IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century
Staff Study
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
One Hundred Fourth Congress
VII. MASINT: Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
Executive Summary
As part of the Intelligence Community of the 21st Century
study (IC21), the Committee reviewed the Measurement and Signatures
Intelligence (MASINT) discipline for its relevance in the
Intelligence Community's (IC) future. The results of the study
reaffirmed some long held beliefs about the relatively
unpredictable future -- especially in terms of specific
technologies the Community will have to face. One truism that
seems to hold is that the sophistication of the technologies
employed in the future weapon system (threats that the IC will be
tasked against) will be radically improved, and perhaps even more
radically different than those we attempt to understand today. The
resulting need for a more sophisticated IC collection capability is
clear. Clear also, is the need to unambiguously identify these
specific weapons or capabilities -- often before they are ever
used. Less clear, but undoubtedly true, is the vital role
conventional technical intelligence disciplines (IMINT, SIGINT,
etc.) will continue to play in the identification and location of
the more dynamic targets. However, as the sophistication of these
targets increases, or as countries (or transnational players)
employ effective denial and deception techniques, we will need to
employ new capabilities to ensure we can continue to answer the
consumers' questions. One such capability is MASINT. This study
concludes that MASINT will take on a more important role than it
does today in providing critical information on these future
threats. Accordingly, this discipline must be focused and well-managed
to ensure the Community can provide the necessary information to its
various users.
The study's major findings include:
- MASINT can provide specific weapon system
identifications, chemical compositions and material
content and a potential adversary's ability to
employ these weapons.
- The Central MASINT Office (CMO) has the requisite
legal authorities to carry out its
responsibilities. However, it is not staffed
commensurate with those responsibilities, and a
fractured organizational structure limits its
overall management abilities.
- MASINT, as a specific and unique discipline, is not
well understood by both the IC and user
communities. Therefore, the potential of its
future contributions may be limited.
- MASINT is both a true, unique collection/analysis
discipline and a highly refined analytical
technique of the traditional disciplines.
- MASINT straddles strict disciplinary definitions. It
may use collection techniques of, but does not fit
neatly into any one or all of the more recognized
"traditional" disciplines of IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, etc.
- MASINT is the least understood of the disciplines and is
perceived as a "strategic" capability with limited
"tactical" support capabilities. However, MASINT has a
potential ability to provide real-time situation
awareness and targeting not necessarily available from
the more classic disciplines.
- MASINT is a science-intensive discipline that needs
people/scientists well versed in the broad range of
physical and electrical sciences. Such scientists can
not typically be professionally developed with the IC.
They must come from academia fresh with scientific
knowledge from experimentation and research. Nor can
they continue to be "proficient" in their areas of
expertise if they remain in government employ for an
entire career.
The study's major recommendations include:
- The MASINT technical management function should be
contained within the construct of a multi-intelligence
disciplined technical collection agency which oversees
the coordinated employment of all technical collection
systems.
- The IC should create a "U.S. MASINT System" analogous to
USSS and USIS.
- The MASINT manager should be a General Officer or SES/SIS
and a permanent member of the MIB, NFIB, and other senior
DCI and DoD boards/panels. His/Her authorities to manage
the MASINT community should be equal to those of the
SIGINT and IMINT managers.
- The IC needs to increase emphasis on informing the IC and
user communities about MASINT capabilities and products.
Additionally, the IC needs to make MASINT a formal course
of professional education for all IC school houses.
- MASINT should remain a specific collection and processing
discipline. However, MASINT exploitation is becoming
more critical as threat technologies improve. Therefore,
the IC needs to place increased emphasis on MASINT
exploitation within the traditional technical
disciplines.
- MASINT planning and system development must focus on not
only technical analysis that is necessary for long term
signature development, but must also plan, at the outset
of any capability development/use, the need to satisfy
immediate "tactical" information requirements.
- The IC must be able to tap into any/all U.S. resources,
including those not specifically within the IC, that have
the ability to input into intelligence data bases. This
includes having better access to, and guidance of,
national laboratories.
- The IC needs a budgeting mechanism that is equivalent of
"ready cash." This would provide the ability to readily
fund fleeting or promising technologies, R&D efforts
(without penalty for those technologies/or scientific
breakthroughs that do not bear fruit), or unplanned
operational opportunities. This authority needs to be
analogous to a venture capitalist.
- The IC needs to examine the feasibility of pursuing trial
personnel management programs that provide incentives to
recruit and maintain the necessary scientific experts.
MASINT: MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE
Study Purpose
One can argue that the requirements levied on the Intelligence
Community (IC) in the twenty-first century will not be radically
different than those levied on it today. The basic information
needs of "who, what, where, when and why" will likely not change.
However, most can easily agree that the sophistication of the
technologies employed in the future weapon systems (threats) that
the IC will be tasked against will be radically improved, and
perhaps even more radically different than those we attempt to
understand today. Increasingly, even unsophisticated countries are
gaining access to relatively inexpensive, but high technology
weapons. Weapons that can be "launched and forgotten," weapons of
mass destruction -- including nuclear, chemical and biological, or
weapons that are difficult to detect or are stealthy. The
resulting need for a more sophisticated IC collection capability is
clear. Clear also, is the need to unambiguously identify these
specific weapons or capabilities -- often before they are ever
used. The IC's ability to specifically locate, identify,
characterize, and determine the intentions of such weapons or
threats is, and will become even more, critical. Conventional
technical intelligence disciplines -- Imagery Intelligence (IMINT),
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), etc. -- have played, and will
continue to play, a vital role in the identification and location
of such targets. However, as the sohpistication of these targets
increases, or as countries (or transnational players) employ
effective denial and deception techniques, we will need to employ
new capabilities to ensure we can continue to answer the consumers'
questions. One such capability is Measurement and Signature
Intelligence, or MASINT. MASINT is a very scientific and
technically-based discipline that can provide unique contributions
to the IC in terms of specific weapon identifications, chemical
compositions, material content, etc. Such unique identifications
will be a major factor in answering the future questions of "who,
what where, when and why." In fact, some believe MASINT will be
the most important "technical INT of the future."
Despite the clear criticality, both present and future, of the
MASINT discipline, it is the least well known of the technical
collection/analysis disciplines. Many have questioned the nature
of the discipline: is it a true collection discipline or is it a
unique product based on specialized analysis? Few who have had the
opportunity to review MASINT products, however, can dispute their
utility, or the current and growing need for these products. The
purpose of this study, therefore, was to determine several specific
issues relative to MASINT. First, was to identify the viability
and need for MASINT-unique collection and processing in the 21st
Century. Second, was to determine the IC's strengths and
weaknesses in providing such necessary MASINT support. This was to
include making any recommendations for necessary changes to
systems, architectures, management, technologies requiring
emphasis, etc. to ensure the discipline's viability. Finally, we
wanted to address the budget implications of attempting to achieve
these goals.
Study Approach
It should be first noted that this is not a scientific study,
but rather an assessment based on community expert inputs. To get
substantive input for the study, the staff team sponsored several
round-table panel discussions, numerous individual interviews, and
formal presentations with MASINT Committee members, the Services,
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Arms Control professionals
and former community officials. The effort was designed to "think
out of the Future Years' Development Program (FYDP) box." That is,
there was no attempt to indict the past, present, or programmed
organization and efforts, but rather to look "beyond" into the
future. The team developed an outline and series of questions to
prompt inputs/discussion from each of the invited participants.
The approach viewed MASINT as a distinct collection discipline even
though the discipline is not well bounded by specific (and unique)
collection and exploitation definitions. Our effort focused on
identifying the current capabilities and systems trying to
determine their individual contributions and where each
should/could be best employed in the future. However, the sciences
and rapidly evolving technologies involved eventually focused us
more toward a review of MASINT management, including the abilities
to coordinate and program for new sensors/technologies, to task
sensors, and to use and disseminate MASINT information.
Recommendations from participants were noted and, to the extent
possible, identified in this report.
Secondly, it also needs to be noted that the recommendations
offered below were originally focused on a MASINT management and
operational structure that was generally maintained within the
current IC organization. And, although these recommendations were
made before the completion of the Intelligence Community Management
staff study, they work well within the construct of that study's
more consolidated community organization. Specifically within the
context of that study, all references to the "Central MASINT Office
(CMO)" are assumed to be describing a division (or office) within
the Technical Collection Agency (TCA) under the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence for Community Management (DDCI/CM). If the
TCA construct is not adopted, the CMO references describe the
Community's MASINT management organization assumed to be within the
DIA.
Finally, in addition to the panel discussions and interviews,
the team reviewed and used the following supporting documents
during the study:
A. MASINT Handbook for the Warfighter, prepared by the INCA
Project Office, November 1994
B. CMO Biological and Chemical Warfare Intelligence
Collection Strategy Briefing, R. Paul Schaudies,
Ph.D., November 1994
C. CMO Investment Process Briefing, Mr. Dale Helmer, August 94
D. CMO MASINT Master Plan, January 1994
E. MASINT 2010 Study, October 1995
F. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 2/11-1,
December 1992
G. DoD Instruction 5105.58, February 1993
H. DoD Instruction 5105.21, May 1977
Background
A general understanding of the genesis of MASINT and its
official definition is appropriate prior to a study regarding the
future of the discipline.
Recognizing the need to ensure proper exploitation of complex,
technically-derived data, the IC classified MASINT as a formal
intelligence discipline in 1986. At that time, the IC Staff MASINT
Committee was formed to oversee all MASINT activities. To further
consolidate MASINT management, the Central MASINT office (CMO) was
established in 1993 by the Director, DIA, with specific
responsibilities detailed by the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) and Department of Defense (DoD) Directives. The CMO is a
joint IC and DoD activity within DIA, that directs and implements
national and DoD policies and procedures on MASINT matters. With
that quick background, it is useful to identify the IC's current
official definition of MASINT:
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) is
technically derived intelligence (excluding
traditional imagery and signal intelligence) which
when collected, processed, and analyzed, results in
intelligence that detects, tracks, identifies, or
describes the signatures (distinctive
characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target
sources. MASINT includes the advanced processing
and exploitation of data derived from IMINT and
SIGINT collection sources. MASINT sensors include,
but are not limited to, radar, optical, infrared,
acoustic, nuclear, radiation detection,
spetroradiometric, and seismic systems as well as
gas, liquid, and solid material sampling systems.
Despite this definition, many in the IC (and policy
community) are confused as to what MASINT really is. Although
MASINT can be described as the highly technical exploitation of
traditional disciplines, the MASINT collection techniques cover
areas not addressed by other disciplines. In many respects,
there is a clear distinction between MASINT and the other
disciplines. MASINT can be considered analogous to the
individual who relies on all senses to gain information about his
or her environment. Where SIGINT is akin to sound, and IMINT to
sight, MASINT is akin to touch, taste and smell. The areas where
MASINT expands on the traditional disciplines (IMINT and SIGINT)
can be thought of as providing aids to improve upon or add
dimensions and capabilities to the sight and sound senses that
would not otherwise be possible. Is MASINT a true collection
discipline, or is it actually specialized processing of other
collection disciplines? Is it a separate field of
specialization, or more appropriately classified as additional
processing and analysis of existing data? These questions were
a fundamental basis for the study that went into this report.
Specifically, we tried to determine how to correct this "identity
crisis," while ensuring the community will be served by the truly
unique product MASINT can provide.
General Conclusions
Based on the various inputs, the group identified six
general conclusions that appear to sum up the general issues
relative to MASINT. Each of the general conclusions are later
broken down into specific conclusions and recommendations.
A. MASINT is difficult to bound by strict
definitions. In fact, MASINT collections
can, in part, legitimately be labeled as
SIGINT, Infrared Intelligence (IRINT),
IMINT, HUMINT, etc. However, MASINT does
not fit neatly into any one or all of these
recognized "traditional" intelligence
disciplines. MASINT is both a true, unique,
collection/analysis discipline and highly
refined analytical techniques of those
traditional disciplines. Despite these gray
lines of demarcation, MASINT may be the
"intelligence discipline of the future" --
that is, MASINT is a discipline that is
becoming more important in identifying and
characterizing new and emerging threats,
particularly as weapon system technologies
become more complex and capable. Without a
robust and focused capability, MASINT's
support to future needs, such as "brilliant"
weapons and national information
requirements (e.g., weapons proliferation,
arms control, force modernization, strategic
programs, scientific and technical needs,
environmental and humanitarian concerns, and
counter-narcotics/terrorism), may be
inadequate.
B. MASINT is perceived as a "strategic"
discipline with limited "tactical" support
capabilities. But, by application of
real-time analysis and dissemination, MASINT
has a potential ability to provide real-time
situation awareness and targeting not
necessarily available to the more classic
disciplines. Because of these perceptions,
MASINT does not get the attention of the
tactical consumers, and has less
constituency support than the more
traditional intelligence disciplines.
Lacking proper constituency, MASINT sensors
and analysis will likely not be properly
supported or maintained. Results will
include a lack of targeting templates for
smart weapons.
C. MASINT, as a specific and unique discipline,
is not well understood by the IC as a whole.
Therefore, although it provides significant
intelligence products, its contributions, or
the potential of its contributions may have
been and will likely be limited. The full
extent if its future application to national
and operational intelligence will not be
realized.
D. Funding levels for the current MASINT
systems, and those projected into the future
are not reflective of the importance of this
discipline to the Nation's general
intelligence/ dominant knowledge efforts.
This is primarily because users do not have
direct tasking over, and therefore
understanding of, MASINT sensors.
E. The roadmap for specific MASINT technologies
appears to be fairly well thought out and
necessary for the 21st century. However,
there may be insufficient funding
flexibility for reacting to, or pursuing
new, emerging, or fleeting technologies.
Additionally, there is a need to ensure a
balance between the requirements and
technologies that support military
battlefield requirements, and the often more
exacting requirements and technologies that
are needed for IC national monitoring and
detection of weapon or agent developments.
F. Although the CMO has the necessary legal
authorities, it is not properly staffed
commensurate with its responsibilities.
Additionally, a fractured organizational
structure provides little to no focused
MASINT management, budgeting oversight,
tasking control, or coordination of effort.
This may potentially cause inefficient
expenditures of resources and duplicative
developments.
Specific Conclusions/Findings
A. "MASINT is difficult to bound by strict definitions. In
fact, MASINT collections can, in part, legitimately be labeled
as SIGINT, IRINT, IMINT, HUMINT, etc. However, MASINT does not
fit neatly into any one or all of these recognized
"traditional" intelligence disciplines. MASINT is both a true,
unique, collection/analysis discipline and highly refined
analytical techniques of those traditional disciplines.
Despite these gray lines of demarcation, MASINT may be the
"intelligence discipline of the future" -- that is, MASINT is
a discipline that is becoming more important in identifying and
characterizing new and emerging threats, particularly as weapon
system technologies become more complex and capable. Without
a robust and focused capability, MASINT's support to future
needs, such as "brilliant" weapons and national information
requirements (e.g., weapons proliferation, arms control, force
modernization, strategic programs, scientific and technical
needs, environmental and humanitarian concerns, and
counter-narcotics/terrorism), may be inadequate."
1) One discussion point focused on whether to maintain
MASINT as a separate discipline or to break it up into the
separate disciplines (i.e. Radar Intelligence (RADINT),
SIGINT, IMINT, etc.). This discussion focused on whether or
not to make MASINT professionals organic to the traditional
intelligence disciplines or keep them separated within the
distinct discipline. Some believe that doing away with the
unique professional MASINT discipline that cuts across the
other disciplines' collection spectra would be
counterproductive. They believe better coordinated MASINT
products are possible when viewed across the various
collection disciplines. Their argument for maintaining a
separate MASINT discipline states that such "cross cutting"
is providing positive results in terms of all-source
analysis. Upon close inspection this is apparently true.
However, there is a counter-argument that includes the issue
of refined "technical" exploitation of the "traditional
intelligence disciplines" (explained below). This
counter-argument focuses on the need to "proliferate" the
MASINT exploitation potential to other disciplines.
Regardless of the whether MASINT remains a distinct
discipline or not, there is a need to redouble efforts to
get people of different "intelligence stovepipe" expertises
together doing true all-source (including non-intelligence
sourced information) analysis.
2) As touched on above, a counter-argument is that MASINT,
as a term and as a separate discipline, may not be what is
needed for the 21st century. A specific case can be made
that MASINT is simply more refined, more scientific and more
technically challenging analysis of existing collection/1/
(although much MASINT collection is done outside the realms
of other existing collection disciplines). However, one
respondent (favoring maintaining a separate discipline)
stated, "Frankly, the MASINT odds and ends (e.g., phase
history data) that could belong to other intelligence
disciplines would probably not exist today if the MASINT
phenomenologists had not pursued them." This may be true,
but the question still exists which asks "Is MASINT a
separate collection discipline or is it IMINT, SIGINT,
HUMINT, IRINT, or other disciplines in their various forms?"
Further, if the answer to the latter is "yes," then one has
to ask whether MASINT is then the more detailed exploitation
of those available collections. This argument becomes less
clear, and the apparent answer to the first question becomes
"no" when one studies the clearly MASINT-unique collection
systems, entities and missions such as seismometry, nuclear
and soil sampling.
The argument for subsuming the MASINT discipline
assumes that the MASINT product is not-so-simply the result
of more in-depth analysis of the "traditional" intelligence
disciplines. For example, although COBRA BALL is clearly a
MASINT platform, its collection media are multidisciplined,
and include IMINT (visible and non-visible spectra). The
product distinction is more in the resulting analysis and
use of the data collected via these disciplines' means. The
product then, rather than being used for the traditional
intelligence support functions of counting tanks, locating
battalions, and targeting ATACMS missiles, is used for
scientific/technical refinement to do signature and
capability analysis. The basic sciences (between MASINT and
the other disciplines) are not altered or different, but the
state of refinement is. Another example is effluent
analysis based on hyper-spectral collection. The collection
is, arguably, IMINT in its various (non-imaging) spectra,
but the product is fundamentally different analysis of the
effluent content -- not just the detection (or imaging) of
presence. This argument would question whether MASINT
tasking, analysis and expertise need to be better developed
within the existing "traditional" intelligence disciplines.
3) Another argument for maintaining MASINT as a distinct
discipline is captured in the following. Specifically,
MASINT seeks to collect metric data and signatures. Metric
data are derived from the direct measurement of the
kinematics performance of targets of interest. Metric data
provide information on the dynamic capabilities of targets
and/or the tactics for their use. Signature data typically
are -- or are derived from -- "high-fidelity measurements of
targets of interest, in the context of their application,
use or production, to allow the current or future unique
identification of such targets." SIGINT, as its name
implies, is based on the desire to intercept or collect
signals -- the transmission of information from one place to
another. Intercepted signals could contain information on
a wide variety of topics that overlap information collected
by IMINT or MASINT means; but the collection is still
SIGINT. IMINT endeavors to provide pictorial
representations of targets and areas of interest -- not the
spectral analysis of material content. All three technical
collection disciplines employ electro-optical (EO) - and
radio frequency (RF) -- based systems to provide unique
MASINT, SIGINT, and IMINT collection capabilities. However,
and additionally, MASINT also makes use of a wide range of
other measurement techniques such as seismic, acoustics,
magnetic, and nuclear, to provide capabilities against
targets that cannot be prosecuted using EO- or RF-based
systems. In summary, intelligence disciplines are
differentiated on the basis of the type of information being
collected and extracted through processing and exploitation
-- not on the physical basis of the collection system
employed or the intelligence problem being addressed. This
argument attempts to justify the need to maintain MASINT as
a separate discipline. This is a good argument and
position, but perhaps one that is bound by the "current
think" box.
Findings/Recommendations (There are several, possibly
conflicting recommendations which need to be
discussed/debated)
4) There are several possibilities for ensuring the MASINT
capability into the future. The first would be to delete
the term MASINT from the IC's vernacular. This option would
place MASINT collection and exploitation functions within
the auspices of the other collection disciplines. This
would require replacing the term with a deeper
understanding, and, moreover, appreciation for the fact that
more exploitable information is available (much within the
current discipline collections) than what is being used
today by the "traditional exploiters" (those unique
collections traditionally identified as "MASINT" not
withstanding). This understanding will require the
employment of scientific and technical people (the current
"MASINTers") within the traditional intelligence
organizations (the services, NSA, CIO, etc.), and force more
"traditional collection" in the areas of sampling, etc.
This is to say that specific, technically-astute (MASINT)
individuals need to do this; it most likely cannot be done
by people who are experts in the known collection and
exploitation functions of the traditional disciplines.
However, there is a danger in deleting the term, and putting
"MASINTers" in with the more traditional disciplines.
These people may eventually "get lost" in the traditional
disciplines' focused charters and the technical and
scientific exploitation will be lost. This was the reason
the MASINT discipline was created in the first place.
Additionally, deleting the term would force other approaches
at non-traditional collection such as seismic, thermal, etc.
5) The second possibility is to maintain the status quo
and retain MASINT as a specific discipline. This does not
improve the problems we see today with the identity of
MASINT.
6) The third is a "hybrid" of the two options above. That
is, MASINT should remain a specific collection and
processing discipline with its core of professionals and
management staff. However, the more traditional technical
disciplines of IMINT and SIGINT should specifically address,
in their charters, the recognition of the MASINT ability to
glean additional data from their collections (this would be
facilitated by the TCA construct). This would require the
deeper understanding, and associated dedicated people
identified in the paragraph above. Additionally, MASINT
should be treated just as are the other technical
disciplines in that the IC should Create a "U.S. MASINT
System" with associated functional manager (the CMO). This
would still be logical within the structure of a TCA.
Finally, based on the outcome of the Intelligence Community
Management staff study, the Committee recommends the MASINT
functional manager (FM) (the CMO) be subordinated to the TCA
for logical management.
7) The basic sciences (between MASINT and the other
disciplines) are not altered or different. It is the state
of refinement (of the technical or scientific analysis),
often the collection source (e.g. the case of soil or
effluent sampling) and nature of data being pursued that are
the differences.
8) MASINT tasking, analysis, and expertises need to be
better developed within the existing "traditional"
intelligence disciplines. Specifically, the more
traditional disciplines need to have a better understanding
and appreciation for the facts that additional exploitable
(MASINT) information may exist within their current
collections. This requires the deeper understanding
recommended above, but also requires a specific oversight
organization (the current CMO) to ensure this refined
analysis and IC direction.
B. "MASINT is perceived as a "strategic" discipline with
limited "tactical" support capabilities. But, by application
of real-time analysis and dissemination, MASINT has a potential
ability to provide real-time situation awareness and targeting
not necessarily available to the more classic disciplines.
Because of these perceptions, MASINT does not get the attention
of the tactical consumers, and has less constituency support
than the more traditional intelligence disciplines. Lacking
proper constituency, MASINT sensors and analysis will likely
not be properly supported or maintained. Results will include
a lack of targeting templates for smart weapons."
1) As stated previously, MASINT is, in some cases, the
more scientific analysis product of the more traditional
collection disciplines. Because of the highly technical
means utilized, most MASINT systems' focus has been on the
longer-term (i.e., not "real-time") analysis of data to
determine characteristics, signatures, target templates,
etc. With the advent of modern processing techniques and
capabilities, MASINT systems have an increased potential for
doing their analysis in near real- or real-time. Such
potential MASINT contributions to the requirements of
tactical customers is poorly known -- and in some cases not
being pursued.
One example of MASINT contributions to real-time
identification is the application of MASINT signature data
for non-cooperative target identification (NCTI). Today,
U.S. systems have a capability to identify hostile fighter
aircraft based on MASINT techniques. However, it is poorly
known that this analysis was done by MASINT resources.
Because of the "unknown sources" for such capabilities,
constituency concerns can arise during budget formulations
when the participants have a poor or no understanding of
MASINT (or other intelligence) applications. Decisions
whether to fund intelligence sensors or additional
technologies -- such as NCTI -- on offensive weapons can be
skewed, based on these lack of understandings. For example,
funding debates that are "pro-intelligence" (versus
"operational") may be short-lived and the original
contributing capability (e.g., a MASINT sensor) is the
loser. It must be continuously recognized there is a basic
difference between the general sensor approach for
"warfighting" and the specific, often more sophisticated,
sensors necessary for intelligence collection and
knowledge-making. Intelligence sensors must have the
ability to measure and define fully the target threat or
signature needed. Therefore, these must have full spectral
coverage, dynamic range, etc. The resulting "battlefield
sensors" employed by users often can be more simply designed
to recognize the presence of a threat based on the
signatures provided by intelligence. The importance of this
thought cannot be underestimated.
2) Despite its "strategic" intelligence past, MASINT has
a critical and growing role in future real-time "warfighter"
support. Specifically, MASINT "sensors" have unique
capabilities to detect missile launch, detect and track
aircraft, ships, and vehicles, do NCTI and battle damage
assessment, and detect and track fallout from nuclear
detonations. Often, these contributions are the first
indicators of hostile activities. The shootdown, for
example, of the two EXOCET-equipped Mirage F-1s during the
Gulf War was attributed to a MASINT collection and analysis.
3) MASINT, or the "MASINT applications" of SIGINT and
IMINT (etc.), will become more important in providing the
future inputs for smart weapons target templating. That is,
MASINT is critical for providing future weapons with the
signatures (fingerprint) of the targets they are seeking (IR
signatures for example).
4) MASINT sensors are often the same systems as
"warfighting systems." The difference is often only the
level of sophistication of the data analysis. A specific
example is the use of data available from operational radars
incidental to the targeting functions for which these radars
were built. AEGIS radar returns contain data that can
provide significant metric data for assessing weapons system
performances.
Findings/Recommendations
5) MASINT planning must focus on not only the technical
analysis that is necessary for long term signature
development, but must also plan, at the outset of any
capability development/use, the need to satisfy immediate
information requirements for the tactical consumer. This
means that MASINT planners must coordinate with the
information users at the inception of a program to
determine, at a minimum, the needs to be satisfied, the
format for display of the information required, and
addressing human factors issues such as amount of data,
timeliness of data, etc.
6) MASINT systems should be provided with the capability
to communicate with/broadcast directly to customers just as
do the "traditional intelligence disciplines." This should
include an assessment of the utility of broadcast systems
such as the Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS)
and other data links. The specific implementation of this
recommendation should be developed by the DDCI/CM's
Infrastructure Support Organization (see Intelligence
Community Management staff study).
7) MASINT culture must be changed to think of analysis in
terms of seconds and hours AS WELL AS its current months and
years. This requires school house concentration on MASINT
curriculum, and an everyday appreciation with the
traditional disciplines. This also demands that users be
involved and informed relative to MASINT capabilities.
8) Specifically identified MASINT systems are not the only
sources of MASINT data. Targeting radars, for example, can
provide ancillary data useful to the national
collection/analysis efforts. CMO must have 1) insight not
only to specifically identified MASINT systems, but also to
those offensive weapons systems (radars for example)
capabilities that can contribute to technical and scientific
(MASINT) information data bases; 2) when necessary, have the
wherewithal to request/suggest/ask for tasking authority for
these systems. Additionally, CMO should have a funding
ability to provide "seed" money to determine or improve
MASINT exploitation of existing weapon system data. This
will require a "rethink" that "intelligence and its sensors"
are not something strictly unique, but rather "intelligence
and its sensors" are the totality of information available
to the U.S. government. The national defense psyche must
not continue in the "we" (operations)/"they" (intelligence)
construct.
9) CMO needs a better understanding of user needs, not
just stated requirements. This demands that the
intelligence and user communities (particularly the MASINT
community in this case) coordinate and talk more. The
security barriers to effective communication must be broken
down. (They are to some extent, but this must be expanded.)
C. "MASINT, as a specific and unique discipline, is not well
understood by the IC as a whole. Therefore, although it
provides significant intelligence products, its contributions,
or the potential of its contributions may have been/will be
limited. Its future application to national and operational
intelligence will not be maximized."
1) Despite the formal definition, MASINT remains an
intelligence discipline enigma. It is more diverse and
unique than the more focused IMINT and SIGINT disciplines.
It is characterized by some as having some similar sources
and methods (of the more classic disciplines), but much more
complex, particularly with respect to analysis than those
others. MASINT has many of the collection characteristics
of the other technical disciplines, however, it is the
unique exploitation and unique techniques that distinguish
MASINT results. One respondent stated that MASINT products
are the intelligence bits remaining after the expected
results of collection are removed. Another stated that
MASINT provides alternatives that supplement "conventional"
collection to provide "the rest of the story."
Some would say it is the unique data retrieved from
additional processing -- the technical and scientific data
-- that can set the MASINT discipline apart from the host
intelligence discipline." However, MASINT collection and
processing are not limited to the phenomena of the
electro-magnetic (RF) spectrum. Significant MASINT
information is derived from seismic sensors, acoustic
sensors, nuclear radiation sensors and material/effluent
sampling. This identity crisis becomes troubling when there
is a choice to be made, particularly in funding issues.
Some state there is no identify crisis for MASINT, that
there is, instead, a need for IC and customer education.
This education need does, indeed, reflect the identity
crisis discussed above.
2) The CMO and INCA have developed a guide called the
MASINT Handbook for the Warfighter. This document has been
printed and distributed to "demystify the world of MASINT."
This handbook is a critical start toward educating the
community and users in the art of MASINT. It needs to be
"standard issue" throughout the IC.
3) As stated briefly above, the MASINT "identity crisis"
is also apparent when there are budget cuts to be made. As
one respondent noted, MASINT is the "soft underbelly," which
is "easily cut" during budget cut drills. Whenever there
are cuts to be made within the IC (i.e., GDIP), MASINT
(particularly Research and Development (R&D) funds) are some
of the first to be targeted.
4) There was much discussion on the need to improve formal
initial and continuing education within the IC/2/ for MASINT
professionals. Formal scientific/technical, mathematical
and engineering skills are critical backgrounds for MASINT
professionals who do the detailed exploitation of MASINT
data. Training for these backgrounds is not typically done
within the IC; it is more a function of academia. To get
the necessary professionals, the IC must be able to recruit
"MASINTers" from the professional (research/laboratory) and
academic worlds. Continuing education needs to be both
"in-house" and fostered within the private/professional
sectors.
5) MASINT has no formal/viable method (i.e., metrics) for
evaluating MASINT contributions to the IC or user
communities. That is, there is no formal method for
determining whether MASINT analysis and products are
satisfying the needs of the customers. This was
specifically characterized by the unbalanced MASINT results
of the recent Community-wide Capabilities Analysis. There
is a need to develop a metric or set of metrics to determine
the impact of MASINT products toward stated knowledge goals.
Findings/Recommendations
6) The services and agencies need to do a better job of
educating the user and, moreover, the IC, on the
capabilities, applications, and specifics of MASINT. MASINT
(familiarity) should become a formal course of professional
education for all IC school houses. Existing courses, that
include MASINT content, should be increased in scope and
duration. Specific tailored courses should provide a
curricula that cuts across the spectrum of general user
overviews to in-depth analytic instruction.
7) The MASINT User's Handbook should be required reading
within the IC. Additionally, recommend the MASINT User's
Handbook be developed in both all-source and unclassified
versions.
8) Continuing IC education should emphasize the unique
collection and products of MASINT, and more specifically,
the MASINT (technical and scientific) applications of
individual "traditional" disciplines. That is, IC
professionals within the IMINT and SIGINT fields should be
made more aware of the contributions MASINT analysis can
make to existing IMINT/SIGINT collections. They need to be
made aware that additional information may be gleaned from
existing collections once the "expected information has been
stripped away."
9) Education, particularly continuing education, of the IC
cannot be overstated. The CMO has developed an updated
video tape that highlights MASINT contributions. This video
tape is an information sharing source that should be
exploited to the extent possible. The IC should share this
tape with all IC components and users. This tape, or like,
should be shown at the school houses and at operational
intelligence organizations to publicize the contributions of
MASINT collection and analysis.
10) CMO should pursue an adjunct training capability, with
trained instructors, like that of NSA to ensure MASINT
training is conducted and maintained. This training
facility should be reviewed for both "in-house" and
exportable training efforts. CMO should be a "clearing
house" for developing such training materials, including
"for credit" courses. Funding for this should be a CMO
responsibility, with the necessary resources programmed and
provided.
11) There is a need to develop and maintain evaluation
criteria (metrics) to gauge MASINT customer needs
satisfaction. The National Intelligence Evaluation Council
(NIEC -- within the recommendations of the Intelligence
Community Management staff study, the NIEC is an
organization subordinate to the DCI and responsible for
evaluating the Communities satisfaction of requirements)
should develop both evaluation criteria and a program for
measuring MASINT product effectiveness. This is necessary
to determine future needs and the ability to satisfy those
needs.
12) CMO needs to provide more community emphasis on
educating the user (warfighter and policy makers) on the
utility of MASINT products and services. Specifically, the
service War Colleges, for example, need to increase the
blocks that teach intelligence to all future leaders of the
Armed Forces. MASINT must be a formal block of instruction
in such courses. Again, without a basic understanding of
what the product can provide, the customer typically has no
appreciation of the need for MASINT and the associated
expenditures of funds. Without such an appreciation, the
discipline may be under-utilized.
D. "Funding levels for the current MASINT systems, and those
projected into the future are not reflective of the importance
of this discipline to the Nation's general intelligence/
dominant knowledge efforts./3/ This is primarily because users
do not have direct tasking over, and therefore understanding
of, MASINT sensors."
1) R&D is the lifeblood of MASINT. However, MASINT R&D
funding is one of the most vulnerable to being cut within
the GDIP program. Low obligation rates and lack
appreciation for R&D's future contributions make this an
easy target which is often hit during cut drills/actions.
2) Funding levels are considered by the group as
relatively reflective of the current need. CMO's long range
technology plan, with associated expected costs, is good,
but does not allow for the unknowns of scientific
breakthroughs or unforeseen technology needs. The disparate
organizational "ownership" of the funding does not allow for
coordinated/effective expenditure of the available funds.
3) MASINT requires, in many cases, single (to several)
technical collections systems, this forces paying "prototype
costs." This is a cost intensive effort that needs to be
acknowledged up front. Pure scientific research is the
bread and butter that must be funded at a continuing level.
There is a need for level-effort-funding like that of the
laboratories, that is not cut for convenience.
Additionally, the MASINT community must do better in terms
of coordinating efforts with the national laboratories.
Findings/Recommendations
4) MASINT resources and funding needs must be better
managed and coordinated between the services, agencies, and
laboratories. CMO must be provided (or assume) better
insight into each of the MASINT programs. This should
include providing recommendations into MASINT system POM
builds. However, the recommended DDCI/CM's Community
Management Staff (CMS) should construct the coordinated
budget.
5) MASINT R&D efforts must be better coordinated to ensure
proper level of effort and minimize redundancy. CMO should
be given authority to have specific insight into the
national laboratory and ARPA developmental and research
efforts, and should have the ability to focus or request
research and experimentation. This should include a
level-of-effort funding program, controlled by CMO to do
required research or to assist a promising technology. CMO
should be given the authority to directly obligate funding.
This recommendation is greatly facilitated by the TCA and
Technology Development Officer (TDO) organizations under the
DDCI/CM.
6) CMO should be given additional budget authority to
control a "to be determined" amount of funding to be applied
to existing intelligence and operational systems to
determine/improve their MASINT data collection potentials.
7) CMO must be directed to specifically prioritize MASINT
systems (agency and service included) for funding purposes.
Such authority must recognize that CMO does not have
jurisdiction over "multi-role" platforms (those that can
accomplish "MASINT collection" as incidental to their
primary tasks).
E. "The roadmap for specific MASINT technologies appears to
be fairly well thought out and necessary for the 21st century.
However, there may be insufficient funding flexibility for
reacting to, or pursuing new, emerging, or fleeting
technologies. Additionally, there is a need to ensure a
balance between the requirements and technologies that support
military battlefield requirements, and the often more exacting
requirements and technologies that are needed for IC national
monitoring and detection of weapon or agent developments."
1) CMO has developed a technology roadmap, complete with
projected cost data. This effort appears to be logical and
complete with necessary analysis. However, the roadmap does
not provide well for the unknown. That is, there are always
the possibilities and probabilities for future new and
emerging technologies or requirements that cannot be
specifically planned for. There is a need to be able to
capitalize on these unforeseen breakthroughs. This is the
need to "plan for the unknown."
2) Relative to "intelligence versus operations," there
appears to be a specific coordination problem with MASINT
versus counter-proliferation efforts against weapons of mass
destruction and, more specifically, chemical and biological
weapon (CW/BW) proliferation. Current efforts are not well
coordinated and resources are scattered throughout the U.S.
government. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear Policy has significant resources available for the
defense of or counter proliferation efforts against CW/BW
weapons. CMO has little to no insight or direction into the
"intelligence-related" activities. Additionally, without
better insight, the CMO's MASINT roadmap will pursue
duplicative efforts.
3) There is a critical difference between battlefield
support to military operations (SMO) MASINT requirements,
and those requirements for detecting, for example, the early
stages of a weapon or chemical agent development. Much
MASINT and, indeed, all other disciplines' emphasis is
placed on SMO. However, the criticality of developing and
maintaining extremely sensitive sensors for ensuring the
Nation's ability to monitor, detect, characterize and
classify developmental weapons/efforts, such as biological,
chemical and nuclear, cannot be overemphasized. There are
specific requirement differences, for example, in designing
battlefield chemical detectors that "simply" identify the
presence of agents, and the more sophisticated sensors
designed to provide the in-depth collection and analysis for
knowledge of the characteristics of these agents. This
requires a balance of emphasis to ensure that "non-SMO"
intelligence requirements are met.
Findings/Recommendations
4) CMO should be provided with a level-of-effort budgeting
capability. That is, CMO should request, and Congress
should provide (via legislation) for, a budgeting mechanism
that is that equivalent of "ready cash" or venture capital.
This account should be used to pursue new or unexpected
technologies, react to unforeseen requirements, etc. Such
a funding mechanism is becoming increasingly critical as
technology turnover times decrease. CMO should have the
specific authorized ability to direct funding against, or to
pursue such promising technologies or R&D efforts (without
penalty for those technologies/or scientific breakthroughs
that do not bear fruit). This authority needs to be
analogous to a capital venturer.
5) As with the "tactical" systems, CMO should have direct
insight and influence over Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
efforts -- most specifically on the intelligence related
issues. There is a great potential to more closely
coordinate efforts and provide a more cohesive national
defense. A CMO specialist should be assigned to
organizations working WMD programs to improve the cross-flow
of information on current and planned
capabilities/operations. Barring this, CMO should be a
formal invitee to any/all discussions that focus on this
area.
6) Bistatics (RF) need more attention. Bistatic RF
solutions are poorly understood/appreciated within the
traditional disciplines. This area needs more study and
resources put against it. Bistatic solutions provide a
unique opportunity to provide real-time NCTI and for
reducing friendly fire losses.
7) CMO needs a continuous, broad review of all government,
and to the extent possible, commercial developments to
determine the most logical and cost effective MASINT
potentials.
8) The community must maintain proper emphasis on both SMO
and "non-SMO" aspects of collection and analysis. The often
more sophisticated and difficult processes of intelligence
collection and processing for detailed knowledge of weapons
systems, material content, molecular compositions, etc.,
require markedly different sensors and techniques which the
IC must pursue. Such collection and analysis capabilities
cannot be overemphasized. It is these techniques that
provide the knowledge base for developing the battlefield
SMO systems.
9) Promising technologies which need current and future
emphasis include:
a. Target signature data bases. These data bases
will be the future "targeting systems" for smart/brilliant
weapons. These data bases will also provide the potential
"countermeasures knowledge" for development of future
defensive systems. These data bases need improvement and
application (and perhaps maintenance) at the "shooter"
level.
b. Continual, coordinated sensor development (as
science and technology advances) in space, air ,sea, and
ground. There is a need to ensure all developments --
whether they are "intelligence" or "operations," and
despite the medium in which they are intended to be
employed, are coordinated to determine their information
production potentials.
c. Refined signal processing that is applicable to
all intelligence disciplines. Technology advances that
are worked in one area of the IC must be shared throughout
the community. Far too often an agency or organization
creates a collection or processing technique or capability
that has much potential for other in the IC. There needs
to be a vehicle whereby such developments can be shared.
d. Multi-sensor/data integration between diverse
intelligence disciplines and within disciplines. Again,
there is much to be gained from synergistic collection and
analysis. This must become the "business norm" throughout
the IC.
e. Wide area surveillance technologies employing
target signature identification methods. Such
technologies hold the promise of improving automated
recognition algorithms for improving analyst productivity.
f. MASINT system direct integration with other
intelligence collection and operational (warfighting)
sensors. Again, the concepts of multi-discipline
intelligence analysis and the immediate (tactical) use of
such available information will be crucial to future needs
satisfaction.
g. Multi-spectral signatures. Current and future
generations of smart weapons; Theater Ballistic Missile
Defense (TBMD), including SCUD hunting, will need improved
specific signature identification (data bases) for target
weapon systems. This can be done via a number of
signature specifics such as acoustic, seismic, thermal and
RF emanations. There is a need to integrate such
information data bases into U.S. weapons systems.
h. MASINT support to Information Warfare. Intelligence
support to Information Warfare (IW) is a growing field.
The potential utilities of MASINT systems need to be
studied and evaluated for their IW potential.
F. "Although the CMO has the necessary legal authorities, it
is not properly staffed commensurate with its responsibilities.
Additionally, a fractured organizational structure provides
little to no focused MASINT management, budgeting oversight,
tasking control, or coordination of effort. This may
potentially cause inefficient expenditures of resources and
duplicative developments."
1) As stated earlier, MASINT as a discipline was created in
1986, with attendant start up of the MASINT Committee.
Three directives provide guidance relative to the MASINT
discipline. Specifically, the DCI Directive 2/11 gives CMO
the authorities to provide for the "common concern (re:
MASINT) on behalf of the Intelligence Community." The
Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5105.21, as amended,
empowers the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) with the
conduct of MASINT, and DoD Directive 5105.58 provides the
CMO with authorities for MASINT within DIA. These
directives proscribe specific responsibilities (for CMO) and
MASINT management duties. Some of these duties include:
providing direct and advisory tasking; developing MASINT
policy; coordinating plans and architectures; and
programming and budgeting. However, CMO's authority does
not expressly extend to the use of CIA human intelligence
assets for the collection and analysis of MASINT.
When first created, the CMO worked (organizationally)
directly for the Director, DIA as the executive agency for
MASINT. As a result of several DIA reorganizations, CMO's
position within DIA has moved to within the Collections
branch, organizationally subordinate to the National
Military Intelligence Collection Center (NMICC). However,
the GDIP Staff, which is directly subordinate to the
Director of Military Intelligence Staff and which is not
directly in the CMO's chain of command, has a direct
influence on the CMO's authorities. Specifically, the GDIP
Manager, who is responsible for recommending GDIP resources
for inclusion in or exclusion from the President's budget,
orchestrates the budget process, allocates fiscal guidance,
directs reductions and reallocations, and approves the GDIP
budget. The GDIP Manager is assisted by three Defense
Intelligence Functional Managers (FMs) for Collection,
Processing, and Infrastructure. These FMs are charged with
the preparation, supervision, and monitoring of GDIP
programs and budgets within their areas of responsibility.
The Director of the NMICC is also the GDIP FM for
Collection. This puts the Collection FM and management
staff directly above the CMO in the current organizational
structure to represent MASINT and other
disciplines/functions. This organizational construct
limits CMO's actual influence over MASINT system
development, tasking/operations, and programmatics. The
MASINT Panel participants unanimously voiced opinions that
the CMO is virtually powerless to direct and coordinate the
MASINT effort. Additionally, CMO only has direct control
over approximately 1/4 of the total MASINT funding./4/ The
remainder is within the service and agency accounts. (It
should be noted that much of this remainder pays for systems
that not strictly MASINT systems or operations - therefore,
much of this should not be the purview of the CMO.)
2) The CMO has true functional management over only those
MASINT funds within the GDIP. Because CMO is a management
organization, most of its funds are actually obligated by
the Services or Agencies. For example, 84% of the GDIP
MASINT funding is obligated by USAF (this equates to 30% of
the USAF's GDIP TOA), and USAF provides 93% of the manpower./5/
These are important statistics in light of previous
recommendations. Further, some respondents stated that
CMO's direct authority over GDIP-only funds tends to focus
CMO's efforts on GDIP issues. That is, CIAP and other
(TIARA) programs do not get proper CMO attention because CMO
does not have insight or leverage into these programs (the
"Golden Rule" applies - "he who owns the gold rules").
Therefore, such programs may suffer a lack of community-wide
direction. CMO needs insight into all "national" (CIAP) and
"tactical" (TIARA) systems, missions and developments.
3) The CMO's Mission Area Assessment identifies, as a
critical need characteristic for future MASINT systems, a
centralized/coordinated direction and oversight./6/ Under the
current construct, the Services and Agencies have control of
over 75% of all MASINT resources./7/ CMO has no direct control
or oversight of these resources, rightfully so in some
cases. But the fact remains, the CMO's ability to provide
quality centralized management is hampered by organizational
and budgetary barriers.
4) There is "no one in charge" of MASINT. An in-depth
review of the MASINT "chain of command" reveals that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to find a congruent chain of
command for the MASINT "system of systems." That is, there
is no continuous chain of responsibility flowing from the
Director, DIA, through Director CMO to the
Services/Agencies, to the collection systems, to the users
and back. Despite the official DCI and DoD responsibilities
and authorities assigned to the CMO, very little authority
is actually applied in reality. This can be directly
attributed to the fractured chain of command, limited CMO
manning, and organizational construct under DIA denies CMO
from providing a real community leadership role. CMO must
actually assume the authorities (with additional billets
described later) which it has been charged.
5) The Director, DIA -- not the Director, CMO -- is the
real spokesman for MASINT at the Military Intelligence Board
(MIB). This contrasts unfavorably with the Director, NSA
and the Director, CIO, who are the (logical) spokespersons
for their technical disciplines. The panel voiced concern
that the Director, DIA is often forced to "choose" between
MASINT issues and all other issues without having the
technical expertise in the MASINT area. As an example,
although budget cuts are worked in a formal process, MASINT
R&D is considered by some as the GDIP budget's "soft
underbelly," liable to be the first to take funding cuts
(before, say, operational systems or manpower billets). It
was acknowledged that some of the R&D cuts are due to poor
execution of funds -- although execution rate determinates
can be misleading. Nonetheless, CMO should have the real
voice in MASINT matters to ensure that balanced,
well-considered, logical decisions are made.
6) With specific regard to the budgeting process, because
the DIA GDIP Management Staff has significant authority in
the current organizational structure over CMO, some
respondents criticized that policy decisions often that do
not reflect the professional thinking within the CMO.
Additionally, since DIA is not an acquisition organization,
CMO must transfer allocated funds to the services to work
specific technology issues. This is done through the DIA
comptroller. The process is slow and cumbersome, and does
not provide the CMO the flexibility they need to ensure
thoughtful technologies and reactive operations. Finally,
because CMO's R&D budget must use the GDIP budgeting
accounting process, obligation rates often lag behind the
established "norms." Accordingly, these funds can be easily
targeted for reduction even though their need is real.
7) Because of prior position cuts, until very recently, the
CMO has been left without the necessary leadership (General
officer or SES-level) that has the real authority to
coordinate the MASINT community.
8) Based on panel respondent estimates, the CMO is
understaffed, both in real terms based on current billets
authorizations, and based on real need. Currently, the CMO
is authorized 30 DIA billets -- 27 of which are filled; 6
CIA billets -- 5 of which are filled; 2 each Army and Navy
billets - none of which are filled; 1 Air Force SES position
-- the individual for this position was just recently hired;
and 15 officer billets for the Consolidated MASINT Technical
Collection Office (CMTCO) -- 14 of which are filled./8/)
Although a specific number needs refined analysis, several
respondents discussed numbers of approximately 75-100
authorized CMO billets as being more in line with the tasked
mission of the office. The current limitation of people
relegates the CMO into an organization that is reactive in
nature and "bound by the in-box." Additionally, CMO is not
manned or postured to do material development. This
development, in most cases, should be, and remains, the
purview of the Services and Agencies. However, CMO should
have oversight and coordination authorities for these
programs. Additionally, partly because of size and IC
organizational structure, CMO is not aware of all
MASINT-related programs conducted throughout the USG. This
is particularly true of multi-, hyper- and ultra-spectral
sensing being pursued by various agencies.
9) The MASINT Committee and its subcommittees (which
predate the CMO) exist primarily as a means of cross-flowing
information between agencies and services. This committee
is analogous to the SIGINT committee. Several participants
questioned whether these committees (and subcommittees) are
only necessary because CMO is not properly sized/staffed to
meet its responsibilities./9/ However, a number of respondents
stated these committees are extremely useful and should be
maintained.
Findings/Recommendations
10) The Director, Central MASINT Office has the necessary
legal authority to carry out the functions of a coordinated
MASINT program. However, because of a lack of personnel,
grade and organizational structure, the Director, CMO does
not have the real authority to carry out his/her
responsibilities. To ensure community-wide coordination of
efforts, CMO's charter under DCID 2/11-1 should specifically
include the management oversight of all MASINT budget builds
including CIA MASINT programs. This charter should also
provide the Director, CMO the authority to "determine" the
systems are or can be a MASINT contributors. This would be
to determine what systems could provide MASINT collection,
and which could be logically managed within the MASINT
program." This CMO authority concept may not be well
received by the Services and Agencies, but is actually CMO's
assigned task today.
11) The Director of CMO needs to be a General Officer or
SES-level position, with not only the statutory or executive
order authority to be the spokesman for, but the real
authority for MASINT, as is the Director, NSA for SIGINT.
The Director, DIA has recently hired a new SES as the
Director, CMO. As of the writing of this report, any new
titles/responsibilities/authorities to be granted this
person are unknown. However, the Director CMO, needs to be
a permanent member of the MIB, NFIB and other senior DCI and
DoD boards/panels as the representative for MASINT. His
authority to establish MASINT community direction,
standards, etc, should be on par with those of Director, NSA
and Director, CIO (or the new NIMA). Director, CMO should
also be a formal member of a senior steering committee that
can vet MASINT issues applicable to the entire IC. (The
Intelligence Community Management staff study recommends a
construct for this to occur.)
12) A MASINT management reorganization will be painful, but
is necessary to ensure the viability of this critical future
discipline. Such a reorganization should focus on joint
units, offices, and organizations. Such an organization
should be within the TCA (see the Intelligence Community
Management staff study). Specifically, MASINT management
requires a "stand alone" capability like that of NSA -
though all would agree, not the size. This should requires
the equivalent of a U.S. MASINT System (USMS) like the U.S.
SIGINT System or the U.S. Imagery System. If there is no
consolidation of the IC structure (i.e. a TCA) the CMO may
need to be an organization independent of the DIA structure,
but not necessarily independent of the Director, DIA. For
"care and feeding" purposes, the CMO can continue to exist
within DIA, but must be an organization that reports
directly to the Director, DIA, not the staff elements of
DIA. Additionally, the CMO must have the authority to use
existing (DIA) budgeting organizations (on an "outsourcing
basis") to facilitate their obligation and transfer of funds
as necessary. CMO could also be organized outside of DIA
directly responsible to the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Command Control Communications and Intelligence. In either
case, CMO needs to be responsible for all USG MASINT efforts
(just like NSA is for SIGINT), and responsible to the DCI
and SECDEF for satisfaction of MASINT information needs. In
either case, the CMO must be given the real authority to
take on the responsibilities laid out in existing charter.
13) The CMO should be given the NSA-equivalent of the
"SIGINT seal of approval." (Under the TCA construct, this
becomes a mute issue.) That is, CMO should be given a U.S.
MASINT System (USMS) lead status with the ability to provide
real guidance relative to programming, research and
development, standards, tasking and operations. CMO should
have more authority over service and agency developments and
acquisitions (this should be a chairman of the board
construct). This is not to undermine service/agency Title
10 authorities, but rather to provide a coordinated approach
to resource expenditures. Again, this may not be well
received by the services/agencies, but is actually CMO's
assigned task today. In conjunction with, and through the
authority of the DDCI/CM's Infrastructure Support
Organization (ISO), the CMO should establish MASINT system
standards, with the services/agencies (the consolidated NRO)
developing the material solutions.
14) Increase the size of the CMO. A specific number needs
further analysis, however, respondents argue that a staff of
at least 75-100 people is needed. This number is based on
an independent (e.g. no TCA) organization. Refined numbers
for a division within the TCA will have to be determined.
However, a TBD percentage of these billets should be
military, with the services providing their experts to the
organization. In the joint environment, the Director, CMO
needs to facilitate the "cross-pollination" of services,
organizations, and agencies to ensure the long term needs of
customers can best be satisfied. Additionally, the CMO
should have representatives assigned to the theater CINCs
just as does NSA, DoD HUMINT, etc.
15) The role of the MASINT Committee should be further
reviewed for adequacy/need. Most study participants voiced
a good deal of support for the MASINT Committee, stating
that it provides a useful forum for the Agencies and
Services to voice their concerns, opinions and positions as
(CMO) policy decisions are developed. They believe this
allows for infusion of some much needed objectivity into the
MASINT decision process. However, there is a question of
what the Committee's true charter is, particularly when
viewed in the light of a stronger, more robust (also read:
joint) CMO. There is no readily apparent savings or added
value to dissolving the MASINT Committee, but the committee
construct as a whole should be viewed for future relevancy.
16) CMO must be able to state and maintain the necessary
management positions (both popular and unpopular) relative
to MASINT budget/programmatic recommendations and decisions.
Such decision must be further incorporated within the CMS
budget process (again, see the Intelligence Community
Management staff study for further discussion). Such
coordinated budgeting can only happen if CMO is given and
takes more direct control of the entire MASINT effort from
budget through policy formulation.
Additional Thoughts
A. MASINT is a science-intensive discipline. Its one true
characteristic is the need for practitioners well-versed in the
broad range of physical and electrical sciences. These people
cannot be honed from military service schools in one or two
years. These people need to come from academia fresh with the
scientific knowledge from experimentation and research. Nor
can they continue to be "proficient" in their areas of
expertise if they are maintained in government employ for an
entire career. Such scientists must have portability. That
is, they must be able to leave government employment and rejoin
the ranks of academics in order to maintain their scientific
knowledge. The IC needs the personnel equivalent of commercial
off-the-shelf technology (COTS). As part of the overall IC
management initiatives, we discussed examining the feasibility
of pursuing trial personnel management programs that provide
incentives to recruit the necessary scientific experts for the
IC's needs. Such programs need to be pursued with the full
understanding that such experts may not spend a 20-30 year
career in government employment. The Committee recognizes the
magnitude of such a proposal, and stops short of attempting to
enact this recommendation into law. However, the we believe
plans, such as limited government pensions, movement of private
pensions and savings plans into (and out of) the federal
retirement plans, bonuses, etc., hold the promise of helping
to ensure the Community can retain these experts for national
service. We also believe there is a need to address the issue
of being able to rehire retired military experts. Although
costly, the returns in terms scientific knowledge would be well
worth the investment.
B. For intelligence collection/support systems, there is a
continuum that runs from those systems that provide pure
intelligence collection and those that provide pure operational
(i.e., SMO) support. In reality, all U.S. IC systems fall
within the two extremes. There is a need to "plot" where
individual systems fall, determine the IC strengths, its
weaknesses (the holes) and use existing systems to cover the
holes before setting off to build new systems or capabilities.
C. The intent of this report is not to "oversell" MASINT,
but rather to call attention to some areas of concern,
weakness, and, in fact, strengths. MASINT is not the most
critical intelligence source for U.S. customers today.
However, for any one particular incident or collection
opportunity, no discipline always is. True all-source
collection and analysis is critical. This report does try to
emphasize that MASINT is a critical discipline that has the
unique potential of being more so in the future. MASINT
provides information that other sources cannot. This is not
to say it is specifically a niche field, but can satisfy niche
requirements.
D. The group identified (via various inputs) some recurring
thoughts that would identify the MASINT system's greatest
needs. These deserve reiterating:
- Educate people on what MASINT is and is not.
- MASINT can be used for immediate battlefield survival
(tactical support).
- MASINT information is critical for national information
needs (national survival) by providing information on the
weapons of mass destruction and chemical and biological
proliferation/use. There is a need to more clearly tie
CMO's structure into the "national" (CIA) structure.
- Smart/brilliant weapons will, increasingly, depend on
MASINT information.
- MASINT development must be focused on sensor to shooter
and sensor to seeker head.
- MASINT provides the potential for unambiguous
discrimination for identification of friend and foe (for
preventing fratricide).
- Underground targets will be a future because of U.S.
successes in DESERT STORM. This will add to the
importance of MASINT exploitation.
- Requirements: there is a need for a "National MASINT
Requirements Tasking Center" similar to the National
HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center (NHRTC)."
- The services are justifiably concerned that any
management/organizational changes may adversely affect
warfighting capabilities. Any changes resulting from
IC-21 must factor those concerns, and a proper balance of
centralized management/coordination versus operational
needs must be found.
- There is absolute need for tasking and planning
interactions between all players for all planning, R&D,
system development, tasking, employment, etc.
- There needs to be a joint collection manager MOS/AFSC
within the services, or, at a minimum, there needs to be
an effective training block/course for all personnel
assigned to work in collection management positions. How
can we develop an JCMT without it?
Conclusion
There are a number of varied thoughts relative to the future
of MASINT. Whether it remains a specifically-named intelligence
discipline or not is less important than ensuring the viability of
the technically and scientifically derived information from the
many collection sources. User knowledge and insight as to what
the MASINT product can provide for the future battlefield or for
national objectives is imperative. Strong leadership is necessary
to steer this "intelligence discipline of the future" into the
next century.
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FOOTNOTES
/1/MASINT panel #3 discussions; individual responses to MASINT
questionnaire
/2/MASINT Panel #1, #2, and #3 discussions and individual
interviews.
/3/Panel respondents, MASINT panel # 1, 2 and 3 discussions.
/4/MASINT Panel #2 and #3 discussions, and with CMO
/5/USAF MASINT briefing
/6/MASINT 2010, Planning the U.S. MASINT System for the 21st
Century
/7/MASINT panel #2 and #3, discussion with acting Director, CMO,
Mr. Jim Fahnestock
/8/CMO figures.
/9/MASINT panels 1, 2, and 3 and personal interviews.