[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 4, Chapters 15 - 17]
[Chapter 17. Committees]
[F. Committee Reports]
[§ 60. Comparative Prints; The Ramseyer Rule]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
[Page 3144-3170]
CHAPTER 17
Committees
F. COMMITTEE REPORTS
Sec. 60. Comparative Prints; The Ramseyer Rule
The Ramseyer rule provides that whenever a committee reports a bill
or joint resolution repealing or amending any statute or part thereof,
the committee report is to include the text of the statute or part
thereof to be repealed, as well as a comparative print showing the
proposed omissions and insertions by stricken-through type and italics,
parallel columns, or other appropriate typographical
devices.(13)
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13. Rule XIII clause 3, House Rules and Manual Sec. 745 (1979). The
rule dates from Jan. 28, 1929, when the House passed H. Res.
278, 70 Cong. Rec. 2371-74, 70th Cong. 2d Sess.
The rule is commonly known as the ``Ramseyer rule'' in
honor of its sponsor, Mr. Christian W. Ramseyer, of Iowa, who
served in the House from 1915 to 1933.
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The purpose of the Ramseyer rule is to inform Members of any
changes in existing law to occur through proposed legislation. The rule
was adopted by the House on Jan. 28, 1929, at which time Mr. Ramseyer
explained its import and meaning as follows:
The proposal in this new rule is simply this: Many bills which
are introduced are to amend statutes. Such bills are reported back
to the House, and there is nothing either in the bill or in the
report accompanying the bill to advise Members of the House just
what specific changes the bill proposes to make in the statute
under consideration. If this amendment to Rule XIII is adopted,
then hereafter a committee which reports a bill to amend an
existing statute must show in the report just what changes are
proposed. Suppose a bill is to amend a statute--we will just call
it section 100--by omitting some words and adding thereto other
words. The proposal is that the report shall show by stricken-
through type the words to be omitted and by italics the words that
are added, so that a Member who is interested in knowing just what
changes it is proposed to make in the statute under consideration
can get the report, read it, and have before him exactly the
changes which are proposed to be made.
Despite some criticism of the resolution on the basis that it did
not go far enough,(14) the House adopted the measure and it
has survived with only one change in the succeeding decades. That
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14. Mr. Henry Allen Cooper (Wisc.), preferred passing a bill that would
have amended the United States Code to require a comparative
printing of all bills and resolutions introduced in both the
House and Senate.
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[[Page 3145]]
change, added Sept. 22, 1961,(15) provides that ``[I]f a
committee reports such a bill or joint resolution with amendments or an
amendment in the nature of a substitute for the entire bill, such
report shall include a comparative print showing any changes in
existing law proposed by the amendments or substitute instead of as in
the bill as introduced.'' (16)
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15. 107 Cong. Rec. 20823, 87th Cong. 1st Sess.
16. See Rule XIII clause 3, House Rules and Manual Sec. 745 (1979).
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Under the doctrine of ``substantial compliance,'' the Speaker has
overruled points of order against committee reports, based on the
Ramseyer rule, on the rationale that the committee had substantially
complied with the requirements of the rule and the deviations were
minor and inconsequential.(17) Also, the rules now provide
that committees may submit supplemental reports to correct technical
errors in a previous report.(18)
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17. Sec. Sec. 60.11-60.14, infra.
18. Rule XI clause 2(1)(5), House Rules and Manual Sec. 714 (1979).
This change in the rules was brought about by the 1970
Legislative Reorganization Act; see Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84
Stat. 1140 (Oct. 26, 1970).
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Points of order based on the Ramseyer rule must be raised at the
proper time. A point of order based on the rule must be made when the
bill is called up in the House and before the House resolves itself
into the Committee of the Whole.(19) The point of order
comes too late after the House has resolved itself into the Committee
of the Whole for the purpose of consideration of the measure and debate
has begun.(20) Compliance with the Ramseyer rule may be
waived by unanimous consent or by special rule. This can be
accomplished either by a general waiver of all points of order against
consideration of the bill, or by an express waiver of the provisions of
the Ramseyer rule.(1)
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19. Sec. 60.16, infra.
20. Sec. 60.18, infra.
1. Sec. Sec. 60.19, 60.20, infra.
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Application of Ramseyer Rule Generally
Sec. 60.1 The Ramseyer rule requires that when reporting a bill
repealing or amending existing law, the committee must include a
comparative print showing, by italic or other typographical device,
the changes proposed; but if the reported measure does not
specifically amend existing law, a point of order based on the
Ramseyer rule will not lie.
[[Page 3146]]
On Oct. 1, 1963,(2) after Mr. Armistead I. Selden, Jr.,
of Alabama, moved the House resolve itself into the Committee of the
Whole for the consideration of a bill (H.R. 7044), Mr. Frank T. Bow, of
Ohio, raised a point of order that the report on the bill violated the
Ramseyer rule. Mr. Bow stated that section 2 of the bill provided ``The
Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission shall cease to exist upon
completion of the construction authorized by this act, or on May 6,
1967, whichever shall first occur.'' Mr. Bow stated that this language
was not contained in the italic required under the Ramseyer rule, and
did not show a change in the existing law. Mr. Bow further stated that
the same language was in a 1958 law giving the time as to when the
commission was to cease to exist, and that the present bill amended
that law by setting a different date for the expiration of the
commission. In response, Mr. Selden contended that section 2 did not
make a specific change in the provisions of the law. The proceedings
were as follows:
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2. 109 Cong. Rec. 18412, 88th Cong.1st Sess. For other illustrations,
see 103 Cong. Rec. 8484, 85th Cong. 1st Sess., June 6, 1957
[H.R. 6127]; and 79 Cong. Rec. 11051, 74th Cong. 1st Sess.,
July 11, 1935 [H. Res. 240].
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The Speaker:(3) The gentleman will state the point
of order.
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3. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
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Mr. Bow: Mr. Speaker, the report on this bill violates rule
XIII, the so called Ramseyer rule. I shall not read the rule as I
know the Speaker is familiar with it.
Mr. Speaker, I would point out that the bill, H.R. 7044, is a
bill to amend Public Law 193, 83d Congress, relating to the
Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission.
I further point out in the bill under section (i) there is a
change in the plans for the memorial, changing it into the type
that is set forth in the bill; and that in the report under changes
in existing law made by the bill, as reported, the report does show
in italic that portion of the amendment.
I further call the Chair's attention to the fact that section 2
of the bill now pending provides ``The Corregidor-Bataan Memorial
Commission shall cease to exist upon completion of the construction
authorized by this act, or on May 6, 1967, whichever shall first
occur.''
I further call attention to the report of the committee in
which they attempt to comply with the Ramseyer rule and in that,
although they do comply in the one instance with the italics on the
construction, later, in the next paragraph of the report, is this
language: ``and the Commission shall cease to exist 90 days after
such submission of such final report.'' This is contained in roman
printing. It is not
[[Page 3147]]
in the italic required under the Ramseyer rule. It does not show
that this is a change in existing law and, inasmuch as section 2
says that the Commission shall cease to exist upon the completion
of the construction authorized, the Speaker will find the same
language in the bill of 1958 giving the time as to when the
Commission will cease to exist. This bill does amend that law by
setting a different date for the expiration of the Commission and
it does not comply with the Ramseyer rule.
I desire, if I may, to point out the precedents of the House
appearing in volume 8 from page 2236 on, and particularly that
precedent that says, ``Although a bill proposed one minor and
obvious change in existing law, the failure to indicate this
change'' is ``in violation of the law.'' Admittedly this is in a
minor and rather obvious position. Nevertheless the report of the
committee does not show in italic and it is a change in existing
law, and I submit it is a violation of the Ramseyer rule.
Mr. Selden: Mr. Speaker, I contend that section 2 does not make
a specific change in the provisions of the law. Therefore the
report of the committee does comply with the Ramseyer rule....
Mr. Bow: Mr. Speaker, may I reply to the gentleman from
Alabama?
The Speaker: The gentleman from Ohio is recognized.
Mr. Bow: . . . I further point out that there is a complete
change in the law as to the time of the expiration of the Bataan-
Corregidor Commission.
The Speaker: The Chair is prepared to rule. In connection with
section 2 that the gentleman from Ohio referred to, that is,
section 2 of the pending bill, the Chair will state that this
section does not amend existing law specifically and applies only
to this bill. Therefore, the report does not, in that respect, have
to meet the requirements of the Ramseyer rule. The portion of the
bill which specifically amends existing law, as the Chair sees it,
is paragraph (i) starting on page 1 and finishing on line 19 of
page 2 of that section, and it is very clear that the committee has
complied with the Ramseyer rule in connection with that paragraph.
So, for the reason stated, the Chair overrules the point of order.
Effect of Noncompliance With Rule
Sec. 60.2 Where a report failed to comply with the provisions of the
Ramseyer rule and a point of order is sustained on that ground, the
bill is recommitted to the committee reporting it.
On May 3, 1937,(4) after the Clerk read the title of a
bill about to be considered, Mr. Jesse P. Wolcott, of Michigan, raised
a point of order against the consideration of the bill on the ground
that the report did not comply with the Ramseyer rule. When Speaker
William B. Bankhead, of Alabama, sustained the point of
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4. 81 Cong. Rec. 4123, 4124, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration
was S. 709, a bill to incorporate the National Education
Association of the United States.
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[[Page 3148]]
order, the bill was recommitted to the Committee on Education, which
had reported it.
The Clerk called the next bill, S. 709, to amend the act
entitled ``An act to incorporate the National Education Association
of the United States'', approved June 30, 1906, as amended.
Mr. Wolcott: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
Mr. Wolcott: Mr. Speaker, if it appears from the report that
subsection 2 (a) of rule XXIII, commonly known as the Ramseyer
rule, has not been complied with, is the bill automatically
recommitted to the committee from which it was reported?
The Speaker: If the point of order should be sustained, under
the provision governing such cases the bill would automatically be
recommitted to the committee from which it was reported.
Mr. Wolcott: Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order against the
consideration of the bill (S. 709) that the so-called Ramseyer rule
has not been complied with.
The Speaker: A very casual reading of the report on the bill
indicates the Ramseyer rule has not been complied with. .
Does the gentleman from Michigan insist on the point of order?
Mr. Wolcott: I insist on the point of order, Mr. Speaker.
The Speaker: The point of order is sustained, and the bill is
recommitted to the Committee on Education.
Purpose of Rule
Sec. 60.3 The purpose of the Ramseyer rule is to require that committee
reports furnish information relating to changes the bill proposes
to make in existing law.
On Dec. 3, 1963,(5) following a motion by Mr. Harold D.
Cooley, of North Carolina, that the House resolve itself into the
Committee of the Whole for consideration of a bill (H.R. 6196), Mr. H.
R. Gross, of Iowa, raised a point of order against consideration of the
bill. Mr. Gross' point of order was that House Report No. 88-336
accompanying the bill did not comply with the requirements of Rule XIII
clause 3, the Ramseyer rule. Following debate on the point of order,
Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, ruled on the point of
order and commented on the purpose of the Ramseyer rule:
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5. 109 Cong. Rec. 23038, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was
H.R. 6196, to encourage increased consumption of cotton; see H.
Rept. No. 88-366.
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It is the opinion of the Chair that the report of the committee
complies with the Ramseyer rule, the purpose of which is to give
Members information in relation to any change in existing law.
If a report includes some other references to other laws which
in a sense would be surplusage or unnecessary, it is the Chair's
opinion that the committee was attempting to give to the
[[Page 3149]]
Members of the House as full information as was possible.
The Chair rules that the report does comply with the Ramseyer
rule, and the point of order is overruled.
Showing Changes Proposed by Bill as Amended
Sec. 60.4 In the 87th Congress, the Ramseyer rule was amended to
provide that where a committee reports a bill with amendments the
comparative print required by the rule must show the changes in
existing law proposed by the bill, as amended, instead of by the
bill as introduced.
On Sept. 22, 1961,(6) the Chairman of the Committee on
Rules, Howard W. Smith, of Virginia, called up House Resolution 407,
amending Rule XIII clause 3. Following the Clerk's reading of the
resolution Mr. Smith and Mr. Clarence J. Brown, of Ohio, explained the
purpose of the resolution.
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6. 107 Cong. Rec. 20823, 87th Cong. 1st Sess.
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The Clerk read the resolution as follows:
Resolved, That the Rules of the House of Representatives are
hereby amended as follows: In rule XIII, clause 3, strike out the
period at the end thereof, insert a colon, and add ``Provided,
however, That if a committee reports such a bill or joint
resolution with amendments or an amendment in the nature of a
substitute for the entire bill, such report shall include a
comparative print showing any changes in existing law proposed by
the amendments or substitute instead of as in the bill as
introduced.''
Mr. Smith of Virginia: Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Brown] and at this time yield myself such
time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, this resolution provides for a change in the so-
called Ramseyer rule of the House of Representatives. The Ramseyer
rule provides that when a bill is reported by a legislative
committee, the committee report on the bill shall contain a
statement in comparative print, setting forth the changes in
existing law that are supposed to be made by the new bill. The way
that that rule has been construed and the way it has operated in
the past has been that if a bill is introduced and referred to a
legislative committee, then when the bill is reported by that
committee, the changes in the law are pointed not at the bill which
is reported, but are pointed at the original bill, as introduced.
It, therefore, causes confusion and is not of any use to the
Members who are trying to find out what the changes are because, as
I said, the comparative print explaining the changes are not
pointed toward the bill you are really going to consider. So this
change which has been worked out by the Parliamentarian in
connection with the Committee on Rules and which has the unanimous
approval of the Committee on Rules would make it so that in order
to comply with the Ramseyer
[[Page 3150]]
rule, the report would have to print in comparative columns or
italic or other distinguishing symbols the changes in existing law
which would be made by the bill which is under consideration and
not by the bill which was originally introduced
Mr. Speaker, I hope that explanation is clear to the Members,
but if it is not, I will be glad to yield or any questions to any
Member who may wish to ask about it.
If there are no questions, Mr. Speaker, I yield now to my
colleague, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Brown].
Mr. Brown: Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may use.
Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman from Virginia, the chairman of
the Committee on Rules, Mr. Smith, has explained, this resolution
provides for an amendment to rule XIII, clause 3, through an
amendment which I believe is very much needed, has been requested
by many Members of the House, and which, as the gentleman from
Virginia has stated, would simply provide, instead of following the
present procedure of printing in a committee report the original
bill and the changes in the present law made by the original bill,
the report would carry the bill, as amended, and the differences
between the present law as provided in the final bill as presented.
In other words, the adoption of this resolution making this
change in the rules will eliminate a great deal of confusion and
make it much easier for all Members of Congress, even members of
the Committee on Rules itself, in considering legislation to
understand just exactly what is in the bill that may be before them
and what changes are made by such legislation from existing law.
This has been long needed. It is a very good amendment of the rule.
This resolution was reported unanimously from the Committee on
Rules, and I hope it will have the unanimous support of the House.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Smith of Virginia: Mr. Speaker, 1 have no further requests
for time.
Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
Supplemental Reports Complying With Rule
Sec. 60.5 By unanimous consent, a committee may be permitted to file a
supplemental report on a bill so as to conform to the Ramseyer rule
and show the changes in existing law proposed by the committee
amendments as well as by the provisions of the bill as introduced.
On Jan. 11, 1962,(7) Mr. Adam C. Powell, of New York,
sought and obtained unanimous consent that the Committee on Education
and Labor be permitted to file a supplemental report on a bill
(H. R. 8890). Mr. Powell stated to Speaker John W. McCormack, of
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7. 108 Cong. Rec. 67, 87th Cong. 2d Sess.
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[[Page 3151]]
Massachusetts, that he was making the request so that the committee
report would comply with the Ramseyer rule, which Mr. Powell noted had
been amended by the House since the filing of the original report on
the bill.(8)
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8. Parliamentarian's Note: Today, unanimous consent is not required to
file a supplemental report correcting a technical error, such
as a violation of the Ramseyer rule, in a previous report. See
Rule XI clause 2(l)(5), House Rules and Manual Sec. 714 (1979).
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Application of Rule to Subsections
Sec. 60.6 Where a bill amends one subsection of existing law but does
not affect other parts of the section, a comparative print which
shows only the affected subsection is in substantial compliance
with the Ramseyer rule.
On July 25, 1966,(9~) Mr. John Bell Williams, of
Mississippi, made a point of order against consideration of H.R. 14765,
on the ground that the report of the Committee on the Judiciary
accompanying the bill did not comply with the requirements of the
Ramseyer rule. In response to the point of order, Mr. Emanuel Celler,
of New York, stated that the report disclosed no information with
respect to certain sections of the bill. Mr. Celler explained that
there were no changes in or amendments to those provisions, so that
there was no need to set forth explanatory material on them:
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9. 112 Cong. Rec. 16840-42, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration
was H.R. 14765 (H. Rept. No. 89-1678), the Civil Rights Act of
1966.
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. . . Since there were no changes, there was no need to make
any comment. There was no ambiguity there. There was no
misinformation. There is nothing that is misleading. There is no
confusion. It is . . . substantial compliance.
As debate on the point of order continued, Mr. Joe D. Waggonner,
Jr., of Louisiana, questioned whether substantial compliance was
sufficient to meet the requirements of the rule, stating:
Mr. Speaker, under the rules of the House of Representatives no
provision is made for use of the word ``substantial'' is it deemed
sufficient in this case that compliance is only substantial and not
technically complete?
After studying the precedents of the House, Speaker John W.
McCormack, of Massachusetts, ruled that there was substantial
compliance, stating:
Well, as the Chair states . . . the Chair cannot analyze every
word, but there are parts here apparent to the Chair that, of
course, are not only substantial compliance but which are cer
[[Page 3152]]
tainly over compliance, which is not violative of the rule, as has
been advanced.
The Chair therefore overruled the point of order.
On a parliamentary inquiry following the Chair's ruling, Mr.
Waggonner asked:
Do I correctly understand the ruling of the Speaker that in
this instance . . . ``substantial compliance'' is all that is
necessary and technicalities are irrelevant? Is compliance in fact
with the rules to be ignored?
The Speaker replied:
The Chair will state that substantial compliance, as the Chair
is not in a position to analyze every word, would comply with and
be in conformance with the rule.
Showing Statutory Waivers and Exemptions
Sec. 60.7 Provisions in a bill, merely waiving certain statutory
requirements, were held not to be specially amendatory of existing
law and the Ramseyer rule did not apply to language in a bill
merely exempting personnel of a proposed agency from conflict of
interest statutes.
On June 6, 1957,(10) after Mr. Emanuel Celler, of New
York, moved that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the
Whole for the consideration of H.R. 6127, a civil rights bill, Mr.
Howard W. Smith, of Virginia, made a point of order against the bill on
the basis of noncompliance with the Ramseyer rule.
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10. 103 Cong. Rec. 8484-88, 85th Cong. 1st Sess.
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The initial exchange went as follows:
Mr. Celler: Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself
into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for
the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6127) to provide means of
further securing and protecting the civil rights of persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States.
Mr. Smith of Virginia: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order
against the bill.
The Speaker:(11) The gentleman will state his point
of order.
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11. Sam Rayburn (Tex.)
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Mr. Smith of Virginia: Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order
that the report on the bill does not comply with the provisions of
the Ramseyer rule, which is rule XIII, clause 3.
I call the Speaker's attention to the provision of the bill
appearing on page 7, line 12, which reads as follows:
Members of the Commission, voluntary and uncompensated
personnel whose services are accepted pursuant to subsection
(b) of this section, and members of advisory committees
constituted pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, shall
be exempt from the operation of sections 281, 283, 284, 434,
and 1914 of title 18 of the United States Code, and section 190
of the Revised Statutes.
[[Page 3153]]
Now, Mr. Speaker, I also call attention to the provision of the
bill providing on page 9, line 8, for the appointment of another
and additional Assistant Attorney General, which changes existing
law and which fixes the number of Assistant Attorneys General and
which changes the provision of existing law that fixes the
qualification of Assistant Attorneys General in that it omits the
requirement that an Assistant Attorney General must be a member of
the legal profession.
Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to discuss the matter in some detail
unless the gentleman from New York is prepared to concede the point
of order.
Mr. Celler: Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is not prepared to
concede anything.
The point of order is not well taken. With reference to the
statement referring to the members of the Commission, the gentleman
called attention to page 7, lines 12 to 19. That is a waiver of the
conflict-of-interest statutes which involves no change whatsoever
in those statutes. It simply provides for the waiver of the
statutes. That is very frequently done. The Committee on the
Judiciary has jurisdiction over matters of that sort; namely,
waiver of conflict-of-interest statutes.
With reference to the gentleman's opinion concerning the part
II provision for an additional Assistant Attorney General, lines 6
to 14 on page 9, I wish to state that no law is amended. We simply
provide for an additional Assistant Attorney General.
While Mr. Smith and proponents of his view contended that any
technical defect in the committee report for failure to comply with the
Ramseyer rule was fatal to the bill, Mr. Celler responded that a waiver
of conflict of interest statutes did not fall within the requirements
of the Ramseyer rule. Mr. Celler stated: ``[W]hen you waive the
provisions of a statute, you do not change the provisions of that
statute and you do not amend the provisions of that statute.''
(12) Mr. Celler further stated that language in the bill
adding a new assistant attorney general merely created a new position
and did not amend a statute.
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12. 103 Cong. Rec. 8486, 85th Cong. 1st Sess.
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After continued debate on the point of order, Speaker Rayburn
overruled the point of order as follows: (13)
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13. Id. at pp. 8487, 8488.
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The Chair is prepared to rule.
This question, or parallel questions, has been raised many
times. The rulings of the Chair have been uniform. . . .
Turning to the first part of the bill on page 7, paragraph (d),
which reads as follows: ``(d) Members of the Commission, voluntary
and uncompensated personnel whose services are accepted pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section, and members of advisory committees
constituted pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, shall be
exempt from the operation of sections 281, 283, 284, 434, and 1914
of title 18 of the United
[[Page 3154]]
States Code, and section 190 of the Revised Statutes (5 U.S.C.
99),'' the Chair holds that that is simply a waiver of the statute
and not a specific amendment to any existing law. Therefore, the
Chair overrules the point of order with respect to that.
Section 111, page 9, which reads as follows: ``Sec. 111. There
shall be in the Department of Justice one additional Assistant
Attorney General, who shall be appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, who shall assist the
Attorney General in the performance of his duties, and who shall
receive compensation at the rate prescribed by law for other
Assistant Attorneys General,'' does not amend any specific law,
because it does not refer to any. Congress has the right at any
time it pleases, the Chair thinks, to provide for an additional
Assistant Attorney General or an additional assistant in any other
department.
Now then, we come to the part of the bill where specific
statutes are amended. And, the Chair might say here that Mr. Snell,
Speaker pro tem on February 7, 1931--Cannon's Precedents, volume
VIII, section 2235--made this ruling: In order to fall within the
purview of the rule requiring indication of proposed changes in
existing law by a typographical device, a bill must repeal or amend
the statute in terms, and general reference to the subject treated
in a statute without proposing specific amendment is not
sufficient.
Mr. O'Connor of New York on April 13, 1932--Cannon's
Precedents, Volume VIII, section 2240--made a ruling on this
specific question, and the gist of that is that the bill is not
subject to the rule requiring comparative prints unless it
specifically amends existing law.
Now, the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Cooper] on April 15,
1940, as Speaker pro tempore, went just a little further than that.
The substance of his ruling was: In determining whether or not a
committee in reporting a bill has complied with the Ramseyer rule,
the duty does not devolve upon the Chair of analyzing every word of
existing law and the changes sought to be made. Hence, Mr. Cooper
held that an effort to substantially comply with the rule only was
necessary.
Now, let the Chair read portions of part III and part IV of the
bill, where specific law is specifically amended: . . .
Remembering what has gone before, the Chair finds on page 16 of
the committee report changes in existing law set forth as follows:
In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the House of
Representatives, there is printed below in roman existing law
in which no change is proposed by enactment of the bill as here
reported; matter proposed to be stricken by the bill as here
reported is here enclosed in black brackets: new language
proposed by the bill as here reported is printed in italic.
And there follows then the existing law proposed to be amended.
The Chair has examined this bill carefully and has examined
this committee report very carefully, and must hold that the
committee did comply in substance and in fact with clause 3 of rule
XIII.
Therefore, the Chair overrules the point of order.
Changes in Court Rules
Sec. 60.8 The Ramseyer rule requirement that a compara
[[Page 3155]]
tive print be provided in reports on bills reported by a committee
is not applicable to a bill changing the rules of evidence for
District of Columbia courts.
On June 12, 1961,(14) Mr. John L. McMillan, of South
Carolina, called up the bill (H.R. 7053), providing for the admission
of certain evidence in the courts of the District of Columbia, and
asked unanimous consent that the bill be considered in the House as in
the Committee of the Whole. Mr. Byron G. Rogers, of Colorado, objected
to the consideration of the bill on the ground that it did not comply
with the Ramseyer rule, and said that in the report of the committee no
reference was made to the law which was being amended. In the debate on
the point of order, Mr. Howard W. Smith, of Virginia, argued that the
change was directed at court rules, not a statute. Speaker Sam Rayburn,
of Texas, then overruled the point of order, stating:
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14. 107 Cong. Rec. 10068, 87th Cong. 1st Sess.
For a similar ruling see also 83 Cong. Rec. 1147, 75th
Cong. 3d Sess., Jan. 26, 1938, involving H.R. 2890, fixing
annual compensation for postmasters of the fourth class.
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The Chair in examining this bill cannot see where it amends any
law or repeals any law specifically, and therefore does not think
the report is in violation of the Ramseyer rule, and therefore
overrules the point of order.
References to Laws Unaffected by Bill
Sec. 60.9 A point of order will not lie against a committee report
merely because the comparative print required by the Ramseyer rule
incorporates laws which are not affected by the reported bill but
which are included to give full information to the Members.
On Dec. 3, 1963,(15) Mr. H. R. Gross, of Iowa, raised a
point of order against the consideration of H.R. 6196, alleging that
House Report No. 88-366 accompanying the bill did not comply with the
requirements of the Ramseyer rule. In debate on the point of order Mr.
Harold D. Cooley, of North Carolina, acknowledged that there was
extraneous and unneeded material in the report but this did not
constitute a violation of the Ramseyer rule. Mr. Cooley stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 109 Cong. Rec. 23036-38, 88th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I want to make just one additional observation. I think the
Speaker of the House and the Parliamentarian will find that all
changes in existing law
[[Page 3156]]
have been shown in our report under the Ramseyer rule. The rule
does not say that you cannot have something else in the report
which might be surplus and which might not be needed. But if you
will look at section 104 on page 25 that is a strict compliance
with the Ramseyer rule insofar as this legislation is concerned.
The reference to section 330, I think, is irrelevant and
immaterial and is not even needed, perhaps, in this report. But we
believe this is a meticulous compliance with the Ramseyer rule and
we ask that the point of order be overruled.
Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, then overruled the
point of order. The Speaker stated:
It is the opinion of the Chair that the report of the committee
complies with the Ramseyer rule, the purpose of which is to give
Members information in relation to any change in existing law.
If a report includes some other references to other laws which
in a sense would be surplusage or unnecessary, it is the Chair's
opinion that the committee was attempting to give to the Members of
the House as full information as was possible.
Application of Rule to Discharged Bills
Sec. 60.10 The Ramseyer rule applies only when a committee reports a
bill. Hence, a point of order alleging noncompliance with the rule
will not lie where a committee is discharged from consideration of
a bill.
On Aug. 19, 1964,(16) Mr. James G. O'Hara, of Michigan,
made a point of order against the consideration of a bill on the ground
it had not been properly reported and that it purported to amend title
28 of the United States Code. He contended that there was no
comparative print of the bill amending the statute. Speaker John W.
McCormack, of Massachusetts, overruled the point of order, noting that
the Ramseyer rule applied only when a committee reports a bill. In this
case, the Committee on the Judiciary, having been discharged from
consideration of the bill, did not file a report, and a comparative
print was not required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 110 Cong. Rec. 20221, 20222, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. Under
consideration was H.R. 11926, limiting the jurisdiction of
federal courts in apportionment cases, considered pursuant to
H. Res. 845.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Substantial Compliance'' With Rule
Sec. 60.11 A point of order raised against a committee report alleged
to be in violation of the Ramseyer rule will not lie where there is
substantial compliance with the require
[[Page 3157]]
ment that the report disclose changes in existing law. Thus, a
letter from the head of an agency in a committee report, setting
out proposed changes in existing law, was held to be a substantial
compliance with the Ramseyer rule.
On Jan. 26, 1938,(17) Mr. Wright Patman, of Texas, made
a point of order against H.R. 8176, a bill dealing with retirement pay
for military officers, based on alleged violation of the Ramseyer rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 83 Cong. Rec. 1143-46, 75th Cong. 3d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speaker William B. Bankhead, of Alabama, overruled the point of
order, finding that the report was in substantial compliance with the
rule. It appeared that a letter to the committee from an Army General,
explaining certain changes that the bill would make in existing law,
substantially satisfied the requirement, although Mr. Patman pointed
out that the letter had been written a month before the committee
reported the bill and that some changes in the bill had been made
subsequent to the date of the letter.
Mr. Patman: Mr. Speaker, I have a further point of order.
The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
Mr. Patman: That is, that the Ramseyer rule is not complied
with in the report of the committee in reporting the bill. Section
3 of the bill undertakes to amend existing law. The Ramseyer rule
requires that a committee report shall disclose where there is an
effort made specifically to change existing law and shall set out
in parallel columns or in some way make it clear and plain to the
Members of the House just exactly how the proposed amendment will
affect existing law. I know that rule does not require any
particular method to be used. I am aware of the fact that in the
committee's report, although the committee's report says nothing
about this amendment--that is, it is not set out specifically in
italics, brackets, or otherwise--but in the letter from General
Hines to the Honorable Lister Hill, commencing on page 4 of the
report, there is mention, on page 5 of the report, in that letter,
that a certain amendment is proposed but it does not say that that
is the only amendment in that particular section. I do not know; I
am unable to find out whether or not that is all or just a part
that General Hines happens to be discussing. He does not say that
is the only way that section is amended. He is just saying that it
is amended to that extent. I submit that is not a compliance with
the letter and spirit of the Ramseyer rule, which is part of the
parliamentary rules of this House, and I make the point of order
against the report on that ground.
The Speaker: The Chair is prepared to rule on the point of
order. The gentleman from Texas makes the point of order that the
report of the committee does not conform to the provisions of the
Ramseyer rule. . . .
With reference to the particular point of order made by the
gentleman
[[Page 3158]]
from Texas, the Chair has examined with some care the report of the
committee which accompanies this bill, and, indeed, the gentleman
from Texas has referred to the matter occurring in the letter on
page 4 of the report, the letter from General Hines to the then
chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, in which upon page 5 of
the report in subsection (b) of section 212, there is set out in
italics the only amendment to the existing law that is proposed in
the bill, as the Chair understands it. The Chair is of opinion that
if the rule itself had not provided that those changes might be
incorporated in the report by citing an accompanying document, very
probably the point of order made by the gentleman from Texas would
be good, but the Chair feels, upon examination of this matter,
inasmuch as the only amendment to existing law is set out in
italics in an accompanying document to the report of the committee,
that a substantial compliance with the rule has been made. . . .
The Chair will state--and this is the final statement of the
Chair upon this matter--that the Chair has examined the bill with
considerable care. The Chair feels justified in saying that section
3 of the bill is, as a matter of fact, the only specific change in
existing law proposed by the bill.
The Chair, therefore, overrules the point of order made by the
gentleman from Texas.
Sec. 60.12 A point of order will not lie against a committee report on
the ground that the comparative print required by the Ramseyer rule
contains a minor typographical error, where the committee has made
a substantial effort to comply with the rule.
On July 26, 1965,(18) after Mr. Adam C. Powell, of New
York, moved that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the
Whole for the consideration of a bill, Mr. Robert P. Griffin, of
Michigan, made a point of order against the motion on the ground that
the report (H. Rept. No. 89-540), on the bill failed to comply with the
provisions of the Ramseyer rule (Rule XIII clause 3), in that it did
not correctly indicate the changes proposed in the first proviso of
section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. Mr. Griffin called
attention to the fact that the matter in italics on page 5 of the
report read ``or in any constitution of [sic] law of any State or
political subdivision thereof,'' whereas the same language in the bill
read ``or in any constitution or law of any State or political
subdivision thereof.'' The difference was that the report showed the
word ``of,'' where the bill used the word ``or.'' Mr. Griffin argued
that the failure to re
[[Page 3159]]
port on the bill to indicate this change was in violation of the rule,
and that the bill should therefore be recommitted to the Committee on
Education and Labor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 111 Cong. Rec. 18100, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was
H.R. 77, a bill to repeal Sec. 14(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts overruled the point of
order, stating:
The Chair is prepared to rule.
The Chair will state that this situation has arisen on several
occasions in the past.
Speaker pro tempore Cooper, on April 15, 1940, having a similar
question presented to him on a point of order, ruled that ``it is
the opinion of the Chair that the duty does not devolve upon the
Chair to analyze every word of existing law or to pass upon the
sufficiency or compliance with the provisions of the so-called
Ramseyer rule.'' The Chair then was of the opinion that the
committee reporting the bill had made an effort to comply with the
provisions of the Ramseyer rule, and the present occupant of the
Chair expresses the same opinion and makes the same ruling, that
is, that the committee made a substantial effort to comply with the
requirements of the rule.
Therefore, the Chair overrules the point of order.
Sec. 60.13 Where a point of order is raised against consideration of a
bill on the ground that the report thereon does not adequately
reflect all the changes in existing law as required by the Ramseyer
rule, the Speaker may overrule the point of order on the ground
that the committee has ``substantially complied'' with the rule.
On July 30, 1968,(19) Mr. Paul Findley, of Illinois,
raised a point of order against a motion by Mr. William R. Poage, of
Texas, that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole
for the consideration of a bill. Mr. Findley's point of order against
consideration of the bill was based on the grounds the committee report
failed to comply with the provisions of the Ramseyer rule in that the
comparative print required thereby contained errors of four types. He
stated the report failed to show by ``stars'' the omission of certain
sections not carried in the Ramseyer print, typographical errors,
errors of punctuation, and a failure to indicate one out of 28 date
changes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 114 Cong. Rec. 24245, 24252-54, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. Under
consideration was H.R. 17126, with its accompanying committee
report, H. Rept. No. 90-1374, the Extension of Food and
Agriculture Act of 1965.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, in overruling the
point of order, stated:
There appear to be 22 pages in the committee report referring
to changes in existing law.
[[Page 3160]]
A few years ago the Chair passed on the basic question of
substantial compliance in connection with another bill. It seems to
the Chair that the committee has substantially complied with the
requirements of the Ramseyer rule. I have used the words ``at
least.'' If a higher test was called for, I could probably say the
committee has complied with the requirements of the Ramseyer rule.
In any event, it is the opinion of the Chair that the report of the
committee at least shows substantial compliance with the provisions
of the Ramseyer rule, and accordingly, the Chair overrules the
point of order.
Sec. 60.14 Where the comparative print required by the Ramseyer rule
contained errors of three types (1) punctuation at variance with
that in the bill, (2) capitalization of certain words not
capitalized in the bill, and (3) abbreviations which did not appear
in the bill--the Speaker held that there was substantial compliance
with the provisions of the rule and overruled a point of order
against the report.
On July 25, 1966,(20) Mr. John Bell Williams, of
Mississippi, made a point of order against consideration of a bill
(H.R. 14765), on the ground that the report of the Committee on the
Judiciary accompanying the bill did not comply with the requirements of
the Ramseyer rule. Mr. Williams stated, in part:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 112 Cong. Rec. 16840-42, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration
was H.R. 14765 and its accompanying report, H. Rept. No. 89-
1678, the Civil Rights Acts of 1966.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first error I would like to call to the attention of the
Chair is set forth on page 49 of the committee report, at the
bottom of the page, purporting to show amendments made to section
16-1312 of the District of Columbia Code. The bill, in section
103(e), found on page 52, lines 1 through 5, states as follows:
Section 16-1312 of the District of Columbia Code is
amended--
And so on--yet the report does not set out the section
amended--it merely sets out selected excerpts from the sections.
I cannot tell from looking at the material on page 49 of the
report just what the amendments to the section accomplish, and I
defy any other Member to do so. Subsection (a) of that section sets
out the duties of the jury commission, but the matter printed in
the report fails to set out all the duties as prescribed by the
section. Then the printed matter completely omits subsection (b) of
the amended section, and subsection (c) as printed in the report
states:
(c) Except as provided by this section, Chapter 121 of
title 28, U.S.C., insofar as it may be applicable, governs
qualifications of jurors.
But how can a Member tell what is provided by the section, when
the section is not set out for him to see?
This section 16-1312 which is amended by the bill also contains
a
[[Page 3161]]
subsection (d), which is not printed in the report.
Mr. Speaker, this failure of the report to show the law which
is changed by the bill makes it impossible for Members to be able
to determine just what changes are actually being made in the
section, and therefore fails to comply with either the spirit or
the letter of the Ramseyer rule. Of course, for that matter, even
the material printed in the subsection (c) at the bottom of page 49
of the report fails to comply literally with the rule, since the
material in italic is not literally the same as the material
proposed to be inserted by the bill--the Ramseyer abbreviates to
``U.S.C.'' the words ``United States Code'' appearing in the bill.
The same erroneous abbreviation also appears in the amendment made
to subsection (a) of that section.
Another failure to follow the literal text of the bill can also
be found on page 52 of the report, Mr. Speaker, where the text of
the proposed new section 303 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
differs substantially in form from the section 303 added to that
act by the bill, on page 79, lines 10 through 19.
Most serious of the deficiencies in this report, however, Mr.
Speaker, is the matter appearing on page 53 of the report, where
the report purports to show changes in title III of the Civil
Rights Act of 1960 made by section 701 of the bill, which appears
on page 80, line 9. Section 701 states ``Title III of the Civil
Rights Act of 1960 is amended'' and so on--yet the report does not
even purport to show title III of that act or any part thereof--all
that Members have to guide them as to the provisions of title III
is a row of asterisks, which I must confess I do not find very
helpful--especially since the proposed new section 307 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1960 refers back to section 301 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1960 stating--page 80 lines 12 and 13 of the bill--``Any
officer of election or custodian required under section 301 of this
Act to retain and preserve records and papers may'' and so forth.
This portion of the committee's report is completely worthless, in
my judgment, in helping Members to understand the changes made in
existing law made by the bill.
The Ramseyer rule requires that the report show, and I quote:
That part of the bill or joint resolution making the
amendment and of the statute or part thereof proposed to be
amended.
I submit, most respectfully, Mr. Speaker, that with respect to
title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, there has been a
complete failure to comply with the portion of the Ramseyer rule
requiring that the statute proposed to be amended be shown. The
report does not show the statute, and it does not even show any
part of the statute--not even the part of the statute most
necessary to understand what the proposed section 307 is all about;
namely, section 301 which is cross-referenced to in the proposed
section 307.
Mr. Speaker, on page 43 of the report, sections 1873 and 1874
of title 18 of the United States Code are shown as repealed, and
new language added in their place; also the Ramseyer on the same
page shows two new sections added--sections 1875 and 1876. I have
not been able to find any place in the bill which repeals any of
these sections, or which adds new text as sec
[[Page 3162]]
tions 1875 and 1876, although the explanatory matter on page 35 of
the report, under the heading ``Changes in existing law'' states as
follows:
Matter proposed to be stricken by the bill as reported is
enclosed in black brackets. New language proposed by the bill
as reported is printed in italic.
I, for one, find this very confusing, if the intent is to show
the changes in section numbers made by section 103 of the bill,
especially since the language preceding the Ramseyer states that
``there is printed below in roman existing law in which no change
is proposed.''
This is, at best, a very odd way to show a renumbering of
sections--so odd, in fact, that I think its potential for confusion
is such as to render it a violation of the Ramseyer rule.
In summary, Mr. Speaker, the committee report fails to comply
with the Ramseyer rule by showing language in the report as a
purported change in existing law which is not the same as language
contained in the bill; the report fails to show the entire text of
a section which is proposed to be amended by the bill, but leaves
Members to guess as to what the amendment actually does; the report
fails to show any part whatsoever of a provision of law amended by
the bill, even where the setting forth of such provision is
essential to understanding of the changes made; and shows
nonexistence repeals and amendments as a means of showing
renumbering of sections.
I respectfully submit that this point of order should be
sustained and the bill recommitted to the Committee on the
Judiciary in accordance with the rules of the House.
Mr. Emanuel Celler, of New York, citing the technical and
insubstantial nature of Mr. Williams' objections, stated with respect
to sections of title III of the statute not quoted in the report, that
no changes in those sections were proposed by the bill. Speaker John W.
McCormack, of Massachusetts, then overruled the point of order.
Implicitly adopting the view that only those portions of existing law
directly affected by a bill need be shown in a comparative print (see
Sec. 60.6, supra), the Speaker indicated that there had been
substantial compliance with the Ramseyer rule in the report in
question, and that substantial compliance was a sufficient basis for
overruling the point of order under that rule. Citing as a precedent a
ruling on the same subject on Apr. 15, 1940, by Speaker pro tempore
Jere Cooper, of Tennessee, Speaker McCormack stated:
Now, on the pending point of order, the Chair calls attention
to the fact that there are approximately 18 pages in the committee
report which relate to complying with the Ramseyer rule.
It is the opinion of the Chair that the committee has
substantially complied with the Ramseyer rule, and follows the
decision which I have referred to, and which was made in 1940 by
Speaker pro tempore Cooper, and reaffirms that decision.
The Chair therefore overrules the point of order.
[[Page 3163]]
Timeliness in Invoking Rule
Sec. 60.15 The proper time to raise a point of order that a committee
report fails to comply with the Ramseyer rule is when the motion is
made to resolve into the Committee of the Whole to consider the
bill.
On July 30, 1968,(1) during debate on House Resolution
1218, which provided that it should be in order to move that the House
resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole for the consideration of
a bill, Mr. Paul Findley, of Illinois, unsuccessfully attempted to
raise a point of order against further consideration of the motion on
the ground that the committee report accompanying the bill did not
comply with the provisions of the Ramseyer rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. 114 Cong. Rec. 24245, 24252, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. Under
consideration was H.R. 17126, the extension of the 1965 Food
and Agriculture Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speaker pro tempore John J. Rooney, of New York, ruled that a point
of order on that ground was not appropriate at that time. Mr. Findley
then inquired as to when the point would be in order. The Speaker pro
tempore replied that it could be raised when the motion was made to
resolve into the Committee of the Whole. After the previous question
was ordered on the resolution and the resolution was agreed to, Mr.
William R. Poage, of Texas, moved that the House resolve itself into
the Committee of the Whole for the consideration of the bill. Speaker
John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, then heard Mr. Findley on his
point of order.
Sec. 60.16 A point of order that a committee report fails to comply
with the Ramseyer rule will not lie in the Committee of the Whole.
On July 25, 1966,(2) in the Committee of the Whole,
Chairman Richard Bolling, of Missouri, ruled untimely a point of order
raised by Mr. John Bell Williams, of Mississippi, against consideration
of a civil rights bill on the ground that the report of the Committee
on the Judiciary accompanying the bill did not comply with requirements
of the Ramseyer rule. On appeal, the Chair's ruling was upheld by a
division vote of 139-101. Mr. Williams had attempted to raise the point
of order prior to the House's resolving itself into the Committee of
the Whole, but, as Speaker John W. McCormack,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. 112 Cong. Rec. 16840, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was
H.R. 14765, the Civil Rights Act of 1966.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 3164]]
of Massachusetts, later acknowledged, the Chair did not hear Mr.
Williams make his point of order. After the Committee rose on motion of
Mr. Williams before general debate had commenced, the Speaker stated
that under the circumstances Mr. Williams could make his point of order
at that time.
The proceedings were as follows:
Mr. [Emanuel] Celler [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I move that
the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R.
14765) to assure nondiscrimination in Federal and State jury
selection and service, to facilitate the desegregation of public
education and other public facilities, to provide judicial relief
against discriminatory housing practices, to prescribe penalties
for certain acts of violence or intimidation. and for other
purposes.
Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
The Speaker: The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Celler].
Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
The Speaker: All those in favor of the motion will let it be
known by saying ``aye.'' All those opposed by saying ``no.''
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of
the bill, H.R. 14765, with Mr. Bolling in the chair.
Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, a point of order. Mr. Chairman, I
have a point of order. I was on my feet----
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was
dispensed with.
Mr. [Joe D.] Waggonner [Jr., of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Under the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Celler) will be recognized for 5 hours and the gentleman from Ohio
[Mr. McCulloch] will be recognized for 5 hours.
Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Waggonner: Mr. Chairman.
Mr. [William M.] McCulloch: Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from Ohio
rise?
Mr. McCulloch: Mr. Chairman, I rise for a parliamentary
inquiry.
The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
Mr. McCulloch: I would like to know if the resolution
unqualifiedly guarantees the minority one-half of the time during
general debate and nothing untoward will happen so that it will be
diminished or denied contrary to gentlemen's agreements.
The Chairman: The Chairman will reply by rereading that portion
of his opening statement. Under the rule, the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Celler], will be recognized for 5 hours, the gentleman
from Ohio [Mr. McCulloch] will be recognized for 5 hours. The Chair
will follow the rules.
Mr. McCulloch: I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Celler: Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
care to use. Mr. Chairman, Negroes propose to be
[[Page 3165]]
free. Many rights have been denied and withheld from them. The
right to be equally educated with whites. The right to equal
housing with whites. The right to equal recreation with whites.
Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
Mr. Celler: Regular order, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, immediately before the House
resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House I was on my
feet on the floor seeking recognition for the purpose of making a
point of order against consideration of H.R. 14765 on the ground
that the report of the Judiciary Committee accompanying the bill
does not comply with all the requirements of clause 3 of rule XIII
of the rules of the House known as the Ramseyer rule and intended
to request I be heard in support of that point of order. I was not
recognized by the Chair. I realize technically under the rules of
the House at this point, my point of order may come too late, after
the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union.
Mr. Celler: Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Williams: But I may say, Mr. Chairman, that I sought to
raise the point of order before the House went into session. May I
ask this question? Is there any way that this point of order can
lie at this time?
The Chairman: Not at this time. It lies only in the House, the
Chair must inform the gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. Williams: May I say that the Parliamentarian and the
Speaker were notified in advance and given copies of the point of
order that I desired to raise, and I was refused recognition
although I was on my feet seeking recognition at the time.
Mr. [John J.] Flynt [Jr., of Georgia]: I appeal the ruling of
the Chair.
The Chairman: The Chair will have to repeat that the gentleman
from Mississippi is well aware that this present occupant of the
chair is powerless to do other than he has stated.
Mr. Waggonner: Mr. Chairman, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
The Chairman: The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair
stand as rendered?
The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr.
Williams) there were--ayes 139, noes 101.
The decision of the Chair was sustained.
Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now
rise, and on that I demand tellers.
Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr.
Celler and Mr. Williams.
The Committee again divided, and the tellers reported that
there were-- ayes 168, noes 144.
So the motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed
the chair, Mr. Bolling, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee,
having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 14765) to assure
nondiscrimination in Federal and State jury selection and service,
to facilitate the desegregation of public education and other
public facilities, to provide
[[Page 3166]]
judicial relief against discriminatory housing practices, to
prescribe penalties for certain acts of violence or intimidation,
and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.
The Speaker: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Mississippi.
Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, the House resolved itself into the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union a moment
ago. When the question was put by the Chair, I was on my feet
seeking recognition for the purpose of offering a point of order
against consideration of the legislation. Although I shouted rather
loudly, apparently the Chair did not hear me. Since the Committee
proceeded to go into the Committee of the Whole, I would like to
know, Mr. Speaker, if the point of order which I had intended to
offer can be offered now in the House against the consideration of
the bill; and, Mr. Speaker, I make such a point of order and ask
that I be heard on the point of order.
The Speaker: The Chair will state that the Chair did not hear
the gentleman make his point of order. There was too much noise.
Under the circumstances the Chair will entertain the point of
order.
Sec. 60.17 A point of order that a report fails to comply with the
requirement that proposed changes in law be indicated
typographically, as required by the Ramseyer rule, is properly made
when the bill is called up in the House and before the House
resolves into the Committee of the Whole.
On July 13, 1959,(3) immediately after Mr. Thomas G.
Abernethy, of Mississippi, moved that the House resolve itself into the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the
consideration of the bill, Mr. H. R. Gross, of Iowa, inquired of the
Speaker:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. 105 Cong. Rec. 13226, 13227, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. Under
consideration was H.R. 6893, a bill to amend the District of
Columbia Stadium Act of 1957 with respect to motor vehicle
parking areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Speaker, I desire to make a point of order against the
consideration of the bill and the report. When is the proper time
to seek recognition for this purpose?
The Speaker Pro Tempore:(4) This is the proper time
for the gentleman to make his point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thereupon, Mr. Gross made a point of order against language found
in the bill which, under the Ramseyer rule, was not stated in the
accompanying report in italicized or other distinctive print. Mr.
Abernethy then withdrew the motion and obtained unanimous consent that
the bill be recommitted to the committee.
Sec. 60.18 A point of order that a committee report on a measure does
not comply with the Ramseyer rule comes too late
[[Page 3167]]
after the House has resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole
to consider the measure and debate has begun.
On Apr. 29, 1941,(5) after the House had resolved itself
into the Committee of the Whole, Mr. John Taber, of New York, made a
point of order against a measure on the basis that it apparently
amended an earlier 1938 agriculture act, a change not disclosed in the
committee report. After some substantiation of Mr. Taber's point of
order, Mr. Hampton P. Fulmer, of South Carolina, in turn made a point
of order against the prior point of order, on the ground that it came
too late and should have been made before the House resolved itself
into the Committee of the Whole. Chairman Harry P. Beam, of Illinois,
then sustained Mr. Fulmer's point of order.
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5. 87 Cong. Rec. 3421, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was
H.J. Res. 149, concerning corn and wheat quotas and loans. See
also 87 Cong. Rec. 3585, 77th Cong. 1st Sess., May 5, 1941.
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The proceedings were as follows:
The Chairman: All time has expired. The Clerk will read.
Mr. Taber: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
Mr. Taber: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the
bill and the report of the committee that the report does not
comply with the Ramseyer rule.
The Chairman: The Chair will be glad to hear the gentleman on
the point of order. . . .
Mr. Fulmer rose.
The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from South
Carolina rise?
Mr. Fulmer: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the
point of order of the gentleman from New York comes too late. The
point of order should have been made in the House instead of in the
Committee of the Whole.
The Chairman: The Chairman will be glad to hear the gentleman
from South Carolina on the point of order.
Mr. Fulmer: I do not care to say anything further on the point
of order, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: The gentleman from New York has made a point of
order that the report on the joint resolution does not comply with
the Ramseyer rule. The gentleman referred first to subparagraph 11
on page 7 of the joint resolution, which reads as follows:
The provisions of this resolution are amendatory of and
supplementary to the act, and all provisions of law applicable
in respect of marketing quotas and loans under such act as so
amended and supplemented shall be applicable, but nothing in
this resolution shall be construed to amend or repeal section
301(b)(6), 323(b) (except as provided in par. (7)), or 335(d)
of the act.
The gentleman from New York has pointed out various other
paragraphs
[[Page 3168]]
of the joint resolution to substantiate his statement that there
has been no compliance with the Ramseyer rule.
Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives, volume 8,
page 51, section 2243, reads as follows:
The point of order that a report fails to comply with the
requirement that proposed changes in law be indicated
typographically is properly made when the bill is called up in
the House and it comes too late after the House has resolved
into the Committee of the Whole for the consideration of the
hill.
Again, the Chair points out that on February 10, 1937, the
Chairman [Mr. Lanham], while proceeding in the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union, substantiating the language
the Chair has just read, held, in effect, that:
A point of order that a committee report does not comply
with the Ramseyer rule comes too late after the House has
resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole for the purpose
of considering the bill and debate thereon has begun. Points of
order against the consideration of bills on the ground that the
reports accompanying said bills do not conform to the Ramseyer
rule come too late after the House has resolved itself into the
Committee of the Whole and consideration has begun.
In view of the circumstances of the case and under the
precedents and rules of the House, the Chair is of the opinion that
the point of order which the gentleman from New York [Mr. Taber]
has stated comes too late. The point of order should have been made
in the House and for these reasons the Chair overrules the point of
order.
Waiver of Rule by Unanimous Consent
Sec. 60.19 The House granted unanimous consent for the waiving of the
provisions of the Ramseyer rule relative to a report to be
submitted subsequently by a committee of the House.
On Mar. 8, 1945,(6) Mr. John J. Cochran, of Missouri, by
direction of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments, reported on H.R. 2504, to repeal certain laws requiring
reports to be made to Congress. Mr. Cochran explained that the bill
would repeal a total of 64 reports required by law. In order to save
money, manpower, and paper, Mr. Cochran requested unanimous consent
that the requirements of the Ramseyer rule be waived, or else all 64
laws would have to be printed. Mr. Cochran gave assurances that the
report would fully explain the bill and all items therein. There was no
objection to the request.
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6. 91 Cong. Rec. 1922, 1923, 79th Cong. 1st Sess.
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Waiver of Rule by Resolution
Sec. 60.20 Where the House adopts a resolution providing for the
consideration
[[Page 3169]]
of a bill, any rule of the House to the contrary notwithstanding,
such action waives the requirement of compliance with the Ramseyer
rule.
On Feb. 15, 1949,(7) after the House had voted to adopt
House Resolution 99, which provided in part ``That, notwithstanding any
rule of the House to the contrary, it shall be in order on Tuesday,
February 15, 1949, to move that the House resolve itself into the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for
consideration of the bill'' [H.R. 2632, a deficiency appropriation bill
for 1949]. Mr. Francis H. Case, of South Dakota, made a point of order
based on the Ramseyer rule against consideration of the bill. Citing
the above language, Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas, overruled the point
of order. The proceedings were as follows: (8)
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7. 95 Cong. Rec. 1214, 81st Cong. 1st Sess.
8. Id. at pp. 1218, 1219.
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Mr. Case of South Dakota: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
Mr. Case of South Dakota: Mr. Speaker, I make the point of
order that the report accompanying the bill, H.R. 2632, does not
comply with the so-called Ramseyer rule.
I call the attention of the Chair to the fact that although the
resolution which has been adopted waives points of order against
the bill by the provisions contained therein it does not
specifically waive or exempt the so-called Ramseyer rule which
requires that a report accompanying a bill, including appropriation
bills, shall set forth in appropriate type the text of the statute
it is proposed to repeal.
In this connection I invite the Chair's attention to the fact
that on page 8 of the proposed bill, line 6, it is proposed to
repeal a title in a previous act of Congress, and again on page 16,
lines 15 and 16, the bill carries this language: ``and the first,
fourth, and fifth provisos under said head are hereby repealed.''
I have diligently searched the entire report on the bill and
can find no citation of the statute to be repealed in order to
comply with the Ramseyer rule.
I make the point of order which, if sustained, as I understand
it, would automatically recommit the bill to the committee.
The Speaker: The Chair will read the rule:
Notwithstanding any rule of the House to the contrary, it
shall be in order--
And so forth--
and all points of order against the bill or any of the
provisions contained therein are hereby waived.
The Chair overrules the point of order.
Mr. Case of South Dakota: Mr. Speaker, will the Chair indulge
me for a moment?
The Speaker: The Chair will indulge the gentleman.
[[Page 3170]]
Mr. Case of South Dakota: Under the rule in the House Manual, a
citation is made to a precedent in the Congressional Record of the
Seventy-first Congress, second session, page 10595. This citation
reads:
Special orders providing for consideration of bills, unless
making specific exemption, do not preclude the point of order
that reports on such bills fail to indicate proposed changes in
existing law. (Cannon's, sec. 9220a; 71st Cong., 2d sees.,
Congressional Record, p. 10595.)
I fail to see any provision in the rule adopted which
specifically exempts clause 2a of rule XIII, the Ramseyer rule.
The Speaker: The Ramseyer rule is a rule of the House, and this
resolution states ``all rules to the contrary notwithstanding,'' it
shall be in order to consider the bill.
The Chair overrules the point of order.