[Deschler-Brown Precedents, Volume 12, Chapter 29 (Sections 1-34), Volume 13, Chapter 29 (Sections 35-end, plus index)]
[Chapter 29. Consideration and Debate]
[F. Disorder in Debate]
[§ 47. Criticism of Executive and Governmental Officials; References to Presidential or Vice-Presidential Candidates]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
[Page 10644-10662]
CHAPTER 29
Consideration and Debate
E. RELEVANCY IN DEBATE
Sec. 47. Criticism of Executive and Governmental Officials; References
to Presidential or Vice-Presidential Candidates
Members are permitted wide latitude to criticize the President,
[[Page 10645]]
other officials of the executive branch, and the government it-self,
contrary to the English parliamentary law which prohibits speaking
``irreverently or seditiously against the King.'' (18) A
Member may criticize the motives or action of the President or of other
executive officials,(19) but such disapproval may not extend
to personal attacks, innuendo, or ridicule.(20) The Chief
Executive must be referred to in debate as the President or Chief
Executive and not by surname.(1)
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18. See Jefferson's Manual, House Rules and Manual Sec. 370 (1995) for
the English rule and the differing practice of the House.
U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 6, clause 1 protects Members from
being questioned outside the House for any reference to the
executive branch. See, in general, Ch. 7, supra.
19. See Sec. Sec. 47.3, 47.4, infra; 5 Hinds' Precedents
Sec. Sec. 5087-5091; 8 Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 2499,
2500.
The precedents on comity, which prohibit most references in
debate to the Senate or Senators, do not apply to the Vice
President, who may preside over the Senate but is not a member
(see Sec. 47.9, infra).
20. See Sec. 47.1, infra; 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 5094; and 8 Cannon's
Precedents Sec. 2497.
1. See Sec. 47.1, infra.
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Members may employ strong language in criticizing the
government,(2) government agencies,(3) and
governmental policies.
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2. See Sec. Sec. 47.3, 47.5, 47.6, infra.
3. See Sec. 47.4, infra.
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In debating propositions to impeach, Members may freely discuss
charges and the basis for them,(4) but may not resort to
personally offensive language.(5)
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4. See Sec. Sec. 47.7, 47.8, infra; 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 5093.
5. See the report prepared by a select committee pursuant to H. Res.
494, 60th Cong. 2d Sess., and cited at 8 Cannon's Precedents
Sec. 2497. See also 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 5094 for
personally offensive and unparliamentary language used in
reference to President Andrew Johnson when being impeached.
Impeachment proceedings and references to respondent, see Ch.
14, supra. -------------------
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Reference to President
Sec. 47.1 In discussing the President of the United States in debate a
Member may not refer to him contemptuously or by surname.
On Jan. 23, 1933,(6) Mr. James M. Beck, of Pennsylvania,
arose to a point of order and stated as follows:
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6. 76 Cong. Rec. 2297, 72d Cong. 2d Sess.
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The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McFadden] who is now
addressing the House has on more than one occasion in the course of
his address referred to the President of the United States as
``Hoover.'' My point of order is that it does not accord with the
dig
[[Page 10646]]
nity of this House that the President of the United States should
be contemptuously referred to by his last name.
Speaker Pro Tempore Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, sustained the
point of order.
Sec. 47.2 A statement in debate that a Member would have no more reason
for criticizing the administration than for ``shoving the Vice
President around'' was held not a breach of order.
On June 10, 1964,(7) Mr. Wayne L. Hays, of Ohio, stated
in response to a comment critical of the present administration, ``You
would not have any more reason for criticizing the administration than
you would for shoving the Vice President around in Dallas.'' (Addressed
to Mr. Edgar Franklin Foreman [Tex.]).
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7. 110 Cong. Rec. 13275, 88th Cong. 2d Sess.
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The words were demanded to be taken down, and Speaker John W.
McCormack, of Massachusetts, ruled that there was nothing objectionable
or in violation of the rules of the House in the language used, being
simply an opinion by Mr. Hays.
Conduct of Government Officials
Sec. 47.3 In debate Members may arraign in strong terms the conduct of
officials of the executive branch of the government.
On Oct. 1, 1940,(8) Mr. John C. Schafer, of Wisconsin,
delivered the following remarks in debate:
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8. 86 Cong. Rec. 12985, 12986, 76th Cong. 3d Sess.
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. . . God knows our half-baked nitwits who are handling the
foreign affairs have been carrying on a course of conduct which
inevitably will plunge us into the new European war. . . .
Mr. Sam Hobbs, of Alabama, demanded that those words be taken down,
and Speaker Pro Tempore Jere Cooper, of Tennessee, ruled that the words
were not a breach of order since they did not refer to Members of the
House but to certain officials in the executive branch of the
government.
Characterization of Government Agency
Sec. 47.4 A statement in debate referring to a federal agency as a
socialist and communist experiment was held not to reflect upon the
membership of the House and not to be a breach of order.
On Mar. 31, 1954,(9) Mr. Ralph W. Gwinn, of New York,
speaking on an amendment before the Com
[[Page 10647]]
mittee of the Whole stated as follows: ``Mr. Chairman, we have had 20
years' experience now with America's first, much-touted, great,
Socialist, Communist experiment.'' (Referring to the Tennessee Valley
Authority) Mr. James P. Sutton, of Tennessee, demanded that the words
be taken down, and Speaker Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts,
ruled, after Mr. Gwinn unsuccessfully attempted to read a definition of
communism, that nothing in the language cited reflected upon the
membership of the House or would otherwise be considered
unparliamentary.
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9. 100 Cong. Rec. 4221, 83d Cong. 2d Sess.
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General Criticism of Government
Sec. 47.5 A statement in debate characterizing the national government
as a ``labor government, rapidly headed into a labor dictatorship,
which, if not checked, will soon run into labor despotism'' was
held merely an expression of opinion and not a breach of order.
On Feb. 26, 1942,(10) Mr. Edward E. Cox, of Georgia,
stated in debate: ``We are already living under a labor government,
rapidly headed into a labor dictatorship, which, if not checked, will
soon run into labor despotism.'' Mr. Raymond S. McKeough, of Illinois,
demanded that the words be tak-en down and Speaker Sam Rayburn, of
Texas, ruled as follows:
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10. 88 Cong. Rec. 1714, 77th Cong. 2d Sess.
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Whatever might be the opinion of anybody who occupies this
place, the present occupant would think that it would be going very
far, even though words were harsh, if Members were precluded from
expressing an opinion with respect to a Government tendency. The
Chair sees only in these words the expression of an opinion by the
gentleman from Georgia and therefore feels constrained to hold that
they are not unparliamentary.
Sec. 47.6 The Speaker held that language condemning the government as
having become ``something hated, something oppressive'' did not
transgress House rules.
On June 14, 1929,(11) the following words were used in
debate by Mr. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, of New York, ``Why, Mr. Speaker,
Uncle Sam, the United States Government, was always considered by the
American people as something kindly, something to love; instead, now,
it has become something hated, something oppressive.'' Mr. B. Frank
Murphy,
[[Page 10648]]
of Ohio, demanded that the words be taken down, and Speaker Pro Tempore
Thomas S. Williams, of Illinois, ruled that ``the gentleman from New
York was merely condemning a measure that has been enacted into law.
That certainly does not transgress any rule of the House and the Chair
holds the words to be in order.''
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11. 71 Cong. Rec. 2924, 71st Cong. 1st Sess.
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Debate on Impeachment
Sec. 47.7 In presenting impeachment charges a Member is not confined to
a bare statement of the charges but may supplement them with
argumentative statements as to the official in question.
On May 7, 1935,(12) Mr. Everett M. Dirksen, of Illinois,
rose in order to prefer charges of impeachment against a federal judge.
During Mr. Dirksen's address, during which he stated his personal
opinion of the judge in question and of other federal judges, Mr.
Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, arose to state as follows:
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12. 79 Cong. Rec. 7081, 74th Cong. 1st Sess.
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I am not familiar with the precedents, but I have the
impression that in preferring charges of impeachment, argumentative
statements should be avoided as much as possible. If I am wrong in
that statement with reference to what the precedents and custom
have established, I of course withdraw the
observation.(13)
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13. Id. at p. 7085.
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Mr. Dirksen stated that he had no desire to violate the precedents
but stated that there were two additional pages of explanatory matter
which he desired either to state to the House or to insert into the
Record to elaborate the statement of specific charges that had been
made. Speaker Joseph W. Byrns, of Tennessee, ruled as follows:
The Chair thinks it is entirely up to the gentleman from
Illinois so far as the propriety of his statement is
concerned.(14)
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14. Id.
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Similarly, on Jan. 14, 1936, Mr. Robert A. Green, of Florida, arose
to present impeachment charges against a federal judge.(15)
Mr. Carl E. Mapes, of Michigan, rose to state a point of order that Mr.
Green was presenting argumentative and personal statements, after Mr.
Green had delivered the following remarks:
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15. 80 Cong. Rec. 404, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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. . . I am vitally interested in this investigation for two
important reasons: First, from a careful study of the evidence I am
convinced that Judge Ritter is an ignorant, unjust, tyrannical, and
corrupt judge; that a majority of the people in his district have
the same convictions that I have; that
[[Page 10649]]
confidence in him and his court is lacking; that his usefulness as
a judge of the southern district of Florida has long since come to
an end. Second, a large portion of the district over which Judge
Ritter presides is in my congressional district, and my people
demand and feel that they are entitled to a judge learned in the
law and one who has dignity, honor, and integrity.(16)
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16. Id. at p. 405.
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Speaker Byrns ruled that Mr. Green was entitled to one hour's
debate on the charges and that he could use all or any portion of the
hour as he saw fit, including a general discussion of the
charges.(17)
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17. Id. at p. 406.
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Sec. 47.8 In debating articles of impeachment a Member may refer to the
political, social, and family background of the accused.
On Mar. 2, 1936, Mr. Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, called up for
consideration House Resolution 422, presenting articles of impeachment
against Federal Judge Halsted L. Ritter.(18) Extensive
debate ensued on the resolution, and Mr. Louis Ludlow, of Indiana,
arose to present himself as a ``character witness'' on behalf of Judge
Ritter. He began to discuss the family background of the accused and
the ``outstanding character and personality'' of the accused's father.
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18. 80 Cong. Rec. 3066, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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Mr. Malcolm C. Tarver, of Georgia, arose to state the point of
order that Mr. Ludlow was ``endeavoring to read into the Record a
statement with regard to the progenitors of the gentleman against whom
these impeachment proceedings are pending.'' Mr. Tarver stated that
such matters were not properly to be considered by the House and should
not be discussed.(19)
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19. Id. at p. 3069.
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Speaker Joseph W. Byrns, of Tennessee, ruled that within the four
and one-half hours of debate provided for on the resolution, Members
could address themselves to any subject relating to the articles of
impeachment and the accused.(20)
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20. Id.
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Application of Rule of Comity
Sec. 47.9 The Minority Leader stated that the rule of comity,
prohibiting any reference in the House to the Senate or to
Senators, was not applicable to criticisms in debate of the Vice
President as an official of the executive branch, the Vice
President not being a member of the Senate.
[[Page 10650]]
On July 22, 1971,(1) Mr. John H. Dent, of Pennsylvania,
referred critically in debate to Vice President Spiro T. Agnew. The
Minority Leader, Gerald R. Ford, of Michigan, responded that Mr. Dent's
remarks were inappropriate and in poor taste, and then discussed in the
same context a special-order speech made on the preceding day by Mr.
William L. Clay, of Missouri:
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1. 117 Cong. Rec. 26654, 92d Cong. 1st Sess.
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. . . If I could, let me add another comment at this point: in
a special order yesterday one of the gentlemen from the other side
of the aisle, on page 26517, used language in reference to a high
official in the U.S. Government that I have never seen used or
heard used in this Chamber. I have checked it out, and apparently
under the rules of the House, that language of the gentleman from
Missouri is not subject to the rules of the House because the Vice
President is not a Member of the other body.
Mr. [Wayne L.] Hays [of Ohio]: May I say to the gentleman----
Mr. Gerald R. Ford: May I finish my thought? And I appreciate
the gentleman giving me this time.
I cannot imagine somebody in this body on either side of the
aisle using language of that kind on the floor of the House in
reference to the second ranking Member of the U.S. Government in
the executive branch. I could appropriately categorize that
language in one way or another, but I would have to use language,
in my opinion, that would violate the rules of the House.
It seems to me that the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Clay) for
having used that language, owes an apology to the House and an
apology to the Vice President.
References to Senators, Candidates for President
Sec. 47.10 Although it is not in order in debate to criticize a member
of the Senate, where a Senator is also a candidate for President or
Vice President, his official policies, actions, and opinions as a
candidate may be criticized in terms not personally offensive.
On Sept. 29, 1988,(2) Speaker James C. Wright, Jr., of
Texas, set forth the principles governing references to candidates for
President or Vice-President, particularly where a candidate is a member
of the Senate. On that day, after a demand that words uttered in debate
be taken down as unparliamentary, the Speaker ruled that the remarks
characterizing the relationship between Senator and Vice-Presidential
candidate J. Danforth Quayle's political words and his living deeds as
``hypoc
[[Page 10651]]
risy'' were out of order and should be withdrawn:
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2. 134 Cong. Rec. 26683, 26684, 100th Cong. 2d Sess.
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(Mr. Williams asked and was given permission to address the
House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. [Pat] Williams [of Montana]: Mr. Speaker, yesterday
Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Dan Quayle was in Texas. He
visited, he was kind enough to go by and visit a Job Corps center
in El Paso, and while there he looked 300 Job Corps students in the
eye and said, ``We believe in you.''
He did not tell them that he had voted to shut that center
down. He did not tell them that the Reagan-Bush administration in
fact has demanded that every Job Corps center in America, bar none,
be closed.
This is the same Senator Quayle that supports wars that he
won't fight, the same Senator Quayle who got into law school under
an entry minority program that he later votes against.
There is a word for it, my colleagues, it is called hypocrisy.
Mr. [Dan] Lungren [of California]: Mr. Speaker, I ask that the
gentleman's words be taken down. . . .
The Speaker: The Clerk will report the words of the gentleman
from Montana.
The Clerk read as follows:
This is the same Senator Quayle that supports wars that he
won't fight, the same Senator Quayle who got into law school
under an entry minority program that he later votes against.
There is a word for it, my colleagues, it is called
hypocrisy.
The Speaker: The Chair has considered closely the question of
the use of words to distinguish policies as opposed to individuals.
There are precedents touching on proper and improper references in
debate and dealing with the preservation of comity between the
House and Senate. It is important to recognize that the individual
referenced in the remarks not only is a candidate for Vice
President of the United States but is a Member of the other body.
The precedents relating to references in debate to the
President, Vice President, or to a Member of the other body who is
a nominated or declared candidate for President or Vice President
permit criticisms of official policy, actions and opinions of that
person as a candidate, but do not permit personal abuse, do not
permit innuendo and do not permit ridicule, and they do require
that the proper rules of decorum must be followed during any debate
relating to the President of the United States or a Member of the
other body.
It could be argued that there is a distinction between calling
an individual a hypocrite, for example, and referring to some
policy as hypocrisy, but the Chair has discovered a precedent that
seems to be directly in point. In 1945, a Member of the House from
Georgia referred to another Member and said, ``I was reminded that
pretexts are never wanting when hypocrisy wishes to add malice to
falsehood or cowardice to stab a foe who cannot defend himself.''
Speaker Rayburn ruled that this was out of order as an
unparliamentary reference to another Member of the body.
By extension, the same identical words should be held out of
order in reference to a Member of the other body whether or not he
were a can
[[Page 10652]]
didate for a high office, and under these circumstances and citing
this precedent, the Chair would suggest that the gentleman from
Montana withdraw the offending remarks, including the particular
word ``hypocrisy,'' and either amend his reference in the permanent
Record or delete it. . . .
Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, do I understand correctly that the
Speaker's ruling is based upon my characterization of a U.S.
Senator, in this case Senator Quayle, that had the Republican Vice-
Presidential candidate not been at this time a U.S. Senator, that
my remarks would, in fact, be in order? . . .
The Speaker: . . . The Chair would suggest to the gentleman
from Montana that there are standards that apply in the Chamber and
in the precedents with respect to nominated candidates for
President and Vice President. The Chair is not certain if they are
precisely the same as applied to a Member of the other body or a
Member of this body, but in this instance, it is not necessary to
make that hypothetical distinction since the individual involved is
a Member of the other body.
Mr. Williams: Further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker: Would
it be within the rules of the House if the last sentence of my 1-
minute, the one which characterizes Senator Quayle's actions as
hypocrisy, be removed by unanimous consent from my 1-minute
statement?
The Speaker: The Chair would suggest to the gentleman from
Montana that this might be a satisfactory solution.
Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the
last sentence of my 1-minute statement, the sentence in which I
characterized Senator Quayle's actions as hypocrisy, be stricken.
Mr. Lungren: Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry.
The Speaker: Please, the Chair will recognize the gentleman for
a parliamentary inquiry, but, first, please permit the gentleman
from Montana to complete his request. . . .
Mr. Lungren: I reserve the right to object, Mr. Speaker.
The Speaker: That is fine. The gentleman may reserve his right
to object, but in the interests of orderly procedure, permit the
Chair to allow the gentleman from Montana to complete his request.
Mr. Williams: Let me be sure the Chair understands my request:
I have asked unanimous consent that the last sentence of my 1-
minute statement be stricken. . . .
The Speaker: . . . Has the gentleman from Montana completed his
request?
Mr. Williams: No, Mr. Speaker, I have not. Both times I have
been interrupted as I have attempted to ask unanimous consent that
the last sentence of my 1-minute statement be eliminated. That was
the sentence which referred to Senator Quayle's actions as
hypocrisy. I seek unanimous consent to strike the last sentence of
my 1-minute statement.
The Speaker: Is there objection to the request of the gentleman
from Montana?
Mr. Lungren: Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, Mr.
Speaker, under normal circumstances and in the interests of comity
of this House and
[[Page 10653]]
the relationship of this House and the other body, I would not
object. However, as is very obvious from the statements of the
gentleman, the insult, the language that is not to be used under
our rules was repeated three times in an effort to make a point
which violates, in my judgment, the sense of the rules of the House
and, therefore, since it is not, I believe, appropriate to do that,
I object.
The Speaker: Objection is heard.
References to President Made Outside Chamber
Sec. 47.11 The Minority Leader took the floor to criticize the Speaker
for making certain remarks in his daily press conference concerning
the President of the United States.
On July 25, 1984,(3) the following statement was made on
the floor by Minority Leader Robert H. Michel, of Illinois:
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3. 130 Cong. Rec. 20931, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
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Mr. Michel: Mr. Speaker, a few moments ago the distinguished
majority leader referred to the President as ``intellectually
dishonest.''
Mr. Speaker, on July 19, 1984, United Press International
reported that the Speaker of the House said the following things
about the President of the United States--and I quote:
The evil is in the White House at the present time . . .
and that evil is a man who has no care and no concern for the
working class . . . He's cold. He's mean. He's got ice water
for blood.
In almost 30 years in the House, I have never heard such
abusive language used by a Speaker of the House about the President
of the United States. . . .
There are precedents in our House rules forbidding personal
abuse of a President on the floor of the House.
Surely the spirit of these rules ought to be adhered to by the
Speaker off the floor as well as on the floor.
Parliamentarian's Note: While there are precedents indicating that
it is a breach of order in debate to refer to the President
disrespectfully,(4) the principle has not been extended to
statements made outside the Chamber.
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4. See 8 Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 2497, 2498.
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Inserting in Record Remarks Made in Press Critical of President
Sec. 47.12 In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Chair, while
declining to rule on the propriety in prior debates of certain
references to the President, indicated that a more permissive
standard than that applicable to references to a sitting Member
does not permit language personally abusive of the President.
[[Page 10654]]
The following proceedings occurred in the House on Feb. 25, 1985:
(5)
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5. 131 Cong. Rec. 3344-47, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
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The Speaker Pro Tempore:(6) Under a previous order
of the House, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Gingrich) is
recognized for 60 minutes.
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6. Sam B. Hall, Jr. (Tex.).
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Mr. [Newt] Gingrich [of Georgia]: Mr. Speaker, I am going to
insert in the Record today and read into the Record several
editorials, one from the Atlanta Journal and Constitution
yesterday, Sunday, February 24, and one this morning from the Wall
Street Journal. . . .
Yet twice the House has voted to deny McIntyre the seat
while it investigates. . . .
A few Republicans near each election try to remind voters
that the Democrats' first vote will be for O'Neill and that
vote signals bondage. This year it meant the abandonment of
fairness. . . .
Mr. Gingrich: . . . I was asking the Chair to rule in this sort
of setting if one is reporting to the House on the written opinion
of a columnist in which the columnist has said very strong things,
is it appropriate for the House to be informed of this and, if so,
what is the correct procedure?
The Speaker Pro Tempore: The ruling of the Chair is that the
gentleman should not read into the Record things which would
clearly be outside the rules of this House. . . .
Mr. Gingrich: If I may continue a moment to ask the gentleman,
if we are in a situation where in the view of some people, such as
Mr. Williams of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, very strong
things are legitimately being said, and this is obviously his
viewpoint, what is the appropriate manner in which to report his
language to the House?
That is not me saying these things; he is saying these things.
The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman knows the rules of the
House, I am certain, and he can take out or delete any things that
he knows would violate the rules of this House if spoken from the
floor. . . .
Mr. Gingrich: If I may reclaim my time and also ask the Chair .
. . would the Chair uphold the same precedents on the
unparliamentary remarks with respect to the President of the United
States?
The Speaker Pro Tempore: If they violate the rules of the House
the Chair would certainly do that. If the President is personally
being abused on the floor of this House, the Chair would do so. . .
.
Anyone could raise a point of order concerning such language,
and the Chair cannot now say how the Chair would rule. . . .
Mr. Gingrich: But it is the Chair's--I will yield in just a
second--but it would be the Chair's understanding, or the Chair's
inclination that the President has the same basic protection as a
Member of the House in terms of his name?
The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman would recognize that it
is not quite the same standard, but nonetheless anyone, of course,
is capable of making an objection.
In Cannon's Procedure, as to the President, section 370, it
says:
[[Page 10655]]
The principles of decorum and courtesy governing the
relations of the two Houses should extend to the relations of
the House with the President. In referring to the President a
Member shall abstain from language personally offensive and
shall eschew terms of [opprobrium]. It is the duty of the House
to protect the President from personal abuse or innuendo.
Mr. Gingrich: So about a year ago when the very distinguished
majority leader referred to him I think 16 times in 1 minute, using
words like ``untrue'' and ``lie''----
The Speaker Pro Tempore: First of all let the Chair say to the
gentleman from Georgia that the Chair is not going to rule on
something that happened before. . . .
The Chair heard no objection to that speech to which the
gentleman is referring.
Addressing President in Debate
Sec. 47.13 Although Members may discuss past and present Presidential
actions and suggest possible future Presidential actions, it is not
in order to address remarks in debate directly to the President, as
in the second person.
On Oct. 16, 1989,(7) during the period for one-minute
speeches in the House, the Speaker cautioned Members against a renewed
tendency to address remarks in debate directly to the President.
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7. 135 Cong. Rec. 24715, 101st Cong. 1st Sess.
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Mr. [Robert G.] Torricelli [of New Jersey]: Mr. Speaker, George
Bush's honeymoon is most assuredly now over. . . .
Mr. President, it is time to get to work, time to decide why is
it you sought the Presidency, to tell us where it is you would take
America. . . .
Mr. President, listen to this, if you will, from the president
of the Chase Manhattan Bank: ``There are some very significant
issues out there such as the fiscal deficit, our relations with
Japan, that have to be the subject of major initiatives. I'd like
to see that initiative, and I haven't. There is no agenda.''
Mr. President, listen to not only your critics but to your
fans. It is time to lead our country.
The Speaker: (8) As the Chair announced on July 23,
1987, it is not in order to address the President in debate.
Members must address their remarks to the Chair. Although Members
may discuss past and present Presidential actions and suggest
possible future Presidential actions, they may not directly address
the President, as in the second person.(9)
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8. Thomas S. Foley (Wash.).
9. See also the proceedings of May 17, 1989 (remarks of Mrs. Barbara
Boxer, of California); and, in the 101st Cong. 2d Sess., the
proceedings of May 8, 1990 (remarks of Mr. Richard J. Durbin,
of Illinois) and May 9, 1990 (remarks of Mr. Charles E.
Schumer, of New York).
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Sec. 47.14 Under clause 1 of Rule XIV, remarks in debate
[[Page 10656]]
should be addressed to the Chair, and it is not in order to direct
remarks outside the Chamber or to address others, including the
President, in the second person.
During a one-minute speech in the House on Oct. 11,
1990,(10) the Chair admonished a Member against directing
his remarks to any individual other than the Chair. The proceedings
were as follows:
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10. 136 Cong. Rec. p. ____, 101st Cong. 2d Sess.
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Mr. [Les] AuCoin [of Oregon]: Mr. Speaker, I am truly amazed at
the President's flip-flop on whether the wealthy should pay their
fair share of income taxes. . . .
Well, Mr. President, you were elected to know what to do.
The American people are confused. They want you to lead. Let me
make a suggestion:
Drop your commitment to no new taxes for your rich friends, and
take a stand for the middle class and say, ``I am with you. I'm
going to make this Tax Code fair for American working families.'' .
. .
The Speaker Pro Tempore: (11) The Chair is
constrained to remind Members that it is not proper directly to
address the President from the floor.
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11. Romano L. Mazzoli (Ky.).
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Unparliamentary References to President
Sec. 47.15 Language in debate charging that the President has been
``intellectually dishonest'' is a breach of order connoting an
intent to deceive that is personally abusive of the President; the
Chair clarified his ruling in this instance by comparing similar
words that were distinguishable in connotation.
On May 9, 1990,(12) following an admonition to a Member
to refrain from unparliamentary references to the President, the Chair
clarified that earlier ruling, as indicated below:
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12. 136 Cong. Rec. 9828, 9829, 101st Cong. 2d Sess.
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(Mr. Torricelli asked and was given permission to address the
House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. [Robert G.] Torricelli [of New Jersey]: Mr. Speaker, you
heard it here today: Republican Member after Republican Member
taking the floor, predicting that the President will never raise
taxes.
I am here to predict that he will raise taxes. And, Mr.
Speaker, we are both right because no doubt, for the President's
friends, for those of privilege in America he will never raise
taxes.
But for you and for me and for the overwhelming majority of
Americans, he is--he says that he is going to, and he is about
doing it. It isn't, Mr. Speaker, that the President is
intellectually dishonest, though indeed in the last election he
was. It is about the fact that he has a $500 billion----
[[Page 10657]]
Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I ask
that the gentleman's words be taken down.
[The words in question were held to be unparliamentary, the
Speaker Pro Tempore (13) stating as follows:]
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13. John P. Murtha (Pa.).
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In referring to the President during debate a Member shall
abstain from ``terms of approbrium,'' such as calling the President
a ``liar''--V, 5094, VIII, 2498.
Subsequently in the proceedings, the Chair stated as follows:
The Speaker Pro Tempore: If the Chair could have order, let the
Chair clarify his ruling.
The Chair would like to clarify his earlier ruling on the words
of the gentleman from New Jersey.
The Chair does not believe that an allegation of intellectual
inconsistency is necessarily unparliamentary.
However, to whatever extent the phrase ``intellectual
dishonesty'' may connote an intent to deceive, the Chair believes
that it does tend to be personally offensive and therefore
unparliamentary.
Sec. 47.16 Debate may not include remarks personally offensive toward
the President, including references to accusations of sexual
misconduct, and the Chair will caution Members against using such
personally offensive references.
On May 10, 1994,(14) in response to frequent remarks
relative to allegations of sexual misconduct by the President, the
Speaker reminded all Members that the rules of comity prevent
discussions of the President's personal character.
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14. 140 Cong. Rec. p. ____, 103d Cong. 2d Sess.
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The Speaker: (15) Under the Speaker's announced
policy of February 11, 1994, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith)
is recognized during morning business for 5 minutes.
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15. Thomas S. Foley (Wash.).
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Mr. [Lamar S.] Smith of Texas: Mr. Speaker, a few days ago
Newsweek published an article the likes of which I have never seen
before concerning a current President. Titled ``The Politics of
Promiscuity,'' it examines the basic question of President
Clinton's character. . . .
The Newsweek author is not talking about promiscuity's most
common meaning, but its fullest meaning--casual or irregular
behavior. Whether at home or abroad, this kind of careless,
cavalier conduct has been the trademark of this administration. . .
.
President Clinton's financial dealings are a case in point. . .
.
The President has insisted that he lost money on his financial
transactions and he believes that should be the end of the
discussion. . . .
The question is not whether money was made, but why was he
involved in the first place? And the answer is that he had no
business doing business with people whose business it was his
business to regulate.
If this fault were the only lapse--or if the administration's
faults were only lapses--then there would not be such a
[[Page 10658]]
cause for concern. But as the administration's faults continue to
mount and continue to erode America's foundations, it becomes daily
more obvious that they are not lapses. They are not strayings from
a shared path of principles, but a new route of questionable rights
and values altogether. . . .
The Newsweek article observes President Clinton tells his
closest advisers that ``character is a journey, not a
destination.'' Klein writes:
This evolutionary notion of character is something of a
finesse: it can drift from explaining lapses to excusing them.
There is an adolescent, unformed, half-baked quality to it--as
there is to the notion of promiscuity itself: an inability to
settle, to stand, to commit. It will not suffice in a
president. . . .
(Mr. Ballenger asked and was given permission to address the
House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. [Cass] Ballenger [of North Carolina]: Mr. Speaker, the
President has hired Robert Bennett, the noted defense attorney, to
defend him against charges of sexual harassment.
Can Bennett defend the President against charges of factual
harassment? This is where the President says one thing, but does
another.
His health care plan was supposed to promote health security
for all, but in reality would lower health care quality while
costing a million jobs.
He promised to end welfare as we know it, but if he has a plan
he will not show it. . . .
The Speaker: The Chair wishes to remind Members that comments
regarding the President of the United States are covered by House
rules of comity, and Members should avoid any references to the
President that involve suggestions of a personal character.
The Chair wishes to allow reasonable latitude for debate on
subjects of personal interest and importance, but Members will
observe the rules of comity with regard to the President, Members
of the other body, and their fellow Members.
Parliamentarian's Note: The Speaker, with the concurrence of the
Minority Leader, advised the Parliamentarian that extraneous matter
inserted in the Record should also be perused for conformity with the
Speaker's statement on this matter.
Sec. 47.17 A Member was disciplined for stating that the President had
given ``aid and comfort to the enemy,'' and the Chair indicated
that the Member would not be allowed to speak on the floor of the
House or to insert remarks in the Record in any manner or form for
24 hours.
On Jan. 25, 1995,(16) a Member was disciplined for
remarks relating to the President:
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16. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ____, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
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(Mr. Dornan asked and was given permission to address the House
for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. [Robert K.] Dornan [of California]: . . . I was offended by
Clinton's speech last night on 15 points.
[[Page 10659]]
I will do a 5-minute special order tonight I have just signed
up for. I can only mention four.
The first one is new covenant. The Ark of the Covenant was the
Old Covenant. The New Covenant was the Son of God, Jesus Christ. .
. .
No. 2, to put a Medal of Honor winner in the gallery that
joined the Marine Corps at 16, fudging his birth certificate, that
pulled that second grenade under his stomach, miraculously
surviving and saving his four friends, he did that 6 days past his
17th birthday.
Does Clinton think putting a Medal of Honor winner up there is
not going to recall for most of us that he avoided the draft three
times and put teenagers in his place possibly to go to Vietnam?
No. 3, the line on the cold war. . . .
By the way, Mr. Speaker, the second amendment is not for
killing little ducks and leaving Huey and Dewey and Louis without
an aunt and uncle. It is for hunting politicians, like Grozny,
1776, when they take your independence away. . . .
Mr. [Vic] Fazio of California: Mr. Speaker, I move the
gentleman's words be taken down. . . .
The Speaker Pro Tempore: (17) All Members will
suspend. The Clerk will report the words spoken by the gentleman. .
. .
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17. John J. Duncan, Jr. (Tenn.).
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The Clerk read as follows:
Even Andrea Mitchell of NBC took note that [it] is Ronald
Reagan's prerogative, George Bush's and all of us who wore the
uniform or served in a civilian capacity to crush the evil
empire. Clinton gave aid and comfort to the enemy.
The Speaker Pro Tempore: In the opinion of the Chair, that is
not a proper reference to the President. Without objection, the
words are stricken from the Record. . . .
Mr. Fazio of California: Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to
object, I think the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan] owes the
entire institution, the Congress, and the President an apology.
Mr. Dornan: Hell no; hell, no. . . .
Unanimous consent to proceed for 15 seconds? . . .
The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from California [Mr.
Fazio] has the floor at this moment.
Mr. Fazio of California: I would be happy to yield to my
colleague from California, since I have the time, to hear his
response.
Mr. Dornan: Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Fazio of California: I yield to the gentleman from
California.
Mr. Dornan: To my distinguished friend and colleague, Maj. Earl
Kolbile, Lt. Comdr. J. J. Connell was beaten to death in Hanoi. I
have had friends beaten to death in Hanoi, tortured and beaten. You
have not. . . .
I will not withdraw my remarks. I will not only not apologize.
. . .
Mr. [Harold L.] Volkmer [of Missouri]: I ask that the words of
the gentleman from California be taken down.
Mr. Dornan: Good. I will leave the floor, no apology, and I
will not speak the rest of the day. The truth is the truth.
The Speaker Pro Tempore: The House will be in order. The
gentleman's words have already been taken down. . . .
[[Page 10660]]
Mr. Fazio of California: The gentleman is challenging the words
that were uttered in response to my question.
The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair rules that those words as
follows ``I believe the President did give aid and comfort to the
enemy, Hanoi,'' were also out of order. The Chair has ruled that,
based on the precedents of the House, the words of the gentleman
from California were out of order, and without objection, both sets
of words will be stricken from the Record. . . .
Mr. Fazio of California: I have a parliamentary inquiry of the
Speaker at this point.
The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his inquiry.
Mr. Fazio of California: When the Speaker rules that the
gentleman should not be allowed to speak for 24 hours, does that
encompass remarks that might be placed in the Record, participation
in special orders, and other activities that might not involve the
gentleman speaking on the floor?
The Speaker Pro Tempore: It is the House's determination as to
whether or not the Member should be allowed to proceed in order for
the remainder of the day. That determination shall not be made by
the Chair.
Mr. Fazio of California: In other words, is the House required
to vote on whether or not remarks should be placed in the Record?
The Speaker Pro Tempore: Unparliamentary remarks cannot be
inserted in the Record.
Mr. Fazio of California: But remarks that are not ruled
unparliamentary may be placed in the Record if they are not uttered
on the floor; is that the ruling of the Speaker?
The Speaker Pro Tempore: Unparliamentary remarks should not be
inserted in the Record in any manner or form. . . .
Mr. Fazio of California: So in other words, just to confirm the
Speaker's ruling, we will not read or hear from the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dornan] for the next 24 hours; is that correct?
The Speaker Pro Tempore: Unless the House permits him to
proceed in order, the gentleman is correct.
Mr. Fazio of California: And for the House to permit that would
require a majority vote?
The Speaker Pro Tempore: It would require either unanimous
consent or a majority vote of the House to permit the gentleman to
proceed in order. . . .
Mr. [David E.] Bonior [of Michigan]: Mr. Speaker, the gentleman
from California [Mr. Dornan] is on his feet. Is he not supposed to
remain seated until the determination?
The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman can either be seated or
leave the Chamber.
Mr. Bonior: He chose to leave the Chamber; OK. . . .
In a further ruling, the Chair stated that the following words were
not unparliamentary:
By the way, Mr. Speaker, the Second Amendment is not for
killing little ducks and leaving Huey, Duey and Louie without
an aunt and uncle. It is for hunting politicians, like Grozny,
1776, when they take your independence away. Thank you, Mr.
Speaker.
References to President's Family
Sec. 47.18 In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the
[[Page 10661]]
Speaker advised that it is not in order in debate to refer to the
President in terms personally offensive; but that the traditional
protections (in Jefferson's Manual and the precedents) against
unparliamentary references to the President do not necessarily
extend to members of his family.
On July 12, 1990,(18) after the Chair had exercised his
initiative in cautioning a Member against improper references to
individual Senators, he responded to a parliamentary inquiry regarding
references to the President. The proceedings in the House were as
follows:
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18. 136 Cong. Rec. p. ____, 101st Cong. 2d Sess.
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Mr. [Newt] Gingrich [of Georgia]: Mr. Speaker, it is outrageous
for the Senate Democratic leader to publicly demand higher taxes
and a massive 25-percent increase in the income tax top rate. The
Senate Democratic leader is threatening to destroy the budget
summit.
Mr. Speaker, Senator Mitchell does not attend summit meetings.
He publicly demands tax increases. Senator Mitchell does not offer
serious budget reforms. He publicly demands tax increases. . . .
The Speaker: (19) The Chair will . . . caution the
gentleman from Georgia that such references to Members of the other
body are not in order. . . .
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19. Thomas S. Foley (Wash.).
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Debate may include references to actions taken by the
Senate or by committees thereof, which are a matter of public
record . . . but may not include other references to individual
Members of the Senate or other quotations from Senate
proceedings.
Mr. Gingrich: Let me then ask the Speaker:
Is the Chair prepared, because there is a similar phrase about
protecting the integrity of the President, is the Chair as prepared
to rule tightly when members of the Democratic Party describe
President Bush and his immediate family? Are we going to have a
standard by which I may not refer to the action of the Democratic
leader in the Senate, which is a public action in a newspaper, but
the members of the Democratic Party may say virtually anything
weakening, and defaming and insulting the President of the United
States? . . .
The Speaker: The Chair will tell the gentleman from Georgia
[Mr. Gingrich] that references to the President of the United
States that are personally offensive references are not permitted
in debate. They are not covered by this particular rule. This rule
reflects upon references to the other body and is in a long
tradition of comity between the two bodies of the Congress. It has
been recently amended to permit references to Senate actions, but
the tradition against making references to individual Senators or
characterizing their activity on or off the floor is against the
rule and traditions of the House. . . .
Mr. Gingrich: . . . I would simply want to serve notice to my
colleagues
[[Page 10662]]
on the Democratic side that we will ask the Chair to be as strict
in protecting the President and his immediate family as the Chair
is legitimately being with respect to the other body.
The Speaker: The gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Gingrich] has, in
effect, cooperated with the Chair on the matter. . . .
Mr. [Dennis E.] Eckart [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, I have a
parliamentary inquiry. . . .
To what extent do the rules of the House extend to individuals
who may be related to public officials.
The Speaker: The traditions only go to the references to
Members of the other body personally or to the President
personally, but do not necessarily go to the matters of the
President's family.
Parliamentarian's Note: In some instances, of course, a particular
criticism of the President's family might constitute a personal affront
to the President himself.