are faced with unfair foreign competition over which they can have no control. Only the Government can treat with closed foreign markets, the purchasing policies of United States Government agencies, dual priced imports, tax rebates by foreign governments to their own manufacturers on sales to the United States, and an often intangible variety of non-tariff barriers to our American exports.

The increase in imports of large utility-type equipment to this country is not the result of superior technology or lower foreign manufacturing costs. While employment costs are lower abroad, careful studies show that America's production methods offset them substantially. The increased imports of this equipment result from the unfair

trade practices cited in the previous paragraph.

The Randal Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, in its 1954 Report, took note of the problem of closed foreign markets. It recommended amendment of Buy American policy "to give authority to the President to exempt from the provisions of such legislation the bidders from other nations that treat our bidders on an equal basis with their own nationals . . ." While part of this recommendation was ordered into effect, the part which would have required equal treatment for American bidders in foreign countries was omitted.

It is meaningless to secure a reduction in tariff from a country that would not allow the item to be purchased from a source beyond its borders. In the 1967 Kennedy round of tariff reductions, for example, responsible American officials reduced U.S. duties on nearly all large electrical equipment the full 50 percent. Britain and Japan as well as a number of European nations reduced their tariffs also. In most of these foreign countries, with some exceptions in Japan, electric utilities are either government-owned or government-controlled. Almost uniformly, however, they observe policies sanctioned or mandated by their governments and will not buy from American manufacturers.

Despite the lack of access for American-made products to foreign markets, the American market is wide open. Imports of foreign-made electrical equipment to this country are encouraged by United States Government policies. As already indicated, the principal purchasers of large electrical equipment from foreign suppliers have been agencies of the United States Government—the Tennessee Valley Authority, Bonneville Power Administration, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. They have bought this equipment at prices below—often far below—the prices charged by these foreign suppliers in their home markets. Additionally, they have established a trend in purchasing which investor-owned utilities with a long-standing preference for domestic equipment have found it difficult not to follow.

Foreign manufacturers, selling as they do from protected home markets, can afford to offer lower prices to American customers than they offer in their home countries. The prices they charge in their domestic markets are sufficient to cover all or most of their manufacturing plant overhead costs. Export orders are then sought and obtained at reduced prices to fill unused plant capacity. In many industrialized countries, the governments pay subsidies and offer other incentives in the form of tax rebates or the like to exporting manufacturers.

The following facts provide some insight into the extent of imports of heavy electrical equipment into the United States:

In 1970 through May 31, of the orders for large steam turbine generators placed by American electric utilities, 43 percent, measured in kilowatts of generating capacity, have gone to foreign suppliers.

In the two years ending June 1970, more than 95 percent of large power transformer purchases by U.S. Government agencies were from foreign manufacturers. In the same period 15 percent of total U.S. orders for large power transformers—Government agencies and investor-owned utilities—were placed with foreign manufacturers.

Approximately 80 percent of extra-high voltage power circuit breakers procured by Federal power agencies since 1963 have been foreign products. In the highest and most technologically advanced rating—765,000 volts—all but one power circuit breaker has been purchased from abroad.

The United States represents half of the free world market for large electrical equipment. Its demand for equipment is expected to double in the next 10 to 15 years. About



one-fourth of the total world market is in Japan and industrialized Western Europe. Demand in this segment is expected to triple in the same period. Because the U.S. market is open, foreign manufacturers will share substantially in the American expansion, while enjoying "sole supplier" status in their expanding protected home markets.

American manufacturers, keeping abreast of expanding domestic requirements, have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in recent years in new and expanding production facilities. Their plants are modern and their equipment sophisticated. Increasing one-way, dual-priced foreign trade is vitiating this investment. Furthermore, it is jeopardizing essential research and development and the maintenance of a highly skilled American work force.

We believe an essential first step toward arresting this damaging one-way trade would be to increase the Buy American differential to 50 percent from the current 6 percent level. Then, a more vigorous Government attitude toward enforcing the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes should be adopted and carried out. Other steps may also be necessary.

Your support of such changes in policy would be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

A. L. BETHEL,  
Vice President, Manufacturing.

#### BARNYARD SCIENCE

### HON. TIM LEE CARTER

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Speaker, for many years the people of Kentucky were pleased each morning to read in the Louisville Courier-Journal the erudite renditions from the fearless forum of that master of barnyard science, Allan M. Trout.

Allan had longed for a golden Cadillac on his retirement from service with the Louisville Courier-Journal. Many of us wanted to make this dream come true, but at the moment of truth, Allan declined.

For the Members of this body, I am enclosing one of his masterpieces, entitled "The Zipper Story":

#### FIRST YEAR: THE ZIPPER STORY

It was December 7, 1939, the first year of Greetings, that light was shed here on the famous zipper story. To this day, I get more requests to reprint that column than any other. Here 'tis:

John Brown, Richmond, Va., weighed 200 pounds. He gorged himself one night on backbone and dumplings. When he and his wife later went to the picture show, Mr. Brown settled back, loosened his belt, and lowered the zipper on his pants a few inches.

A lady in the same row got up to leave. As Mr. Brown arose to let her by, he remembered his zipper was unfastened. He reached down to pull it up. But it caught in the lady's dress and he could not work the thing up or down.

She felt a tug at her dress and gave him a hard look. She felt another tug, so she leaned toward him and hissed:

"What are you trying to do?"

Mrs. Brown then turned to her husband and whispered hoarsely:

"John, what are you doing to the lady?"

"Not a thing," he whispered in reply.

"He is, too," said the lady. "He is tugging at my dress."

Mrs. Brown half arose from her seat. "Turn her loose this instant," she said. "What in the world has come over you?"

"I can't turn her loose," Mr. Brown replied. "Her dress is caught in my pants."

Mrs. Brown gasped. Mr. Brown began to perspire freely. The people behind them began to get restless.

"What are you trying to do?" asked a gentleman behind Mr. Brown.

"Her dress is caught in my pants."

"Good Lord," said the gentleman.

"Do something," insisted the lady.

"I'm doing all I can," Mr. Brown replied, "but it is getting worse."

By this time everybody in the picture show had been attracted by the commotion.

"We'll have to go out in the lobby," Mr. Brown at last remarked to the lady.

"Together?" she asked.

"You're darn right, together," he told her. "Do you think I'm going to take off my pants and let you walk off with them?"

She agreed there was nothing else to do. She started slowly up the aisle, leading Mr. Brown along sideways. Folks sitting in the aisle seats almost fell out of them with laughter at the sight of Mr. Brown and the lady waltzing toward the lobby where an usher finally cut them apart with his pocket knife.

#### DRUG ABUSE

### HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I include in the RECORD an article by Dr. Allan Y. Cohen, professor of psychology at John F. Kennedy University in Martinez, Calif., director of the Institute of Drug Abuse Education and Research, which appeared in the spring 1971 Journal of Psychedelic Drugs.

"The Journey Beyond Trips: Alternatives to Drugs" outlines some of the major misconceptions about the causes and solutions of the American drug problem. It offers a simple motivational model of drug use and suggests various alternatives to drug use.

The article follows:

THE JOURNEY BEYOND TRIPS: ALTERNATIVES TO DRUGS

(Allan Y. Cohen, Ph.D.)<sup>1</sup>

Interviewer: Why do you use drugs?

User: Why not?

Interviewer: How could someone convince you to stop?

User: Show me something better.

Of all the dialogues between clinical and research interviewees and their subjects, ones like the above, though terse, are incredibly significant.

Governments, social institutions and private individuals have been forced to respond to what is popularly known as "the drug epidemic." Total social response to the fact of drug use has been neither successful nor appropriate; one might say it has been badly botched. Intentions have been good, sometimes truly compassionate; but execution has missed the mark. But, "no blame"—

<sup>1</sup> Associate Professor of Psychology and Director of the Institute for Drug Abuse Education and Research, John F. Kennedy University, Martinez, California.

the fault is due less to incompetence than to misconception.

It is the purpose of this paper, humbly conceived though opinionated, to outline some major misconceptions about the causes and solutions of the American drug problem, to offer a simple motivational model of drug use and to suggest a positive orientation which is relevant and applicable.

#### THE MYTHS

Some obvious myths and stereotypes about drugs have been exposed adequately by previous commentators. Let us investigate more subtle myths, ones which have sprung up from initial public attitudes about drugs and "addicts," nurtured by well-intentioned research and analysis, and rendered inappropriate by the phenomenal growth of drug experimentation. It is my contention that such questionable assumptions have implied strategies doomed to ineffectiveness in the control, treatment, prevention and amelioration of the drug crisis.

Those Weird Drug Users.—One widespread notion is that drug "users" are a certain "breed" of people or social group. (To simplify language, "users" is taken to cover the broad range from "experimenters" to "drug dependers," unless specifically modified below.) Predictably, many studies have abounded with conclusions about personality and socio-cultural correlates of drug use. The object of such research, aside from pure science, is to understand "what makes drug users tick;" extrapolating the implications to prevention or to education.

But is there a certain type using drugs? Can one ever "predict" individuals predisposed to drug use? More importantly, does it help to talk in such terms . . . I think not. I say this because behind the common personality-social research lies an assumption which is now very suspect—that drug experimentation and use is a *minority* phenomenon, that study of this special group will generate practical insights.

On the contrary, the apparent survey and interview evidence suggests that drug use has become a *majority* phenomenon, not only among the young. Even excluding alcohol, coffee and cigarettes, it is now safe to estimate that over 50% of the total American population over 13 years of age has at least tried some powerful mind-altering drug via prescription or on the illicit market. Rare is the urban school using authentic survey data which reports that less than 50% of their secondary students have used amphetamines, psychedelics, barbiturates, cannabis products and like drugs within the last 12 months. No figures can be given on overall *regular* use, but scores of spot interviews indicate that the high school "dopers" peer culture is challenging the size of the "straights." In the adult world, one recent survey found that 25% of all American women over 30 were currently under prescription for amphetamines, barbiturates or tranquilizers, the percentage going up to 40% for ladies of higher income families.<sup>1</sup>

All things considered, it is my contention that drug use must now be admitted as the social *norm*. We must realize that our chemical culture has produced an atmosphere leading to the naturalness of using drugs—no matter what the underlying complaint or need. Failure to comprehend this cultural reality leads to dysfunctional priorities. Popular now is the notion that drug users are necessarily deviant or pathological. Drug use, too many surmise, indicates something terribly wrong with the person, either morally ("send 'em to jail") or psychologically ("send 'em to a mental hospital"). But we know better. Drug users may not necessarily show lack of morality or personality disturb-

Footnotes at end of article.

ance, at least not more than many non-users. Indeed, the *non-user* may be "deviant" in the purely statistical sense. It may well be that the primary question among youth presented with the opportunity for experimentation is no longer "Why?" but "Why not?" A basic inadequacy in this "deviance-minority" model is that it tends to focus emphasis on *symptoms* rather than *causes*. It produces a philosophy of social intervention which is essentially *reactive and negative*. Perhaps we might be able to come up with another kind of conceptual model, a more useful one, based on logic, common sense, and our accumulated knowledge of the drug scene.

#### THE MOTIVES

In this conceptual model, which leads to an ultimate emphasis on alternatives to drugs, we begin with a simple formulation of the most basic motivational forces leading to drug use:

Principle I.—People take drugs because they want to.

Principle II.—People use drugs to "feel better" or to "get high." Individuals *experiment* with drugs out of curiosity or hope that using drugs can make them feel better.

Principle III.—People have been taught by cultural example, media, etc. that drugs are an effective way to make them feel better.

Principle IV.—"Feeling better" encompasses a huge range of mood or consciousness change, including such aspects as oblivion-sleep, emotion shift, energy modification and visions of the Divine, etc.

Principle V.—With many mind or mood-altering drugs, taken principally for that purpose, individuals may temporarily feel better. However, drugs have substantial short and long term disadvantages related to the motive for their use. These include possible physiological damage, psychological deterioration and cognitive breakdown. Drugs also tend to be temporary, relatively devoid of satisfying translation to the ordinary non-drug state of life, and siphon off energy for long term constructive growth.

Principle VI.—Basically, individuals do not stop using drugs until they discover "something better."

Principle VII.—The key to meeting problems of drug abuse is to focus on the "something better," and maximize opportunities for experiencing satisfying nonchemical alternatives. The same key can be used to discourage experimentation or, more likely, keep experimentation from progressing to dependency.

This model may seem simplistic, but I find it valuable. If I admit to the logic that people use drugs because they *want to*, I also have been forced to realize that people will only stop drug use *when they want to*.

#### THE ALTERNATIVES

I shall call this kind of formulation the "Alternatives Model." While the above assumptions are most relevantly applied to the common psychotropic substances, they might even be extended to common medicinal drugs (i.e., if we gave as much attention to the natural prevention of the common cold as to cold remedies, we would all be healthier).

The Alternatives Model emphasizes *causes*; and mandates increased attention to be development and communication of alternative attitudes, strategies, techniques, institutional changes and life styles which could diminish the desire for using drugs to attain legitimate personal aspirations. "Alternative" is *not* just a synonym for "substitute" since it implies an orientation which is *more effective* than drugs for giving the person real satisfaction.

Considering its logical importance, the literature on alternatives to drug use is very sparse, although the situation seems to be improving.<sup>3</sup> Ironically, there is a huge store of literature and wisdom about possible alternatives, but this material has not been

specifically applied to drug use education and research.

Once we presume that "alternatives" are important, we must expand the model to fit complex variables in all phases of the drug scene. We face questions like: "Which alternative for which drug?"—"Which alternative for which motive?"—"Which alternative for which person?" At this point, I wish to share a list of categories which has assisted me in thinking about applying alternatives. It was obvious to me that motives and relevant alternatives were intimately connected, and that one way of conceptualizing the relationship was in terms of different "levels of experience." Thus, as an illustration rather than an ultimate formulation, I have included Table E. Each level of experience pertains to certain types of motives leading to drug use or experimentation, examples of which are listed in the Table. Across from each level-motive category are examples of types of alternatives which might replace, ameliorate or prevent drug abuse. I expect the reader will come up with many more motives and an almost infinite addition of alternatives. Of course, there are other ways to conceptualize the different kinds of alternatives—again, this Table is intended to serve only as an example and stimulate. Needless to say, several levels of experience may operate within a particular individual or subgroup, so categories and motives may be related across levels and should not be taken as mutually exclusive.

There is one alternative not mentioned in the Table because it is so obvious. Yet it deserves some comment. A growing viable alternative to using drugs is *not to use drugs or discontinuing drug use*. Many long term users move away from drugs because they feel better *not* using them. For some, being "straight" or "clean" is a refreshing change in itself from being stoned or hooked. Often this response is out of negativity, e.g., fright from a bad trip, the agony of being strung out, the realization of personal self-destruction, the boredom of being stoned all the time, etc. The pre-experimenter who avoids drugs may also be acting from a flight from negativity—in this case, an avoidance of anticipated hurtful results. It may be, however, that most non-experimenters have already found an alternative so positive that there is no felt need for drugs or a reluctance to risk something perceived as valuable. Preliminary research<sup>3</sup> tends to confirm this supposition—that young non-users of common illicit drugs avoid them more because of satisfaction gained in exploring positive alternatives, rather than from a fear of consequent harm.

Thus, *not using drugs* only becomes a viable alternative in one of two cases: (1) when a drug user is suffering, and realizes the suffering is drug-related, or, (2) when a pre-user has so much going for him that perceived drug-related risks threaten present satisfaction.

Referring back to the Table, the Alternatives Model was originally developed around the issue of psychedelic drugs and cannabis. However, this type of categorization allows us to consider all types of psycho-pharmacological intervention, from the case of the heroin addict to the "housewife junkie" on her diet pills; from the fourth grader sniffing airplane glue to the middle-aged alcoholic.

We are aware that an expressed motive may be different from the "real" underlying motive, and we should be alert to basic motives, no matter what is expressed. We should also remember that certain drugs may be most associated with certain kinds of motives. For example, heroin is likely to be more associated with the classic "escape" motives because of its consciousness-numbing effect, whereas LSD might be used more to try to satisfy aspirations on the creative, philosophical or spiritual level of experience.

#### IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATIVES, GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The Alternatives Model can be very helpful in assigning priorities to social action for the control, treatment and prevention of drug abuse. Clearly, punitive control has severe limits upon its effectiveness because it does not respond with viable alternatives to the predisposing motives, and its fear-generating capacity is not an adequate deterrent.

In rehabilitation and treatment, sequences of intervention should parallel priorities in the level of experience category. For example, in treating heroin addiction, methadone represents a viable alternative to the physical component of the addict's needs, but the eventual treatment program must aim at providing more permanent fulfillment of deeper psycho-social needs. The existence or non-existence of these deeper aspirations will determine whether the addict can resist temptation after withdrawal from methadone. As a parallel case, the "freak-out" victim of strong psychedelics is best first treated on the emotional and perhaps interpersonal levels to return him to ordinary consciousness. But, after that, adequate rehabilitation programs must respond to the things which got him hung up in the first place.

Perhaps the most powerful application of the Alternative Model lies in the field of drug education. There is still a powerful premise circulating among educators that individuals, especially children, can be *frightened* away from drugs with "proper information about dangers." In all frankness, this hope is a utopian fantasy. Before anyone gets optimistically excited about "dynamic, hard-hitting facts" in a drug abuse curriculum, he should give careful thought to the remarkable staying power of cigarettes in the mature adult population. The case against smoking cigarettes could hardly be much stronger (in view of the demonstrated dangers) and yet wide-spread anti-smoking publicity has made only a remarkably small dent in the smoking habits of those most "responsible" citizens.

Level of experience, corresponding motives (examples), and possible alternatives (examples):

Physical: Desire for physical satisfaction; physical relaxation; relief from sickness; desire for more energy; maintenance of physical dependency. Athletics: dance; exercise; hiking; diet; health training; carpentry or outdoor work.

Sensory: Desire to stimulate sight, sound, touch, taste; need for sensual-sexual stimulation; desire to magnify sensorium. Sensory awareness training; sky diving; experiencing sensory beauty of nature.

Emotional: Relief from psychological pain; attempt to solve personal perplexities; relief from bad mood; escape from anxiety; desire for emotional insight; liberation of feeling; emotional relaxation. Competent individual counseling; well-run group therapy; instructional psychology of personal development.

Interpersonal: To gain peer acceptance; to break through interpersonal barriers; to "communicate," especially non-verbally; defiance of authority figures; cement two-person relationships; relaxation of interpersonal inhibition; solve interpersonal hang-ups. Expertly managed sensitivity and encounter groups; well-run group therapy; instruction in social customs; confidence training; social-interpersonal counseling; emphasis on assisting others in distress via education; marriage.

Social (including Socio-Cultural and Environmental): To promote social change; to find identifiable subculture; to tune out intolerable environmental conditions, e.g., poverty; changing awareness of the masses." Social service; community action in positive social change; helping the poor, aged infirm, young, tutoring handicapped; ecology action.



**Political:** To promote political change; to identify with anti-establishment subgroup; to change drug legislation; out of desperation with the social-political order; to gain wealth or affluence or power. Political service; political action; non-partisan projects such as ecological lobbying; field work with politicians and public officials.

**Intellectual:** To escape mental boredom; out of intellectual curiosity; to solve cognitive problems; to gain new understanding in the world of ideas; to study better; to research one's own awareness; for science. Intellectual excitement through reading, through discussion; creative games and puzzles; self-hypnosis; training in concentration; synectics—training in intellectual breakthroughs; memory training.

**Creative-Aesthetic:** To improve creativity in the arts; to enhance enjoyment of art already produced, e.g., music; to enjoy imaginative mental productions. Non-graded instruction in producing and/or appreciating art, music, drama, crafts, handiwork, cooking, sewing, gardening, writing, singing, etc.

**Philosophical:** To discover meaningful values; to grasp the nature of the universe; to find meaning in life; to help establish personal identity; to organize a belief structure. Discussions, seminars, courses in the meaning of life; study of ethics, morality, the nature of reality; relevant philosophical literature; guided exploration of value systems.

**Spiritual-Mystical:** To transcend orthodox religions; to develop spiritual insights; to reach higher levels of consciousness; to have Divine Visions; to communicate with God; to augment yogic practices; to get a spiritual shortcut; to attain enlightenment; to attain spiritual powers. Exposure to non-chemical methods of spiritual developments; study of world religions; introduction to applied mysticism, meditation; yogic techniques.

**Miscellaneous:** Adventure, risk drama, "kicks," unexpressed motives; pro-drug general attitudes, etc. "Outward Bound" survival training; combinations of alternatives above; pronaturalness attitudes; brain-wave training; meaningful employment, etc.

In view of such a fact, does it seem reasonable to expect a "scare" campaign to be decisive? Of course not. The young are more non-rational, risk-oriented and unbelieving. Further, the effects of the most used drugs have not been accurately delineated, and the credibility of authority figures is very strained. (One young pothead told me that he would not believe any research unless the study was conducted in Switzerland! Neutrality equals objectivity, he guessed.)

Reliance on fear motivation can produce the instructor's ultimate frustration in the older age groups. He succeeds in persuading students that drugs have bad effects. But the students reason that they live in a dangerous world (bad air, chemicals in food, possibility of war, etc.) and that the dangers of drugs do not outweigh the pleasure they can give in return. Once again, the educator has paid the price of the "deviance" theory, i.e., that reasonable people will not want to use drugs, and that education regarding the dangers will weed out all those pre-experimenters except the mentally ill or criminally inclined.

I do not wish to downgrade the real value of accurate information about drug effects—such information can be a significant help in the decision-making process. Further, it may serve to bolster the intuitive guess that drugs are harmful and may help some youths to justify to their peers the adoption of non-chemical alternatives. Educational honesty and credibility must be maximized in the same way that legislators should make drug use a public health and not a criminal concern. But the real promise in education would seem to involve educating about alternatives. There is no higher priority; and

there are few other ways to give such a powerful assist to the minimization of drug abuse.

It is my contention that education about non-chemical alternatives for each level of experience is the best mode of "prevention." It is also the method of choice for moderate experimenters. And finally, the Alternatives Model is the treatment of choice for heavy users (here much stress would be put on the alternative of *not using*). In the application of the Alternatives Model, it must be realized that there is no one motive responsible for all drug use. Also, it should be noted that the alternatives of best application are those which are *incompatible* with being high. For example, "listening to recorded music" is not an alternative unless it precludes being stoned while listening. In this particular case, techniques or ways of listening must be sufficiently taught so that chemically-altered awareness gets in the way of the experience. In general, extremely *passive* alternatives must be utilized with a bit more care than alternatives necessitating *action* or work with one's resources. The more active and demanding alternatives are those which clearly interfere with a drug-taking life-style.

#### IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVES: A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE

To give one small specific instance in which the Alternatives Model may be applied to institutional action, let us take the case of the public schools. It has been argued that many of our public school systems, through rigidity, misassessed priorities and lack of relevance, have contributed to the dissatisfactions which lead children toward drugs. It seems indisputable that the "Art of Living" has become a critically important skill for young people, one not reflected in course curricula. The schools have become expert at transmitting information and training intellectual skills, but this is partially lost if the young are preoccupied and are not motivated to learn what the schools want them to learn.

The issue of educational reform is far too broad to treat in this paper, but let us offer one small suggestion based on the Alternatives Model. Most schools offer course experiences in non-intellective areas, but emasculate anti-chemical possibilities by assigning grades to such courses. I am referring to subjects like music, art, homemaking, drama, physical education, manual training, family life education and the like. All of these subject areas *could* pertain to the motive levels discussed previously. They *could* get children so personally involved that drugs would not be so inviting. Usually they do not. The arbitrary grading process infuses anxiety and competition into just those areas which might provide creative relief. Students deliberately avoid electives in alternative areas for fear of lowering their academic average. Only the best students in non-intellective areas are really encouraged to go on developing nonintellective resources, and even they are prey to "evaluation anxiety"—that fear of failure which makes neurotics out of prospective artists.

The abolition of grades in alternative subjects would be a powerful stroke in turning kids on to a "natural high," with little if any monetary outflow. Parents might object to a lack of competitive evaluation, but they should be reminded that one of the pulls to the drug scene is that no one gets an "F" for turning on. Logically related steps could include the expansion of subject hours in alternative areas, invitations to community members who could share what turns them on nonchemically, time outside the walls to taste social involvement and service, a philosophical admission of the importance of interpersonal as well as intellectual skills. These are the kinds of steps which might come to mind when focusing on the necessity of alternatives.

#### TOWARD A NEWER HUMANITY

When proposing a large scale turn towards the Alternatives Model, some might respond skeptically and ask for research findings which have demonstrated the model's effectiveness. Long-term research simply has not yet been done in the alternatives area. However, survey and interview studies have amply suggested that most users stop (or would stop) because of a preferable alternative.<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps the most exciting aspect of the Alternatives Model is that it can be applied to any level of action or reaction to drug use. It is limited only by the imagination and wisdom of the implementor. The positive possibilities seem limitless; while obsession with drug-related symptoms and dangers appear an endless pit of futility.

There are other advantages to the Alternatives Model. Application of provided alternatives to drug use simultaneously provides alternatives to other forms of human difficulties. After all, truly effective solutions to the "problem of drugs" are the effective solutions to the "problem of people" and the "problem of life." Very possibly, deterioration may be shifted to harmony. Those solutions, applied to every level of experience could make man's abuse of himself and others fade into an historical remembrance of a thankfully transcended cultural psychosis.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Data relayed in a 1970 speech by Professor Joseph Maloney, University of Louisville, Ky.

<sup>2</sup> Articles: Dohner, A. V. "Mood-Altering Agent Use in America: Why Drugs?" *Rocky Mountain Med. J.* (February, 1970); Chanin, A. "Understanding Teenagers: Alternatives to Drug Abuse." *Chn. Pediat.* Vol. 8: 6-10. (January, 1969); Townshend, P. "In Love with Meher Baba." *Rolling Stone*, No. 71: 25-27. (26 November, 1970). Books: Gustatis, R. *Turning On*. (New York: Macmillan, 1969); Needleman, J. *The New Religions*. (New York: Doubleday, 1970; Marin, P. & Cohen, A. Y. *Understanding Drug Use: An Adult's Guide to Drugs and the Young*. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); Payne, B. *Getting There Without Drugs*. (New York: Viking Press, In Press).

<sup>3</sup> Survey conducted by students, Pacific High School, San Leandro, California. In response to an essay question: "If you do not use drugs, what has been the biggest deterrent for not using them?", 39.8% said there was "no need" (or "life is fine, I'm happy," "turn on other ways," etc.). This contrasts with 7.1% who mentioned laws or "getting busted," (study conducted in 1968-1969).

<sup>4</sup> Cohen, A. Y. "Relieving Acid Indigestion: Psychological and Social Dynamics Related to Hallucinogenic Drug Abuse." Final report submitted to the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control under Research Contract 67-25. (1968). (Now possibly available through the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Washington, D.C.).

#### NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE

(By Allan Y. Cohen, Ph. D.)

During the course of the last ten years, I have come to some working conclusions about marihuana, its relationship to the individual and to society. For three years in the early sixties, I was a user of cannabis as well as other psychoactive drugs. Since then, much of my professional life has involved counseling, research and education in the field of drug abuse. I wish to share my observations with humility and hopefully with objectivity, but not without firmness.

In this introductory statement, I wish to suggest that the active constituents of marihuana and hashish *can* pose a significant threat to the psychological, physiological and spiritual integrity of the human organism, but that a criminalistic approach to drug abuse is shortsighted.

The question of marihuana has gotten out of perspective and become unnecessarily controversial, perhaps because two issues before the Commission have become intermixed and confused. There are such strong feelings about the appropriateness of legal controls that some professionals are unable to view the scientific and clinical evidence with objectivity. Some sincere individuals, feeling that liberalization of marihuana penalties would lead to moral and social degradation, tend to believe that marihuana is a "terrible narcotic leading to crime, instant psychosis and heroin addiction." On the other hand, and currently more fashionable, are those "experts" so convinced that present legislation is unfair and unrealistic that they want to see marihuana as less dangerous than pabulum. The resulting arguments and counterarguments, even among scientists, may have generated more smoke than light, and are sometimes more political than logical.

**Effects of Marihuana:** When thinking about the effects of marihuana, I find it much more useful not to use the concept "marihuana", but rather to speak about the active constituents of the cannabis plant. Scientifically, we should not be concerned with the effects of marihuana as such, but with its psychoactive ingredients, in particular the tetrahydrocannabinols. In order to simplify, I ask your permission to use THC as a shorthand for the active constituents of the cannabis plant (even though there may be other psychoactive ingredients than merely delta-9 THC).

First, looking over the experimental literature, I see little evidence that would lead me to believe in the physiological harmlessness of THC. The precise effect of THC on organs, tissues and biochemical systems is still unknown, some of the research either incomplete or vulnerable to criticism. But even common sense tells us that THC is toxic. The human body intuitively treats THC not as a food, not as a vitamin, not even as a neutral substance, but tries to destroy it. To the extent that our "eco-system" fails in the detoxification process, the individual gets high. When the body finally overwhelms the THC, the individual "comes down".

More interesting, and perhaps serious, is the question of the psychological and cognitive effects of THC over the long term. Questions about long term effects now seem even more relevant because of recent research suggesting that THC (or perhaps THC metabolites) may accumulate in the system under continual use. Surely, there are difficult methodological problems with many of the experiments in this area. But it seems to me that the weight of the research has demonstrated what we workers in the field have known for a long time—that there are definite side effects *causally* associated with the long-term use of the active constituents of marihuana and hashish.

In brief, the overall model most helpful to me as a clinician is to understand THC as a "junior LSD," junior in that cannabis use produces the same general results as the ingestion of small amounts of LSD. The side effects I have seen from cannabis overuse are very similar to symptoms of extended use of psychedelics. (This should be no surprise—research suggests that THC, by weight, may be more capable of producing psychedelic effects than comparable amounts of mescaline.) In the case of cannabis, the side effects are much less acute and build up more gradually. Ironically, the gradual effect sustains a massive delusion on the part of the user that there are no negative side effects.

There is no doubt in my mind that THC in cannabis can produce psychotic episodes in relatively well-adjusted individuals, just as small doses of LSD have produced bad trips in certain individuals who were not classically pre-psychotic. I have seen several of them. However, in the case of low THC marihuana, the phenomenon is very rare.

It also seems clear that THC ingestion can set off "flashbacks" in persons who previously used stronger psychedelics.

Over and over, in field research, hundreds of clinical interviews, and thousands of conversations with marihuana users and former users, I keep hearing about certain typical long range symptoms. They include:

- (1) Increasing problems in concentration,
- (2) Increasing difficulties with memory function,
- (3) Occasional decrease in mathematical ability,
- (4) Speech difficulties, especially in the translation of thoughts to words,
- (5) Hypersuggestibility,
- (6) Exaggerated changes in self-esteem and selfishness,
- (7) Passivity and energy loss, lately called the "amotivational syndrome."
- (8) Loss of judgment and sensitivity in personal relationships,
- (9) Creeping paranoia and irrational distrust, and
- (10) Firm denial that cannabis has any negative side effects.

Perhaps the most powerful data validating these effects come from ex-users, who frequently experience a significant improvement in these areas after they stop using. The symptoms usually disappear within a year after the last drug experience.

Former users are possibly the best source of subjective data regarding the effects of THC. The value of subjective reports of users is very limited, because one of the likely side effects of marihuana-hashish use is to distort judgment and preclude effective feedback about one's functioning. In my own case, I would have absolutely denied any hampered functioning while I was using psychedelic drugs. This self-deluding capacity of THC is one of the most difficult symptoms to deal with.

At this point I would like to keep my discussion in perspective. It is important to note that there are great individual differences among persons' reactions to the active constituents of cannabis and that the severity of long-term reactions differs with psychic predisposition, "set and setting," motives for use and the like. In general, the more potent cannabis used and the more frequently used, the higher the probability of detrimental side effects. Even so, we occasionally run across a person who has used marihuana for a long time and seems not to have experienced undesirable side effects. We must also remember that many other drugs, some available through illicit channels, can have equally undesirable side effects.

It is possible to get buried in comparisons and inundated with all kinds of contradictory medical data regarding THC. It helps me to remember that the burden of proof regarding drug effects of any newly researched chemical rests on its harmlessness. Any research showing no harmful results from a drug is much less significant than a study suggesting detrimental findings. After all, research techniques only lately were able to catalogue the effects of smoking on health. Then we remember the tragic case of Thalidomide, a drug which at first passed tests with flying colors, a drug which might have seemed much safer than THC at similar stages in research.

**Legal Controls:** Assuming that it is desirable for society to minimize the use of dangerous chemicals and that laws must be made somehow controlling dangerous substances, the following brief observations have occurred to me:

- (1) Marihuana should be treated in the same general way as other potentially dangerous substances;
- (2) Criminal laws against possession have not been a great deterrent among the young, and, in general, a penalistic approach to drug abuse is counterproductive;

(3) Sanctions against the possession of marihuana for use should be liberalized, but not abandoned;

(4) The major social effort for marihuana and other drug abuse must take a public health orientation and emphasize education;

(5) Any sanctions against drug use must also include an optional, non-criminal provision for treatment and education;

(6) Legalization of marihuana, in the same way as alcohol, would be unwise at this time. There is a significant deterrent effect among many portions of the adult population. Also, legalization might lead to a "crop-out" on the part of society in getting at the problems underlying drug abuse. We sometimes forget the massive problem of alcoholism, perhaps because we have accepted it as quite legal;

(7) Finally, drugs are not the problem; life in society is the problem, but also the challenge. The needs which lead to drug use must be satisfied in constructive ways. We must move toward education in meaningful alternatives, radical reforms in our educational system, and a creative approach to marihuana and drug abuse.

## SOCIAL SECURITY AND WELFARE REFORM

HON. J. EDWARD ROUSH

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. ROUSH. Mr. Speaker, several weeks ago, the House spent a great deal of time debating passage of H.R. 1, which embodies changes in the social security pension system, in medicare and in the welfare program. I voted for this whole package on Tuesday, June 22, not because I agreed with every item in this bill but because it contained essential features of great importance and value.

Under even the modified closed rule, I could not make certain changes I favored; therefore, I accepted what I considered to be imperfections in the total bill in order to make sure that the American people would reap the benefits of the many worthwhile provisions. I would like to list some of these which I think are important and which led me to support this legislation.

Under the new social security provisions, there will be a 5-percent increase in payments and an accompanying increase in the minimum payment from \$70.40 to \$74 a month. Almost \$5 million will be spent on retired persons in the Fourth Congressional District as a result of this provision.

For some time, social security beneficiaries have urged the adoption of an automatic cost-of-living increase in their benefits to fit the continuing rise in prices. H.R. 1 carries this reform and provides that the trigger for the increase will be a 3-percent climb in the Consumer Price Index.

Widows and widowers have had to make do with 82½ percent of the full benefit due their deceased spouses; now the full 100-percent benefit will be provided and this will provide almost \$2 million to widows and widowers in the Fourth Congressional District.

Equally needed was a raise in the amount of the income a retired person



could earn without losing social security benefits. H.R. 1 increases that amount from the present \$1,680 to \$2,000, making available an increase from \$140 to \$166.66 in the amount of wages a beneficiary may earn in a given month and still get full benefits for that month. An additional feature of this legislation is that only \$1 in benefits will be withheld for each \$2 of earnings above \$2,000 regardless of how high the earnings might be—instead of the present \$1 for \$1 reduction. This is a recognition of the need to increase the overall amount retirees receive and to encourage those who wish to work to do so. The fiscal impact of this change will mean about \$1.3 million in the Fourth Congressional District.

Additional changes provide for increased benefits for those who delay retiring until 72; equalization of the age computation for men with that of women—making both 62; election of full benefit at 65 even though another benefit has been taken at a reduced rate before that date; allowing the combination of income of a married working couple for the sake of benefits with each receiving a benefit equal to 75 percent of the benefits based on their combined earnings.

The number of significant changes in medicare is less. Of major importance is the fact that medicare coverage will be broadened to include persons entitled to disability benefits under the social security and railroad retirement programs, providing an additional \$2.9 million for disabled persons in the Fourth Congressional District.

People reaching age 65 who are ineligible for hospital insurance benefits under medicare will be able to enroll, on a voluntary basis and at their own expense, for hospital insurance coverage.

This is good news in the fact that the premiums paid by persons enrolled in the supplementary medical insurance program will be increased only in the event of a general increase in cash benefits, whereas in the past 5 years that premium has gone up almost 87 percent.

In addition, the number of hospital lifetime reserve days will be increased from 60 to 120 days. The idea is to provide for extended hospital care especially in the case of catastrophic illnesses.

For our retired citizens, these changes in social security benefits and medicare provisions are notable.

I believe the changes provided for needy, old persons, and disabled families are equally notable.

H.R. 1 establishes a new Federal program to provide financial assistance to needy persons who have reached age 65, or are blind or disabled. Benefits will increase over the next 3 years, with a single individual receiving monthly benefits of \$150 by 1974; an individual with an eligible spouse, \$200 by that time.

The two programs providing assistance for needy families offer important innovations that I felt worthy of support for the following changes made:

First, there will be a Federal floor of \$2,400 per year provided for a family of four with no income—with a maximum of \$3,600 for any family of eight or more.

This new program provides for the separation of needy families into two

distinct groups, those with an employable adult and those without an employable adult, with appropriate help tailored for each group; incentives and requirements for working and training for employable persons; a heavy investment in training and job placement with expanded child care, manpower training and public service employment; uniform requirements for eligibility for cash assistance, susceptible to effective, uniform administration with specific limitations and requirements.

This program also offers an efficient, modern, national administrative mechanism designed to assure that only those who are eligible receive benefits, while avoiding unproductive red tape and delay.

This program provides higher benefits than current levels in 22 States. Yet it costs the States less. Even if a State decides to supplement the Federal benefit to maintain its present payment level, including an increase to take account of the loss of the value of the food stamp bonus that results from this legislation, and decides to have the Federal Government administer the supplement payment, the State will be assured: First, that its benefit costs 1973 through 1977 will be no higher than its benefit expenditures in calendar year 1971, and second, that it will have a net savings for each of those years not less than an amount equal to the costs of administering the present program.

As a result of this legislation, Indiana can keep up its present level of payment, provide money in place of food stamps and still save almost \$9 million.

Many of the complaints against the present welfare system are that it is expensive; that the welfare loads continue to expand; that States vary widely in their payments; that welfare recipients have no incentive to work; that fatherless families are encouraged by State denials of welfare for low-income families headed by a father, employable or not; that the system is degrading and self-perpetuating.

I believe this new program will meet and overcome most of these difficulties, and is a welcome beginning in welfare reform.

#### COST OF U.N. TO CITY OF NEW YORK

### HON. BELLA S. ABZUG

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, the city of New York is proud to be the host of the United Nations. The U.N. is a powerful force for world peace, and I hope it comes to play an increasingly important role in a world which can no longer afford narrow nationalism.

In this as in a number of other areas, the city shoulders special expenses for activities conducted not just for itself but as a center of national diplomatic, business, and cultural affairs. It costs the city millions of dollars per year for expenses related to the United Nations. This includes costs of police protection at

the U.N. buildings, protection of foreign diplomats and consulates, as well as the tax loss the city takes on the untaxed U.N. buildings.

Last fall, the U.N. celebrated its 25th anniversary. A large number of heads of state and foreign ministers attended the celebration, at a time of great international concern about kidnappings of diplomats, plane hijackings, and tension over the persecution of Soviet Jews. It was necessary to pay large amounts of overtime for policemen assigned to extra tours at the U.N., and to divert large numbers of policemen from their regular assignments. The city incurred out-of-pocket costs of 1.1 million and diverted another 1.4 million worth of police manpower from other assignments.

Several bills have been introduced in this session of Congress to provide relief to the city for these expenses, both for those associated with the 25th anniversary and for the recurring, but nevertheless extraordinary, expenses incurred year by year in connection with the United Nations. H.R. 2572, which I have the honor of cosponsoring, provides for relief in the amount of approximately \$2.6 million for the expenses of the anniversary celebration. Other bills propose financial assistance to the city for protection expenses yearly, and provide for the extension of the Executive Protection Service on a regular basis to the city. I believe the problem demands a permanent solution in the form of one or the other of these proposals. However, in the absence of any such permanent relief, I believe the city is entitled to this claim for special and extraordinary expenses.

It may be argued that since the United Nations brings money into the city, the city should pay for expenses resulting from its presence. With reference to this, I would like to call attention to a Rand Corp. study of this question, as well as to the testimony of the mayor of New York before the Subcommittee on Claims of the House Judiciary Committee. Both of these sources indicate that the U.N. costs the city considerably more than it brings in. This is especially true in the light of the fact that tax exemption of the U.N. buildings costs the city about \$5.3 million a year which it would have otherwise collected in real estate taxes on the property. It is also worth noting that the city has a larger diplomatic community than Washington, D.C., with nearly 200 consulates and missions.

The administration supports legislation which would reimburse the city for its "out-of-pocket" direct costs for police overtime. This suggestion does not offer adequate compensation to the city. The city is entitled to reimbursement for the full cost of police protection for the anniversary expenses, including the cost of the police manpower which was diverted from regular assignments in the neighborhoods of the city to the U.N. site.

It is only fair that this financial burden be shared by the Federal Government. After all, it is not just the city but the United States as a whole that is the U.N.'s host. These expenses are a small enough price to pay for protection of an organization of the value of the U.N. They are a national responsibility.

CHET MOULTON OF BOISE, IDAHO

**HON. LEN B. JORDAN**

OF IDAHO

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. Mr. President, I would like to take a moment to pay tribute to my friend, Chet Moulton of Boise, Idaho, who served as director of the Idaho Department of Aeronautics from 1946 to 1971. Chet served as the first director of the department and can take credit for its many achievements during his tenure.

Under Chet's leadership, the department has compiled an enviable record in establishing a State aviation network and in search and rescue operations. He has received a good deal of well-deserved recognition for his efforts, including the Federal Aviation Administration's "Do it Yourself Award"; designation as "General Aviation Man of the Year" for 1970 by Flying magazine, and selection as Idaho's "State Employee of the Year" in 1967.

During my tenure as Governor of Idaho in the early fifties, I had an opportunity to get to know Chet and to fly with him. In addition to being a good friend, he is an excellent pilot and has the distinction of flying in excess of 2 million miles without an accident or rules violation.

Recently Idaho fliers and other friends of Chet got together at a "fly-in" to express their appreciation to him for his great service to them and to the State of Idaho. At that time he was presented with a fund which these people had collected with which he was instructed to purchase a pickup truck and camper so that he could take a vacation for the first time since beginning his tenure as Idaho's aviation director.

I was quite moved by Chet's response to this tribute by the Idaho fliers and I ask unanimous consent that his letter of thanks be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BOISE, IDAHO,  
June 30, 1971.

To: Idaho Pilots and Friends—

It was such a pleasure to work with and for the aviation fraternity during my service as Director of Aeronautics for the State of Idaho and I want to thank everyone who pitched in to help with the many programs and airports we collectively achieved for the Gem State's aviation facility asset.

As I end a quarter-century of public service to the people and aviation interests of Idaho, I have nothing in mind for the immediate future. I had a very challenging and rewarding job over these past 25 years and have enjoyed the fellowship of thousands of the finest people in the world. I am now going to take my first vacation and catch up on a little fishing as soon as the waters recede.

Two types of gratification stand out in such a job. One being achievement and the other how your fellow-man feels toward you and your work. When one has helped contribute in any small way to the structure of a hundred or more facilities to support and foster one of the newest and most important of all transportation mediums, the sense of personal achievement in the development of

your state's resource becomes a treasure of memories.

On the other hand, nothing has ever touched me so much in pleasure or emotional response as to learn that pilots and friends sponsored a fund to purchase a new pickup truck to be presented as a memorial "thank you" and "going away" tribute for 25 years of acceptable service to Idaho's aviation development. The "fund" has been received and was applied on June 25th toward a new Deluxe Model Chevrolet pickup.

Every time my wife and I head down the road, we will be warmly reminded of the fine people with whom we worked . . . and who made such a memorable gift a token of friendship.

We wish to express our appreciation and gratitude to you, as one of the Fund participants, for your thoughtfulness and tribute. It is with deep regret that we find ourselves suddenly severed from the work and associations we enjoyed so much and your kindness will be long remembered.

In appreciation,

CHET MOULTON.

**WOMEN AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS****HON. DONALD M. FRASER**

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, since we will soon be voting on the equal rights amendment, I feel that this article by Eulah Laucks on "Women and Constitutional Rights" is particularly informative. Mrs. Laucks is a member of the board of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in California and made these remarks at a recent center-sponsored series on the constitutional crisis. She points out that women all over the country are going to the courts for redress of grievances in the areas of employment, marriage, education, tax law, social security legislation. Leaving aside the problem of overloaded court calendars, she states that—

Clarification of the status of women by amendment to the Constitution should have the force of eliminating many of these contests.

She offers a rather pointed analysis of the reasons why Congress is so reluctant to pass an equal rights amendment:

The basic rule that has been adhered to up to the present is that woman must yield her rights as an individual to the presumed needs of social stability, as interpreted by men. This attitude stems from the Adam syndrome, which presumes women's God-directed inferiority to the male, and is rooted in English common law tradition, providing that the husband and wife are as one, and that one is the husband.

Since the passage of a women's rights amendment, and the greater activity of women in public life will require radical changes in this attitude, one can see why it will have taken almost fifty years to get the amendment out of Congressional cloak rooms.

Mrs. Laucks' article follows:

**WOMEN AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS**  
(By Eulah Laucks)

Despite what you may hear about the lunatic fringe of the women's liberation movement, the women's revolution in America is no joke. It is not a fad or a fashion that will soon fade away. I believe that

within twenty years those of us who live that long will be part of a society in which women will have as much to say and do about it as men will.

To substantiate this I might start by looking at what is happening in areas in higher education that in the past have been restricted to men. There is now at least one woman dean of a law school. In 1969 the California Institute of Technology hired its first woman professor and admitted women undergraduates. Yale University recently admitted rather a high percentage of women undergraduates. There are one hundred or more colleges and universities (among them Princeton, Cornell, Northwestern—and, of course, Radcliffe and Bryn Mawr) that are offering a wide range of courses in female studies for full credit. Some, like San Diego State, have full formal programs on women, with ten or more courses. Some medical schools are allowing women to raise families while training, and are even providing day-care centers for children, to encourage more women to enter the field.

**A WOMAN JUSTICE?**

Women are entering many formerly all-male job areas. There are now two hundred and fifty female air traffic controllers in the United States, and the Air Force is using their services frequently. We have a dozen or so women directors of major federal bureaus, and several women ambassadors. President Nixon is now being urged to name a woman to the Supreme Court. We already have women judges on state supreme courts and federal district courts.

In the masculine world of conducting symphonies, there is now a woman leading the American Symphony in New York's Lincoln Center, and an assistant female conductor at the New York Philharmonic orchestra. There is a woman crew member on a U.S. flag freighter and the first American woman scientist has been sent to conduct field studies in Antarctica. American women haven't made it yet in the atmospheric and space sciences, but they now comprise three per cent of the once strictly male earth and marine scientists.

In finance, several women have scaled the Wall Street citadel. One has a seat on the New York Stock Exchange, another is a member of the American Stock Exchange, a third is president of a major stock brokerage firm. The Chicago Board of Trade, world's largest commodities exchange, after one hundred and twenty years a male sanctum, admitted a woman last year. Women are now managing banks. One female president of a California national bank employs only women. A bank in St. Louis has a fifteen member women's advisory board of directors. There are at least two women at the head of large advertising agencies, who, by the way, are spending a good deal of time pressing for the elimination of moronic and insulting references in commercials and ads that portray women as simpletons.

And in spite of David Susskind, the proportion of serious programs and articles on women in the various media is steadily rising. As one writer put it: the entire communications industry is infiltrated by female Trojan horses and borers from within. There are indications that the men who run these media are listening with at least one ear.

**EQUAL OPPORTUNITY CHURCHES**

But what is happening to women in business and finance may have less impact in the long run on women's rights than what is happening to them in the Church. As an institution, the Church has practiced discrimination against women probably longer and more flagrantly than any institution in society. Now, there is a growing urgency in hierarchical discussions about finding ways to make it possible for women to take part in substantive Church affairs—even as priests and bishops. Theologians all over the world



are reexamining scriptural sources and dogma for guide lines in formulating new policies on women that will in some degree accord with modern realities. Seventy denominations around the world now permit the ordination of women to the ministry and almost all newly unified churches provide such rights for women. At the last Episcopal General Convention, a push for the ordination of women was defeated by only a narrow margin.

The Lutheran Church in America recently voted overwhelmingly to authorize ordination of women. Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, the United Church of Christ, and others already have clergywomen. In practically all churches, women are now quietly acquiring the academic credentials for roles as ministers.

In the Roman Catholic Church there are now some spring-like shoots of awareness popping up to proclaim a thaw. Pope Paul startled the world recently by appointing five women to posts in the Curia. That is a little like letting women join the Trappist monks. Paul has also elevated two female saints to "Doctor of the Church"—a position formerly for males only.

In many Roman Catholic dioceses, women have gained a foothold at the altar gates as lecturers, if not as occupants of the pulpit. And the theologians of a Roman Catholic commission on women's status in the Church declared a short time ago that there is no insurmountable Biblical or dogmatic obstacle to the ordination of women.

#### TEST CASES

Now, if I have at least partially convinced you that the women's revolution is a going thing, let me turn to some of the legal entanglements that will likely result in the years immediately ahead. Even though the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits job discrimination based on sex, as well as race; and even though twenty-five states have laws dictating equal pay for equal work, there still has been only limited enforcement of such rulings. Also, forty-three states still have so-called "protective" legislation in effect which prohibits women from working overtime, thus giving men unfair advantage when applying for jobs that sometimes require overtime.

Until recently, women have scarcely been aware of the possibilities open to them for redress of some of these inequities. Now, complaints and suits are proliferating all over the country. Betty Friedan, probably the most prominent American feminist, predicts that, in coming months, case after case will be pushed to the Supreme Court. What all this means in terms of already overloaded court calendars, I'll leave to the constitutional lawyers. However, this may be a good reason for hastening the passage of the proposed women's rights amendment. Clarification of the status of women by amendment to the Constitution should have the force of eliminating many of these contests.

#### OPENING PANDORA'S BOX

If and when the amendment is passed, and people become fully aware of the significance of its being literally "on the books," we shall be facing some very fundamental changes. What will happen to property laws, under which now in some states a woman's property and income are still under the control of her husband? In most states she cannot use her maiden name if her husband objects, and she can't maintain a separate domicile for tax or voting purposes. What of inheritance laws? Will the present community property laws, for example, as they relate to inheritance, have to be completely overhauled?

How will legal individuality for women, in areas where formerly their rights inhered in their husbands, affect income tax laws and social security regulations? I am not very

familiar with Social Security regulations; I understand there are inequities, especially for widows, and for divorced and single women in the latter. Certainly there are inequities now in income tax regulations relating to single persons. At any rate, when women are earning as much money as men are, the whole Social Security and income tax structure, and a lot else, may have to be changed.

What will happen to child custody procedures in divorce cases? Who will get the children: Will the mother still be the parent given preference for physical custody? Will the legal responsibility for child support be shared? Suppose overpopulation becomes critical to the point that laws are passed limiting the number of children a family may have. What constitutional rights will a woman have over her own body if she elects to have more children than the limit prescribes?

To paraphrase Professor Leo Kanowitz, in his book, *Women and the Law*, the basic rule that has been adhered to up to the present is that woman must yield her rights as an individual to the presumed needs of social stability, as interpreted by men. This attitude stems from the Adam syndrome, which presumes woman's God-directed inferiority to the male, and is rooted in English common law tradition, providing that the husband and wife are as one, and that one is the husband.

Since the passage of a women's rights amendment, and the greater activity of women in public life will require radical changes in this attitude, one can see why it will have taken almost fifty years to get the amendment out of Congressional cloak rooms!

#### RENT SUPPLEMENT HOUSING IN COLORADO

### HON. FRANK E. EVANS

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I recently read an article about not what is wrong, but rather what is right, at a rent supplement housing project in Colorado Springs. It is principally a story of how one man can make a difference, a big difference.

I commend the article, which was written by Bill Woestendiek for the Colorado Springs Sun, to my colleagues' attention:

#### THINKING OUT LOUD

(By Bill Woestendiek)

"I want to take care of the people. If we can't help each other, there's no reason to be on this earth. My mother always told me: 'Treat people right. Be good to people.'"

That's a pretty simple—and good philosophy. It works. It's a shame more of us don't practice it.

One man who does, and the man I was quoting above, is James H. Smith Sr., the project manager of Prince Hall Apartments, a government rent-supplement housing project on Southgate Road. I was privileged to sit in his office last week and talk about his "project."

Project manager is his official title, but it hardly begins to describe what this man does—and the results he gets. For Jim Smith is many things to the people who come to live in Prince Hall because they are financially handicapped.

He is a friend, a consultant, a helper, a minister, a playmate, a man dedicated to

taking "extra steps" to help people, because "that's what counts."

Jim Smith manages, guides, worries over 206 adults and 293 children who live in the apartments. The occupants consist of 11 black families, 30 Spanish American families, eight Indian families, 12 Mexican families; the rest are white families.

It's a harmonious group. Jim Smith happens to be a black man. His secretary is white. But the colors could be green and blue. It's the spirit of the man that counts, and his tenants love Jim Smith.

"If anybody here has any racial prejudices," Jim says, "I tell them they're at the wrong station. We're all going to respect the rights of each other."

When Jim walks out his office door ("the door is always open") into the yard, it's not surprising to see 50 kids rush up to him.

"We go to the ice cream parlor once in a while," he says with a smile. On his desk is a box of hard candy, which the children come in to get "once in a while."

Prince Hall Apartments are available to people of any race, creed, or color on a first come, first served basis. The only limitation is on income—one person cannot be making more than \$3,400, annually, seven people \$5,400. The minimum rent runs from \$42 to \$61; the government pays the rest.

Those eligible must be persons displaced by government action, either husband or wife 62 years of age or older, physically handicapped, now living in substandard housing or formerly occupied units destroyed by natural disaster.

I wasn't surprised when Jim told me Prince Hall has 100 percent occupancy. In the year since the project opened, Jim has done wonders. Just a few examples:

He held a Christmas party for 507 people. "I gave a Christmas bag to every human being." Those bags contained oranges, grapefruits, apples, mixed nuts and candy canes. ("I went into a bank, cold turkey, and asked for money. They donated it to me with no questions asked.")

He has, with dogged persistence, worked out a program with the YMCA whereby 39 Prince Hall children will go to Y camp this summer.

He has organized an advisory board, composed of tenants "to improve the environmental conditions of Prince Hall and the surrounding area."

Plus which, there has been less than one per cent damage to the apartments by tenants.

It's refreshing to see and talk with someone like Jim and the people who live in his project at a time when so many landlords and so many tenants in so many places seem always to be at each other's throats.

"I go to bed with these folks on my mind and I get up with them on my mind," Jim said. And it shows.

He helps them with welfare problems, legal aid, library assistance . . . "everything that comes up, I help." He has helped find furniture, provided food . . .

He was getting ready to leave to go visit two members of his "Prince Hall family" who were in the hospital.

Jim Smith came from a poor family. He was one of nine kids who stood in the soup line three times a day with a bowl and a spoon during the depression—and he remembers.

"Here I can do something to help humanity," he said.

And he is.

His tenants agree. Perhaps this excerpt from a note (one of many) he received from one of his tenants says it best:

"You probably wonder why I'm writing. I just want to tell you something that would be hard to say in person and I know you're a very busy person but I want to say thank you. For what? For a chance to have something I've always wanted. A beautiful place

to live, a place my son and I can be proud of. I'm so happy for the first time. . . .

"Thank you for letting me take the children caroling and then the 48 children for hot chocolate. We had a ball. . . .

"This is a wonderful thing you are doing. . . . God Bless You. . . ."

There was a P.S. "I hope there will never be a reason for you to regret letting us live here."

As Jim says, if we can't help each other, there is no reason for being on this earth.

**MRS. DEELEY: A DEDICATED  
PUBLIC SERVANT**

**HON. STEWART B. MCKINNEY**

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. MCKINNEY. Mr. Speaker, there are not many people who can look proudly back on 45 years of dedicated public service. One of the few who can, Mr. Speaker, is a resident of my district, Mrs. Mildred Deeley, of Stamford.

Recently, the Stamford Advocate published an interview with Mrs. Deeley and I found it to be not only a marvelous character study of this fine woman but a good look at the type of people who live in Connecticut. I would commend its contents to my colleagues. I would add that the author of the piece is a 19-year-old, Dick Vane, who I am sure you will agree has a promising future in journalism. A student at Trinity College, he is obviously learning quite a bit about the newspaper business in this, his second summer on the job.

As for Mrs. Deeley, all I can add to Dick's fine job is the thanks of all the people of the district for her unswerving dedication and a job well done.

45 HAPPY YEARS AT VEHICLE DEPT.—MRS.  
DEELEY LOVED TO AID PUBLIC

(By Dick Vane)

Mrs. Mildred Deeley of Stamford worked with the public for 45 years, as an employe and later as the manager of the Stamford Motor Vehicle Department.

And what does she think of the public—particularly the Stamford public?

"They're great," she said.

Mrs. Deeley, who never talked much about her job while she was doing it, still would not say a lot on the occasion of her retirement a few days ago. But about the people she worked with, and for, she was loquacious.

Mrs. Deeley was the manager of the Stamford Motor Vehicles Department from 1950 until she retired from the department. She had been with the Motor Vehicle bureau since 1926.

"My decision to retire was a very difficult one," said Mrs. Deeley, "and I think that in part what made it so difficult was that I knew if I retired that I would miss that public very much. I always found them very interesting and satisfying."

"I never felt like not going to work in the morning," continued the petite redhead. "Each day brought something new and different. I met many fascinating people during my years at the Stamford Motor Vehicle Department."

Mrs. Deeley, a life-long resident of Stamford, joined the Stamford Motor Vehicle Department in 1926 upon graduating from Stamford High School. Her first job with the

department was that of a clerk. She was the fifth member of an all-female staff.

In those days the Motor Vehicle Department was located on Atlantic St. where the Hartford National Bank currently is located. In 1948 the department was moved to Grove St., where it stayed until 1968 when it was moved to its present location on Magee Ave.

"When I first joined the department I really didn't think it would be my life's work," said Mrs. Deeley. "I just liked it and had no desire to change. Before I knew it, 45 years had passed by. I enjoyed every day of it."

"The type of people who live in Stamford has changed a great deal since I first began serving the public," said Mrs. Deeley.

"In the early days Stamford had more of a rural mind, the pace was slower and you could get to know the people you were dealing with a little better than you can today."

"Modern Stamford citizens have a more urban mind, and it's impossible to get to talk to them as much as I could earlier because we're dealing with so many people today. But, basically, I think the Stamford citizen isn't really any different because we're all basically the same."

Since Mrs. Deeley began working at Motor Vehicles, the staff has increased from five to 18 and the number of cars registered from hundreds to tens of thousands. Motorcycles, boat trailers, trucks, school buses and campers have also grown enormously in number, especially since Mrs. Deeley became the department's manager.

"People don't realize how much hard work it takes to keep the department running efficiently," said Mrs. Deeley. "But a good staff of dedicated people, and some wonderful superiors in Wethersfield made a tough job enjoyable."

Mrs. Pearl Butler, who worked with Mrs. Deeley for 23 years is supervising the department now. Mrs. Deeley is planning to go down to Florida, with the possibility, should she like the warm weather, of making her stay there a permanent one.

But one would expect that many Stamford people hope that Mrs. Deeley's trip to Florida is only a visit and that she will come back to Stamford, because when the public knows that a public official looks forward to seeing the public the public looks forward to seeing her, too.

**HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE  
ACTION ON GREECE AP-  
PLAUDED**

**HON. DON EDWARDS**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 20, 1971

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, for those dedicated to the cause of democracy the recent action of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in suspending aid to Greece and Pakistan gives renewed hope that we as a country will no longer support the suppression of this precious form of government by other countries. In a time when our Government leans far too heavily on the Pentagon for advice in foreign affairs, the members of this committee are to be commended for seeing through the maze of military tactics and objectives to the real issue that the United States ought not support a dictatorship in the country that was the cradle of democracy. In particular, we owe our thanks to the Honorable BENJAMIN ROSENTHAL, chair-

man of the Europe Subcommittee, and the Honorable WAYNE HAYS, who led the fight against continuing aid to Greece. Mr. Speaker, I present for the consideration of my fellow colleagues the editorial in yesterday's New York Times. It is worthy of our consideration and the consideration of the administration:

**A HOUSE COMMITTEE REBELS**

A majority of the House Foreign Affairs Committee has finally rebelled against stale and spurious arguments of the Defense and State Departments and voted to cut off aid to the military regimes of Greece and Pakistan. Rather than attempting feverishly to overturn the decision in the full House, the Nixon Administration should try to understand what this usually docile committee majority was telling it with these votes.

Chairman Thomas E. Morgan and colleagues of both parties were endeavoring first of all to reassert the proper role of this committee in the shaping of foreign policy. The Administration henceforth can expect many more such challenges from both houses as Congress strives to restore a long-absent balance between executive and legislative branches in foreign affairs.

Secondly, the majority was rejecting the notion that it is always unwise for the United States to rock the diplomatic boat by suspending military or economic aid to dictatorships that fall to make good their commitments to their own oppressed people. In voting to cut off nearly \$132 million in aid to Pakistan, the committee was taking a stand previously advocated by the World Bank in light of the Yahya Khan regime's bloody repression in East Pakistan. Aid could be resumed under certain conditions but in any case the cutoff would not bar the use of \$100 million approved earlier by the committee for refugee relief.

Action to halt aid to Greece resulted directly from testimony last week before a Foreign Affairs subcommittee headed by Representative Benjamin Rosenthal of Queens. Here some members learned, evidently for the first time, that the 1967 coup had not been an action of military leaders to head off Communism, as so frequently represented, but "an open mutiny within the armed forces and a rebellion by those mutineers against their King and the constitutional Government of Greece."

The man who said this was Col. Oliver Marshall, now retired, American Defense and Army attaché in Athens, 1963-67. He sees "the greatest danger to future Greek-American and Greek-NATO relationships" in the widely-held belief that "the United States supported this military mutiny and continues to do so." In other words, by sustaining the junta this country will jeopardize its own and NATO's security rather than protect it.

Colonel Marshall advocated an all-out effort to convince Greeks that the United States does not back the junta and to persuade the junta to keep its promise to restore democratic government. Contradicting the State-Pentagon line, he said this effort should take priority over "our immediate military needs on Greek soil."

In the Greek case, the President can resume aid if he reports to Congress that the overriding security requirements of the United States justify it. Even then, however, the military aid would be resumed at the current annual level of \$80.3 million rather than the \$118 million the Administration requested.

The Foreign Affairs Committee has projected the national interest on a broader canvas than that employed by the State and Defense Departments. It would be foolhardy for the Administration to ignore the meaning of its actions.