of the agency, board, commission, or officer concerned if needed for the transaction of the public business. Certified copies of any papers included in the record or any supplemental record may also be returned to the agency, board, commission, or officer concerned upon the final determination of review or enforcement proceedings.

(d) The provisions of this section are not applicable to proceedings to review decisions of the Tax Court of the United States or to proceedings to review or enforce those orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions, or officers which are by law reviewable or enforceable by the district courts.

(Added Pub. L. 85–791, §2, Aug. 28, 1958, 72 Stat. 941; amended Pub. L. 89–773, §5(a), (b), Nov. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 1323; Pub. L. 100–236, §1, Jan. 8, 1988, 101 Stat. 1731.)

AMENDMENTS

1988—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 100–236 substituted ''If proceedings are instituted in two or more courts of appeals with respect to the same order, the following shall apply:'' and pars. (1) to (5) for ''If proceedings have been instituted in two or more courts of appeals with respect to the same order the agency, board, commission, or officer concerned shall file the record in that one of such courts in which a proceeding with respect to such order was first instituted. The other courts in which such proceedings are pending shall thereupon transfer them to the court of appeals in which the record has been filed. For the convenience of the parties in the interest of justice such court may thereafter transfer all the proceedings with respect to such order to any other court of appeals.''

1966—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 89–773, §5(a), substituted ''The rules prescribed under the authority of section 2072 of this title may provide for the time and manner of filing'' for ''The several courts of appeal shall have power to adopt, with the approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States, rules, which so far as practicable shall be uniform in all such courts prescribing the time and manner of filing.'' See section 2072 of this title.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 89–773, §5(b), substituted ''the rules prescribed under the authority of section 2072 of this title'' for ''the said rules of the court of appeals'' and for ''the rules of such court''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1988 AMENDMENT

Section 3 of Pub. L. 100–236 provided that: ''The amendments made by this Act [amending this section and section 1369 of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters] take effect 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Jan 8, 1988], except that the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation may issue rules pursuant to subsection (a)(3) of section 2112 of title 28, United States Code (as added by section 1), on or after such date of enactment.''

SAVINGS PROVISION

Section 5(c) of Pub. L. 89–773 provided that: ''The amendments of section 2112 of title 28 of the United States Code made by this Act shall not operate to invalidate or repeal rules adopted under the authority of that section prior to the enactment of this Act [Nov. 6, 1966], which rules shall remain in effect until superseded by rules prescribed under the authority of section 2072 of title 28 of the United States Code as amended by this Act.''

§ 2113. Definition

For purposes of this chapter, the terms ''State court'', ''State courts'', and ''highest court of a State'' include the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

(Added Pub. L. 91–358, title I, §172(a)(2)(A), July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 590.)

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section effective the first day of the seventh calendar month which begins after July 29, 1970, see section 199(a) of Pub. L. 91–358, set out as an Effective Date of 1970 Amendment note under section 1257 of this title.

PART VI—PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT

Chapters 169, 171 and 173 were renumbered ''167'', ''169'' and ''171'', respectively, without change in their section numbers, by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.

AMENDMENTS

2010—Pub. L. 111–223, §3(c), Aug. 10, 2010, 124 Stat. 2384, added item for chapter 181.

2000—Pub. L. 106–310, div. B, title XXXIV, §3405(c)(2), Oct. 17, 2000, 114 Stat. 1221, struck out item for chapter 175 ''Civil Commitment and Rehabilitation of Narcotic Addicts''.

1998—Pub. L. 105–304, title IV, §406(b), Oct. 28, 1998, 112 Stat. 2905, added item for chapter 180.

1996—Pub. L. 104–331, §3(e), Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4071, added item for chapter 179.

Pub. L. 104–132, title I, §107(b), Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1226, as amended Pub. L. 104–294, title VI, §605(k), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3510, added item for chapter 154.

1995—Pub. L. 104–88, title III, §305(c)(2), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 945, which directed amendment of the item for chapter 157 in the table of chapters of this title by substituting ''Surface Transportation Board'' for ''Interstate Commerce Commission'', was executed by making the substitution in the table of chapters for this part to reflect the probable intent of Congress.

1992—Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, §902(b)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516, substituted ''United States Court of Fed-

[1] So in original.

[2] So in original. Probably should be capitalized.

eral Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court'' in item for chapter 165.

Pub. L. 102–559, § 2(b), Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 4228, substituted ''Procedure'' for ''Procedures'' in item for chapter 176 and added item for chapter 178.

1990—Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3302 [3612], Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4964, added item for chapter 176.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164, title I, §§ 139(*o*)(1), 140, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 44, substituted ''United States Claims Court Procedure'' for ''Court of Claims Procedure'' in item for chapter 165 and struck out item for chapter 167 ''Court of Customs and Patent Appeals Procedure''.

1980—Pub. L. 96–417, title V, § 501(25), Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1742, substituted ''Court of International Trade Procedure'' for ''Customs Court Procedure'' in item for chapter 169.

1966—Pub. L. 89–793, title VI, § 603, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1450, added item for chapter 175.

Pub. L. 89–554, § 4(d), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 621, added item for chapter 158.

1960—Pub. L. 86–682, § 10, Sept. 2, 1960, 74 Stat. 708, added item for chapter 173.

CHAPTER 151—DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

§ 2201. Creation of remedy

(a) In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, a proceeding under section 505 or 1146 of title 11, or in any civil action involving an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding regarding a class or kind of merchandise of a free trade area country (as defined in section 516A(f)(10) of the Tariff Act of 1930), as determined by the administering authority, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.

(b) For limitations on actions brought with respect to drug patents see section 505 or 512 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, or section 351 of the Public Health Service Act.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 964; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 111, 63 Stat. 105; Aug. 28, 1954, ch. 1033, 68 Stat. 890; Pub. L. 85–508, § 12(p), July 7, 1958, 72 Stat. 349; Pub. L. 94–455, title XIII, § 1306(b)(8), Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 1719; Pub. L. 95–598, title II, § 249, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2672; Pub. L. 98–417, title I, § 106, Sept. 24, 1984, 98 Stat. 1597; Pub. L. 100–449, title IV, § 402(c), Sept. 28, 1988, 102 Stat. 1884; Pub. L. 100–670, title I, § 107(b), Nov. 16, 1988, 102 Stat. 3984; Pub. L. 103–182, title IV, § 414(b), Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2147; Pub. L. 111–148, title VII, § 7002(c)(2), Mar. 23, 2010, 124 Stat. 816.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 400 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 274d, as added June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955; Aug. 30, 1935, ch. 829, § 405, 49 Stat. 1027).

This section is based on the first paragraph of section 400 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed. Other provisions of such section are incorporated in section 2202 of this title.

While this section does not exclude declaratory judgments with respect to State taxes, such suits will not ordinarily be entertained in the courts of the United States where State law makes provision for payment under protest and recovery back or otherwise affords adequate remedy in the State courts. See *Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman*, La. 1943, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 319 U.S. 293, 87 L.Ed. 1407. See also *Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin*, Conn. 1944, 65 S.Ct. 152, 323 U.S. 101, 89 L.Ed. 101. See also section 1341 of this title forbidding district courts to restrain enforcements of State taxes where State courts afford plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.

Changes were made in phraseology.

1949 ACT

Section corrects a typographical error in section 2201 of title 28, U.S.C.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (a), is classified to section 7428 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

Section 516A(f)(10) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a), is classified to section 1516a(f)(10) of Title 19, Customs Duties.

Sections 505 and 512 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, referred to in subsec. (b), are classified to sections 355 and 360b, respectively, of Title 21, Food and Drugs.

Section 351 of the Public Health Service Act, referred to in subsec. (b), is classified to section 262 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.

AMENDMENTS

2010—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 111–148 inserted '', or section 351 of the Public Health Service Act'' before period.

1993—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103–182 substituted ''merchandise of a free trade area country (as defined in section 516A(f)(10) of the Tariff Act of 1930),'' for ''Canadian merchandise,''.

1988—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 100–449 substituted ''1986,'' for ''1954 or'' and inserted ''or in any civil action involving an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding regarding a class or kind of Canadian merchandise, as determined by the administering authority,'' after ''title 11,''.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 100–670 inserted ''or 512'' after ''505''.

1984—Pub. L. 98–417 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

1978—Pub. L. 95–598 inserted reference to proceedings under section 505 or 1146 of title 11.

1976—Pub. L. 94–455 substituted ''taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954'' for ''taxes''.

1958—Pub. L. 85–508 struck out provisions which related to District Court for Territory of Alaska. See section 81A of this title which establishes a United States District Court for the State of Alaska.

1954—Act Aug. 28, 1954, extended provisions to Alaska.

1949—Act May 24, 1949, corrected spelling of ''or'' in second sentence.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1993 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 103–182 effective on the date the North American Free Trade Agreement enters into force with respect to the United States [Jan. 1, 1994], but not applicable to any final determination described in section 1516a(a)(1)(B) or (2)(B)(i), (ii), or (iii) of Title 19, Customs Duties, notice of which is published in the Federal Register before such date, or to a determination described in section 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) of Title 19, notice of which is received by the Government of Canada or Mexico before such date, or to any binational panel review under the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, or to any extraordinary challenge arising out of any such review that was commenced before such date, see section 416 of Pub. L. 103–182, set out as an Effective Date note under section 3431 of Title 19.

EFFECTIVE AND TERMINATION DATES OF 1988 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 100–449 effective on date United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement enters into force (Jan. 1, 1989), and to cease to have effect on date Agreement ceases to be in force, see section 501(a), (c) of Pub. L. 100–449, set out in a note under section 2112 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1978 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 95–598 effective Oct. 1, 1979, see section 402(c) of Pub. L. 95–598, set out as an Effective Date note preceding section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1976 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 94–455 applicable with respect to pleadings filed with the United States Tax Court, the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, or the United States Court of Claims more than 6 months after Oct. 4, 1976, but only with respect to determinations (or requests for determinations) made after Jan. 1, 1976, see section 1306(c) of Pub. L. 94–455, set out as an Effective Date note under section 7428 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1958 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 85–508 effective Jan. 3, 1959, on admission of Alaska into the Union pursuant to Proc. No. 3269, Jan. 3, 1959, 24 F.R. 81, 73 Stat. c16, as required by sections 1 and 8(c) of Pub. L. 85–508, see notes set out under section 81A of this title and preceding section 21 of Title 48, Territories and Insular Possessions.

EFFECT OF TERMINATION OF NAFTA COUNTRY STATUS

For provisions relating to effect of termination of NAFTA country status on sections 401 to 416 of Pub. L. 103–182, see section 3451 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY

Jurisdictional amount in diversity of citizenship cases, see section 1332 of this title.

§ 2202. Further relief

Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 964.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 400 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 274d, as added June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955; Aug. 30, 1935, ch. 829, § 405, 49 Stat. 1027).

This section is based on the second paragraph of section 400 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed. Other provisions of such section are incorporated in section 2201 of this title.

Provision in said section 400 that the court shall require adverse parties whose rights are adjudicated to show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith, were omitted as unnecessary and covered by the revised section.

Provisions relating to submission of interrogatories to a jury were omitted as covered by rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Changes were made in phraseology.

CHAPTER 153—HABEAS CORPUS

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT

Chapter catchline was changed by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.

AMENDMENTS

1978—Pub. L. 95–598, title II, § 250(b), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2672, directed the addition of item 2256 ''Habeas corpus from bankruptcy courts'', which amendment did not become effective pursuant to section 402(b) of Pub. L. 95–598, as amended, set out as an Effective Date note preceding section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy.

1966—Pub. L. 89–711, § 3, Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1106, substituted ''Federal courts'' for ''State Courts'' in item 2254.

§ 2241. Power to grant writ

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.

(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless—

(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or

(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or

(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or

(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.

(d) Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody under the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or more Federal judi-

cial districts, the application may be filed in the district court for the district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him and each of such district courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application. The district court for the district wherein such an application is filed in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of justice may transfer the application to the other district court for hearing and determination.

(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.

(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801 note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 964; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 112, 63 Stat. 105; Pub. L. 89–590, Sept. 19, 1966, 80 Stat. 811; Pub. L. 109–148, div. A, title X, § 1005(e)(1), Dec. 30, 2005, 119 Stat. 2741; Pub. L. 109–163, div. A, title XIV, § 1405(e)(1), Jan. 6, 2006, 119 Stat. 3477; Pub. L. 109–366, § 7(a), Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 2635; Pub. L. 110–181, div. A, title X, § 1063(f), Jan. 28, 2008, 122 Stat. 323.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 451, 452, 453 (R.S. §§ 751, 752, 753; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 291, 36 Stat. 1167; Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 6, 43 Stat. 940).

Section consolidates sections 451, 452 and 453 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with changes in phraseology necessary to effect the consolidation.

Words ''for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty'' in section 452 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., were omitted as merely descriptive of the writ.

Subsection (b) was added to give statutory sanction to orderly and appropriate procedure. A circuit judge who unnecessarily entertains applications which should be addressed to the district court, thereby disqualifies himself to hear such matters on appeal and to that extent limits his usefulness as a judge of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court and Supreme Court Justices should not be burdened with applications for writs cognizable in the district courts.

1949 ACT

This section inserts commas in certain parts of the text of subsection (b) of section 2241 of title 28, U.S.C., for the purpose of proper punctuation.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, referred to in subsec. (e)(2), is section 1005(e) of title X of div. A of Pub. L. 109–148, which is set out as a note under section 801 of Title 10, Armed Forces.

AMENDMENTS

2008—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 110–181 amended directory language of Pub. L. 109–366, § 7(a). See 2006 Amendment note below.

2006—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 109–366, § 7(a), as amended by Pub. L. 110–181, added subsec. (e) and struck out both former subsecs. (e) relating to jurisdiction to hear or consider action against United States or its agents relating to detention of alien by Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 109–163 added subsec. (e), relating to section 1405 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.

2005—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 109–148 added subsec. (e), relating to section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.

1966—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 89–590 added subsec. (d).

1949—Subsec. (b). Act May 24, 1949, inserted commas after ''Supreme Court'' and ''any justice thereof''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2006 AMENDMENT

Pub. L. 109–366, § 7(b), Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 2636, provided that: ''The amendment made by subsection (a) [amending this section] shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 17, 2006], and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States since September 11, 2001.''

TREATY OBLIGATIONS NOT ESTABLISHING GROUNDS FOR CERTAIN CLAIMS

Pub. L. 109–366, § 5, Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 2631, provided that:

''(a) IN GENERAL.—No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its States or territories.

''(b) GENEVA CONVENTIONS DEFINED.—In this section, the term 'Geneva Conventions' means—

''(1) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3114);

''(2) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217);

''(3) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and

''(4) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3516).''

§ 2242. Application

Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.

It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant's commitment or detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known.

It may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.

If addressed to the Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge it shall state the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 965.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 454 (R.S. § 754).

Words ''or by someone acting in his behalf'' were added. This follows the actual practice of the courts, as set forth in *United States ex rel. Funaro v. Watchorn*, C.C. 1908, 164 F. 152; *Collins v. Traeger*, C.C.A. 1928, 27 F.2d 842, and cases cited.

The third paragraph is new. It was added to conform to existing practice as approved by judicial decisions. See *Dorsey v. Gill* (App.D.C.) 148 F.2d 857, 865, 866. See also *Holiday v. Johnston*, 61 S.Ct. 1015, 313 U.S. 342, 85 L.Ed. 1392.

Changes were made in phraseology.

§ 2243. Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision

A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.

The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.

The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.

When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.

Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained.

The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts.

The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.

The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 965.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, and 461 (R.S. §§ 755–761).

Section consolidates sections 455–461 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.

The requirement for return within 3 days ''unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding 20 days is allowed'' in the second paragraph, was substituted for the provision of such section 455 which allowed 3 days for return if within 20 miles, 10 days if more than 20 but not more than 100 miles, and 20 days if more than 100 miles distant.

Words ''unless for good cause additional time is allowed'' in the fourth paragraph, were substituted for words ''unless the party petitioning requests a longer time'' in section 459 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.

The fifth paragraph providing for production of the body of the detained person at the hearing is in conformity with *Walker v. Johnston*, 1941, 61 S.Ct. 574, 312 U.S. 275, 85 L.Ed. 830.

Changes were made in phraseology.

§ 2244. Finality of determination

(a) No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States if it appears that the legality of such detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus, except as provided in section 2255.

(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.

(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless—

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

(3)(A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.

(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive application shall be determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals.

(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.

(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion.

(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.

(4) A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of this section.

(c) In a habeas corpus proceeding brought in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a prior judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States on an appeal or review by a writ of certiorari at the instance of the prisoner of the decision of such State court, shall be conclusive as to all issues of fact or law with respect to an asserted denial of a Federal right which constitutes ground for discharge in a habeas corpus proceeding, actually adjudicated by the Supreme Court therein,

unless the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus shall plead and the court shall find the existence of a material and controlling fact which did not appear in the record of the proceeding in the Supreme Court and the court shall further find that the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus could not have caused such fact to appear in such record by the exercise of reasonable diligence.

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 965; Pub. L. 89–711, §1, Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1104; Pub. L. 104–132, title I, §§101, 106, Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1217, 1220.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

This section makes no material change in existing practice. Notwithstanding the opportunity open to litigants to abuse the writ, the courts have consistently refused to entertain successive ''nuisance'' applications for habeas corpus. It is derived from H.R. 4232 introduced in the first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress by Chairman Hatton Sumners of the Committee on the Judiciary and referred to that Committee.

The practice of suing out successive, repetitious, and unfounded writs of habeas corpus imposes an unnecessary burden on the courts. See *Dorsey v. Gill*, 1945, 148 F.2d 857, 862, in which Miller, J., notes that ''petitions for the writ are used not only as they should be to protect unfortunate persons against miscarriages of justice, but also as a device for harassing court, custodial, and enforcement officers with a multiplicity of repetitious, meritless requests for relief. The most extreme example is that of a person who, between July 1, 1939, and April 1944 presented in the District Court 50 petitions for writs of habeas corpus; another person has presented 27 petitions; a third, 24; a fourth, 22; a fifth, 20. One hundred nineteen persons have presented 597 petitions—an average of 5.''

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENTS

Section amended to modify original language which denied Federal judges power to entertain application for writ where legality of detention had been determined on prior application and later application presented no new grounds, and to omit reference to rehearing in section catch line and original provision authorizing hearing judge to grant rehearing. 80th Congress, Senate Report No. 1559, Amendment No. 45.

AMENDMENTS

1996—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 104–132, §106(a), substituted '', except as provided in section 2255.'' for ''and the petition presents no new ground not heretofore presented and determined, and the judge or court is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry.''

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 104–132, §106(b), amended subsec. (b) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (b) read as follows: ''When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.''

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 104–132, §101, added subsec. (d).

1966—Pub. L. 89–711 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), struck out provision making the subsection's terms applicable to applications seeking inquiry into detention of persons detained pursuant to judgments of State courts, and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

§ 2245. Certificate of trial judge admissible in evidence

On the hearing of an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment the certificate of the judge who presided at the trial resulting in the judgment, setting forth the facts occurring at the trial, shall be admissible in evidence. Copies of the certificate shall be filed with the court in which the application is pending and in the court in which the trial took place.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 966.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

This section makes no substantive change in existing law. It is derived from H.R. 4232 introduced in the first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress by Chairman Sumners of the House Committee on the Judiciary. It clarifies existing law and promotes uniform procedure.

§ 2246. Evidence; depositions; affidavits

On application for a writ of habeas corpus, evidence may be taken orally or by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by affidavit. If affidavits are admitted any party shall have the right to propound written interrogatories to the affiants, or to file answering affidavits.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 966.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

This section is derived from H.R. 4232 introduced in the first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress by Chairman Sumners of the House Committee on the Judiciary. It clarifies existing practice without substantial change.

§ 2247. Documentary evidence

On application for a writ of habeas corpus documentary evidence, transcripts of proceedings upon arraignment, plea and sentence and a transcript of the oral testimony introduced on any previous similar application by or in behalf of the same petitioner, shall be admissible in evidence.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 966.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derived from H.R. 4232, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session. It is declaratory of existing law and practice.

§ 2248. Return or answer; conclusiveness

The allegations of a return to the writ of habeas corpus or of an answer to an order to show cause in a habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as true except to the extent that the judge finds from the evidence that they are not true.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 966.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derived from H.R. 4232, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session. At common law the return was conclusive and could not be controverted but it is now almost universally held that the return is not conclusive of the facts alleged therein. 39 C.J.S. pp. 664–666, §§ 98, 99.

§ 2249. Certified copies of indictment, plea and judgment; duty of respondent

On application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of any person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States, the respondent shall promptly file with the court certified copies of the indictment, plea of petitioner and the judgment, or such of them as may be material to the questions raised, if the petitioner fails to attach them to his petition, and same shall be attached to the return to the writ, or to the answer to the order to show cause.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 966.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derived from H.R. 4232, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session. It conforms to the prevailing practice in habeas corpus proceedings.

§ 2250. Indigent petitioner entitled to documents without cost

If on any application for a writ of habeas corpus an order has been made permitting the petitioner to prosecute the application in forma pauperis, the clerk of any court of the United States shall furnish to the petitioner without cost certified copies of such documents or parts of the record on file in his office as may be required by order of the judge before whom the application is pending.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 966.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derived from H.R. 4232, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session. It conforms to the prevailing practice.

§ 2251. Stay of State court proceedings

(a) IN GENERAL.—

(1) PENDING MATTERS.—A justice or judge of the United States before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pending, may, before final judgment or after final judgment of discharge, or pending appeal, stay any proceeding against the person detained in any State court or by or under the authority of any State for any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding.

(2) MATTER NOT PENDING.—For purposes of this section, a habeas corpus proceeding is not pending until the application is filed.

(3) APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL.—If a State prisoner sentenced to death applies for appointment of counsel pursuant to section 3599(a)(2) of title 18 in a court that would have jurisdiction to entertain a habeas corpus application regarding that sentence, that court may stay execution of the sentence of death, but such stay shall terminate not later than 90 days after counsel is appointed or the application for appointment of counsel is withdrawn or denied.

(b) NO FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.—After the granting of such a stay, any such proceeding in any State court or by or under the authority of any State shall be void. If no stay is granted, any such proceeding shall be as valid as if no habeas corpus proceedings or appeal were pending.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 966; Pub. L. 109–177, title V, § 507(f), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 251.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 465 (R.S. § 766; Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 226, 27 Stat. 751; Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 8(c), 43 Stat. 940; June 19, 1934, ch. 673, 48 Stat. 1177).

Provisions relating to proceedings pending in 1934 were deleted as obsolete.

A provision requiring an appeal to be taken within 3 months was omitted as covered by sections 2101 and 2107 of this title.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

2006—Pub. L. 109–177 designated first par. of existing provisions as subsec. (a)(1) and inserted headings, added pars. (2) and (3), and designated second par. of existing provisions as subsec. (b) and inserted heading.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2006 AMENDMENT

Pub. L. 109–177, title V, § 507(d), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 251, provided that:

''(1) IN GENERAL.—This section [enacting section 2265 of this title, amending this section and sections 2261 and 2266 of this title, and repealing former section 2265 of this title] and the amendments made by this section shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act [Mar. 9, 2006].

''(2) TIME LIMITS.—In a case pending on the date of enactment of this Act, if the amendments made by this section establish a time limit for taking certain action, the period of which began on the date of an event that occurred prior to the date of enactment of this Act, the period of such time limit shall instead begin on the date of enactment of this Act.''

§ 2252. Notice

Prior to the hearing of a habeas corpus proceeding in behalf of a person in custody of State officers or by virtue of State laws notice shall be served on the attorney general or other appropriate officer of such State as the justice or

judge at the time of issuing the writ shall direct.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 462 (R.S. § 762).

Section 462 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., was limited to alien prisoners described in section 453 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed. The revised section extends to all cases of all prisoners under State custody or authority, leaving it to the justice or judge to prescribe the notice to State officers, to specify the officer served, and to satisfy himself that such notice has been given.

Provision for making due proof of such service was omitted as unnecessary. The sheriff's or marshal's return is sufficient.

Changes were made in phraseology.

§ 2253. Appeal

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 113, 63 Stat. 105; Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 52, 65 Stat. 727; Pub. L. 104–132, title I, § 102, Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1217.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 463(a) and 466 (Mar. 10, 1908, ch. 76, 36 Stat. 40; Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, §§ 6, 13, 43 Stat. 940, 942; June 29, 1938, ch. 806, 52 Stat. 1232).

This section consolidates paragraph (a) of section 463, and section 466 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.

The last two sentences of section 463(a) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., were omitted. They were repeated in section 452 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed. (See reviser's note under section 2241 of this title.)

Changes were made in phraseology.

1949 ACT

This section corrects a typographical error in the second paragraph of section 2253 of title 28.

AMENDMENTS

1996—Pub. L. 104–132 reenacted section catchline without change and amended text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows:

''In a habeas corpus proceeding before a circuit or district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit where the proceeding is had.

''There shall be no right of appeal from such an order in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove, to another district or place for commitment or trial, a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of his detention pending removal proceedings.

''An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding where the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court, unless the justice or judge who rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause.''

1951—Act Oct. 31, 1951, substituted ''to remove, to another district or place for commitment or trial, a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of his'' for ''of removal issued pursuant to section 3042 of Title 18 or the'' in second par.

1949—Act May 24, 1949, substituted ''3042'' for ''3041'' in second par.

§ 2254. State custody; remedies in Federal courts

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that—

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or

(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.

(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that—

(A) the claim relies on—

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

(f) If the applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced in such State court proceeding to support the State court's determination of a factual issue made therein, the applicant, if able, shall produce that part of the record pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such determination. If the applicant, because of indigency or other reason is unable to produce such part of the record, then the State shall produce such part of the record and the Federal court shall direct the State to do so by order directed to an appropriate State official. If the State cannot provide such pertinent part of the record, then the court shall determine under the existing facts and circumstances what weight shall be given to the State court's factual determination.

(g) A copy of the official records of the State court, duly certified by the clerk of such court to be a true and correct copy of a finding, judicial opinion, or other reliable written indicia showing such a factual determination by the State court shall be admissible in the Federal court proceeding.

(h) Except as provided in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, in all proceedings brought under this section, and any subsequent proceedings on review, the court may appoint counsel for an applicant who is or becomes financially unable to afford counsel, except as provided by a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Appointment of counsel under this section shall be governed by section 3006A of title 18.

(i) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral postconviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967; Pub. L. 89–711, §2, Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1105; Pub. L. 104–132, title I, §104, Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1218.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

This new section is declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the Supreme Court. (See Ex parte Hawk, 1944, 64 S. Ct. 448, 321, U.S. 114, 88L. Ed. 572.)

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENTS

Senate amendment to this section, Senate Report No. 1559, amendment No. 47, has three declared purposes, set forth as follows:

''The first is to eliminate from the prohibition of the section applications in behalf of prisoners in custody under authority of a State officer but whose custody has not been directed by the judgment of a State court. If the section were applied to applications by persons detained solely under authority of a State officer it would unduly hamper Federal courts in the protection of Federal officers prosecuted for acts committed in the course of official duty.

''The second purpose is to eliminate, as a ground of Federal jurisdiction to review by habeas corpus judgments of State courts, the proposition that the State court has denied a prisoner a 'fair adjudication of the legality of his detention under the Constitution and laws of the United States.' The Judicial Conference believes that this would be an undesirable ground for Federal jurisdiction in addition to exhaustion of State remedies or lack of adequate remedy in the State courts because it would permit proceedings in the Federal court on this ground before the petitioner had exhausted his State remedies. This ground would, of course, always be open to a petitioner to assert in the Federal court after he had exhausted his State remedies or if he had no adequate State remedy.

''The third purpose is to substitute detailed and specific language for the phrase 'no adequate remedy available.' That phrase is not sufficiently specific and precise, and its meaning should, therefore, be spelled out in more detail in the section as is done by the amendment.''

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, referred to in subsec. (h), is classified to section 848 of Title 21, Food and Drugs.

AMENDMENTS

1996—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 104–132, §104(1), amended subsec. (b) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (b) read as follows: ''An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.''

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 104–132, §104(3), added subsec. (d). Former subsec. (d) redesignated (e).

Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 104–132, §104(4), amended subsec. (e) generally, substituting present provisions for provisions which stated that presumption of correctness existed unless applicant were to establish or it otherwise appeared or respondent were to admit that any of several enumerated factors applied to invalidate State determination or else that factual determination by State court was clearly erroneous.

Pub. L. 104–132, §104(2), redesignated subsec. (d) as (e). Former subsec. (e) redesignated (f).

Subsecs. (f), (g). Pub. L. 104–132, §104(2), redesignated subsecs. (e) and (f) as (f) and (g), respectively.

Subsecs. (h), (i). Pub. L. 104–132, §104(5), added subsecs. (h) and (i).

1966—Pub. L. 89–711 substituted ''Federal courts'' for ''State Courts'' in section catchline, added subsec. (a),

designated existing paragraphs as subsecs. (b) and (c), and added subsecs. (d) to (f).

APPROVAL AND EFFECTIVE DATE OF RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES AND SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

For approval and effective date of rules governing petitions under section 2254 and motions under section 2255 of this title filed on or after Feb. 1, 1977, see section 1 of Pub. L. 94–426, set out as a note under section 2074 of this title.

POSTPONEMENT OF EFFECTIVE DATE OF PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTIONS 2254 AND 2255 OF THIS TITLE

Rules and forms governing proceedings under sections 2254 and 2255 of this title proposed by Supreme Court order of Apr. 26, 1976, effective 30 days after adjournment sine die of 94th Congress, or until and to the extent approved by Act of Congress, whichever is earlier, see section 2 of Pub. L. 94–349, set out as a note under section 2074 of this title.

RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

(*Effective Feb. 1, 1977, as amended to Jan. 7, 2011*)

EFFECTIVE DATE OF RULES; EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1975 AMENDMENT

Rules governing Section 2254 cases, and the amendments thereto by Pub. L. 94–426, Sept. 28, 1976, 90 Stat. 1334, effective with respect to petitions under section 2254 of this title and motions under section 2255 of this title filed on or after Feb. 1, 1977, see section 1 of Pub. L. 94–426, set out as a note under section 2074 of this title.

Rule 1. Scope

(a) CASES INVOLVING A PETITION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2254. These rules govern a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in a United States district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by:

(1) a person in custody under a state-court judgment who seeks a determination that the custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States; and

(2) a person in custody under a state-court or federal-court judgment who seeks a determination that future custody under a state-court judgment would violate the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

(b) OTHER CASES. The district court may apply any or all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not covered by Rule 1(a).

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Rule 1 provides that the habeas corpus rules are applicable to petitions by persons in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court. See *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Whether the rules ought to apply to other situations (*e.g.*, person in active military service, *Glazier v. Hackel*, 440 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1971); or a reservist called to active duty but not reported, *Hammond v. Lenfest*, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968)) is left to the discretion of the court.

The basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) provides that the ''writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless * * * (h)e is *in custody* in violation of the Constitution.'' 28 U.S.C. § 2254 deals specifically with state custody, providing that habeas corpus shall apply only ''in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court * * *.''

In *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, *supra*, the court said: ''It is clear . . . that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.'' 411 U.S. at 484.

Initially the Supreme Court held that habeas corpus was appropriate only in those situations in which petitioner's claim would, if upheld, result in an immediate release from a present custody. *McNally v. Hill*, 293 U.S. 131 (1934). This was changed in *Peyton v. Rowe*, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), in which the court held that habeas corpus was a proper way to attack a consecutive sentence to be served in the future, expressing the view that consecutive sentences resulted in present custody under both judgments, not merely the one imposing the first sentence. This view was expanded in *Carafas v. LaVallee*, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), to recognize the propriety of habeas corpus in a case in which petitioner was in custody when the petition had been originally filed but had since been unconditionally released from custody.

See also *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. at 486 et seq.

Since *Carafas*, custody has been construed more liberally by the courts so as to make a § 2255 motion or habeas corpus petition proper in more situations. ''In custody'' now includes a person who is: on parole, *Jones v. Cunningham*, 371 U.S. 236 (1963); at large on his own recognizance but subject to several conditions pending execution of his sentence, *Hensley v. Municipal Court*, 411 U.S. 345 (1973); or released on bail after conviction pending final disposition of his case, *Lefkowitz v. Newsome*, 95 S.Ct. 886 (1975). See also *United States v. Re*, 372 F.2d 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912 (1967) (on probation); *Walker v. North Carolina*, 262 F.Supp. 102 (W.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 372 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967) (recipient of a conditionally suspended sentence); *Burris v. Ryan*, 397 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1968); *Marden v. Purdy*, 409 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1969) (free on bail); *United States ex rel. Smith v. Dibella*, 314 F.Supp. 446 (D.Conn. 1970) (release on own recognizance); *Choung v. California*, 320 F.Supp. 625 (E.D.Cal. 1970) (federal stay of state court sentence); *United States ex rel. Meadows v. New York*, 426 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1971) (subject to parole detainer warrant); *Capler v. City of Greenville*, 422 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1970) (released on appeal bond); *Glover v. North Carolina*, 301 F.Supp. 364 (E.D.N.C. 1969) (sentence served, but as convicted felon disqualified from engaging in several activities).

The courts are not unanimous in dealing with the above situations, and the boundaries of custody remain somewhat unclear. In *Morgan v. Thomas*, 321 F.Supp. 565 (S.D.Miss. 1970), the court noted:

> It is axiomatic that actual physical custody or restraint is not required to confer habeas jurisdiction. Rather, the term is synonymous with restraint of liberty. The real question is how much restraint of one's liberty is necessary before the right to apply for the writ comes into play. * * *
>
> It is clear however, that something more than moral restraint is necessary to make a case for habeas corpus.

321 F.Supp. at 573

Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968), reviewed prior ''custody'' doctrine and reaffirmed a generalized flexible approach to the issue. In speaking about 28 U.S.C. §2241, the first section in the habeas corpus statutes, the court said:

> While the language of the Act indicates that a writ of habeas corpus is appropriate only when a petitioner is ''in custody,'' * * * the Act ''does not attempt to mark the boundaries of 'custody' nor in any way other than by use of that word attempt to limit the situations in which the writ can be used.'' * * * And, recent Supreme Court decisions have made clear that ''[i]t [habeas corpus] is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.'' * * * ''[B]esides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man's liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus.''

398 F.2d at 710–711

There is, as of now, no final list of the situations which are appropriate for habeas corpus relief. It is not the intent of these rules or notes to define or limit ''custody.''

It is, however, the view of the Advisory Committee that claims of improper conditions of custody or confinement (not related to the propriety of the custody itself), can better be handled by other means such as 42 U.S.C. §1983 and other related statutes. In *Wilwording v. Swanson*, 404 U.S. 249 (1971), the court treated a habeas corpus petition by a state prisoner challenging the conditions of confinement as a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Civil Rights Act. Compare *Johnson v. Avery*, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).

The distinction between duration of confinement and conditions of confinement may be difficult to draw. Compare *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), with *Clutchette v. Procunier*, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (1975).

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 1 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. In response to at least one commentator on the published rules, the Committee modified Rule 1(b) to reflect the point that if the court was considering a habeas petition not covered by §2254, the court could apply some or all of the rules.

Rule 2. The Petition

(a) CURRENT CUSTODY; NAMING THE RESPONDENT. If the petitioner is currently in custody under a state-court judgment, the petition must name as respondent the state officer who has custody.

(b) FUTURE CUSTODY; NAMING THE RESPONDENTS AND SPECIFYING THE JUDGMENT. If the petitioner is not yet in custody—but may be subject to future custody—under the state-court judgment being contested, the petition must name as respondents both the officer who has current custody and the attorney general of the state where the judgment was entered. The petition must ask for relief from the state-court judgment being contested.

(c) FORM. The petition must:

(1) specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner;

(2) state the facts supporting each ground;

(3) state the relief requested;

(4) be printed, typewritten, or legibly handwritten; and

(5) be signed under penalty of perjury by the petitioner or by a person authorized to sign it for the petitioner under 28 U.S.C. §2242.

(d) STANDARD FORM. The petition must substantially follow either the form appended to these rules or a form prescribed by a local district-court rule. The clerk must make forms available to petitioners without charge.

(e) SEPARATE PETITIONS FOR JUDGMENTS OF SEPARATE COURTS. A petitioner who seeks relief from judgments of more than one state court must file a separate petition covering the judgment or judgments of each court.

(As amended Pub. L. 94–426, §2(1), (2), Sept. 28, 1976, 90 Stat. 1334; Apr. 28, 1982, eff. Aug. 1, 1982; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Rule 2 describes the requirements of the actual petition, including matters relating to its form, contents, scope, and sufficiency. The rule provides more specific guidance for a petitioner and the court than 28 U.S.C. §2242, after which it is patterned.

Subdivision (a) provides that an applicant challenging a state judgment, pursuant to which he is presently in custody, must make his application in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It also requires that the state officer having custody of the applicant be named as respondent. This is consistent with 28 U.S.C. §2242, which says in part, ''[Application for a writ of habeas corpus] shall allege * * * the name of the person who has custody over [the applicant] * * *.'' The proper person to be served in the usual case is either the warden of the institution in which the petitioner is incarcerated (*Sanders v. Bennett*, 148 F.2d 19 (D.C.Cir. 1945)) or the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions.

Subdivision (b) prescribes the procedure to be used for a petition challenging a judgment under which the petitioner will be subject to custody in the future. In this event the relief sought will usually not be released from present custody, but rather for a declaration that the judgment being attacked is invalid. Subdivision (b) thus provides for a prayer for ''appropriate relief.'' It is also provided that the attorney general of the state of the judgment as well as the state officer having actual custody of the petitioner shall be named as respondents. This is appropriate because no one will have custody of the petitioner in the state of the judgment being attacked, and the habeas corpus action will usually be defended by the attorney general. The attorney general is in the best position to inform the court as to who the proper party respondent is. If it is not the attorney general, he can move for a substitution of party.

Since the concept of ''custody'' requisite to the consideration of a petition for habeas corpus has been enlarged significantly in recent years, it may be worthwhile to spell out the various situations which might arise and who should be named as respondent(s) for each situation.

(1) The applicant is in jail, prison, or other actual physical restraint due to the state action he is attacking. The named respondent shall be the state officer who has official custody of the petitioner (for example, the warden of the prison).

(2) The applicant is on probation or parole due to the state judgment he is attacking. The named respondents shall be the particular probation or parole officer responsible for supervising the applicant, and the official in charge of the parole or probation agency, or the state correctional agency, as appropriate.

(3) The applicant is in custody in any other manner differing from (1) and (2) above due to the effects of the state action he seeks relief from. The named respondent should be the attorney general of the state wherein such action was taken.

(4) The applicant is in jail, prison, or other actual physical restraint but is attacking a state action which will cause him to be kept in custody in the future rather than the government action under which he is presently confined. The named respondents shall be the state or federal officer who has official custody of him at the time the petition is filed and the attorney general of the state whose action subjects the petitioner to future custody.

(5) The applicant is in custody, although not physically restrained, and is attacking a state action which will result in his future custody rather than the government action out of which his present custody arises. The named respondent(s) shall be the attorney general of the state whose action subjects the petitioner to future custody, as well as the government officer who has present official custody of the petitioner if there is such an officer and his identity is ascertainable.

In any of the above situations the judge may require or allow the petitioner to join an additional or different party as a respondent if to do so would serve the ends of justice.

As seen in rule 1 and paragraphs (4) and (5) above, these rules contemplate that a petitioner currently in federal custody will be permitted to apply for habeas relief from a state restraint which is to go into effect in the future. There has been disagreement in the courts as to whether they have jurisdiction of the habeas application under these circumstances (compare *Piper v. United States*, 306 F.Supp. 1259 (D.Conn. 1969), with *United States ex rel. Meadows v. New York*, 426 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1971)). This rule seeks to make clear that they do have such jurisdiction.

Subdivision (c) provides that unless a district court requires otherwise by local rule, the petition must be in the form annexed to these rules. Having a standard prescribed form has several advantages. In the past, petitions have frequently contained mere conclusions of law, unsupported by any facts. Since it is the relationship of the facts to the claim asserted that is important, these petitions were obviously deficient. In addition, lengthy and often illegible petitions, arranged in no logical order, were submitted to judges who have had to spend hours deciphering them. For example, in *Passic v. Michigan*, 98 F.Supp. 1015, 1016 (E.D.Mich. 1951), the court dismissed a petition for habeas corpus, describing it as ''two thousand pages of irrational, prolix and redundant pleadings * * *.''

Administrative convenience, of benefit to both the court and the petitioner, results from the use of a prescribed form. Judge Hubert L. Will briefly described the experience with the use of a standard form in the Northern District of Illinois:

> Our own experience, though somewhat limited, has been quite satisfactory. * * *
>
> In addition, [petitions] almost always contain the necessary basic information * * *. Very rarely do we get the kind of hybrid federal-state habeas corpus petition with civil rights allegations thrown in which were not uncommon in the past. * * * [W]hen a real constitutional issue is raised it is quickly apparent * * *.
>
> 33 F.R.D. 363, 384

Approximately 65 to 70% of all districts have adopted forms or local rules which require answers to essentially the same questions as contained in the standard form annexed to these rules. All courts using forms have indicated the petitions are time-saving and more legible. The form is particularly helpful in getting information about whether there has been an exhaustion of state remedies or, at least, where that information can be obtained.

The requirement of a standard form benefits the petitioner as well. His assertions are more readily apparent, and a meritorious claim is more likely to be properly raised and supported. The inclusion in the form of the ten most frequently raised grounds in habeas corpus petitions is intended to encourage the applicant to raise all his asserted grounds in one petition. It may better enable him to recognize if an issue he seeks to raise is cognizable under habeas corpus and hopefully inform him of those issues as to which he must first exhaust his state remedies.

Some commentators have suggested that the use of forms is of little help because the questions usually are too general, amounting to little more than a restatement of the statute. They contend the blanks permit a prisoner to fill in the same ambiguous answers he would have offered without the aid of a form. See Comment, Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1177–1178 (1970). Certainly, as long as the statute requires factual pleading, the adequacy of a petition will continue to be affected largely by the petitioner's intelligence and the legal advice available to him. On balance, however, the use of forms has contributed enough to warrant mandating their use.

Giving the petitioner a list of often-raised grounds may, it is said, encourage perjury. See Comment, Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1178 (1970). Most inmates are aware of, or have access to, some common constitutional grounds for relief. Thus, the risk of perjury is not likely to be substantially increased and the benefit of the list for some inmates seems sufficient to outweigh any slight risk that perjury will increase. There is a penalty for perjury, and this would seem the most appropriate way to try to discourage it.

Legal assistance is increasingly available to inmates either through paraprofessional programs involving law students or special programs staffed by members of the bar. See Jacob and Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 Kan.L.Rev. 493 (1970). In these situations, the prescribed form can be filled out more competently, and it does serve to ensure a degree of uniformity in the manner in which habeas corpus claims are presented.

Subdivision (c) directs the clerk of the district court to make available to applicants upon request, without charge, blank petitions in the prescribed form.

Subdivision (c) also requires that all available grounds for relief be presented in the petition, including those grounds of which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, the petitioner should be aware. This is reinforced by rule 9(b), which allows dismissal of a second petition which fails to allege new grounds or, if new grounds are alleged, the judge finds an inexcusable failure to assert the ground in the prior petition.

Both subdivision (c) and the annexed form require a legibly handwritten or typewritten petition. As required by 28 U.S.C. § 2242, the petition must be signed and sworn to by the petitioner (or someone acting in his behalf).

Subdivision (d) provides that a single petition may assert a claim only against the judgment or judgments of a single state court (*i.e.*, a court of the same county or judicial district or circuit). This permits, but does not require, an attack in a single petition on judgments based upon separate indictments or on separate counts even though sentences were imposed on separate days by the same court. A claim against a judgment of a court of a different political subdivision must be raised by means of a separate petition.

Subdivision (e) allows the clerk to return an insufficient petition to the petitioner, and it must be returned if the clerk is so directed by a judge of the court. Any failure to comply with the requirements of rule 2 or 3 is grounds for insufficiency. In situations where there may be arguable noncompliance with another rule, such as rule 9, the judge, not the clerk, must make the decision. If the petition is returned it must be accompanied by a statement of the reason for its return. No petitioner should be left to speculate as to

why or in what manner his petition failed to conform to these rules.

Subdivision (e) also provides that the clerk shall retain one copy of the insufficient petition. If the prisoner files another petition, the clerk will be in a better position to determine the sufficiency of the new petition. If the new petition is insufficient, comparison with the prior petition may indicate whether the prisoner has failed to understand the clerk's prior explanation for its insufficiency, so that the clerk can make another, hopefully successful, attempt at transmitting this information to the petitioner. If the petitioner insists that the original petition was in compliance with the rules, a copy of the original petition is available for the consideration of the judge. It is probably better practice to make a photocopy of a petition which can be corrected by the petitioner, thus saving the petitioner the task of completing an additional copy.

1982 AMENDMENT

Subdivision (c). The amendment takes into account 28 U.S.C. §1746, enacted after adoption of the §2254 rules. Section 1746 provides that in lieu of an affidavit an unsworn statement may be given under penalty of perjury in substantially the following form if executed within the United States, its territories, possessions or commonwealths: ''I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature).'' The statute is ''intended to encompass prisoner litigation,'' and the statutory alternative is especially appropriate in such cases because a notary might not be readily available. *Carter v. Clark*, 616 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1980). The §2254 forms have been revised accordingly.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 2 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as described below.

Revised Rule 2(c)(5) has been amended by removing the requirement that the petition be signed personally by the petitioner. As reflected in 28 U.S.C. §2242, an application for habeas corpus relief may be filed by the person who is seeking relief, or by someone acting on behalf of that person. *See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas*, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (discussion of requisites for ''next friend'' standing in petition for habeas corpus). Thus, under the, [sic] amended rule the petition may be signed by petitioner personally or by someone acting on behalf of the petitioner, assuming that the person is authorized to do so, for example, an attorney for the petitioner. The Committee envisions that the courts will apply third-party, or ''next-friend,'' standing analysis in deciding whether the signer was actually authorized to sign the petition on behalf of the petitioner.

The language in new Rule 2(d) has been changed to reflect that a petitioner must substantially follow the standard form, which is appended to the rules, or a form provided by the court. The current rule, Rule 2(c), seems to indicate a preference for the standard ''national'' form. Under the amended rule, there is no stated preference. The Committee understood that current practice in some courts is that if the petitioner first files a petition using the national form, the courts may then ask the petitioner to supplement it with the local form.

Current Rule 2(e), which provided for returning an insufficient petition, has been deleted. The Committee believed that the approach in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(e) was more appropriate for dealing with petitions that do not conform to the form requirements of the rule. That Rule provides that the clerk may not refuse to accept a filing solely for the reason that it fails to comply with these rules or local rules. Before the adoption of a one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, the petitioner suffered no penalty, other than delay, if the petition was deemed insufficient. Now that a one-year statute of limitations applies to petitions filed under §2254, *see* 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1), the court's dismissal of a petition because it is not in proper form may pose a significant penalty for a petitioner, who may not be able to file another petition within the one-year limitations period. Now, under revised Rule 3(b), the clerk is required to file a petition, even though it may otherwise fail to comply with the provisions in revised Rule 2(c). The Committee believed that the better procedure was to accept the defective petition and require the petitioner to submit a corrected petition that conforms to Rule 2(c).

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee changed Rule 2(c)(2) to read ''state the facts'' rather then [sic] ''briefly summarize the facts.'' As one commentator noted, the current language may actually mislead the petitioner and is also redundant. The Committee modified Rule 2(c)(5) to emphasize that any person, other than the petitioner, who signs the petition must be authorized to do so; the revised rule now specifically cites §2242. The Note was changed to reflect that point.

Rule 2(c)(4) was modified to account for those cases where the petitioner prints the petition on a computer word-processing program.

AMENDMENTS BY PUBLIC LAW

1976—Subd. (c). Pub. L. 94–426, §2(1), inserted ''substantially'' after ''The petition shall be in'', and struck out requirement that the petition follow the prescribed form.

Subd. (e). Pub. L. 94–426, §2(2), inserted ''substantially'' after ''district court does not'', and struck out provision which permitted the clerk to return a petition for noncompliance without a judge so directing.

Rule 3. Filing the Petition; Inmate Filing

(a) WHERE TO FILE; COPIES; FILING FEE. An original and two copies of the petition must be filed with the clerk and must be accompanied by:

(1) the applicable filing fee, or

(2) a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. §1915, and a certificate from the warden or other appropriate officer of the place of confinement showing the amount of money or securities that the petitioner has in any account in the institution.

(b) FILING. The clerk must file the petition and enter it on the docket.

(c) TIME TO FILE. The time for filing a petition is governed by 28 U.S.C. §2244(d).

(d) INMATE FILING. A paper filed by an inmate confined in an institution is timely if deposited in the institution's internal mailing system on or before the last day for filing. If an institution has a system designed for legal mail, the inmate must use that system to receive the benefit of this rule. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. §1746 or by a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Rule 3 sets out the procedures to be followed by the petitioner and the court in filing the petition. Some of its provisions are currently dealt with by local rule or practice, while others are innovations. Subdivision (a) specifies the petitioner's responsibilities. It requires

that the petition, which must be accompanied by two conformed copies thereof, be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court. The petition must be accompanied by the filing fee prescribed by law (presently $5; see 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)), unless leave to prosecute the petition in forma pauperis is applied for and granted. In the event the petitioner desires to prosecute the petition in forma pauperis, he must file the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915, together with a certificate showing the amount of funds in his institutional account.

Requiring that the petition be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court provides an efficient and uniform system of filing habeas corpus petitions.

Subdivision (b) requires the clerk to file the petition. If the filing fee accompanies the petition, it may be filed immediately, and, if not, it is contemplated that prompt attention will be given to the request to proceed in forma pauperis. The court may delegate the issuance of the order to the clerk in those cases in which it is clear from the petition that there is full compliance with the requirements to proceed in forma pauperis.

Requiring the copies of the petition to be filed with the clerk will have an impact not only upon administrative matters, but upon more basic problems as well. In districts with more than one judge, a petitioner under present circumstances may send a petition to more than one judge. If no central filing system exists for each district, two judges may independently take different action on the same petition. Even if the action taken is consistent, there may be needless duplication of effort.

The requirement of an additional two copies of the form of the petition is a current practice in many courts. An efficient filing system requires one copy for use by the court (central file), one for the respondent (under 3(b), the respondent receives a copy of the petition whether an answer is required or not), and one for petitioner's counsel, if appointed. Since rule 2 provides that blank copies of the petition in the prescribed form are to be furnished to the applicant free of charge, there should be no undue burden created by this requirement.

Attached to copies of the petition supplied in accordance with rule 2 is an affidavit form for the use of petitioners desiring to proceed in forma pauperis. The form requires information concerning the petitioner's financial resources.

In forma pauperis cases, the petition must also be accompanied by a certificate indicating the amount of funds in the petitioner's institution account. Usually the certificate will be from the warden. If the petitioner is on probation or parole, the court might want to require a certificate from the supervising officer. Petitions by persons on probation or parole are not numerous enough, however, to justify making special provision for this situation in the text of the rule.

The certificate will verify the amount of funds credited to the petitioner in an institution account. The district court may by local rule require that any amount credited to the petitioner, in excess of a stated maximum, must be used for the payment of the filing fee. Since prosecuting an action in forma pauperis is a privilege (see *Smart v. Heinze*, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965)), it is not to be granted when the petitioner has sufficient resources.

Subdivision (b) details the clerk's duties with regard to filing the petition. If the petition does not appear on its face to comply with the requirements of rules 2 and 3, it may be returned in accordance with rule 2(e). If it appears to comply, it must be filed and entered on the docket in the clerk's office. However, under this subdivision the respondent is not required to answer or otherwise move with respect to the petition unless so ordered by the court.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 3 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended except as described below.

The last sentence of current Rule 3(b), dealing with an answer being filed by the respondent, has been moved to revised Rule 5(a).

Revised Rule 3(b) is new and is intended to parallel Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(e), which provides that the clerk may not refuse to accept a filing solely for the reason that it fails to comply with these rules or local rules. Before the adoption of a one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, the petitioner suffered no penalty, other than delay, if the petition was deemed insufficient. That Act, however, added a one-year statute of limitations to petitions filed under § 2254, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Thus, a court's dismissal of a defective petition may pose a significant penalty for a petitioner who may not be able to file a corrected petition within the one-year limitations period. The Committee believed that the better procedure was to accept the defective petition and require the petitioner to submit a corrected petition that conforms to Rule 2. Thus, revised Rule 3(b) requires the clerk to file a petition, even though it may otherwise fail to comply with Rule 2. The rule, however, is not limited to those instances where the petition is defective only in form; the clerk would also be required, for example, to file the petition even though it lacked the requisite filing fee or an *in forma pauperis* form.

Revised Rule 3(c), which sets out a specific reference to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), is new and has been added to put petitioners on notice that a one-year statute of limitations applies to petitions filed under these Rules. Although the rule does not address the issue, every circuit that has addressed the issue has taken the position that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is available in appropriate circumstances. *See, e.g., Smith v. McGinnis*, 208 F.3d 13, 17–18 (2d Cir. 2000); *Miller v. New Jersey State Department of Corrections*, 145 F.3d 616, 618–19 (3d Cir. 1998); *Harris v. Hutchinson*, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has not addressed the question directly. *See Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001) (''We . . . have no occasion to address the question that Justice Stevens raises concerning the availability of equitable tolling.'').

Rule 3(d) is new and provides guidance on determining whether a petition from an inmate is considered to have been filed in a timely fashion. The new provision parallels Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(2)(C).

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee Note was changed to reflect that the clerk must file a petition, even in those instances where the necessary filing fee or in forma pauperis form is not attached. The Note also includes new language concerning the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

Rule 4. Preliminary Review; Serving the Petition and Order

The clerk must promptly forward the petition to a judge under the court's assignment procedure, and the judge must promptly examine it. If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner. If the petition is not dismissed, the judge must order the respondent to file an answer, motion, or other response within a fixed time, or to take other action the judge may order. In every case, the clerk must serve a copy of the petition and any order on the respondent and on the attorney general or other appropriate officer of the state involved.

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Rule 4 outlines the options available to the court after the petition is properly filed. The petition must be promptly presented to and examined by the judge to whom it is assigned. If it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits attached thereto that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must enter an order summarily dismissing the petition and cause the petitioner to be notified. If summary dismissal is not ordered, the judge must order the respondent to file an answer or to otherwise plead to the petition within a time period to be fixed in the order.

28 U.S.C. §2243 requires that the writ shall be awarded, or an order to show cause issued, ''unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.'' Such consideration may properly encompass any exhibits attached to the petition, including, but not limited to, transcripts, sentencing records, and copies of state court opinions. The judge may order any of these items for his consideration if they are not yet included with the petition. See 28 U.S.C. §753(f) which authorizes payment for transcripts in habeas corpus cases.

It has been suggested that an answer should be required in every habeas proceeding, taking into account the usual petitioner's lack of legal expertise and the important functions served by the return. See Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1178 (1970). However, under §2243 it is the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer. *Allen v. Perini*, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970). In addition, ''notice'' pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a ''real possibility of constitutional error.'' See *Aubut v. State of Maine*, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970).

In the event an answer is ordered under rule 4, the court is accorded greater flexibility than under §2243 in determining within what time period an answer must be made. Under §2243, the respondent must make a return within three days after being so ordered, with additional time of up to forty days allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 81(a)(2), for good cause. In view of the widespread state of work overload in prosecutors' offices (see, *e.g., Allen*, 424 F.2d at 141), additional time is granted in some jurisdictions as a matter of course. Rule 4, which contains no fixed time requirement, gives the court the discretion to take into account various factors such as the respondent's workload and the availability of transcripts before determining a time within which an answer must be made.

Rule 4 authorizes the judge to ''take such other action as the judge deems appropriate.'' This is designed to afford the judge flexibility in a case where either dismissal or an order to answer may be inappropriate. For example, the judge may want to authorize the respondent to make a motion to dismiss based upon information furnished by respondent, which may show that petitioner's claims have already been decided on the merits in a federal court; that petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies; that the petitioner is not in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §2254; or that a decision in the matter is pending in state court. In these situations, a dismissal may be called for on procedural grounds, which may avoid burdening the respondent with the necessity of filing an answer on the substantive merits of the petition. In other situations, the judge may want to consider a motion from respondent to make the petition more certain. Or the judge may want to dismiss some allegations in the petition, requiring the respondent to answer only those claims which appear to have some arguable merit.

Rule 4 requires that a copy of the petition and any order be served by certified mail on the respondent and the attorney general of the state involved. See 28 U.S.C. §2252. Presently, the respondent often does not receive a copy of the petition unless the court directs an answer under 28 U.S.C. §2243. Although the attorney general is served, he is not required to answer if it is more appropriate for some other agency to do so. Although the rule does not specifically so provide, it is assumed that copies of the court orders to respondent will be mailed to petitioner by the court.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 4 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as described below.

The amended rule reflects that the response to a habeas petition may be a motion.

The requirement that in every case the clerk must serve a copy of the petition on the respondent by certified mail has been deleted. In addition, the current requirement that the petition be sent to the Attorney General of the state has been modified to reflect practice in some jurisdictions that the appropriate state official may be someone other than the Attorney General, for example, the officer in charge of a local confinement facility. This comports with a similar provision in 28 U.S.C. §2252, which addresses notice of habeas corpus proceedings to the state's attorney general or other appropriate officer of the state.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Rule was modified slightly to reflect the view of some commentators that it is common practice in some districts for the government to file a pre-answer motion to dismiss. The Committee agreed with that recommendation and changed the word ''pleading'' in the rule to ''response.'' It also made several minor changes to the Committee Note.

Rule 5. The Answer and the Reply

(a) WHEN REQUIRED. The respondent is not required to answer the petition unless a judge so orders.

(b) CONTENTS: ADDRESSING THE ALLEGATIONS; STATING A BAR. The answer must address the allegations in the petition. In addition, it must state whether any claim in the petition is barred by a failure to exhaust state remedies, a procedural bar, non-retroactivity, or a statute of limitations.

(c) CONTENTS: TRANSCRIPTS. The answer must also indicate what transcripts (of pretrial, trial, sentencing, or post-conviction proceedings) are available, when they can be furnished, and what proceedings have been recorded but not transcribed. The respondent must attach to the answer parts of the transcript that the respondent considers relevant. The judge may order that the respondent furnish other parts of existing transcripts or that parts of untranscribed recordings be transcribed and furnished. If a transcript cannot be obtained, the respondent may submit a narrative summary of the evidence.

(d) CONTENTS: BRIEFS ON APPEAL AND OPINIONS. The respondent must also file with the answer a copy of:

(1) any brief that the petitioner submitted in an appellate court contesting the conviction or sentence, or contesting an adverse judgment or order in a post-conviction proceeding;

(2) any brief that the prosecution submitted in an appellate court relating to the conviction or sentence; and

(3) the opinions and dispositive orders of the appellate court relating to the conviction or the sentence.

(e) REPLY. The petitioner may submit a reply to the respondent's answer or other pleading within a time fixed by the judge.

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Rule 5 details the contents of the ''answer''. (This is a change in terminology from ''return,'' which is still used below when referring to prior practice.) The answer plays an obviously important rule in a habeas proceeding:

> The return serves several important functions: it permits the court and the parties to uncover quickly the disputed issues; it may reveal to the petitioner's attorney grounds for release that the petitioner did not know; and it may demonstrate that the petitioner's claim is wholly without merit.
>
> Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1083, 1178 (1970).

The answer must respond to the allegations of the petition. While some districts require this by local rule (see, *e.g.*, E.D.N.C.R. 17(B)), under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 little specificity is demanded. As a result, courts occasionally receive answers which contain only a statement certifying the true cause of detention, or a series of delaying motions such as motions to dismiss. The requirement of the proposed rule that the ''answer shall respond to the allegations of the petition'' is intended to ensure that a responsive pleading will be filed and thus the functions of the answer fully served.

The answer must also state whether the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies. This is a prerequisite to eligibility for the writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and applies to every ground the petitioner raises. Most form petitions now in use contain questions requiring information relevant to whether the petitioner has exhausted his remedies. However, the exhaustion requirement is often not understood by the unrepresented petitioner. The attorney general has both the legal expertise and access to the record and thus is in a much better position to inform the court on the matter of exhaustion of state remedies. An alleged failure to exhaust state remedies as to any ground in the petition may be raised by a motion by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.

The rule requires the answer to indicate what transcripts are available, when they can be furnished, and also what proceedings have been recorded and not transcribed. This will serve to inform the court and petitioner as to what factual allegations can be checked against the actual transcripts. The transcripts include pretrial transcripts relating, for example, to pretrial motions to suppress; transcripts of the trial or guilty plea proceeding; and transcripts of any post-conviction proceedings which may have taken place. The respondent is required to furnish those portions of the transcripts which he believes relevant. The court may order the furnishing of additional portions of the transcripts upon the request of petitioner or upon the court's own motion.

Where transcripts are unavailable, the rule provides that a narrative summary of the evidence may be submitted.

Rule 5 (and the general procedure set up by this entire set of rules) does not contemplate a traverse to the answer, except under special circumstances. See advisory committee note to rule 9. Therefore, the old common law assumption of verity of the allegations of a return until impeached, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2248, is no longer applicable. The meaning of the section, with its exception to the assumption ''to the extent that the judge finds from the evidence that they (the allegations) are not true,'' has given attorneys and courts a great deal of difficulty. It seems that when the petition and return pose an issue of fact, no traverse is required; *Stewart v. Overholser*, 186 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1950).

> We read § 2248 of the Judicial Code as not requiring a traverse when a factual issue has been clearly framed by the petition and the return or answer. This section provides that the allegations of a return or answer to an order to show cause shall be accepted as true if not traversed, except to the extent the judge finds from the evidence that they are not true. This contemplates that where the petition and return or answer do present an issue of fact material to the legality of detention, evidence is required to resolve that issue despite the absence of a traverse. This reference to evidence assumes a hearing on issues raised by the allegations of the petition and the return or answer to the order to show cause.
>
> 186 F.2d at 342, n. 5

In actual practice, the traverse tends to be a mere pro forma refutation of the return, serving little if any expository function. In the interests of a more streamlined and manageable habeas corpus procedure, it is not required except in those instances where it will serve a truly useful purpose. Also, under rule 11 the court is given the discretion to incorporate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when appropriate, so civil rule 15(a) may be used to allow the petitioner to amend his petition when the court feels this is called for by the contents of the answer.

Rule 5 does not indicate who the answer is to be served upon, but it necessarily implies that it will be mailed to the petitioner (or to his attorney if he has one). The number of copies of the answer required is left to the court's discretion. Although the rule requires only a copy of petitioner's brief on appeal, respondent is free also to file a copy of respondent's brief. In practice, courts have found it helpful to have a copy of respondent's brief.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 5 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as described below.

Revised Rule 5(a), which provides that the respondent is not required to file an answer to the petition, unless a judge so orders, is taken from current Rule 3(b). The revised rule does not address the practice in some districts, where the respondent files a pre-answer motion to dismiss the petition. But revised Rule 4 permits that practice and reflects the view that if the court does not dismiss the petition, it may require (or permit) the respondent to file a motion.

Rule 5(b) has been amended to require that the answer address not only failure to exhaust state remedies, but also procedural bars, non-retroactivity, and any statute of limitations. Although the latter three matters are not addressed in the current rule, the Committee intends no substantive change with the additional new language. *See, e.g.*, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). Instead, the Committee believes that the explicit mention of those issues in the rule conforms to current case law and statutory provisions. *See, e.g.*, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Revised Rule 5(d) includes new material. First, Rule 5(d)(2), requires a respondent—assuming an answer is filed—to provide the court with a copy of any brief submitted by the prosecution to the appellate court. And Rule 5(d)(3) now provides that the respondent also file copies of any opinions and dispositive orders of the appellate court concerning the conviction or sentence. These provisions are intended to ensure that the court is provided with additional information that may assist it in resolving the issues raised, or not raised, in the petition.

Finally, revised Rule 5(e) adopts the practice in some jurisdictions of giving the petitioner an opportunity to file a reply to the respondent's answer. Rather than using terms such as ''traverse,'' *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2248, to identify the petitioner's response to the answer, the rule uses the more general term ''reply.'' The Rule prescribes that the court set the time for such responses

and in lieu of setting specific time limits in each case, the court may decide to include such time limits in its local rules.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. Rule 5(a) was modified to read that the government is not required to ''respond'' to the petition unless the court so orders; the term ''respond'' was used because it leaves open the possibility that the government's first response (as it is in some districts) is in the form of a pre-answer motion to dismiss the petition. The Note has been changed to reflect the fact that although the rule itself does not reflect that particular motion, it is used in some districts and refers the reader to Rule 4.

The Committee also deleted the reference to ''affirmative defenses,'' because the Committee believed that the term was a misnomer in the context of habeas petitions. The Note was also changed to reflect that there has been a potential substantive change from the current rule, to the extent that the published rule now requires that the answer address procedural bars and any statute of limitations. The Note states that the Committee believes the new language reflects current law.

The Note was modified to address the use of the term ''traverse.'' One commentator noted that that is the term that is commonly used but that it does not appear in the rule itself.

Rule 6. Discovery

(a) LEAVE OF COURT REQUIRED. A judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and may limit the extent of discovery. If necessary for effective discovery, the judge must appoint an attorney for a petitioner who qualifies to have counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.

(b) REQUESTING DISCOVERY. A party requesting discovery must provide reasons for the request. The request must also include any proposed interrogatories and requests for admission, and must specify any requested documents.

(c) DEPOSITION EXPENSES. If the respondent is granted leave to take a deposition, the judge may require the respondent to pay the travel expenses, subsistence expenses, and fees of the petitioner's attorney to attend the deposition.

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

This rule prescribes the procedures governing discovery in habeas corpus cases. Subdivision (a) provides that any party may utilize the processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (rules 26–37) if, and to the extent that, the judge allows. It also provides for the appointment of counsel for a petitioner who qualifies for this when counsel is necessary for effective utilization of discovery procedures permitted by the judge.

Subdivision (a) is consistent with *Harris v. Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286 (1969). In that case the court noted,

> [I]t is clear that there was no intention to extend to habeas corpus, as a matter of right, the broad discovery provisions * * * of the new [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].
>
> 394 U.S. at 295

However, citing the lack of methods for securing information in habeas proceedings, the court pointed to an alternative.

> Clearly, in these circumstances * * * the courts may fashion appropriate modes of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial usage. * * * Their authority is expressly confirmed in the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
>
> 394 U.S. at 299

The court concluded that the issue of discovery in habeas corpus cases could best be dealt with as part of an effort to provide general rules of practice for habeas corpus cases:

> In fact, it is our view that the rulemaking machinery should be invoked to formulate rules of practice with respect to federal habeas corpus and § 2255 proceedings, on a comprehensive basis and not merely one confined to discovery. The problems presented by these proceedings are materially different from those dealt with in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and reliance upon usage and the opaque language of Civil Rule 81(a)(2) is transparently inadequate. In our view the results of a meticulous formulation and adoption of special rules for federal habeas corpus and § 2255 proceedings would promise much benefit.
>
> 394 U.S. at 301 n. 7

Discovery may, in appropriate cases, aid in developing facts necessary to decide whether to order an evidentiary hearing or to grant the writ following an evidentiary hearing:

> We are aware that confinement sometimes induces fantasy which has its basis in the paranoia of prison rather than in fact. But where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry. Obviously, in exercising this power, the court may utilize familiar procedures, as appropriate, whether these are found in the civil or criminal rules or elsewhere in the ''usages and principles.''

Granting discovery is left to the discretion of the court, discretion to be exercised where there is a showing of good cause why discovery should be allowed. Several commentators have suggested that at least some discovery should be permitted without leave of court. It is argued that the courts will be burdened with weighing the propriety of requests to which the discovered party has no objection. Additionally, the availability of protective orders under Fed.R.Civ.R., Rules 30(b) and 31(d) will provide the necessary safeguards. See Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1186–87 (1970); Civil Discovery in Habeas Corpus, 67 Colum.L.Rev. 1296, 1310 (1967).

Nonetheless, it is felt the requirement of prior court approval of all discovery is necessary to prevent abuse, so this requirement is specifically mandated in the rule.

While requests for discovery in habeas proceedings normally follow the granting of an evidentiary hearing, there may be instances in which discovery would be appropriate beforehand. Such an approach was advocated in *Wagner v. United States*, 418 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 1969), where the opinion stated the trial court could permit interrogatories, provide for deposing witnesses, ''and take such other prehearing steps as may be appropriate.'' While this was an action under § 2255, the reasoning would apply equally well to petitions by state prisoners. Such pre-hearing discovery may show an evidentiary hearing to be unnecessary, as when there are ''no disputed issues of law or fact.'' 83 Harv. L.Rev. 1038, 1181 (1970). The court in Harris alluded to such a possibility when it said ''the court may * * * authorize such proceedings with respect to development, *before or in conjunction with the hearing* of the facts * * *.'' [emphasis added] 394 U.S. at 300. Such pre-hearing discovery, like all discovery under rule 6, requires leave of court. In addition, the provisions in rule 7 for the use of an expanded record may eliminate much of the need for this type of discovery. While probably not as frequently sought or granted as discovery in conjunction with a hearing, it may nonetheless serve a valuable function.

In order to make pre-hearing discovery meaningful, subdivision (a) provides that the judge should appoint counsel for a petitioner who is without counsel and qualifies for appointment when this is necessary for the proper utilization of discovery procedures. Rule 8 pro-

vides for the appointment of counsel at the evidentiary hearing stage (see rule 8(b) and advisory committee note), but this would not assist the petitioner who seeks to utilize discovery to stave off dismissal of his petition (see rule 9 and advisory committee note) or to demonstrate that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. Thus, if the judge grants a petitioner's request for discovery prior to making a decision as to the necessity for an evidentiary hearing, he should determine whether counsel is necessary for the effective utilization of such discovery and, if so, appoint counsel for the petitioner if the petitioner qualifies for such appointment.

This rule contains very little specificity as to what types and methods of discovery should be made available to the parties in a habeas proceeding, or how, once made available, these discovery procedures should be administered. The purpose of this rule is to get some experience in how discovery would work in actual practice by letting district court judges fashion their own rules in the context of individual cases. When the results of such experience are available it would be desirable to consider whether further, more specific codification should take place.

Subdivision (b) provides for judicial consideration of all matters subject to discovery. A statement of the interrogatories, or requests for admission sought to be answered, and a list of any documents sought to be produced, must accompany a request for discovery. This is to advise the judge of the necessity for discovery and enable him to make certain that the inquiry is relevant and appropriately narrow.

Subdivision (c) refers to the situation where the respondent is granted leave to take the deposition of the petitioner or any other person. In such a case the judge may direct the respondent to pay the expenses and fees of counsel for the petitioner to attend the taking of the deposition, as a condition granting the respondent such leave. While the judge is not required to impose this condition subdivision (c) will give the court the means to do so. Such a provision affords some protection to the indigent petitioner who may be prejudiced by his inability to have counsel, often court-appointed, present at the taking of a deposition. It is recognized that under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g), court-appointed counsel in a § 2254 proceeding is entitled to receive up to $250 and reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred. (Compare Fed.R. Crim.P. 15(c).) Typically, however, this does not adequately reimburse counsel if he must attend the taking of depositions or be involved in other pre-hearing proceedings. Subdivision (c) is intended to provide additional funds, if necessary, to be paid by the state government (respondent) to petitioner's counsel.

Although the rule does not specifically so provide, it is assumed that a petitioner who qualifies for the appointment of counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) and is granted leave to take a deposition will be allowed witness costs. This will include recording and transcription of the witness's statement. Such costs are payable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1825. See Opinion of Comptroller General, February 28, 1974.

Subdivision (c) specifically recognizes the right of the respondent to take the deposition of the petitioner. Although the petitioner could not be called to testify against his will in a criminal trial, it is felt the nature of the habeas proceeding, along with the safeguards accorded by the Fifth Amendment and the presence of counsel, justify this provision. See 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1183–84 (1970).

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 6 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.

Although current Rule 6(b) contains no requirement that the parties provide reasons for the requested discovery, the revised rule does so and also includes a requirement that the request be accompanied by any proposed interrogatories and requests for admission, and must specify any requested documents. The Committee believes that the revised rule makes explicit what has been implicit in current practice.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. Rule 6(b) was modified to require that discovery requests be supported by reasons, to assist the court in deciding what, if any, discovery should take place. The Committee believed that the change made explicit what has been implicit in current practice.

Rule 7. Expanding the Record

(a) IN GENERAL. If the petition is not dismissed, the judge may direct the parties to expand the record by submitting additional materials relating to the petition. The judge may require that these materials be authenticated.

(b) TYPES OF MATERIALS. The materials that may be required include letters predating the filing of the petition, documents, exhibits, and answers under oath to written interrogatories propounded by the judge. Affidavits may also be submitted and considered as part of the record.

(c) REVIEW BY THE OPPOSING PARTY. The judge must give the party against whom the additional materials are offered an opportunity to admit or deny their correctness.

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

This rule provides that the judge may direct that the record be expanded. The purpose is to enable the judge to dispose of some habeas petitions not dismissed on the pleadings, without the time and expense required for an evidentiary hearing. An expanded record may also be helpful when an evidentiary hearing is ordered.

The record may be expanded to include additional material relevant to the merits of the petition. While most petitions are dismissed either summarily or after a response has been made, of those that remain, by far the majority require an evidentiary hearing. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, for example, of 8,423 § 2254 cases terminated, 8,231 required court action. Of these, 7,812 were dismissed before a prehearing conference and 469 merited further court action (*e.g.*, expansion of the record, prehearing conference, or an evidentiary hearing). Of the remaining 469 cases, 403 required an evidentiary hearing, often time-consuming, costly, and, at least occasionally, unnecessary. See Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report, 245a–245c (table C4) (1970). In some instances these hearings were necessitated by slight omissions in the state record which might have been cured by the use of an expanded record.

Authorizing expansion of the record will, hopefully, eliminate some unnecessary hearings. The value of this approach was articulated in *Raines v. United States*, 423 F.2d 526, 529–530 (4th Cir. 1970):

> Unless it is clear from the pleadings and the files and records that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the statute makes a hearing mandatory. We think there is a permissible intermediate step that may avoid the necessity for an expensive and time consuming evidentiary hearing in every Section 2255 case. It may instead be perfectly appropriate, depending upon the nature of the allegations, for the district court to proceed by requiring that the record be expanded to include letters, documentary evidence, and, in an appropriate case, even affidavits. *United States v. Carlino*, 400 F.2d 56 (2nd Cir. 1968); *Mirra v. United States*, 379 F.2d 782 (2nd Cir. 1967); *Accardi v. United States*, 379 F.2d 312 (2nd Cir. 1967). When the issue is one of credibility, resolution on the basis of affidavits can rarely be conclusive, but that is not to say they may not be helpful.

In *Harris v. Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969), the court said:

At any time in the proceedings * * * *either on [the court's] own motion* or upon cause shown by the petitioner, it may issue such writs and take or authorize such proceedings * * * *before* or in conjunction with the hearing of the facts * * * [emphasis added]

Subdivision (b) specifies the materials which may be added to the record. These include, without limitation, letters predating the filing of the petition in the district court, documents, exhibits, and answers under oath directed to written interrogatories propounded by the judge. Under this subdivision affidavits may be submitted and considered part of the record. Subdivision (b) is consistent with 28 U.S.C. §§2246 and 2247 and the decision in *Raines* with regard to types of material that may be considered upon application for a writ of habeas corpus. See *United States v. Carlino*, 400 F.2d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1968), and *Machibroda v. United States*, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).

Under subdivision (c) all materials proposed to be included in the record must be submitted to the party against whom they are to be offered.

Under subdivision (d) the judge can require authentication if he believes it desirable to do so.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 7 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as noted below.

Revised Rule 7(a) is not intended to restrict the court's authority to expand the record through means other than requiring the parties themselves to provide the information. Further, the rule has been changed to remove the reference to the ''merits'' of the petition in the recognition that a court may wish to expand the record in order to assist it in deciding an issue other than the merits of the petition.

The language in current Rule 7(d), which deals with authentication of materials in the expanded record, has been moved to revised Rule 7(a).

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee modified Rule 7(a) by removing the reference to the ''merits'' of the petition. One commentator had commented that the court might wish to expand the record for purposes other than the merits of the case. The Committee agreed to the change and also changed the rule to reflect that someone other than a party may authenticate the materials.

Rule 8. Evidentiary Hearing

(a) DETERMINING WHETHER TO HOLD A HEARING. If the petition is not dismissed, the judge must review the answer, any transcripts and records of state-court proceedings, and any materials submitted under Rule 7 to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted.

(b) REFERENCE TO A MAGISTRATE JUDGE. A judge may, under 28 U.S.C. §636(b), refer the petition to a magistrate judge to conduct hearings and to file proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition. When they are filed, the clerk must promptly serve copies of the proposed findings and recommendations on all parties. Within 14 days after being served, a party may file objections as provided by local court rule. The judge must determine de novo any proposed finding or recommendation to which objection is made. The judge may accept, reject, or modify any proposed finding or recommendation.

(c) APPOINTING COUNSEL; TIME OF HEARING. If an evidentiary hearing is warranted, the judge must appoint an attorney to represent a petitioner who qualifies to have counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. §3006A. The judge must conduct the hearing as soon as practicable after giving the attorneys adequate time to investigate and prepare. These rules do not limit the appointment of counsel under §3006A at any stage of the proceeding.

(As amended Pub. L. 94–426, §2(5), Sept. 28, 1976, 90 Stat. 1334; Pub. L. 94–577, §2(a)(1), (b)(1), Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2730, 2731; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

This rule outlines the procedure to be followed by the court immediately prior to and after the determination of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing.

The provisions are applicable if the petition has not been dismissed at a previous stage in the proceeding [including a summary dismissal under rule 4; a dismissal pursuant to a motion by the respondent; a dismissal after the answer and petition are considered; or a dismissal after consideration of the pleadings and an expanded record].

If dismissal has not been ordered, the court must determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. This determination is to be made upon a review of the answer, the transcript and record of state court proceedings, and if there is one, the expanded record. As the United States Supreme Court noted in *Townsend v. Sam*, 372 U.S. 293, 319 (1963):

> Ordinarily [the complete state-court] record—including the transcript of testimony (or if unavailable some adequate substitute, such as a narrative record), the pleadings, court opinions, and other pertinent documents—is indispensable to determining whether the habeas applicant received a full and fair state-court evidentiary hearing resulting in reliable findings.

Subdivision (a) contemplates that all of these materials, if available, will be taken into account. This is especially important in view of the standard set down in *Townsend* for determining *when* a hearing in the federal habeas proceeding is mandatory.

> The appropriate standard * * * is this: Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding.
>
> 372 U.S. at 312

The circumstances under which a federal hearing is mandatory are now specified in 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). The 1966 amendment clearly places the burden on the petitioner, when there has already been a state hearing, to show that it was not a fair or adequate hearing for one or more of the specifically enumerated reasons, in order to force a federal evidentiary hearing. Since the function of an evidentiary hearing is to try issues of fact (372 U.S. at 309), such a hearing is unnecessary when only issues of law are raised. See, *e.g., Yeaman v. United States*, 326 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1963).

In situations in which an evidentiary hearing is not mandatory, the judge may nonetheless decide that an evidentiary hearing is desirable:

> The purpose of the test is to indicate the situations in which the holding of an evidentiary hearing is mandatory. In all other cases where the material facts are in dispute, the holding of such a hearing is in the discretion of the district judge.
>
> 372 U.S. at 318

If the judge decides that an evidentiary hearing is neither required nor desirable, he shall make such a disposition of the petition ''as justice shall require.'' Most habeas petitions are dismissed before the prehearing conference stage (see Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report

245a–245c (table C4) (1970)) and of those not dismissed, the majority raise factual issues that necessitate an evidentiary hearing. If no hearing is required, most petitions are dismissed, but in unusual cases the court may grant the relief sought without a hearing. This includes immediate release from custody or nullification of a judgment under which the sentence is to be served in the future.

Subdivision (b) provides that a magistrate, when so empowered by rule of the district court, may recommend to the district judge that an evidentiary hearing be held or that the petition be dismissed, provided he gives the district judge a sufficiently detailed description of the facts so that the judge may decide whether or not to hold an evidentiary hearing. This provision is not inconsistent with the holding in *Wingo v. Wedding*, 418 U.S. 461 (1974), that the Federal Magistrates Act did not change the requirement of the habeas corpus statute that federal judges personally conduct habeas evidentiary hearings, and that consequently a local district court rule was invalid insofar as it authorized a magistrate to hold such hearings. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) provides that a district court may by rule authorize any magistrate to perform certain additional duties, including preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to whether there should be a hearing.

As noted in *Wingo*, review ''by Magistrates of applications for post-trial relief is thus limited to review for the purpose of proposing, not holding, evidentiary hearings.''

Utilization of the magistrate as specified in subdivision (b) will aid in the expeditious and fair handling of habeas petitions.

> A qualified, experienced magistrate will, it is hoped, acquire an expertise in examining these [post-conviction review] applications and summarizing their important contents for the district judge, thereby facilitating his decisions. Law clerks are presently charged with this responsibility by many judges, but judges have noted that the normal 1-year clerkship does not afford law clerks the time or experience necessary to attain real efficiency in handling such applications.
>
> S. Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1967)

Under subdivision (c) there are two provisions that differ from the procedure set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2243. These are the appointment of counsel and standard for determining how soon the hearing will be held.

If an evidentiary hearing is required the judge must appoint counsel for a petitioner who qualified for appointment under the Criminal Justice Act. Currently, the appointment of counsel is not recognized as a right at any stage of a habeas proceeding. See, *e.g.*, *United States ex rel. Marshall v. Wilkins*, 338 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1964). Some district courts have, however, by local rule, required that counsel must be provided for indigent petitioners in cases requiring a hearing. See, *e.g.*, D.N.M.R. 21(f), E.D. N.Y.R. 26(d). Appointment of counsel at this stage is mandatory under subdivision (c). This requirement will not limit the authority of the court to provide counsel at an earlier stage if it is thought desirable to do so as is done in some courts under current practice. At the evidentiary hearing stage, however, an indigent petitioner's access to counsel should not depend on local practice and, for this reason, the furnishing of counsel is made mandatory.

Counsel can perform a valuable function benefiting both the court and the petitioner. The issues raised can be more clearly identified if both sides have the benefit of trained legal personnel. The presence of counsel at the prehearing conference may help to expedite the evidentiary hearing or make it unnecessary, and counsel will be able to make better use of available prehearing discovery procedures. Compare ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies § 4.4, p. 66 (Approved Draft 1968). At a hearing, the petitioner's claims are more likely to be effectively and properly presented by counsel.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g), payment is allowed counsel up to $250, plus reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred. The standards of indigency under this section are less strict than those regarding eligibility to prosecute a petition in forma pauperis, and thus many who cannot qualify to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 will be entitled to the benefits of counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g). Under rule 6(c), the court may order the respondent to reimburse counsel from state funds for fees and expenses incurred as the result of the utilization of discovery procedures by the respondent.

Subdivision (c) provides that the hearing shall be conducted as promptly as possible, taking into account ''the need of counsel for both parties for adequate time for investigation and preparation.'' This differs from the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2243, which requires that the day for the hearing be set ''not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.'' This time limit fails to take into account the function that may be served by a prehearing conference and the time required to prepare adequately for an evidentiary hearing. Although ''additional time'' is often allowed under § 2243, subdivision (c) provides more flexibility to take account of the complexity of the case, the availability of important materials, the workload of the attorney general, and the time required by appointed counsel to prepare.

While the rule does not make specific provision for a prehearing conference, the omission is not intended to cast doubt upon the value of such a conference:

> The conference may limit the questions to be resolved, identify areas of agreement and dispute, and explore evidentiary problems that may be expected to arise. * * * [S]uch conferences may also disclose that a hearing is unnecessary * * *.
>
> ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies § 4.6, commentary pp. 74–75. (Approved Draft, 1968.)

See also Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1188 (1970).

The rule does not contain a specific provision on the subpoenaing of witnesses. It is left to local practice to determine the method for doing this. The implementation of 28 U.S.C. § 1825 on the payment of witness fees is dealt with in an opinion of the Comptroller General, February 28, 1974.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 8 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.

Rule 8(a) is not intended to supersede the restrictions on evidentiary hearings contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

The requirement in current Rule 8(b)(2) that a copy of the magistrate judge's findings must be promptly mailed to all parties has been changed in revised Rule 8(b) to require that copies of those findings be served on all parties. As used in this rule, ''service'' means service consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b), which allows mailing the copies.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee changed the Committee Note to reflect the view that the amendments to Rule 8 were not intended to supercede the restrictions on evidentiary hearings contained in § 2254(e)(2).

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2009 AMENDMENT

The time set in the former rule at 10 days has been revised to 14 days. See the Committee Note to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 45(a).

AMENDMENTS BY PUBLIC LAW

1976—Subd. (b). Pub. L. 94–577, § 2(a)(1), substituted provisions which authorized magistrates, when des-

ignated to do so in accordance with section 636(b) of this title, to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, on the petition and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition, which directed the magistrate to file proposed findings and recommendations with the court with copies furnished to all parties, which allowed parties thus served 10 days to file written objections thereto, and which directed a judge of the court to make de novo determinations of the objected-to portions and to accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations for provisions under which the magistrate had been empowered only to recommend to the district judge that an evidentiary hearing be held or that the petition be dismissed.

Subd. (c). Pub. L. 94–577, §2(b)(1), substituted ''and the hearing shall be conducted'' for ''and shall conduct the hearing''.

Pub. L. 94–426 provided that these rules not limit the appointment of counsel under section 3006A of title 18, if the interest of justice so require.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1976 AMENDMENT

Section 2(c) of Pub. L. 94–577 provided that: ''The amendments made by this section [amending subdivs. (b) and (c) of this rule and Rule 8(b), (c) of the Rules Governing Proceedings Under Section 2255 of this title] shall take effect with respect to petitions under section 2254 and motions under section 2255 of title 28 of the United States Code filed on or after February 1, 1977.''

Rule 9. Second or Successive Petitions

Before presenting a second or successive petition, the petitioner must obtain an order from the appropriate court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider the petition as required by 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3) and (4).

(As amended Pub. L. 94–426, §2(7), (8), Sept. 28, 1976, 90 Stat. 1335; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

This rule is intended to minimize abuse of the writ of habeas corpus by limiting the right to assert stale claims and to file multiple petitions. Subdivision (a) deals with the delayed petition. Subdivision (b) deals with the second or successive petition.

Subdivision (a) provides that a petition attacking the judgment of a state court may be dismissed on the grounds of delay if the petitioner knew or should have known of the existence of the grounds he is presently asserting in the petition and the delay has resulted in the state being prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition. If the delay is more than five years after the judgment of conviction, prejudice is presumed, although this presumption is rebuttable by the petitioner. Otherwise, the state has the burden of showing such prejudice.

The assertion of stale claims is a problem which is not likely to decrease in frequency. Following the decisions in *Jones v. Cunningham*, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), and *Benson v. California*, 328 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1964), the concept of custody expanded greatly, lengthening the time period during which a habeas corpus petition may be filed. The petitioner who is not unconditionally discharged may be on parole or probation for many years. He may at some date, perhaps ten or fifteen years after conviction, decide to challenge the state court judgment. The grounds most often troublesome to the courts are ineffective counsel, denial of right of appeal, plea of guilty unlawfully induced, use of a coerced confession, and illegally constituted jury. The latter four grounds are often interlocked with the allegation of ineffective counsel. When they are asserted after the passage of many years, both the attorney for the defendant and the state have difficulty in ascertaining what the facts are. It often develops that the defense attorney has little or no recollection as to what took place and that many of the participants in the trial are dead or their whereabouts unknown. The court reporter's notes may have been lost or destroyed, thus eliminating any exact record of what transpired. If the case was decided on a guilty plea, even if the record is intact, it may not satisfactorily reveal the extent of the defense attorney's efforts in behalf of the petitioner. As a consequence, there is obvious difficulty in investigating petitioner's allegations.

The interest of both the petitioner and the government can best be served if claims are raised while the evidence is still fresh. The American Bar Association has recognized the interest of the state in protecting itself against stale claims by limiting the right to raise such claims after completion of service of a sentence imposed pursuant to a challenged judgment. See ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies §2.4 (c), p. 45 (Approved Draft, 1968). Subdivision (a) is not limited to those who have completed their sentence. Its reach is broader, extending to all instances where delay by the petitioner has prejudiced the state, subject to the qualifications and conditions contained in the subdivision.

In *McMann v. Richardson*, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the court made reference to the issue of the stale claim:

> What is at stake in this phase of the case is not the integrity of the state convictions obtained on guilty pleas, *but whether, years later*, defendants must be permitted to withdraw their pleas, which were perfectly valid when made, and be given another choice between admitting their guilt and putting the State to its proof. [Emphasis added.]

397 U.S. at 773

The court refused to allow this, intimating its dislike of collateral attacks on sentences long since imposed which disrupt the state's interest in finality of convictions which were constitutionally valid when obtained.

Subdivision (a) is not a statute of limitations. Rather, the limitation is based on the equitable doctrine of laches. ''Laches is such delay in enforcing one's rights as works disadvantage to another.'' 30A C.J.S. Equity §112, p. 19. Also, the language of the subdivision, ''a petition *may* be dismissed'' [emphasis added], is permissive rather than mandatory. This clearly allows the court which is considering the petition to use discretion in assessing the equities of the particular situation.

The use of a flexible rule analogous to laches to bar the assertion of stale claims is suggested in ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies §2.4, commentary at 48 (Approved Draft, 1968). Additionally, in *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the Supreme Court noted:

> Furthermore, habeas corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles. *United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi*, 344 U.S. 561, 573 (dissenting opinion). Among them is the principle that a suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may disentitle him to the relief he seeks.

372 U.S. at 438

Finally, the doctrine of laches has been applied with reference to another postconviction remedy, the writ of coram nobis. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §1606(25), p. 779.

The standard used for determining if the petitioner shall be barred from asserting his claim is consistent with that used in laches provisions generally. The petitioner is held to a standard of reasonable diligence. Any inference or presumption arising by reason of the failure to attack collaterally a conviction may be disregarded where (1) there has been a change of law or fact (new evidence) or (2) where the court, in the interest of justice, feels that the collateral attack should be entertained and the prisoner makes a proper showing as to why he has not asserted a particular ground for relief.

Subdivision (a) establishes the presumption that the passage of more than five years from the time of the

judgment of conviction to the time of filing a habeas petition is prejudicial to the state. ''Presumption'' has the meaning given it by Fed.R.Evid. 301. The prisoner has ''the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption'' that the state has not been prejudiced by the passage of a substantial period of time. This does not impose too heavy a burden on the petitioner. He usually knows what persons are important to the issue of whether the state has been prejudiced. Rule 6 can be used by the court to allow petitioner liberal discovery to learn whether witnesses have died or whether other circumstances prejudicial to the state have occurred. Even if the petitioner should fail to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the state, he is not automatically barred from asserting his claim. As discussed previously, he may proceed if he neither knew nor, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known of the grounds for relief.

The presumption of prejudice does not come into play if the time lag is not more than five years.

The time limitation should have a positive effect in encouraging petitioners who have knowledge of it to assert all their claims as soon after conviction as possible. The implementation of this rule can be substantially furthered by the development of greater legal resources for prisoners. See ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies §3.1, pp. 49–50 (Approved Draft, 1968).

Subdivision (a) does not constitute an abridgement or modification of a substantive right under 28 U.S.C. §2072. There are safeguards for the hardship case. The rule provides a flexible standard for determining when a petition will be barred.

Subdivision (b) deals with the problem of successive habeas petitions. It provides that the judge may dismiss a second or successive petition (1) if it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief or (2) if new or different grounds for relief are alleged and the judge finds the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition is inexcusable.

In *Sanders v. United States*, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), the court, in dealing with the problem of successive applications, stated:

> Controlling weight *may* be given to denial of a prior application for federal habeas corpus or §2255 relief only if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application. [Emphasis added.]

373 U.S. at 15

The requirement is that the prior determination of the same ground has been on the merits. This requirement is in 28 U.S.C. §2244(b) and has been reiterated in many cases since *Sanders*. See *Gains v. Allgood*, 391 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1968); *Hutchinson v. Craven*, 415 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1969); *Brown v. Peyton*, 435 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1970).

With reference to a successive application asserting a new ground or one not previously decided on the merits, the court in *Sanders* noted:

> In either case, full consideration of the merits of the new application can be avoided only if there has been an abuse of the writ * * * and this the Government has the burden of pleading. * * *
>
> Thus, for example, if a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal collateral relief at the time of filing his first application, * * * he may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on a second application presenting the withheld ground.

373 U.S. at 17–18

Subdivision (b) has incorporated this principle and requires that the judge find petitioner's failure to have asserted the new grounds in the prior petition to be inexcusable.

Sanders, 18 U.S.C. §2244, and subdivision (b) make it clear that the court has discretion to entertain a successive application.

The burden is on the government to plead abuse of the writ. See *Sanders v. United States*, 373 U.S. 1, 10 (1963); *Dixon v. Jacobs*, 427 F.2d 589, 596 (D.C.Cir. 1970); cf. *Johnson v. Copinger*, 420 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1969). Once the government has done this, the petitioner has the burden of proving that he has not abused the writ. In *Price v. Johnston*, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948), the court said:

> [I]f the Government chooses * * * to claim that the prisoner has abused the writ of *habeas corpus*, it rests with the Government to make that claim with clarity and particularity in its return to the order to show cause. That is not an intolerable burden. The Government is usually well acquainted with the facts that are necessary to make such a claim. Once a particular abuse has been alleged, the prisoner has the burden of answering that allegation and of proving that he has not abused the writ.

Subdivision (b) is consistent with the important and well established purpose of habeas corpus. It does not eliminate a remedy to which the petitioner is rightfully entitled. However, in *Sanders*, the court pointed out:

> Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.

373 U.S. at 18

There are instances in which petitioner's failure to assert a ground in a prior petition is excusable. A retroactive change in the law and newly discovered evidence are examples. In rare instances, the court may feel a need to entertain a petition alleging grounds that have already been decided on the merits. *Sanders*, 373 U.S. at 1, 16. However, abusive use of the writ should be discouraged, and instances of abuse are frequent enough to require a means of dealing with them. For example, a successive application, already decided on the merits, may be submitted in the hope of getting before a different judge in multijudge courts. A known ground may be deliberately withheld in the hope of getting two or more hearings or in the hope that delay will result in witnesses and records being lost. There are instances in which a petitioner will have three or four petitions pending at the same time in the same court. There are many hundreds of cases where the application is at least the second one by the petitioner. This subdivision is aimed at screening out the abusive petitions from this large volume, so that the more meritorious petitions can get quicker and fuller consideration.

The form petition, supplied in accordance with rule 2(c), encourages the petitioner to raise all of his available grounds in one petition. It sets out the most common grounds asserted so that these may be brought to his attention.

Some commentators contend that the problem of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus is greatly overstated:

> Most prisoners, of course, are interested in being released as soon as possible; only rarely will one inexcusably neglect to raise all available issues in his first federal application. The purpose of the ''abuse'' bar is apparently to deter repetitious applications from those few bored or vindictive prisoners * * *.

83 Harv.L.Rev. at 1153–1154

See also ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies §6.2, commentary at 92 (Approved Draft, 1968), which states: ''The occasional, highly litigious prisoner stands out as the rarest exception.'' While no recent systematic study of repetitious applications exists, there is no reason to believe that the problem has decreased in significance in relation to the total number of §2254 petitions filed. That number has increased from 584 in 1949 to 12,088 in 1971. See Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report, table 16 (1971). It is appropriate that action be taken by rule to allow the courts to deal with this problem, whatever its specific magnitude. The bar set

up by subdivision (b) is not one of rigid application, but rather is within the discretion of the courts on a case-by-case basis.

If it appears to the court after examining the petition and answer (where appropriate) that there is a high probability that the petition will be barred under either subdivision of rule 9, the court ought to afford petitioner an opportunity to explain his apparent abuse. One way of doing this is by the use of the form annexed hereto. The use of a form will ensure a full airing of the issue so that the court is in a better position to decide whether the petition should be barred. This conforms with *Johnson v. Copinger*, 420 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1969), where the court stated:

> [T]he petitioner is obligated to present facts demonstrating that his earlier failure to raise his claims is excusable and does not amount to an abuse of the writ. However, it is inherent in this obligation placed upon the petitioner that he must be given an opportunity to make his explanation, if he has one. If he is not afforded such an opportunity, the requirement that he satisfy the court that he has not abused the writ is meaningless. Nor do we think that a procedure which allows the imposition of a forfeiture for abuse of the writ, without allowing the petitioner an opportunity to be heard on the issue, comports with the minimum requirements of fairness.
>
> 420 F.2d at 399

Use of the recommended form will contribute to an orderly handling of habeas petitions and will contribute to the ability of the court to distinguish the excusable from the inexcusable delay or failure to assert a ground for relief in a prior petition.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 9 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as noted below.

First, current Rule 9(a) has been deleted as unnecessary in light of the applicable one-year statute of limitations for § 2254 petitions, added as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Second, current Rule 9(b), now Rule 9, has been changed to also reflect provisions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) and (4), which now require a petitioner to obtain approval from the appropriate court of appeals before filing a second or successive petition.

Finally, the title of Rule 9 has been changed to reflect the fact that the only topic now addressed in the rules is that of second or successive petitions.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 9.

AMENDMENTS BY PUBLIC LAW

1976—Subd. (a). Pub. L. 94–426, § 2(7), struck out provision which established a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the state if the petition was filed more than five years after conviction and started the running of the five year period, where a petition challenged the validity of an action after conviction, from the time of the order of such action.

Subd. (b). Pub. L. 94–426, § 2(8), substituted ''constituted an abuse of the writ'' for ''is not excusable''.

Rule 10. Powers of a Magistrate Judge

A magistrate judge may perform the duties of a district judge under these rules, as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636.

(As amended Pub. L. 94–426, § 2(11), Sept. 28, 1976, 90 Stat. 1335; Apr. 30, 1979, eff. Aug. 1, 1979; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Under this rule the duties imposed upon the judge of the district court by rules 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 may be performed by a magistrate if and to the extent he is empowered to do so by a rule of the district court. However, when such duties involve the making of an order under rule 4 disposing of the petition, that order must be made by the court. The magistrate in such instances must submit to the court his report as to the facts and his recommendation with respect to the order.

The Federal Magistrates Act allows magistrates, when empowered by local rule, to perform certain functions in proceedings for post-trial relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). The performance of such functions, when authorized, is intended to ''afford some degree of relief to district judges and their law clerks, who are presently burdened with burgeoning numbers of habeas corpus petitions and applications under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.'' Committee on the Judiciary, The Federal Magistrates Act, S.Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 26 (1967).

> Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any district court,
> by the concurrence of a majority of all the judges of such district court, may establish rules pursuant to which any full-time United States magistrate * * * may be assigned within the territorial jurisdiction of such court such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

The proposed rule recognizes the limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) upon the powers of magistrates to act in federal postconviction proceedings. These limitations are: (1) that the magistrate may act only pursuant to a rule passed by the majority of the judges in the district court in which the magistrate serves, and (2) that the duties performed by the magistrate pursuant to such rule be consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

It has been suggested that magistrates be empowered by law to hold hearings and make final decisions in habeas proceedings. See Proposed Reformation of Federal Habeas Corpus Procedure: Use of Federal Magistrates, 54 Iowa L.Rev. 1147, 1158 (1969). However, the Federal Magistrates Act does not authorize such use of magistrates. *Wingo v. Wedding*, 418 U.S. 461 (1974). See advisory committee note to rule 8. While the use of magistrates can help alleviate the strain imposed on the district courts by the large number of unmeritorious habeas petitions, neither 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) nor this rule contemplate the abdication by the court of its decision-making responsibility. See also Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L.Rev. 1038, 1188 (1970)

Where a full-time magistrate is not available, the duties contemplated by this rule may be assigned to a part-time magistrate.

1979 AMENDMENT

This amendment conforms the rule to subsequently enacted legislation clarifying and further defining the duties which may be assigned to a magistrate, 18 U.S.C. § 636, as amended in 1976 by Pub. L. 94–577. To the extent that rule 10 is more restrictive than § 636, the limitations are of no effect, for the statute expressly governs ''[n]otwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.''

The reference to particular rules is stricken, as under § 636(b)(1)(A) a judge may designate a magistrate to perform duties under other rules as well (e.g., order that further transcripts be furnished under rule 5; appoint counsel under rule 8). The reference to ''established standards and criteria'' is stricken, as § 636(4) requires each district court to ''establish rules pursuant to which the magistrates shall discharge their duties.'' The exception with respect to a rule 4 order dismissing a petition is stricken, as that limitation appears in § 636(b)(1)(B) and is thereby applicable to certain other actions under these rules as well (e.g., determination of a need for an evidentiary hearing under rule 8; dismissal of a delayed or successive petition under rule 9).

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 10 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee restyled the proposed rule.

AMENDMENTS BY PUBLIC LAW

1976—Pub. L. 94–426 inserted ", and to the extent the district court has established standards and criteria for the performance of such duties" after "rule of the district court".

Rule 11. Certificate of Appealability; Time to Appeal

(a) CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY. The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. Before entering the final order, the court may direct the parties to submit arguments on whether a certificate should issue. If the court issues a certificate, the court must state the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). If the court denies a certificate, the parties may not appeal the denial but may seek a certificate from the court of appeals under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22. A motion to reconsider a denial does not extend the time to appeal.

(b) TIME TO APPEAL. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) governs the time to appeal an order entered under these rules. A timely notice of appeal must be filed even if the district court issues a certificate of appealability.

(As added Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2009

Subdivision (a). As provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), an applicant may not appeal to the court of appeals from a final order in a proceeding under § 2254 unless a judge issues a certificate of appealability (COA), identifying the specific issues for which the applicant has made a substantial showing of a denial of constitutional right. New Rule 11(a) makes the requirements concerning COAs more prominent by adding and consolidating them in the appropriate rule of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Rule 11(a) also requires the district judge to grant or deny the certificate at the time a final order is issued. *See* 3d Cir. R. 22.2, 111.3. This will ensure prompt decision making when the issues are fresh, rather than postponing consideration of the certificate until after a notice of appeal is filed. These changes will expedite proceedings, avoid unnecessary remands, and help inform the applicant's decision whether to file a notice of appeal.

Subdivision (b). The new subdivision is designed to direct parties to the appropriate rule governing the timing of the notice of appeal and make it clear that the district court's grant of a COA does not eliminate the need to file a notice of appeal.

Changes Made to Proposed Amendment Released for Public Comment. In response to public comments, a sentence was added stating that prior to the entry of the final order the district court may direct the parties to submit arguments on whether or not a certificate should issue. This allows a court in complex cases (such as death penalty cases with numerous claims) to solicit briefing that might narrow the issues for appeal. For purposes of clarification, two sentences were added at the end of subdivision (a) stating that (1) although the district court's denial of a certificate is not appealable, a certificate may be sought in the court of appeals, and (2) a motion for reconsideration of a denial of a certificate does not extend the time to appeal.

Finally, a new subdivision (b) was added to mirror the information provided in subdivision (b) of Rule 11 of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, directing petitioners to Rule 4 of the appellate rules and indicating that notice of appeal must be filed even if a COA is issued.

Minor changes were also made to conform to style conventions.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, referred to in text, are set out in the Appendix to this title.

Rule 12. Applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules, may be applied to a proceeding under these rules.

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Habeas corpus proceedings are characterized as civil in nature. See *e.g., Fisher v. Baker*, 203 U.S. 174, 181 (1906). However, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(2), the applicability of the civil rules to habeas corpus actions has been limited, although the various courts which have considered this problem have had difficulty in setting out the boundaries of this limitation. See *Harris v. Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) at 289, footnote 1. Rule 11 is intended to conform with the Supreme Court's approach in the *Harris* case. There the court was dealing with the petitioner's contention that Civil Rule 33 granting the right to discovery via written interrogatories is wholly applicable to habeas corpus proceedings. The court held:

> We agree with the Ninth Circuit that Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to habeas corpus proceedings and that 28 U.S.C. § 2246 does not authorize interrogatories except in limited circumstances not applicable to this case; but we conclude that, in appropriate circumstances, a district court, confronted by a petition for habeas corpus which establishes a prima facie case for relief, may use or authorize the use of suitable discovery procedures, including interrogatories, reasonably fashioned to elicit facts necessary to help the court to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require" 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
>
> 394 U.S. at 290

The court then went on to consider the contention that the "conformity" provision of Rule 81(a)(2) should be rigidly applied so that the civil rules would be applicable only to the extent that habeas corpus practice had conformed to the practice in civil actions at the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on September 16, 1938. The court said:

> Although there is little direct evidence, relevant to the present problem, of the purpose of the "conformity" provision of Rule 81(a)(2), the concern of the draftsmen, as a general matter, seems to have been to provide for the continuing applicability of the "civil" rules in their new form to those areas of practice in habeas corpus and other enumerated proceedings in which the "specified" proceedings had theretofore utilized the modes of civil practice. Otherwise, those proceedings were to be considered outside of the scope of the rules without prejudice, of course, to the use of particular rules by analogy or otherwise, where appropriate.
>
> 394 U.S. at 294

The court then reiterated its commitment to judicial discretion in formulating rules and procedures for habeas corpus proceedings by stating:

> [T]he habeas corpus jurisdiction and the duty to exercise it being present, the courts may fashion appropriate modes of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial usage.

Where their duties require it, this is the inescapable obligation of the courts. Their authority is expressly confirmed in the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

394 U.S. at 299

Rule 6 of these proposed rules deals specifically with the issue of discovery in habeas actions in a manner consistent with *Harris*. Rule 11 extends this approach to allow the court considering the petition to use any of the rules of civil procedure (unless inconsistent with these rules of habeas corpus) when in its discretion the court decides they are appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case. The court does not have to rigidly apply rules which would be inconsistent or inequitable in the overall framework of habeas corpus. Rule 11 merely recognizes and affirms their discretionary power to use their judgment in promoting the ends of justice.

Rule 11 permits application of the civil rules only when it would be appropriate to do so. Illustrative of an inappropriate application is that rejected by the Supreme Court in *Pitchess v. Davis*, 95 S.Ct. 1748 (1975), holding that Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) should not be applied in a habeas case when it would have the effect of altering the statutory exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 11 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 11.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2009 AMENDMENT

The amendment renumbers current Rule 11 to accommodate the new rule on certificates of appealability.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in heading and text, are set out in the Appendix to this title.

APPENDIX OF FORMS

Petition for Relief From a Conviction or Sentence By a Person in State Custody

(Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus)

Instructions

1. To use this form, you must be a person who is currently serving a sentence under a judgment against you in a state court. You are asking for relief from the conviction or the sentence. This form is your petition for relief.

2. You may also use this form to challenge a state judgment that imposed a sentence to be served in the future, but you must fill in the name of the state where the judgment was entered. If you want to challenge a federal judgment that imposed a sentence to be served in the future, you should file a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the federal court that entered the judgment.

3. Make sure the form is typed or neatly written.

4. You must tell the truth and sign the form. If you make a false statement of a material fact, you may be prosecuted for perjury.

5. Answer all the questions. You do not need to cite law. You may submit additional pages if necessary. If you do not fill out the form properly, you will be asked to submit additional or correct information. If you want to submit a brief or arguments, you must submit them in a separate memorandum.

6. You must pay a fee of $5. If the fee is paid, your petition will be filed. If you cannot pay the fee, you may ask to proceed *in forma pauperis* (as a poor person). To do that, you must fill out the last page of this form. Also, you must submit a certificate signed by an officer at the institution where you are confined showing the amount of money that the institution is holding for you. If your account exceeds $ _____, you must pay the filing fee.

7. In this petition, you may challenge the judgment entered by only one court. If you want to challenge a judgment entered by a different court (either in the same state or in different states), you must file a separate petition.

8. When you have completed the form, send the original and two copies to the Clerk of the United States District Court at this address:

   Clerk, United States District Court for _____
   Address
   City, State Zip Code

9. CAUTION: **You must include in this petition all the grounds for relief from the conviction or sentence that you challenge. And you must state the facts that support each ground. If you fail to set forth all the grounds in this petition, you may be barred from presenting additional grounds at a later date.**

10. CAPITAL CASES: **If you are under a sentence of death, you are entitled to the assistance of counsel and should request the appointment of counsel.**

PETITION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2254 FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BY A PERSON IN STATE CUSTODY

United States District Court	District
Name (under which you were convicted):	Docket or Case No.:
Place of Confinement:	Prisoner No.:
Petitioner (include the name under which you were convicted)	Respondent (authorized person having custody of petitioner)
v.	
The Attorney General of the State of	

PETITION

1. (a) Name and location of court that entered the judgment of conviction you are challenging: _____

   _____

   _____

   (b) Criminal docket or case number (if you know): _____
2. (a) Date of the judgment of conviction (if you know): _____

   (b) Date of sentencing: _____
3. Length of sentence: _____
4. In this case, were you convicted on more than one count or of more than one crime? Yes ❑ No ❑
5. Identify all crimes of which you were convicted and sentenced in this case: _____

   _____

   _____

   _____

   _____
6. (a) What was your plea? (Check one)

   (1) Not guilty ❑ (3) Nolo contendere (no contest) ❑

   (2) Guilty ❑ (4) Insanity plea ❑

   (b) If you entered a guilty plea to one count or charge and a not guilty plea to another count or charge, what did you plead guilty to and what did you plead not guilty to?_____

   _____

   _____

   _____

(c) If you went to trial, what kind of trial did you have? (Check one)

Jury ❑ Judge only ❑

7. Did you testify at a pretrial hearing, trial, or a post-trial hearing?

Yes ❑ No ❑

8. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction?

Yes ❑ No ❑

9. If you did appeal, answer the following:

(a) Name of court: _____

(b) Docket or case number (if you know): _____

(c) Result: _____

(d) Date of result (if you know): _____

(e) Citation to the case (if you know): _____

(f) Grounds raised: _____

(g) Did you seek further review by a higher state court? Yes ❑ No ❑

If yes, answer the following:

(1) Name of court: _____

(2) Docket or case number (if you know): _____

(3) Result: _____

(4) Date of result (if you know): _____

(5) Citation to the case (if you know): _____

(6) Grounds raised: _____

(h) Did you file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court? Yes ❑ No ❑

If yes, answer the following:

(1) Docket or case number (if you know): _____

(2) Result: _____

_____

(3) Date of result (if you know): _____

(4) Citation to the case (if you know): _____

10. Other than the direct appeals listed above, have you previously filed any other petitions, applications, or motions concerning this judgment of conviction in any state court?

Yes ❑ No ❑

11. If your answer to Question 10 was "Yes," give the following information:

(a) (1) Name of court: _____

(2) Docket or case number (if you know): _____

(3) Date of filing (if you know): _____

(4) Nature of the proceeding: _____

(5) Grounds raised: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(6) Did you receive a hearing where evidence was given on your petition, application, or motion? Yes ❑ No ❑

(7) Result: _____

(8) Date of result (if you know): _____

(b) If you filed any second petition, application, or motion, give the same information:

(1) Name of court: _____

(2) Docket or case number (if you know): _____

(3) Date of filing (if you know): _____

(4) Nature of the proceeding: _____

(5) Grounds raised: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(6) Did you receive a hearing where evidence was given on your petition, application, or motion? Yes ❑ No ❑

(7) Result: _____

(8) Date of result (if you know): _____

(c) If you filed any third petition, application, or motion, give the same information:

(1) Name of court: _____

(2) Docket or case number (if you know): _____

(3) Date of filing (if you know): _____

(4) Nature of the proceeding: _____

(5) Grounds raised: _____

(6) Did you receive a hearing where evidence was given on your petition, application, or motion? Yes ❑ No ❑

(7) Result: _____

(8) Date of result (if you know): _____

(d) Did you appeal to the highest state court having jurisdiction over the action taken on your petition, application, or motion?

(1) First petition: Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) Second petition: Yes ❑ No ❑

(3) Third petition: Yes ❑ No ❑

(e) If you did not appeal to the highest state court having jurisdiction, explain why you did not:

12. For this petition, state every ground on which you claim that you are being held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Attach additional pages if you have more than four grounds. State the facts supporting each ground.

CAUTION: To proceed in the federal court, you must ordinarily first exhaust (use up) your available state-court remedies on each ground on which you request action by the federal court. Also, if you fail to set forth all the grounds in this petition, you may be barred from presenting additional grounds at a later date.

GROUND ONE: _____

_____

(a) Supporting facts (Do not argue or cite law. Just state the specific facts that support your claim.):

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(b) If you did not exhaust your state remedies on Ground One, explain why: _____

_____

_____

_____

(c) **Direct Appeal of Ground One:**

(1) If you appealed from the judgment of conviction, did you raise this issue?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If you did not raise this issue in your direct appeal, explain why: _____

_____

_____

(d) **Post-Conviction Proceedings:**

(1) Did you raise this issue through a post-conviction motion or petition for habeas corpus in a state trial court? Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If your answer to Question (d)(1) is "Yes," state:

Type of motion or petition: _____

Name and location of the court where the motion or petition was filed: _____

_____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

_____

_____

(3) Did you receive a hearing on your motion or petition?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(4) Did you appeal from the denial of your motion or petition?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(5) If your answer to Question (d)(4) is "Yes," did you raise this issue in the appeal?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(6) If your answer to Question (d)(4) is "Yes," state:

Name and location of the court where the appeal was filed: _____

_____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

_____

_____

(7) If your answer to Question (d)(4) or Question (d)(5) is "No," explain why you did not raise this issue: _____

_____

_____

_____

(e) **Other Remedies:** Describe any other procedures (such as habeas corpus, administrative remedies, etc.) that you have used to exhaust your state remedies on Ground One: _____

_____

_____

GROUND TWO: _____

_____

(a) Supporting facts (Do not argue or cite law. Just state the specific facts that support your claim.):

_____

_____

_____

_____

(b) If you did not exhaust your state remedies on Ground Two, explain why: _____

(c) **Direct Appeal of Ground Two:**

(1) If you appealed from the judgment of conviction, did you raise this issue?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If you did not raise this issue in your direct appeal, explain why: _____

(d) **Post-Conviction Proceedings:**

(1) Did you raise this issue through a post-conviction motion or petition for habeas corpus in a state trial court?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If your answer to Question (d)(1) is "Yes," state:

Type of motion or petition: _____

Name and location of the court where the motion or petition was filed: _____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

(3) Did you receive a hearing on your motion or petition?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(4) Did you appeal from the denial of your motion or petition?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(5) If your answer to Question (d)(4) is "Yes," did you raise this issue in the appeal?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(6) If your answer to Question (d)(4) is "Yes," state:

Name and location of the court where the appeal was filed: _____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

_____

_____

(7) If your answer to Question (d)(4) or Question (d)(5) is "No," explain why you did not raise this issue: _____

_____

_____

_____

(e) **Other Remedies:** Describe any other procedures (such as habeas corpus, administrative remedies, etc.) that you have used to exhaust your state remedies on Ground Two: _____

_____

_____

_____

GROUND THREE: _____

_____

(a) Supporting facts (Do not argue or cite law. Just state the specific facts that support your claim.):

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(b) If you did not exhaust your state remedies on Ground Three, explain why: _____

_____

_____

_____

(c) **Direct Appeal of Ground Three:**

(1) If you appealed from the judgment of conviction, did you raise this issue?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If you did not raise this issue in your direct appeal, explain why: _____

_____

_____

(d) **Post-Conviction Proceedings:**

(1) Did you raise this issue through a post-conviction motion or petition for habeas corpus in a state trial court? Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If your answer to Question (d)(1) is "Yes," state:

Type of motion or petition: _____

Name and location of the court where the motion or petition was filed: _____

_____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

_____

_____

(3) Did you receive a hearing on your motion or petition?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(4) Did you appeal from the denial of your motion or petition?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(5) If your answer to Question (d)(4) is "Yes," did you raise this issue in the appeal?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(6) If your answer to Question (d)(4) is "Yes," state:

Name and location of the court where the appeal was filed: _____

_____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

_____

_____

(7) If your answer to Question (d)(4) or Question (d)(5) is "No," explain why you did not raise this issue: _____

_____

_____

_____

(e) **Other Remedies:** Describe any other procedures (such as habeas corpus, administrative remedies, etc.) that you have used to exhaust your state remedies on Ground Three: _____

_____

_____

GROUND FOUR: _____

_____

(a) Supporting facts (Do not argue or cite law. Just state the specific facts that support your claim.):

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(b) If you did not exhaust your state remedies on Ground Four, explain why: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(c) **Direct Appeal of Ground Four:**

(1) If you appealed from the judgment of conviction, did you raise this issue?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If you did not raise this issue in your direct appeal, explain why: _____

_____

(d) **Post-Conviction Proceedings:**

(1) Did you raise this issue through a post-conviction motion or petition for habeas corpus in a state trial court? Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If your answer to Question (d)(1) is "Yes," state:

Type of motion or petition: _____

Name and location of the court where the motion or petition was filed: _____

_____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

_____

_____

(3) Did you receive a hearing on your motion or petition?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(4) Did you appeal from the denial of your motion or petition?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(5) If your answer to Question (d)(4) is "Yes," did you raise this issue in the appeal?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(6) If your answer to Question (d)(4) is "Yes," state:

Name and location of the court where the appeal was filed: _____

_____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

_____

_____

_____

(7) If your answer to Question (d)(4) or Question (d)(5) is "No," explain why you did not raise this issue: _____

_____

_____

_____

(e) **Other Remedies:** Describe any other procedures (such as habeas corpus, administrative remedies, etc.) that you have used to exhaust your state remedies on Ground Four: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

13. Please answer these additional questions about the petition you are filing:

(a) Have all grounds for relief that you have raised in this petition been presented to the highest state court having jurisdiction? Yes ❑ No ❑

If your answer is "No," state which grounds have not been so presented and give your reason(s) for not presenting them: _____

_____

_____

_____

(b) Is there any ground in this petition that has not been presented in some state or federal court? If so, which ground or grounds have not been presented, and state your reasons for not presenting them: _____

_____

_____

14. Have you previously filed any type of petition, application, or motion in a federal court regarding the conviction that you challenge in this petition? Yes ❑ No ❑

If "Yes," state the name and location of the court, the docket or case number, the type of proceeding, the issues raised, the date of the court's decision, and the result for each petition, application, or motion filed. Attach a copy of any court opinion or order, if available. _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

15. Do you have any petition or appeal now pending (filed and not decided yet) in any court, either state or federal, for the judgment you are challenging? Yes ❑ No ❑

If "Yes," state the name and location of the court, the docket or case number, the type of proceeding, and the issues raised. _____

_____

_____

_____

16. Give the name and address, if you know, of each attorney who represented you in the following stages of the judgment you are challenging:

(a) At preliminary hearing: _____

_____

(b) At arraignment and plea: _____

_____

(c) At trial: _____

_____

(d) At sentencing: _____

_____

(e) On appeal: _____

_____

(f) In any post-conviction proceeding: _____

_____

(g) On appeal from any ruling against you in a post-conviction proceeding: _____

_____

_____

17. Do you have any future sentence to serve after you complete the sentence for the judgment that you are challenging? Yes ❑ No ❑

(a) If so, give name and location of court that imposed the other sentence you will serve in the future: _____

_____

(b) Give the date the other sentence was imposed: _____

(c) Give the length of the other sentence: _____

(d) Have you filed, or do you plan to file, any petition that challenges the judgment or sentence to be served in the future? Yes ❑ No ❑

18. TIMELINESS OF PETITION: If your judgment of conviction became final over one year ago, you must explain why the one-year statute of limitations as contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) does not bar your petition.* _____

_____

_____

_____

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_____

* The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") as contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides in part that:

(1) A one-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —

(continued...)

Therefore, petitioner asks that the Court grant the following relief: _____

_____

_____

or any other relief to which petitioner may be entitled.

_____

Signature of Attorney (if any)

I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was placed in the prison mailing system on _____ (month, date, year).

Executed (signed) on _____ (date).

_____

Signature of Petitioner

*(...continued)

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such state action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

If the person signing is not petitioner, state relationship to petitioner and explain why petitioner is not signing this petition. _____

_____

_____

IN FORMA PAUPERIS DECLARATION

_____
[Insert appropriate court]

_____ (Petitioner)

v.

_____ (Respondent(s))

DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST TO PROCEED *IN FORMA PAUPERIS*

I, _____, declare that I am the petitioner in the above entitled case; that in support of my motion to proceed without being required to prepay fees, costs or give security therefor, I state that because of my poverty I am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give security therefor; that I believe I am entitled to relief.

1. Are you presently employed? Yes ☐ No ☐
   a. If the answer is ''yes,'' state the amount of your salary or wages per month, and give the name and address of your employer.
   _____
   _____
   b. If the answer is ''no,'' state the date of last employment and the amount of the salary and wages per month which you received.
   _____
   _____
2. Have you received within the past twelve months any money from any of the following sources?
   a. Business, profession or form of self-employment? Yes ☐ No ☐
   b. Rent payments, interest or dividends? Yes ☐ No ☐
   c. Pensions, annuities or life insurance payments? Yes ☐ No ☐
   d. Gifts or inheritances? Yes ☐ No ☐
   e. Any other sources? Yes ☐ No ☐
   If the answer to any of the above is ''yes,'' describe each source of money and state the amount received from each during the past twelve months.
   _____
   _____
   _____
   _____
3. Do you own cash, or do you have money in a checking or savings account?
   Yes ☐ No ☐ (Include any funds in prison accounts.)
   If the answer is ''yes,'' state the total value of the items owned.
   _____
   _____
   _____
4. Do you own any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other valuable property (excluding ordinary household furnishings and clothing)?
   Yes ☐ No ☐
   If the answer is ''yes,'' describe the property and state its approximate value.
   _____
   _____
   _____
5. List the persons who are dependent upon you for support, state your relationship to those persons, and indicate how much you contribute toward their support.
   _____
   _____
   _____

I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on _____.
(date)

_____
Signature of Petitioner

Certificate

I hereby certify that the petitioner herein has the sum of $_____ on account to his credit at the _____ institution where he is confined. I further certify that petitioner likewise has the following securities to his credit according to the records of said _____ institution:

_____
_____
_____
_____

_____
Authorized Officer of Institution

(As amended Apr. 28, 1982, eff. Aug. 1, 1982; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

MODEL FORM FOR USE IN 28 U.S.C. § 2254 CASES INVOLVING A RULE 9 ISSUE

Form No. 9

[Abrogated Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.]

Changes Made After Publication and Comments—Forms Accompanying Rules Governing § 2254 and § 2255 Proceedings. Responding to a number of comments from the public, the Committee deleted from both sets of official forms the list of possible grounds of relief. The Committee made additional minor style corrections to the forms.

§ 2255. Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence

(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

(b) Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.

(c) A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.

(d) An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.

(e) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by

motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

(f) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(g) Except as provided in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, in all proceedings brought under this section, and any subsequent proceedings on review, the court may appoint counsel, except as provided by a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Appointment of counsel under this section shall be governed by section 3006A of title 18.

(h) A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain—

(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or

(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §114, 63 Stat. 105; Pub. L. 104–132, title I, §105, Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1220; Pub. L. 110–177, title V, §511, Jan. 7, 2008, 121 Stat. 2545.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

This section restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure in the nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis. It provides an expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous sentences without resort to habeas corpus. It has the approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Its principal provisions are incorporated in H.R. 4233, Seventy-ninth Congress.

1949 ACT

This amendment conforms language of section 2255 of title 28, U.S.C., with that of section 1651 of such title and makes it clear that the section is applicable in the district courts in the Territories and possessions.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, referred to in subsec. (g), is classified to section 848 of Title 21, Food and Drugs.

AMENDMENTS

2008—Pub. L. 110–177 designated first through eighth undesignated pars. as subsecs. (a) to (h), respectively.

1996—Pub. L. 104–132 inserted at end three new undesignated paragraphs beginning ''A 1-year period of limitation'', ''Except as provided in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act'', and ''A second or successive motion must be certified'' and struck out second and fifth undesignated pars. providing, respectively, that ''A motion for such relief may be made at any time.'' and ''The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.''

1949—Act May 24, 1949, substituted ''court established by Act of Congress'' for ''court of the United States'' in first par.

APPROVAL AND EFFECTIVE DATE OF RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES AND SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

For approval and effective date of rules governing petitions under section 2254 and motions under section 2255 of this title filed on or after Feb. 1, 1977, see section 1 of Pub. L. 94–426, set out as a note under section 2074 of this title.

POSTPONEMENT OF EFFECTIVE DATE OF PROPOSED RULES AND FORMS GOVERNING PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTIONS 2254 AND 2255 OF THIS TITLE

Rules and forms governing proceedings under sections 2254 and 2255 of this title proposed by Supreme Court order of Apr. 26, 1976, effective 30 days after adjournment sine die of 94th Congress, or until and to the extent approved by Act of Congress, whichever is earlier, see section 2 of Pub. L. 94–349, set out as a note under section 2074 of this title.

RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

(*Effective Feb. 1, 1977, as amended to Jan. 7, 2011*)

Rule

APPENDIX OF FORMS

EFFECTIVE DATE OF RULES; EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1975 AMENDMENT

Rules, and the amendments thereto by Pub. L. 94–426, Sept. 28, 1976, 90 Stat. 1334, effective with respect to petitions under section 2254 of this title and motions under section 2255 of this title filed on or after Feb. 1, 1977, see section 1 of Pub. L. 94–426, set out as a note under section 2074 of this title.

Rule 1. Scope

These rules govern a motion filed in a United States district court under 28 U.S.C. §2255 by:

(a) a person in custody under a judgment of that court who seeks a determination that:

(1) the judgment violates the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(2) the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment;

(3) the sentence exceeded the maximum allowed by law; or

(4) the judgment or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral review; and

(b) a person in custody under a judgment of a state court or another federal court, and subject to future custody under a judgment of the district court, who seeks a determination that:

(1) future custody under a judgment of the district court would violate the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(2) the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment;

(3) the district court's sentence exceeded the maximum allowed by law; or

(4) the district court's judgment or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral review.

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

The basic scope of this postconviction remedy is prescribed by 28 U.S.C. §2255. Under these rules the person seeking relief from federal custody files a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, rather than a petition for habeas corpus. This is consistent with the terminology used in section 2255 and indicates the difference between this remedy and federal habeas for a state prisoner. Also, habeas corpus is available to the person in federal custody if his ''remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.''

Whereas sections 2241–2254 (dealing with federal habeas corpus for those in state custody) speak of the district court judge ''issuing the writ'' as the operative remedy, section 2255 provides that, if the judge finds the movant's assertions to be meritorious, he ''shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.'' This is possible because a motion under §2255 is a further step in the movant's criminal case and not a separate civil action, as appears from the legislative history of section 2 of S. 20, 80th Congress, the provisions of which were incorporated by the same Congress in title 28 U.S.C. as §2255. In reporting S. 20 favorably the Senate Judiciary Committee said (Sen. Rep. 1526, 80th Cong. 2d Sess., p. 2):

The two main advantages of such motion remedy over the present habeas corpus are as follows:

First, habeas corpus is a separate civil action and not a further step in the criminal case in which petitioner is sentenced (*Ex parte Tom Tong*, 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883)). It is not a determination of guilt or innocence of the charge upon which petitioner was sentenced. Where a prisoner sustains his right to discharge in habeas corpus, it is usually because some right—such as lack of counsel—has been denied which reflects no determination of his guilt or innocence but affects solely the fairness of his earlier criminal trial. Even under the broad power in the statute ''to dispose of the party as law and justice require'' (28 U.S.C.A., sec. 461), the court or judge is by no means in the same advantageous position in habeas corpus to do justice as would be so if the matter were determined in the criminal proceeding (see *Medley*, petitioner, 134 U.S. 160, 174 (1890)). For instance, the judge (by habeas corpus) cannot grant a new trial in the criminal case. Since the motion remedy is in the criminal proceeding, this section 2 affords the opportunity and expressly gives the broad powers to set aside the judgment and to ''discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.''

The fact that a motion under §2255 is a further step in the movant's criminal case rather than a separate civil action has significance at several points in these rules. See, *e.g.*, advisory committee note to rule 3 (re no filing fee), advisory committee note to rule 4 (re availability of files, etc., relating to the judgment), advisory committee note to rule 6 (re availability of discovery under criminal procedure rules), advisory committee note to rule 11 (re no extension of time for appeal), and advisory committee not to rule 12 (re applicability of federal criminal rules). However, the fact that Congress has characterized the motion as a further step in the criminal proceedings does *not* mean that proceedings upon such a motion are of necessity governed by the legal principles which are applicable at a criminal trial regarding such matters as counsel, presence, confrontation, self-incrimination, and burden of proof.

The challenge of decisions such as the revocation of probation or parole are not appropriately dealt with under 28 U.S.C. §2255, which is a continuation of the original criminal action. Other remedies, such as habeas corpus, are available in such situations.

Although rule 1 indicates that these rules apply to a motion for a determination that the judgment was imposed ''in violation of the . . . laws of the United States,'' the language of 28 U.S.C. §2255, it is not the intent of these rules to define or limit what is encompassed within that phrase. See *Davis v. United States*, 417 U.S. 333 (1974), holding that it is not true ''that every asserted error of law can be raised on a §2255 motion,'' and that the appropriate inquiry is ''whether the claimed error of law was a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' and whether [i]t . . . present[s] exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.' ''

For a discussion of the ''custody'' requirement and the intended limited scope of this remedy, see advisory committee note to §2254 rule 1.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 1 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 1.

Rule 2. The Motion

(a) APPLYING FOR RELIEF. The application must be in the form of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.

(b) FORM. The motion must:

(1) specify all the grounds for relief available to the moving party;

(2) state the facts supporting each ground;

(3) state the relief requested;

(4) be printed, typewritten, or legibly handwritten; and

(5) be signed under penalty of perjury by the movant or by a person authorized to sign it for the movant.

(c) STANDARD FORM. The motion must substantially follow either the form appended to these rules or a form prescribed by a local district-court rule. The clerk must make forms available to moving parties without charge.

(d) SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR SEPARATE JUDGMENTS. A moving party who seeks relief from more than one judgment must file a separate motion covering each judgment.

(As amended Pub. L. 94–426, §2(3), (4), Sept. 28, 1976, 90 Stat. 1334; Apr. 28, 1982, eff. Aug. 1, 1982; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Under these rules the application for relief is in the form of a motion rather than a petition (see rule 1 and

advisory committee note). Therefore, there is no requirement that the movant name a respondent. This is consistent with 28 U.S.C. §2255. The United States Attorney for the district in which the judgment under attack was entered is the proper party to oppose the motion since the federal government is the movant's adversary of record.

If the movant is attacking a federal judgment which will subject him to future custody, he must be in present custody (see rule 1 and advisory committee note) as the result of a state or federal governmental action. He need not alter the nature of the motion by trying to include the government officer who presently has official custody of him as a psuedo-respondent, or third-party plaintiff, or other fabrication. The court hearing his motion attacking the future custody can exercise jurisdiction over those having him in present custody without the use of artificial pleading devices.

There is presently a split among the courts as to whether a person currently in state custody may use a §2255 motion to obtain relief from a federal judgment under which he will be subjected to custody in the future. Negative, see *Newton v. United States*, 329 F.Supp. 90 (S.D. Texas 1971); affirmative, see *Desmond v. The United States Board of Parole*, 397 F.2d 386 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 919 (1968); and *Paalino v. United States*, 314 F.Supp. 875 (C.D.Cal. 1970). It is intended that these rules settle the matter in favor of the prisoner's being able to file a §2255 motion for relief under those circumstances. The proper district in which to file such a motion is the one in which is situated the court which rendered the sentence under attack.

Under rule 35, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court may correct an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, or may reduce the sentence. This remedy should be used, rather than a motion under these §2255 rules, whenever applicable, but there is some overlap between the two proceedings which has caused the courts difficulty.

The movant should not be barred from an appropriate remedy because he has misstyled his motion. See *United States v. Morgan*, 346 U.S. 502, 505 (1954). The court should construe it as whichever one is proper under the circumstances and decide it on its merits. For a §2255 motion construed as a rule 35 motion, see *Heflin v. United States*, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); and *United States v. Coke*, 404 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968). For writ of error coram nobis treated as a rule 35 motion, see *Hawkins v. United States*, 324 F.Supp. 223 (E.D.Texas, Tyler Division 1971). For a rule 35 motion treated as a §2255 motion, see *Moss v. United States*, 263 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1959); *Jones v. United States*, 400 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 991 (1969); and *United States v. Brown*, 413 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 947 (1970).

One area of difference between §2255 and rule 35 motions is that for the latter there is no requirement that the movant be ''in custody.'' *Heflin v. United States*, 358 U.S. 415, 418, 422 (1959); *Duggins v. United States*, 240 F.2d 479, 483 (6th Cir. 1957). Compare with rule 1 and advisory committee note for §2255 motions. The importance of this distinction has decreased since *Peyton v. Rowe*, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), but it might still make a difference in particular situations.

A rule 35 motion is used to attack the sentence imposed, not the basis for the sentence. The court in *Gilinsky v. United States*, 335 F.2d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 1964), stated, ''a Rule 35 motion presupposes a valid conviction. * * * [C]ollateral attack on errors allegedly committed at trial is not permissible under Rule 35.'' By illustration the court noted at page 917: ''a Rule 35 proceeding contemplates the correction of a sentence of a court having jurisdiction. * * * [J]urisdictional defects * * * involve a collateral attack, they must ordinarily be presented under 28 U.S.C. §2255.'' In *United States v. Semet*, 295 F.Supp. 1084 (E.D. Okla. 1968), the prisoner moved under rule 35 and §2255 to invalidate the sentence he was serving on the grounds of his failure to understand the charge to which he pleaded guilty. The court said:

> As regards Defendant's Motion under Rule 35, said Motion must be denied as its presupposes a valid conviction of the offense with which he was charged and may be used only to attack the sentence. It may not be used to examine errors occurring prior to the imposition of sentence.
>
> 295 F.Supp. at 1085

See also: *Moss v. United States*, 263 F.2d at 616; *Duggins v. United States*, 240 F. 2d at 484; *Migdal v. United States*, 298 F.2d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1961); *Jones v. United States*, 400 F.2d at 894; *United States v. Coke*, 404 F.2d at 847; and *United States v. Brown*, 413 F.2d at 879.

A major difficulty in deciding whether rule 35 or §2255 is the proper remedy is the uncertainty as to what is meant by an ''illegal sentence.'' The Supreme Court dealt with this issue in *Hill v. United States*, 368 U.S. 424 (1962). The prisoner brought a §2255 motion to vacate sentence on the ground that he had not been given a Fed.R.Crim. P. 32(a) opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf at the time of sentencing. The majority held this was not an error subject to collateral attack under §2255. The five-member majority considered the motion as one brought pursuant to rule 35, but denied relief, stating:

> [T]he narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction at any time of an illegal *sentence*, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence. The sentence in this case was not illegal. The punishment meted out was not in excess of that prescribed by the relevant statutes, multiple terms were not imposed for the same offense, nor were the terms of the sentence itself legally or constitutionally invalid in any other respect.
>
> 368 U.S. at 430

The four dissenters felt the majority definition of ''illegal'' was too narrow.

> [Rule 35] provides for the correction of an ''illegal sentence'' without regard to the reasons why that sentence is illegal and contains not a single word to support the Court's conclusion that only a sentence illegal by reason of the punishment it imposes is ''illegal'' within the meaning of the Rule. I would have thought that a sentence imposed in an illegal manner—whether the amount or form of the punishment meted out constitutes an additional violation of law or not—would be recognized as an ''illegal sentence'' under any normal reading of the English language.
>
> 368 U.S. at 431–432

The 1966 amendment of rule 35 added language permitting correction of a sentence imposed in an ''illegal manner.'' However, there is a 120-day time limit on a motion to do this, and the added language does not clarify the intent of the rule or its relation to §2255.

The courts have been flexible in considering motions under circumstances in which relief might appear to be precluded by *Hill v. United States*. In *Peterson v. United States*, 432 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1970), the court was confronted with a motion for reduction of sentence by a prisoner claiming to have received a harsher sentence than his codefendants because he stood trial rather than plead guilty. He alleged that this violated his constitutional right to a jury trial. The court ruled that, even though it was past the 120-day time period for a motion to reduce sentence, the claim was still cognizable under rule 35 as a motion to correct an illegal sentence.

The courts have made even greater use of §2255 in these types of situations. In *United States v. Lewis*, 392 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1968), the prisoner moved under §2255 and rule 35 for relief from a sentence he claimed was the result of the judge's misunderstanding of the relevant sentencing law. The court held that he could not get relief under rule 35 because it was past the 120 days for correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal manner and under *Hill v. United States* it was not an illegal

sentence. However, § 2255 was applicable because of its ''otherwise subject to collateral attack'' language. The flaw was not a mere trial error relating to the finding of guilt, but a rare and unusual error which amounted to ''exceptional circumstances'' embraced in § 2255's words ''collateral attack.'' See 368 U.S. at 444 for discussion of other cases allowing use of § 2255 to attack the sentence itself in similar circumstances, especially where the judge has sentenced out of a misapprehension of the law.

In *United States v. McCarthy*, 433 F.2d 591, 592 (1st Cir. 1970), the court allowed a prisoner who was past the time limit for a proper rule 35 motion to use § 2255 to attack the sentence which he received upon a plea of guilty on the ground that it was induced by an unfulfilled promise of the prosecutor to recommend leniency. The court specifically noted that under § 2255 this was a proper collateral attack on the sentence and there was no need to attack the conviction as well.

The court in *United States v. Malcolm*, 432 F.2d 809, 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1970), allowed a prisoner to challenge his sentence under § 2255 without attacking the conviction. It held rule 35 inapplicable because the sentence was not illegal on its face, but the manner in which the sentence was imposed raised a question of the denial of due process in the sentencing itself which was cognizable under § 2255.

The flexible approach taken by the courts in the above cases seems to be the reasonable way to handle these situations in which rule 35 and § 2255 appear to overlap. For a further discussion of this problem, see C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure; Criminal §§ 581–587 (1969, Supp. 1975).

See the advisory committee note to rule 2 of the § 2254 rules for further discussion of the purposes and intent of rule 2 of these § 2255 rules.

1982 AMENDMENT

Subdivision (b). The amendment takes into account 28 U.S.C. § 1746, enacted after adoption of the § 2255 rules. Section 1746 provides that in lieu of an affidavit an unsworn statement may be given under penalty of perjury in substantially the following form if executed within the United States, its territories, possessions or commonwealths: ''I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature).'' The statute is ''intended to encompass prisoner litigation,'' and the statutory alternative is especially appropriate in such cases because a notary might not be readily available. *Carter v. Clark*, 616 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1980). The § 2255 forms have been revised accordingly.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 2 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as described below.

Revised Rule 2(b)(5) has been amended by removing the requirement that the motion be signed personally by the moving party. Thus, under the amended rule the motion may be signed by [the] movant personally or by someone acting on behalf of the movant, assuming that the person is authorized to do so, for example, an attorney for the movant. The Committee envisions that the courts would apply third-party, or ''next-friend,'' standing analysis in deciding whether the signer was actually authorized to sign the motion on behalf of the movant. *See generally Whitmore v. Arkansas*, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (discussion of requisites for ''next friend'' standing in habeas petitions). *See also* 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (application for state habeas corpus relief may be filed by the person who is seeking relief, or by someone acting on behalf of that person).

The language in new Rule 2(c) has been changed to reflect that a moving party must substantially follow the standard form, which is appended to the rules, or a form provided by the court. The current rule, Rule 2(c), seems to indicate a preference for the standard ''national'' form. Under the amended rule, there is no stated preference. The Committee understood that the current practice in some courts is that if the moving party first files a motion using the national form, that courts may ask the moving party to supplement it with the local form.

Current Rule 2(d), which provided for returning an insufficient motion[,] has been deleted. The Committee believed that the approach in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(e) was more appropriate for dealing with motions that do not conform to the form requirements of the rule. That Rule provides that the clerk may not refuse to accept a filing solely for the reason that it fails to comply with these rules or local rules. Before the adoption of a one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, the moving party suffered no penalty, other than delay, if the motion was deemed insufficient. Now that a one-year statute of limitations applies to motions filed under § 2255, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), the court's dismissal of a motion because it is not in proper form may pose a significant penalty for a moving party, who may not be able to file another motion within the one-year limitations period. Now, under revised Rule 3(b), the clerk is required to file a motion, even though it may otherwise fail to comply with the provisions in revised Rule 2(b). The Committee believed that the better procedure was to accept the defective motion and require the moving party to submit a corrected motion that conforms to Rule 2(b).

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee changed Rule 2(b)(2) to read ''state the facts'' rather then [sic] ''briefly summarize the facts.'' One commentator had written that the current language may actually mislead the petitioner and is also redundant.

Rule 2(b)(4) was also modified to reflect that some motions may be printed using a word processing program.

Finally, Rule 2(b)(5) was changed to emphasize that any person, other than the petitioner, who signs the petition must be authorized to do so.

AMENDMENTS

1976—Subd. (b). Pub. L. 94–426, § 2(3), inserted ''substantially'' after ''The motion shall be in'', and struck out requirement that the motion follow the prescribed form.

Subd. (d). Pub. L. 94–426, § 2(4), inserted ''substantially'' after ''district court does not'', and struck out provision which permitted the clerk to return a motion for noncompliance without a judge so directing.

Rule 3. Filing the Motion; Inmate Filing

(a) WHERE TO FILE; COPIES. An original and two copies of the motion must be filed with the clerk.

(b) FILING AND SERVICE. The clerk must file the motion and enter it on the criminal docket of the case in which the challenged judgment was entered. The clerk must then deliver or serve a copy of the motion on the United States attorney in that district, together with a notice of its filing.

(c) TIME TO FILE. The time for filing a motion is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 6.

(d) INMATE FILING. A paper filed by an inmate confined in an institution is timely if deposited in the institution's internal mailing system on or before the last day for filing. If an institution has a system designed for legal mail, the inmate must use that system to receive the benefit of this rule. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or by

a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

There is no filing fee required of a movant under these rules. This is a change from the practice of charging $15 and is done to recognize specifically the nature of a § 2255 motion as being a continuation of the criminal case whose judgment is under attack.

The long-standing practice of requiring a $15 filing fee has followed from 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) whereby ''parties instituting any civil action * * * pay a filing fee of $15, except that on an application for a writ of habeas corpus the filing fee shall be $5.'' This has been held to apply to a proceeding under § 2255 despite the rationale that such a proceeding is a motion and thus a continuation of the criminal action. (See note to rule 1.)

> A motion under Section 2255 is a civil action and the clerk has no choice but to charge a $15.00 filing fee unless by leave of court it is filed in forma pauperis.
>
> *McCune* v. *United States*, 406 F.2d 417, 419 (6th Cir. 1969).

Although the motion has been considered to be a new civil action in the nature of habeas corpus for filing purposes, the reduced fee for habeas has been held not applicable. The Tenth Circuit considered the specific issue in *Martin* v. *United States*, 273 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853 (1961), holding that the reduced fee was exclusive to habeas petitions.

> Counsel for Martin insists that, if a docket fee must be paid, the amount is $5 rather than $15 and bases his contention on the exception contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1914 that in habeas corpus the fee is $5. This reads into § 1914 language which is not there. While an application under § 2255 may afford the same relief as that previously obtainable by habeas corpus, it is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A change in § 1914 must come from Congress.
>
> 273 F.2d at 778

Although for most situations § 2255 is intended to provide to the federal prisoner a remedy equivalent to habeas corpus as used by state prisoners, there is a major distinction between the two. Calling a § 2255 request for relief a motion rather than a petition militates toward charging no new filing fee, not an increased one. In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to suppose that Congress did not mean what it said in making a § 2255 action a motion. Therefore, as in other motions filed in a criminal action, there is no requirement of a filing fee. It is appropriate that the present situation of docketing a § 2255 motion as a new action and charging a $15 filing fee be remedied by the rule when the whole question of § 2255 motions is thoroughly thought through and organized.

Even though there is no need to have a forma pauperis affidavit to proceed with the action since there is no requirement of a fee for filing the motion the affidavit remains attached to the form to be supplied potential movants. Most such movants are indigent, and this is a convenient way of getting this into the official record so that the judge may appoint counsel, order the government to pay witness fees, allow docketing of an appeal, and grant any other rights to which an indigent is entitled in the course of a § 2255 motion, when appropriate to the particular situation, without the need for an indigency petition and adjudication at such later point in the proceeding. This should result in a streamlining of the process to allow quicker disposition of these motions.

For further discussion of this rule, see the advisory committee note to rule 3 of the § 2254 rules.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 3 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as indicated below.

Revised Rule 3(b) is new and is intended to parallel Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(e), which provides that the clerk may not refuse to accept a filing solely for the reason that it fails to comply with these rules or local rules. Before the adoption of a one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, the moving party suffered no penalty, other than delay, if the petition was deemed insufficient. That Act, however, added a one-year statute of limitations to motions filed under § 2255, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Thus, a court's dismissal of a defective motion may pose a significant penalty for a moving party who may not be able to file a corrected motion within the one-year limitation period. The Committee believed that the better procedure was to accept the defective motion and require the moving party to submit a corrected motion that conforms to Rule 2. Thus, revised Rule 3(b) requires the clerk to file a motion, even though it may otherwise fail to comply with Rule 2.

Revised Rule 3(c), which sets out a specific reference to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, paragraph 6, is new and has been added to put moving parties on notice that a one-year statute of limitations applies to motions filed under these Rules. Although the rule does not address the issue, every circuit that has addressed the issue has taken the position that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is available in appropriate circumstances. *See, e.g., Dunlap v. United States*, 250 F.3d 1001, 1004–07 (6th Cir. 2001); *Moore v. United States*, 173 F.3d 1131, 1133–35 (8th Cir. 1999); *Sandvik v. United States*, 177 F.3d 1269, 1270–72 (11th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has not addressed the question directly. *See Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001) (''We . . . have no occasion to address the question that Justice Stevens raises concerning the availability of equitable tolling.'').

Rule 3(d) is new and provides guidance on determining whether a motion from an inmate is considered to have been filed in a timely fashion. The new provision parallels Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(2)(C).

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee modified the Committee Note to reflect that the clerk must file a motion, even in those instances where the necessary filing fee or in forma pauperis form is not attached. The Note also includes new language concerning the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

Rule 4. Preliminary Review

(a) REFERRAL TO A JUDGE. The clerk must promptly forward the motion to the judge who conducted the trial and imposed sentence or, if the judge who imposed sentence was not the trial judge, to the judge who conducted the proceedings being challenged. If the appropriate judge is not available, the clerk must forward the motion to a judge under the court's assignment procedure.

(b) INITIAL CONSIDERATION BY THE JUDGE. The judge who receives the motion must promptly examine it. If it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion and direct the clerk to notify the moving party. If the motion is not dismissed, the judge must order the United States attorney to file an answer, motion, or other response within a fixed time, or to take other action the judge may order.

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Rule 4 outlines the procedure for assigning the motion to a specific judge of the district court and the options available to the judge and the government after the motion is properly filed.

The long-standing majority practice in assigning motions made pursuant to § 2255 has been for the trial judge to determine the merits of the motion. In cases where the § 2255 motion is directed against the sentence, the merits have traditionally been decided by the judge who imposed sentence. The reasoning for this was first noted in *Currell v. United States*, 173 F.2d 348, 348–349 (4th Cir. 1949):

> Complaint is made that the judge who tried the case passed upon the motion. Not only was there no impropriety in this, but it is highly desirable in such cases that the motions be passed on by the judge who is familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding the trial, and is consequently not likely to be misled by false allegations as to what occurred.

This case, and its reasoning, has been almost unanimously endorsed by other courts dealing with the issue.

Commentators have been critical of having the motion decided by the trial judge. See Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1206–1208 (1970).

> [T]he trial judge may have become so involved with the decision that it will be difficult for him to review it objectively. Nothing in the legislative history suggests that ''court'' refers to a specific judge, and the procedural advantages of section 2255 are available whether or not the trial judge presides at the hearing.
>
> The theory that Congress intended the trial judge to preside at a section 2255 hearing apparently originated in *Carvell v. United States*, 173 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949) (per curiam), where the panel of judges included Chief Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit, chairman of the Judicial Conference committee which drafted section 2255. But the legislative history does not indicate that Congress wanted the trial judge to preside. Indeed the advantages of section 2255 can all be achieved if the case is heard in the sentencing district, regardless of which judge hears it. According to the Senate committee report the purpose of the bill was to make the proceeding a part of the criminal action so the court could resentence the applicant, or grant him a new trial. (A judge presiding over a habeas corpus action does not have these powers.) In addition, Congress did not want the cases heard in the district of confinement because that tended to concentrate the burden on a few districts, and made it difficult for witnesses and records to be produced.
>
> 83 Harv.L.Rev. at 1207–1208

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that a judge other than the trial judge should rule on the 2255 motion. See *Halliday v. United States*, 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967).

There is a procedure by which the movant can have a judge other than the trial judge decide his motion in courts adhering to the majority rule. He can file an affidavit alleging bias in order to disqualify the trial judge. And there are circumstances in which the trial judge will, on his own, disqualify himself. See, *e.g.*, *Webster v. United States*, 330 F.Supp. 1080 (1972). However, there has been some questioning of the effectiveness of this procedure. See Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1200–1207 (1970).

Subdivision (a) adopts the majority rule and provides that the trial judge, or sentencing judge if different and appropriate for the particular motion, will decide the motion made pursuant to these rules, recognizing that, under some circumstances, he may want to disqualify himself. A movant is not without remedy if he feels this is unfair to him. He can file an affidavit of bias. And there is the right to appellate review if the trial judge refuses to grant his motion. Because the trial judge is thoroughly familiar with the case, there is obvious administrative advantage in giving him the first opportunity to decide whether there are grounds for granting the motion.

Since the motion is part of the criminal action in which was entered the judgment to which it is directed, the files, records, transcripts, and correspondence relating to that judgment are automatically available to the judge in his consideration of the motion. He no longer need order them incorporated for that purpose.

Rule 4 has its basis in § 2255 (rather than 28 U.S.C. § 2243 in the corresponding habeas corpus rule) which does not have a specific time limitation as to when the answer must be made. Also, under § 2255, the United States Attorney for the district is the party served with the notice and a copy of the motion and required to answer (when appropriate). Subdivision (b) continues this practice since there is no respondent involved in the motion (unlike habeas) and the United States Attorney, as prosecutor in the case in question, is the most appropriate one to defend the judgment and oppose the motion.

The judge has discretion to require an answer or other appropriate response from the United States Attorney. See advisory committee note to rule 4 of the § 2254 rules.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 4 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.

The amended rule reflects that the response to a Section 2255 motion may be a motion to dismiss or some other response.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee modified Rule 4 to reflect the view of some commentators that it is common practice in some districts for the government to file a pre-answer motion to dismiss the § 2255 motion. The Committee agreed with that recommendation and changed the word ''pleading'' in the rule to ''response.'' It also made several minor changes to the Committee Note.

Rule 5. The Answer and the Reply

(a) WHEN REQUIRED. The respondent is not required to answer the motion unless a judge so orders.

(b) CONTENTS. The answer must address the allegations in the motion. In addition, it must state whether the moving party has used any other federal remedies, including any prior post-conviction motions under these rules or any previous rules, and whether the moving party received an evidentiary hearing.

(c) RECORDS OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS. If the answer refers to briefs or transcripts of the prior proceedings that are not available in the court's records, the judge must order the government to furnish them within a reasonable time that will not unduly delay the proceedings.

(d) REPLY. The moving party may submit a reply to the respondent's answer or other pleading within a time fixed by the judge.

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Unlike the habeas corpus statutes (see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2243, 2248) § 2255 does not specifically call for a return or answer by the United States Attorney or set any time limits as to when one must be submitted. The general practice, however, if the motion is not summarily dismissed, is for the government to file an answer to the motion as well as counter-affidavits, when appro-

priate. Rule 4 provides for an answer to the motion by the United States Attorney, and rule 5 indicates what its contents should be.

There is no requirement that the movant exhaust his remedies prior to seeking relief under § 2255. However, the courts have held that such a motion is inappropriate if the movant is simultaneously appealing the decision.

> We are of the view that there is no jurisdictional bar to the District Court's entertaining a Section 2255 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal but that the orderly administration of criminal law precludes considering such a motion absent extraordinary circumstances.
>
> *Womack v. United States*, 395 F.2d 630, 631 (D.C.Cir. 1968)

Also see *Masters v. Eide*, 353 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1965). The answer may thus cut short consideration of the motion if it discloses the taking of an appeal which was omitted from the form motion filed by the movant.

There is nothing in § 2255 which corresponds to the § 2248 requirement of a traverse to the answer. Numerous cases have held that the government's answer and affidavits are not conclusive against the movant, and if they raise disputed issues of fact a hearing must be held. *Machibroda v. United States*, 368 U.S. 487, 494, 495 (1962); *United States v. Salerno*, 290 F.2d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 1961); *Romero v. United States*, 327 F.2d 711, 712 (5th Cir. 1964); *Scott v. United States*, 349 F.2d 641, 642, 643 (6th Cir. 1965); *Schiebelhut v. United States*, 357 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1966); and *Del Piano v. United States*, 362 F.2d 931, 932, 933 (3d Cir. 1966). None of these cases make any mention of a traverse by the movant to the government's answer. As under rule 5 of the § 2254 rules, there is no intention here that such a traverse be required, except under special circumstances. See advisory committee note to rule 9.

Subdivision (b) provides for the government to supplement its answers with appropriate copies of transcripts or briefs if for some reason the judge does not already have them under his control. This is because the government will in all probability have easier access to such papers than the movant, and it will conserve the court's time to have the government produce them rather than the movant, who would in most instances have to apply in forma pauperis for the government to supply them for him anyway.

For further discussion, see the advisory committee note to rule 5 of the § 2254 rules.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 5 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.

Revised Rule 5(a), which provides that the respondent is not required to file an answer to the motion, unless a judge so orders, is taken from current Rule 3(b). The revised rule does not address the practice in some districts, where the respondent files a pre-answer motion to dismiss the motion. But revised Rule 4(b) contemplates that practice and has been changed to reflect the view that if the court does not dismiss the motion, it may require (or permit) the respondent to file a motion.

Finally, revised Rule 5(d) adopts the practice in some jurisdictions giving the movant an opportunity to file a reply to the respondent's answer. Rather than using terms such as ''traverse,'' *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2248, to identify the movant's response to the answer, the rule uses the more general term ''reply.'' The Rule prescribes that the court set the time for such responses, and in lieu of setting specific time limits in each case, the court may decide to include such time limits in its local rules.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. Rule 5(a) was modified to read that the government is not required to ''respond'' to the motion unless the court so orders; the term ''respond'' was used because it leaves open the possibility that the government's first response (as it is in some districts) is in the form of a pre-answer motion to dismiss the petition. The Note has been changed to reflect the fact that although the rule itself does not reflect that particular motion, it is used in some districts and refers the reader to Rule 4.

Finally, the Committee changed the Note to address the use of the term ''traverse,'' a point raised by one of the commentators on the proposed rule.

Rule 6. Discovery

(a) LEAVE OF COURT REQUIRED. A judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or Civil Procedure, or in accordance with the practices and principles of law. If necessary for effective discovery, the judge must appoint an attorney for a moving party who qualifies to have counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.

(b) REQUESTING DISCOVERY. A party requesting discovery must provide reasons for the request. The request must also include any proposed interrogatories and requests for admission, and must specify any requested documents.

(c) DEPOSITION EXPENSES. If the government is granted leave to take a deposition, the judge may require the government to pay the travel expenses, subsistence expenses, and fees of the moving party's attorney to attend the deposition.

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

This rule differs from the corresponding discovery rule under the § 2254 rules in that it includes the processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as the civil. This is because of the nature of a § 2255 motion as a continuing part of the criminal proceeding (see advisory committee note to rule 1) as well as a remedy analogous to habeas corpus by state prisoners.

See the advisory committee note to rule 6 of the § 2254 rules. The discussion there is fully applicable to discovery under these rules for § 2255 motions.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 6 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as indicated below.

Although current Rule 6(b) contains no requirement that the parties provide reasons for the requested discovery, the revised rule does so and also includes a requirement that the request be accompanied by any proposed interrogatories and requests for admission, and must specify any requested documents. The Committee believes that the revised rule makes explicit what has been implicit in current practice.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee modified Rule 6(b), to require that discovery requests be supported by reasons, to assist the court in deciding what, if any, discovery should take place. The Committee amended the Note to reflect the view that it believed that the change made explicit what has been implicit in current practice.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, referred to in subd. (a), are set out in the Appendix to Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subd. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

Rule 7. Expanding the Record

(a) IN GENERAL. If the motion is not dismissed, the judge may direct the parties to expand the record by submitting additional materials relating to the motion. The judge may require that these materials be authenticated.

(b) TYPES OF MATERIALS. The materials that may be required include letters predating the filing of the motion, documents, exhibits, and answers under oath to written interrogatories propounded by the judge. Affidavits also may be submitted and considered as part of the record.

(c) REVIEW BY THE OPPOSING PARTY. The judge must give the party against whom the additional materials are offered an opportunity to admit or deny their correctness.

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

It is less likely that the court will feel the need to expand the record in a § 2255 proceeding than in a habeas corpus proceeding, because the trial (or sentencing) judge is the one hearing the motion (see rule 4) and should already have a complete file on the case in his possession. However, rule 7 provides a convenient method for supplementing his file if the case warrants it.

See the advisory committee note to rule 7 of the § 2254 rules for a full discussion of reasons and procedures for expanding the record.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 7 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.

Revised Rule 7(a) is not intended to restrict the court's authority to expand the record through means other than requiring the parties themselves to provide the information.

The language in current Rule 7(d), which deals with authentication of materials in the expanded record, has been moved to revised Rule 7(a).

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. Rule 7(a) was changed by removing the reference to the ''merits'' of the motion. One commentator had stated that the court may wish to expand the record for purposes other than the merits of the case. The Committee agreed and also changed the rule to reflect that someone other than a party may authenticate the materials.

Rule 8. Evidentiary Hearing

(a) DETERMINING WHETHER TO HOLD A HEARING. If the motion is not dismissed, the judge must review the answer, any transcripts and records of prior proceedings, and any materials submitted under Rule 7 to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted.

(b) REFERENCE TO A MAGISTRATE JUDGE. A judge may, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), refer the motion to a magistrate judge to conduct hearings and to file proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition. When they are filed, the clerk must promptly serve copies of the proposed findings and recommendations on all parties. Within 14 days after being served, a party may file objections as provided by local court rule. The judge must determine de novo any proposed finding or recommendation to which objection is made. The judge may accept, reject, or modify any proposed finding or recommendation.

(c) APPOINTING COUNSEL; TIME OF HEARING. If an evidentiary hearing is warranted, the judge must appoint an attorney to represent a moving party who qualifies to have counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. The judge must conduct the hearing as soon as practicable after giving the attorneys adequate time to investigate and prepare. These rules do not limit the appointment of counsel under § 3006A at any stage of the proceeding.

(d) PRODUCING A STATEMENT. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2(a)–(d) and (f) applies at a hearing under this rule. If a party does not comply with a Rule 26.2(a) order to produce a witness's statement, the court must not consider that witness's testimony.

(As amended Pub. L. 94–426, § 2(6), Sept. 28, 1976, 90 Stat. 1335; Pub. L. 94–577, § 2(a)(2), (b)(2), Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2730, 2731; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

The standards for § 2255 hearings are essentially the same as for evidentiary hearings under a habeas petition, except that the previous federal fact-finding proceeding is in issue rather than the state's. Also § 2255 does not set specific time limits for holding the hearing, as does § 2243 for a habeas action. With these minor differences in mind, see the advisory committee note to rule 8 of § 2254 rules, which is applicable to rule 8 of these § 2255 rules.

1993 AMENDMENT

The amendment to Rule 8 is one of a series of parallel amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32, 32.1, and 46 which extend the scope of Rule 26.2 (Production of Witness Statements) to proceedings other than the trial itself. The amendments are grounded on the compelling need for accurate and credible information in making decisions concerning the defendant's liberty. *See* the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26.2(g). A few courts have recognized the authority of a judicial officer to order production of prior statements by a witness at a Section 2255 hearing, *see*, *e.g.*, *United States v. White*, 342 F.2d 379, 382, n.4 (4th Cir. 1959). The amendment to Rule 8 grants explicit authority to do so. The amendment is not intended to require production of a witness's statement before the witness actually presents oral testimony.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 8 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as described below.

The requirement in current Rule 8(b)(2) that a copy of the magistrate judge's findings must be promptly mailed to all parties has been changed in revised Rule 8(b) to require that copies of those findings be served on all parties. As used in this rule, ''service'' means service consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b), which allows mailing the copies.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 8, as published for public comment.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2009 AMENDMENT

The time set in the former rule at 10 days has been revised to 14 days. See the Committee Note to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 45(a).

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, referred to in subd. (d), are set out in the Appendix to Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure.

AMENDMENTS BY PUBLIC LAW

1976—Subd. (b). Pub. L. 94–577, §2(a)(2), substituted provisions which authorized magistrates, when designated to do so in accordance with section 636(b) of this title, to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, on the petition and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition, which directed the magistrate to file proposed findings and recommendations with the court with copies furnished to all parties, which allowed parties thus served 10 days to file written objections thereto, and which directed a judge of the court to make de novo determinations of the objected-to portions and to accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations for provisions under which the magistrate had been empowered only to recommend to the district judge that an evidentiary hearing be held or that the petition be dismissed.

Subd. (c). Pub. L. 94–577, §2(b)(2), substituted ''and the hearing shall be conducted'' for ''and shall conduct the hearing.''

Pub. L. 94–426 provided that these rules not limit the appointment of counsel under section 3006A of title 18, if the interest of justice so require.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1976 AMENDMENT

Amendments made by Pub. L. 94–577 effective with respect to motions under section 2255 of this title filed on or after Feb. 1, 1977, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 94–577, set out as a note under Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Cases Under Section 2254 of this title.

Rule 9. Second or Successive Motions

Before presenting a second or successive motion, the moving party must obtain an order from the appropriate court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider the motion, as required by 28 U.S.C. §2255, para. 8.

(As amended Pub. L. 94–426, §2(9), (10), Sept. 28, 1976, 90 Stat. 1335; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Unlike the statutory provisions on habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. §§2241–2254), §2255 specifically provides that ''a motion for such relief may be made *at any time.*'' [Emphasis added.] Subdivision (a) provides that delayed motions may be barred from consideration if the government has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the motion by the delay and the movant's failure to seek relief earlier is not excusable within the terms of the rule. Case law, dealing with this issue, is in conflict.

Some courts have held that the literal language of §2255 precludes any possible time bar to a motion brought under it. In *Heflin v. United States*, 358 U.S. 415 (1959), the concurring opinion noted:

> The statute [28 U.S.C. §2255] further provides; ''A motion * * * may be made at any time.'' This * * * simply means that, as in habeas corpus, there is no statute of limitations, no *res judicata*, and that the doctrine of laches is inapplicable.

358 U.S. at 420

McKinney v. United States, 208 F.2d 844 (D.C.Cir. 1953) reversed the district court's dismissal of a §2255 motion for being too late, the court stating:

> McKinney's present application for relief comes late in the day: he has served some fifteen years in prison. But tardiness is irrelevant where a constitutional issue is raised and where the prisoner is still confined.

208 F.2d at 846, 847

In accord, see: *Juelich v. United States*, 300 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1962); *Conners v. United States*, 431 F.2d 1207, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970); *Sturrup v. United States*, 218 F.Supp. 279, 281 (E.D.N.Car. 1963); and *Banks v. United States*, 319 F.Supp. 649, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

It has also been held that delay in filing a §2255 motion does not bar the movant because of lack of reasonable diligence in pressing the claim.

> The statute [28 U.S.C. §2255], when it states that the motion may be made at any time, excludes the addition of a showing of diligence in delayed filings. A number of courts have considered contentions similar to those made here and have concluded that there are no time limitations. This result excludes the requirement of diligence which is in reality a time limitation.

Haier v. United States, 334 F.2d 441, 442 (10th Cir. 1964)

Other courts have recognized that delay may have a negative effect on the movant. In *Raines v. United States*, 423 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1970), the court stated:

> [B]oth petitioners' silence for extended periods, one for 28 months and the other for nine years, serves to render their allegations less believable. ''Although a delay in filing a section 2255 motion is not a controlling element * * * it may merit some consideration * * *.''

423 F.2d at 531

In *Aiken v. United States*, 191 F.Supp. 43, 50 (M.D.N.Car. 1961), aff'd 296 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1961), the court said: ''While motions under 28 U.S.C. §2255 may be made at any time, the lapse of time affects the good faith and credibility of the moving party.'' For similar conclusions, see: *Parker v. United States*, 358 F.2d 50, 54 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 916 (1967); *Le Clair v. United States*, 241 F.Supp. 819, 824 (N.D. Ind. 1965); *Malone v. United States*, 299 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 863 (1962); *Howell v. United States*, 442 F.2d 265, 274 (7th Cir. 1971); and *United States v. Wiggins*, 184 F. Supp. 673, 676 (D.C.Cir. 1960).

There have been holdings by some courts that a delay in filing a §2255 motion operates to increase the burden of proof which the movant must meet to obtain relief. The reasons for this, as expressed in *United States v. Bostic*, 206 F.Supp. 855 (D.C.Cir. 1962), are equitable in nature.

> Obviously, the burden of proof on a motion to vacate a sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255 is on the moving party. . . . The burden is particularly heavy if the issue is one of fact and a long time has elapsed since the trial of the case. While neither the statute of limitations nor laches can bar the assertion of a constitutional right, nevertheless, the passage of time may make it impracticable to retry a case if the motion is granted and a new trial is ordered. No doubt, at times such a motion is a product of an afterthought. Long delay may raise a question of good faith.

206 F.Supp. at 856–857

See also *United States v. Wiggins*, 184 F.Supp. at 676.

A requirement that the movant display reasonable diligence in filing a §2255 motion has been adopted by some courts dealing with delayed motions. The court in *United States v. Moore*, 166 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1948), did this, again for equitable reasons.

> [W]e agree with the District Court that the petitioner has too long slept upon his rights. * * * [A]pparently there is no limitation of time within which * * * a motion to vacate may be filed, except that an applicant must show reasonable diligence in presenting his claim. * * *
>
> The reasons which support the rule requiring diligence seem obvious. * * * Law enforcement officials change, witnesses die, memories grow dim. The prosecuting tribunal is put to a disadvantage if an unexpected retrial should be necessary after long passage of time.

166 F.2d at 105

In accord see *Desmond v. United States*, 333 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir. 1964), on remand, 345 F.2d 225 (1st Cir. 1965).

One of the major arguments advanced by the courts which would penalize a movant who waits an unduly long time before filing a § 2255 motion is that such delay is highly prejudicial to the prosecution. In *Desmond v. United States*, writing of a § 2255 motion alleging denial of effective appeal because of deception by movant's own counsel, the court said:

> [A]pplications for relief such as this must be made promptly. It will not do for a prisoner to wait until government witnesses have become unavailable as by death, serious illness or absence from the country, or until the memory of available government witnesses has faded. It will not even do for a prisoner to wait any longer than is reasonably necessary to prepare appropriate moving papers, however inartistic, after discovery of the deception practiced upon him by his attorney.

333 F.2d at 381

In a similar vein are *United States v. Moore* and *United States v. Bostic*, supra, and *United States v. Wiggins*, 184 F. Supp. at 676.

Subdivision (a) provides a flexible, equitable time limitation based on laches to prevent movants from withholding their claims so as to prejudice the government both in meeting the allegations of the motion and in any possible retrial. It includes a reasonable diligence requirement for ascertaining possible grounds for relief. If the delay is found to be excusable, or nonprejudicial to the government, the time bar is inoperative.

Subdivision (b) is consistent with the language of § 2255 and relevant case law.

The annexed form is intended to serve the same purpose as the comparable one included in the § 2254 rules.

For further discussion applicable to this rule, see the advisory committee note to rule 9 of the § 2254 rules.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 9 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as indicated below.

First, current Rule 9(a) has been deleted as unnecessary in light of the applicable one-year statute of limitations for § 2255 motions, added as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, para. 6.

Second, the remainder of revised Rule 9 reflects provisions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, parh. [sic] 8, which now require a moving party to obtain approval from the appropriate court of appeals before filing a second or successive motion.

Finally, the title of the rule has been changed to reflect the fact that the revised version addresses only the topic of second or successive motions.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 9, as published.

AMENDMENTS BY PUBLIC LAW

1976—Subd. (a). Pub. L. 94–426, § 2(9), struck out provision which established a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to government if the petition was filed more than five years after conviction.

Subd. (b). Pub. L. 94–426, § 2(10), substituted ''constituted an abuse of the procedure governed by these rules'' for ''is not excusable''.

Rule 10. Powers of a Magistrate Judge

A magistrate judge may perform the duties of a district judge under these rules, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 636.

(As amended Pub. L. 94–426, § 2(12), Sept. 28, 1976, 90 Stat. 1335; Apr. 30, 1979, eff. Aug. 1, 1979; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

See the advisory committee note to rule 10 of the § 2254 rules for a discussion fully applicable here as well.

1979 AMENDMENT

This amendment conforms the rule to 18 U.S.C. § 636. See Advisory Committee Note to rule 10 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 10 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee restyled the proposed rule.

AMENDMENTS BY PUBLIC LAW

1976—Pub. L. 94–426 inserted '', and to the extent the district court has established standards and criteria for the performance of such duties,'' after ''rule of the district court''.

Rule 11. Certificate of Appealability; Time to Appeal

(a) CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY. The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. Before entering the final order, the court may direct the parties to submit arguments on whether a certificate should issue. If the court issues a certificate, the court must state the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). If the court denies a certificate, a party may not appeal the denial but may seek a certificate from the court of appeals under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22. A motion to reconsider a denial does not extend the time to appeal.

(b) TIME TO APPEAL. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) governs the time to appeal an order entered under these rules. A timely notice of appeal must be filed even if the district court issues a certificate of appealability. These rules do not extend the time to appeal the original judgment of conviction.

(As amended Apr. 30, 1979, eff. Aug. 1, 1979; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Rule 11 is intended to make clear that, although a § 2255 action is a continuation of the criminal case, the bringing of a § 2255 action does not extend the time.

1979 AMENDMENT

Prior to the promulgation of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, the courts consistently held that the time for appeal in a section 2255 case is as provided in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a), that is, 60 days when the government is a party, rather than as provided in appellate rule 4(b), which says that the time is 10 days in criminal cases. This result has often been explained on the ground that rule 4(a) has to do with civil cases and that ''proceedings under section 2255 are civil in nature.'' E.g., *Rothman v. United States*, 508 F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1975). Because the new section 2255 rules are based upon the premise ''that a motion under § 2255 is a further step in the movant's criminal case rather than a separate civil action,'' see Advisory Committee Note to rule 1, the question has arisen whether the new rules

have the effect of shortening the time for appeal to that provided in appellate rule 4(b). A sentence has been added to rule 11 in order to make it clear that this is not the case.

Even though section 2255 proceedings are a further step in the criminal case, the added sentence correctly states current law. In *United States v. Hayman*, 342 U.S. 205 (1952), the Supreme Court noted that such appeals ''are governed by the civil rules applicable to appeals from final judgments in habeas corpus actions.'' In support, the Court cited *Mercado v. United States*, 183 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1950), a case rejecting the argument that because § 2255 proceedings are criminal in nature the time for appeal is only 10 days. The *Mercado* court concluded that the situation was governed by that part of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 which reads: ''An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.'' Thus, because appellate rule 4(a) is applicable in habeas cases, it likewise governs in § 2255 cases even though they are criminal in nature.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 11 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 11, as published.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2009 AMENDMENT

Subdivision (a). As provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), an applicant may not appeal to the court of appeals from a final order in a proceeding under § 2255 unless a judge issues a COA, identifying the specific issues for which the applicant has made a substantial showing of a denial of constitutional right. New Rule 11(a) makes the requirements concerning certificates of appealability more prominent by adding and consolidating them in the appropriate rule of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. Rule 11(a) also requires the district judge to grant or deny the certificate at the time a final order is issued. *See* 3d Cir. R. 22.2, 111.3. This will ensure prompt decision making when the issues are fresh, rather than postponing consideration of the certificate until after a notice of appeal is filed. These changes will expedite proceedings, avoid unnecessary remands, and help to inform the applicant's decision whether to file a notice of appeal.

Subdivision (b). The amendment is designed to make it clear that the district court's grant of a COA does not eliminate the need to file a notice of appeal.

Changes Made to Proposed Amendment Released for Public Comment. In response to public comments, a sentence was added stating that prior to the entry of the final order the district court may direct the parties to submit arguments on whether or not a certificate should issue. This allows a court in complex cases (such as death penalty cases with numerous claims) to solicit briefing that might narrow the issues for appeal. For purposes of clarification, two sentences were added at the end of subdivision (a) stating that (1) although the district court's denial of a certificate is not appealable, a certificate may be sought in the court of appeals, and (2) a motion for reconsideration of a denial of a certificate does not extend the time to appeal. Finally, a sentence indicating that notice of appeal must be filed even if a COA is issued was added to subdivision (b).

Minor changes were also made to conform to style conventions.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, referred to in text, are set out in the Appendix to this title.

Rule 12. Applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules, may be applied to a proceeding under these rules.

(As amended Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

This rule differs from rule 11 of the § 2254 rules in that it includes the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as the civil. This is because of the nature of a § 2255 motion as a continuing part of the criminal proceeding (see advisory committee note to rule 1) as well as a remedy analogous to habeas corpus by state prisoners.

Since § 2255 has been considered analogous to habeas as respects the restrictions in Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(2) (see *Sullivan v. United States*, 198 F.Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)), rule 12 is needed. For discussion, see the advisory committee note to rule 11 of the § 2254 rules.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2004 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 12 has been amended as part of general restyling of the rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended.

Changes Made After Publication and Comments. The Committee made no changes to Rule 12.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in heading and text, are set out in the Appendix to this title.

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, referred to in heading and text, are set out in the Appendix to Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure.

APPENDIX OF FORMS

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence By a Person in Federal Custody

(Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255)

Instructions

1. To use this form, you must be a person who is serving a sentence under a judgment against you in a federal court. You are asking for relief from the conviction or the sentence. This form is your motion for relief.

2. You must file the form in the United States district court that entered the judgment that you are challenging. If you want to challenge a federal judgment that imposed a sentence to be served in the future, you should file the motion in the federal court that entered that judgment.

3. Make sure the form is typed or neatly written.

4. You must tell the truth and sign the form. If you make a false statement of a material fact, you may be prosecuted for perjury.

5. Answer all the questions. You do not need to cite law. You may submit additional pages if necessary. If you do not fill out the form properly, you will be asked to submit additional or correct information. If you want to submit a brief or arguments, you must submit them in a separate memorandum.

6. If you cannot pay for the costs of this motion (such as costs for an attorney or transcripts), you may ask to proceed *in forma pauperis* (as a poor person). To do that, you must fill out the last page of this form. Also, you must submit a certificate signed by an officer at the institution where you are confined showing the amount of money that the institution is holding for you.

7. In this motion, you may challenge the judgment entered by only one court. If you want to challenge a judgment entered by a different judge or division (either in the same district or in a different district), you must file a separate motion.

8. When you have completed the form, send the original and two copies to the Clerk of the United States District Court at this address:

   Clerk, United States District Court for _____
   Address
   City, State Zip Code

9. CAUTION: **You must include in this motion all the grounds for relief from the conviction or sentence that you challenge. And you must state the facts that support each ground. If you fail to set forth all the grounds in this motion, you may be barred from presenting additional grounds at a later date.**

10. CAPITAL CASES: **If you are under a sentence of death, you are entitled to the assistance of counsel and should request the appointment of counsel.**

MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE BY A PERSON IN FEDERAL CUSTODY

United States District Court	District
Name (under which you were convicted):	Docket or Case No.:
Place of Confinement:	Prisoner No.:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	Movant (include name under which you were convicted)
v.	

MOTION

1. (a) Name and location of court that entered the judgment of conviction you are challenging: _____

_____

_____

_____

(b) Criminal docket or case number (if you know): _____

2. (a) Date of the judgment of conviction (if you know): _____

_____

(b) Date of sentencing: _____

3. Length of sentence: _____

4. Nature of crime (all counts): _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

5. (a) What was your plea? (Check one)

(1) Not guilty ❑ (2) Guilty ❑ (3) Nolo contendere (no contest) ❑

(b) If you entered a guilty plea to one count or indictment, and a not guilty plea to another count or indictment, what did you plead guilty to and what did you plead not guilty to? _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

6. If you went to trial, what kind of trial did you have? (Check one) Jury ❑ Judge only ❑

7. Did you testify at a pretrial hearing, trial, or post-trial hearing? Yes ❑ No ❑

8. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction? Yes ❑ No ❑

9. If you did appeal, answer the following:

(a) Name of court: _____

(b) Docket or case number (if you know): _____

(c) Result: _____

(d) Date of result (if you know): _____

(e) Citation to the case (if you know): _____

(f) Grounds raised: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(g) Did you file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court? Yes ❑ No ❑

If "Yes," answer the following:

(1) Docket or case number (if you know): _____

(2) Result: _____

_____

(3) Date of result (if you know): _____

(4) Citation to the case (if you know): _____

(5) Grounds raised: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

10. Other than the direct appeals listed above, have you previously filed any other motions, petitions, or applications concerning this judgment of conviction in any court?

Yes ❑ No ❑

11. If your answer to Question 10 was "Yes," give the following information:

(a) (1) Name of court: _____

(2) Docket or case number (if you know): _____

(3) Date of filing (if you know): _____

(4) Nature of the proceeding: _____

(5) Grounds raised: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(6) Did you receive a hearing where evidence was given on your motion, petition, or application? Yes ❑ No ❑

(7) Result: _____

(8) Date of result (if you know): _____

(b) If you filed any second motion, petition, or application, give the same information:

(1) Name of court: _____

(2) Docket or case number (if you know): _____

(3) Date of filing (if you know): _____

(4) Nature of the proceeding: _____

(5) Grounds raised: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(6) Did you receive a hearing where evidence was given on your motion, petition, or application? Yes ❑ No ❑

(7) Result: _____

(8) Date of result (if you know): _____

(c) Did you appeal to a federal appellate court having jurisdiction over the action taken on your motion, petition, or application?

(1) First petition: Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) Second petition: Yes ❑ No ❑

(d) If you did not appeal from the action on any motion, petition, or application, explain briefly why you did not: _____

_____

_____

12. For this motion, state every ground on which you claim that you are being held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Attach additional pages if you have more than four grounds. State the facts supporting each ground.

GROUND ONE: _____

_____

(a) Supporting facts (Do not argue or cite law. Just state the specific facts that support your claim.):

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(b) **Direct Appeal of Ground One:**

(1) If you appealed from the judgment of conviction, did you raise this issue?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If you did not raise this issue in your direct appeal, explain why: _____

_____

_____

(c) **Post-Conviction Proceedings:**

(1) Did you raise this issue in any post-conviction motion, petition, or application?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If your answer to Question (c)(1) is "Yes," state:

Type of motion or petition: _____

Name and location of the court where the motion or petition was filed: _____

_____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

_____

_____

(3) Did you receive a hearing on your motion, petition, or application?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(4) Did you appeal from the denial of your motion, petition, or application?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(5) If your answer to Question (c)(4) is "Yes," did you raise this issue in the appeal?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(6) If your answer to Question (c)(4) is "Yes," state:

Name and location of the court where the appeal was filed: _____

_____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

_____

_____

(7) If your answer to Question (c)(4) or Question (c)(5) is "No," explain why you did not appeal or raise this issue: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

GROUND TWO: _____

_____

(a) Supporting facts (Do not argue or cite law. Just state the specific facts that support your claim.):

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(b) **Direct Appeal of Ground Two:**

(1) If you appealed from the judgment of conviction, did you raise this issue?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If you did not raise this issue in your direct appeal, explain why: _____

(c) **Post-Conviction Proceedings:**

(1) Did you raise this issue in any post-conviction motion, petition, or application?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If your answer to Question (c)(1) is "Yes," state:

Type of motion or petition: _____

Name and location of the court where the motion or petition was filed: _____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

(3) Did you receive a hearing on your motion, petition, or application?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(4) Did you appeal from the denial of your motion, petition, or application?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(5) If your answer to Question (c)(4) is "Yes," did you raise this issue in the appeal?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(6) If your answer to Question (c)(4) is "Yes," state:

Name and location of the court where the appeal was filed: _____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

(7) If your answer to Question (c)(4) or Question (c)(5) is "No," explain why you did not appeal or raise this issue: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

GROUND THREE: _____

_____

(a) Supporting facts (Do not argue or cite law. Just state the specific facts that support your claim.):

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(b) **Direct Appeal of Ground Three:**

(1) If you appealed from the judgment of conviction, did you raise this issue?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If you did not raise this issue in your direct appeal, explain why: _____

_____

_____

(c) **Post-Conviction Proceedings:**

(1) Did you raise this issue in any post-conviction motion, petition, or application?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If your answer to Question (c)(1) is "Yes," state:

Type of motion or petition: _____

Name and location of the court where the motion or petition was filed: _____

_____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

_____

_____

(3) Did you receive a hearing on your motion, petition, or application?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(4) Did you appeal from the denial of your motion, petition, or application?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(5) If your answer to Question (c)(4) is "Yes," did you raise this issue in the appeal?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(6) If your answer to Question (c)(4) is "Yes," state:

Name and location of the court where the appeal was filed: _____

_____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

_____

_____

(7) If your answer to Question (c)(4) or Question (c)(5) is "No," explain why you did not appeal or raise this issue: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

GROUND FOUR: _____

_____

(a) Supporting facts (Do not argue or cite law. Just state the specific facts that support your claim.):

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(b) **Direct Appeal of Ground Four:**

(1) If you appealed from the judgment of conviction, did you raise this issue?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If you did not raise this issue in your direct appeal, explain why: _____

(c) **Post-Conviction Proceedings:**

(1) Did you raise this issue in any post-conviction motion, petition, or application?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(2) If your answer to Question (c)(1) is "Yes," state:

Type of motion or petition: _____

Name and location of the court where the motion or petition was filed: _____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

(3) Did you receive a hearing on your motion, petition, or application?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(4) Did you appeal from the denial of your motion, petition, or application?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(5) If your answer to Question (c)(4) is "Yes," did you raise this issue in the appeal?

Yes ❑ No ❑

(6) If your answer to Question (c)(4) is "Yes," state:

Name and location of the court where the appeal was filed: _____

Docket or case number (if you know): _____

Date of the court's decision: _____

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order, if available): _____

(7) If your answer to Question (c)(4) or Question (c)(5) is "No," explain why you did not appeal or raise this issue: _____

13. Is there any ground in this motion that you have not previously presented in some federal court? If so, which ground or grounds have not been presented, and state your reasons for not presenting them: _____

14. Do you have any motion, petition, or appeal now pending (filed and not decided yet) in any court for the judgment you are challenging? Yes ❑ No ❑
If "Yes," state the name and location of the court, the docket or case number, the type of proceeding, and the issues raised. _____

15. Give the name and address, if known, of each attorney who represented you in the following stages of the judgment you are challenging:
(a) At preliminary hearing: _____
(b) At arraignment and plea: _____
(c) At trial: _____
(d) At sentencing: _____

(e) On appeal: _____

_____

(f) In any post-conviction proceeding: _____

_____

(g) On appeal from any ruling against you in a post-conviction proceeding: _____

_____

_____

16. Were you sentenced on more than one count of an indictment, or on more than one indictment, in the same court and at the same time? Yes ❑ No ❑

17. Do you have any future sentence to serve after you complete the sentence for the judgment that you are challenging? Yes ❑ No ❑

(a) If so, give name and location of court that imposed the other sentence you will serve in the future: _____

_____

(b) Give the date the other sentence was imposed: _____

(c) Give the length of the other sentence: _____

(d) Have you filed, or do you plan to file, any motion, petition, or application that challenges the judgment or sentence to be served in the future? Yes ❑ No ❑

18. TIMELINESS OF MOTION: If your judgment of conviction became final over one year ago, you must explain why the one-year statute of limitations as contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not bar your motion.*

* The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") as contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2255, paragraph 6, provides in part that:

A one-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction became final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making such a motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Therefore, movant asks that the Court grant the following relief: _____

_____

_____

or any other relief to which movant may be entitled.

_____

Signature of Attorney (if any)

I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was placed in the prison mailing system on _____ _____ (month, date, year).

Executed (signed) on _____ (date).

_____

Signature of Movant

If the person signing is not movant, state relationship to movant and explain why movant is not signing this motion. _____

_____

_____

IN FORMA PAUPERIS DECLARATION

_____

[Insert appropriate court]

United States v. _____ (Movant)	DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST TO PROCEED *IN FORMA PAUPERIS*

I, _____, declare that I am the movant in the above entitled case; that in support of my motion to proceed without being required to prepay fees, costs or give security therefor, I state that because of my poverty, I am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give security therefor; that I believe I am entitled to relief.

1. Are you presently employed? Yes ☐ No ☐
   a. If the answer is ''yes,'' state the amount of your salary or wages per month, and give the name and address of your employer.
   _____
   _____
   b. If the answer is ''no,'' state the date of last employment and the amount of the salary and wages per month which you received.
   _____
   _____
2. Have you received within the past twelve months any money from any of the following sources?
   a. Business, profession or form of self-employment? Yes ☐ No ☐
   b. Rent payments, interest or dividends? Yes ☐ No ☐
   c. Pensions, annuities or life insurance payments? Yes ☐ No ☐
   d. Gifts or inheritances? Yes ☐ No ☐
   e. Any other sources? Yes ☐ No ☐
   If the answer to any of the above is ''yes,'' describe each source of money and state the amount received from each during the past twelve months.
   _____
   _____
   _____
3. Do you own any cash, or do you have money in a checking or savings account?
   Yes ☐ No ☐ (Include any funds in prison accounts)
   If the answer is ''yes,'' state the total value of the items owned.
   _____
   _____
   _____
4. Do you own real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other valuable property (excluding ordinary household furnishings and clothing)?
   Yes ☐ No ☐
   If the answer is ''yes,'' describe the property and state its approximate value.
   _____
   _____
5. List the persons who are dependent upon you for support, state your relationship to those persons, and indicate how much you contribute toward their support.
   _____
   _____

I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on _____.
(date)

_____
Signature of Movant

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the movant herein has the sum of $_____ on account to his credit at the _____ institution where he is confined.

I further certify that movant likewise has the following securities to his credit according to the records of said _____ institution:

_____
_____
_____
_____

_____
Authorized Officer of Institution

(As amended Apr. 28, 1982, eff. Aug. 1, 1982; Apr. 26, 2004, eff. Dec. 1, 2004.)

MODEL FORM FOR USE IN 28 U.S.C. §2255 CASES INVOLVING A RULE 9 ISSUE

Form No. 9

[Omitted as obsolete]

Changes Made After Publication and Comments—Forms Accompanying Rules Governing §2254 and §2255 Proceedings. Responding to a number of comments from the public, the Committee deleted from both sets of official forms the list of possible grounds of relief. The Committee made additional minor style corrections to the forms.

[§ 2256. Omitted]

CODIFICATION

Section, added Pub. L. 95–598, title II, §250(a), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2672, did not become effective pursuant to section 402(b) of Pub. L. 95–598, as amended, set out as an Effective Date note preceding section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. Section read as follows:

§ 2256. Habeas corpus from bankruptcy courts

A bankruptcy court may issue a writ of habeas corpus—

(1) when appropriate to bring a person before the court—

(A) for examination;

(B) to testify; or

(C) to perform a duty imposed on such person under this title; or

(2) ordering the release of a debtor in a case under title 11 in custody under the judgment of a Federal or State court if—

(A) such debtor was arrested or imprisoned on process in any civil action;

(B) such process was issued for the collection of a debt—

(i) dischargeable under title 11; or

(ii) that is or will be provided for in a plan under chapter 11 or 13 of title 11; and

(C) before the issuance of such writ, notice and a hearing have been afforded the adverse party of such debtor in custody to contest the issuance of such writ.

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2256, added Pub. L. 95–144, §3, Oct. 28, 1977, 91 Stat. 1220, related to jurisdiction of proceedings relating to transferred offenders, prior to transfer to section 3244 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, by Pub. L. 95–598, title III, §314(j), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2677.

CHAPTER 154—SPECIAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL CASES

AMENDMENTS

Pub. L. 109–177, title V, §507(c)(2), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 251, substituted ''Certification and judicial review'' for ''Application to State unitary review procedure'' in item 2265.

§ 2261. Prisoners in State custody subject to capital sentence; appointment of counsel; requirement of rule of court or statute; procedures for appointment

(a) This chapter shall apply to cases arising under section 2254 brought by prisoners in State custody who are subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied.

(b) COUNSEL.—This chapter is applicable if—

(1) the Attorney General of the United States certifies that a State has established a mechanism for providing counsel in postconviction proceedings as provided in section 2265; and

(2) counsel was appointed pursuant to that mechanism, petitioner validly waived counsel, petitioner retained counsel, or petitioner was found not to be indigent.

(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection (b) must offer counsel to all State prisoners under capital sentence and must provide for the entry of an order by a court of record—

(1) appointing one or more counsels to represent the prisoner upon a finding that the prisoner is indigent and accepted the offer or is unable competently to decide whether to accept or reject the offer;

(2) finding, after a hearing if necessary, that the prisoner rejected the offer of counsel and made the decision with an understanding of its legal consequences; or

(3) denying the appointment of counsel upon a finding that the prisoner is not indigent.

(d) No counsel appointed pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) to represent a State prisoner under capital sentence shall have previously represented the prisoner at trial in the case for which the appointment is made unless the prisoner and counsel expressly request continued representation.

(e) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during State or Federal post-conviction proceedings in a capital case shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254. This limitation shall not preclude the appointment of different counsel, on the court's own motion or at the request of the prisoner, at any phase of State or Federal post-conviction proceedings on the basis of the ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel in such proceedings.

(Added Pub. L. 104–132, title I, §107(a), Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1221; amended Pub. L. 109–177, title V, §507(a), (b), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 250.)

AMENDMENTS

2006—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 109–177, §507(a), added subsec. (b) and struck out former subsec. (b) which read as follows: ''This chapter is applicable if a State establishes by statute, rule of its court of last resort, or by another agency authorized by State law, a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose capital convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct appeal to the court of last resort in the State or have otherwise become final for State law purposes. The rule of court or statute must provide standards of competency for the appointment of such counsel.''

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 109–177, §507(b), struck out ''or on direct appeal'' after ''at trial''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2006 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 109–177 applicable to cases pending on or after Mar. 9, 2006, with special rule for certain cases pending on that date, see section 507(d) of Pub. L. 109–177, set out as a note under section 2251 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section 107(c) of Pub. L. 104–132 provided that: ''Chapter 154 of title 28, United States Code (as added by subsection (a)) shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act [Apr. 24, 1996].''

§ 2262. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on stays of execution; successive petitions

(a) Upon the entry in the appropriate State court of record of an order under section 2261(c), a warrant or order setting an execution date for a State prisoner shall be stayed upon application to any court that would have jurisdiction over any proceedings filed under section 2254. The application shall recite that the State has invoked the post-conviction review procedures of this chapter and that the scheduled execution is subject to stay.

(b) A stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection (a) shall expire if—

(1) a State prisoner fails to file a habeas corpus application under section 2254 within the time required in section 2263;

(2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the presence of counsel, unless the prisoner has competently and knowingly waived such counsel, and after having been advised of the consequences, a State prisoner under capital sentence waives the right to pursue habeas corpus review under section 2254; or

(3) a State prisoner files a habeas corpus petition under section 2254 within the time required by section 2263 and fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a Federal right or is denied relief in the district court or at any subsequent stage of review.

(c) If one of the conditions in subsection (b) has occurred, no Federal court thereafter shall have the authority to enter a stay of execution in the case, unless the court of appeals approves the filing of a second or successive application under section 2244(b).

(Added Pub. L. 104–132, title I, §107(a), Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1222.)

§ 2263. Filing of habeas corpus application; time requirements; tolling rules

(a) Any application under this chapter for habeas corpus relief under section 2254 must be filed in the appropriate district court not later than 180 days after final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.

(b) The time requirements established by subsection (a) shall be tolled—

(1) from the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of the petition if a State prisoner files the petition to secure review by the Supreme Court of the affirmance of a capital sentence on direct review by the court of last resort of the State or other final State court decision on direct review;

(2) from the date on which the first petition for post-conviction review or other collateral relief is filed until the final State court disposition of such petition; and

(3) during an additional period not to exceed 30 days, if—

(A) a motion for an extension of time is filed in the Federal district court that would have jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus application under section 2254; and

(B) a showing of good cause is made for the failure to file the habeas corpus application within the time period established by this section.

(Added Pub. L. 104–132, title I, § 107(a), Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1223.)

§ 2264. Scope of Federal review; district court adjudications

(a) Whenever a State prisoner under capital sentence files a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this chapter applies, the district court shall only consider a claim or claims that have been raised and decided on the merits in the State courts, unless the failure to raise the claim properly is—

(1) the result of State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(2) the result of the Supreme Court's recognition of a new Federal right that is made retroactively applicable; or

(3) based on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence in time to present the claim for State or Federal post-conviction review.

(b) Following review subject to subsections (a), (d), and (e) of section 2254, the court shall rule on the claims properly before it.

(Added Pub. L. 104–132, title I, § 107(a), Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1223.)

§ 2265. Certification and judicial review

(a) CERTIFICATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—If requested by an appropriate State official, the Attorney General of the United States shall determine—

(A) whether the State has established a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners who have been sentenced to death;

(B) the date on which the mechanism described in subparagraph (A) was established; and

(C) whether the State provides standards of competency for the appointment of counsel in proceedings described in subparagraph (A).

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The date the mechanism described in paragraph (1)(A) was established shall be the effective date of the certification under this subsection.

(3) ONLY EXPRESS REQUIREMENTS.—There are no requirements for certification or for application of this chapter other than those expressly stated in this chapter.

(b) REGULATIONS.—The Attorney General shall promulgate regulations to implement the certification procedure under subsection (a).

(c) REVIEW OF CERTIFICATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The determination by the Attorney General regarding whether to certify a State under this section is subject to review exclusively as provided under chapter 158 of this title.

(2) VENUE.—The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction over matters under paragraph (1), subject to review by the Supreme Court under section 2350 of this title.

(3) STANDARD OF REVIEW.—The determination by the Attorney General regarding whether to certify a State under this section shall be subject to de novo review.

(Added Pub. L. 109–177, title V, § 507(c)(1), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 250.)

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2265, added Pub. L. 104–132, title I, § 107(a), Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1223, related to the application of sections 2262, 2263, 2264, and 2266 of this title to State unitary review procedures, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 109–177, title V, § 507(c)(1), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 250.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section applicable to cases pending on or after Mar. 9, 2006, with special rule for certain cases pending on that date, see section 507(d) of Pub. L. 109–177, set out as an Effective Date of 2006 Amendment note under section 2251 of this title.

§ 2266. Limitation periods for determining applications and motions

(a) The adjudication of any application under section 2254 that is subject to this chapter, and the adjudication of any motion under section 2255 by a person under sentence of death, shall be given priority by the district court and by the court of appeals over all noncapital matters.

(b)(1)(A) A district court shall render a final determination and enter a final judgment on any application for a writ of habeas corpus brought under this chapter in a capital case not later than 450 days after the date on which the application is filed, or 60 days after the date on which the case is submitted for decision, whichever is earlier.

(B) A district court shall afford the parties at least 120 days in which to complete all actions, including the preparation of all pleadings and briefs, and if necessary, a hearing, prior to the submission of the case for decision.

(C)(i) A district court may delay for not more than one additional 30-day period beyond the period specified in subparagraph (A), the rendering of a determination of an application for a writ of habeas corpus if the court issues a written order making a finding, and stating the reasons for the finding, that the ends of justice that would be served by allowing the delay outweigh the best interests of the public and the applicant in a speedy disposition of the application.

(ii) The factors, among others, that a court shall consider in determining whether a delay in the disposition of an application is warranted are as follows:

(I) Whether the failure to allow the delay would be likely to result in a miscarriage of justice.

(II) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate briefing within the time limitations established by subparagraph (A).

(III) Whether the failure to allow a delay in a case that, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as described in subclause (II), but would otherwise deny the applicant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the applicant or the government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the applicant or the government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

(iii) No delay in disposition shall be permissible because of general congestion of the court's calendar.

(iv) The court shall transmit a copy of any order issued under clause (i) to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for inclusion in the report under paragraph (5).

(2) The time limitations under paragraph (1) shall apply to—

(A) an initial application for a writ of habeas corpus;

(B) any second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus; and

(C) any redetermination of an application for a writ of habeas corpus following a remand by the court of appeals or the Supreme Court for further proceedings, in which case the limitation period shall run from the date the remand is ordered.

(3)(A) The time limitations under this section shall not be construed to entitle an applicant to a stay of execution, to which the applicant would otherwise not be entitled, for the purpose of litigating any application or appeal.

(B) No amendment to an application for a writ of habeas corpus under this chapter shall be permitted after the filing of the answer to the application, except on the grounds specified in section 2244(b).

(4)(A) The failure of a court to meet or comply with a time limitation under this section shall not be a ground for granting relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence.

(B) The State may enforce a time limitation under this section by petitioning for a writ of mandamus to the court of appeals. The court of appeals shall act on the petition for a writ of mandamus not later than 30 days after the filing of the petition.

(5)(A) The Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall submit to Congress an annual report on the compliance by the district courts with the time limitations under this section.

(B) The report described in subparagraph (A) shall include copies of the orders submitted by the district courts under paragraph (1)(B)(iv).

(c)(1)(A) A court of appeals shall hear and render a final determination of any appeal of an order granting or denying, in whole or in part, an application brought under this chapter in a capital case not later than 120 days after the date on which the reply brief is filed, or if no reply brief is filed, not later than 120 days after the date on which the answering brief is filed.

(B)(i) A court of appeals shall decide whether to grant a petition for rehearing or other request for rehearing en banc not later than 30 days after the date on which the petition for rehearing is filed unless a responsive pleading is required, in which case the court shall decide whether to grant the petition not later than 30 days after the date on which the responsive pleading is filed.

(ii) If a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc is granted, the court of appeals shall hear and render a final determination of the appeal not later than 120 days after the date on which the order granting rehearing or rehearing en banc is entered.

(2) The time limitations under paragraph (1) shall apply to—

(A) an initial application for a writ of habeas corpus;

(B) any second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus; and

(C) any redetermination of an application for a writ of habeas corpus or related appeal following a remand by the court of appeals en banc or the Supreme Court for further proceedings, in which case the limitation period shall run from the date the remand is ordered.

(3) The time limitations under this section shall not be construed to entitle an applicant to a stay of execution, to which the applicant would otherwise not be entitled, for the purpose of litigating any application or appeal.

(4)(A) The failure of a court to meet or comply with a time limitation under this section shall not be a ground for granting relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence.

(B) The State may enforce a time limitation under this section by applying for a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court.

(5) The Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall submit to Congress an annual report on the compliance by the courts of appeals with the time limitations under this section.

(Added Pub. L. 104–132, title I, § 107(a), Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1224; amended Pub. L. 109–177, title V, § 507(e), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 251.)

AMENDMENTS

2006—Subsec. (b)(1)(A). Pub. L. 109–177 substituted ''450 days after the date on which the application is filed, or 60 days after the date on which the case is submitted for decision, whichever is earlier'' for ''180 days after the date on which the application is filed''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2006 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 109–177 applicable to cases pending on or after Mar. 9, 2006, with special rule for certain cases pending on that date, see section 507(d) of Pub. L. 109–177, set out as a note under section 2251 of this title.

CHAPTER 155—INJUNCTIONS; THREE-JUDGE COURTS

AMENDMENTS

1976—Pub. L. 94–381, § 4, Aug. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 1119, struck out item 2281 ''Injunction against enforcement of State statute; three-judge court required'', item 2282 ''Injunction against enforcement of Federal statute; three-judge court required'', and inserted ''when required'' after ''district court'' in item 2284.

[§§ 2281, 2282. Repealed. Pub. L. 94–381, §§ 1, 2, Aug. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 1119]

Section 2281, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968, provided that an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of a State statute on grounds of unconstitutionality should not be granted unless the application has been heard and determined by a three-judge district court.

Section 2282, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968, provided that an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress on grounds of unconstitutionality should not be granted unless the application therefor has been heard and determined by a three-judge district court.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPEAL

Repeal not applicable to any action commenced on or before Aug. 12, 1976, see section 7 of Pub. L. 94–381 set out as an Effective Date of 1976 Amendment note under section 2284 of this title.

§ 2283. Stay of State court proceedings

A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 379 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 265, 36 Stat. 1162).

An exception as to acts of Congress relating to bankruptcy was omitted and the general exception substituted to cover all exceptions.

The phrase ''in aid of its jurisdiction'' was added to conform to section 1651 of this title and to make clear the recognized power of the Federal courts to stay proceedings in State cases removed to the district courts.

The exceptions specifically include the words ''to protect or ''effectuate its judgments,'' for lack of which the Supreme Court held that the Federal courts are without power to enjoin relitigation of cases and controversies fully adjudicated by such courts. (See *Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.*, 62 S.Ct. 139, 314 U.S. 118, 86 L.Ed. 100. A vigorous dissenting opinion (62 S.Ct. 148) notes that at the time of the 1911 revision of the Judicial Code, the power of the courts, of the United States to protect their judgments was unquestioned and that the revisers of that code noted no change and Congress intended no change).

Therefore the revised section restores the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision.

Changes were made in phraseology.

§ 2284. Three-judge court; when required; composition; procedure

(a) A district court of three judges shall be convened when otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.

(b) In any action required to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges under subsection (a) of this section, the composition and procedure of the court shall be as follows:

(1) Upon the filing of a request for three judges, the judge to whom the request is presented shall, unless he determines that three judges are not required, immediately notify the chief judge of the circuit, who shall designate two other judges, at least one of whom shall be a circuit judge. The judges so designated, and the judge to whom the request was presented, shall serve as members of the court to hear and determine the action or proceeding.

(2) If the action is against a State, or officer or agency thereof, at least five days' notice of hearing of the action shall be given by registered or certified mail to the Governor and attorney general of the State.

(3) A single judge may conduct all proceedings except the trial, and enter all orders permitted by the rules of civil procedure except as provided in this subsection. He may grant a temporary restraining order on a specific finding, based on evidence submitted, that specified irreparable damage will result if the order is not granted, which order, unless previously revoked by the district judge, shall remain in force only until the hearing and determination by the district court of three judges of an application for a preliminary injunction. A single judge shall not appoint a master, or order a reference, or hear and determine any application for a preliminary or permanent injunction or motion to vacate such an injunction, or enter judgment on the merits. Any action of a single judge may be reviewed by the full court at any time before final judgment.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968; Pub. L. 86–507, § 1(19), June 11, 1960, 74 Stat. 201; Pub. L. 94–381, § 3, Aug. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 1119; Pub. L. 98–620, title IV, § 402(29)(E), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3359.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 47, 47a, 380, 380a, and 792 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 210, 266, 36 Stat. 1150,

[1] So in original. Does not conform to section catchline.

1162; Mar. 4, 1943, ch. 160, 37 Stat. 1013; Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 220; Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, §1, 43 Stat. 938; Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, §3, 50 Stat. 752; Apr. 6, 1942, ch. 210, §3, 56 Stat. 199).

Provisions of sections 47, 47a, 380, and 380a of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction of direct appeals appear in section 1253 of this title.

Provisions of sections 47, 380, and 380a of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., requiring applications for injunctions restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of Federal or State statutes or orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission to be heard and determined by three-judge district courts appear in sections 2281, 2282, and 2325 of this title.

The provision for notice to the United States attorney for the district where the action is pending was added because of the necessity of the United States attorney's preparation for hearing as soon as possible, to expedite such a case.

Provisions of sections 47, 47a, 380, and 380a of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., respecting time for direct appeal appear in section 2101 of this title.

This revised section represents an effort to provide a uniform method of convoking three-judge district courts, and for procedure therein. It follows recommendations of a committee appointed by the Judicial Conference of the United States, composed of Circuit Judges Evan A. Evans, Kimbrough Stone, Orie L. Phillips, and Albert B. Maris.

The committee pointed out that section 380a of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., is the latest and ''most carefully drawn expression by Congress on the subject.'' Consequently, this section follows closely such section 380a and eliminates the discrepancies between sections 47, 47a, 380, and 380a of such title.

This section governs only the composition and procedure of three-judge district courts. The requirement that applications for injunctions be heard and determined by such courts will appear in other sections of this and other titles of the United States Code as Congress may enact from time to time. For example, see sections 2281, 2282, and 2325 of this title, sections 1213, 1215, 1255 of title 11, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Bankruptcy, section 28 of title 15, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Commerce and Trade, and section 44 of title 49, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Transportation.

United States District Judge W. Calvin Chestnut, has referred to the provisions relating to enforcement or setting aside or orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission as unfortunately lengthy and prolix. He has urged revision to insure uniform procedure in the several classes of so-called three-judge cases.

The provision that such notice shall be given by the clerk by registered mail, and shall be complete on the mailing thereof follows, substantially, rules 4(d)(4) and 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Changes were made in phraseology.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The rules of civil procedure, referred to in subsec. (b)(3), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

AMENDMENTS

1984—Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 98–620 struck out provision that the hearing had to be given precedence and held at the earliest practicable day.

1976—Pub. L. 94–381 substituted ''Three-judge court; when required'' for ''Three-judge district court'' in section catchline, and generally revised section to alter the method by which three-judge courts are composed, the procedure used by such courts, and to conform its requirements to the repeal of sections 2281 and 2282 of this title.

1960—Pub. L. 86–507 substituted ''by registered mail or by certified mail by the clerk and'' for ''by registered mail by the clerk, and''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1984 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 98–620 not applicable to cases pending on Nov. 8, 1984, see section 403 of Pub. L. 98–620, set out as an Effective Date note under section 1657 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1976 AMENDMENT

Section 7 of Pub. L. 94–381 provided that: ''This Act [amending this section and section 2403 of this title and repealing sections 2281 and 2282 of this title] shall not apply to any action commenced on or before the date of enactment [Aug. 12, 1976].''

CHAPTER 157—SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD ORDERS; ENFORCEMENT AND REVIEW

AMENDMENTS

1995—Pub. L. 104–88, title III, §305(c)(1)(A), (E), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 944, 945, substituted ''SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD'' for ''INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION'' in chapter heading and ''Board's'' for ''Commission's'' in item 2321.

1975—Pub. L. 93–584, §8, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1918, substituted ''Judicial Review of Commission's orders and decisions; procedure generally; process'' for ''Procedure generally; process'' in item 2321 and struck out item 2324 ''Stay of Commission's order'' and item 2325 ''Injunction; three-judge court required''.

§ 2321. Judicial review of Board's orders and decisions; procedure generally; process

(a) Except as otherwise provided by an Act of Congress, a proceeding to enjoin or suspend, in whole or in part, a rule, regulation, or order of the Surface Transportation Board shall be brought in the court of appeals as provided by and in the manner prescribed in chapter 158 of this title.

(b) The procedure in the district courts in actions to enforce, in whole or in part, any order of the Surface Transportation Board other than for payment of money or the collection of fines, penalties, and forfeitures, shall be as provided in this chapter.

(c) The orders, writs, and process of the district courts may, in the cases specified in subsection (b) and in enforcement actions and actions to collect civil penalties under subtitle IV of title 49, run, be served and be returnable anywhere in the United States.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 969; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §115, 63 Stat. 105; Pub. L. 93–584, §5, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1917; Pub. L. 95–473, §2(a)(3)(B), Oct. 17, 1978, 92 Stat. 1465; Pub. L. 104–88, title III, §305(c)(1)(B), (C), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 945.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §44 (Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 220.)

Word ''actions'' was substituted for ''cases,'' in view of rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The exception as to procedure in the infliction of criminal punishment was omitted as unnecessary, as Title 18, U.S.C., Crimes and Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure govern procedure in criminal matters.

Changes were made in phraseology.

1949 ACT

This section corrects, in section 2321 of title 28, U.S.C., the reference to certain sections in title 49,

U.S.C. The provisions which were formerly set out as section 49 of such title 49, are now set out as section 23 of such title.

AMENDMENTS

1995—Pub. L. 104–88 substituted ''Board's'' for ''Commission's'' in section catchline and ''Surface Transportation Board'' for ''Interstate Commerce Commission'' in subsecs. (a) and (b).

1978—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 95–473 substituted ''enforcement actions and actions to collect civil penalties under subtitle IV of title 49'' for ''actions under section 20 of the Act of February 4, 1887, as amended (24 Stat. 386; 49 U.S.C. 20), section 23 of the Act of May 16, 1942, as amended (56 Stat. 301; 49 U.S.C. 23), and section 3 of the Act of February 19, 1903, as amended (32 Stat. 848; 49 U.S.C. 43)''.

1975—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 93–584 designated existing provisions as subsecs. (b) and (c) and added subsec. (a).

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 93–584 designated existing first par. as subsec. (b) and substituted ''in whole or in part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission other than for'', for ''suspend, enjoin, annual or set aside in whole or in part any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission other than for the''.

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 93–584 designated existing second par. as subsec. (c), substituted reference to subsec. (b) of this section for reference to this section, and inserted references to the dates of enactment, statute citations and code references of sections 20, 23 and 43 of Title 49.

1949—Act May 24, 1949, substituted ''20, 23, and 43'' for ''20, 43, and 49'' in second par.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1995 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 104–88 effective Jan. 1, 1996, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as an Effective Date note under section 701 of Title 49, Transportation.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1975 AMENDMENT

Section 10 of Pub. L. 93–584 provided that: ''This Act [amending this section, sections 1336, 1398, 2323, 2341, and 2342 of this title, and section 305 of former Title 49, Transportation, and repealing sections 2324 and 2325 of this title] shall not apply to any action commenced on or before the last day of the first month beginning after the date of enactment [Jan. 2, 1975]. However, actions to enjoin or suspend orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission which are pending when this Act becomes effective shall not be affected thereby, but shall proceed to final disposition under the law existing on the date they were commenced.''

§ 2322. United States as party

All actions specified in section 2321 of this title shall be brought by or against the United States.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 969.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 48 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 211, 36 Stat. 1150; Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 219).

Word ''actions'' was substituted for ''cases and proceedings'', in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A provision authorizing intervention by the United States was omitted. The United States, under the provisions of this section, is a necessary and indispensable original party, and hence intervention is unnecessary. (See *Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.*, 1922, 42 S.Ct. 349, 258 U.S. 377, 66 L.Ed. 671.)

§ 2323. Duties of Attorney General; intervenors

The Attorney General shall represent the Government in the actions specified in section 2321 of this title and in enforcement actions and actions to collect civil penalties under subtitle IV of title 49.

The Surface Transportation Board and any party or parties in interest to the proceeding before the Board, in which an order or requirement is made, may appear as parties of their own motion and as of right, and be represented by their counsel, in any action involving the validity of such order or requirement or any part thereof, and the interest of such party.

Communities, associations, corporations, firms, and individuals interested in the controversy or question before the Board, or in any action commenced under the aforesaid sections may intervene in said action at any time after commencement thereof.

The Attorney General shall not dispose of or discontinue said action or proceeding over the objection of such party or intervenor, who may prosecute, defend, or continue said action or proceeding unaffected by the action or nonaction of the Attorney General therein.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 970; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 116, 63 Stat. 105; Pub. L. 93–584, § 6, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1917; Pub. L. 95–473, § 2(a)(3)(C), Oct. 17, 1978, 92 Stat. 1465; Pub. L. 104–88, title III, § 305(c)(1)(C), (D), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 945.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 45a (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 212, 213, 36 Stat. 1150, 1151; Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 220).

The provision in the second sentence of section 45a of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., authorizing the Attorney General to employ and compensate special attorneys was omitted as covered by sections 503 and 508 [now 543 and 548] of this title. The provision in the same sentence authorizing the court to make rules for the conduct and procedure of actions under this section were omitted as covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and section 2071 of this title relating to authority of district courts to promulgate local rules of procedure.

The last paragraph of section 45a of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., was omitted as merely repetitive of the language immediately following the first proviso.

Word ''action'' was substituted for ''suit'' in conformity with Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Changes were made in phraseology.

1949 ACT

This section corrects, in section 2323 of title 28, U.S.C., the reference to certain sections in title 49, U.S.C. The provisions which were formerly set out as section 49 of such title 49 are now set out as section 23 of such title.

AMENDMENTS

1995—Pub. L. 104–88 substituted ''Surface Transportation Board'' for ''Interstate Commerce Commission'' and substituted ''the Board'' for ''the Commission'' in two places.

1978—Pub. L. 95–473 substituted ''enforcement actions and actions to collect civil penalties under subtitle IV of title 49'' for ''actions under section 20 of the Act of February 4, 1887, as amended (24 Stat. 386; 49 U.S.C. 20), section 23 of the Act of May 16, 1942, as amended (56 Stat. 301; 49 U.S.C. 23), and section 3 of the Act of February 19, 1903, as amended (32 Stat. 848; 49 U.S.C. 43)'' in first par.

1975—Pub. L. 93–584 struck out reference to the district courts and the Supreme Court of the United States upon appeal from the district courts as the courts in which the Attorney General can represent the United States in first par.

1949—Act May 24, 1949, substituted ''20, 23, and 43'' for ''20, 43, and 49'' in first par.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1995 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 104–88 effective Jan. 1, 1996, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as an Effective Date note under section 701 of Title 49, Transportation.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1975 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 93–584 not applicable to actions commenced on or before last day of first month beginning after Jan. 2, 1975, and actions to enjoin or suspend orders of Interstate Commerce Commission which are pending when this amendment becomes effective shall not be affected thereby, but shall proceed to final disposition under the law existing on the date they were commenced, see section 10 of Pub. L. 93–584, set out as a note under section 2321 of this title.

[§§ 2324, 2325. Repealed. Pub. L. 93–584, § 7, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1918]

Section 2324, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 970, related to power of court to restrain or suspend operation of orders of Interstate Commerce Commission pending final hearing and determination of action.

Section 2325, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 970, related to requirement of a three judge district court to hear and determine interlocutory or permanent injunctions restraining enforcement, operation or execution of orders of Interstate Commerce Commission.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPEAL

Repeal applicable to actions commenced on or before last day of first month beginning after Jan. 2, 1975, and actions to enjoin or suspend orders of Interstate Commerce Commission which are pending when this repeal becomes effective shall not be affected thereby, but shall proceed to final disposition under the law existing on the date they were commenced, see section 10 of Pub. L. 93–584, set out as an Effective Date of 1975 Amendment note under section 2321 of this title.

CHAPTER 158—ORDERS OF FEDERAL AGENCIES; REVIEW

AMENDMENTS

1982—Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 138, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42, struck out item 2353 ''Decision of the Plant Variety Protection Office''.

1966—Pub. L. 89–773, § 4, Nov. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 1323, struck out item 2352 ''Rules''.

§ 2341. Definitions

As used in this chapter—

(1) ''clerk'' means the clerk of the court in which the petition for the review of an order, reviewable under this chapter, is filed;

(2) ''petitioner'' means the party or parties by whom a petition to review an order, reviewable under this chapter, is filed; and

(3) ''agency'' means—

(A) the Commission, when the order sought to be reviewed was entered by the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Maritime Commission, or the Atomic Energy Commission, as the case may be;

(B) the Secretary, when the order was entered by the Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of Transportation;

(C) the Administration, when the order was entered by the Maritime Administration;

(D) the Secretary, when the order is under section 812 of the Fair Housing Act; and

(E) the Board, when the order was entered by the Surface Transportation Board.

(Added Pub. L. 89–554, § 4(e), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 622; amended Pub. L. 93–584, § 3, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1917; Pub. L. 100–430, § 11(b), Sept. 13, 1988, 102 Stat. 1635; Pub. L. 102–365, § 5(c)(1), Sept. 3, 1992, 106 Stat. 975; Pub. L. 104–88, title III, § 305(d)(1)–(4), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 945.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derivation	*U.S. Code*	*Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large*
.....	5 U.S.C. 1031.	Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §1, 64 Stat. 1129. Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, §2(a), 68 Stat. 961.

Subsection (a) of former section 1031 of title 5 is omitted as unnecessary because the term ''court of appeals'' as used in title 28 means a United States Court of Appeals and no additional definition is necessary.

In paragraph (3), reference to the United States Maritime Commission is omitted because that Commission was abolished by 1950 Reorg. Plan No. 21, § 306, eff. May 24, 1950, 64 Stat. 1277. Reference to ''Federal Maritime Commission'' is substituted for ''Federal Maritime Board'' on authority of 1961 Reorg. Plan No. 7, eff. Aug. 12, 1961, 75 Stat. 840.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 812 of the Fair Housing Act, referred to in par. (3)(D), is classified to section 3612 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.

AMENDMENTS

1995—Par. (3)(A). Pub. L. 104–88, § 305(d)(1), struck out ''the Interstate Commerce Commission,'' after ''Maritime Commission,''.

Par. (3)(E). Pub. L. 104–88, § 305(d)(2)–(4), added subpar. (E).

1992—Par. (3)(B). Pub. L. 102–365 inserted ''or the Secretary of Transportation'' after ''Secretary of Agriculture''.

1988—Par. (3)(D). Pub. L. 100–430 added subpar. (D).

1975—Par. (3)(A). Pub. L. 93–584 inserted reference to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1995 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 104–88 effective Jan. 1, 1996, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as an Effective Date note under section 701 of Title 49, Transportation.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1988 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 100–430 effective on the 180th day beginning after Sept. 13, 1988, see section 13(a) of Pub. L. 100–430, set out as a note under section 3601 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1975 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 93–584 not applicable to actions commenced on or before last day of first month beginning after Jan. 2, 1975, and actions to enjoin or

suspend orders of Interstate Commerce Commission which are pending when this amendment becomes effective shall not be affected thereby, but shall proceed to final disposition under the law existing on the date they were commenced, see section 10 of Pub. L. 93–584, set out as a note under section 2321 of this title.

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

Atomic Energy Commission abolished and functions transferred by sections 5814 and 5841 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. See, also, Transfer of Functions notes set out under those sections.

§ 2342. Jurisdiction of court of appeals

The court of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of—

(1) all final orders of the Federal Communication Commission made reviewable by section 402(a) of title 47;

(2) all final orders of the Secretary of Agriculture made under chapters 9 and 20A of title 7, except orders issued under sections 210(e), 217a, and 499g(a) of title 7;

(3) all rules, regulations, or final orders of—

(A) the Secretary of Transportation issued pursuant to section 50501, 50502, 56101–56104, or 57109 of title 46 or pursuant to part B or C of subtitle IV, subchapter III of chapter 311, chapter 313, or chapter 315 of title 49; and

(B) the Federal Maritime Commission issued pursuant to section 305, 41304, 41308, or 41309 or chapter 421 or 441 of title 46;

(4) all final orders of the Atomic Energy Commission made reviewable by section 2239 of title 42;

(5) all rules, regulations, or final orders of the Surface Transportation Board made reviewable by section 2321 of this title;

(6) all final orders under section 812 of the Fair Housing Act; and

(7) all final agency actions described in section 20114(c) of title 49.

Jurisdiction is invoked by filing a petition as provided by section 2344 of this title.

(Added Pub. L. 89–554, § 4(e), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 622; amended Pub. L. 93–584, § 4, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1917; Pub. L. 95–454, title II, § 206, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1144; Pub. L. 96–454, § 8(b)(2), Oct. 15, 1980, 94 Stat. 2021; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 137, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 41; Pub. L. 98–554, title II, § 227(a)(4), Oct. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 2852; Pub. L. 99–336, § 5(a), June 19, 1986, 100 Stat. 638; Pub. L. 100–430, § 11(a), Sept. 13, 1988, 102 Stat. 1635; Pub. L. 102–365, § 5(c)(2), Sept. 3, 1992, 106 Stat. 975; Pub. L. 103–272, § 5(h), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1375; Pub. L. 104–88, title III, § 305(d)(5)–(8), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 945; Pub. L. 104–287, § 6(f)(2), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3399; Pub. L. 109–59, title IV, § 4125(a), Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat. 1738; Pub. L. 109–304, § 17(f)(3), Oct. 6, 2006, 120 Stat. 1708.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derivation	*U.S. Code*	*Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large*
.....	5 U.S.C. 1032.	Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, § 2, 64 Stat. 1129. Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, § 2(b), 68 Stat. 961.

The words ''have exclusive jurisdiction'' are substituted for ''shall have exclusive jurisdiction''.

In paragraph (1), the word ''by'' is substituted for ''in accordance with''.

In paragraph (3), the word ''now'' is omitted as unnecessary. The word ''under'' is substituted for ''pursuant to the provisions of''. Reference to ''Federal Maritime Commission'' is substituted for ''Federal Maritime Board'' on authority of 1961 Reorg. Plan No. 7, eff. Aug. 12, 1961, 75 Stat. 840. Reference to the United States Maritime Commission is omitted because that Commission was abolished by 1950 Reorg. Plan No. 21, § 306, eff. May 24, 1951, 64 Stat. 1277, and any existing rights are preserved by technical sections 7 and 8.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 812 of the Fair Housing Act, referred to in par. (6), is classified to section 3612 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.

AMENDMENTS

2006—Par. (3)(A). Pub. L. 109–304, § 17(f)(3)(A), substituted ''section 50501, 50502, 56101–56104, or 57109 of title 46'' for ''section 2, 9, 37, or 41 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (46 U.S.C. App. 802, 803, 808, 835, 839, and 841a)''.

Par. (3)(B). Pub. L. 109–304, § 17(f)(3)(B), added subpar. (B) and struck out former subpar. (B) which read as follows:

''(B) the Federal Maritime Commission issued pursuant to—

''(i) section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46 U.S.C. App. 876);

''(ii) section 14 or 17 of the Shipping Act of 1984 (46 U.S.C. App. 1713 or 1716); or

''(iii) section 2(d) or 3(d) of the Act of November 6, 1966 (46 U.S.C. App. 817d(d) or 817e(d));''.

2005—Par. (3)(A). Pub. L. 109–59 inserted '', subchapter III of chapter 311, chapter 313, or chapter 315'' before ''of title 49''.

1996—Par. (3)(A). Pub. L. 104–287 amended Pub. L. 104–88, § 305(d)(6). See 1995 Amendment note below.

1995—Par. (3)(A). Pub. L. 104–88, § 305(d)(6), as amended by Pub. L. 104–287, inserted ''or pursuant to part B or C of subtitle IV of title 49'' before the semicolon.

Pub. L. 104–88, § 305(d)(5), substituted ''or 41'' for ''41, or 43''.

Par. (3)(B). Pub. L. 104–88, § 305(d)(7), redesignated cls. (ii), (iv), and (v) as (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively, and struck out former cls. (i) and (iii) which read as follows:

''(i) section 23, 25, or 43 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (46 U.S.C. App. 822, 824, or 841a);

''(iii) section 2, 3, 4, or 5 of the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933 (46 U.S.C. App. 844, 845, 845a, or 845b);''.

Par. (5). Pub. L. 104–88, § 305(d)(8), added par. (5) and struck out former par. (5) which read as follows: ''all rules, regulations, or final orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission made reviewable by section 2321 of this title and all final orders of such Commission made reviewable under section 11901(j)(2) of title 49, United States Code;''.

1994—Par. (7). Pub. L. 103–272 substituted ''section 20114(c) of title 49'' for ''section 202(f) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970''.

1992—Par. (7). Pub. L. 102–365, which directed the addition of par. (7) at end, was executed by adding par. (7) after par. (6) and before concluding provisions, to reflect the probable intent of Congress.

1988—Par. (6). Pub. L. 100–430 added par. (6).

1986—Par. (3). Pub. L. 99–336 amended par. (3) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (3) read as follows: ''such final orders of the Federal Maritime Commission or the Maritime Administration entered under chapters 23 and 23A of title 46 as are subject to judicial review under section 830 of title 46;''.

1984—Par. (5). Pub. L. 98–554 substituted ''11901(j)(2)'' for ''11901(i)(2)''.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 inserted ''(other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit)'' after ''court of appeals'' in provisions preceding par. (1), and

struck out par. (6) which had given the court of appeals jurisdiction in cases involving all final orders of the Merit Systems Protection Board except as provided for in section 7703(b) of title 5. See section 1295(a)(9) of this title.

1980—Par. (5). Pub. L. 96–454 inserted ''and all final orders of such Commission made reviewable under section 11901(i)(2) of title 49, United States Code'' after ''section 2321 of this title''.

1978—Par. (6). Pub. L. 95–454 added par. (6).

1975—Par. (5). Pub. L. 93–584 added par. (5).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1996 AMENDMENT

Section 6(f) of Pub. L. 104–287 provided that the amendment made by that section is effective Dec. 29, 1995.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1995 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 104–88 effective Jan. 1, 1996, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as an Effective Date note under section 701 of Title 49, Transportation.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1988 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 100–430 effective on 180th day beginning after Sept. 13, 1988, see section 13(a) of Pub. L. 100–430, set out as a note under section 3601 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1986 AMENDMENT

Section 5(b) of Pub. L. 99–336 provided that: ''The amendment made by this section [amending this section] shall apply with respect to any rule, regulation, or final order described in such amendment which is issued on or after the date of the enactment of this Act [June 19, 1986].''

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1978 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 95–454 effective 90 days after Oct. 13, 1978, see section 907 of Pub. L. 95–454, set out as a note under section 1101 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1975 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 93–584 not applicable to actions commenced on or before last day of first month beginning after Jan. 2, 1975, and actions to enjoin or suspend orders of Interstate Commerce Commission which are pending when this amendment becomes effective shall not be affected thereby, but shall proceed to final disposition under the law existing on the date they were commenced, see section 10 of Pub. L. 93–584, set out as a note under section 2321 of this title.

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

Atomic Energy Commission abolished and functions transferred by sections 5814 and 5841 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. See, also, Transfer of Functions notes set out under those sections.

§ 2343. Venue

The venue of a proceeding under this chapter is in the judicial circuit in which the petitioner resides or has its principal office, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

(Added Pub. L. 89–554, § 4(e), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 622.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derivation	*U.S. Code*	*Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large*
.....	5 U.S.C. 1033.	Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §3, 64 Stat. 1130.

The section is reorganized for clarity and conciseness. The word ''is'' is substituted for ''shall be''. The word ''petitioner'' is substituted for ''party or any of the parties filing the petition for review'' in view of the definition of ''petitioner'' in section 2341 of this title.

§ 2344. Review of orders; time; notice; contents of petition; service

On the entry of a final order reviewable under this chapter, the agency shall promptly give notice thereof by service or publication in accordance with its rules. Any party aggrieved by the final order may, within 60 days after its entry, file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue lies. The action shall be against the United States. The petition shall contain a concise statement of—

(1) the nature of the proceedings as to which review is sought;

(2) the facts on which venue is based;

(3) the grounds on which relief is sought; and

(4) the relief prayed.

The petitioner shall attach to the petition, as exhibits, copies of the order, report, or decision of the agency. The clerk shall serve a true copy of the petition on the agency and on the Attorney General by registered mail, with request for a return receipt.

(Added Pub. L. 89–554, § 4(e), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 622.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derivation	*U.S. Code*	*Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large*
.....	5 U.S.C. 1034.	Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §4, 64 Stat. 1130.

The section is reorganized, with minor changes in phraseology. The words ''as prescribed by section 1033 of this title'' are omitted as surplusage. The words ''of the United States'' following ''Attorney General'' are omitted as unnecessary.

§ 2345. Prehearing conference

The court of appeals may hold a prehearing conference or direct a judge of the court to hold a prehearing conference.

(Added Pub. L. 89–554, § 4(e), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 622.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derivation	*U.S. Code*	*Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large*
.....	5 U.S.C. 1035.	Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §5, 64 Stat. 1130.

§ 2346. Certification of record on review

Unless the proceeding has been terminated on a motion to dismiss the petition, the agency shall file in the office of the clerk the record on review as provided by section 2112 of this title.

(Added Pub. L. 89–554, § 4(e), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 623.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derivation	*U.S. Code*	*Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large*
.....	5 U.S.C. 1036.	Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §6, 64 Stat. 1130.

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES—CONTINUED

Derivation	*U.S. Code*	*Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large*
		Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. 85–791, §31(a), 72 Stat. 951.

The words ''of the court of appeals in which the proceeding is pending'' are omitted as unnecessary in view of the definition of ''clerk'' in section 2341 of this title, and by reason of the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of appeals set forth in section 2342 of this title.

§ 2347. Petitions to review; proceedings

(a) Unless determined on a motion to dismiss, petitions to review orders reviewable under this chapter are heard in the court of appeals on the record of the pleadings, evidence adduced, and proceedings before the agency, when the agency has held a hearing whether or not required to do so by law.

(b) When the agency has not held a hearing before taking the action of which review is sought by the petition, the court of appeals shall determine whether a hearing is required by law. After that determination, the court shall—

(1) remand the proceedings to the agency to hold a hearing, when a hearing is required by law;

(2) pass on the issues presented, when a hearing is not required by law and it appears from the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties that no genuine issue of material fact is presented; or

(3) transfer the proceedings to a district court for the district in which the petitioner resides or has its principal office for a hearing and determination as if the proceedings were originally initiated in the district court, when a hearing is not required by law and a genuine issue of material fact is presented. The procedure in these cases in the district court is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(c) If a party to a proceeding to review applies to the court of appeals in which the proceeding is pending for leave to adduce additional evidence and shows to the satisfaction of the court that—

(1) the additional evidence is material; and

(2) there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence before the agency;

the court may order the additional evidence and any counterevidence the opposite party desires to offer to be taken by the agency. The agency may modify its findings of fact, or make new findings, by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and may modify or set aside its order, and shall file in the court the additional evidence, the modified findings or new findings, and the modified order or the order setting aside the original order.

(Added Pub. L. 89–554, §4(e), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 623.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derivation	*U.S. Code*	*Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large*
.....	5 U.S.C. 1037.	Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §7, 64 Stat. 1130. Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. 85–791, §31(b), 72 Stat. 951.

The headnotes of the subsections are omitted as unnecessary and to conform to the style of title 28.

In subsection (a), the words ''the petition'' following ''on a motion to dismiss'' are omitted as unnecessary. The word ''are'' is substituted for ''shall be''. The words ''in fact'' following ''when the agency has'' are omitted as unnecessary.

In subsection (b)(3), the words ''United States'' preceding ''district court'' are omitted as unnecessary because the term ''district court'' as used in title 28 means a United States district court. See section 451 of title 28, United States Code. The words ''or any petitioner'' are omitted as unnecessary in view of the definition of ''petitioner'' in section 2341 of this title. In the last sentence, the word ''is'' is substituted for ''shall be''.

In subsection (c), the words ''applies'' and ''shows'' are substituted for ''shall apply'' and ''shall show'', respectively.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (b)(3), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

§ 2348. Representation in proceeding; intervention

The Attorney General is responsible for and has control of the interests of the Government in all court proceedings under this chapter. The agency, and any party in interest in the proceeding before the agency whose interests will be affected if an order of the agency is or is not enjoined, set aside, or suspended, may appear as parties thereto of their own motion and as of right, and be represented by counsel in any proceeding to review the order. Communities, associations, corporations, firms, and individuals, whose interests are affected by the order of the agency, may intervene in any proceeding to review the order. The Attorney General may not dispose of or discontinue the proceeding to review over the objection of any party or intervenor, but any intervenor may prosecute, defend, or continue the proceeding unaffected by the action or inaction of the Attorney General.

(Added Pub. L. 89–554, §4(e), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 623.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derivation	*U.S. Code*	*Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large*
.....	5 U.S.C. 1038.	Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §8, 64 Stat. 1131.

In the first sentence, the words ''is responsible for and has control'' are substituted for ''shall be responsible for and have charge and control''.

In the last sentence, the word ''may'' is substituted for ''shall''. The word ''aforesaid'' following ''any party or intervenor'' is omitted as unnecessary. The words ''any intervenor'' and ''inaction'' are substituted for ''said intervenor or intervenors'' and ''nonaction'', respectively.

§ 2349. Jurisdiction of the proceeding

(a) The court of appeals has jurisdiction of the proceeding on the filing and service of a petition to review. The court of appeals in which the record on review is filed, on the filing, has jurisdiction to vacate stay orders or interlocutory injunctions previously granted by any court, and has exclusive jurisdiction to make and enter, on the petition, evidence, and proceedings set forth in the record on review, a judgment de-

termining the validity of, and enjoining, setting aside, or suspending, in whole or in part, the order of the agency.

(b) The filing of the petition to review does not of itself stay or suspend the operation of the order of the agency, but the court of appeals in its discretion may restrain or suspend, in whole or in part, the operation of the order pending the final hearing and determination of the petition. When the petitioner makes application for an interlocutory injunction restraining or suspending the enforcement, operation, or execution of, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any order reviewable under this chapter, at least 5 days' notice of the hearing thereon shall be given to the agency and to the Attorney General. In a case in which irreparable damage would otherwise result to the petitioner, the court of appeals may, on hearing, after reasonable notice to the agency and to the Attorney General, order a temporary stay or suspension, in whole or in part, of the operation of the order of the agency for not more than 60 days from the date of the order pending the hearing on the application for the interlocutory injunction, in which case the order of the court of appeals shall contain a specific finding, based on evidence submitted to the court of appeals, and identified by reference thereto, that irreparable damage would result to the petitioner and specifying the nature of the damage. The court of appeals, at the time of hearing the application for an interlocutory injunction, on a like finding, may continue the temporary stay or suspension, in whole or in part, until decision on the application.

(Added Pub. L. 89–554, § 4(e), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 624; amended Pub. L. 98–620, title IV, § 402(29)(F), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3359.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derivation	*U.S. Code*	*Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large*
.....	5 U.S.C. 1039.	Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, § 9, 64 Stat. 1131. Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. 87–225, § 1, 75 Stat. 497.

The headnotes of the subsections are omitted as unnecessary and to conform to the style of title 28.

In subsection (a), the words ''has jurisdiction'' and ''has exclusive jurisdiction'' are substituted for ''shall have jurisdiction'' and ''shall have exclusive jurisdiction'', respectively. The words ''previously granted'' are substituted for ''theretofore granted'' as the preferred expression.

In subsection (b), the words ''does not'' are substituted for ''shall not''. The words ''of the United States'' following ''Attorney General'' are omitted as unnecessary. The words ''In a case in which'' are substituted for ''In cases where''. The word ''result'' is substituted for ''ensue''. In the fourth sentence, the words ''provided for above'' following the last word ''application'' are omitted as unnecessary. In the last sentence, the word ''applies'' is substituted for ''shall apply''.

AMENDMENTS

1984—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98–620 struck out provisions that the hearing on an application for an interlocutory injunction be given preference and expedited and heard at the earliest practicable date after the expiration of the notice of hearing on the application, and that on the final hearing of any proceeding to review any order under this chapter, the same requirements as to precedence and expedition was to apply.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1984 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 98–620 not applicable to cases pending on Nov. 8, 1984, see section 403 of Pub. L. 98–620 set out as an Effective Date note under section 1657 of this title.

§ 2350. Review in Supreme Court on certiorari or certification

(a) An order granting or denying an interlocutory injunction under section 2349(b) of this title and a final judgment of the court of appeals in a proceeding to review under this chapter are subject to review by the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari as provided by section 1254(1) of this title. Application for the writ shall be made within 45 days after entry of the order and within 90 days after entry of the judgment, as the case may be. The United States, the agency, or an aggrieved party may file a petition for a writ of certiorari.

(b) The provisions of section 1254(2) of this title, regarding certification, and of section 2101(f) of this title, regarding stays, also apply to proceedings under this chapter.

(Added Pub. L. 89–554, § 4(e), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 624; amended Pub. L. 100–352, § 5(e), June 27, 1988, 102 Stat. 663.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derivation	*U.S. Code*	*Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large*
.....	5 U.S.C. 1040.	Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, § 10, 64 Stat. 1132.

The words ''of the United States'' following ''Supreme Court'' are omitted as unnecessary because the term ''Supreme Court'' as used in title 28 means the Supreme Court of the United States.

The words ''section 2101(f) of this title'' are substituted for ''section 2101(e) of Title 28'' on authority of the Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 106(b), 63 Stat. 104, which redesignated subsection (e) of section 2101 as subsection (f).

AMENDMENTS

1988—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 100–352 substituted ''1254(2)'' for ''1254(3)''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1988 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 100–352 effective ninety days after June 27, 1988, except that such amendment not to apply to cases pending in Supreme Court on such effective date or affect right to review or manner of reviewing judgment or decree of court which was entered before such effective date, see section 7 of Pub. L. 100–352, set out as a note under section 1254 of this title.

§ 2351. Enforcement of orders by district courts

The several district courts have jurisdiction specifically to enforce, and to enjoin and restrain any person from violating any order issued under section 193 of title 7.

(Added Pub. L. 89–554, § 4(e), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 624.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derivation	*U.S. Code*	*Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large*
.....	5 U.S.C. 1042.	Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, § 12, 64 Stat. 1132.

The words ''United States'' preceding ''district court'' are omitted as unnecessary because the term

''district court'' as used in title 28 means a United States district court. See section 451 of title 28, United States Code. The words ''have jurisdiction'' are substituted for ''are vested with jurisdiction''. The words ''heretofore or hereafter'' following ''order'' are omitted as unnecessary and any existing rights and liabilities are preserved by technical sections 7 and 8.

[§ 2352. Repealed. Pub. L. 89–773, § 4, Nov. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 1323]

Section, Pub. L. 89–554, § 4(e), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 624, directed the several courts of appeals to adopt and promulgate rules, subject to the approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States, governing the practice and procedure, including prehearing conference procedure, in proceedings to review orders under this chapter. See section 2072 of this title.

SAVINGS PROVISION

Section 4 of Pub. L. 89–773 provided in part that the repeal of this section shall not operate to invalidate or repeal rules adopted under the authority of this section prior to the enactment of Pub. L. 89–773, which rules shall remain in effect until superseded by rules prescribed under authority of section 2072 of this title as amended by Pub. L. 89–773.

[§ 2353. Repealed. Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 138, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42]

Section, added Pub. L. 91–577, title III, § 143(c), Dec. 24, 1970, 84 Stat. 1559, gave the court of appeals nonexclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals under section 71 of the Plant Variety Protection Act (7 U.S.C. 2461). See section 1295(a)(8) of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPEAL

Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as an Effective Date of 1982 Amendment note under section 171 of this title.

CHAPTER 159—INTERPLEADER

§ 2361. Process and procedure

In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this title, a district court may issue its process for all claimants and enter its order restraining them from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United States court affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved in the interpleader action until further order of the court. Such process and order shall be returnable at such time as the court or judge thereof directs, and shall be addressed to and served by the United States marshals for the respective districts where the claimants reside or may be found.

Such district court shall hear and determine the case, and may discharge the plaintiff from further liability, make the injunction permanent, and make all appropriate orders to enforce its judgment.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 970; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 117, 63 Stat. 105.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 41(26) (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, par. 26, as added Jan. 20, 1936, ch. 13, § 1, 49 Stat. 1096).

Jurisdiction and venue provisions of section 41(26) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., appear in sections 1335 and 1397 of this title.

Subsection (e) of section 41(26) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to defense in nature of interpleader and joinder of additional parties, was omitted as unnecessary, such matters being governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Words, ''Notwithstanding any provision of part I of this title to the contrary'' were omitted as unnecessary, since the revised title contains no ''contrary provisions.''

Changes were made in phraseology.

1949 ACT

This section makes clear that section 2361 of title 28, U.S.C., applies only to statutory actions and not to general equity interpleader suits in which the jurisdictional amount and diversity of citizenship requirements are the same as in other diversity cases.

AMENDMENTS

1949—Act May 24, 1949, substituted ''In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335 under this title'' for ''In any interpleader action,'', and inserted ''or prosecuting'' between ''instituting'' and ''any proceeding''.

CHAPTER 161—UNITED STATES AS PARTY GENERALLY

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1949 ACT

This section amends the analysis of chapter 161 of title 28, U.S.C., to conform item 2411 therein with the catch line of section 2411 of such title as amended by another section of this bill.

AMENDMENTS

1980—Pub. L. 96–481, title II, § 204(b), Oct. 21, 1980, 94 Stat. 2329, substituted ''Costs and fees'' for ''Costs'' in item 2412.

1976—Pub. L. 94–381, § 6, Aug. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 1120, inserted ''or a State'' after ''United States'' in item 2403.

1972—Pub. L. 92–562, § 3(b), Oct. 25, 1972, 86 Stat. 1177, added item 2409a.

1966—Pub. L. 89–505, § 2, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 305, added items 2415 and 2416.

1961—Pub. L. 87–187, § 2, Aug. 30, 1961, 75 Stat. 416, substituted ''and compromise settlements'' for ''against the United States'' in item 2414.

1954—Act July 30, 1954, ch. 648, §2(b), 68 Stat. 589, struck out ''denied'' in item 2402.

1949—Act May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §118, 63 Stat. 105, substituted ''Interest'' for ''Interest on judgments against United States'' in item 2411.

§ 2401. Time for commencing action against United States

(a) Except as provided by chapter 71 of title 41, every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues. The action of any person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be commenced within three years after the disability ceases.

(b) A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 971; Apr. 25, 1949, ch. 92, §1, 63 Stat. 62; Pub. L. 86–238, §1(3), Sept. 8, 1959, 73 Stat. 472; Pub. L. 89–506, §7, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 307; Pub. L. 95–563, §14(b), Nov. 1, 1978, 92 Stat. 2389; Pub. L. 111–350, §5(g)(8), Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3848.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§41(20), 942 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §24, part 20, 36 Stat. 1093; Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, §1310(c), 42 Stat. 311; June 2, 1924, 4:01 p.m., ch. 234, §1025(c), 43 Stat. 348; Feb. 24, 1925, ch. 309, 43 Stat. 972; Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, §§1122(c), 1200, 44 Stat. 121, 125; Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §420, 60 Stat. 845).

Section consolidates provision in section 41(20) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., as to time limitation for bringing actions against the United States under section 1346(a) of this title, with section 942 of said title 28.

Words ''or within one year after the date of enactment of this Act whichever is later'', in section 942 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., were omitted as executed.

Provisions of section 41(20) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to jurisdiction of district courts and trial by the court of actions against the United States are the basis of sections 1346(a) and 2402 of this title.

Words in subsec. (a) of this revised section, ''person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues'' were substituted for ''claims of married women, first accrued during marriage, of persons under the age of twenty-one years, first accrued during minority, and of idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the seas at the time the claim accrued, entitled to the claim.'' (See reviser's note under section 2501 of this title.)

Words in section 41(20) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., ''nor shall any of the said disabilities operate cumulatively'' were omitted. (See reviser's note under section 2501 of this title.)

A provision in section 41(20) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., that disabilities other than those specifically mentioned should not prevent any action from being barred was omitted as superfluous.

Subsection (b) of the revised section simplifies and restates said section 942 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., without change of substance.

Changes were made in phraseology.

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT

Subsection (b) amended in the Senate to insert the 1 year limitation on the bringing of tort actions and to include the limitation upon the time in which tort claims not exceeding $1000 must be presented to the appropriate Federal agencies for administrative disposition. 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559, Amendment No. 48.

AMENDMENTS

2011—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 111–350 substituted ''chapter 71 of title 41'' for ''the Contract Disputes Act of 1978''.

1978—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 95–563 inserted Contract Disputes Act of 1978 exception.

1966—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 89–506 struck out provisions dealing with a tort claim of $2,500 or under as a special category of tort claim requiring preliminary administrative action and substituted provisions requiring presentation of all tort claims to the appropriate Federal agency in writing within two years after the claim accrues and commencement of an action within six months of the date of mailing of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented for provisions requiring commencement of an action within two years after the claim accrues.

1959—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 86–238 substituted ''$2,500'' for ''$1,000'' in two places.

1949—Subsec. (b). Act Apr. 25, 1949, the time limitation on bringing tort actions from 1 year to 2 years.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1978 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 95–563 effective with respect to contracts entered into 120 days after Nov. 1, 1978, and, at the election of the contractor, with respect to any claim pending at such time before the contracting officer or initiated thereafter, see section 16 of Pub. L. 95–563, Nov. 1, 1978, 92 Stat. 2391, formerly set out as an Effective Date note under section 601 of former Title 41, Public Contracts.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 89–506 applicable to claims accruing six months or more after July 18, 1966, see section 10 of Pub. L. 89–506, set out as a note under section 2672 of this title.

§ 2402. Jury trial in actions against United States

Subject to chapter 179 of this title, any action against the United States under section 1346 shall be tried by the court without a jury, except that any action against the United States under section 1346(a)(1) shall, at the request of either party to such action, be tried by the court with a jury.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 971; July 30, 1954, ch. 648, §2(a), 68 Stat. 589; Pub. L. 104–331, §3(b)(3), Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4069.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§41(20), 931(a) (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §24, par. 20, 36 Stat. 1093; Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, §1310(c), 42 Stat. 311; June 2, 1924, 4:01 p.m., ch. 234, §1025(c), 43 Stat. 348; Feb. 24, 1925, ch. 309, 43 Stat. 972; Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, §§1122(c), 1200, 44 Stat. 121, 125; Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §410(a), 60 Stat. 843).

Section consolidates non-jury provisions of sections 41(20) and 931(a) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed. For other provisions of said section 931(a) relating to tort claims, see Distribution Table.

Word ''actions'' was substituted for ''suits'', in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Provisions of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §41(20) relating to jurisdiction of district courts and time for bringing actions against the United States are the basis of sections 1346 and 2401 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1996—Pub. L. 104–331 substituted ''Subject to chapter 179 of this title, any action'' for ''Any action''.

1954—Act July 30, 1954, permitted a jury trial at the request of either party in actions under section 1346(a)(1) of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1996 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 104–331 effective Oct. 1, 1997, see section 3(d) of Pub. L. 104–331, set out as an Effective Date note under section 1296 of this title.

§ 2403. Intervention by United States or a State; constitutional question

(a) In any action, suit or proceeding in a court of the United States to which the United States or any agency, officer or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the Attorney General, and shall permit the United States to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question of constitutionality. The United States shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality.

(b) In any action, suit, or proceeding in a court of the United States to which a State or any agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any statute of that State affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the attorney general of the State, and shall permit the State to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question of constitutionality. The State shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 971; Pub. L. 94–381, § 5, Aug. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 1120.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 401 (Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, § 1, 50 Stat. 751).

Word ''action'' was added before ''suit or proceeding'', in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Since this section applies to all Federal courts, the word ''suit'' was not required to be deleted by such rule.

''Court of the United States'' is defined in section 451 of this title. Direct appeal from decisions invalidating Acts of Congress is provided by section 1252 of this title.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1976—Pub. L. 94–381, § 5(b), inserted ''or a State'' after ''United States'' in section catchline.

Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub. L. 94–381, § 5(a), designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1976 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 94–381 not applicable to any action commenced on or before Aug. 12, 1976, see section 7 of Pub. L. 94–381, set out as a note under section 2284 of this title.

§ 2404. Death of defendant in damage action

A civil action for damages commenced by or on behalf of the United States or in which it is interested shall not abate on the death of a defendant but shall survive and be enforceable against his estate as well as against surviving defendants.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 971.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 780a (June 16, 1933, ch. 103, 48 Stat. 311).

Substitution of parties, see rule 25(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Changes in phraseology were made.

§ 2405. Garnishment

In any action or suit commenced by the United States against a corporation for the recovery of money upon a bill, note, or other security, the debtors of the corporation may be summoned as garnishees. Any person so summoned shall appear in open court and depose in writing to the amount of his indebtedness to the corporation at the time of the service of the summons and at the time of making the deposition, and judgment may be entered in favor of the United States for the sum admitted by the garnishee to be due the corporation as if it had been due the United States. A judgment shall not be entered against any garnishee until after judgment has been rendered against the corporation, nor until the sum in which the garnishee is indebted is actually due.

When any garnishee deposes in open court that he is not and was not at the time of the service of the summons indebted to the corporation, an issue may be tendered by the United States upon such deposition. If, upon the trial of that issue, a verdict is rendered against the garnishee, judgment shall be entered in favor of the United States, pursuant to such verdict, with costs.

Any garnishee who fails to appear at the term to which he is summoned shall be subject to attachment for contempt.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 971.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 748, 749, and 750 (R.S. §§ 935, 936, 937).

Changes were made in phraseology.

§ 2406. Credits in actions by United States; prior disallowance

In an action by the United States against an individual, evidence supporting the defendant's claim for a credit shall not be admitted unless he first proves that such claim has been disallowed, in whole or in part, by the Government Accountability Office, or that he has, at the time of the trial, obtained possession of vouchers not previously procurable and has been prevented from presenting such claim to the Government Accountability Office by absence from the United States or unavoidable accident.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 972; Pub. L. 108–271, § 8(b), July 7, 2004, 118 Stat. 814.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 774 (R.S., §§ 236, 951; June 10, 1921, ch. 18, §§ 304, 305, 42 Stat. 24).

Word ''action'' was substituted for ''suits'', in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 774 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., provided that ''no claim for a credit shall be admitted, upon trial'', etc. This was changed to ''evidence supporting the defendant's claim for a credit shall not be admitted'', to clarify the meaning of the section. The case of *U.S. v. Heard*, D.C.Va. 1940, 32 F.Supp. 39, reviews the conflicting decisions on the question whether compliance with the section must be pleaded, and offers persuasive argument that it need not be, and that the section was designed as a rule of evidence. The wording of the remainder of the section also supports this conclusion, as pointed out by Judge Learned Hand in *U.S. v. Standard Aircraft Corp.*, D.C.N.Y. 1926, 16 F.2d 307, followed in the Heard case.

Changes in phraseology were made.

AMENDMENTS

2004—Pub. L. 108–271 substituted ''Government Accountability Office'' for ''General Accounting Office'' in two places.

§ 2407. Delinquents for public money; judgment at return term; continuance

In an action by the United States against any person accountable for public money who fails to pay into the Treasury the sum reported due the United States, upon the adjustment of his account the court shall grant judgment upon motion unless a continuance is granted as specified in this section.

A continuance may be granted if the defendant, in open court and in the presence of the United States attorney, states under oath that he is equitably entitled to credits which have been disallowed by the Government Accountability Office prior to the commencement of the action, specifying each particular claim so rejected, and stating that he cannot safely come to trial.

A continuance may also be granted if such an action is commenced on a bond or other sealed instrument and the court requires the original instrument to be produced.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 972; Pub. L. 108–271, § 8(b), July 7, 2004, 118 Stat. 814.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 781 (R.S. § 957; June 10, 1921, ch. 18, § 304, 42 Stat. 24).

Word ''action'' was substituted for ''suit'', in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Words ''court requires the original instrument to be produced'' were substituted for ''defendant pleads non est factum, verifying such plea or motion by his oath, and the court thereupon requires the production of the original bond, contract, or other paper certified in the affidavit''. The plea of non est factum is obsolete under Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, the words deleted are superfluous, since a court would not require the production of an original instrument unless the proper procedure were taken to require such production.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

2004—Pub. L. 108–271 substituted ''Government Accountability Office'' for ''General Accounting Office'' in second par.

§ 2408. Security not required of United States

Security for damages or costs shall not be required of the United States, any department or agency thereof or any party acting under the direction of any such department or agency on the issuance of process or the institution or prosecution of any proceeding.

Costs taxable, under other Acts of Congress, against the United States or any such department, agency or party shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the department or agency which directed the proceedings to be instituted.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 972.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 870 (R.S. § 1001; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 117, 289, 36 Stat. 1131, 1167; Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, § 1, 45 Stat. 54; June 19, 1934, ch. 653, § 7, 48 Stat. 1109).

Section 870 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., applied only to the Supreme Court and district courts. The revised section applies to all courts.

Words ''process or the institution or prosecution of any proceeding'' were substituted for ''appeal, or other process in law, admiralty, or equity.''

Word ''agency'' was substituted for ''any corporation all the stock of which is beneficially owned by the United States, either directly or indirectly'', in view of the creation of many independent governmental agencies since the enactment of the original law on which this section is based.

Changes were made in phraseology.

§ 2409. Partition actions involving United States

Any civil action by any tenant in common or joint tenant owning an undivided interest in lands, where the United States is one of such tenants in common or joint tenants, against the United States alone or against the United States and any other of such owners, shall proceed, and be determined, in the same manner as would a similar action between private persons.

Whenever in such action the court orders a sale of the property or any part thereof the Attorney General may bid for the same in behalf of the United States. If the United States is the purchaser, the amount of the purchase money shall be paid from the Treasury upon a warrant drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury on the requisition of the Attorney General.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 972.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 766 (May 17, 1898, ch. 339, §§ 1, 2, 30 Stat. 416).

Provisions relating to service or commencement of the action and duty of United States attorneys to appear, defend, and file answer were omitted as surplusage and covered by Rules 2, 3, and 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and section 507 of this title.

Words ''shall proceed, and be determined, in the same manner as would a similar action between private persons'' were substituted for ''shall proceed as other cases for partition by courts of equity, and in making such partition the court shall be governed by the same principles of equity that control courts of equity, in partition proceedings between private persons,'' in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Changes were made in phraseology.

§ 2409a. Real property quiet title actions

(a) The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights. This section does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands, nor does it apply to or

affect actions which may be or could have been brought under sections 1346, 1347, 1491, or 2410 of this title, sections 7424, 7425, or 7426 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (26 U.S.C. 7424, 7425, and 7426), or section 208 of the Act of July 10, 1952 (43 U.S.C. 666).

(b) The United States shall not be disturbed in possession or control of any real property involved in any action under this section pending a final judgment or decree, the conclusion of any appeal therefrom, and sixty days; and if the final determination shall be adverse to the United States, the United States nevertheless may retain such possession or control of the real property or of any part thereof as it may elect, upon payment to the person determined to be entitled thereto of an amount which upon such election the district court in the same action shall determine to be just compensation for such possession or control.

(c) No preliminary injunction shall issue in any action brought under this section.

(d) The complaint shall set forth with particularity the nature of the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff claims in the real property, the circumstances under which it was acquired, and the right, title, or interest claimed by the United States.

(e) If the United States disclaims all interest in the real property or interest therein adverse to the plaintiff at any time prior to the actual commencement of the trial, which disclaimer is confirmed by order of the court, the jurisdiction of the district court shall cease unless it has jurisdiction of the civil action or suit on ground other than and independent of the authority conferred by section 1346(f) of this title.

(f) A civil action against the United States under this section shall be tried by the court without a jury.

(g) Any civil action under this section, except for an action brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States.

(h) No civil action may be maintained under this section by a State with respect to defense facilities (including land) of the United States so long as the lands at issue are being used or required by the United States for national defense purposes as determined by the head of the Federal agency with jurisdiction over the lands involved, if it is determined that the State action was brought more than twelve years after the State knew or should have known of the claims of the United States. Upon cessation of such use or requirement, the State may dispute title to such lands pursuant to the provisions of this section. The decision of the head of the Federal agency is not subject to judicial review.

(i) Any civil action brought by a State under this section with respect to lands, other than tide or submerged lands, on which the United States or its lessee or right-of-way or easement grantee has made substantial improvements or substantial investments or on which the United States has conducted substantial activities pursuant to a management plan such as range improvement, timber harvest, tree planting, mineral activities, farming, wildlife habitat improvement, or other similar activities, shall be barred unless the action is commenced within twelve years after the date the State received notice of the Federal claims to the lands.

(j) If a final determination in an action brought by a State under this section involving submerged or tide lands on which the United States or its lessee or right-of-way or easement grantee has made substantial improvements or substantial investments is adverse to the United States and it is determined that the State's action was brought more than twelve years after the State received notice of the Federal claim to the lands, the State shall take title to the lands subject to any existing lease, easement, or right-of-way. Any compensation due with respect to such lease, easement, or right-of-way shall be determined under existing law.

(k) Notice for the purposes of the accrual of an action brought by a State under this section shall be—

(1) by public communications with respect to the claimed lands which are sufficiently specific as to be reasonably calculated to put the claimant on notice of the Federal claim to the lands, or

(2) by the use, occupancy, or improvement of the claimed lands which, in the circumstances, is open and notorious.

(*l*) For purposes of this section, the term ''tide or submerged lands'' means ''lands beneath navigable waters'' as defined in section 2 of the Submerged Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1301).

(m) Not less than one hundred and eighty days before bringing any action under this section, a State shall notify the head of the Federal agency with jurisdiction over the lands in question of the State's intention to file suit, the basis therefor, and a description of the lands included in the suit.

(n) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit suits against the United States based upon adverse possession.

(Added Pub. L. 92–562, § 3(a), Oct. 25, 1972, 86 Stat. 1176; amended Pub. L. 99–514, § 2, Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2095; Pub. L. 99–598, Nov. 4, 1986, 100 Stat. 3351.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 208 of the Act of July 10, 1952, referred to in subsec. (a), is section 208(a) to (d) of act July 10, 1952, ch. 651, 66 Stat. 560. Section 208(a) to (c) is classified to section 666 of Title 43, Public Lands. Section 208(d) is not classified to the Code.

AMENDMENTS

1986—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 99–514 substituted ''Internal Revenue Code of 1986'' for ''Internal Revenue Code of 1954''.

Subsecs. (c) to (n). Pub. L. 99–598 added subsecs. (c) and (h) to (m), redesignated former subsecs. (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) as (d), (e), (f), (g), and (n), respectively, and inserted '', except for an action brought by a State,'' in subsec. (g).

SHORT TITLE

This section is popularly known as the ''Quiet Title Act''.

§ 2410. Actions affecting property on which United States has lien

(a) Under the conditions prescribed in this section and section 1444 of this title for the protection of the United States, the United States may be named a party in any civil action or suit in any district court, or in any State court having jurisdiction of the subject matter—

(1) to quiet title to,

(2) to foreclose a mortgage or other lien upon,

(3) to partition,

(4) to condemn, or

(5) of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader with respect to,

real or personal property on which the United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien.

(b) The complaint or pleading shall set forth with particularity the nature of the interest or lien of the United States. In actions or suits involving liens arising under the internal revenue laws, the complaint or pleading shall include the name and address of the taxpayer whose liability created the lien and, if a notice of the tax lien was filed, the identity of the internal revenue office which filed the notice, and the date and place such notice of lien was filed. In actions in the State courts service upon the United States shall be made by serving the process of the court with a copy of the complaint upon the United States attorney for the district in which the action is brought or upon an assistant United States attorney or clerical employee designated by the United States attorney in writing filed with the clerk of the court in which the action is brought and by sending copies of the process and complaint, by registered mail, or by certified mail, to the Attorney General of the United States at Washington, District of Columbia. In such actions the United States may appear and answer, plead or demur within sixty days after such service or such further time as the court may allow.

(c) A judgment or decree in such action or suit shall have the same effect respecting the discharge of the property from the mortgage or other lien held by the United States as may be provided with respect to such matters by the local law of the place where the court is situated. However, an action to foreclose a mortgage or other lien, naming the United States as a party under this section, must seek judicial sale. A sale to satisfy a lien inferior to one of the United States shall be made subject to and without disturbing the lien of the United States, unless the United States consents that the property may be sold free of its lien and the proceeds divided as the parties may be entitled. Where a sale of real estate is made to satisfy a lien prior to that of the United States, the United States shall have one year from the date of sale within which to redeem, except that with respect to a lien arising under the internal revenue laws the period shall be 120 days or the period allowable for redemption under State law, whichever is longer, and in any case in which, under the provisions of section 505 of the Housing Act of 1950, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1701k), and subsection (d) of section 3720 of title 38 of the United States Code, the right to redeem does not arise, there shall be no right of redemption. In any case where the debt owing the United States is due, the United States may ask, by way of affirmative relief, for the foreclosure of its own lien and where property is sold to satisfy a first lien held by the United States, the United States may bid at the sale such sum, not exceeding the amount of its claim with expenses of sale, as may be directed by the head (or his delegate) of the department or agency of the United States which has charge of the administration of the laws in respect to which the claim of the United States arises. In any case where the United States is a bidder at the judicial sale, it may credit the amount determined to be due it against the amount it bids at such sales.

(d) In any case in which the United States redeems real property under this section or section 7425 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, the amount to be paid for such property shall be the sum of—

(1) the actual amount paid by the purchaser at such sale (which, in the case of a purchaser who is the holder of the lien being foreclosed, shall include the amount of the obligation secured by such lien to the extent satisfied by reason of such sale),

(2) interest on the amount paid (as determined under paragraph (1)) at 6 percent per annum from the date of such sale, and

(3) the amount (if any) equal to the excess of (A) the expenses necessarily incurred in connection with such property, over (B) the income from such property plus (to the extent such property is used by the purchaser) a reasonable rental value of such property.

(e) Whenever any person has a lien upon any real or personal property, duly recorded in the jurisdiction in which the property is located, and a junior lien, other than a tax lien, in favor of the United States attaches to such property, such person may make a written request to the officer charged with the administration of the laws in respect of which the lien of the United States arises, to have the same extinguished. If after appropriate investigation, it appears to such officer that the proceeds from the sale of the property would be insufficient to wholly or partly satisfy the lien of the United States, or that the claim of the United States has been satisfied or by lapse of time or otherwise has become unenforceable, such officer may issue a certificate releasing the property from such lien.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 972; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §119, 63 Stat. 105; Pub. L. 85–508, §12(h), July 7, 1958, 72 Stat. 348; Pub. L. 86–507, §1(20), June 11, 1960, 74 Stat. 201; Pub. L. 89–719, title II, §201, Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1147; Pub. L. 99–514, §2, Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2095; Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, §3630, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4966; Pub. L. 102–83, §5(c)(2), Aug. 6, 1991, 105 Stat. 406; Pub. L. 104–316, title I, §114, Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3834.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§901, 902, 904, 905 (Mar. 4, 1931, ch. 515, §§1, 2, 4, 5, 46 Stat. 1528, 1529; May 17, 1932, ch. 190, 47 Stat. 158; June 25, 1936, ch. 804, 49

Stat. 1921; June 6, 1940, ch. 242, 54 Stat. 234; Dec. 2, 1942, ch. 656, §§1–3, 56 Stat. 1026).

Provisions including the districts of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, in section 901 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., were omitted as covered by ''any district court.'' See section 451 of this title.

Provisions in section 902 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to process, were omitted as covered by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Changes were made in phraseology.

1949 ACT

This amendment conforms the language of section 2410(b) of title 28, U.S.C., with that of the prior law with respect to service of process and complaint upon the United States in suits brought in State courts. This is provided for by rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to such suits in United States district courts.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 7425 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (d), is classified to section 7425 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

AMENDMENTS

1996—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 104–316 struck out ''shall so report to the Comptroller General who'' after ''unenforceable, such officer'' in second sentence.

1991—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 102–83 substituted ''section 3720 of title 38'' for ''section 1820 of title 38''.

1990—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101–647 inserted at end ''In any case where the United States is a bidder at the judicial sale, it may credit the amount determined to be due it against the amount it bids at such sales.''

1986—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 99–514 substituted ''Internal Revenue Code of 1986'' for ''Internal Revenue Code of 1954''.

1966—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 89–719 substituted ''subject matter—

''(1) to quiet title to,

''(2) to foreclose a mortgage or other lien upon,

''(3) to partition,

''(4) to condemn, or

''(5) of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader

with respect to,''

for ''subject matter, to quiet title to or for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien upon''.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 89–719 substituted ''complaint or pleading shall set forth'' for ''complaint shall set forth'', and inserted sentence requiring the complaint or pleading, in actions or suits involving liens arising under the internal revenue laws, to include the name and address of the taxpayer whose liability created the lien and, if a notice of the tax lien was filed, the identity of the internal revenue office which filed the notice, and the date and place such notice of lien was filed.

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 89–719 substituted ''judgment or decree in such action'' for ''judicial sale in such action'', ''discharge of the property from the mortgage or other lien'' for ''discharge of the property from liens and encumbrances'', and ''place where the court is situated'' for ''place where the property is situated'', and inserted provisions requiring an action to foreclose a mortgage or other lien, in which the United States is named as a party under this section, to seek a judicial sale, providing that the period of redemption where a sale is made with respect to a lien arising under the internal revenue laws is 120 days or the period allowable for redemption under State law, whichever is longer, and prohibiting the right of redemption in any case which, under the provisions of section 1701k of Title 12 and section 1820(d) of Title 38, the right to redeem does not arise.

Subsecs. (d), (e). Pub. L. 89–719 added subsec. (d) and redesignated former subsec. (d) as (e).

1960—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 86–507 inserted ''or by certified mail,'' after ''registered mail,''.

1958—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 85–508 struck out provisions which extended section to District Court for Territory of Alaska. See section 81A of this title which establishes a United States District Court for the State of Alaska.

1949—Subsec. (b). Act May 24, 1949, conformed section with that of prior law with respect to service of process and complaint upon the United States in suits brought in State courts.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1990 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 101–647 effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, see section 3631 of Pub. L. 101–647, set out as an Effective Date note under section 3001 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 89–719 applicable after Nov. 2, 1966, see section 203 of Pub. L. 89–719, set out as a note under section 1346 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1958 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 85–508 effective Jan. 3, 1959, on admission of Alaska into the Union pursuant to Proc. No. 3269, Jan. 3, 1959, 24 F.R. 81, 73 Stat. c16, as required by sections 1 and 8(c) of Pub. L. 85–508, see notes set out under section 81A of this title and preceding section 21 of Title 48, Territories and Insular Possessions.

§ 2411. Interest

In any judgment of any court rendered (whether against the United States, a collector or deputy collector of internal revenue, a former collector or deputy collector, or the personal representative in case of death) for any overpayment in respect of any internal-revenue tax, interest shall be allowed at the overpayment rate established under section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 upon the amount of the overpayment, from the date of the payment or collection thereof to a date preceding the date of the refund check by not more than thirty days, such date to be determined by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Commissioner is authorized to tender by check payment of any such judgment, with interest as herein provided, at any time after such judgment becomes final, whether or not a claim for such payment has been duly filed, and such tender shall stop the running of interest, whether or not such refund check is accepted by the judgment creditor.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 973; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §120, 63 Stat. 106; Pub. L. 93–625, §7(a)(2), Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 2115; Pub. L. 97–164, title III, §302(b), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 56; Pub. L. 99–514, §2, title XV, §1511(c)(18), Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2095, 2746.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§765, 931(a), 932, Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 359, §10, 24 Stat. 507; Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, §8, 43 Stat. 940; Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, §1, 45 Stat. 54; Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §§410(a), 411, 60 Stat. 843, 844).

Section consolidates section 765 with provisions of sections 931(a) and 932, all of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to interest on judgments, the latter two sections being applicable to judgments in tort claims cases. For other provisions of said sections 931(a) and 932, see Distribution Table. Said section 932 made the provisions of said section 765 applicable to such judgments, therefore the provisions of said section 931(a) that ''the United States shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment'' was omitted as covered by the language of said

section 765 providing that interest shall be computed from the date of the judgment.

Provisions of section 765 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., that when the findings of fact and the law applicable thereto have been filed in any case as provided in ''section 763'' [764] of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., and the judgment or decree is adverse to the Government, it shall be the duty of the district attorney to transmit to the Attorney General of the United States certified copies of all the papers filed in the cause, with a transcript of the testimony taken, the written findings of the court, and his written opinion as to the same, that, whereupon, the Attorney General shall determine and direct whether an appeal shall be taken or not, and that, when so directed, the district attorney shall cause an appeal to be perfected in accordance with the terms of the statutes and rules of practice governing the same were omitted as unnecessary and covered by section 507 of this title which provides for supervision of United States attorneys by the Attorney General.

Words of section 765 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., ''Until the time when an appropriation is made for the payment of the judgment or decree'' were omitted and words ''up to, but not exceeding, thirty days after the date of approval of any appropriation act providing for payment of the judgment'' were substituted. Substituted words clarify meaning and are in accord with congressional procedure in annual deficiency appropriation acts for payment of judgments against the United States. The substituted words will obviate necessity of repeating such provisions in appropriation acts.

Changes were made in phraseology.

1949 ACT

This section amends section 2411 of title 28, U.S.C., by restoring the provisions of section 177 of the former Judicial Code for the payment of interest on tax refunds.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in text, is classified to section 6621 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

AMENDMENTS

1986—Pub. L. 99–514, §1511(c)(18), substituted ''the overpayment rate established under section 6621'' for ''an annual rate established under section 6621''.

Pub. L. 99–514, §2, substituted ''Internal Revenue Code of 1986'' for ''Internal Revenue Code of 1954''.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 struck out ''(a)'' before ''In any judgment'' and struck out subsec. (b) which provided that, except as otherwise provided in subsection (a) of this section, on all final judgments rendered against the United States in actions instituted under section 1346 of this title, interest was to be computed at the rate of 4 per centum per annum from the date of the judgment up to, but not exceeding, thirty days after the date of approval of any appropriation Act providing for payment of the judgment.

1975—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 93–625 substituted ''an annual rate established under section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954'' for ''the rate of 6 per centum per annum''.

1949—Act May 24, 1949, restored provisions relating to payment of interest on tax refunds.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1986 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 99–514 applicable for purposes of determining interest for periods after Dec. 31, 1986, see section 1511(d) of Pub. L. 99–514, set out as a note under section 6621 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2412. Costs and fees

(a)(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title, but not including the fees and expenses of attorneys, may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. A judgment for costs when taxed against the United States shall, in an amount established by statute, court rule, or order, be limited to reimbursing in whole or in part the prevailing party for the costs incurred by such party in the litigation.

(2) A judgment for costs, when awarded in favor of the United States in an action brought by the United States, may include an amount equal to the filing fee prescribed under section 1914(a) of this title. The preceding sentence shall not be construed as requiring the United States to pay any filing fee.

(b) Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. The United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.

(c)(1) Any judgment against the United States or any agency and any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity for costs pursuant to subsection (a) shall be paid as provided in sections 2414 and 2517 of this title and shall be in addition to any relief provided in the judgment.

(2) Any judgment against the United States or any agency and any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity for fees and expenses of attorneys pursuant to subsection (b) shall be paid as provided in sections 2414 and 2517 of this title, except that if the basis for the award is a finding that the United States acted in bad faith, then the award shall be paid by any agency found to have acted in bad faith and shall be in addition to any relief provided in the judgment.

(d)(1)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

(B) A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an

itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based) which is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.

(C) The court, in its discretion, may reduce the amount to be awarded pursuant to this subsection, or deny an award, to the extent that the prevailing party during the course of the proceedings engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the matter in controversy.

(D) If, in a civil action brought by the United States or a proceeding for judicial review of an adversary adjudication described in section 504(a)(4) of title 5, the demand by the United States is substantially in excess of the judgment finally obtained by the United States and is unreasonable when compared with such judgment, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the court shall award to the party the fees and other expenses related to defending against the excessive demand, unless the party has committed a willful violation of law or otherwise acted in bad faith, or special circumstances make an award unjust. Fees and expenses awarded under this subparagraph shall be paid only as a consequence of appropriations provided in advance.

(2) For the purposes of this subsection—

(A) ''fees and other expenses'' includes the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case, and reasonable attorney fees (The amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that (i) no expert witness shall be compensated at a rate in excess of the highest rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by the United States; and (ii) attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.);

(B) ''party'' means (i) an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, or (ii) any owner of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or organization, the net worth of which did not exceed $7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, and which had not more than 500 employees at the time the civil action was filed; except that an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3)) exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code, or a cooperative association as defined in section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Act (12 U.S.C. 1141j(a)), may be a party regardless of the net worth of such organization or cooperative association or for purposes of subsection (d)(1)(D), a small entity as defined in section 601 of title 5;

(C) ''United States'' includes any agency and any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity;

(D) ''position of the United States'' means, in addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based; except that fees and expenses may not be awarded to a party for any portion of the litigation in which the party has unreasonably protracted the proceedings;

(E) ''civil action brought by or against the United States'' includes an appeal by a party, other than the United States, from a decision of a contracting officer rendered pursuant to a disputes clause in a contract with the Government or pursuant to chapter 71 of title 41;

(F) ''court'' includes the United States Court of Federal Claims and the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims;

(G) ''final judgment'' means a judgment that is final and not appealable, and includes an order of settlement;

(H) ''prevailing party'', in the case of eminent domain proceedings, means a party who obtains a final judgment (other than by settlement), exclusive of interest, the amount of which is at least as close to the highest valuation of the property involved that is attested to at trial on behalf of the property owner as it is to the highest valuation of the property involved that is attested to at trial on behalf of the Government; and

(I) ''demand'' means the express demand of the United States which led to the adversary adjudication, but shall not include a recitation of the maximum statutory penalty (i) in the complaint, or (ii) elsewhere when accompanied by an express demand for a lesser amount.

(3) In awarding fees and other expenses under this subsection to a prevailing party in any action for judicial review of an adversary adjudication, as defined in subsection (b)(1)(C) of section 504 of title 5, United States Code, or an adversary adjudication subject to chapter 71 of title 41, the court shall include in that award fees and other expenses to the same extent authorized in subsection (a) of such section, unless the court finds that during such adversary adjudication the position of the United States was substantially justified, or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

(4) Fees and other expenses awarded under this subsection to a party shall be paid by any agency over which the party prevails from any funds made available to the agency by appropriation or otherwise.

(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any costs, fees, and other expenses in connection with any proceeding to which section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 applies (determined without regard to subsections (b) and (f) of such section). Nothing in the preceding sentence shall prevent the awarding

under subsection (a) of section 2412 of title 28, United States Code, of costs enumerated in section 1920 of such title (as in effect on October 1, 1981).

(f) If the United States appeals an award of costs or fees and other expenses made against the United States under this section and the award is affirmed in whole or in part, interest shall be paid on the amount of the award as affirmed. Such interest shall be computed at the rate determined under section 1961(a) of this title, and shall run from the date of the award through the day before the date of the mandate of affirmance.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 973; Pub. L. 89–507, §1, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 308; Pub. L. 96–481, title II, §204(a), (c), Oct. 21, 1980, 94 Stat. 2327, 2329; Pub. L. 97–248, title II, §292(c), Sept. 3, 1982, 96 Stat. 574; Pub. L. 99–80, §§2, 6, Aug. 5, 1985, 99 Stat. 184, 186; Pub. L. 99–514, §2, Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2095; Pub. L. 102–572, title III, §301(a), title V, §§502(b), 506(a), title IX, §902(b)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4511–4513, 4516; Pub. L. 104–66, title I, §1091(b), Dec. 21, 1995, 109 Stat. 722; Pub. L. 104–121, title II, §232, Mar. 29, 1996, 110 Stat. 863; Pub. L. 105–368, title V, §512(b)(1)(B), Nov. 11, 1998, 112 Stat. 3342; Pub. L. 111–350, §5(g)(9), Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3848.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§258, 931(a) (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §152, 36 Stat. 1138; Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §410(a), 60 Stat. 843).

Section consolidates the last sentence of section 931(a) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with section 258 of said title 28. For other provisions of said section 931(a), see Distribution Table.

Subsection (a) is new. It follows the well-known common-law rule that a sovereign is not liable for costs unless specific provision for such liability is made by law. This is a corollary to the rule that a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent.

Many enactments of Congress relating to fees and costs contain specific exceptions as to the liability of the United States. (See, for example, section 548 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.) A uniform rule, embodied in this section, will make such specific exceptions unnecessary.

Subsection (b) incorporates section 258 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.

Subsection (c) incorporates the costs provisions of section 931(a) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.

Words ''and for summoning the same,'' after ''witnesses,'' were omitted from subsection (b) as covered by ''those actually incurred for witnesses.''

Changes were made in phraseology.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (e), is classified to section 7430 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

AMENDMENTS

2011—Subsec. (d)(2)(E). Pub. L. 111–350, §5(g)(9)(A), substituted ''chapter 71 of title 41'' for ''the Contract Disputes Act of 1978''.

Subsec. (d)(3). Pub. L. 111–350, §5(g)(9)(B), substituted ''chapter 71 of title 41'' for ''the Contract Disputes Act of 1978''.

1998—Subsec. (d)(2)(F). Pub. L. 105–368 substituted ''Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims'' for ''Court of Veterans Appeals''.

1996—Subsec. (d)(1)(D). Pub. L. 104–121, §232(a), added subpar. (D).

Subsec. (d)(2)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 104–121, §232(b)(1), substituted ''$125'' for ''$75''.

Subsec. (d)(2)(B). Pub. L. 104–121, §232(b)(2), inserted before semicolon at end ''or for purposes of subsection (d)(1)(D), a small entity as defined in section 601 of title 5''.

Subsec. (d)(2)(I). Pub. L. 104–121, §232(b)(3)–(5), added subpar. (I).

1995—Subsec. (d)(5). Pub. L. 104–66 struck out par. (5) which read as follows: ''The Attorney General shall report annually to the Congress on the amount of fees and other expenses awarded during the preceding fiscal year pursuant to this subsection. The report shall describe the number, nature, and amount of the awards, the claims involved in the controversy, and any other relevant information which may aid the Congress in evaluating the scope and impact of such awards.''

1992—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102–572, §301(a), designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2).

Subsec. (d)(2)(F). Pub. L. 102–572, §902(b)(1), substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

Pub. L. 102–573, §506(a), inserted before semicolon at end ''and the United States Court of Veterans Appeals''.

Subsec. (d)(5). Pub. L. 102–572, §502(b), substituted ''The Attorney General shall report annually to the Congress on'' for ''The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall include in the annual report prepared pursuant to section 604 of this title,''.

1986—Subsecs. (d)(2)(B), (e). Pub. L. 99–514 substituted ''Internal Revenue Code of 1986'' for ''Internal Revenue Code of 1954''.

1985—Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub. L. 99–80, §2(a)(1), substituted ''or any agency or any official of the United States'' for ''or any agency and any official of the United States''.

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 99–80, §6, repealed amendment made by Pub. L. 96–481, §204(c), and provided that subsec. (d) was effective on or after Aug. 5, 1985, as if it had not been repealed by section 204(c). See 1980 Amendment note and Revival of Previously Repealed Provisions note below.

Subsec. (d)(1)(A). Pub. L. 99–80, §2(a)(2), inserted '', including proceedings for judicial review of agency actions,'' after ''in tort)''.

Subsec. (d)(1)(B). Pub. L. 99–80, §2(b), inserted provisions directing that whether or not the position of the United States was substantially justified must be determined on the basis of the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action was based) which is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.

Subsec. (d)(2)(B). Pub. L. 99–80, §2(c)(1), substituted ''$2,000,000'' for ''$1,000,000'' in cl. (i), and substituted ''or (ii) any owner of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or organization, the net worth of which did not exceed $7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, and which had not more than 500 employees at the time the civil action was filed; except that an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3)) exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code, or a cooperative association as defined in section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Act (12 U.S.C. 1141j(a)), may be a party regardless of the net worth of such organization or cooperative association;'' for ''(ii) a sole owner of an unincorporated business, or a partnership, corporation, association, or organization whose net worth did not exceed $5,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, except that an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3)) exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of the Code and a cooperative association as defined in section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Act (12 U.S.C. 1141j(a)), may be a party regardless of the net worth of such organization or cooperative association, or (iii) a sole owner of an unincorporated business, or a partnership, corporation, association, or organiza-

tion, having not more than 500 employees at the time the civil action was filed; and''.

Subsec. (d)(2)(D) to (H). Pub. L. 99–80, §2(c)(2), added subpars. (D) to (H).

Subsec. (d)(4). Pub. L. 99–80, §2(d), amended par. (4) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (4) read as follows:

''(A) Fees and other expenses awarded under this subsection may be paid by any agency over which the party prevails from any funds made available to the agency, by appropriation or otherwise, for such purpose. If not paid by any agency, the fees and other expenses shall be paid in the same manner as the payment of final judgments is made in accordance with sections 2414 and 2517 of this title.

''(B) There is authorized to be appropriated to each agency for each of the fiscal years 1982, 1983, and 1984, such sums as may be necessary to pay fees and other expenses awarded pursuant to this subsection in such fiscal years.''

Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 99–80, §2(e), added subsec. (f).

1982—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 97–248 added subsec. (e).

1980—Pub. L. 96–481, §204(a), designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), struck out provision that payment of a judgment for costs shall be as provided in section 2414 and section 2517 of this title for the payment of judgments against the United States, and added subsecs. (b) to (d). Pub. L. 96–481, §204(c), repealed subsec. (d) eff. Oct. 1, 1984. See Effective Date of 1980 Amendment note below.

1966—Pub. L. 89–507 empowered a court having jurisdiction to award judgment for costs, except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, to the prevailing party in any action brought by or against the United States or any agency or official of the United States acting in his official capacity, limited the judgment for costs when taxed against the Government to reimbursing in whole or in part the prevailing party for costs incurred by him in the litigation, required the payment of a judgment for costs to be as provided in section 2414 and section 2517 of this title for the payment of judgments against the United States and eliminated provisions which limited the liability of the United States for fees and costs to those cases in which liability was expressed provided for by Act of Congress, permitted the district court or the Court of Claims, in an action under section 1346(a) or 1491 of this title if the United States put in issue plaintiff's right to recover, to allow costs to the prevailing party from the time of joining such issue, and which authorized the allowance of costs to the successful claimant in an action under section 1346(b) of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1998 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 105–368 effective on first day of first month beginning more than 90 days after Nov. 11, 1998, see section 513 of Pub. L. 105–368, set out as a note under section 7251 of Title 38, Veterans' Benefits.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1996 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 104–121 applicable to civil actions and adversary adjudications commenced on or after Mar. 29, 1996, see section 233 of Pub. L. 104–121, set out as a note under section 504 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Section 506(b) of Pub. L. 102–572 provided that: ''The amendment made by subsection (a) [amending this section] shall apply to any case pending before the United States Court of Veterans Appeals [now United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims] on the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 29, 1992], to any appeal filed in that court on or after such date, and to any appeal from that court that is pending on such date in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.''

Section 506(d) of Pub. L. 102–572 provided that: ''This section [amending this section and enacting provisions set out under this section], and the amendment made by this section, shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 29, 1992].''

Amendment by section 902(b)(1) of Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

Amendment by sections 301(a) and 502(b) of Pub. L. 102–572 effective Jan. 1, 1993, see section 1101(a) of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 905 of Title 2, The Congress.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1985 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 99–80 applicable to cases pending on or commenced on or after Aug. 5, 1985, but with provision for additional applicability to certain prior cases and to prior board of contracts appeals cases, see section 7 of Pub. L. 99–80, set out as a note under section 504 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–248 applicable to civil actions or proceedings commenced after Feb. 28, 1983, see section 292(e)(1) of Pub. L. 97–248, set out as an Effective Date note under section 7430 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1980 AMENDMENT

Amendment by section 204(a) of Pub. L. 96–481 effective Oct. 1, 1981, and applicable to any adversary adjudication, as defined in section 504(b)(1)(C) of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, and any civil action or adversary adjudication described in this section which is pending on, or commenced on or after, such date, see section 208 of Pub. L. 96–481, set out as an Effective Date note under section 504 of Title 5.

Section 204(c) of Pub. L. 96–481 which provided in part that effective Oct. 1, 1984, subsec. (d) of this section is repealed, except that the provisions of subsec. (d) shall continue to apply through final disposition of any adversary adjudication initiated before the date of repeal, was repealed by Pub. L. 99–80, §6(b)(2), Aug. 5, 1985, 99 Stat. 186.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENT

Section 3 of Pub. L. 89–507 provided that: ''These amendments [amending this section and section 2520 of this title] shall apply only to judgments entered in actions filed subsequent to the date of enactment of this Act [July 18, 1966]. These amendments shall not authorize the reopening or modification of judgments entered prior to the enactment of this Act.''

REVIVAL OF PREVIOUSLY REPEALED PROVISIONS

For revival of subsec. (d) of this section effective on or after Aug. 5, 1985, as if it had not been repealed by section 204(c) of Pub. L. 96–481, and repeal of section 204(c) of Pub. L. 96–481, see section 6 of Pub. L. 99–80, set out as a note under section 504 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

SAVINGS PROVISION

Section 206 of Pub. L. 96–481, as amended by Pub. L. 99–80, §3, Aug. 5, 1985, 99 Stat. 186, provided that:

''(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), nothing in section 2412(d) of title 28, United States Code, as added by section 204(a) of this title, alters, modifies, repeals, invalidates, or supersedes any other provision of Federal law which authorizes an award of such fees and other expenses to any party other than the United States that prevails in any civil action brought by or against the United States.

''(b) Section 206(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 406(b)(1)) shall not prevent an award of fees and other expenses under section 2412(d) of title 28, United States Code. Section 206(b)(2) of the Social Security Act shall not apply with respect to any such award but only if, where the claimant's attorney receives fees for the same work under both section 206(b) of that Act and

section 2412(d) of title 28, United States Code, the claimant's attorney refunds to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.''

AUTHORITY OF COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS TO AWARD FEES UNDER EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT FOR NON-ATTORNEY PRACTITIONERS.

Pub. L. 107–330, title IV, § 403, Dec. 6, 2002, 116 Stat. 2833, provided that: ''The authority of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys under section 2412(d) of title 28, United States Code, shall include authority to award fees and expenses, in an amount determined appropriate by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, of individuals admitted to practice before the Court as non-attorney practitioners under subsection (b) or (c) of Rule 46 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.''

NONLIABILITY OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS FOR COSTS

Pub. L. 104–317, title III, § 309(a), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3853, provided that: ''Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no judicial officer shall be held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, in any action brought against such officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer's jurisdiction.''

FEE AGREEMENTS

Section 506(c) of Pub. L. 102–572 provided that: ''Section 5904(d) of title 38, United States Code, shall not prevent an award of fees and other expenses under section 2412(d) of title 28, United States Code. Section 5904(d) of title 38, United States Code, shall not apply with respect to any such award but only if, where the claimant's attorney receives fees for the same work under both section 5904 of title 38, United States Code, and section 2412(d) of title 28, United States Code, the claimant's attorney refunds to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.''

§ 2413. Executions in favor of United States

A writ of execution on a judgment obtained for the use of the United States in any court thereof shall be issued from and made returnable to the court which rendered the judgment, but may be executed in any other State, in any Territory, or in the District of Columbia.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 974.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 839 (R.S. § 986).

Words ''or in the District of Columbia'' were added on the authority of 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 384, declaring that, under this section, a writ of execution in favor of the United States, obtained from a Federal court in any State, could be executed in the District of Columbia. (See, also, section 1963 of this title.)

Changes in phraseology were made.

§ 2414. Payment of judgments and compromise settlements

Except as provided by chapter 71 of title 41, payment of final judgments rendered by a district court or the Court of International Trade against the United States shall be made on settlements by the Secretary of the Treasury. Payment of final judgments rendered by a State or foreign court or tribunal against the United States, or against its agencies or officials upon obligations or liabilities of the United States, shall be made on settlements by the Secretary of the Treasury after certification by the Attorney General that it is in the interest of the United States to pay the same.

Whenever the Attorney General determines that no appeal shall be taken from a judgment or that no further review will be sought from a decision affirming the same, he shall so certify and the judgment shall be deemed final.

Except as otherwise provided by law, compromise settlements of claims referred to the Attorney General for defense of imminent litigation or suits against the United States, or against its agencies or officials upon obligations or liabilities of the United States, made by the Attorney General or any person authorized by him, shall be settled and paid in a manner similar to judgments in like causes and appropriations or funds available for the payment of such judgments are hereby made available for the payment of such compromise settlements.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 974; Pub. L. 87–187, § 1, Aug. 30, 1961, 75 Stat. 415; Pub. L. 95–563, § 14(d), Nov. 1, 1978, 92 Stat. 2390; Pub. L. 96–417, title V, § 512, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1744; Pub. L. 104–316, title II, § 202(k), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3843; Pub. L. 111–350, § 5(g)(10), Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3848.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on section 228 of title 31, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Money and Finance (Feb. 18, 1904, ch. 160, § 1, 33 Stat. 41; June 10, 1921, ch. 18, § 304, 42 Stat. 24).

Similar provisions of section 228 of title 31, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to judgments of the court of claims are incorporated in section 2517 of this title.

The second paragraph was added to make clear that the payment of judgments not appealed may be expedited by certificate to that effect.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

2011—Pub. L. 111–350 substituted ''chapter 71 of title 41'' for ''the Contract Disputes Act of 1978'' in first par.

1996—Pub. L. 104–316 in first par. substituted ''Secretary of the Treasury'' for ''General Accounting Office'' in two places.

1980—Pub. L. 96–417 provided for payment of final judgments rendered by the Court of International Trade against the United States on settlements by the General Accounting Office.

1978—Pub. L. 95–563 inserted Contract Disputes Act of 1978 exception.

1961—Pub. L. 87–187 provided for payment of final judgments rendered by a State or foreign court against the United States, its agencies or officials and compromise settlements and substituted ''and compromise settlements'' for ''against the United States'' in section catchline.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1980 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 96–417 effective Nov. 1, 1980, and applicable with respect to civil actions pending on or commenced on or after such date, see section 701(a) of Pub. L. 96–417, set out as a note under section 251 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1978 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 95–563 effective with respect to contracts entered into 120 days after Nov. 1, 1978, and, at the election of the contractor, with respect to any claim pending at such time before the contracting officer or initiated thereafter, see section 16 of Pub. L. 95–563, Nov. 1, 1978, 92 Stat. 2391, formerly set out as an Effective Date note under section 601 of former Title 41, Public Contracts.

§ 2415. Time for commencing actions brought by the United States

(a) Subject to the provisions of section 2416 of this title, and except as otherwise provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon any contract express or implied in law or fact, shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action accrues or within one year after final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings required by contract or by law, whichever is later: *Provided*, That in the event of later partial payment or written acknowledgment of debt, the right of action shall be deemed to accrue again at the time of each such payment or acknowledgment: *Provided further*, That an action for money damages brought by the United States for or on behalf of a recognized tribe, band or group of American Indians shall not be barred unless the complaint is filed more than six years and ninety days after the right of action accrued: *Provided further*, That an action for money damages which accrued on the date of enactment of this Act in accordance with subsection (g) brought by the United States for or on behalf of a recognized tribe, band, or group of American Indians, or on behalf of an individual Indian whose land is held in trust or restricted status, shall not be barred unless the complaint is filed sixty days after the date of publication of the list required by section 4(c) of the Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982: *Provided*, That, for those claims that are on either of the two lists published pursuant to the Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982, any right of action shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within (1) one year after the Secretary of the Interior has published in the Federal Register a notice rejecting such claim or (2) three years after the date the Secretary of the Interior has submitted legislation or legislative report to Congress to resolve such claim or more than two years after a final decision has been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings required by contract or by law, whichever is later.

(b) Subject to the provisions of section 2416 of this title, and except as otherwise provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon a tort shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within three years after the right of action first accrues: *Provided*, That an action to recover damages resulting from a trespass on lands of the United States; an action to recover damages resulting from fire to such lands; an action to recover for diversion of money paid under a grant program; and an action for conversion of property of the United States may be brought within six years after the right of action accrues, except that such actions for or on behalf of a recognized tribe, band or group of American Indians, including actions relating to allotted trust or restricted Indian lands, may be brought within six years and ninety days after the right of action accrues, except that such actions for or on behalf of a recognized tribe, band, or group of American Indians, including actions relating to allotted trust or restricted Indian lands, or on behalf of an individual Indian whose land is held in trust or restricted status which accrued on the date of enactment of this Act in accordance with subsection (g) may be brought on or before sixty days after the date of the publication of the list required by section 4(c) of the Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982: *Provided*, That, for those claims that are on either of the two lists published pursuant to the Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982, any right of action shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within (1) one year after the Secretary of the Interior has published in the Federal Register a notice rejecting such claim or (2) three years after the Secretary of the Interior has submitted legislation or legislative report to Congress to resolve such claim.

(c) Nothing herein shall be deemed to limit the time for bringing an action to establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or personal property.

(d) Subject to the provisions of section 2416 of this title and except as otherwise provided by Congress, every action for the recovery of money erroneously paid to or on behalf of any civilian employee of any agency of the United States or to or on behalf of any member or dependent of any member of the uniformed services of the United States, incident to the employment or services of such employee or member, shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action accrues: *Provided*, That in the event of later partial payment or written acknowledgment of debt, the right of action shall be deemed to accrue again at the time of each such payment or acknowledgment.

(e) In the event that any action to which this section applies is timely brought and is thereafter dismissed without prejudice, the action may be recommenced within one year after such dismissal, regardless of whether the action would otherwise then be barred by this section. In any action so recommenced the defendant shall not be barred from interposing any claim which would not have been barred in the original action.

(f) The provisions of this section shall not prevent the assertion, in an action against the United States or an officer or agency thereof, of any claim of the United States or an officer or agency thereof against an opposing party, a coparty, or a third party that arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. A claim of the United States or an officer or agency thereof that does not arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim may, if time-barred, be asserted only by way of offset and may be allowed in an amount not to exceed the amount of the opposing party's recovery.

(g) Any right of action subject to the provisions of this section which accrued prior to the date of enactment of this Act shall, for purposes of this section, be deemed to have accrued on the date of enactment of this Act.

(h) Nothing in this Act shall apply to actions brought under the Internal Revenue Code or incidental to the collection of taxes imposed by the United States.

(i) The provisions of this section shall not prevent the United States or an officer or agency thereof from collecting any claim of the United States by means of administrative offset, in accordance with section 3716 of title 31.

(Added Pub. L. 89–505, §1, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 304; amended Pub. L. 92–353, July 18, 1972, 86 Stat. 499; Pub. L. 92–485, Oct. 13, 1972, 86 Stat. 803; Pub. L. 95–64, July 11, 1977, 91 Stat. 268; Pub. L. 95–103, Aug. 15, 1977, 91 Stat. 842; Pub. L. 96–217, §1, Mar. 27, 1980, 94 Stat. 126; Pub. L. 97–365, §9, Oct. 25, 1982, 96 Stat. 1754; Pub. L. 97–394, title I, §2, Dec. 30, 1982, 96 Stat. 1976; Pub. L. 97–452, §2(d)(2), Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2478; Pub. L. 98–250, §4(a), Apr. 3, 1984, 98 Stat. 118.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The date of enactment of this Act, referred to in subsecs. (a), (b), and (g), means the date of enactment of Pub. L. 89–505, which was approved July 18, 1966.

The Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (b), is Pub. L. 97–394, title I, §§2–6, Dec. 30, 1982, 96 Stat. 1976–1978, which amended this section and enacted provisions set out as notes below. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 1982 Amendment note set out below and Tables.

This Act, referred to in subsec. (h), probably means Pub. L. 89–505, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 304, which enacted this section and section 2416 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.

AMENDMENTS

1984—Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub. L. 98–250 substituted ''Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982'' for ''Indian Claims Act of 1982'' wherever appearing.

1983—Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 97–452 substituted ''section 3716 of title 31'' for ''section 5 of the Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966''.

1982—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97–394, §2(a), substituted ''sixty days after the date of publication of the list required by section 4(c) of the Indian Claims Act of 1982: *Provided*, That, for those claims that are on either of the two lists published pursuant to the Indian Claims Act of 1982, any right of action shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within (1) one year after the Secretary of the Interior has published in the Federal Register a notice rejecting such claim or (2) three years after the date the Secretary of the Interior has submitted legislation or legislative report to Congress to resolve such claim'' for ''after December 31, 1982'' in third proviso.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 97–394, §2(b), substituted ''sixty days after the date of the publication of the list required by section 4(c) of the Indian Claims Act of 1982: *Provided*, That, for those claims that are on either of the two lists published pursuant to the Indian Claims Act of 1982, any right of action shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within (1) one year after the Secretary of the Interior has published in the Federal Register a notice rejecting such claim or (2) three years after the Secretary of the Interior has submitted legislation or legislative report to Congress to resolve such claim'' for ''December 31, 1982'' at end of proviso.

Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 97–365 added subsec. (i).

1980—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 96–217, §1(a), substituted ''December 31, 1982'' for ''April 30, 1980''.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 96–217, §1(b), substituted ''December 31, 1982'' for ''April 1, 1980''.

1977—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 95–103, §1(a), substituted ''after April 1, 1980'' for ''after August 18, 1977''.

Pub. L. 95–64, §1(a), substituted ''unless the complaint is filed after August 18, 1977'' for ''unless the complaint is filed more than eleven years after the right of action accrued'' in proviso covering actions for money damages brought by the United States for or on behalf of a recognized tribe, band, or group of American Indians, or on behalf of an individual Indian whose land is held in trust or restricted status based upon rights of action which accrued on July 18, 1966, in accordance with subsec. (g).

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 95–103, §1(b), substituted ''on or before April 1, 1980'' for ''on or before August 18, 1977''.

Pub. L. 95–64, §1(b), substituted ''may be brought on or before August 18, 1977'' for ''may be brought within eleven years after the right of action accrues'' in proviso covering actions for or on behalf of recognized tribes, bands, or groups of American Indians, including actions related to allotted trust or restricted Indian lands, or on behalf of an individual Indian whose land is held in trust or restricted status based upon rights of action which accrued on July 18, 1966, in accordance with subsec. (g).

1972—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 92–485, §1(a), inserted proviso relating to actions for money damages brought by the United States for or on behalf of a recognized tribe, band, or group of American Indians, or on behalf of an individual Indian whose land is held in trust or restricted status.

Pub. L. 92–353, §1(a), inserted proviso that an action for money damages brought by the United States on behalf of American Indians shall not be barred unless the complaint is filed more than six years and ninety days after the right of action accrued.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 92–485, §1(b), inserted exception relating to actions for or on behalf of a recognized tribe, band, or group of American Indians, including actions relating to allotted trust or restricted Indian lands, or on behalf of an individual Indian whose land is held in trust or restricted status.

Pub. L. 92–353, §1(b), increased the period of limitation to six years and ninety days for actions brought by the United States under the subsection for or on behalf of American Indians.

SHORT TITLE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Section 1 of Pub. L. 97–394, as amended by Pub. L. 98–250, §4(b), Apr. 3, 1984, 98 Stat. 119, provided that: ''Sections 2 through 6 of this Act [amending this section and enacting provisions set out below] may be cited as the 'Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982'.''

PUBLICATION OF LIST OF INDIAN CLAIMS; ADDITIONAL CLAIMS; TIME TO COMMENCE ACTION; REJECTION OF CLAIMS; CLAIMS RESOLVED BY LEGISLATION

Sections 3 to 6 of Pub. L. 97–394 provided that:

''SEC. 3. (a) Within ninety days after the enactment of this Act [Dec. 30, 1982], the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the 'Secretary') shall publish in the Federal Register a list of all claims accruing to any tribe, band or group of Indians or individual Indian on or before July 18, 1966, which have at any time been identified by or submitted to the Secretary under the 'Statute of Limitation Project' undertaken by the Department of the Interior and which, but for the provisions of this Act [see Short Title of 1982 Amendment note above], would be barred by the provisions of section 2415 of title 28, United States Code: *Provided*, That the Secretary shall have the discretion to exclude from such list any matter which was erroneously identified as a claim and which has no legal merit whatsoever.

''(b) Such list shall group the claims on a reservation-by-reservation, tribe-by-tribe, or State-by-State basis, as appropriate, and shall state the nature and geographic location of each claim and only such other additional information as may be needed to identify specifically such claims.

''(c) Within thirty days after the publication of this list, the Secretary shall provide a copy of the Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982 [see Short Title of 1982 Amendment note above] and a copy of the Federal Register containing this list, or such parts as may be pertinent, to each Indian tribe, band or group whose rights or the rights of whose members could be affected by the provisions of section 2415 of title 28, United States Code.

''SEC. 4. (a) Any tribe, band or group of Indians or any individual Indian shall have one hundred and eighty days after the date of the publication in the Federal Register of the list provided for in section 3 of this Act to submit to the Secretary any additional specific claim or claims which such tribe, band or group of Indians or individual Indian believes may be affected by section 2415 of title 28, United States Code, and desires to have considered for litigation or legislation by the United States.

''(b) Any such claim submitted to the Secretary shall be accompanied by a statement identifying the nature of the claim, the date when the right of action allegedly accrued, the names of the potential plaintiffs and defendants, if known, and such other information needed to identify and evaluate such claim.

''(c) Not more than thirty days after the expiration of the one hundred and eighty day period provided for in subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register a list containing the additional claims submitted during such period: *Provided*, That the Secretary shall have the discretion to exclude from such list any matter which has not been sufficiently identified as a claim.

''SEC. 5. (a) Any right of action shall be barred sixty days after the date of the publication of the list required by section 4(c) of this Act for those pre-1966 claims which, but for the provisions of this Act [see Short Title of 1982 Amendment note above], would have been barred by section 2415 of title 28, United States Code, unless such claims are included on either of the lists required by section 3 or 4(c) of this Act.

''(b) If the Secretary decides to reject for litigation any of the claims or groups or categories of claims contained on either of the lists required by section 3 or 4(c) of this Act, he shall send a report to the appropriate tribe, band, or group of Indians, whose rights or the rights of whose members could be affected by such rejection, advising them of his decision. The report shall identify the nature and geographic location of each rejected claim and the name of the potential plaintiffs and defendants if they are known or can be reasonably ascertained and shall, briefly, state the reasons why such claim or claims were rejected for litigation. Where the Secretary knows or can reasonably ascertain the identity of any of the potential individual Indian plaintiffs and their present addresses, he shall provide them with written notice of such rejection. Upon the request of any Indian claimant, the Secretary shall, without undue delay, provide to such claimant any nonprivileged research materials or evidence gathered by the United States in the documentation of such claim.

''(c) The Secretary, as soon as possible after providing the report required by subsection (b) of this section, shall publish a notice in the Federal Register identifying the claims covered in such report. With respect to any claim covered by such report, any right of action shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within one year after the date of publication in the Federal Register.

''SEC. 6. (a) If the Secretary determines that any claim or claims contained in either of the lists as provided in sections 3 or 4(c) of this Act is not appropriate for litigation, but determines that such claims may be appropriately resolved by legislation, he shall submit to the Congress legislation to resolve such claims or shall submit to Congress a report setting out options for legislative resolution of such claims.

''(b) Any right of action on claims covered by such legislation or report shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within 3 years after the date of submission of such legislation or legislative report to Congress.''

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS RESPECTING APPROPRIATENESS OF RESOLUTION BY LITIGATION OF UNRESOLVED INDIAN CLAIMS

Section 2 of Pub. L. 96–217 provided that: ''Not later than June 30, 1981, the Secretary of the Interior, after consultation with the Attorney General, shall submit to the Congress legislative proposals to resolve those Indian claims subject to the amendments made by the first section of this Act [amending this section] that the Secretary of the Interior or the Attorney General believes are not appropriate to resolve by litigation.''

§ 2416. Time for commencing actions brought by the United States—Exclusions

For the purpose of computing the limitations periods established in section 2415, there shall be excluded all periods during which—

(a) the defendant or the res is outside the United States, its territories and possessions, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; or

(b) the defendant is exempt from legal process because of infancy, mental incompetence, diplomatic immunity, or for any other reason; or

(c) facts material to the right of action are not known and reasonably could not be known by an official of the United States charged with the responsibility to act in the circumstances; or

(d) the United States is in a state of war declared pursuant to article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States.

(Added Pub. L. 89–505, § 1, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 305.)

CHAPTER 163—FINES, PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES

AMENDMENTS

2000—Pub. L. 106–185, §§ 4(b), 14(b), 15(b), Apr. 25, 2000, 114 Stat. 213, 219, 221, substituted ''Return of property to claimant; liability for wrongful seizure; attorney fees, costs, and interest'' for ''Return of property to claimant; certificate of reasonable cause; liability for wrongful seizure'' in item 2465 and added items 2466 and 2467.

§ 2461. Mode of recovery

(a) Whenever a civil fine, penalty or pecuniary forfeiture is prescribed for the violation of an Act of Congress without specifying the mode of recovery or enforcement thereof, it may be recovered in a civil action.

(b) Unless otherwise provided by Act of Congress, whenever a forfeiture of property is prescribed as a penalty for violation of an Act of Congress and the seizure takes place on the high seas or on navigable waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, such forfeiture may be enforced by libel in admiralty but in cases of seizures on land the forfeiture may be enforced by a proceeding by libel which shall conform as near as may be to proceedings in admiralty.

(c) If a person is charged in a criminal case with a violation of an Act of Congress for which

the civil or criminal forfeiture of property is authorized, the Government may include notice of the forfeiture in the indictment or information pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the defendant is convicted of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture, the court shall order the forfeiture of the property as part of the sentence in the criminal case pursuant to to[1] the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and section 3554 of title 18, United States Code. The procedures in section 413 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853) apply to all stages of a criminal forfeiture proceeding, except that subsection (d) of such section applies only in cases in which the defendant is convicted of a violation of such Act.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 974; Pub. L. 106–185, §16, Apr. 25, 2000, 114 Stat. 221; Pub. L. 109–177, title IV, §410, Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 246.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Subsection (a) was drafted to clarify a serious ambiguity in existing law and is based upon rulings of the Supreme Court. Numerous sections in the United States Code prescribe civil fines, penalties, and pecuniary forfeitures for violation of certain sections without specifying the mode of recovery or enforcement thereof. See, for example, section 567 of title 12, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Banks and Banking, section 64 of title 14, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Coast Guard, and section 180 of title 25, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Indians. Compare section 1 (21) of title 49, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Transportation.

A civil fine, penalty, or pecuniary forfeiture is recoverable in a civil action. *United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess* et al., 1943, 63 S.Ct. 379, 317 U.S. 537, 87 L.Ed. 433, rehearing denied 63 S.Ct. 756, 318 U.S. 799, 87 L.Ed. 1163; *Hepner v. United States*, 1909, 29 S.Ct. 474, 213 U.S. 103, 53 L.Ed. 720, and cases cited therein.

Forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal cases are enforceable by procedure set out in Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

If the statute contemplates a criminal fine, it can only be recovered in a criminal proceeding under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, after a conviction. The collection of civil fines and penalties, however, may not be had under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 54(b)(5), but enforcement of a criminal fine imposed in a criminal case may be had by execution on the judgment rendered in such case, as in civil actions. (See section 569 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Crimes and Criminal Procedure, incorporated in section 3565 of H.R. 1600, 80th Congress, for revision of the Criminal Code. See also Rule 69 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Advisory Committee Note thereunder, as to execution in civil actions.)

Subsection (b) was drafted to cover the subject of forfeiture of property generally. Sections in the United States Code specifically providing a mode of enforcement of forfeiture of property for their violation and other procedural matters will, of course, govern and subsection (b) will not affect them. It will only cover cases where no mode of recovery is prescribed.

Words ''Unless otherwise provided by enactment of Congress'' were inserted at the beginning of subsection (b) to exclude from its application instances where a libel in admiralty is not required. For example, under sections 1607, 1609, and 1610 of title 19, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Customs Duties, the collector of customs may, by summary procedure, sell at public auction, without previous declaration of forfeiture or libel proceedings, any vessel, etc., under $1,000 in value in cases where no claim for the same is filed or bond given as required by customs laws.

Rule 81 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes such rules applicable to the appeals in cases of seizures on land. (See also *443 Cans of Frozen Egg Product v. United States*, 1912, 33 S.Ct. 50, 226 U.S. 172, 57 L.Ed. 174, and *Eureka Productions v. Mulligan*, C.C.A. 1940, 108 F.2d 760.) The proceeding, which resembles a suit in admiralty in that it is begun by a libel, is, strictly speaking, an ''action at law'' (The Sarah, 1823, 8 Wheat. 391, 21 U.S. 391, 5 L.Ed. 644; Morris's Cotton, 1869, 8 Wall. 507, 75 U.S. 507, 19 L.Ed. 481; Confiscation cases, 1873, 20 Wall. 92, 87 U.S. 92, 22 L.Ed. 320; *Eureka Productions v. Mulligan*, supra), even though the statute may direct that the proceedings conform to admiralty as near as may be. *In re Graham*, 1870, 10 Wall. 541, 19 L.Ed. 981, and *443 Cans of Frozen Egg Product v. United States*, supra.

Subsection (b) is in conformity with Rule 21 of the Supreme Court Admiralty Rules, which recognizes that a libel may be filed upon seizure for any breach of any enactment of Congress, whether on land or on the high seas or on navigable waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. Such rule also permits an information to be filed, but is rarely, if ever, used at present. Consequently, ''information'' has been omitted from the text and only ''libel'' is incorporated.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, referred to in subsec. (c), are set out in the Appendix to Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure.

The Controlled Substances Act, referred to in subsec. (c), is title II of Pub. L. 91–513, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, which is classified principally to subchapter I (§801 et seq.) of chapter 13 of Title 21, Food and Drugs. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 801 of Title 21 and Tables.

AMENDMENTS

2006—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 109–177 amended subsec. (c) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (c) read as follows: ''If a forfeiture of property is authorized in connection with a violation of an Act of Congress, and any person is charged in an indictment or information with such violation but no specific statutory provision is made for criminal forfeiture upon conviction, the Government may include the forfeiture in the indictment or information in accordance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and upon conviction, the court shall order the forfeiture of the property in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 413 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853), other than subsection (d) of that section.''

2000—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 106–185 added subsec. (c).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2000 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 106–185 applicable to any forfeiture proceeding commenced on or after the date that is 120 days after Apr. 25, 2000, see section 21 of Pub. L. 106–185, set out as a note under section 1324 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.

FEDERAL CIVIL PENALTIES INFLATION ADJUSTMENT

Pub. L. 101–410, Oct. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 890, as amended by Pub. L. 104–134, title III, §31001(s)(1), Apr. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 1321–373; Pub. L. 105–362, title XIII, §1301(a), Nov. 10, 1998, 112 Stat. 3293, provided that:

''SHORT TITLE

''SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the 'Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990'.

''FINDINGS AND PURPOSE

''SEC. 2. (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

''(1) the power of Federal agencies to impose civil monetary penalties for violations of Federal law and regulations plays an important role in deterring violations and furthering the policy goals embodied in such laws and regulations;

[1] So in original.

''(2) the impact of many civil monetary penalties has been and is diminished due to the effect of inflation;

''(3) by reducing the impact of civil monetary penalties, inflation has weakened the deterrent effect of such penalties; and

''(4) the Federal Government does not maintain comprehensive, detailed accounting of the efforts of Federal agencies to assess and collect civil monetary penalties.

''(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is to establish a mechanism that shall—

''(1) allow for regular adjustment for inflation of civil monetary penalties;

''(2) maintain the deterrent effect of civil monetary penalties and promote compliance with the law; and

''(3) improve the collection by the Federal Government of civil monetary penalties.

''DEFINITIONS

''SEC. 3. For purposes of this Act, the term—

''(1) 'agency' means an Executive agency as defined under section 105 of title 5, United States Code, and includes the United States Postal Service;

''(2) 'civil monetary penalty' means any penalty, fine, or other sanction that—

''(A)(i) is for a specific monetary amount as provided by Federal law; or

''(ii) has a maximum amount provided for by Federal law; and

''(B) is assessed or enforced by an agency pursuant to Federal law; and

''(C) is assessed or enforced pursuant to an administrative proceeding or a civil action in the Federal courts; and

''(3) 'Consumer Price Index' means the Consumer Price Index for all-urban consumers published by the Department of Labor.

''CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY INFLATION ADJUSTMENT REPORTS

''SEC. 4. The head of each agency shall, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 [Apr. 26, 1996], and at least once every 4 years thereafter—

''(1) by regulation adjust each civil monetary penalty provided by law within the jurisdiction of the Federal agency, except for any penalty (including any addition to tax and additional amount) under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 U.S.C. 1 et seq.], the Tariff Act of 1930 [19 U.S.C. 1202 et seq.], the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 [29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.], or the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 301 et seq.], by the inflation adjustment described under section 5 of this Act; and

''(2) publish each such regulation in the Federal Register.

''COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS OF CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES

''SEC. 5. (a) ADJUSTMENT.—The inflation adjustment under section 4 shall be determined by increasing the maximum civil monetary penalty or the range of minimum and maximum civil monetary penalties, as applicable, for each civil monetary penalty by the cost-of-living adjustment. Any increase determined under this subsection shall be rounded to the nearest—

''(1) multiple of $10 in the case of penalties less than or equal to $100;

''(2) multiple of $100 in the case of penalties greater than $100 but less than or equal to $1,000;

''(3) multiple of $1,000 in the case of penalties greater than $1,000 but less than or equal to $10,000;

''(4) multiple of $5,000 in the case of penalties greater than $10,000 but less than or equal to $100,000;

''(5) multiple of $10,000 in the case of penalties greater than $100,000 but less than or equal to $200,000; and

''(6) multiple of $25,000 in the case of penalties greater than $200,000.

''(b) DEFINITION.—For purposes of subsection (a), the term 'cost-of-living adjustment' means the percentage (if any) for each civil monetary penalty by which—

''(1) the Consumer Price Index for the month of June of the calendar year preceding the adjustment, exceeds

''(2) the Consumer Price Index for the month of June of the calendar year in which the amount of such civil monetary penalty was last set or adjusted pursuant to law.

''SEC. 6. Any increase under this Act in a civil monetary penalty shall apply only to violations which occur after the date the increase takes effect.''

[Pub. L. 104–134, title III, § 31001(s)(2), Apr. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 1321–373, provided that: ''The first adjustment of a civil monetary penalty made pursuant to the amendment made by paragraph (1) [amending Pub. L. 101–410, set out above] may not exceed 10 percent of such penalty.'']

[For authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to consolidate reports required under the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101–410, set out above, to be submitted between Jan. 1, 1995, and Sept. 30, 1997, or to adjust their frequency and due dates, see section 404 of Pub. L. 103–356, set out as a note under section 501 of Title 31, Money and Finance.]

§ 2462. Time for commencing proceedings

Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the property is found within the United States in order that proper service may be made thereon.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 974.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 791 (R.S. § 1047). Changes were made in phraseology.

§ 2463. Property taken under revenue law not repleviable

All property taken or detained under any revenue law of the United States shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of the law and subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction thereof.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 974.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 747 (R.S. § 934). Changes were made in phraseology.

§ 2464. Security; special bond

(a) Except in cases of seizures for forfeiture under any law of the United States, whenever a warrant of arrest or other process in rem is issued in any admiralty case, the United States marshal shall stay the execution of such process, or discharge the property arrested if the process has been levied, on receiving from the respondent or claimant of the property a bond or stipulation in double the amount claimed by the libellant, with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge of the district court where the case is pending, or, in his absence, by the collector of the port, conditioned to answer the decree of the

court in such case. Such bond or stipulation shall be returned to the court, and judgment or decree thereon, against both the principal and sureties, may be secured at the time of rendering the decree in the original case. The owner of any vessel may deliver to the marshal a bond or stipulation, with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge of the district court, conditioned to answer the decree of such court in all or any cases that are brought thereafter in such court against the vessel. Thereupon the execution of all such process against such vessel shall be stayed so long as the amount secured by such bond or stipulation is at least double the aggregate amount claimed by libellants in such suits which are begun and pending against such vessel. Similar judgments or decrees and remedies may be had on such bond or stipulation as if a special bond or stipulation had been filed in each of such suits.

(b) The court may make necessary orders to carry this section into effect, particularly in giving proper notice of any such suit. Such bond or stipulation shall be indorsed by the clerk with a minute of the suits wherein process is so stayed. Further security may be required by the court at any time.

(c) If a special bond or stipulation in the particular case is given under this section, the liability as to said case on the general bond or stipulation shall cease. The parties may stipulate the amount of the bond or stipulation for the release of a vessel or other property to be not more than the amount claimed in the libel, with interest, plus an allowance for libellant's costs. In the event of the inability or refusal of the parties to so stipulate, the court shall fix the amount, but if not so fixed then a bond shall be required in the amount prescribed in this section.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 974.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §754 (R.S. §941; Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 441, 30 Stat. 1354; Aug. 3, 1935, ch. 431, §3, 49 Stat. 513).

Changes were made in phraseology.

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

All offices of collector of customs, comptroller of customs, surveyor of customs, and appraiser of merchandise of Bureau of Customs of Department of the Treasury to which appointments were required to be made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate were ordered abolished, with such offices to be terminated not later than Dec. 31, 1966, by Reorg. Plan No. 1, of 1965, eff. May 25, 1965, 30 F.R. 7035, 79 Stat. 1317, set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees. All functions of the offices eliminated were already vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by Reorg. Plan No. 26 of 1950, eff. July 31, 1950, 15 F.R. 4935, 64 Stat. 1280, set out in the Appendix to Title 5.

§2465. Return of property to claimant; liability for wrongful seizure; attorney fees, costs, and interest

(a) Upon the entry of a judgment for the claimant in any proceeding to condemn or forfeit property seized or arrested under any provision of Federal law—

(1) such property shall be returned forthwith to the claimant or his agent; and

(2) if it appears that there was reasonable cause for the seizure or arrest, the court shall cause a proper certificate thereof to be entered and, in such case, neither the person who made the seizure or arrest nor the prosecutor shall be liable to suit or judgment on account of such suit or prosecution, nor shall the claimant be entitled to costs, except as provided in subsection (b).

(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any civil proceeding to forfeit property under any provision of Federal law in which the claimant substantially prevails, the United States shall be liable for—

(A) reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred by the claimant;

(B) post-judgment interest, as set forth in section 1961 of this title; and

(C) in cases involving currency, other negotiable instruments, or the proceeds of an interlocutory sale—

(i) interest actually paid to the United States from the date of seizure or arrest of the property that resulted from the investment of the property in an interest-bearing account or instrument; and

(ii) an imputed amount of interest that such currency, instruments, or proceeds would have earned at the rate applicable to the 30-day Treasury Bill, for any period during which no interest was paid (not including any period when the property reasonably was in use as evidence in an official proceeding or in conducting scientific tests for the purpose of collecting evidence), commencing 15 days after the property was seized by a Federal law enforcement agency, or was turned over to a Federal law enforcement agency by a State or local law enforcement agency.

(2)(A) The United States shall not be required to disgorge the value of any intangible benefits nor make any other payments to the claimant not specifically authorized by this subsection.

(B) The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply if the claimant is convicted of a crime for which the interest of the claimant in the property was subject to forfeiture under a Federal criminal forfeiture law.

(C) If there are multiple claims to the same property, the United States shall not be liable for costs and attorneys fees associated with any such claim if the United States—

(i) promptly recognizes such claim;

(ii) promptly returns the interest of the claimant in the property to the claimant, if the property can be divided without difficulty and there are no competing claims to that portion of the property;

(iii) does not cause the claimant to incur additional, reasonable costs or fees; and

(iv) prevails in obtaining forfeiture with respect to one or more of the other claims.

(D) If the court enters judgment in part for the claimant and in part for the Government, the court shall reduce the award of costs and attorney fees accordingly.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 975; Pub. L. 106–185, §4(a), Apr. 25, 2000, 114 Stat. 211.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§818, 827 (R.S. §§970, 979).

Section consolidates sections 818 and 827 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with changes of phraseology necessary to effect the consolidation.

The words ''in any proceeding to condemn or forfeit property'' were inserted in conformity with the uniform course of judicial decisions. See *Hammel v. Little*, App.D.C. 1936, 87 F.2d 907, and cases there cited.

The qualifying language of section 827 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., requiring the claimant to pay his own costs before the return of his property was omitted as unnecessary and involving a matter more properly for regulation by rule of court. (See sections 1913, 1914, and 1925 of this title.)

(See also section 2006 of this title with respect to actions against internal revenue officers and their liability for acts in the performance of official duties.)

AMENDMENTS

2000—Pub. L. 106–185 amended section catchline and text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: ''Upon the entry of judgment for the claimant in any proceeding to condemn or forfeit property seized under any Act of Congress, such property shall be returned forthwith to the claimant or his agent; but if it appears that there was reasonable cause for the seizure, the court shall cause a proper certificate thereof to be entered and the claimant shall not, in such case, be entitled to costs, nor shall the person who made the seizure, nor the prosecutor, be liable to suit or judgment on account of such suit or prosecution.''

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2000 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 106–185 applicable to any forfeiture proceeding commenced on or after the date that is 120 days after Apr. 25, 2000, see section 21 of Pub. L. 106–185, set out as a note under section 1324 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.

§ 2466. Fugitive disentitlement

(a) A judicial officer may disallow a person from using the resources of the courts of the United States in furtherance of a claim in any related civil forfeiture action or a claim in third party proceedings in any related criminal forfeiture action upon a finding that such person—

(1) after notice or knowledge of the fact that a warrant or process has been issued for his apprehension, in order to avoid criminal prosecution—

(A) purposely leaves the jurisdiction of the United States;

(B) declines to enter or reenter the United States to submit to its jurisdiction; or

(C) otherwise evades the jurisdiction of the court in which a criminal case is pending against the person; and

(2) is not confined or held in custody in any other jurisdiction for commission of criminal conduct in that jurisdiction.

(b) Subsection (a) may be applied to a claim filed by a corporation if any majority shareholder, or individual filing the claim on behalf of the corporation is a person to whom subsection (a) applies.

(Added Pub. L. 106–185, §14(a), Apr. 25, 2000, 114 Stat. 219; amended Pub. L. 107–56, title III, §322, Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 315; Pub. L. 109–162, title XI, §1171(c), Jan. 5, 2006, 119 Stat. 3123; Pub. L. 109–177, title IV, §406(a)(1), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 244.)

AMENDMENTS

2006—Pub. L. 109–177 directed amendment of directory language of Pub. L. 107–56, §322, identical to amendment by Pub. L. 109–162. See below.

Pub. L. 109–162 amended directory language of Pub. L. 107–56, §322. See 2001 Amendment note below.

2001—Pub. L. 107–56, §322, as amended by Pub. L. 109–162, designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2006 AMENDMENT

Pub. L. 109–162, title XI, §1171(c), Jan. 5, 2006, 119 Stat. 3123, provided in part that the amendment made by section 1171(c) of Pub. L. 109–162 is effective Oct. 26, 2001.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Pub. L. 106–185, §14(c), Apr. 25, 2000, 114 Stat. 219, provided that: ''The amendments made by this section [enacting this section] shall apply to any case pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act [Apr. 25, 2000].''

§ 2467. Enforcement of foreign judgment

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

(1) the term ''foreign nation'' means a country that has become a party to the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (referred to in this section as the ''United Nations Convention'') or a foreign jurisdiction with which the United States has a treaty or other formal international agreement in effect providing for mutual forfeiture assistance; and

(2) the term ''forfeiture or confiscation judgment'' means a final order of a foreign nation compelling a person or entity—

(A) to pay a sum of money representing the proceeds of an offense described in Article 3, Paragraph 1, of the United Nations Convention, any violation of foreign law that would constitute a violation or an offense for which property could be forfeited under Federal law if the offense were committed in the United States, or any foreign offense described in section 1956(c)(7)(B) of title 18, or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds; or

(B) to forfeit property involved in or traceable to the commission of such offense.

(b) REVIEW BY ATTORNEY GENERAL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A foreign nation seeking to have a forfeiture or confiscation judgment registered and enforced by a district court of the United States under this section shall first submit a request to the Attorney General or the designee of the Attorney General, which request shall include—

(A) a summary of the facts of the case and a description of the proceedings that resulted in the forfeiture or confiscation judgment;

(B) certified[1] copy of the forfeiture or confiscation judgment;

(C) an affidavit or sworn declaration establishing that the foreign nation took steps, in accordance with the principles of due process, to give notice of the proceedings to all persons with an interest in the property in sufficient time to enable such persons to defend against the charges and that the judg-

[1] So in original. Probably should be preceded by ''a''.

ment rendered is in force and is not subject to appeal; and

(D) such additional information and evidence as may be required by the Attorney General or the designee of the Attorney General.

(2) CERTIFICATION OF REQUEST.—The Attorney General or the designee of the Attorney General shall determine whether, in the interest of justice, to certify the request, and such decision shall be final and not subject to either judicial review or review under subchapter II of chapter 5, or chapter 7, of title 5 (commonly known as the ''Administrative Procedure Act'').

(c) JURISDICTION AND VENUE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—If the Attorney General or the designee of the Attorney General certifies a request under subsection (b), the United States may file an application on behalf of a foreign nation in district court of the United States seeking to enforce the foreign forfeiture or confiscation judgment as if the judgment had been entered by a court in the United States.

(2) PROCEEDINGS.—In a proceeding filed under paragraph (1)—

(A) the United States shall be the applicant and the defendant or another person or entity affected by the forfeiture or confiscation judgment shall be the respondent;

(B) venue shall lie in the district court for the District of Columbia or in any other district in which the defendant or the property that may be the basis for satisfaction of a judgment under this section may be found; and

(C) the district court shall have personal jurisdiction over a defendant residing outside of the United States if the defendant is served with process in accordance with rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(d) ENTRY AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The district court shall enter such orders as may be necessary to enforce the judgment on behalf of the foreign nation unless the court finds that—

(A) the judgment was rendered under a system that provides tribunals or procedures incompatible with the requirements of due process of law;

(B) the foreign court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant;

(C) the foreign court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter;

(D) the foreign nation did not take steps, in accordance with the principles of due process, to give notice of the proceedings to a person with an interest in the property of the proceedings[2] in sufficient time to enable him or her to defend; or

(E) the judgment was obtained by fraud.

(2) PROCESS.—Process to enforce a judgment under this section shall be in accordance with rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(3) PRESERVATION OF PROPERTY.—

(A) RESTRAINING ORDERS.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—To preserve the availability of property subject to civil or criminal forfeiture under foreign law, the Government may apply for, and the court may issue, a restraining order at any time before or after the initiation of forfeiture proceedings by a foreign nation.

(ii) PROCEDURES.—

(I) IN GENERAL.—A restraining order under this subparagraph shall be issued in a manner consistent with subparagraphs (A), (C), and (E) of paragraph (1) and the procedural due process protections for a restraining order under section 983(j) of title 18.

(II) APPLICATION.—For purposes of applying such section 983(j)—

(aa) references in such section 983(j) to civil forfeiture or the filing of a complaint shall be deemed to refer to the applicable foreign criminal or forfeiture proceedings; and

(bb) the reference in paragraph (1)(B)(i) of such section 983(j) to the United States shall be deemed to refer to the foreign nation.

(B) EVIDENCE.—The court, in issuing a restraining order under subparagraph (A)—

(i) may rely on information set forth in an affidavit describing the nature of the proceeding or investigation underway in the foreign country, and setting forth a reasonable basis to believe that the property to be restrained will be named in a judgment of forfeiture at the conclusion of such proceeding; or

(ii) may register and enforce a restraining order that has been issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in the foreign country and certified by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2).

(C) LIMIT ON GROUNDS FOR OBJECTION.—No person may object to a restraining order under subparagraph (A) on any ground that is the subject of parallel litigation involving the same property that is pending in a foreign court.

(e) FINALITY OF FOREIGN FINDINGS.—In entering orders to enforce the judgment, the court shall be bound by the findings of fact to the extent that they are stated in the foreign forfeiture or confiscation judgment.

(f) CURRENCY CONVERSION.—The rate of exchange in effect at the time the suit to enforce is filed by the foreign nation shall be used in calculating the amount stated in any forfeiture or confiscation judgment requiring the payment of a sum of money submitted for registration.

(Added Pub. L. 106–185, § 15(a), Apr. 25, 2000, 114 Stat. 219; amended Pub. L. 107–56, title III, § 323, Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 315; Pub. L. 111–342, § 2, Dec. 22, 2010, 124 Stat. 3607.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsecs. (c)(2)(C) and (d)(2), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

[2] So in original. The words ''of the proceedings'' probably should not appear.

AMENDMENTS

2010—Subsec. (d)(3)(A). Pub. L. 111–342 amended subpar. (A) generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: ''To preserve the availability of property subject to a foreign forfeiture or confiscation judgment, the Government may apply for, and the court may issue, a restraining order pursuant to section 983(j) of title 18, at any time before or after an application is filed pursuant to subsection (c)(1) of this section.''

2001—Subsec. (a)(2)(A). Pub. L. 107–56, § 323(4), inserted '', any violation of foreign law that would constitute a violation or an offense for which property could be forfeited under Federal law if the offense were committed in the United States'' after ''United Nations Convention''.

Subsec. (b)(1)(C). Pub. L. 107–56, § 323(2), substituted ''establishing that the foreign nation took steps, in accordance with the principles of due process, to give notice of the proceedings to all persons with an interest in the property in sufficient time to enable such persons'' for ''establishing that the defendant received notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable the defendant''.

Subsec. (d)(1)(D). Pub. L. 107–56, § 323(3), substituted ''the foreign nation did not take steps, in accordance with the principles of due process, to give notice of the proceedings to a person with an interest in the property'' for ''the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice''.

Subsec. (d)(3). Pub. L. 107–56, § 323(1), added par. (3).

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section applicable to any forfeiture proceeding commenced on or after the date that is 120 days after Apr. 25, 2000, see section 21 of Pub. L. 106–185, set out as an Effective Date of 2000 Amendment note under section 1324 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.

CHAPTER 165—UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS PROCEDURE

AMENDMENTS

2000—Pub. L. 106–518, title II, § 207, Nov. 13, 2000, 114 Stat. 2414, struck out item 2520 ''Fees''.

1992—Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, §§ 902(a)(1), 910(b), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516, 4520, substituted ''UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS'' for ''UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT'' in chapter heading and inserted ''and incidental powers'' in item 2521.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(b)(2), (i)(2), (*l*), (n)(4), (*o*)(2), (q)(2), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42–44, substituted ''UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT'' for ''COURT OF CLAIMS'' in chapter heading, substituted ''Proceedings generally'' for ''Proceedings before commissioners generally'' in item 2503, substituted ''Referral of cases by Comptroller General'' for ''Referral of cases by the Comptroller General or the head of an executive department or agency'' in item 2510, struck out item 2518 ''Certification of judgments for appropriation'', substituted ''Fees'' for ''Fees; cost of printing record'' in item 2520, and added item 2522.

1978—Pub. L. 95–563, § 14(h)(2)(B), Nov. 1, 1978, 92 Stat. 2390, inserted ''or the head of an executive department or agency'' after ''Comptroller General'' in item 2510.

1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, §§ 46, 54(c), 55(d), 59(b), 68 Stat. 1243, 1247, 1248, substituted ''Trial before judges'' for ''Place of taking evidence'' in item 2505, and ''Calls and discovery,'' for ''Calls on departments for information'' in item 2507, rephrased item 2510, and added item 2521.

§ 2501. Time for filing suit

Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.

Every claim under section 1497 of this title shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within two years after the termination of the river and harbor improvements operations on which the claim is based.

A petition on the claim of a person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be filed within three years after the disability ceases.

A suit for the fees of an officer of the United States shall not be filed until his account for such fees has been finally acted upon, unless the Government Accountability Office fails to act within six months after receiving the account.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 976; Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 52, 68 Stat. 1246; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(a), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516; Pub. L. 108–271, § 8(b), July 7, 2004, 118 Stat. 814.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 250(2), 250a, and 262 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 145, 156, 36 Stat. 1136, 1139; June 10, 1921, ch. 18, § 304, 42 Stat. 24; Aug. 30, 1935, ch. 831, § 13, 49 Stat. 1049; July 13, 1943, ch. 231, 57 Stat. 553).

Section consolidates limitation provisions of sections 250(2), 250a, and 262 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.

Words ''a person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues'' were substituted for ''married women first accrued during marriage, of persons under the age of twenty-one years first accrued during minority, and of idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the seas at the time the claim accrued; entitled to the claim,''. The revised language will cover all legal disabilities actually barring suit. For example, the particular reference to married women is archaic, and is eliminated by use of the general language substituted.

Words ''nor shall any of the said disabilities operate cumulatively'' were omitted, in view of the elimination of the reference to specific disabilities. Also, persons under legal disability could not sue, and their suits should not be barred until they become able to sue. Similar sections of the U.S. Code do not contain any such provision. (For example, see section 502 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., incorporated in section 544 of this title.)

The section was extended to include claims referred by the head of an executive department in conformity with section 2510 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

2004—Pub. L. 108–271 substituted ''Government Accountability Office'' for ''General Accounting Office'' in last par.

[1] So in original. Does not conform to section catchline.

1992—Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims''.

1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, struck out '', or the claim is referred by the Senate or House of Representatives, or by the head of an executive department'' in first par.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2502. Aliens' privilege to sue

(a) Citizens or subjects of any foreign government which accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against their government in its courts may sue the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims if the subject matter of the suit is otherwise within such court's jurisdiction.

(b) See section 7422(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for exception with respect to suits involving internal revenue taxes.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 976; Pub. L. 89–713, § 3(b), Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1108; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(a), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42; Pub. L. 99–514, § 2, Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2095; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 261 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 155, 36 Stat. 1139).

Changes were made in phraseology.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 7422(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (b), is classified to section 7422(f) of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

AMENDMENTS

1992—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1986—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 99–514 substituted ''Internal Revenue Code of 1986'' for ''Internal Revenue Code of 1954''.

1982—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims''.

1966—Pub. L. 89–713 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 89–713 applicable to suits brought against officers, employees, or personal representatives instituted 90 days or more after Nov. 2, 1966, see section 3(d) of Pub. L. 89–713, set out as a note under section 7422 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

§ 2503. Proceedings generally

(a) Parties to any suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims may appear before a judge of that court in person or by attorney, produce evidence, and examine witnesses.

(b) The proceedings of the Court of Federal Claims shall be in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure (other than the rules of evidence) as the Court of Federal Claims may prescribe and in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence.

(c) The judges of the Court of Federal Claims shall fix times for trials, administer oaths or affirmations, examine witnesses, receive evidence, and enter dispositive judgments. Hearings shall, if convenient, be held in the counties where the witnesses reside.

(d) For the purpose of construing sections 1821, 1915, 1920, and 1927 of this title, the United States Court of Federal Claims shall be deemed to be a court of the United States.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 976; Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 53, 68 Stat. 1246; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(b)(1), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, §§ 902(a), 909, Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516, 4519.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 269, 276, and 278 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 168, 170, 36 Stat. 1140; Feb. 24, 1925, ch. 301, § 1, 43 Stat. 964; June 23, 1930, ch. 573, § 2, 46 Stat. 799).

Section consolidates provisions relating to proceedings before commissioners and reporter-commissioners contained in sections 269, 276, and 278 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.

Provisions of section 269 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to appointment and compensation of commissioners are incorporated in section 792 of this title.

Words ''including reporter-commissioners'' after ''commissioners'' were inserted to clarify meaning and conform to Rule 54(a) of the Court of Claims authorizing oaths before reporter-commissioners.

Changes were made in phraseology.

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT

The Senate amended this section by inserting ''and when directed by the court his recommendations for conclusions of law'' following ''commissioner'' in the second paragraph. This amendment authorizes the Court to direct its commissioners to report recommendations for conclusions of law as well as findings of fact in cases assigned to them. 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559, Amendment No. 50.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Evidence, referred to in subsec. (b), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

AMENDMENTS

1992—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102–572, § 902(a)(1), substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

Subsecs. (b), (c). Pub. L. 102–572, § 902(a)(2), substituted ''Court of Federal Claims'' for ''Claims Court'' wherever appearing.

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 102–572, § 909, added subsec. (d).

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''Proceedings generally'' for ''Proceedings before commissioners generally'' in section catchline.

Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''Parties to any suit in the United States Claims Court may appear before a judge of that court in person or by attorney, produce evidence, and examine witnesses'' for ''Parties

to any suit in the Court of Claims may appear before a commissioner in person or by attorney, produce evidence and examine witnesses'' and redesignated as subsec. (c) provisions that, in accordance with rules and orders of the court, commissioners would fix times for trials, administer oaths or affirmations to and examine witnesses, receive evidence and report findings of fact, that when directed by the court, commissioners would report their recommendations for conclusions of law in cases assigned to them, and that hearings would, if convenient, be held in the counties where the witnesses resided.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''The proceedings of the Claims Court shall be in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure (other than the rules of evidence) as the Claims Court may prescribe and in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence'' for ''The rules of the court shall provide for the filing in court of the commissioner's report of facts and recommendations for conclusions of law, and for opportunity for the parties to file exceptions thereto, and a hearing thereon before the court within a reasonable time'' and struck out provision that this section did not prevent the court from passing upon all questions and findings regardless of whether exceptions were taken before a commissioner.

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 97–164 redesignated provisions in second and third sentences of former subsec. (a) as (c) and substituted ''The judges of the Claims Court'' for ''In accordance with rules and orders of the court, commissioners'' and ''enter dispositive judgments'' for ''report findings of fact and, when directed by the court, their recommendations for conclusions of law in cases assigned to them''.

1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, designated former first par. subsec. (a), and former second par. subsec. (b), and incorporated in one place provisions relating to function of Commissioners.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2504. Plaintiff's testimony

The United States Court of Federal Claims may, at the instance of the Attorney General, order any plaintiff to appear, upon reasonable notice, before any judge of the court and be examined on oath as to all matters pertaining to his claim. Such examination shall be reduced to writing by the judge, and shall be returned to and filed in the court, and may, at the discretion of the attorneys for the United States, be read and used as evidence on the trial. If any plaintiff, after such order is made and due and reasonable notice thereof is given to him, fails to appear, or refuses to testify or answer fully as to all material matters within his knowledge, the court may order that the case shall not be tried until he fully complies with such order.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 976; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(c), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 274 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 166, 36 Stat. 1140).

Words ''Attorney General'' were substituted for ''attorney or solicitor appearing in behalf of the United States,'' in view of section 309 of title 5, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Executive Departments and Government Officers and Employees.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1992—Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims'', and ''judge'' for ''commissioner'' wherever appearing.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2505. Trial before judges

Any judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims may sit at any place within the United States to take evidence and enter judgment.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 976; Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 54(a), (b), 68 Stat. 1246; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(d), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 275 and 275a (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 167, 36 Stat. 1140; Feb. 24, 1925, ch. 301, § 2, 43 Stat. 965; June 23, 1930, ch. 573, § 1, 46 Stat. 799; Oct. 16, 1941, ch. 443, 55 Stat. 741).

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1992—Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims'' and ''enter judgment'' for ''report findings''.

1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, substituted ''Trial before judges'' for ''Place of taking evidence'' in section catchline and repealed second par. relating to taking of testimony.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2506. Interest of witness

A witness in a suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims shall not be exempt or disqualified because he is a party to or interested in such suit.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 977; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(e), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 274 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 186, 36 Stat. 1143; Feb. 5, 1912, ch. 28, 37 Stat. 61).

A provision that a witness should not be disqualified by color was omitted as obsolete and unnecessary, since no such disqualification could be invoked in absence of statutory authority.

A provision that the United States could examine any plaintiff or party interested is covered by the word ''exempt'' in the revised section, and by section 2504 of this title.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1992—Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2507. Calls and discovery

(a) The United States Court of Federal Claims may call upon any department or agency of the United States or upon any party for any information or papers, not privileged, for purposes of discovery or for use as evidence. The head of any department or agency may refuse to comply with a call issued pursuant to this subsection when, in his opinion, compliance will be injurious to the public interest.

(b) Without limitation on account of anything contained in subsection (a) of this section, the court may, in accordance with its rules, provide additional means for the discovery of any relevant facts, books, papers, documents or tangible things, not privileged.

(c) The Court of Federal Claims may use all recorded and printed reports made by the committees of the Senate or House of Representatives.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 977; Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 55(a)–(c), 68 Stat. 1247; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(f), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 272 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 164, 36 Stat. 1140).

Words ''or agency'' were added. (See reviser's note under section 1345 of this title.)

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1992—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102–572, § 902(a)(1), substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 102–572, § 902(a)(2), substituted ''Court of Federal Claims'' for ''Claims Court''.

1982—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97–164, § 139(f)(1), substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims''.

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 97–164, § 139(f)(2), substituted ''Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims''.

1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, substituted ''Calls and discovery'' for ''Calls on departments for information'' in section catchline, designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2508. Counterclaim or set-off; registration of judgment

Upon the trial of any suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims in which any setoff, counterclaim, claim for damages, or other demand is set up on the part of the United States against any plaintiff making claim against the United States in said court, the court shall hear and determine such claim or demand both for and against the United States and plaintiff.

If upon the whole case it finds that the plaintiff is indebted to the United States it shall render judgment to that effect, and such judgment shall be final and reviewable.

The transcript of such judgment, filed in the clerk's office of any district court, shall be entered upon the records and shall be enforceable as other judgments.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 977; July 28, 1953, ch. 253, § 10, 67 Stat. 227; Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 47(a), 68 Stat. 1243; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(g), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 252 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 146, 36 Stat. 1137).

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1992—Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims''.

1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, struck out ''United States'' from name of Court of Claims in first par.

1953—Act July 28, 1953, substituted ''United States Court of Claims'' for ''Court of Claims'' in first par., and substituted ''shall be enforceable as other judgments'' for ''be a judgment of such district court and enforceable as such'' in third par.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2509. Congressional reference cases

(a) Whenever a bill, except a bill for a pension, is referred by either House of Congress to the chief judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims pursuant to section 1492 of this title, the chief judge shall designate a judge as hearing officer for the case and a panel of three judges of the court to serve as a reviewing body. One member of the review panel shall be designated as presiding officer of the panel.

(b) Proceedings in a congressional reference case shall be under rules and regulations prescribed for the purpose by the chief judge who is hereby authorized and directed to require the application of the pertinent rules of practice of the Court of Federal Claims insofar as feasible. Each hearing officer and each review panel shall have authority to do and perform any acts which may be necessary or proper for the efficient performance of their duties, including the power of subpena and the power to administer oaths and affirmations. None of the rules, rulings, findings, or conclusions authorized by this section shall be subject to judicial review.

(c) The hearing officer to whom a congressional reference case is assigned by the chief judge shall proceed in accordance with the applicable rules to determine the facts, including facts relating to delay or laches, facts bearing upon the question whether the bar of any statute of limitation should be removed, or facts claimed to excuse the claimant for not having resorted to any established legal remedy. He shall append to his findings of fact conclusions sufficient to inform Congress whether the demand is a legal or equitable claim or a gratuity, and the amount, if any, legally or equitably due from the United States to the claimant.

(d) The findings and conclusions of the hearing officer shall be submitted by him, together with the record in the case, to the review panel for review by it pursuant to such rules as may be provided for the purpose, which shall include provision for submitting the report of the hearing officer to the parties for consideration, exception, and argument before the panel. The panel, by majority vote, shall adopt or modify the findings or the conclusions of the hearing officer.

(e) The panel shall submit its report to the chief judge for transmission to the appropriate House of Congress.

(f) Any act or failure to act or other conduct by a party, a witness, or an attorney which would call for the imposition of sanctions under the rules of practice of the Court of Federal Claims shall be noted by the panel or the hearing officer at the time of occurrence thereof and upon failure of the delinquent or offending party, witness, or attorney to make prompt compliance with the order of the panel or the hearing officer a full statement of the circumstances shall be incorporated in the report of the panel.

(g) The Court of Federal Claims is hereby authorized and directed, under such regulations as it may prescribe, to provide the facilities and services of the office of the clerk of the court for the filing, processing, hearing, and dispatch of congressional reference cases and to include within its annual appropriations the costs thereof and other costs of administration, including (but without limitation to the items herein listed) the salaries and traveling expenses of the judges serving as hearing officers and panel members, mailing and service of process, necessary physical facilities, equipment, and supplies, and personnel (including secretaries and law clerks).

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 977; Pub. L. 89–681, § 2, Oct. 15, 1966, 80 Stat. 958; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(h), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 257 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 151, 36 Stat. 1138).

Jurisdiction provisions of section 257 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., appear in section 1492 of this title.

A provision as to the court's power to render judgment on a referred claim and its duty to report thereon to Congress, was omitted from this section as covered by sections 791(c) and 1492 of this title.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1992—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102–572, § 902(a)(1), substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

Subsecs. (b), (f), (g). Pub. L. 102–572, § 902(a)(2), substituted ''Court of Federal Claims'' for ''Claims Court''.

1982—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97–164, § 139(h)(1), substituted ''chief judge'' for ''chief commissioner'' wherever appearing, ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims'', ''judge as hearing officer'' for ''trial commissioner'', ''judges'' for ''commissioners'', and ''presiding officer'' for ''presiding commissioner''.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 97–164, § 139(h)(2)(A)–(C), substituted ''chief judge'' for ''chief commissioner'', ''Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims'', and ''hearing officer'' for ''trial commissioner''.

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 97–164, § 139(h)(2)(A), (B), substituted ''hearing officer'' for ''trial commissioner'' and ''chief judge'' for ''chief commissioner''.

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 97–164, § 139(h)(2)(A), (D), substituted ''hearing officer'' for ''trial commissioner'' wherever appearing and struck out ''of commissioners'' after ''review panel''.

Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 97–164, § 139(h)(2)(B), substituted ''chief judge'' for ''chief commissioner''.

Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 97–164, § 139(h)(2)(A), (C), substituted ''Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims'', and ''hearing officer'' for ''trial commissioner'' wherever appearing.

Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 97–164, § 139(h)(2)(C), (E), substituted ''Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims'' and ''judges serving as hearing officers'' for ''commissioners serving as trial commissioners''.

1966—Pub. L. 89–681 substituted provisions for reference of bills to the chief commissioner of the Court of Claims pursuant to section 1492 of this title for provisions calling simply for reference to the Court of Claims, substituted provisions naming the trial commissioner to whom a reference case is assigned by the chief commissioner for provisions simply naming the Court of Claims as the agency by which findings and conclusions are made, and inserted provisions for the designation of a trial commissioner and reviewing body consisting of three other commissioners, the promulgation of rules and regulations for Congressional reference cases by the chief commissioner, the procedure to be followed, and the supplying of facilities and personnel for the dispatch of Congressional reference cases.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2510. Referral of cases by Comptroller General

(a) The Comptroller General may transmit to the United States Court of Federal Claims for trial and adjudication any claim or matter of

which the Court of Federal Claims might take jurisdiction on the voluntary action of the claimant, together with all vouchers, papers, documents, and proofs pertaining thereto.

(b) The Court of Federal Claims shall proceed with the claims or matters so referred as in other cases pending in such Court and shall render judgment thereon.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 977; July 28, 1953, ch. 253, §11, 67 Stat. 227; Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, §47(b), 68 Stat. 1243; Pub. L. 95–563, §14(h)(1), (2)(A), Nov. 1, 1978, 92 Stat. 2390; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, §139(i)(1), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 43; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, §902(a), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§254 and 255 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§148, 149, 36 Stat. 1137, 1138; June 10, 1921, ch. 18, §304, 42 Stat. 24).

Section consolidates procedural provisions of sections 254 and 255 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to departmental reference cases.

Jurisdiction provisions of such section 254 appear in section 1493 of this title.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1992—Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court'' and ''Court of Federal Claims'' for ''Claims Court'' wherever appearing.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''Referral of cases by Comptroller General'' for ''Referral of cases by the Comptroller General or the head of an executive department or agency'' in section catchline.

Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''transmit to the United States Claims Court for trial and adjudication any claim or matter of which the Claims Court might take jurisdiction'' for ''transmit to the Court of Claims for trial and adjudication any claim or matter of which the Court of Claims might take jurisdiction'' in first sentence of subsec. (a). The second sentence of subsec. (a) was redesignated (b).

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 97–164 designated as subsec. (b) the former second sentence of subsec. (a) and substituted ''The Claims Court'' for ''The Court of Claims'' and ''Court'' for ''court''. Former subsec. (b), which provided that the head of any executive department or agency could, with the prior approval of the Attorney General, refer to the Court of Claims for judicial review any final decision rendered by a board of contract appeals pursuant to the terms of any contract with the United States awarded by that department or agency which such head of such department or agency had concluded was not entitled to finality pursuant to the review standards specified in section 10(b) of the Contracts Disputes Act of 1978, with the head of each executive department or agency to make any referral under this section within 120 days of the receipt of a copy of the final appeal decision, that the Court of Claims was to review the matter referred in accordance with the standards specified in section 10(b) of the Contracts Disputes Act of 1978, and that the court was to proceed with judicial review on the administrative record made before the board of contract appeals on matters so referred as in other cases pending in such court, determine the issue of finality of the appeal decision, and render judgment thereon, take additional evidence, or remand the matter pursuant to the authority specified in section 1491 of this title was struck out.

1978—Pub. L. 95–563, inserted ''or the head of an executive department or agency'' in section catchline, designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), and added subsec. (b).

1954—Act Sept. 3, 1954, substituted ''Referral of cases by Comptroller General'' for ''Departmental reference cases'' in section catchline.

1953—Act July 28, 1953, struck out provisions relating to procedure in connection with departmental reference cases provided for by former section 1493 of this title; and, in connection with trial and adjudication of cases referred by the Comptroller General, inserted provision for rendering judgment, and struck out requirement that such cases be transmitted through the Secretary of the Treasury.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1978 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 95–563 effective with respect to contracts entered into 120 days after Nov. 1, 1978, and, at the election of the contractor, with respect to any claim pending at such time before the contracting officer or initiated thereafter, see section 16 of Pub. L. 95–563, Nov. 1, 1978, 92 Stat. 2391, formerly set out as an Effective Date note under section 601 of former Title 41, Public Contracts.

§ 2511. Accounts of officers, agents or contractors

Notice of suit under section 1494 of this title shall be given to the Attorney General, to the Comptroller General, and to the head of the department requested to settle the account in question.

The judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims in such suit shall be conclusive upon the parties, and payment of the amount found due shall discharge the obligation.

The transcript of such judgment, filed in the clerk's office of any district court, shall be entered upon the records, and shall be enforceable as other judgments.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 977; July 28, 1953, ch. 253, §12, 67 Stat. 227; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, §139(j), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 43; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, §902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §287 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §180, 36 Stat. 1141; Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, §3, 43 Stat. 939).

Words ''The Attorney General shall represent the United States at the hearing of said cause'' were omitted as covered by sections 309 and 310 of title 5, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Executive Departments and Government Officers and Employees.

Jurisdiction provisions of section 287 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., appear in section 1494 of this title.

A provision for continuances was omitted as unnecessary, in view of the inherent power of the court to grant continuances in any suit.

A provision in section 287 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., that section 274 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., should apply to cases under such section 287 was omitted as covered by section 2504 of this title.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1992—Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''The judgment of the United States Claims Court in such suit shall be conclusive'' for ''The judgment of the Court of Claims in

such suit, or of the Supreme Court upon review, shall be conclusive''.

1953—Act July 28, 1953, inserted ''to the Comptroller General,'' in first par., struck out third par. which provided for accrual to the United States of a right of action upon the judgment, with a limitation period extending to three years after judgment, and inserted provisions for filing and recording the transcript of such judgment in the clerk's office of any district court and for enforcement thereof.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2512. Disbursing officers; relief

Whenever the United States Court of Federal Claims finds that any loss by a disbursing officer of the United States was without his fault or negligence, it shall render a judgment setting forth the amount thereof, and the Government Accountability Office shall allow the officer such amount as a credit in the settlement of his accounts.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 978; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(j)(2), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 43; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516; Pub. L. 108–271, § 8(b), July 7, 2004, 118 Stat. 814.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 253 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 147, 36 Stat. 1137; June 10, 1921, ch. 18, § 304, 42 Stat. 24).

Words ''paymaster, quartermaster, commissary of subsistence, or other'' were omitted as covered by words ''disbursing officer of the United States''. (See reviser's note under section 1496 of this title.)

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

2004—Pub. L. 108–271 substituted ''Government Accountability Office'' for ''General Accounting Office''.

1992—Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2513. Unjust conviction and imprisonment

(a) Any person suing under section 1495 of this title must allege and prove that:

(1) His conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty of the offense of which he was convicted, or on new trial or rehearing he was found not guilty of such offense, as appears from the record or certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such conviction, or that he has been pardoned upon the stated ground of innocence and unjust conviction and

(2) He did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with such charge constituted no offense against the United States, or any State, Territory or the District of Columbia, and he did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution.

(b) Proof of the requisite facts shall be by a certificate of the court or pardon wherein such facts are alleged to appear, and other evidence thereof shall not be received.

(c) No pardon or certified copy of a pardon shall be considered by the United States Court of Federal Claims unless it contains recitals that the pardon was granted after applicant had exhausted all recourse to the courts and that the time for any court to exercise its jurisdiction had expired.

(d) The Court may permit the plaintiff to prosecute such action in forma pauperis.

(e) The amount of damages awarded shall not exceed $100,000 for each 12-month period of incarceration for any plaintiff who was unjustly sentenced to death and $50,000 for each 12-month period of incarceration for any other plaintiff.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 978; Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 56, 68 Stat. 1247; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(j)(2), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 43; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516; Pub. L. 108–405, title IV, § 431, Oct. 30, 2004, 118 Stat. 2293.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on sections 729–732 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Crimes and Criminal Procedure (May 24, 1938, ch. 266, §§ 1–4, 52 Stat. 438.)

Sections 729–732 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., were consolidated and completely rewritten in order to clarify ambiguities which made the statute unworkable as enacted originally. Jurisdictional provisions of section 729 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., are incorporated in section 1495 of this title.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

2004—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 108–405 substituted ''exceed $100,000 for each 12-month period of incarceration for any plaintiff who was unjustly sentenced to death and $50,000 for each 12-month period of incarceration for any other plaintiff'' for ''exceed the sum of $5,000''.

1992—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1982—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims''.

1954—Subsec. (c). Act Sept. 3, 1954, substituted ''considered by'' for ''filed with''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2514. Forfeiture of fraudulent claims

A claim against the United States shall be forfeited to the United States by any person who

corruptly practices or attempts to practice any fraud against the United States in the proof, statement, establishment, or allowance thereof.

In such cases the United States Court of Federal Claims shall specifically find such fraud or attempt and render judgment of forfeiture.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 978; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(j)(2), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 43; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 279 and 280 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 172, 173, 36 Stat. 1141).

A provision of section 279 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., that a judgment of forfeiture shall forever bar the prosecution of the claim was omitted as covered by section 2518 of this title.

A provision of section 280 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., barring allowance by accounting officers of fraudulent claims under Act June 16, 1874, 18 Stat. 75, was omitted as obsolete.

A provision of section 280 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., barring allowance of fraudulent claims by Congress was omitted as unnecessary and superfluous.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1992—Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2515. New trial; stay of judgment

(a) The United States Court of Federal Claims may grant a plaintiff a new trial on any ground established by rules of common law or equity applicable as between private parties.

(b) Such court, at any time while any suit is pending before it, or after proceedings for review have been instituted, or within two years after the final disposition of the suit, may grant the United States a new trial and stay the payment of any judgment upon satisfactory evidence, cumulative or otherwise, that any fraud, wrong, or injustice has been done the United States.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 978; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(j)(2), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 43; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 281 and 282 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 174, 175, 36 Stat. 1141).

Words ''but until an order is made staying the payment of a judgment, the same shall be payable and paid as on March 3, 1911, was provided by law,'' in section 282 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., were omitted as surplusage.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1992—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1982—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2516. Interest on claims and judgments

(a) Interest on a claim against the United States shall be allowed in a judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims only under a contract or Act of Congress expressly providing for payment thereof.

(b) Interest on a judgment against the United States affirmed by the Supreme Court after review on petition of the United States is paid at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 978; Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 57, 68 Stat. 1248; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(j)(2), title III, § 302(d), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 43, 56; Pub. L. 97–258, § 2(g)(5), (m)(3), Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1061, 1062; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516; Pub. L. 106–554, § 1(a)(7) [title III, § 307(d)(2)], Dec. 21, 2000, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A–636.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 284 and section 226 of title 31, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Money and Finance (Sept. 30, 1890, ch. 1126, § 1, 26 Stat. 537; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 177, 36 Stat. 1141; Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 1324(b), 42 Stat. 316; June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 1020, 43 Stat. 346; Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 3(c), 43 Stat. 939; Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1117, 1200, 44 Stat. 119, 125; May 29, 1928, ch. 852, § 615(a), 45 Stat. 877; June 22, 1936, ch. 690, § 808, 49 Stat. 1746).

Subdivision (b) of section 284 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., was omitted as covered by section 3771 of title 26, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Internal Revenue Code. Such omission required the exception in subdivision (a) of such section 284, reading: ''except as provided in subdivision (b)'', to be changed to read: ''or Act of Congress expressly providing for payment thereof.''

Subsection (b) of this section is based on the last sentence of section 226 of title 31, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Money and Finance.

Changes were made in phraseology.

1982 ACT

Revised Section	*Source (U.S. Code)*	*Source (Statutes at Large)*
28:2516(b)	28:2516(b)(1st sentence words before ''from the date'').	

Section 2(g)(5) of the bill restates 28:2516(b) because the provisions in 28:2516(b) on the periods for computing interest were superseded by the source provisions restated in section 1304 of the revised title 31.

AMENDMENTS

2000—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 106–554 substituted ''the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury

yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding'' for ''the coupon issue yield equivalent (as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United States Treasury bills settled immediately before''.

1992—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1982—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97–164, §139(j)(2), substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims''.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 97–258 substituted provisions that interest on a judgment against the United States is paid at a rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent of the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United States Treasury bills settled immediately before the date of judgment for provisions that such interest would be paid at the rate of four percent per annum from the date of the filing of the transcript of the judgment in the Treasury Department to the date of mandate of affirmance by the Supreme Court and that the interest would not be allowed for any period after the term of the Supreme Court at which the judgment was affirmed, and repealed the amendment made by Pub. L. 97–164, §302(d), eff. Oct. 1, 1982. See, also, section 1304(b) of Title 31, Money and Finance.

Pub. L. 97–164, §§302(d), 402, eff. Oct. 1, 1982, struck out ''at the rate of four percent per annum'' and all that follows through ''affirmance'' and inserted in lieu thereof '', from the date of the filing of the transcript of the judgment in the General Accounting Office to the date of the mandate of the affirmance, at a rate of interest equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of the judgment''.

1954—Subsec. (b). Act Sept. 3, 1954, inserted ''for any period'' after ''allowed'' in last sentence.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Section 2(g)(5) of Pub. L. 97–258 provided that the amendment made by that section is effective Oct. 1, 1982.

REPEAL

Section 302(d) of Pub. L. 97–164, cited as a credit to this section, was repealed by Pub. L. 97–258, §2(m)(3), Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1062, eff. Oct. 1, 1982.

§ 2517. Payment of judgments

(a) Except as provided by chapter 71 of title 41, every final judgment rendered by the United States Court of Federal Claims against the United States shall be paid out of any general appropriation therefor, on presentation to the Secretary of the Treasury of a certification of the judgment by the clerk and chief judge of the court.

(b) Payment of any such judgment and of interest thereon shall be a full discharge to the United States of all claims and demands arising out of the matters involved in the case or controversy, unless the judgment is designated a partial judgment, in which event only the matters described therein shall be discharged.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 979; Pub. L. 95–563, §14(e), (f), Nov. 1, 1978, 92 Stat. 2390; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, §139(k), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 43; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, §902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516; Pub. L. 104–316, title II, §202(*l*), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3843; Pub. L. 111–350, §5(g)(11), Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3848.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §285, and sections 225, 228, of title 31, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Money and Finance, (R.S. §§236, 1089; Feb. 18, 1904, ch. 160, §1, 33 Stat. 41; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §178, 36 Stat. 1141; June 10, 1921, ch. 18, §§304, 305, 42 Stat. 24; Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, §3(c), 43 Stat. 939).

Section consolidates section 285 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., and sections 225 and 228 of title 31, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Money and Finance.

Words ''chief judge'' were substituted for ''the chief justice, or, in his absence, by the presiding judge of said court'' in section 225 of title 31, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Money and Finance, in conformity with chapter 7 of this title.

Words ''or, on review, by the Supreme Court, where the same are affirmed in favor of the claimant'' in section 225 of title 31, U.S.C., 1940 ed., were omitted as unnecessary.

Provisions of section 228 of title 31, U.S.C., 1940 ed., for payment of district court judgments are incorporated in section 2414 of this title.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

2011—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 111–350 substituted ''chapter 71 of title 41'' for ''the Contract Disputes Act of 1978''.

1996—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 104–316 substituted ''Secretary of the Treasury'' for ''General Accounting Office''.

1992—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1982—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97–164, §139(k)(1), substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims''.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 97–164, §139(k)(2), struck out the comma after ''shall be discharged'' thereby correcting a technical error in the directory language in Pub. L. 95–563 which placed both a comma and a period after ''shall be discharged''.

1978—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 95–563, §14(e), inserted Contract Disputes Act of 1978 exception.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 95–563, §14(f), inserted provision relating to discharge of partial judgments.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1978 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 95–563 effective with respect to contracts entered into 120 days after Nov. 1, 1978, and, at the election of the contractor, with respect to any claim pending at such time before the contracting officer or initiated thereafter, see section 16 of Pub. L. 95–563, Nov. 1, 1978, 92 Stat. 2391, formerly set out as an Effective Date note under section 601 of former Title 41, Public Contracts.

[§ 2518. Repealed. Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(*l*), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 43]

Section, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 979, related to certification of Court of Claims judgments for appropriation.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPEAL

Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as an Effective Date of 1982 Amendment note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2519. Conclusiveness of judgment

A final judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims against any plaintiff shall forever bar any further claim, suit, or demand against the United States arising out of the matters involved in the case or controversy.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 979; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(m), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 43; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 286 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 179, 36 Stat. 1141).

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1992—Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court''.

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''United States Claims Court'' for ''Court of Claims''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

[§ 2520. Repealed. Pub. L. 106–518, title II, § 207, Nov. 13, 2000, 114 Stat. 2414]

Section, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 979; Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 58, 68 Stat. 1248; Pub. L. 89–507, § 2, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 308; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(n)(1)–(3), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 43, 44; Pub. L. 100–702, title X, § 1012(a)(1), Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4668; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516, required the Court of Federal Claims to impose a fee not exceeding $120 for petition filings.

§ 2521. Subpoenas and incidental powers

(a) Subpoenas requiring the attendance of parties or witnesses and subpoenas requiring the production of books, papers, documents or tangible things by any party or witness having custody or control thereof, may be issued for purposes of discovery or for use of the things produced as evidence in accordance with the rules and orders of the court. Such subpoenas shall be issued and served and compliance therewith shall be compelled as provided in the rules and orders of the court.

(b) The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority as—

(1) misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;

(2) misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; or

(3) disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.

(c) The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have such assistance in the carrying out of its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command as is available to a court of the United States. The United States marshal for any district in which the Court of Federal Claims is sitting shall, when requested by the chief judge of the Court of Federal Claims, attend any session of the Court of Federal Claims in such district.

(Added Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 59(a), 68 Stat. 1248; amended Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 910(a), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4519.)

AMENDMENTS

1992—Pub. L. 102–572 inserted ''and incidental powers'' in section catchline, designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2522. Notice of appeal

Review of a decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims shall be obtained by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the Court of Federal Claims within the time and in the manner prescribed for appeals to United States courts of appeals from the United States district courts.

(Added Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 139(q)(1), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 44; amended Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(a), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

AMENDMENTS

1992—Pub. L. 102–572 substituted ''United States Court of Federal Claims'' for ''United States Claims Court'' and ''Court of Federal Claims'' for ''Claims Court''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as an Effective Date of 1982 Amendment note under section 171 of this title.

[CHAPTER 167—REPEALED]

[§§ 2601 to 2604. Repealed. Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 140, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 44]

Section 2601, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 979; June 2, 1970, Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 103, 84 Stat. 275; Oct. 10, 1980, Pub. L. 96–417, title IV, § 403(a)–(d), title V, § 501(27), (28), 94 Stat. 1740–1742, provided for appeals to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals from final judgments or orders of the Court of International Trade and for the procedures to be followed in such appeals. See section 1295(a)(5) of this title.

Section 2602, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 980; Oct. 14, 1966, Pub. L. 89–651, § 8(c)(3), 80 Stat. 902; June 2, 1970, Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 104, 84 Stat. 276; Oct. 10, 1980, Pub. L. 96–417, title IV, § 403(e)(1), 94 Stat. 1741, provided for the precedence of enumerated civil actions in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See section 1296 of this title.

Section 2603, added Pub. L. 96–417, title IV, § 404(a), Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1741, provided that, except as provided in section 2639 or 2641(b) of this title or in the rules prescribed by the court, the Federal Rules of Evidence would apply in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in any appeal from the Court of International Trade.

Section 2604, added Pub. L. 96–417, title IV, § 405(a), Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1741, authorized the chief judge of

the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to summon annually the judges of the court to a judicial conference for the purpose of considering the business of the court and improvements in the administration of justice of the court.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPEAL

Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as an Effective Date of 1982 Amendment note under section 171 of this title.

CHAPTER 169—COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE PROCEDURE

AMENDMENTS

1984—Pub. L. 98–620 title IV, § 402(29)(G), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3359, struck out item 2647 ''Precedence of cases''.

1980—Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1730, substituted ''COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE PROCEDURE'' for ''CUSTOMS COURT PROCEDURE'' in chapter heading, ''Persons entitled to commence a civil action'' for ''Time for commencement of action'' in item 2631, ''Commencement of a civil action'' for ''Customs Court procedures and fees'' in item 2632, ''Procedure and fees'' for ''Precedence of cases'' in item 2633, ''Filing of official documents'' for ''Burden of proof; evidence of value'' in item 2635, ''Time for commencement of action'' for ''Analysis of imported merchandise'' in item 2636, ''Exhaustion of administrative remedies'' for ''Witnesses; inspection of documents'' in item 2637, ''New grounds in support of a civil action'' for ''Decisions; findings of fact and conclusions of law; effect of opinions'' in item 2638, ''Burden of proof; evidence of value'' for ''Retrial or rehearing'' in item 2639, and added items 2640 to 2647.

1979—Pub. L. 96–39, title X, § 1001(b)(4)(F), July 26, 1979, 93 Stat. 306, substituted ''Precedence of cases'' for ''Precedence of American manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler cases'' in item 2633.

1970—Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 123(e), June 2, 1970, 84 Stat. 282, substituted ''Time for commencement of action'' for ''Appeal for reappraisement; assignment to single judge; hearing'' in item 2631, ''Customs Court procedures and fees'' for ''Notice'' in item 2632, ''Precedence of American manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler cases'' for ''Evidence of value, upon reappraisement; burden of proof'' in item 2633, ''Notice'' for ''Witnesses; inspection of documents'' in item 2634, ''Burden of proof; evidence of value'' for ''Decision of single judge in reappraisement appeal'' in item 2635, ''Analysis of imported merchandise'' for ''Review of single judge's decision; disqualification of judges; remand; presumption'' in item 2636, ''Witnesses; inspection of documents'' for ''Review of decisions of divisions'' in item 2637, ''Decisions; findings of fact and conclusions of law; effect of opinions'' for ''Precedence of classification cases'' in item 2638, and ''Retrial or rehearing'' for ''Analysis of imported merchandise'' in item 2639, and struck out item 2640 ''Rehearing or retrial'', item 2641 ''Frivolous protest or appeal'', and item 2642 ''Amendment of protests, appeals, and pleadings''.

1949—Act May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 121, 63 Stat. 106, substituted ''Amendment of protests, appeals, and pleadings'' for ''Disqualification of judge'' in item 2642.

§ 2631. Persons entitled to commence a civil action

(a) A civil action contesting the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person who filed the protest pursuant to section 514 of such Act, or by a surety on the transaction which is the subject of the protest.

(b) A civil action contesting the denial of a petition under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person who filed such petition.

(c) A civil action contesting a determination listed in section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by any interested party who was a party to the proceeding in connection with which the matter arose.

(d)(1) A civil action to review any final determination of the Secretary of Labor under section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility of workers for adjustment assistance under such Act may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by a worker, group of workers, certified or recognized union, or authorized representative of such worker or group that applies for assistance under such Act and is aggrieved by such final determination.

(2) A civil action to review any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section 251 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility of a firm for adjustment assistance under such Act may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by a firm or its representative that applies for assistance under such Act and is aggrieved by such final determination, or by any other interested domestic party that is aggrieved by such final determination.

(3) A civil action to review any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section 271 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility of a community for adjustment assistance under such Act may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by a community that applies for assistance under such Act and is aggrieved by such final determination, or by any other interested domestic party that is aggrieved by such final determination.

(e) A civil action to review a final determination made under section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by any person who was a party-at-interest with respect to such determination.

(f) A civil action involving an application for the issuance of an order directing the administering authority or the International Trade Commission to make confidential information available under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by any interested party whose application for disclosure of such confidential

information was denied under section 777(c)(1) of such Act.

(g)(1) A civil action to review any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to deny a customs broker's license under section 641(b)(2) or (3) of the Tariff Act of 1930, or to deny a customs broker's permit under section 641(c)(1) of such Act, or to revoke such license or permit under section 641(b)(5) or (c)(2) of such Act, may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person whose license or permit was denied or revoked.

(2) A civil action to review any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to revoke or suspend a customs broker's license or permit or impose a monetary penalty in lieu thereof under section 641(d)(2)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person against whom the decision was issued.

(3) A civil action to review any decision or order of the Customs Service to deny, suspend, or revoke accreditation of a private laboratory under section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person whose accreditation was denied, suspended, or revoked.

(h) A civil action described in section 1581(h) of this title may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person who would have standing to bring a civil action under section 1581(a) of this title if he imported the goods involved and filed a protest which was denied, in whole or in part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.

(i) Any civil action of which the Court of International Trade has jurisdiction, other than an action specified in subsections (a)–(h) of this section, may be commenced in the court by any person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of section 702 of title 5.

(j)(1) Any person who would be adversely affected or aggrieved by a decision in a civil action pending in the Court of International Trade may, by leave of court, intervene in such action, except that—

(A) no person may intervene in a civil action under section 515 or 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930;

(B) in a civil action under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, only an interested party who was a party to the proceeding in connection with which the matter arose may intervene, and such person may intervene as a matter of right; and

(C) in a civil action under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, only a person who was a party to the investigation may intervene, and such person may intervene as a matter of right.

(2) In those civil actions in which intervention is by leave of court, the Court of International Trade shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

(k) In this section—

(1) ''interested party'' has the meaning given such term in section 771(9) of the Tariff Act of 1930; and

(2) ''party-at-interest'' means—

(A) a foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter, or a United States importer, of merchandise which is the subject of a final determination under section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979;

(B) a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States of a like product;

(C) United States members of a labor organization or other association of workers whose members are employed in the manufacture, production, or wholesale in the United States of a like product;

(D) a trade or business association a majority of whose members manufacture, produce, or wholesale a like product in the United States,[1] and

(E) an association composed of members who represent parties-at-interest described in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D).

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, §301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1730; amended Pub. L. 98–573, title II, §212(b)(3), title VI, §612(b)(3), Oct. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 2983, 3034; Pub. L. 103–182, title VI, §684(a)(2), Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2219.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsecs. (a), (h), (j)(1)(A), is classified to section 1515 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

Section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a), is classified to section 1514 of Title 19.

Section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsecs. (b), (j)(1)(A), is classified to section 1516 of Title 19.

Section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsecs. (c), (j)(1)(B), is classified to section 1516a of Title 19.

The Trade Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (d)(1) to (3), is Pub. L. 93–618, Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 1978, as amended, which is classified principally to chapter 12 (§2101 et seq.) of Title 19. Sections 223, 251, and 271 of the Trade Act of 1974 are classified to sections 2273, 2341, and 2371, respectively, of Title 19. Section 2371 of Title 19 was omitted from the Code as terminated Sept. 30, 1982. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see References in Text note set out under section 2101 of Title 19 and Tables.

Section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, referred to in subsecs. (e), (k)(2)(A), is classified to section 2515(b)(1) of Title 19.

Section 777 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsecs. (f), (j)(1)(C), is classified to section 1677f of Title 19.

Section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (g), is classified to section 1641 of Title 19.

Section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (g)(3), is classified to section 1499(b) of Title 19.

Section 771(9) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (k)(1), is classified to section 1677(9) of Title 19.

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2631, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 980; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §122, 63 Stat. 106; June 2, 1970, Pub. L. 91–271, title I, §112, 84 Stat. 278; Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. 93–618, title III, §321(f)(2), 88 Stat. 2048, related to time for commencement of action, prior to the general revision of this chapter by Pub. L. 96–417. See section 2636 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1993—Subsec. (g)(3). Pub. L. 103–182 added par. (3).

1984—Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 98–573, §212(b)(3), amended subsec. (g) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (g) read as follows:

[1] So in original. The comma probably should be a semicolon.

''(1) A civil action to review any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to deny or revoke a customhouse broker's license under section 641(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person whose license was denied or revoked.

''(2) A civil action to review any order of the Secretary of the Treasury to revoke or suspend a customhouse broker's license under section 641(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person whose license was revoked or suspended.''

Subsec. (k)(2)(E). Pub. L. 98–573, § 612(b)(3), added subpar. (E).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1984 AMENDMENT

Amendment by section 212(b)(3) of Pub. L. 98–573 effective on close of 180th day after Oct. 30, 1984, see section 214(d) of Pub. L. 98–573, set out as a note under section 1304 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

Amendment by section 612(b)(3) of Pub. L. 98–573 applicable with respect to investigations initiated by petition or by the administering authority under subtitle A or B of title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq., 1673 et seq.), and to reviews begun under section 751 of that Act (19 U.S.C. 1675), on or after Oct. 30, 1984, see section 626(b)(1) of Pub. L. 98–573, as amended, set out as a note under section 1671 of Title 19.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Chapter effective Nov. 1, 1980, unless otherwise provided, and applicable with respect to civil actions pending on or commenced on or after such date, see section 701(a) of Pub. L. 96–417, set out as an Effective Date of 1980 Amendment note under section 251 of this title.

Subsecs. (d) and (g) to (j) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of Pub. L. 96–417.

APPLICATION OF 1993 AMENDMENT

For purposes of applying amendment by Pub. L. 103–182, any decision or order of Customs Service denying, suspending, or revoking accreditation of a private laboratory on or after Dec. 8, 1993, and before regulations to implement 19 U.S.C. 1499(b) are issued to be treated as having been denied, suspended, or revoked under such section 1499(b), see section 684(b) of Pub. L. 103–182, set out as a note under section 1581 of this title.

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the United States Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, including functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see sections 203(1), 551(d), 552(d), and 557 of Title 6, Domestic Security, and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan of November 25, 2002, as modified, set out as a note under section 542 of Title 6.

§ 2632. Commencement of a civil action

(a) Except for civil actions specified in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a civil action in the Court of International Trade shall be commenced by filing concurrently with the clerk of the court a summons and complaint, with the content and in the form, manner, and style prescribed by the rules of the court.

(b) A civil action in the Court of International Trade under section 515 or section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930 shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court a summons, with the content and in the form, manner, and style prescribed by the rules of the court.

(c) A civil action in the Court of International Trade under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court a summons or a summons and a complaint, as prescribed in such section, with the content and in the form, manner, and style prescribed by the rules of the court.

(d) The Court of International Trade may prescribe by rule that any summons, pleading, or other paper mailed by registered or certified mail properly addressed to the clerk of the court with the proper postage affixed and return receipt requested shall be deemed filed as of the date of mailing.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1732.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Sections 515 and 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (b), are classified to sections 1515 and 1516, respectively, of Title 19, Customs Duties.

Section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (c), is classified to section 1516a of Title 19.

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2632, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 980; June 2, 1970, Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 113, 84 Stat. 279; Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. 93–618, title III, § 321(f)(3), 88 Stat. 2048; July 26, 1979, Pub. L. 96–39, title X, § 1001(b)(4)(C), 93 Stat. 306, related to Customs Court procedure and fees, prior to the general revision of this chapter by Pub. L. 96–417. See section 2633 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Subsec. (a) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of Pub. L. 96–417, set out as an Effective Date of 1980 Amendment note under section 251 of this title.

§ 2633. Procedure and fees

(a) A filing fee shall be payable to the clerk of the Court of International Trade upon the commencement of a civil action in such court. The amount of the fee shall be prescribed by the rules of the court, but shall be not less than $5 nor more than the filing fee for commencing a civil action in a district court of the United States. The court may fix all other fees to be charged by the clerk of the court.

(b) The Court of International Trade shall prescribe rules governing the summons, pleadings, and other papers, for their amendment, service, and filing, for consolidations, severances, suspensions of cases, and for other procedural matters.

(c) All summons, pleadings, and other papers filed in the Court of International Trade shall be served on all parties in accordance with rules prescribed by the court. When the United States, its agencies, or its officers are adverse parties, service of the summons shall be made upon the Attorney General and the head of the Government agency whose action is being contested. When injunctive relief is sought, the summons, pleadings, and other papers shall also be served upon the named officials sought to be enjoined.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1732.)

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2633, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 980; June 2, 1970, Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 114, 84 Stat. 279; July 26, 1979, Pub. L. 96–39, title X,

§ 1001(b)(4)(D), 93 Stat. 306, related to precedence of cases, prior to the general revision of this chapter by Pub. L. 96–417. See section 2647 of this title.

§ 2634. Notice

Reasonable notice of the time and place of trial or hearing before the Court of International Trade shall be given to all parties to any civil action, as prescribed by the rules of the court.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1733.)

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2634, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 981; June 2, 1970, Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 115, 84 Stat. 280, related to notice, prior to the general revision of this chapter by Pub. L. 96–417. See section 2634 of this title.

§ 2635. Filing of official documents

(a) In any action commenced in the Court of International Trade contesting the denial of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 or the denial of a petition under section 516 of such Act, the Customs Service, as prescribed by the rules of the court, shall file with the clerk of the court, as part of the official record, any document, paper, information or data relating to the entry of merchandise and the administrative determination that is the subject of the protest or petition.

(b)(1) In any civil action commenced in the Court of International Trade under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, within forty days or within such other period of time as the court may specify, after the date of service of a complaint on the administering authority established to administer title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 or the United States International Trade Commission, the administering authority or the Commission shall transmit to the clerk of the court the record of such action, as prescribed by the rules of the court. The record shall, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, consist of—

(A) a copy of all information presented to or obtained by the administering authority or the Commission during the course of the administrative proceedings, including all governmental memoranda pertaining to the case and the record of ex parte meetings required to be maintained by section 777(a)(3) of the Tariff Act of 1930; and

(B)(i) a copy of the determination and the facts and conclusions of law upon which such determination was based, (ii) all transcripts or records of conferences or hearings, and (iii) all notices published in the Federal Register.

(2) The administering authority or the Commission shall identify and transmit under seal to the clerk of the court any document, comment, or information that is accorded confidential or privileged status by the Government agency whose action is being contested and that is required to be transmitted to the clerk under paragraph (1) of this subsection. Any such document, comment, or information shall be accompanied by a nonconfidential description of the nature of the material being transmitted. The confidential or privileged status of such material shall be preserved in the civil action, but the court may examine the confidential or privileged material in camera and may make such material available under such terms and conditions as the court may order.

(c) Within fifteen days, or within such other period of time as the Court of International Trade may specify, after service of a summons and complaint in a civil action involving an application for an order directing the administering authority or the International Trade Commission to make confidential information available under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the administering authority or the Commission shall transmit under seal to the clerk of the Court of International Trade, as prescribed by its rules, the confidential information involved, together with pertinent parts of the record. Such information shall be accompanied by a nonconfidential description of the nature of the information being transmitted. The confidential status of such information shall be preserved in the civil action, but the court may examine the confidential information in camera and may make such information available under a protective order consistent with section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930.

(d)(1) In any other civil action in the Court of International Trade in which judicial review is to proceed upon the basis of the record made before an agency, the agency shall, within forty days or within such other period of time as the court may specify, after the date of service of the summons and complaint upon the agency, transmit to the clerk of the court, as prescribed by its rules—

(A) a copy of the contested determination and the findings or report upon which such determination was based;

(B) a copy of any reported hearings or conferences conducted by the agency; and

(C) any documents, comments, or other papers filed by the public, interested parties, or governments with respect to the agency's action.

(2) The agency shall identify and transmit under seal to the clerk of the court any document, comment, or other information that was obtained on a confidential basis and that is required to be transmitted to the clerk under paragraph (1) of this subsection. Any such document, comment, or information shall include a nonconfidential description of the nature of the material being transmitted. The confidential or privileged status of such material shall be preserved in the civil action, but the court may examine such material in camera and may make such material available under such terms and conditions as the court may order.

(3) The parties may stipulate that fewer documents, comments, or other information than those specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1733; amended Pub. L. 103–182, title VI, § 684(d), Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2219.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsecs. (a), (b)(1), and (c), is act June 17, 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590,

as amended. Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 is classified generally to subtitle IV (§ 1671 et seq.) of chapter 4 of Title 19, Customs Duties. Sections 515, 516, 516A, and 777 of the Tariff Act of 1930 are classified to sections 1515, 1516, 1516a, and 1677f, respectively, of Title 19. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1654 of Title 19 and Tables.

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2635, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 981; June 2, 1970, Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 116, 84 Stat. 280, related to burden of proof and evidence of value, prior to the general revision of this chapter by Pub. L. 96–417. See section 2639 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1993—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103–182 amended subsec. (a) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (a) read as follows:

''(1) Upon service of the summons on the Secretary of the Treasury in any civil action contesting the denial of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 or the denial of a petition under section 516 of such Act, the appropriate customs officer shall forthwith transmit to the clerk of the Court of International Trade, as prescribed by its rules, and as a part of the official record—

''(A) the consumption or other entry and the entry summary;

''(B) the commercial invoice;

''(C) the special customs invoice;

''(D) a copy of the protest or petition;

''(E) a copy of the denial, in whole or in part, of the protest or petition;

''(F) the importer's exhibits;

''(G) the official and other representative samples;

''(H) any official laboratory reports; and

''(I) a copy of any bond relating to the entry.

''(2) If any of the items listed in paragraph (1) of this subsection do not exist in a particular civil action, an affirmative statement to that effect shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court.''

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701 (b)(1)(B) of Pub. L. 96–417, set out as an Effective Date of 1980 Amendment note under section 251 of this title.

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the United States Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, including functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see sections 203(1), 551(d), 552(d), and 557 of Title 6, Domestic Security, and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan of November 25, 2002, as modified, set out as a note under section 542 of Title 6.

§ 2636. Time for commencement of action

(a) A civil action contesting the denial, in whole or in part, of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade—

(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the date of mailing of notice of denial of a protest under section 515(a) of such Act; or

(2) within one hundred and eighty days after the date of denial of a protest by operation of law under the provisions of section 515(b) of such Act.

(b) A civil action contesting the denial of a petition under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within thirty days after the date of mailing of a notice pursuant to section 516(c) of such Act.

(c) A civil action contesting a reviewable determination listed in section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within the time specified in such section.

(d) A civil action contesting a final determination of the Secretary of Labor under section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974 or a final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section 251 or section 271 of such Act is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within sixty days after the date of notice of such determination.

(e) A civil action contesting a final determination made under section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within thirty days after the date of the publication of such determination in the Federal Register.

(f) A civil action involving an application for the issuance of an order making confidential information available under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930 is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within ten days after the date of the denial of the request for such confidential information.

(g) A civil action contesting the denial or revocation by the Secretary of the Treasury of a customs broker's license or permit under subsection (b) or (c) of section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, or the revocation or suspension of such license or permit or the imposition of a monetary penalty in lieu thereof by such Secretary under section 641(d) of such Act, is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within sixty days after the date of the entry of the decision or order of such Secretary.

(h) A civil action contesting the denial, suspension, or revocation by the Customs Service of a private laboratory's accreditation under section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within 60 days after the date of the decision or order of the Customs Service.

(i) A civil action of which the Court of International Trade has jurisdiction under section 1581 of this title, other than an action specified in subsections (a)–(h) of this section, is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the court within two years after the cause of action first accrues.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1734; amended Pub. L. 98–573, title II, § 212(b)(4), title VI, § 623(b)(1), Oct. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 2984, 3041; Pub. L. 103–182, title VI, § 684(a)(3), Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2219.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a), is classified to section 1515 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

Section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (b), is classified to section 1516 of Title 19.

Section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (c), is classified to section 1516a of Title 19.

Sections 223, 251, and 271 of the Trade Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (d), are classified to sections 2273, 2341, and 2371, respectively, of Title 19, Customs Duties. Section 2371 of Title 19 was omitted from the Code as terminated Sept. 30, 1982.

Section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, referred to in subsec. (e), is classified to section 2515(b)(1) of Title 19.

Section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (f), is classified to section 1677f(c)(2) of Title 19.

Section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (g), is classified to section 1641 of Title 19.

Section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (h), is classified to section 1499(b) of Title 19.

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2636, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 981; June 2, 1970, Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 117, 84 Stat. 280, related to analysis of imported merchandise, prior to the general revision of this chapter by Pub. L. 96–417. See section 2642 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1993—Subsecs. (h), (i). Pub. L. 103–182 added subsec. (h) and redesignated former subsec. (h) as (i).

1984—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 98–573, § 623(b)(1)(A), amended subsec. (c) generally, striking out '', other than a determination under section 703(b), 703(c), 733(b), or 733(c) of such Act,'' and substituting ''within the time specified in such section'' for ''within thirty days after the date of the publication of such determination in the Federal Register''.

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 98–573, § 623(b)(1)(B), redesignated subsec. (e) as (d). Former subsec. (d), which provided that civil actions contesting certain determinations by the administering authority under sections 703(b), (c), and 733(b), (c), of the Tariff Act of 1930 were barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of International Trade within 10 days after publication of the determination in the Federal Register, was struck out.

Subsecs. (e) to (g). Pub. L. 98–573, § 623(b)(1)(B), redesignated subsecs. (f) to (h) as (e) to (g), respectively. Former subsec. (e) redesignated (d).

Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 98–573, § 623(b)(1)(B), redesignated subsec. (i) as (h). Former subsec. (h) redesignated (g).

Pub. L. 98–573, § 212(b)(4), amended subsec. (h) generally, substituting ''customs broker's license or permit under subsection (b) or (c) of section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, or the revocation or suspension of such license or permit or the imposition of a monetary penalty in lieu thereof by such Secretary under section 641(d) of such Act,'' for ''customhouse broker's license under section 641(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 or the revocation or suspension by such Secretary of a customhouse broker's license under section 641(b) of such Act''.

Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 98–573, § 623(b)(1)(B), redesignated subsec. (i) as (h).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1984 AMENDMENT

Amendment by section 212(b)(4) of Pub. L. 98–573 effective on close of 180th day after Oct. 30, 1984, see section 214(d) of Pub. L. 98–573, set out as a note under section 1304 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

Amendment by section 623(b)(1) of Pub. L. 98–573 applicable with respect to civil actions pending on, or filed on or after, Oct. 30, 1984, see section 626(b)(2) of Pub. L. 98–573, set out as a note under section 1671 of Title 19.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of Pub. L. 96–417, set out as an Effective Date of 1980 Amendment note under section 251 of this title.

APPLICATION OF 1993 AMENDMENT

For purposes of applying amendment by Pub. L. 103–182, any decision or order of Customs Service denying, suspending, or revoking accreditation of a private laboratory on or after Dec. 8, 1993, and before regulations to implement 19 U.S.C. 1499(b) are issued to be treated as having been denied, suspended, or revoked under such section 1499(b), see section 684(b) of Pub. L. 103–182, set out as a note under section 1581 of this title.

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the United States Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, including functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see sections 203(1), 551(d), 552(d), and 557 of Title 6, Domestic Security, and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan of November 25, 2002, as modified, set out as a note under section 542 of Title 6.

§ 2637. Exhaustion of administrative remedies

(a) A civil action contesting the denial of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade only if all liquidated duties, charges, or exactions have been paid at the time the action is commenced, except that a surety's obligation to pay such liquidated duties, charges, or exactions is limited to the sum of any bond related to each entry included in the denied protest.

(b) A civil action contesting the denial of a petition under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade only by a person who has first exhausted the procedures set forth in such section.

(c) A civil action described in section 1581(h) of this title may be commenced in the Court of International Trade prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies if the person commencing the action makes the demonstration required by such section.

(d) In any civil action not specified in this section, the Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1735.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a), is classified to section 1515 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

Section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (b), is classified to section 1516 of Title 19.

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2637, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 982; June 2, 1970, Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 118, 84 Stat. 280; July 26, 1979, Pub. L. 96–39, title X, § 1001(b)(4)(E), 93 Stat. 306, related to witnesses and inspection of documents, prior to the general revision of this chapter by Pub. L. 96–417. See section 2641 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Subsec. (c) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of Pub. L. 96–417, set out as an Effective Date of 1980 Amendment note under section 251 of this title.

§ 2638. New grounds in support of a civil action

In any civil action under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 in which the denial, in whole or in part, of a protest is a precondition to the commencement of a civil action in the Court of International Trade, the court, by rule, may consider any new ground in support of the civil action if such new ground—

(1) applies to the same merchandise that was the subject of the protest; and

(2) is related to the same administrative decision listed in section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930 that was contested in the protest.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1736.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in text, is classified to section 1515 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

Section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in par. (2), is classified to section 1514 of Title 19.

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2638, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 982; June 2, 1970, Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 119, 84 Stat. 281, related to decisions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and effect of opinions, prior to the general revision of this chapter by Pub. L. 96–417. See section 2645 (a) and (c) of this title.

§ 2639. Burden of proof; evidence of value

(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, in any civil action commenced in the Court of International Trade under section 515, 516, or 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury, the administering authority, or the International Trade Commission is presumed to be correct. The burden of proving otherwise shall rest upon the party challenging such decision.

(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to any civil action commenced in the Court of International Trade under section 1582 of this title.

(b) In any civil action described in section 1581(h) of this title, the person commencing the action shall have the burden of making the demonstration required by such section by clear and convincing evidence.

(c) Where the value of merchandise or any of its components is in issue in any civil action in the Court of International Trade—

(1) reports or depositions of consuls, customs officers, and other officers of the United States, and depositions and affidavits of other persons whose attendance cannot reasonably be had, may be admitted into evidence when served upon the opposing party as prescribed by the rules of the court; and

(2) price lists and catalogs may be admitted in evidence when duly authenticated, relevant, and material.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1736.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Sections 515, 516, and 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a)(1), are classified to sections 1515, 1516, and 1516a, respectively, of Title 19, Customs Duties.

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2639, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 982; June 2, 1970, Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 120, 84 Stat. 281, provided for retrial or rehearing, prior to the general revision of this chapter by Pub. L. 96–417. See section 2646 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Subsec. (a)(2) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after the 90th day after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(c)(1)(A) of Pub. L. 96–417, set out as an Effective Date of 1980 Amendment note under section 251 of this title.

Subsec. (b) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of Pub. L. 96–417.

§ 2640. Scope and standard of review

(a) The Court of International Trade shall make its determinations upon the basis of the record made before the court in the following categories of civil actions:

(1) Civil actions contesting the denial of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.

(2) Civil actions commenced under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930.

(3) Civil actions commenced to review a final determination made under section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.

(4) Civil actions commenced under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930.

(5) Civil actions commenced to review any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury under section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, with the exception of decisions under section 641(d)(2)(B), which shall be governed by subdivision (d) of this section.

(6) Civil actions commenced under section 1582 of this title.

(b) In any civil action commenced in the Court of International Trade under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, the court shall review the matter as specified in subsection (b) of such section.

(c) In any civil action commenced in the Court of International Trade to review any final determination of the Secretary of Labor under section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974 or any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section 251 or section 271 of such Act, the court shall review the matter as specified in section 284 of such Act.

(d) In any civil action commenced to review any order or decision of the Customs Service under section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the court shall review the action on the basis of the record before the Customs Service at the time of issuing such decision or order.

(e) In any civil action not specified in this section, the Court of International Trade shall review the matter as provided in section 706 of title 5.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1736; amended Pub. L. 98–573, title II, § 212(b)(5), Oct. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 2984; Pub. L. 103–182, title VI, § 684(a)(4), Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2219.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a)(1), is classified to section 1515 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

Section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a)(2), is classified to section 1516 of Title 19.

Section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, referred to in subsec. (a)(3), is classified to section 2515(b)(1) of Title 19.

Section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a)(4), is classified to section 1677f(c)(2) of Title 19.

Section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (a)(5), is classified to section 1641 of Title 19.

Section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (b), is classified to section 1516a of Title 19.

Sections 223, 251, 271, and 284 of the Trade Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (c), are classified to sections 2273, 2341, 2371, and 2395, respectively, of Title 19, Customs Duties. Section 2371 of Title 19 was omitted from the Code as terminated Sept. 30, 1982.

Section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (d), is classified to section 1499(b) of Title 19.

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2640, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 982, authorized the division which had decided a case or the single judge who had decided an appeal for a reappraisement to grant a rehearing or retrial, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 121, June 2, 1970, 84 Stat. 281. See section 2646 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1993—Subsecs. (d), (e). Pub. L. 103–182 added subsec. (d) and redesignated former subsec. (d) as (e).

1984—Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 98–573 amended par. (5) generally, substituting ''under section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, with the exception of decisions under section 641(d)(2)(B), which shall be governed by subdivision (d) of this section'' for ''to deny or revoke a customhouse broker's license under section 641(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1984 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 98–573 effective on close of 180th day after Oct. 30, 1984, see section 214(d) of Pub. L. 98–573, set out as a note under section 1304 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Subsecs. (a)(5), (c), and (d) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of Pub. L. 96–417, set out as an Effective Date of 1980 Amendment note under section 251 of this title.

Subsec. (a)(6) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after the 90th day after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(c)(1)(A) of Pub. L. 96–417.

APPLICATION OF 1993 AMENDMENT

For purposes of applying amendment by Pub. L. 103–182, any decision or order of Customs Service denying, suspending, or revoking accreditation of a private laboratory on or after Dec. 8, 1993, and before regulations to implement 19 U.S.C. 1499(b) are issued to be treated as having been denied, suspended, or revoked under such section 1499(b), see section 684(b) of Pub. L. 103–182, set out as a note under section 1581 of this title.

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the United States Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, including functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see sections 203(1), 551(d), 552(d), and 557 of Title 6, Domestic Security, and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan of November 25, 2002, as modified, set out as a note under section 542 of Title 6.

§ 2641. Witnesses; inspection of documents

(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, in any civil action in the Court of International Trade, each party and its counsel shall have an opportunity to introduce evidence, to hear and cross-examine the witnesses of the other party, and to inspect all samples and papers admitted or offered as evidence, as prescribed by the rules of the court. Except as provided in section 2639 of this title, subsection (b) of this section, or the rules of the court, the Federal Rules of Evidence shall apply to all civil actions in the Court of International Trade.

(b) The Court of International Trade may order that trade secrets and commercial or financial information which is privileged and confidential, or any information provided to the United States by any foreign government or foreign person, may be disclosed to a party, its counsel, or any other person under such terms and conditions as the court may order.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1737.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Evidence, referred to in subsec. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2641, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 982, authorized the Customs Court to assess a penalty of not less than $5 nor more than $250 against any person filing a frivolous protest or appeal, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 121, June 2, 1970, 84 Stat. 281.

§ 2642. Analysis of imported merchandise

The Court of International Trade may order an analysis of imported merchandise and reports thereon by laboratories or agencies of the United States or laboratories accredited by the Customs Service under section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1737; amended Pub. L. 103–182, title VI, § 684(a)(5), Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2219.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in text, is classified to section 1499(b) of Title 19, Customs Duties.

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 2642, act May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 123, 63 Stat. 106, authorized the Customs Court under its rules and in its discretion to permit the amendment of protests, appeals and pleadings, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 91–271, title I, § 121, June 2, 1970, 84 Stat. 281. See section 2633(b) of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1993—Pub. L. 103–182 inserted before period at end ''or laboratories accredited by the Customs Service under section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930''.

APPLICATION OF 1993 AMENDMENT

For purposes of applying amendment by Pub. L. 103–182, any decision or order of Customs Service denying, suspending, or revoking accreditation of a private laboratory on or after Dec. 8, 1993, and before regulations to implement 19 U.S.C. 1499(b) are issued to be treated as having been denied, suspended, or revoked under such section 1499(b), see section 684(b) of Pub. L. 103–182, set out as a note under section 1581 of this title.

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the United States Customs Service of the

Department of the Treasury, including functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see sections 203(1), 551(d), 552(d), and 557 of Title 6, Domestic Security, and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan of November 25, 2002, as modified, set out as a note under section 542 of Title 6.

§ 2643. Relief

(a) The Court of International Trade may enter a money judgment—

(1) for or against the United States in any civil action commenced under section 1581 or 1582 of this title; and

(2) for or against the United States or any other party in any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party action under section 1583 of this title.

(b) If the Court of International Trade is unable to determine the correct decision on the basis of the evidence presented in any civil action, the court may order a retrial or rehearing for all purposes, or may order such further administrative or adjudicative procedures as the court considers necessary to enable it to reach the correct decision.

(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5) of this subsection, the Court of International Trade may, in addition to the orders specified in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, order any other form of relief that is appropriate in a civil action, including, but not limited to, declaratory judgments, orders of remand, injunctions, and writs of mandamus and prohibition.

(2) The Court of International Trade may not grant an injunction or issue a writ of mandamus in any civil action commenced to review any final determination of the Secretary of Labor under section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974, or any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section 251 or section 271 of such Act.

(3) In any civil action involving an application for the issuance of an order directing the administering authority or the International Trade Commission to make confidential information available under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the Court of International Trade may issue an order of disclosure only with respect to the information specified in such section.

(4) In any civil action described in section 1581(h) of this title, the Court of International Trade may only order the appropriate declaratory relief.

(5) In any civil action involving an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding regarding a class or kind of merchandise of a free trade area country (as defined in section 516A(f)(10) of the Tariff Act of 1930), as determined by the administering authority, the Court of International Trade may not order declaratory relief.

(d) If a surety commences a civil action in the Court of International Trade, such surety shall recover only the amount of the liquidated duties, charges, or exactions paid on the entries included in such action. The excess amount of any recovery shall be paid to the importer of record.

(e) In any proceeding involving assessment or collection of a monetary penalty under section 641(b)(6) or 641(d)(2)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the court may not render judgment in an amount greater than that sought in the initial pleading of the United States, and may render judgment in such lesser amount as shall seem proper and just to the court.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1737; amended Pub. L. 98–573, title II, § 212(b)(6), Oct. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 2984; Pub. L. 100–449, title IV, § 402(b), Sept. 28, 1988, 102 Stat. 1884; Pub. L. 103–182, title IV, § 414(b), Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2147.)

References in Text

Sections 223, 251, and 271 of the Trade Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (c)(2), are classified to sections 2273, 2341, and 2371, respectively, of Title 19, Customs Duties. Section 2371 of Title 19 was omitted from the Code as terminated Sept. 30, 1982.

Section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (c)(3), is classified to section 1677f(c)(2) of Title 19.

Section 516A(f)(10) of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (c)(5), is classified to section 1516a(f)(10) of Title 19.

Section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in subsec. (e), is classified to section 1641 of Title 19.

Amendments

1993—Subsec. (c)(5). Pub. L. 103–182 substituted ''merchandise of a free trade area country (as defined in section 516A(f)(10) of the Tariff Act of 1930)'' for ''Canadian merchandise''.

1988—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 100–449 substituted ''(4), and (5)'' for ''and (4)'' in par. (1) and added par. (5).

1984—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 98–573 added subsec. (e).

Effective Date of 1993 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 103–182 effective on the date the North American Free Trade Agreement enters into force with respect to the United States [Jan. 1, 1994], but not applicable to any final determination described in section 1516a(a)(1)(B) or (2)(B)(i), (ii), or (iii) of Title 19, Customs Duties, notice of which is published in the Federal Register before such date, or to a determination described in section 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) of Title 19, notice of which is received by the Government of Canada or Mexico before such date, or to any binational panel review under the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, or to any extraordinary challenge arising out of any such review that was commenced before such date, see section 416 of Pub. L. 103–182, set out as an Effective Date note under section 3431 of Title 19.

Effective and Termination Dates of 1988 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 100–449 effective on date United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement enters into force (Jan. 1, 1989), and to cease to have effect on date Agreement ceases to be in force, see section 501(a), (c) of Pub. L. 100–449, set out in a note under section 2112 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

Effective Date of 1984 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 98–573 effective on close of 180th day after Oct. 30, 1984, see section 214(d) of Pub. L. 98–573, set out as a note under section 1304 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

Effective Date

Subsecs. (a) and (c)(2), (4) of this section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of Pub. L. 96–417, set out as an Effective Date of 1980 Amendment note under section 251 of this title.

EFFECT OF TERMINATION OF NAFTA COUNTRY STATUS

For provisions relating to effect of termination of NAFTA country status on sections 401 to 416 of Pub. L. 103–182, see section 3451 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

§ 2644. Interest

If, in a civil action in the Court of International Trade under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the plaintiff obtains monetary relief by a judgment or under a stipulation agreement, interest shall be allowed at an annual rate established under section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the filing of the summons in such action to the date of the refund.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1738; amended Pub. L. 99–514, § 2, Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2095.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, referred to in text, is classified to section 1515 of Title 19, Customs Duties.

Section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in text, is classified to section 6621 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

AMENDMENTS

1986—Pub. L. 99–514 substituted ''Internal Revenue Code of 1986'' for ''Internal Revenue Code of 1954''.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section applicable with respect to civil actions commenced on or after Nov. 1, 1980, see section 701(b)(1)(B) of Pub. L. 96–417, set out as an Effective Date of 1980 Amendment note under section 251 of this title.

§ 2645. Decisions

(a) A final decision of the Court of International Trade in a contested civil action or a decision granting or refusing a preliminary injunction shall be supported by—

(1) a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law; or

(2) an opinion stating the reasons and facts upon which the decision is based.

(b) After the Court of International Trade has rendered a judgment, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon its own motion, amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the decision and judgment accordingly. A motion of a party or the court shall be made not later than thirty days after the date of entry of the judgment.

(c) A decision of the Court of International Trade is final and conclusive, unless a retrial or rehearing is granted pursuant to section 2646 of this title or an appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the Court of International Trade within the time and in the manner prescribed for appeals to United States courts of appeals from the United States district courts.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1738; amended Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 141, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 45.)

AMENDMENTS

1982—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 97–164 substituted ''is taken to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the Court of International Trade within the time and in the manner prescribed for appeals to United States courts of appeals from the United States district courts'' for ''is taken to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals within the time and in the manner provided in section 2601 of this title''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title.

§ 2646. Retrial or rehearing

After the Court of International Trade has rendered a judgment or order, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon its own motion, grant a retrial or rehearing, as the case may be. A motion of a party or the court shall be made not later than thirty days after the date of entry of the judgment or order.

(Added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1739.)

[§ 2647. Repealed. Pub. L. 98–620, title IV, § 402(29)(G), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3359]

Section, added Pub. L. 96–417, title III, § 301, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1739; amended Pub. L. 98–573, title VI, § 623(b)(2), Oct. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 3041, related to precedence of cases.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPEAL

Repeal not applicable to cases pending on Nov. 8, 1984, see section 403 of Pub. L. 98–620, set out as an Effective Date note under section 1657 of this title.

CHAPTER 171—TORT CLAIMS PROCEDURE

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT

As printed in this report, this chapter should have read ''173'' and not ''171''. It was properly numbered ''173'' in the bill. However, the chapter was renumbered ''171'', without change in its section numbers, by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.

AMENDMENTS

1966—Pub. L. 89–506, § 9(b), July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 308, substituted ''claims'' for ''claims of $2,500 or less'' in item 2672.

1959—Pub. L. 86–238, § 1(2), Sept. 8, 1959, 73 Stat. 472, substituted ''$2,500'' for ''$1,000'' in item 2672.

§ 2671. Definitions

As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401(b) of this title, the term ''Federal agency'' includes the executive departments, the judicial and legislative branches, the military departments, independent establishments of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the

United States, but does not include any contractor with the United States.

''Employee of the government'' includes (1) officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United States, members of the National Guard while engaged in training or duty under section 115, 316, 502, 503, 504, or 505 of title 32, and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation, and (2) any officer or employee of a Federal public defender organization, except when such officer or employee performs professional services in the course of providing representation under section 3006A of title 18.

''Acting within the scope of his office or employment'', in the case of a member of the military or naval forces of the United States or a member of the National Guard as defined in section 101(3) of title 32, means acting in line of duty.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 982; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 124, 63 Stat. 106; Pub. L. 89–506, § 8, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 307; Pub. L. 97–124, § 1, Dec. 29, 1981, 95 Stat. 1666; Pub. L. 100–694, § 3, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4564; Pub. L. 106–398, § 1 [[div. A], title VI, § 665(b)], Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–169; Pub. L. 106–518, title IV, § 401, Nov. 13, 2000, 114 Stat. 2421.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 941 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 402, 60 Stat. 842).

Changes were made in phraseology.

1949 ACT

This section corrects a typographical error in section 2671 of title 28, U.S.C.

AMENDMENTS

2000—Pub. L. 106–518, in par. defining ''Employee of the government'', inserted ''(1)'' after ''includes'' and added cl. (2).

Pub. L. 106–398 inserted ''115,'' after ''members of the National Guard while engaged in training or duty under section'' in par. defining ''Employee of the government''.

1988—Pub. L. 100–694 inserted ''the judicial and legislative branches,'' after ''departments,'' in first par.

1981—Pub. L. 97–124 inserted ''members of the National Guard while engaged in training or duty under section 316, 502, 503, 504, or 505 of title 32,'' in definition of ''Employee of the government'' and ''or a member of the National Guard as defined in section 101(3) of title 32'' in definition of ''Acting within the scope of his office or employment''.

1966—Pub. L. 89–506 expanded definition of ''Federal agency'' to include military departments.

1949—Act May 24, 1949, corrected spelling of ''office''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2000 AMENDMENT

Pub. L. 106–398, § 1 [[div. A], title VI, § 665(c)(2)], Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–169, provided that: ''The amendment made by subsection (b) [amending this section] shall apply with respect to acts and omissions occurring before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 30, 2000].''

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1988 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 100–694 effective Nov. 18, 1988, and applicable to all claims, civil actions, and proceedings pending on, or filed on or after, Nov. 18, 1988, see section 8 of Pub. L. 100–694, set out as a note under section 2679 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1981 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–124 applicable only with respect to claims arising on or after Dec. 29, 1981, see section 4 of Pub. L. 97–124, set out as a note under section 1089 of Title 10, Armed Forces.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 89–506 applicable to claims accruing six months or more after July 18, 1966, see section 10 of Pub. L. 89–506, set out as a note under section 2672 of this title.

SHORT TITLE

This chapter is popularly known as the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Federal Tort Claims Act was previously the official short title of title IV of act Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842, which was classified principally to chapter 20 (§§ 921, 922, 931–934, 941–946) of former Title 28, Judicial Code and Judiciary. Title IV of act Aug. 2, 1946, was substantially repealed and reenacted as sections 1346(b) and 2671 et seq. of this title by act June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 992, the first section of which enacted this title. For complete classification of title IV to the Code, see Tables. For distribution of former sections of Title 28 into this title, see Table at the beginning of this title.

SEVERABILITY

Section 7 of Pub. L. 100–694 provided that: ''If any provision of this Act [see Short Title of 1988 Amendment note under section 1 of this title] or the amendments made by this Act or the application of the provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act and such amendments and the application of the provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected by that invalidation.''

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER ACTING WITHIN SCOPE OF OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT

Pub. L. 105–277, div. A, § 101(h) [title VI, § 627], Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681–480, 2681–519, as amended by Pub. L. 106–58, title VI, § 623, Sept. 29, 1999, 113 Stat. 471, provided that:

''(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

''(1) the term 'crime of violence' has the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United States Code; and

''(2) the term 'law enforcement officer' means any employee described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of section 8401(17) of title 5, United States Code; and any special agent in the Diplomatic Security Service of the Department of State.

''(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Effective on the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 21, 1998] and thereafter, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to tort liability, a law enforcement officer shall be construed to be acting within the scope of his or her office or employment, if the officer takes reasonable action, including the use of force, to—

''(1) protect an individual in the presence of the officer from a crime of violence;

''(2) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or

''(3) prevent the escape of any individual who the officer reasonably believes to have committed in the presence of the officer a crime of violence.''

CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND PURPOSES

Pub. L. 100–694, § 2, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4563, provided that:

''(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds and declares the following:

''(1) For more than 40 years the Federal Tort Claims Act [see Short Title note above] has been the legal mechanism for compensating persons injured by negligent or wrongful acts of Federal employees committed within the scope of their employment.

''(2) The United States, through the Federal Tort Claims Act, is responsible to injured persons for the common law torts of its employees in the same manner in which the common law historically has recognized the responsibility of an employer for torts committed by its employees within the scope of their employment.

''(3) Because Federal employees for many years have been protected from personal common law tort liability by a broad based immunity, the Federal Tort Claims Act has served as the sole means for compensating persons injured by the tortious conduct of Federal employees.

''(4) Recent judicial decisions, and particularly the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Westfall v. Erwin, have seriously eroded the common law tort immunity previously available to Federal employees.

''(5) This erosion of immunity of Federal employees from common law tort liability has created an immediate crisis involving the prospect of personal liability and the threat of protracted personal tort litigation for the entire Federal workforce.

''(6) The prospect of such liability will seriously undermine the morale and well being of Federal employees, impede the ability of agencies to carry out their missions, and diminish the vitality of the Federal Tort Claims Act as the proper remedy for Federal employee torts.

''(7) In its opinion in Westfall v. Erwin, the Supreme Court indicated that the Congress is in the best position to determine the extent to which Federal employees should be personally liable for common law torts, and that legislative consideration of this matter would be useful.

''(b) PURPOSE.—It is the purpose of this Act [see Short Title of 1988 Amendment note under section 1 of this title] to protect Federal employees from personal liability for common law torts committed within the scope of their employment, while providing persons injured by the common law torts of Federal employees with an appropriate remedy against the United States.''

§ 2672. Administrative adjustment of claims

The head of each Federal agency or his designee, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, may consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, compromise, and settle any claim for money damages against the United States for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the agency while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred: *Provided*, That any award, compromise, or settlement in excess of $25,000 shall be effected only with the prior written approval of the Attorney General or his designee. Notwithstanding the proviso contained in the preceding sentence, any award, compromise, or settlement may be effected without the prior written approval of the Attorney General or his or her designee, to the extent that the Attorney General delegates to the head of the agency the authority to make such award, compromise, or settlement. Such delegations may not exceed the authority delegated by the Attorney General to the United States attorneys to settle claims for money damages against the United States. Each Federal agency may use arbitration, or other alternative means of dispute resolution under the provisions of subchapter IV of chapter 5 of title 5, to settle any tort claim against the United States, to the extent of the agency's authority to award, compromise, or settle such claim without the prior written approval of the Attorney General or his or her designee.

Subject to the provisions of this title relating to civil actions on tort claims against the United States, any such award, compromise, settlement, or determination shall be final and conclusive on all officers of the Government, except when procured by means of fraud.

Any award, compromise, or settlement in an amount of $2,500 or less made pursuant to this section shall be paid by the head of the Federal agency concerned out of appropriations available to that agency. Payment of any award, compromise, or settlement in an amount in excess of $2,500 made pursuant to this section or made by the Attorney General in any amount pursuant to section 2677 of this title shall be paid in a manner similar to judgments and compromises in like causes and appropriations or funds available for the payment of such judgments and compromises are hereby made available for the payment of awards, compromises, or settlements under this chapter.

The acceptance by the claimant of any such award, compromise, or settlement shall be final and conclusive on the claimant, and shall constitute a complete release of any claim against the United States and against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, by reason of the same subject matter.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 983; Apr. 25, 1949, ch. 92, § 2(b), 63 Stat. 62; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 125, 63 Stat. 106; Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1010, § 9, 64 Stat. 987; Pub. L. 86–238, § 1(1), Sept. 8, 1959, 73 Stat. 471; Pub. L. 89–506, §§ 1, 9(a), July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 306, 308; Pub. L. 101–552, § 8(a), Nov. 15, 1990, 104 Stat. 2746.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 921 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 403, 60 Stat. 843).

The phrase ''accruing on and after January 1, 1945'' was omitted because executed as of the date of the enactment of this revised title.

Changes were made in phraseology.

1949 ACT

This section corrects a typographical error in section 2672 of title 28, U.S.C.

AMENDMENTS

1990—Pub. L. 101–552 inserted at end of first par. ''Notwithstanding the proviso contained in the preceding sentence, any award, compromise, or settlement may be effected without the prior written approval of the Attorney General or his or her designee, to the extent that the Attorney General delegates to the head of the agency the authority to make such award, compromise, or settlement. Such delegations may not exceed the authority delegated by the Attorney General to the United States attorneys to settle claims for money damages against the United States. Each Fed-

eral agency may use arbitration, or other alternative means of dispute resolution under the provisions of subchapter IV of chapter 5 of title 5, to settle any tort claim against the United States, to the extent of the agency's authority to award, compromise, or settle such claim without the prior written approval of the Attorney General or his or her designee.''

1966—Pub. L. 89–506 substituted ''claims'' for ''claims of $2,500 or less'' in section catchline, authorized administrative settlement of tort claims, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, of up to $25,000 and, with the prior written approval of the Attorney General or his designee, in excess of $25,000, inserted ''compromise'' and ''settlement'' to list of administrative acts that would be final and conclusive on all officers of the government, authorized the payment of administrative settlements in excess of $2,500 in the manner similar to judgments and compromises in like causes, and made appropriations and funds which were available for the payment of such judgments and compromises available for the payment of awards, compromises, or settlements under this chapter.

1959—Pub. L. 86–238 substituted ''$2,500'' for ''$1,000'' in section catchline and text.

1950—Act Sept. 23, 1950, struck out requirement for specific authorization for payment of tort claims in appropriation acts.

1949—Act Apr. 25, 1949, inserted ''accruing on or after January 1, 1945'' after ''United States'' in first par.

Act May 24, 1949, substituted ''2677'' for ''2678'' in third par.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENT

Section 10 of Pub. L. 89–506 provided that: ''This Act [amending this section, sections 2401, 2671, 2675, 2677, 2678, and 2679 of this title, section 724a of former Title 31, Money and Finance, and former section 4116 of Title 38, Veterans' Benefits], shall apply to claims accruing six months or more after the date of its enactment [July 18, 1966].''

LAWS UNAFFECTED

Section 424(b) of act Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, title IV, 60 Stat. 856, provided that: ''Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to repeal any provision of law authorizing any Federal agency to consider, ascertain, adjust, settle, determine, or pay any claim on account of damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death, in cases in which such damage, loss, injury, or death was not caused by any negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, or any other claim not cognizable under part 2 of this title.''

§ 2673. Reports to Congress

The head of each federal agency shall report annually to Congress all claims paid by it under section 2672 of this title, stating the name of each claimant, the amount claimed, the amount awarded, and a brief description of the claim.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 983.)

REPEAL

Section 1(1) of Pub. L. 89–348, Nov. 8, 1965, 79 Stat. 1310, repealed the requirement that an annual report to Congress be made of the administrative adjustment of tort claims of $2,500 or less, stating the name of each claimant, the amount claimed, the amount awarded, and a brief description of the claim.

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 922 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 404, 60 Stat. 843).

Changes were made in phraseology.

§ 2674. Liability of United States

The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.

If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law of the place where the act or omission complained of occurred provides, or has been construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the United States shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons respectively, for whose benefit the action was brought, in lieu thereof.

With respect to any claim under this chapter, the United States shall be entitled to assert any defense based upon judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise would have been available to the employee of the United States whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, as well as any other defenses to which the United States is entitled.

With respect to any claim to which this section applies, the Tennessee Valley Authority shall be entitled to assert any defense which otherwise would have been available to the employee based upon judicial or legislative immunity, which otherwise would have been available to the employee of the Tennessee Valley Authority whose act or omission gave rise to the claim as well as any other defenses to which the Tennessee Valley Authority is entitled under this chapter.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 983; Pub. L. 100–694, §§ 4, 9(c), Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4564, 4567.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 931(a) (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 410(a), 60 Stat. 843).

Section constitutes the liability provisions in the second sentence of section 931(a) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.

Other provisions of section 931(a) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., are incorporated in sections 1346(b), 1402, 2402, 2411, and 2412 of this title, but the provision of such section 931(a) that the United States shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment was omitted as unnecessary in view of section 2411 of this title, which provides that interest on judgments against the United States shall be computed from the date of judgment. Such section 2411 is made applicable to tort-claim actions by section 932 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.

Changes were made in phraseology.

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT

For Senate amendment to this section, see 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559, amendment No. 60.

AMENDMENTS

1988—Pub. L. 100–694 inserted two pars. at end entitling the United States and the Tennessee Valley Authority to assert any defense based upon judicial or legislative immunity.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1988 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 100–694 effective Nov. 18, 1988, and applicable to all claims, civil actions, and proceedings pending on, or filed on or after, Nov. 18, 1988, see section 8 of Pub. L. 100–694 set out as a note under section 2679 of this title.

§ 2675. Disposition by federal agency as prerequisite; evidence

(a) An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to such claims as may be asserted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by third party complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim.

(b) Action under this section shall not be instituted for any sum in excess of the amount of the claim presented to the federal agency, except where the increased amount is based upon newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of intervening facts, relating to the amount of the claim.

(c) Disposition of any claim by the Attorney General or other head of a federal agency shall not be competent evidence of liability or amount of damages.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 983; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 126, 63 Stat. 107; Pub. L. 89–506, § 2, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 306.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 931(b) (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 410(b), 60 Stat. 844).

Section constitutes all of section 931(b), except the first sentence, of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed. The remainder of such section 931(b) is incorporated in section 2677 of this title.

Changes were made in phraseology.

1949 ACT

This section corrects a typographical error in section 2675(b) of title 28, U.S.C.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

AMENDMENTS

1966—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 89–506, § 2(a), required that all administrative claims be filed with the agency or department and finally denied by the agency and sent by certified or registered mail prior to the filing of a court action against the United States, provided that the claimant be given the option of considering the claim to have been denied if the agency fails to make final disposition of the claim within six months of presentation of the claim to the agency, and provided that the requirements of the subsection would not apply to claims asserted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by third party complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 89–506, § 2(b), struck out provisions under which a claimant could, upon 15 days written notice, withdraw a claim from the agency and institute an action thereon.

1949—Subsec. (b). Act May 24, 1949, substituted ''section'' for ''subsection''.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 89–506 applicable to claims accruing six months or more after July 18, 1966, see section 10 of Pub. L. 89–506, set out as a note under section 2672 of this title.

§ 2676. Judgment as bar

The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 984.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 931(b) (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 410(b), 60 Stat. 844).

Section constitutes the first sentence of section 931(b) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed. Other provisions of such section 931(b) are incorporated in section 2675 of this title.

Changes were made in phraseology.

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT

This section was eliminated by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.

§ 2677. Compromise

The Attorney General or his designee may arbitrate, compromise, or settle any claim cognizable under section 1346(b) of this title, after the commencement of an action thereon.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 984; Pub. L. 89–506, § 3, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 307.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 934 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 413, 60 Stat. 845).

Changes were made in phraseology.

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT

This section was renumbered ''2676'' by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.

AMENDMENTS

1966—Pub. L. 89–506 struck out provision requiring that approval of court be obtained before Attorney General could arbitrate, compromise, or settle a claim after commencement of an action thereon.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 89–506 applicable to claims accruing six months or more after July 18, 1966, see section 10 of Pub. L. 89–506, set out as a note under section 2672 of this title.

§ 2678. Attorney fees; penalty

No attorney shall charge, demand, receive, or collect for services rendered, fees in excess of 25 per centum of any judgment rendered pursuant to section 1346(b) of this title or any settlement made pursuant to section 2677 of this title, or in excess of 20 per centum of any award, compromise, or settlement made pursuant to section 2672 of this title.

Any attorney who charges, demands, receives, or collects for services rendered in connection

with such claim any amount in excess of that allowed under this section, if recovery be had, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 984; Pub. L. 89–506, § 4, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 307.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 944 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 422, 60 Stat. 846).

Words ''shall be guilty of a misdemeanor'' and ''shall, upon conviction thereof'', in the second sentence, were omitted in conformity with revised title 18, U.S.C., Crimes and Criminal Procedure (H.R. 1600, 80th Cong.). See sections 1 and 2 of said revised title 18.

Changes were made in phraseology.

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT

This section was renumbered ''2677'' by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.

AMENDMENTS

1966—Pub. L. 89–506 raised the limitations on allowable attorneys fees from 10 to 20 percent for administrative settlements and from 20 to 25 percent for fees in cases after suit is filed and removed the requirement of agency or court allowance of the amount of attorneys fees.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 89–506 applicable to claims accruing six months or more after July 18, 1966, see section 10 of Pub. L. 89–506, set out as a note under section 2672 of this title.

§ 2679. Exclusiveness of remedy

(a) The authority of any federal agency to sue and be sued in its own name shall not be construed to authorize suits against such federal agency on claims which are cognizable under section 1346(b) of this title, and the remedies provided by this title in such cases shall be exclusive.

(b)(1) The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of such employee. Any other civil action or proceeding for money damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the employee or the employee's estate is precluded without regard to when the act or omission occurred.

(2) Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the Government—

(A) which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or

(B) which is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized.

(c) The Attorney General shall defend any civil action or proceeding brought in any court against any employee of the Government or his estate for any such damage or injury. The employee against whom such civil action or proceeding is brought shall deliver within such time after date of service or knowledge of service as determined by the Attorney General, all process served upon him or an attested true copy thereof to his immediate superior or to whomever was designated by the head of his department to receive such papers and such person shall promptly furnish copies of the pleadings and process therein to the United States attorney for the district embracing the place wherein the proceeding is brought, to the Attorney General, and to the head of his employing Federal agency.

(d)(1) Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an action against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.

(2) Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a State court shall be removed without bond at any time before trial by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place in which the action or proceeding is pending. Such action or proceeding shall be deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant. This certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal.

(3) In the event that the Attorney General has refused to certify scope of office or employment under this section, the employee may at any time before trial petition the court to find and certify that the employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment. Upon such certification by the court, such action or proceeding shall be deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant. A copy of the petition shall be served upon the United States in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the event the petition is filed in a civil action or proceeding pending in a State court, the action or proceeding may be removed without bond by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place in which it is pending. If, in considering the petition, the district court determines that the employee was not acting within the scope of his office or employment, the action or proceeding shall be remanded to the State court.

(4) Upon certification, any action or proceeding subject to paragraph (1), (2), or (3) shall pro-

ceed in the same manner as any action against the United States filed pursuant to section 1346(b) of this title and shall be subject to the limitations and exceptions applicable to those actions.

(5) Whenever an action or proceeding in which the United States is substituted as the party defendant under this subsection is dismissed for failure first to present a claim pursuant to section 2675(a) of this title, such a claim shall be deemed to be timely presented under section 2401(b) of this title if—

(A) the claim would have been timely had it been filed on the date the underlying civil action was commenced, and

(B) the claim is presented to the appropriate Federal agency within 60 days after dismissal of the civil action.

(e) The Attorney General may compromise or settle any claim asserted in such civil action or proceeding in the manner provided in section 2677, and with the same effect.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 984; Pub. L. 87–258, §1, Sept. 21, 1961, 75 Stat. 539; Pub. L. 89–506, §5(a), July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 307; Pub. L. 100–694, §§5, 6, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4564.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §945 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §423, 60 Stat. 846).

Changes were made in phraseology.

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT

The catchline and text of this section were changed and the section was renumbered ''2678'' by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (d)(3), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

AMENDMENTS

1988—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 100–694, §5, amended subsec. (b) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (b) read as follows: ''The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of this title for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death, resulting from the operation by any employee of the Government of any motor vehicle while acting within the scope of his office or employment, shall hereafter be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or his estate whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.''

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 100–694, §6, amended subsec. (d) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (d) read as follows: ''Upon a certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the incident out of which the suit arose, any such civil action or proceeding commenced in a State court shall be removed without bond at any time before trial by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending and the proceedings deemed a tort action brought against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto. Should a United States district court determine on a hearing on a motion to remand held before a trial on the merits that the case so removed is one in which a remedy by suit within the meaning of subsection (b) of this section is not available against the United States, the case shall be remanded to the State court.''

1966—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 89–506 inserted reference to section 2672 of this title and substituted ''remedy'' for ''remedy by suit''.

1961—Pub. L. 87–258 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and added subsecs. (b) to (e).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1988 AMENDMENT

Section 8 of Pub. L. 100–694 provided that:

''(a) GENERAL RULE.—This Act and the amendments made by this Act [enacting section 831c–2 of Title 16, Conservation, amending this section and sections 2671 and 2674 of this title, and enacting provisions set out as notes under this section and section 2671 of this title] shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 18, 1988].

''(b) APPLICABILITY TO PROCEEDINGS.—The amendments made by this Act [amending this section and sections 2671 and 2674 of this title] shall apply to all claims, civil actions, and proceedings pending on, or filed on or after, the date of the enactment of this Act.

''(c) PENDING STATE PROCEEDINGS.—With respect to any civil action or proceeding pending in a State court to which the amendments made by this Act apply, and as to which the period for removal under section 2679(d) of title 28, United States Code (as amended by section 6 of this Act), has expired, the Attorney General shall have 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act during which to seek removal under such section 2679(d).

''(d) CLAIMS ACCRUING BEFORE ENACTMENT.—With respect to any civil action or proceeding to which the amendments made by this Act apply in which the claim accrued before the date of the enactment of this Act, the period during which the claim shall be deemed to be timely presented under section 2679(d)(5) of title 28, United States Code (as amended by section 6 of this Act) shall be that period within which the claim could have been timely filed under applicable State law, but in no event shall such period exceed two years from the date of the enactment of this Act.''

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 89–506 applicable to claims accruing six months or more after July 18, 1966, see section 10 of Pub. L. 89–506, set out as a note under section 2672 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1961 AMENDMENT

Section 2 of Pub. L. 87–258 provided that: ''The amendments made by this Act [amending this section] shall be deemed to be in effect six months after the enactment hereof [Sept. 21, 1961] but any rights or liabilities then existing shall not be affected.''

§ 2680. Exceptions

The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to—

(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.

(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.

(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer, except that the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title apply to any claim based on injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property, while in the possession of any officer

of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer, if—

(1) the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of property other than as a sentence imposed upon conviction of a criminal offense;

(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited;

(3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or mitigated (if the property was subject to forfeiture); and

(4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for which the interest of the claimant in the property was subject to forfeiture under a Federal criminal forfeiture law..[1]

(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by chapter 309 or 311 of title 46 relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.

(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Government in administering the provisions of sections 1–31 of Title 50, Appendix.

(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine by the United States.

[(g) Repealed. Sept. 26, 1950, ch. 1049, § 13 (5), 64 Stat. 1043.]

(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: *Provided*, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, ''investigative or law enforcement officer'' means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.

(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system.

(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.

(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.

(*l*) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company.

(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 984; July 16, 1949, ch. 340, 63 Stat. 444; Sept. 26, 1950, ch. 1049, §§ 2(a)(2), 13(5), 64 Stat. 1038, 1043; Pub. L. 86–168, title II, § 202(b), Aug. 18, 1959, 73 Stat. 389; Pub. L. 93–253, § 2, Mar. 16, 1974, 88 Stat. 50; Pub. L. 106–185, § 3(a), Apr. 25, 2000, 114 Stat. 211; Pub. L. 109–304, § 17(f)(4), Oct. 6, 2006, 120 Stat. 1708.)

[1] So in original.

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 943 (Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 421, 60 Stat. 845).

Changes were made in phraseology.

Section 946 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., which was derived from section 424(b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, was omitted from this revised title. It preserved the existing authority of federal agencies to settle tort claims not cognizable under section 2672 of this title. Certain enumerated laws granting such authority were specifically repealed by section 424(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, which section was also omitted from this revised title. These provisions were not included in this revised title as they are not properly a part of a code of general and permanent law.

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT

Sections 2680 and 2681 were renumbered ''2679'' and ''2680'', respectively, by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Sections 1–31 of Title 50, Appendix, referred to in subsec. (e), was in the original source of this section (section 943 of act Aug. 2, 1946) a reference to the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended. The Trading with the Enemy Act is now comprised of sections 1 to 43, which are classified to sections 1 to 6, 7 to 39, and 41 to 44 of Title 50, Appendix, War and National Defense.

The date of the enactment of this proviso, referred to in subsec. (h), means Mar. 16, 1974, the date on which Pub. L. 93–253, which enacted the proviso, was approved.

Panama Canal Company, referred to in subsec. (m), deemed to refer to Panama Canal Commission, see section 3602(b)(5) of Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse.

AMENDMENTS

2006—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 109–304 substituted ''chapter 309 or 311 of title 46'' for ''sections 741–752, 781–790 of Title 46,''.

2000—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 106–185 substituted ''any goods, merchandise, or other property'' for ''any goods or merchandise'' and ''law enforcement'' for ''law-enforcement'', inserted '', except that the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title apply to any claim based on injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property, while in the possession of any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer, if—'', and added pars. (1) to (4).

1974—Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 93–253 inserted proviso.

1959—Subsec. (n). Pub. L. 86–168 added subsec. (n).

1950—Subsec. (g). Act Sept. 26, 1950, § 13(5), repealed subsec. (g).

Subsec. (m). Act Sept. 26, 1950, § 2, substituted ''Panama Canal Company'' for ''Panama Railroad Company''.

1949—Subsec. (m). Act July 16, 1949, added subsec. (m).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2000 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 106–185 applicable to any forfeiture proceeding commenced on or after the date that is 120 days after Apr. 25, 2000, see section 21 of Pub. L. 106–185, set out as a note under section 1324 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1959 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 86–168 effective Jan. 1, 1960, see section 203(c) of Pub. L. 86–168.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1950 AMENDMENT

Amendment by act Sept. 26, 1950, to take effect upon effective date of transfer to the Panama Canal Company, pursuant to the provisions of section 256 of the former Canal Zone Code, as added by section 10 of that act, of the Panama Canal together with the facilities

and appurtenances related thereto, see section 14 of act Sept. 26, 1950.

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

For transfer of authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of the Coast Guard, including the authorities and functions of the Secretary of Transportation relating thereto, to the Department of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see sections 468(b), 551(d), 552(d), and 557 of Title 6, Domestic Security, and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan of November 25, 2002, as modified, set out as a note under section 542 of Title 6.

Coast Guard transferred to Department of Transportation and all functions, powers, and duties, relating to Coast Guard, of Secretary of the Treasury and of all other offices and officers of Department of the Treasury transferred to Secretary of Transportation by Pub. L. 89–670, § 6(b)(1), Oct. 15, 1966, 80 Stat. 938. Section 6(b)(2) of Pub. L. 89–670, however, provided that notwithstanding such transfer of functions, Coast Guard shall operate as part of Navy in time of war or when President directs as provided in section 3 of Title 14, Coast Guard. See section 108 of Title 49, Transportation.

For transfer of certain functions relating to claims and litigation, insofar as they pertain to the Air Force, from Secretary of the Army to Secretary of the Air Force, see Secretary of Defense Transfer Order No. 34 [§ 1a(2)(4)], eff. July 1, 1949.

NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS—APPLICABILITY OF SUBSEC. (k)

Pub. L. 97–357, title II, § 204, Oct. 19, 1982, 96 Stat. 1708, provided: ''That the Northern Mariana Islands shall not be considered a foreign country for purposes of subsection (k) of section 2680 of title 28, United States Code, with respect to claims which accrued no more than two years prior to the effective date of this Act [Oct. 19, 1982].''

TERMINATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

Declaration of national emergency in effect on Sept. 14, 1976, was terminated two years from that date by section 1601 of Title 50, War and National Defense.

APPLICABILITY OF SUBSEC. (j)

Joint Res. July 3, 1952, ch. 570, § 1(a)(32), 66 Stat. 333, as amended by Joint Res. Mar. 31, 1953, ch. 13, § 1, 67 Stat. 18, and Joint Res. June 30, 1953, ch. 172, 67 Stat. 132, provided that subsec. (j) of this section, in addition to coming into full force and effect in time of war, should continue in force until six months after the termination of the national emergency proclaimed by the President on Dec. 16, 1950 by 1950 Proc. No. 2914, 15 F.R. 9029, set out as a note preceding section 1 of Title 50 Appendix, War and National Defense, or such earlier date or dates as may be provided for by Congress, but in no event beyond Aug. 1, 1953. Section 7 of Joint Res. July 3, 1952, provided that it should become effective June 16, 1952.

Joint Res. July 3, 1952, ch. 570, § 6, 66 Stat. 334, repealed Joint Res. Apr. 14, 1952, ch. 204, 66 Stat. 54 as amended by Joint Res. May 28, 1952, ch. 339, 66 Stat. 96; Joint Res. June 14, 1952, ch. 437, 66 Stat. 137; Joint Res. June 30, 1952, ch. 526, 66 Stat. 296, which continued provisions of subsec. (j) of this section until July 3, 1952. This repeal was made effective June 16, 1952, by section 7 of Joint Res. July 3, 1952.

CHAPTER 173—ATTACHMENT IN POSTAL SUITS

§ 2710. Right of attachment

(a) Where debts are due from a defaulting or delinquent postmaster, contractor, or other officer, agent or employee of the Post Office Department, a warrant of attachment may issue against all property and legal and equitable rights belonging to him, and his sureties, or either of them, where he—

(1) is a nonresident of the district where he was appointed, or has departed from that district for the purpose of permanently residing outside thereof, or of avoiding the service of civil process; and

(2) has conveyed away, or is about to convey away any of his property, or has removed or is about to remove the same from the district wherein it is situated, with intent to defraud the United States.

(b) When the property has been removed, the marshal of the district into which it has been removed, upon receipt of certified copies of the warrant, may seize the property and convey it to a convenient place within the jurisdiction of the court which issued the warrant. Alias warrants may be issued upon due application. The warrant first issued remains valid until the return day thereof.

(Added Pub. L. 86–682, § 9, Sept. 2, 1960, 74 Stat. 706.)

CODIFICATION

Section was derived from R.S. § 924, which was originally classified to section 737 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. § 924 was reclassified to section 837 of Title 39. R.S. § 924 was repealed by section 12(c) of Pub. L. 86–682 (section 1 of which revised and enacted Title 39), and reenacted by section 9 thereof as section 2710 of this title.

CHANGE OF NAME

References to Post Office Department, Postal Service, Postal Field Service, Field Postal Service, or Departmental Service or Departmental Headquarters of Post Office Department to be considered references to United States Postal Service pursuant to Pub. L. 91–375, § 6(*o*), Aug. 12, 1970, 84 Stat. 783, set out as a Cross Reference note preceding section 101 of Title 39, Postal Service.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Chapter effective Sept. 1, 1960, see section 11 of Pub. L. 86–682.

§ 2711. Application for warrant

A United States attorney or assistant United States attorney or a person authorized by the Attorney General—

(1) upon his own affidavit or that of another credible person, stating the existence of either of the grounds of attachments enumerated in section 2710 of this title and

(2) upon production of legal evidence of the debt

may apply for a warrant of attachment to a judge, or, in his absence, to the clerk of any

court of the United States having original jurisdiction of the cause of action.

(Added Pub. L. 86–682, §9, Sept. 2, 1960, 74 Stat. 707.)

CODIFICATION

Section was derived from R.S. §925, which was originally classified to section 738 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §925 was reclassified to section 838 of Title 39. R.S. §925 was repealed by section 12(c) of Pub. L. 86–682 (section 1 of which revised and enacted Title 39), and reenacted by section 9 thereof as section 2711 of this title.

§ 2712. Issue of warrant

Upon an order of a judge of a court, or, in his absence and upon the clerk's own initiative, the clerk shall issue a warrant for the attachment of the property belonging to the person specified in the affidavit. The marshal shall execute the warrant forthwith and take the property attached, if personal, in his custody, subject to the interlocutory or final orders of the court.

(Added Pub. L. 86–682, §9, Sept. 2, 1960, 74 Stat. 707.)

CODIFICATION

Section was derived from R.S. §926, which was originally classified to section 739 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §926 was reclassified to section 839 of Title 39. R.S. §926 was repealed by section 12(c) of Pub. L. 86–682 (section 1 of which revised and enacted Title 39), and reenacted by section 9 thereof as section 2712 of this title.

§ 2713. Trial of ownership of property

Not later than twenty days before the return day of a warrant issued under section 2712 of this title, the party whose property is attached, on notice to the United States Attorney, may file a plea in abatement, denying the allegations of the affidavit, or denying ownership in the defendant of the property attached. The court, upon application of either party, shall order a trial by jury of the issues. Where the parties, by consent, waive a trial by jury, the court shall decide the issues. A party claiming ownership of the property attached and seeking its return is limited to the remedy afforded by this section, but his right to an action of trespass, or other action for damages, is not impaired.

(Added Pub. L. 86–682, §9, Sept. 2, 1960, 74 Stat. 707.)

CODIFICATION

Section was derived from R.S. §927, which was originally classified to section 740 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §927 was reclassified to section 840 of Title 39. R.S. §927 was repealed by section 12(c) of Pub. L. 86–682 (section 1 of which revised and enacted Title 39), and reenacted by section 9 thereof as section 2713 of this title.

§ 2714. Investment of proceeds of attached property

When the property attached is sold on an interlocutory order or is producing revenue, the money arising from the sale or revenue shall be invested, under the order of the court, in securities of the United States. The accretions therefrom are subject to the order of the court.

(Added Pub. L. 86–682, §9, Sept. 2, 1960, 74 Stat. 707.)

CODIFICATION

Section was derived from R.S. §928, which was originally classified to section 741 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §928 was reclassified to section 841 of Title 39. R.S. §928 was repealed by section 12(c) of Pub. L. 86–682 (section 1 of which revised and enacted Title 39), and reenacted by section 9 thereof as section 2714 of this title.

§ 2715. Publication

The marshal shall cause publication of an executed warrant of attachment—

(1) for two months in case of an absconding debtor, and

(2) for four months in case of a nonresident debtor

in a newspaper published in the district where the property is situated pursuant to the details of the order under which the warrant is issued.

(Added Pub. L. 86–682, §9, Sept. 2, 1960, 74 Stat. 707.)

CODIFICATION

Section was derived from R.S. §929, which was originally classified to section 742 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §929 was reclassified to section 842 of Title 39. R.S. §929 was repealed by section 12(c) of Pub. L. 86–682 (section 1 of which revised and enacted Title 39), and reenacted by section 9 thereof as section 2715 of this title.

§ 2716. Personal notice

After the first publication of the notice of attachment, a person indebted to, or having possession of property of a defendant and having knowledge of the notice, shall answer for the amount of his debt or the value of the property. Any disposal or attempted disposal of the property, to the injury of the United States, is unlawful. When the person indebted to, or having possession of the property of a defendant, is known to the United States attorney or marshal, the officer shall cause a personal notice of the attachment to be served upon him, but the lack of the notice does not invalidate the attachment.

(Added Pub. L. 86–682, §9, Sept. 2, 1960, 74 Stat. 707.)

CODIFICATION

Section was derived from R.S. §930, which was originally classified to section 743 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §930 was reclassified to section 843 of Title 39. R.S. §930 was repealed by section 12(c) of Pub. L. 86–682 (section 1 of which revised and enacted Title 39), and reenacted by section 9 thereof as section 2716 of this title.

§ 2717. Discharge

The court, or a judge thereof, upon—

(1) application of the party when property has been attached and

(2) execution to the United States of a penal bond, approved by a judge, in double the value of the property attached and conditioned upon the return of the property or the payment of any judgment rendered by the court

may discharge the warrant of attachment as to the property of the applicant.

(Added Pub. L. 86–682, §9, Sept. 2, 1960, 74 Stat. 708.)

CODIFICATION

Section was derived from R.S. §931, which was originally classified to section 744 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §931 was reclassified to section 844 of Title 39. R.S. §931 was repealed by section 12(c) of Pub. L. 86–682 (section 1 of which revised and enacted Title 39), and reenacted by section 9 thereof as section 2717 of this title.

§ 2718. Interest on balances due department

In suits for balances due the Post Office Department may recover interest at the rate of 6 per centum per year from the time of default.

(Added Pub. L. 86–682, §9, Sept. 2, 1960, 74 Stat. 708.)

CODIFICATION

Section was derived from R.S. §964, which was originally classified to section 788 of former Title 28. Following the general revision and enactment of Title 28 by act June 25, 1948, R.S. §964 was reclassified to section 846 of Title 39. R.S. §964 was repealed by section 12(c) of Pub. L. 86–682 (section 1 of which revised and enacted Title 39), and reenacted by section 9 thereof as section 2718 of this title.

CHANGE OF NAME

References to Post Office Department, Postal Service, Postal Field Service, Field Postal Service, or Departmental Service or Departmental Headquarters of Post Office Department to be considered references to United States Postal Service pursuant to Pub. L. 91–375, §6(*o*), Aug. 12, 1970, 84 Stat. 783, set out as a Cross References note preceding section 101 of Title 39, Postal Service.

[CHAPTER 175—REPEALED]

[§§ 2901 to 2906. Repealed. Pub. L. 106–310, div. B, title XXXIV, §3405(c)(1), Oct. 17, 2000, 114 Stat. 1221]

Section 2901, added Pub. L. 89–793, title I, §101, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1438; amended Pub. L. 91–513, title III, §1102(*l*), Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1293; Pub. L. 92–420, §2, Sept. 16, 1972, 86 Stat. 677; Pub. L. 98–473, title II, §228(c), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2030, defined terms used in chapter.

Section 2902, added Pub. L. 89–793, title I, §101, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1439, related to discretionary authority of court, examination, report, and determination by court, and termination of civil commitment.

Section 2903, added Pub. L. 89–793, title I, §101, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1440, related to authority and responsibilities of the Surgeon General, institutional custody, aftercare, maximum period of civil commitment, and credit toward sentence.

Section 2904, added Pub. L. 89–793, title I, §101, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1441, related to civil commitment not a conviction and use of test results.

Section 2905, added Pub. L. 89–793, title I, §101, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1441, related to delegation of functions by Surgeon General and use of Federal, State, and private facilities.

Section 2906, added Pub. L. 89–793, title I, §101, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1441, related to absence of offer by the court to a defendant of an election under section 2902(a) or any determination as to civil commitment not being reviewable on appeal or otherwise.

CHAPTER 176—FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE

SUBCHAPTER A—DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

CHANGE OF NAME

''United States magistrate judges'' substituted for ''United States magistrates'' in item 3008 pursuant to section 321 of Pub. L. 101–650, set out as a note under section 631 of this title.

§ 3001. Applicability of chapter

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), the[1] chapter provides the exclusive civil procedures for the United States—

(1) to recover a judgment on a debt; or

(2) to obtain, before judgment on a claim for a debt, a remedy in connection with such claim.

(b) LIMITATION.—To the extent that another Federal law specifies procedures for recovering on a claim or a judgment for a debt arising under such law, those procedures shall apply to such claim or judgment to the extent those procedures are inconsistent with this chapter.

(c) AMOUNTS OWING OTHER THAN DEBTS.—This chapter shall not apply with respect to an amount owing that is not a debt or to a claim for an amount owing that is not a debt.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, §3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4933.)

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section 3631 of title XXXVI of Pub. L. 101–647 provided that:

''(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act [probably should be ''title'', meaning title XXXVI of Pub. L. 101–647, which enacted this chapter and section 2044 of this title, amended sections 550, 1962, 1963, and

[1] Editorially supplied.

[2] So in original. Does not conform to subchapter heading.

[1] So in original. Probably should be ''this''.

2044 of this title, amended sections 550, 1962, 1963, and 2410 of this title, section 523 of Title 11, Bankruptcy, and sections 3142 and 3552 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, and enacted provisions set out as a note under section 1 of this title] and the amendments made by this Act [title] shall take effect 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 29, 1990].

''(b)(1) The amendments made by title I of this Act [probably should be ''subtitle A of this title'', meaning subtitle A (§§ 3611, 3302 [3612]) of title XXXVI of Pub. L. 101–647, which enacted this chapter] shall apply with respect to actions pending on the effective date of this Act [probably should be title XXXVI of Pub. L. 101–647] in any court on—

''(A) a claim for a debt; or

''(B) a judgment for a debt.

''(2) All notices, writs, orders, and judgments in effect in such actions shall continue in effect until superseded or modified in an action under chapter 176 of title 28 of the United States Code, as added by title I of this Act [subtitle A of this title].

''(3) For purposes of this subsection—

''(A) the term 'court' means a Federal, State, or local court, and

''(B) the term 'debt' has the meaning given such term in section and [sic] 3002(3) of such chapter.''

§ 3002. Definitions

As used in this chapter:

(1) ''Counsel for the United States'' means—

(A) a United States attorney, an assistant United States attorney designated to act on behalf of the United States attorney, or an attorney with the United States Department of Justice or with a Federal agency who has litigation authority; and

(B) any private attorney authorized by contract made in accordance with section 3718 of title 31 to conduct litigation for collection of debts on behalf of the United States.

(2) ''Court'' means any court created by the Congress of the United States, excluding the United States Tax Court.

(3) ''Debt'' means—

(A) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a direct loan, or loan insured or guaranteed, by the United States; or

(B) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a fee, duty, lease, rent, service, sale of real or personal property, overpayment, fine, assessment, penalty, restitution, damages, interest, tax, bail bond forfeiture, reimbursement, recovery of a cost incurred by the United States, or other source of indebtedness to the United States, but that is not owing under the terms of a contract originally entered into by only persons other than the United States;

and includes any amount owing to the United States for the benefit of an Indian tribe or individual Indian, but excludes any amount to which the United States is entitled under section 3011(a).

(4) ''Debtor'' means a person who is liable for a debt or against whom there is a claim for a debt.

(5) ''Disposable earnings'' means that part of earnings remaining after all deductions required by law have been withheld.

(6) ''Earnings'' means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program.

(7) ''Garnishee'' means a person (other than the debtor) who has, or is reasonably thought to have, possession, custody, or control of any property in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest, including any obligation due the debtor or to become due the debtor, and against whom a garnishment under section 3104 or 3205 is issued by a court.

(8) ''Judgment'' means a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt.

(9) ''Nonexempt disposable earnings'' means 25 percent of disposable earnings, subject to section 303 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.

(10) ''Person'' includes a natural person (including an individual Indian), a corporation, a partnership, an unincorporated association, a trust, or an estate, or any other public or private entity, including a State or local government or an Indian tribe.

(11) ''Prejudgment remedy'' means the remedy of attachment, receivership, garnishment, or sequestration authorized by this chapter to be granted before judgment on the merits of a claim for a debt.

(12) ''Property'' includes any present or future interest, whether legal or equitable, in real, personal (including choses in action), or mixed property, tangible or intangible, vested or contingent, wherever located and however held (including community property and property held in trust (including spendthrift and pension trusts)), but excludes—

(A) property held in trust by the United States for the benefit of an Indian tribe or individual Indian; and

(B) Indian lands subject to restrictions against alienation imposed by the United States.

(13) ''Security agreement'' means an agreement that creates or provides for a lien.

(14) ''State'' means any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, or any territory or possession of the United States.

(15) ''United States'' means—

(A) a Federal corporation;

(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or

(C) an instrumentality of the United States.

(16) ''United States marshal'' means a United States marshal, a deputy marshal, or an official of the United States Marshals Service designated under section 564.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4933.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 303 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, referred to in par. (9), is classified to section 1673 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

§ 3003. Rules of construction

(a) TERMS.—For purposes of this chapter—

(1) the terms ''includes'' and ''including'' are not limiting;

(2) the term ''or'' is not exclusive; and

(3) the singular includes the plural.

(b) EFFECT ON RIGHTS OF THE UNITED STATES.—This chapter shall not be construed to curtail or limit the right of the United States under any other Federal law or any State law—

(1) to collect taxes or to collect any other amount collectible in the same manner as a tax;

(2) to collect any fine, penalty, assessment, restitution, or forfeiture arising in a criminal case;

(3) to appoint or seek the appointment of a receiver; or

(4) to enforce a security agreement.

(c) EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS.—This chapter shall not be construed to supersede or modify the operation of—

(1) title 11;

(2) admiralty law;

(3) section 3713 of title 31;

(4) section 303 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1673);

(5) a statute of limitation applicable to a criminal proceeding;

(6) the common law or statutory rights to set-off or recoupment;

(7) any Federal law authorizing, or any inherent authority of a court to provide, injunctive relief;

(8) the authority of a court—

(A) to impose a sanction under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

(B) to appoint a receiver to effectuate its order; or

(C) to exercise the power of contempt under any Federal law;

(9) any law authorizing the United States to obtain partition, or to recover possession, of property in which the United States holds title; or

(10) any provision of any other chapter of this title, except to the extent such provision is inconsistent with this chapter.

(d) PREEMPTION.—This chapter shall preempt State law to the extent such law is inconsistent with a provision of this chapter.

(e) EFFECT ON RIGHTS OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.—This chapter shall not be construed to curtail or limit the rights of the United States under foreign law, under a treaty or an international agreement, or otherwise under international law.

(f) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.—Except as provided otherwise in this chapter, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply with respect to actions and proceedings under this chapter.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, §3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4935.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsecs. (c)(8)(A) and (f), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

§ 3004. Service of process; enforcement; notice

(a) MANNER OF SERVICE.—A complaint, notice, writ, or other process required to be served in an action or proceeding under this chapter shall be served in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise provided in this chapter.

(b) NATIONWIDE ENFORCEMENT.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2)—

(A) any writ, order, judgment, or other process, including a summons and complaint, filed under this chapter may be served in any State; and

(B) such writ, order, or judgment may be enforced by the court issuing the writ, order, or process, regardless of where the person is served with the writ, order, or process.

(2) If the debtor so requests, within 20 days after receiving the notice described in section 3101(d) or 3202(b), the action or proceeding in which the writ, order, or judgment was issued shall be transferred to the district court for the district in which the debtor resides.

(c) NOTICE AND OTHER PROCESS.—At such time as counsel for the United States considers appropriate, but not later than the time a prejudgment or postjudgment remedy is put into effect under this chapter, counsel for the United States shall exercise reasonable diligence to serve on the debtor and any person who the United States believes, after exercising due diligence, has possession, custody, or control of the property, a copy of the application for such remedy, the order granting such remedy, and the notice required by section 3101(d) or 3202(b).

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, §3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4936.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

§ 3005. Application of chapter to judgments

This chapter shall not apply with respect to a judgment on a debt if such judgment is entered more than 10 years before the effective date of this chapter.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, §3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4936.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

For effective date of this chapter, referred to in text, see section 3631 of Pub. L. 101–647, set out as an Effective Date note under section 3001 of this title.

§ 3006. Affidavit requirements

Any affidavit required of the United States by this chapter may be made on information and belief, if reliable and reasonably necessary, establishing with particularity, to the court's satisfaction, facts supporting the claim of the United States.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, §3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4936.)

§ 3007. Perishable personal property

(a) AUTHORITY TO SELL.—If at any time during any action or proceeding under this chapter the

court determines on its own initiative or upon motion of any party, that any seized or detained personal property is likely to perish, waste, or be destroyed, or otherwise substantially depreciate in value during the pendency of the proceeding, the court shall order a commercially reasonable sale of such property.

(b) DEPOSIT OF SALE PROCEEDS.—Within 5 days after such sale, the proceeds shall be deposited with the clerk of the court, accompanied by a statement in writing and signed by the United States marshal, to be filed in the action or proceeding, stating the time and place of sale, the name of the purchaser, the amount received, and an itemized account of expenses.

(c) PRESUMPTION.—For purposes of liability on the part of the United States, there shall be a presumption that the price paid at a sale under subsection (a) is the fair market value of the property or portion.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4937.)

§ 3008. Proceedings before United States magistrate judges

A district court of the United States may assign its duties in proceedings under this chapter to a United States magistrate judge to the extent not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4937; amended Pub. L. 101–650, title III, § 321, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5117.)

CHANGE OF NAME

''United States magistrate judges'' substituted for ''United States magistrates'' in catchline and ''United States magistrate judge'' substituted for ''United States magistrate'' in text pursuant to section 321 of Pub. L. 101–650, set out as a note under section 631 of this title.

§ 3009. United States marshals' authority to designate keeper

Whenever a United States marshal is authorized to seize property pursuant to this chapter, the United States marshal may designate another person or Federal agency to hold for safekeeping such property seized.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4937.)

§ 3010. Co-owned property

(a) LIMITATION.—The remedies available to the United States under this chapter may be enforced against property which is co-owned by a debtor and any other person only to the extent allowed by the law of the State where the property is located. This section shall not be construed to limit any right or interest of a debtor or co-owner in a retirement system for Federal military or civilian personnel established by the United States or any agency thereof or in a qualified retirement arrangement.

(b) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of subsection (a)—

(1) the term ''retirement system for Federal military or civilian personnel'' means a pension or annuity system for Federal military or civilian personnel of more than one agency, or for some or all of such personnel of a single agency, established by statute or by regulation pursuant to statutory authority; and

(2) the term ''qualified retirement arrangement'' means a plan qualified under section 401(a), 403(a), or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or a plan that is subject to the requirements of section 205 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4937.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Sections 401(a), 403(a), and 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (b)(2), are classified to sections 401(a), 403(a), and 409, respectively, of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

Section 205 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (b)(2), is classified to section 1055 of Title 29, Labor.

§ 3011. Assessment of surcharge on a debt

(a) SURCHARGE AUTHORIZED.—In an action or proceeding under subchapter B or C, and subject to subsection (b), the United States is entitled to recover a surcharge of 10 percent of the amount of the debt in connection with the recovery of the debt, to cover the cost of processing and handling the litigation and enforcement under this chapter of the claim for such debt.

(b) LIMITATION.—Subsection (a) shall not apply if—

(1) the United States receives an attorney's fee in connection with the enforcement of the claim; or

(2) the law pursuant to which the action on the claim is based provides any other amount to cover such costs.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4937.)

§ 3012. Joinder of additional defendant

The United States or the debtor may join as an additional defendant in an action or proceeding under this chapter any person reasonably believed to owe money (including money owed on account of a requirement to provide goods or services pursuant to a loan or loan guarantee extended under Federal law) to the debtor arising out of the transaction or occurrence giving rise to a debt.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4938.)

§ 3013. Modification or protective order; supervision of enforcement

The court may at any time on its own initiative or the motion of any interested person, and after such notice as it may require, make an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending, or modifying the use of any enforcement procedure under this chapter.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4938.)

§ 3014. Exempt property

(a) ELECTION TO EXEMPT PROPERTY.—An individual debtor may, in an action or proceeding

under this chapter, elect to exempt property listed in either paragraph (1) or, in the alternative, paragraph (2). If such action or proceeding is against debtors who are husband and wife, one debtor may not elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (1) and the other debtor elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (2). If the debtors cannot agree on the alternative to be elected, they shall be deemed to elect paragraph (1). Such property is either—

(1) property that is specified in section 522(d) of title 11, as amended from time to time; or

(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than paragraph (1), or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the application for a remedy under this chapter at the place in which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of such application, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place; and

(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the filing of such application, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant, or an interest in a community estate, to the extent that such interest is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.

(b) EFFECT ON ASSERTION AND MANNER OF DETERMINATION.—

(1) STATEMENT.—A court may order the debtor to file a statement with regard to any claimed exemption. A copy of such statement shall be served on counsel for the United States. Such statement shall be under oath and shall describe each item of property for which exemption is claimed, the value and the basis for such valuation, and the nature of the debtor's ownership interest.

(2) HEARING.—The United States or the debtor, by application to the court in which an action or proceeding under this chapter is pending, may request a hearing on the applicability of any exemption claimed by the debtor. The court shall determine the extent (if any) to which the exemption applies. Unless it is reasonably evident that the exemption applies, the debtor shall bear the burden of persuasion.

(3) STAY OF DISPOSITION.—Assertion of an exemption shall prevent the United States from selling or otherwise disposing of the property for which such exemption is claimed until the court determines whether the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest in such property. The United States may not take possession of, dispose of, sell, or otherwise interfere with the debtor's normal use and enjoyment of an interest in property the United States knows or has reason to know is exempt.

(c) DEBTORS IN JOINT CASES.—Subject to the limitation in subsection (a), this section shall apply separately with respect to each debtor in a joint case.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4938.)

§ 3015. Discovery as to debtor's financial condition

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), in an action or proceeding under subchapter B or C, the United States may have discovery regarding the financial condition of the debtor in the manner in which discovery is authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in an action on a claim for a debt.

(b) LIMITATION.—Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to an action or proceeding under subchapter B unless there is a reasonable likelihood that the debt involved exceeds $50,000.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4939.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

SUBCHAPTER B—PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES

§ 3101. Prejudgment remedies

(a) APPLICATION.—(1) The United States may, in a proceeding in conjunction with the complaint or at any time after the filing of a civil action on a claim for a debt, make application under oath to a court to issue any prejudgment remedy.

(2) Such application shall be filed with the court and shall set forth the factual and legal basis for each prejudgment remedy sought.

(3) Such application shall—

(A) state that the debtor against whom the prejudgment remedy is sought shall be afforded an opportunity for a hearing; and

(B) set forth with particularity that all statutory requirements under this chapter for the issuance of the prejudgment remedy sought have been satisfied.

(b) GROUNDS.—Subject to section 3102, 3103, 3104, or 3105, a prejudgment remedy may be granted by any court if the United States shows reasonable cause to believe that—

(1) the debtor—

(A) is about to leave the jurisdiction of the United States with the effect of hindering, delaying, or defrauding the United States in its effort to recover a debt;

(B) has or is about to assign, dispose, remove, conceal, ill treat, waste, or destroy property with the effect of hindering, delaying, or defrauding the United States;

(C) has or is about to convert the debtor's property into money, securities, or evidence of debt in a manner prejudicial to the United States with the effect of hindering, delaying, or defrauding the United States; or

(D) has evaded service of process by concealing himself or has temporarily withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the United States with the effect of hindering, delaying, or defrauding the United States; or

(2) a prejudgment remedy is required to obtain jurisdiction within the United States and

the prejudgment remedy sought will result in obtaining such jurisdiction.

(c) AFFIDAVIT.—(1) The application under subsection (a) shall include an affidavit establishing with particularity to the court's satisfaction facts supporting the probable validity of the claim for a debt and the right of the United States to recover what is demanded in the application.

(2) The affidavit shall state—

(A) specifically the amount of the debt claimed by the United States and any interest or costs attributable to such debt;

(B) one or more of the grounds specified in subsection (b); and

(C) the requirements of section 3102(b), 3103(a), 3104(a), or 3105(b), as the case may be.

(3) No bond is required of the United States.

(d) NOTICE AND HEARING.—(1) On filing an application by the United States as provided in this section, the counsel for the United States shall prepare, and the clerk shall issue, a notice for service on the debtor against whom the prejudgment remedy is sought and on any other person whom the United States reasonably believes, after exercising due diligence, has possession, custody, or control of property affected by such remedy. Three copies of the notice shall be served on each such person. The form and content of such notice shall be approved jointly by a majority of the chief judges of the Federal districts in the State in which the court is located and shall be in substantially the following form:

''NOTICE

''You are hereby notified that this [property] is being taken by the United States Government ('the Government'), which says that [name of debtor] owes it a debt of $ [amount] for [reason for debt] and has filed a lawsuit to collect this debt. The Government says it must take this property at this time because [recite the pertinent ground or grounds from section 3101(b)]. The Government wants to make sure [name of debtor] will pay if the court determines that this money is owed.

''In addition, you are hereby notified that there are exemptions under the law which may protect some of this property from being taken by the Government if [name of debtor] can show that the exemptions apply. Below is a summary of the major exemptions which apply in most situations in the State of [State where property is located]:

''[A statement summarizing in plain and understandable English the election available with respect to such State under section 3014 and the types of property that may be exempted under each of the alternatives specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 3014(a), and a statement that different property may be so exempted with respect to the State in which the debtor resides.]

''If you are [name of debtor] and you disagree with the reason the Government gives for taking your property now, or if you think you do not owe the money to the Government that it says you do, or if you think the property the Government is taking qualifies under one of the above exemptions, you have a right to ask the court to return your property to you.

''If you want a hearing, you must promptly notify the court. You must make your request in writing, and either mail it or deliver it in person to the clerk of the court at [address]. If you wish, you may use this notice to request the hearing by checking the box below and mailing this notice to the court clerk. You must also send a copy of your request to the Government at [address], so the Government will know you want a hearing. The hearing will take place within 5 days after the clerk receives your request, if you ask for it to take place that quickly, or as soon after that as possible.

''At the hearing you may explain to the judge why you think you do not owe the money to the Government, why you disagree with the reason the Government says it must take your property at this time, or why you believe the property the Government has taken is exempt or belongs to someone else. You may make any or all of these explanations as you see fit.

''If you think you live outside the Federal judicial district in which the court is located, you may request, not later than 20 days after you receive this notice, that this proceeding to take your property be transferred by the court to the Federal judicial district in which you reside. You must make your request in writing, and either mail it or deliver it in person to the clerk of the court at [address]. You must also send a copy of your request to the Government at [address], so the Government will know you want the proceeding to be transferred.

''Be sure to keep a copy of this notice for your own records. If you have any questions about your rights or about this procedure, you should contact a lawyer, an office of public legal assistance, or the clerk of the court. The clerk is not permitted to give legal advice, but can refer you to other sources of information.''

(2) By requesting, at any time before judgment on the claim for a debt, the court to hold a hearing, the debtor may move to quash the order granting such remedy. The court shall hold a hearing on such motion as soon as practicable, or, if requested by the debtor, within 5 days after receiving the request for a hearing or as soon thereafter as possible. The issues at such hearing shall be limited to—

(A) the probable validity of the claim for the debt for which such remedy was granted and of any defense or claim of exemption asserted by such person;

(B) compliance with any statutory requirement for the issuance of the prejudgment remedy granted;

(C) the existence of any ground set forth in subsection (b); and

(D) the inadequacy of alternative remedies (if any) to protect the interests of the United States.

(e) ISSUANCE OF WRIT.—On the court's determination that the requirements of subsections (a), (b), and (c) have been met, the court shall issue all process sufficient to put into effect the prejudgment remedy sought.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4939.)

§ 3102. Attachment

(a) PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ATTACHMENT.—(1) Any property in the possession, custody, or control of the debtor and in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest, except earnings, may be attached pursuant to a writ of attachment in an action or proceeding against a debtor on a claim for a debt and may be held as security to satisfy such judgment, and interest and costs, as the United States may recover on such claim.

(2) The value of property attached shall not exceed the amount by which the sum of the amount of the debt claimed by the United States and the amount of interest and costs reasonably likely to be assessed against the debtor by the court exceeds the aggregate value of the nonexempt interest of the debtor in any—

(A) property securing the debt; and

(B) property garnished or in receivership, or income sequestered, under this subchapter.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF ATTACHMENT.—If the requirements of section 3101 are satisfied, a court shall issue a writ authorizing the United States to attach property in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest, as security for such judgment (and interest and costs) as the United States may recover on a claim for a debt—

(1) in an action on a contract, express or implied, against the debtor for payment of money, only if the United States shows reasonable cause to believe that—

(A) the contract is not fully secured by real or personal property; or

(B) the value of the original security is substantially diminished, without any act of the United States or the person to whom the security was given, below the amount of the debt;

(2) in an action against the debtor for damages in tort;

(3) if the debtor resides outside the jurisdiction of the United States; or

(4) in an action to recover a fine, penalty, or tax.

(c) ISSUANCE OF WRIT; CONTENTS.—(1) Subject to subsections (a) and (b), a writ of attachment shall be issued by the court directing the United States marshal of the district where property described in subsection (a) is located to attach the property.

(2) Several writs of attachment may be issued at the same time, or in succession, and sent to different judicial districts until sufficient property is attached.

(3) The writ of attachment shall contain—

(A) the date of the issuance of the writ;

(B) the identity of the court, the docket number of the action, and the identity of the cause of action;

(C) the name and last known address of the debtor;

(D) the amount to be secured by the attachment; and

(E) a reasonable description of the property to be attached.

(d) LEVY OF ATTACHMENT.—(1) The United States marshal receiving the writ shall proceed without delay to levy upon the property specified for attachment if found within the district. The marshal may not sell property unless ordered by the court.

(2) In performing the levy, the United States marshal may enter any property owned, occupied, or controlled by the debtor, except that the marshal may not enter a residence or other building unless the writ expressly authorizes the marshal to do so or upon specific order of the court.

(3) Levy on real property is made by entering the property and posting the writ and notice of levy in a conspicuous place upon the property.

(4) Levy on personal property is made by taking possession of it. Levy on personal property not easily taken into possession or which cannot be taken into possession without great inconvenience or expense may be made by affixing a copy of the writ and notice of levy on it or in a conspicuous place in the vicinity of it describing in the notice of levy the property by quantity and with sufficient detail to identify the property levied on.

(5) The United States marshal shall file a copy of the notice of levy in the same manner as provided for judgments in section 3201(a)(1). The United States marshal shall serve a copy of the writ and notice of levy on—

(A) the debtor against whom the writ is issued; and

(B) the person who has possession of the property subject to the writ;

in the same manner that a summons is served in a civil action and make the return thereof.

(e) RETURN OF WRIT; DUTIES OF MARSHAL; FURTHER RETURN.—(1) A United States marshal executing a writ of attachment shall return the writ with the marshal's action endorsed thereon or attached thereto and signed by the marshal, to the court from which it was issued, within 5 days after the date of the levy.

(2) The return shall describe the property attached with sufficient certainty to identify it and shall state the location where it was attached, the date and time it was attached, and the disposition made of the property. If no property was attached, the return shall so state.

(3) If the property levied on is claimed, replevied under subsection (j)(2), or sold under section 3007 after the return, the United States marshal shall immediately make a further return to the clerk of the court showing the disposition of the property.

(4) If personal property is replevied, the United States marshal shall deliver the replevin bond to the clerk of the court to be filed in the action.

(f) LEVY OF ATTACHMENT AS LIEN ON PROPERTY; SATISFACTION OF LIEN.—(1) A levy on property under a writ of attachment under this section creates a lien in favor of the United States on the property or, in the case of perishable property sold under section 3007, on the proceeds of the sale.

(2) Such lien shall be ranked ahead of any other security interests perfected after the later of the time of levy and the time a copy of the notice of levy is filed under subsection (d)(5).

(3) Such lien shall arise from the time of levy and shall continue until a judgment in the ac-

tion is obtained or denied, or the action is otherwise dismissed. The death of the debtor whose property is attached does not terminate the attachment lien. Upon issuance of a judgment in the action and registration under this chapter, the judgment lien so created relates back to the time of levy.

(g) REDUCTION OR DISSOLUTION OF ATTACHMENT.—(1) If an excessive or unreasonable attachment is made, the debtor may submit a motion to the court for a reduction of the amount of the attachment or its dissolution. Notice of such motion shall be served on the United States.

(2) The court shall order a part of the property to be released, if after a hearing the court finds that the amount of the attachment is excessive or unreasonable or if the attachment is for an amount larger than the sum of the liquidated or ascertainable amount of the debt and the amount of interest and costs likely to be taxed.

(3) The court shall dissolve the attachment if the amount of the debt is unliquidated and unascertainable by calculation.

(4) If any property claimed to be exempt is levied on, the debtor may, at any time after such levy, request that the court vacate such levy. If it appears to the court that the property so levied upon is exempt, the court shall order the levy vacated and the property returned to the debtor.

(h) REPLEVIN OF ATTACHED PROPERTY BY DEBTOR; BOND.—If attached property is not sold before judgment, the debtor may replevy such property or any part thereof by giving a bond approved by counsel for the United States or the court and payable to the United States in double the reasonable value of the property to be replevied or double the value of the claim, whichever is less.

(i) PRESERVATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY UNDER ATTACHMENT.—If personal property in custody of the United States marshal under a writ of attachment is not replevied, claimed, or sold, the court may make such order for its preservation or use as appears to be in the interest of the parties.

(j) JUDGMENT AND DISPOSITION OF ATTACHED PROPERTY.—

(1) JUDGMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES.—On entry of judgment for the United States, the court shall order the proceeds of personal property sold pursuant to section 3007 to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, and shall order the sale of any remaining personal property and any real property levied on to the extent necessary to satisfy the judgment.

(2) JUDGMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES WHEN PERSONAL PROPERTY REPLEVIED.—With respect to personal property under attachment that is replevied, the judgment which may be entered shall be against the debtor against whom the writ of attachment is issued and also against the sureties on the debtor's replevin bond for the value of the property.

(3) RESTORATION OF PROPERTY AND EXONERATION OF REPLEVIN BOND.—If the attachment is vacated or if the judgment on the claim for the debt is for the person against whom the writ attachment is issued, the court shall order the property, or proceeds of perishable property sold under section 3007, restored to the debtor and shall exonerate any replevin bond.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4942.)

§ 3103. Receivership

(a) APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER.—If the requirements of section 3101 are satisfied, a court may appoint a receiver for property in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest if the United States shows reasonable cause to believe that there is a substantial danger that the property will be removed from the jurisdiction of the court, lost, concealed, materially injured or damaged, or mismanaged.

(b) POWERS OF RECEIVER.—(1) The appointing court may authorize a receiver—

(A) to take possession of real and personal property and sue for, collect, and sell obligations upon such conditions and for such purposes as the court shall direct; and

(B) to administer, collect, improve, lease, repair or sell pursuant to section 3007 such real and personal property as the court shall direct.

A receiver appointed to manage residential or commercial property shall have demonstrable expertise in the management of these types of property.

(2) Unless expressly authorized by order of the court, a receiver shall have no power to employ attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons.

(c) DURATION OF RECEIVERSHIP.—A receivership shall not continue past the entry of judgment, or the conclusion of an appeal of such judgment, unless the court orders it continued under section 3203(e) or unless the court otherwise directs its continuation.

(d) ACCOUNTS; REQUIREMENT TO REPORT.—A receiver shall keep written accounts itemizing receipts and expenditures, describing the property and naming the depository of receivership funds. The receiver's accounts shall be open to inspection by any person having an apparent interest in the property. The receiver shall file reports at regular intervals as directed by the court and shall serve the debtor and the United States with a copy thereof.

(e) MODIFICATION OF POWERS; REMOVAL.—On motion of the receiver or on its own initiative, the court which appointed the receiver may remove the receiver or modify the receiver's powers at any time.

(f) PRIORITY.—If more than one court appoints a receiver for particular property, the receiver first qualifying under law shall be entitled to take possession, control, or custody of the property.

(g) COMPENSATION OF RECEIVERS.—(1) A receiver is entitled to such commissions, not exceeding 5 percent of the sums received and disbursed by him, as the court allows unless the court otherwise directs.

(2) If, at the termination of a receivership, there are no funds in the hands of a receiver, the court may fix the compensation of the receiver in accordance with the services rendered and

may direct the party who moved for the appointment of the receiver to pay such compensation in addition to the necessary expenditures incurred by the receiver which remain unpaid.

(3) At the termination of a receivership, the receiver shall file a final accounting of the receipts and disbursements and apply for compensation setting forth the amount sought and the services rendered by the receiver.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4944.)

§ 3104. Garnishment

(a) IN GENERAL.—If the requirements of section 3101 are satisfied, a court may issue a writ of garnishment against property (excluding earnings) in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest and which is in the possession, custody, or control of a person other than the debtor in order to satisfy a claim for a debt. Co-owned property shall be subject to garnishment to the same extent as co-owned property is subject to garnishment under the law of the State in which such property is located. A court may issue simultaneous separate writs of garnishment to several garnishees. A writ of garnishment issued under this subsection shall be continuing and shall terminate only as provided in section 3205(c)(10).

(b) WRIT.—(1) Subsections (b)(2) and (c) of section 3205 shall apply with respect to garnishment under this section, except that for purposes of this section—

(A) earnings of the debtor shall not be subject to garnishment; and

(B) a reference in such subsections to a judgment debtor shall be deemed to be a reference to a debtor.

(2) The United States shall include in its application for a writ of garnishment—

(A) the amount of the claim asserted by the United States for a debt; and

(B) the date the writ is issued.

(c) LIMITATION.—The value of property garnished shall not exceed the amount by which the sum of the amount of the debt claimed by the United States and the amount of interest and costs reasonably likely to be assessed against the debtor by the court exceeds the aggregate value of the nonexempt interest of the debtor in any—

(1) property securing the debt; and

(2) property attached or in receivership, or income sequestered, under this subchapter.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4945.)

§ 3105. Sequestration

(a) PROPERTY SUBJECT TO SEQUESTRATION.—(1) Any income from property in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest may be sequestered pursuant to a writ of sequestration in an action or proceeding against a debtor on a claim for a debt and may be held as security to satisfy such judgment, and interest and costs, as the United States may recover on such claim.

(2) The amount of income sequestered shall not exceed the amount by which the sum of the amount of the debt claimed by the United States and the amount of interest and costs reasonably likely to be assessed against the debtor by the court exceeds the aggregate value of the nonexempt interest of the debtor in any—

(A) property securing the debt; and

(B) property attached, garnished, or in receivership under this subchapter.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF SEQUESTRATION.—If the requirements of section 3101 are satisfied, a court shall issue a writ authorizing the United States to sequester income from property in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest, as security for such judgment (and interest and costs) as the United States may recover on a claim for a debt—

(1) in an action on a contract, express or implied, against the debtor for payment of money, only if the United States shows reasonable cause to believe that—

(A) the contract is not fully secured by real or personal property; or

(B) the value of the original security is substantially diminished, without any act of the United States or the person to whom the security was given, below the amount of the debt;

(2) in an action against the debtor for damages in tort;

(3) if the debtor resides outside the jurisdiction of the United States; or

(4) in an action to recover a fine, penalty, or tax.

(c) ISSUANCE OF WRIT; CONTENTS.—(1) Subject to subsections (a) and (b), a writ of sequestration shall be issued by the court directing the United States marshal of the district where income described in subsection (a) is located to sequester the income.

(2) Several writs of sequestration may be issued at the same time, or in succession, and sent to different judicial districts until sufficient income is sequestered.

(3) The writ of sequestration shall contain—

(A) the date of the issuance of the writ;

(B) the identity of the court, the docket number of the action, and the identity of the cause of action;

(C) the name and last known address of the debtor;

(D) the amount to be secured by the sequestration; and

(E) a reasonable description of the income to be sequestered.

(d) EXECUTION OF WRIT.—(1) The United States marshal receiving the writ shall proceed without delay to execute the writ.

(2) The United States marshal shall file a copy of the notice of sequestration in the same manner as provided for judgments in section 3201(a)(1). The United States marshal shall serve a copy of the writ and notice of sequestration on—

(A) the debtor against whom the writ is issued; and

(B) the person who has possession of the income subject to the writ;

in the same manner that a summons is served in a civil action and make the return thereof.

(e) DEPOSIT OF SEQUESTERED INCOME.—A person who has possession of the income subject to

a writ of sequestration shall deposit such income with the clerk of the court, accompanied by a statement in writing stating the person's name, the name of the debtor, the amount of such income, the property from which such income is produced, and the period during which such income is produced.

(f) RETURN OF WRIT; DUTIES OF MARSHAL; FURTHER RETURN.—(1) A United States marshal executing a writ of sequestration shall return the writ with the marshal's action endorsed thereon or attached thereto and signed by the marshal, to the court from which it was issued, within 5 days after the date of the execution.

(2) The return shall describe the income sequestered with sufficient certainty to identify it and shall state the location where it was sequestered, and the date and time it was sequestered. If no income was sequestered, the return shall so state.

(3) If sequestered income is claimed after the return, the United States marshal shall immediately make a further return to the clerk of the court showing the disposition of the income.

(g) REDUCTION OR DISSOLUTION OF SEQUESTRATION.—(1) If an excessive or unreasonable sequestration is made, the debtor may submit a motion to the court for a reduction of the amount of the sequestration or its dissolution. Notice of such motion shall be served on the United States.

(2) The court shall order a part of the income to be released, if after a hearing the court finds that the amount of the sequestration is excessive or unreasonable or if the sequestration is for an amount larger than the sum of the liquidated or ascertainable amount of the debt and the amount of interest and costs likely to be taxed.

(3) The court shall dissolve the sequestration if the amount of the debt is unliquidated and unascertainable by calculation.

(h) PRESERVATION OF INCOME UNDER SEQUESTER.—If personal property in custody of the United States marshal under a writ of sequestration is not claimed, the court may make such order for its preservation or use as appears to be in the interest of the parties.

(i) JUDGMENT AND DISPOSITION OF SEQUESTERED INCOME.—

(1) JUDGMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES.—On entry of judgment for the United States, the court shall order the sequestered income to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment.

(2) RESTORATION OF INCOME.—If the sequestration is vacated or if the judgment on the claim for the debt is for the person against whom the writ of sequestration is issued, the court shall order the income restored to the debtor.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4946.)

SUBCHAPTER C—POSTJUDGMENT REMEDIES

§ 3201. Judgment liens

(a) CREATION.—A judgment in a civil action shall create a lien on all real property of a judgment debtor on filing a certified copy of the abstract of the judgment in the manner in which a notice of tax lien would be filed under paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 6323(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. A lien created under this paragraph is for the amount necessary to satisfy the judgment, including costs and interest.

(b) PRIORITY OF LIEN.—A lien created under subsection (a) shall have priority over any other lien or encumbrance which is perfected later in time.

(c) DURATION OF LIEN; RENEWAL.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a lien created under subsection (a) is effective, unless satisfied, for a period of 20 years.

(2) Such lien may be renewed for one additional period of 20 years upon filing a notice of renewal in the same manner as the judgment is filed and shall relate back to the date the judgment is filed if—

(A) the notice of renewal is filed before the expiration of the 20-year period to prevent the expiration of the lien; and

(B) the court approves the renewal of such lien under this paragraph.

(d) RELEASE OF JUDGMENT LIEN.—A judgment lien shall be released on the filing of a satisfaction of judgment or release of lien in the same manner as the judgment is filed to obtain the lien.

(e) EFFECT OF LIEN ON ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL GRANTS, LOANS OR PROGRAMS.—A debtor who has a judgment lien against the debtor's property for a debt to the United States shall not be eligible to receive any grant or loan which is made, insured, guaranteed, or financed directly or indirectly by the United States or to receive funds directly from the Federal Government in any program, except funds to which the debtor is entitled as beneficiary, until the judgment is paid in full or otherwise satisfied. The agency of the United States that is responsible for such grants and loans may promulgate regulations to allow for waiver of this restriction on eligibility for such grants, loans, and funds.

(f) SALE OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO JUDGMENT LIEN.—(1) On proper application to a court, the court may order the United States to sell, in accordance with sections 2001 and 2002, any real property subject to a judgment lien in effect under this section.

(2) This subsection shall not preclude the United States from using an execution sale pursuant to section 3203(g) to sell real property subject to a judgment lien.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4948.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 6323(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (a), is classified to section 6323(f) of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

§ 3202. Enforcement of judgments

(a) ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES.—A judgment may be enforced by any of the remedies set forth in

this subchapter. A court may issue other writs pursuant to section 1651 of title 28, United States Code, as necessary to support such remedies, subject to rule 81(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(b) NOTICE.—On the commencement by the United States of an action or proceeding under this subchapter to obtain a remedy, the counsel for the United States shall prepare, and clerk of the court shall issue, a notice in substantially the following form:

''NOTICE

''You are hereby notified that this [property] is being taken by the United States Government, which has a court judgment in [case docket number and jurisdiction of court] of $[amount] for [reason of debt].

''In addition, you are hereby notified that there are exemptions under the law which may protect some of this property from being taken by the United States Government if [name of judgment debtor] can show that the exemptions apply. Below is a summary of the major exemptions which apply in most situations in the State of [State where property is located]:

''[A statement summarizing in plain and understandable English the election available with respect to such State under section 3014 and the types of property that may be exempted under each of the alternatives specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 3014(a) and a statement that different property may be so exempted with respect to the State in which the debtor resides.]

''If you are [name of judgment debtor], you have a right to ask the court to return your property to you if you think the property the Government is taking qualifies under one of the above exemptions [For a default judgment:] or if you think you do not owe the money to the United States Government that it says you do.

''If you want a hearing, you must notify the court within 20 days after you receive this notice. You must make your request in writing, and either mail it or deliver it in person to the clerk of the court at [address]. If you wish, you may use this notice to request the hearing by checking the box below and mailing this notice to the court clerk. You must also send a copy of your request to the Government at [address], so the Government will know you want a hearing. The hearing will take place within 5 days after the clerk receives your request, if you ask for it to take place that quickly, or as soon after that as possible.

''At the hearing you may explain to the judge why you believe the property the Government has taken is exempt [For a default judgment:] or why you think you do not owe the money to the Government. [For a writ of execution:] If you do not request a hearing within 20 days of receiving this notice, your [property] may be sold at public auction and the payment used toward the money you owe the Government.

''If you think you live outside the Federal judicial district in which the court is located, you may request, not later than 20 days after your[1] receive this notice, that this proceeding to take your property be transferred by the court to the Federal judicial district in which you reside. You must make your request in writing, and either mail it or deliver it in person to the clerk of the court at [address]. You must also send a copy of your request to the Government at [address], so the Government will know you want the proceeding to be transferred.

''Be sure to keep a copy of this notice for your own records. If you have any questions about your rights or about this procedure, you should contact a lawyer, an office of public legal assistance, or the clerk of the court. The clerk is not permitted to give legal advice, but can refer you to other sources of information.''

(c) SERVICE.—A copy of the notice and a copy of the application for granting a remedy under this subchapter shall be served by counsel for the United States on the judgment debtor against whom such remedy is sought and on each person whom the United States, after diligent inquiry, has reasonable cause to believe has an interest in property to which the remedy is directed.

(d) HEARING.—By requesting, within 20 days after receiving the notice described in section 3202(b), the court to hold a hearing, the judgment debtor may move to quash the order granting such remedy. The court that issued such order shall hold a hearing on such motion as soon as practicable, or, if so requested by the judgment debtor, within 5 days after receiving the request or as soon thereafter as possible. The issues at such hearing shall be limited—

(1) to the probable validity of any claim of exemption by the judgment debtor;

(2) to compliance with any statutory requirement for the issuance of the post-judgment remedy granted; and

(3) if the judgment is by default and only to the extent that the Constitution or another law of the United States provides a right to a hearing on the issue, to—

(A) the probable validity of the claim for the debt which is merged in the judgment; and

(B) the existence of good cause for setting aside such judgment.

This subparagraph shall not be construed to afford the judgment debtor the right to more than one such hearing except to the extent that the Constitution or another law of the United States provides a right to more than one such hearing.

(e) SALE OF PROPERTY.—The property of a judgment debtor which is subject to sale to satisfy the judgment may be sold by judicial sale, pursuant to sections 2001, 2002, and 2004 or by execution sale pursuant to section 3203(g). If a hearing is requested pursuant to subsection (d), property with respect to which the request relates shall not be sold before such hearing.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, §3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4949.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

[1] So in original. Probably should be ''you''.

§ 3203. Execution

(a) PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EXECUTION.—All property in which the judgment debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest shall be subject to levy pursuant to a writ of execution. The debtor's earnings shall not be subject to execution while in the possession, custody, or control of the debtor's employer. Co-owned property shall be subject to execution to the extent such property is subject to execution under the law of the State in which it is located.

(b) CREATION OF EXECUTION LIEN.—A lien shall be created in favor of the United States on all property levied on under a writ of execution and shall date from the time of the levy. Such lien shall have priority over all subsequent liens and shall be for the aggregate amount of the judgment, costs, and interest. The execution lien on any real property as to which the United States has a judgment lien shall relate back to the judgment lien date.

(c) WRIT OF EXECUTION.—

(1) ISSUANCE.—On written application of counsel for the United States, the court may issue a writ of execution. Multiple writs may issue simultaneously, and successive writs may issue before the return date of a writ previously issued.

(2) FORM OF WRIT.—

(A) GENERAL CONTENTS.—A writ of execution shall specify the date that the judgment is entered, the court in which it is entered, the amount of the judgment if for money, the amount of the costs, the amount of interest due, the sum due as of the date the writ is issued, the rate of postjudgment interest, the name of the judgment debtor, and the judgment debtor's last known address.

(B) ADDITIONAL CONTENTS.—(i) Except as provided in clauses (ii) and (iii), the writ shall direct the United States marshal to satisfy the judgment by levying on and selling property in which the judgment debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest, but not to exceed property reasonably equivalent in value to the aggregate amount of the judgment, costs, and interest.

(ii) A writ of execution issued on a judgment for the delivery to the United States of the possession of personal property, or for the delivery of the possession of real property, shall particularly describe the property, and shall require the marshal to deliver the possession of the property to the United States.

(iii) A writ of execution on a judgment for the recovery of personal property or its value shall direct the marshal, in case a delivery of the specific property cannot be had, to levy and collect such value out of any property in which the judgment debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest.

(d) LEVY OF EXECUTION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Levy on property pursuant to a writ of execution issued under this section shall be made in the same manner as levy on property is made pursuant to a writ of attachment issued under section 3102(d).

(2) DEATH OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR.—The death of the judgment debtor after a writ of execution is issued stays the execution proceedings, but any lien acquired by levy of the writ shall be recognized and enforced by the court for the district in which the estate of the deceased is located. The execution lien may be enforced—

(A) against the executor, administrator, or personal representative of the estate of the deceased; or

(B) if there be none, against the deceased's property coming to the heirs or devisees or at their option against cash in their possession, but only to the extent of the value of the property coming to them.

(3) RECORDS OF UNITED STATES MARSHAL.—(A) A United States marshal receiving a writ of execution shall endorse thereon the exact hour and date of receipt.

(B) The United States marshal shall make a written record of every levy, specify the property on which levy is made, the date on which levy is made, and the marshal's costs, expenses, and fees.

(C) The United States marshal shall make a written return to the court on each writ of execution stating concisely what is done pursuant to the writ and shall deliver a copy to counsel for the United States who requests the writ. The writ shall be returned not more than—

(i) 90 days after the date of issuance if levy is not made; or

(ii) 10 days after the date of sale of property on which levy is made.

(e) APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER.—Pending the levy of execution, the court may appoint a receiver to manage property described in such writ if there is a substantial danger that the property will be removed from the jurisdiction of the court, lost, materially injured or damaged, or mismanaged.

(f) REPLEVY; REDEMPTION.—

(1) BEFORE EXECUTION SALE.—(A) Before execution sale, the United States marshal may return property[1] to the judgment debtor any personal property taken in execution, on—

(i) satisfaction of the judgment, interest, and costs, and any costs incurred in connection with scheduling the sale; or

(ii) receipt from the judgment debtor of a bond—

(I) payable to the United States, with 2 or more good and sufficient sureties to be approved by the marshal, conditioned on the delivery of the property to the marshal at the time and place named in the bond to be sold under subsection (g); or

(II) for the payment to the marshal of a fair value thereof which shall be stated in the bond.

(B) A judgment debtor who sells or disposes of property replevied under subparagraph (A) shall pay the United States marshal the stipulated value of such property.

(C) If the judgment debtor fails to deliver such property to the United States marshal pursuant to the terms of the delivery de-

[1] So in original. The word ''property'' probably should not appear.

scribed in subparagraph (A)(ii)(I) and fails to pay the United States marshal the stipulated value of such property, the United States marshal shall endorse the bond ''forfeited'' and return it to the court from which the writ of execution issued. If the judgment is not fully satisfied, the court shall issue a writ of execution against the judgment debtor and the sureties on the bond for the amount due, not exceeding the stipulated value of the property, on which execution no delivery bond shall be taken, which instruction shall be endorsed on the writ.

(2) AFTER EXECUTION SALE.—The judgment debtor shall not be entitled to redeem the property after the execution sale.

(g) EXECUTION SALE.—

(1) GENERAL PROCEDURES.—An execution sale under this section shall be conducted in a commercially reasonable manner—

(A) SALE OF REAL PROPERTY.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—(I) Except as provided in clause (ii), real property, or any interest therein, shall be sold, after the expiration of the 90-day period beginning on the date of levy under subsection (d), for cash at public auction at the courthouse of the county, parish, or city in which the greater part of the property is located or on the premises or some parcel thereof.

(II) The court may order the sale of any real property after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the date of levy under subsection (d) if the court determines that such property is likely to perish, waste, be destroyed, or otherwise substantially depreciate in value during the 90-day period beginning on the date of levy.

(III) The time and place of sale of real property, or any interest therein, under execution shall be advertised by the United States marshal, by publication of notice, once a week for at least 3 weeks prior to the sale, in at least one newspaper of general circulation in the county or parish where the property is located. The first publication shall appear not less than 25 days preceding the day of sale. The notice shall contain a statement of the authority by which the sale is to be made, the time of levy, the time and place of sale, and a brief description of the property to be sold, sufficient to identify the property (such as a street address for urban property and the survey identification and location for rural property), but it shall not be necessary for the notice to contain field notes. Such property shall be open for inspection and appraisal, subject to the judgment debtor's reasonable objections, for a reasonable period before the day of sale.

(IV) The United States marshal shall serve written notice of public sale by personal delivery, or certified or registered mail, to each person whom the marshal has reasonable cause to believe, after a title search is conducted by the United States, has an interest in property under execution, including lienholders, co-owners, and tenants, at least 25 days before the day of sale, to the last known address of each such person.

(ii) SALE OF CITY LOTS.—If the real property consists of several lots, tracts, or parcels in a city or town, each lot, tract, or parcel shall be offered for sale separately, unless not susceptible to separate sale because of the character of improvements.

(iii) SALE OF RURAL PROPERTY.—If the real property is not located in a city or town, the judgment debtor may—

(I) divide the property into lots of not less than 50 acres or in such greater or lesser amounts as ordered by the court;

(II) furnish a survey of such prepared by a registered surveyor; and

(III) designate the order in which those lots shall be sold.

When a sufficient number of lots are sold to satisfy the amount of the execution and costs of sale, the marshal shall stop the sale.

(B) SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.—(i) Personal property levied on shall be offered for sale on the premises where it is located at the time of levy, at the courthouse of the county, parish or city wherein it is located, or at another location if ordered by the court. Personal property susceptible of being exhibited shall not be sold unless it is present and subject to the view of those attending the sale unless—

(I) the property consists of shares of stock in corporations;

(II) by reason of the nature of the property, it is impractical to exhibit it; or

(III) the debtor's interest in the property does not include the right to the exclusive possession.

(ii)(I) Except as provided in subclause (II), personal property, or any interest therein, shall be sold after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the date of levy under subsection (d).

(II) The court may order the sale of any personal property before the expiration of such 30-day period if the court determines that such property is likely to perish, waste, be destroyed, or otherwise substantially depreciate in value during such 30-day period.

(iii) Notice of the time and place of the sale of personal property shall be given by the United States marshal by posting notice thereof for not less than 10 days successively immediately before the day of sale at the courthouse of any county, parish, or city, and at the place where the sale is to be made.

(iv) The United States marshal shall serve written notice of public sale by personal delivery, or registered or certified mail at their last known addresses, on the judgment debtor and other persons who the marshal has reasonable cause to believe, after diligent inquiry, have a substantial interest in the property.

(2) POSTPONEMENT OF SALE.—The United States marshal may postpone an execution sale from time to time by continuing the re-

quired posting or publication of notice until the date to which the sale is postponed, and appending, at the foot of each such notice of a current copy of the following:

''The above sale is postponed until the day of , 19 , at o'clock .M., , United States Marshal for the District of , by , Deputy, dated .''

(3) SALE PROCEDURES.—

(A) BIDDING REQUIREMENTS.—A bidder at an execution sale of property, may be required by the United States marshal to make a cash deposit of as much as 20 percent of the sale price proposed before the bid is accepted.

(B) RESALE OF PROPERTY.—If the terms of the sale are not complied with by the successful bidder, the United States marshal shall proceed to sell the property again on the same day if there is sufficient time. If there is insufficient time, the marshal shall schedule and notice a subsequent sale of the property as provided in paragraphs (1) and (2).

(4) RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PURCHASERS.—

(A) TRANSFER OF TITLE AFTER SALE.—

(i) If property is sold under this subsection and the successful bidder complies with the terms of the sale, the United States marshal shall execute and deliver all documents necessary to transfer to the successful bidder, without warranty, all the rights, titles, interests, and claims of the judgment debtor in the property.

(ii) If the successful bidder dies before execution and delivery of the documents needed to transfer ownership, the United States marshal shall execute and deliver them to the successful bidder's estate. Such delivery to the estate shall have the same effect as if accomplished during the lifetime of the purchaser.

(B) PURCHASER CONSIDERED INNOCENT PURCHASER WITHOUT NOTICE.—The purchaser of property sold under execution shall be deemed to be an innocent purchaser without notice if the purchaser would have been considered an innocent purchaser without notice had the sale been made voluntarily and in person by the judgment debtor.

(C) LIABILITY OF SUCCESSFUL BIDDER WHO FAILS TO COMPLY.—A successful bidder at an execution sale who fails to comply with the terms of the sale shall forfeit to the United States the cash deposit or, at the election of the United States, shall be liable to the United States, on a subsequent sale of the property, for all net losses incurred by the United States as a result of such failure.

(h) DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDS; FURTHER LEVY.—

(1) DISTRIBUTION OF SALE PROCEEDS.—(A) The United States marshal shall first deliver to the judgment debtor such amounts to which the judgment debtor is entitled from the sale of partially exempt property.

(B) The United States marshal shall next deduct from the proceeds of an execution sale of property an amount equal to the reasonable expenses incurred in making the levy of execution and in keeping and maintaining the property.

(C) Except as provided in subparagraph (D), the United States marshal shall deliver the balance of the proceeds to the counsel for the United States as soon as practicable.

(D) If more proceeds are received from the execution sale than is necessary to satisfy the executions held by the United States marshal, the marshal shall pay the surplus to the judgment debtor.

(2) FURTHER LEVY IF EXECUTION NOT SATISFIED.—If the proceeds of the execution sale of the property levied on are insufficient to satisfy the execution, the United States marshal shall proceed on the same writ of execution to levy other property of the judgment debtor.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4950.)

§ 3204. Installment payment order

(a) AUTHORITY TO ISSUE ORDER.—Subject to subsection (c), if it is shown that the judgment debtor—

(1) is receiving or will receive substantial nonexempt disposable earnings from self employment that are not subject to garnishment; or

(2) is diverting or concealing substantial earnings from any source, or property received in lieu of earnings;

then upon motion of the United States and notice to the judgment debtor, the court may, if appropriate, order that the judgment debtor make specified installment payments to the United States. Notice of the motion shall be served on the judgment debtor in the same manner as a summons or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. In fixing the amount of the payments, the court shall take into consideration after a hearing, the income, resources, and reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor and the judgment debtor's dependents, any other payments to be made in satisfaction of judgments against the judgment debtor, and the amount due on the judgment in favor of the United States.

(b) MODIFICATION OF ORDER.—On motion of the United States or the judgment debtor, and upon a showing that the judgment debtor's financial circumstances have changed or that assets not previously disclosed by the judgment debtor have been discovered, the court may modify the amount of payments, alter their frequency, or require full payment.

(c) LIMITATION.—(1) An order may not be issued under subsection (a), and if so issued shall have no force or effect, against a judgment debtor with respect to whom there is in effect a writ of garnishment of earnings issued under this chapter and based on the same debt.

(2) An order may not be issued under subsection (a) with respect to any earnings of the debtor except nonexempt disposable earnings.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4955.)

§ 3205. Garnishment

(a) IN GENERAL.—A court may issue a writ of garnishment against property (including non-

exempt disposable earnings) in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest and which is in the possession, custody, or control of a person other than the debtor, in order to satisfy the judgment against the debtor. Co-owned property shall be subject to garnishment to the same extent as co-owned property is subject to garnishment under the law of the State in which such property is located. A court may issue simultaneous separate writs of garnishment to several garnishees. A writ of garnishment issued under this subsection shall be continuing and shall terminate only as provided in subsection (c)(10).

(b) WRIT.—

(1) GENERAL REQUIREMENTS.—The United States shall include in its application for a writ of garnishment—

(A) the judgment debtor's name, social security number (if known), and last known address;

(B) the nature and amount of the debt owed and the facts that not less than 30 days has elapsed since demand on the debtor for payment of the debt was made and the judgment debtor has not paid the amount due; and

(C) that the garnishee is believed to have possession of property (including nonexempt disposable earnings) in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest.

(2) PROPER GARNISHEE FOR PARTICULAR PROPERTY.—

(A) If the property consists of a right to or share in the stock of an association or corporation, or interests or profits therein, for which a certificate of stock or other negotiable instrument is not outstanding, the corporation, or the president or treasurer of the association shall be the garnishee.

(B) If the property consists of an interest in a partnership interest, any partner other than the debtor shall be the garnishee on behalf of the partnership.

(C) If the property or a debt is evidenced by a negotiable instrument for the payment of money, a negotiable document of title or a certificate of stock of an association or corporation, the instrument, document, or certificate shall be treated as property capable of delivery and the person holding it shall be the garnishee, except that—

(i) subject to clause (ii), in the case of a security which is transferable in the manner set forth in State law, the entity that carries on its books an account in the name of the debtor in which is reflected such security shall be the garnishee; and

(ii) notwithstanding clause (i), the pledgee shall be the garnishee if such security is pledged.

(c) PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO WRIT.—

(1) COURT DETERMINATION.—If the court determines that the requirements of this section are satisfied, the court shall issue an appropriate writ of garnishment.

(2) FORM OF WRIT.—The writ shall state—

(A) The nature and amount of the debt, and any cost and interest owed with respect to the debt.

(B) The name and address of the garnishee.

(C) The name and address of counsel for the United States.

(D) The last known address of the judgment debtor.

(E) That the garnishee shall answer the writ within 10 days of service of the writ.

(F) That the garnishee shall withhold and retain any property in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest and for which the garnishee is or may become indebted to the judgment debtor pending further order of the court.

(3) SERVICE OF WRIT.—The United States shall serve the garnishee and the judgment debtor with a copy of the writ of garnishment and shall certify to the court that this service was made. The writ shall be accompanied by—

(A) an instruction explaining the requirement that the garnishee submit a written answer to the writ; and

(B) instructions to the judgment debtor for objecting to the answer of the garnishee and for obtaining a hearing on the objections.

(4) ANSWER OF THE GARNISHEE.—In its written answer to the writ of garnishment, the garnishee shall state under oath—

(A) whether the garnishee has custody, control or possession of such property;

(B) a description of such property and the value of such interest;

(C) a description of any previous garnishments to which such property is subject and the extent to which any remaining property is not exempt; and

(D) the amount of the debt the garnishee anticipates owing to the judgment debtor in the future and whether the period for payment will be weekly or another specified period.

The garnishee shall file the original answer with the court issuing the writ and serve a copy on the debtor and counsel for the United States.

(5) OBJECTIONS TO ANSWER.—Within 20 days after receipt of the answer, the judgment debtor or the United States may file a written objection to the answer and request a hearing. The party objecting shall state the grounds for the objection and bear the burden of proving such grounds. A copy of the objection and request for a hearing shall be served on the garnishee and all other parties. The court shall hold a hearing within 10 days after the date the request is received by the court, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, and give notice of the hearing date to all the parties.

(6) GARNISHEE'S FAILURE TO ANSWER OR PAY.—If a garnishee fails to answer the writ of garnishment or to withhold property in accordance with the writ, the United States may petition the court for an order requiring the garnishee to appear before the court to answer the writ and to so withhold property before the appearance date. If the garnishee fails to appear, or appears and fails to show good cause why the garnishee failed to comply with the writ, the court shall enter judgment against the garnishee for the value of the judgment debtor's nonexempt interest in such property (including nonexempt disposable

earnings). The court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to the United States and against the garnishee if the writ is not answered within the time specified therein and a petition requiring the garnishee to appear is filed as provided in this section.

(7) DISPOSITION ORDER.—After the garnishee files an answer and if no hearing is requested within the required time period, the court shall promptly enter an order directing the garnishee as to the disposition of the judgment debtor's nonexempt interest in such property. If a hearing is timely requested, the order shall be entered within 5 days after the hearing, or as soon thereafter as is practicable.

(8) PRIORITIES.—Judicial orders and garnishments for the support of a person shall have priority over a writ of garnishment issued under this section. As to any other writ of garnishment or levy, a garnishment issued under this section shall have priority over writs which are issued later in time.

(9) ACCOUNTING.—(A) While a writ of garnishment is in effect under this section, the United States shall give an annual accounting on the garnishment to the judgment debtor and the garnishee.

(B) Within 10 days after the garnishment terminates, the United States shall give a cumulative written accounting to the judgment debtor and garnishee of all property it receives under a writ of garnishment. Within 10 days after such accounting is received, the judgment debtor or garnishee may file a written objection to the accounting and a request for hearing. The party objecting shall state grounds for the objection. The court shall hold a hearing on the objection within 10 days after the court receives the request for a hearing, or as soon thereafter as is practicable.

(10) TERMINATION OF GARNISHMENT.—A garnishment under this chapter is terminated only by—

(A) a court order quashing the writ of garnishment;

(B) exhaustion of property in the possesion,[1] custody, or control of the garnishee in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest (including nonexempt disposable earnings), unless the garnishee reinstates or reemploys the judgment debtor within 90 days after the judgment debtor's dismissal or resignation; or

(C) satisfaction of the debt with respect to which the writ is issued.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4956.)

§ 3206. Discharge

A person who pursuant to an execution or order issued under this chapter by a court pays or delivers to the United States, a United States marshal, or a receiver, money or other personal property in which a judgment debtor has or will have an interest, or so pays a debt such person owes the judgment debtor, is discharged from such debt to the judgment debtor to the extent of the payment or delivery.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4959.)

SUBCHAPTER D—FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS INVOLVING DEBTS

§ 3301. Definitions

As used in this subchapter:

(1) ''Affiliate'' means—

(A) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities—

(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or

(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote;

(B) a corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than the person who holds securities—

(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or

(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote;

(C) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or

(D) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets.

(2) ''Asset'' means property of a debtor, but does not include—

(A) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;

(B) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or

(C) an interest in real property held in tenancy by the entirety, or as part of a community estate, to extent such interest is not subject to process by the United States holding a claim against only one tenant or coowner.

(3) ''Claim'' means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.

[1] So in original. Probably should be ''possession,''.

[1] So in original. Does not conform to section catchline.

(4) ''Creditor'' means a person who has a claim.

(5) ''Insider'' includes—

(A) if the debtor is an individual—

(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;

(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (ii); or

(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;

(B) if the debtor is a corporation—

(i) a director of the debtor;

(ii) an officer of the debtor;

(iii) a person in control of the debtor;

(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

(v) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (iv); or

(vi) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;

(C) if the debtor is a partnership—

(i) a general partner in the debtor;

(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;

(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (iii); or

(v) a person in control of the debtor.[1]

(D) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; and

(E) a managing agent of the debtor.

(4)[2] ''Lien'' means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common law lien, or a statutory lien.

(5)[3] ''Relative'' means an individual related, by consanguinity or adoption, within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual so related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined.

(6)[4] ''Transfer'' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.

(7)[5] ''Valid lien'' means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained in legal or equitable proceeding.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, §3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4959.)

§ 3302. Insolvency

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (c), a debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation.

(b) PRESUMPTION.—A debtor who is generally not paying debts as they become due is presumed to be insolvent.

(c) CALCULATION.—A partnership is insolvent under subsection (a) if the sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate, at a fair valuation, of—

(1) all of the partnership's assets; and

(2) the sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's non-partnership assets over the partner's non-partnership debts.

(d) ASSETS.—For purposes of this section, assets do not include property that is transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under this subchapter.

(e) DEBTS.—For purposes of this section, debts do not include an obligation to the extent such obligation is secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor not included as an asset.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, §3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4961.)

§ 3303. Value for transfer or obligation

(a) TRANSACTION.—Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise made otherwise than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support to the debtor or another person.

(b) REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE.—For the purposes of sections 3304 and 3307, a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of such interest upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.

(c) PRESENT VALUE.—A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contemporaneous.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, §3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4961.)

§ 3304. Transfer fraudulent as to a debt to the United States

(a) DEBT ARISING BEFORE TRANSFER.—Except as provided in section 3307, a transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a debt to the United States which arises before the transfer is made or the obligation is incurred if—

(1)(A) the debtor makes the transfer or incurs the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation; and

(B) the debtor is insolvent at that time or the debtor becomes insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation; or

(2)(A) the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time; and

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[1] So in original. The period probably should be a semicolon.

[2] So in original. Probably should be ''(6)''.

[3] So in original. Probably should be ''(7)''.

[4] So in original. Probably should be ''(8)''.

[5] So in original. Probably should be ''(9)''.

(B) the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.

(b) TRANSFERS WITHOUT REGARD TO DATE OF JUDGMENT.—(1) Except as provided in section 3307, a transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a debt to the United States, whether such debt arises before or after the transfer is made or the obligation is incurred, if the debtor makes the transfer or incurs the obligation—

(A) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor; or

(B) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation if the debtor—

(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or

(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.

(2) In determining actual intent under paragraph (1), consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether—

(A) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;

(B) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer;

(C) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;

(D) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;

(E) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;

(F) the debtor absconded;

(G) the debtor removed or concealed assets;

(H) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;

(I) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;

(J) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and

(K) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4961.)

§ 3305. When transfer is made or obligation is incurred

For the purposes of this subchapter:

(1) A transfer is made—

(A) with respect to an asset that is real property (other than a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the asset), when the transfer is so far perfected that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and

(B) with respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire, otherwise than under this subchapter, a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee.

(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as approved in paragraph (1) and the transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of an action or proceeding for relief under this subchapter, the transfer is deemed made immediately before the commencement of the action or proceeding.

(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as provided in paragraph (1), the transfer is made when it becomes effective between the debtor and the transferee.

(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the asset transferred.

(5) An obligation is incurred—

(A) if oral, when it becomes effective between the parties; or

(B) if evidenced by a writing executed by the obligor, when such writing is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4962.)

§ 3306. Remedies of the United States

(a) IN GENERAL.—In an action or proceeding under this subchapter for relief against a transfer or obligation, the United States, subject to section 3307 and to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, may obtain—

(1) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the debt to the United States;

(2) a remedy under this chapter against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee; or

(3) any other relief the circumstances may require.

(b) LIMITATION.—A claim for relief with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation under this subchapter is extinguished unless action is brought—

(1) under section 3304(b)(1)(A) within 6 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within 2 years after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant;

(2) under subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1)(B) of section 3304 within 6 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or

(3) under section 3304(a)(2) within 2 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, § 3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4963.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (a), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

§ 3307. Defenses, liability, and protection of transferee

(a) GOOD FAITH TRANSFER.—A transfer or obligation is not voidable under section 3304(b) with

respect to a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value or against any transferee or obligee subsequent to such person.

(b) LIMITATION.—Except as provided in subsection (d), to the extent a transfer is voidable in an action or proceeding by the United States under section 3306(a)(1), the United States may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, but not to exceed the judgment on a debt. The judgment may be entered against—

(1) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made; or

(2) any subsequent transferee, other than a good faith transferee who took for value or any subsequent transferee of such good-faith transferee.

(c) VALUE OF ASSET.—For purposes of subsection (b), the value of the asset is the value of the asset at the time of the transfer, subject to adjustment as the equities may require.

(d) RIGHTS OF GOOD FAITH TRANSFEREES AND OBLIGEES.—Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under this subchapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to—

(1) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred;

(2) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or

(3) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment.

(e) EXCEPTIONS.—A transfer is not voidable under section 3304(a) or section 3304(b)(2) if the transfer results from—

(1) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termination is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or

(2) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code or its equivalent in effect in the State where the property is located.

(f) LIMITATION OF VOIDABILITY.—A transfer is not voidable under section 3304(a)(2)—

(1) to the extent the insider gives new value to or for the benefit of the debtor after the transfer is made unless the new value is secured by a valid lien;

(2) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the insider; or

(3) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and the transfer secured both present value given for that purpose and an antecedent debt of the debtor.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, §3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4963.)

§ 3308. Supplementary provision

Except as provided in this subchapter, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause shall apply to actions and proceedings under this subchapter.

(Added Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXVI, §3611, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4964.)

CHAPTER 178—PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTION

§ 3701. Definitions

For purposes of this chapter—

(1) the term ''amateur sports organization'' means—

(A) a person or governmental entity that sponsors, organizes, schedules, or conducts a competitive game in which one or more amateur athletes participate, or

(B) a league or association of persons or governmental entities described in subparagraph (A),

(2) the term ''governmental entity'' means a State, a political subdivision of a State, or an entity or organization, including an entity or organization described in section 4(5) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2703(5)), that has governmental authority within the territorial boundaries of the United States, including on lands described in section 4(4) of such Act (25 U.S.C. 2703(4)),

(3) the term ''professional sports organization'' means—

(A) a person or governmental entity that sponsors, organizes, schedules, or conducts a competitive game in which one or more professional athletes participate, or

(B) a league or association of persons or governmental entities described in subparagraph (A),

(4) the term ''person'' has the meaning given such term in section 1 of title 1, and

(5) the term ''State'' means any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, or any territory or possession of the United States.

(Added Pub. L. 102–559, §2(a), Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 4227.)

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section 3 of Pub. L. 102–559 provided that: ''This Act [enacting this chapter and provisions set out as a note under section 1 of this title] shall take effect on January 1, 1993.''

§ 3702. Unlawful sports gambling

It shall be unlawful for—

(1) a governmental entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact, or

(2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity,

a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the use of geographical references or otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more performances of such athletes in such games.

(Added Pub. L. 102–559, § 2(a), Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 4228.)

§ 3703. Injunctions

A civil action to enjoin a violation of section 3702 may be commenced in an appropriate district court of the United States by the Attorney General of the United States, or by a professional sports organization or amateur sports organization whose competitive game is alleged to be the basis of such violation.

(Added Pub. L. 102–559, § 2(a), Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 4228.)

§ 3704. Applicability

(a) Section 3702 shall not apply to—

(1) a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme in operation in a State or other governmental entity, to the extent that the scheme was conducted by that State or other governmental entity at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August 31, 1990;

(2) a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme in operation in a State or other governmental entity where both—

(A) such scheme was authorized by a statute as in effect on October 2, 1991; and

(B) a scheme described in section 3702 (other than one based on parimutuel animal racing or jai-alai games) actually was conducted in that State or other governmental entity at any time during the period beginning September 1, 1989, and ending October 2, 1991, pursuant to the law of that State or other governmental entity;

(3) a betting, gambling, or wagering scheme, other than a lottery described in paragraph (1), conducted exclusively in casinos located in a municipality, but only to the extent that—

(A) such scheme or a similar scheme was authorized, not later than one year after the effective date of this chapter, to be operated in that municipality; and

(B) any commercial casino gaming scheme was in operation in such municipality throughout the 10-year period ending on such effective date pursuant to a comprehensive system of State regulation authorized by that State's constitution and applicable solely to such municipality; or

(4) parimutuel animal racing or jai-alai games.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), section 3702 shall apply on lands described in section 4(4) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2703(4)).

(Added Pub. L. 102–559, § 2(a), Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 4228.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The effective date of this chapter, referred to in subsec. (a)(3)(A), is Jan. 1, 1993, see section 3 of Pub. L. 102–559, set out as an Effective Date note under section 3701 of this title.

CHAPTER 179—JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS BY PRESIDENTIAL OFFICES

§ 3901. Civil actions

(a) PARTIES.—In an action under section 1346(g) of this title, the defendant shall be the employing office alleged to have committed the violation involved.

(b) JURY TRIAL.—In an action described in subsection (a), any party may demand a jury trial where a jury trial would be available in an action against a private defendant under the relevant law made applicable by chapter 5 of title 3. In any case in which a violation of section 411 of title 3 is alleged, the court shall not inform the jury of the maximum amount of compensatory damages available under section 411(b)(1) or 411(b)(3) of title 3.

(Added Pub. L. 104–331, § 3(c), Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4070.)

EFFECTIVE DATE

Chapter effective Oct. 1, 1997, see section 3(d) of Pub. L. 104–331, set out as a note under section 1296 of this title.

§ 3902. Judicial review of regulations

In any proceeding under section 1296 or 1346(g) of this title in which the application of a regulation issued under chapter 5 of title 3 is at issue, the court may review the validity of the regulation in accordance with the provisions of subparagraphs (A) through (D) of section 706(2) of title 5. If the court determines that the regulation is invalid, the court shall apply, to the extent necessary and appropriate, the most relevant substantive executive agency regulation promulgated to implement the statutory provisions with respect to which the invalid regulation was issued. Except as provided in this section, the validity of regulations issued under this chapter is not subject to judicial review.

(Added Pub. L. 104–331, § 3(c), Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4070.)

§ 3903. Effect of failure to issue regulations

In any proceeding under section 1296 or 1346(g) of this title, if the President, the designee of the President, or the Federal Labor Relations Authority has not issued a regulation on a matter for which chapter 5 of title 3 requires a regulation to be issued, the court shall apply, to the extent necessary and appropriate, the most relevant substantive executive agency regulation promulgated to implement the statutory provision at issue in the proceeding.

(Added Pub. L. 104–331, § 3(c), Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4070.)

§ 3904. Expedited review of certain appeals

(a) IN GENERAL.—An appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United States from any interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of a court upon the con-

stitutionality of any provision of chapter 5 of title 3.

(b) JURISDICTION.—The Supreme Court shall, if it has not previously ruled on the question, accept jurisdiction over the appeal referred to in subsection (a), advance the appeal on the docket, and expedite the appeal to the greatest extent possible.

(Added Pub. L. 104–331, §3(c), Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4070.)

§ 3905. Attorney's fees and interest

(a) ATTORNEY'S FEES.—If a covered employee, with respect to any claim under chapter 5 of title 3, or a qualified person with a disability, with respect to any claim under section 421 of title 3, is a prevailing party in any proceeding under section 1296 or section 1346(g), the court may award attorney's fees, expert fees, and any other costs as would be appropriate if awarded under section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

(b) INTEREST.—In any proceeding under section 1296 or section 1346(g), the same interest to compensate for delay in payment shall be made available as would be appropriate if awarded under section 717(d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

(c) PUNITIVE DAMAGES.—Except as otherwise provided in chapter 5 of title 3, no punitive damages may be awarded with respect to any claim under chapter 5 of title 3.

(Added Pub. L. 104–331, §3(c), Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4070.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Sections 706 and 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (b), are classified to sections 2000e–5 and 2000e–16, respectively, of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.

§ 3906. Payments

A judgment, award, or compromise settlement against the United States under this chapter (including any interest and costs) shall be paid—

(1) under section 1304 of title 31, if it arises out of an action commenced in a district court of the United States (or any appeal therefrom); or

(2) out of amounts otherwise appropriated or available to the office involved, if it arises out of an appeal from an administrative proceeding under chapter 5 of title 3.

(Added Pub. L. 104–331, §3(c), Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4071.)

§ 3907. Other judicial review prohibited

Except as expressly authorized by this chapter and chapter 5 of title 3, the compliance or noncompliance with the provisions of chapter 5 of title 3, and any action taken pursuant to chapter 5 of title 3, shall not be subject to judicial review.

(Added Pub. L. 104–331, §3(c), Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4071.)

§ 3908. Definitions

For purposes of applying this chapter, the terms ''employing office'' and ''covered employee'' have the meanings given those terms in section 401 of title 3.

(Added Pub. L. 104–331, §3(c), Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4071.)

CHAPTER 180—ASSUMPTION OF CERTAIN CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

§ 4001. Assumption of contractual obligations related to transfers of rights in motion pictures

(a) ASSUMPTION OF OBLIGATIONS.—(1) In the case of a transfer of copyright ownership under United States law in a motion picture (as the terms ''transfer of copyright ownership'' and ''motion picture'' are defined in section 101 of title 17) that is produced subject to 1 or more collective bargaining agreements negotiated under the laws of the United States, if the transfer is executed on or after the effective date of this chapter and is not limited to public performance rights, the transfer instrument shall be deemed to incorporate the assumption agreements applicable to the copyright ownership being transferred that are required by the applicable collective bargaining agreement, and the transferee shall be subject to the obligations under each such assumption agreement to make residual payments and provide related notices, accruing after the effective date of the transfer and applicable to the exploitation of the rights transferred, and any remedies under each such assumption agreement for breach of those obligations, as those obligations and remedies are set forth in the applicable collective bargaining agreement, if—

(A) the transferee knows or has reason to know at the time of the transfer that such collective bargaining agreement was or will be applicable to the motion picture; or

(B) in the event of a court order confirming an arbitration award against the transferor under the collective bargaining agreement, the transferor does not have the financial ability to satisfy the award within 90 days after the order is issued.

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A), ''knows or has reason to know'' means any of the following:

(A) Actual knowledge that the collective bargaining agreement was or will be applicable to the motion picture.

(B)(i) Constructive knowledge that the collective bargaining agreement was or will be applicable to the motion picture, arising from recordation of a document pertaining to copyright in the motion picture under section 205 of title 17 or from publication, at a site available to the public on-line that is operated by the relevant union, of information that identifies the motion picture as subject to a collective bargaining agreement with that union, if the site permits commercially reasonable verification of the date on which the information was available for access.

(ii) Clause (i) applies only if the transfer referred to in subsection (a)(1) occurs—

(I) after the motion picture is completed, or

(II) before the motion picture is completed and—

(aa) within 18 months before the filing of an application for copyright registration for the motion picture under section 408 of title 17, or

(bb) if no such application is filed, within 18 months before the first publication of the motion picture in the United States.

(C) Awareness of other facts and circumstances pertaining to a particular transfer from which it is apparent that the collective bargaining agreement was or will be applicable to the motion picture.

(b) SCOPE OF EXCLUSION OF TRANSFERS OF PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHTS.—For purposes of this section, the exclusion under subsection (a) of transfers of copyright ownership in a motion picture that are limited to public performance rights includes transfers to a terrestrial broadcast station, cable system, or programmer to the extent that the station, system, or programmer is functioning as an exhibitor of the motion picture, either by exhibiting the motion picture on its own network, system, service, or station, or by initiating the transmission of an exhibition that is carried on another network, system, service, or station. When a terrestrial broadcast station, cable system, or programmer, or other transferee, is also functioning otherwise as a distributor or as a producer of the motion picture, the public performance exclusion does not affect any obligations imposed on the transferee to the extent that it is engaging in such functions.

(c) EXCLUSION FOR GRANTS OF SECURITY INTERESTS.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to—

(1) a transfer of copyright ownership consisting solely of a mortgage, hypothecation, or other security interest; or

(2) a subsequent transfer of the copyright ownership secured by the security interest described in paragraph (1) by or under the authority of the secured party, including a transfer through the exercise of the secured party's rights or remedies as a secured party, or by a subsequent transferee.

The exclusion under this subsection shall not affect any rights or remedies under law or contract.

(d) DEFERRAL PENDING RESOLUTION OF BONA FIDE DISPUTE.—A transferee on which obligations are imposed under subsection (a) by virtue of paragraph (1) of that subsection may elect to defer performance of such obligations that are subject to a bona fide dispute between a union and a prior transferor until that dispute is resolved, except that such deferral shall not stay accrual of any union claims due under an applicable collective bargaining agreement.

(e) SCOPE OF OBLIGATIONS DETERMINED BY PRIVATE AGREEMENT.—Nothing in this section shall expand or diminish the rights, obligations, or remedies of any person under the collective bargaining agreements or assumption agreements referred to in this section.

(f) FAILURE TO NOTIFY.—If the transferor under subsection (a) fails to notify the transferee under subsection (a) of applicable collective bargaining obligations before the execution of the transfer instrument, and subsection (a) is made applicable to the transferee solely by virtue of subsection (a)(1)(B), the transferor shall be liable to the transferee for any damages suffered by the transferee as a result of the failure to notify.

(g) DETERMINATION OF DISPUTES AND CLAIMS.—Any dispute concerning the application of subsections (a) through (f) shall be determined by an action in United States district court, and the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party and may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.

(h) STUDY.—The Comptroller General, in consultation with the Register of Copyrights, shall conduct a study of the conditions in the motion picture industry that gave rise to this section, and the impact of this section on the motion picture industry. The Comptroller General shall report the findings of the study to the Congress within 2 years after the effective date of this chapter.

(Added Pub. L. 105–304, title IV, § 406(a), Oct. 28, 1998, 112 Stat. 2903.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The effective date of this chapter, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (h), is Oct. 28, 1998. See Effective Date of 1998 Amendment note set out under section 108 of Title 17, Copyrights.

CHAPTER 181—FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

§ 4101. Definitions

In this chapter:

(1) DEFAMATION.—The term ''defamation'' means any action or other proceeding for defamation, libel, slander, or similar claim alleging that forms of speech are false, have caused damage to reputation or emotional distress, have presented any person in a false light, or have resulted in criticism, dishonor, or condemnation of any person.

(2) DOMESTIC COURT.—The term ''domestic court'' means a Federal court or a court of any State.

(3) FOREIGN COURT.—The term ''foreign court'' means a court, administrative body, or other tribunal of a foreign country.

(4) FOREIGN JUDGMENT.—The term ''foreign judgment'' means a final judgment rendered by a foreign court.

(5) STATE.—The term ''State'' means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

(6) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ''United States person'' means—

(A) a United States citizen;

(B) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;

(C) an alien lawfully residing in the United States at the time that the speech that is

[1] So in original. Does not conform to section catchline.

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the subject of the foreign defamation action was researched, prepared, or disseminated; or

(D) a business entity incorporated in, or with its primary location or place of operation in, the United States.

(Added Pub. L. 111–223, §3(a), Aug. 10, 2010, 124 Stat. 2381.)

FINDINGS

Pub. L. 111–223, §2, Aug. 10, 2010, 124 Stat. 2380, provided that: ''Congress finds the following:

''(1) The freedom of speech and the press is enshrined in the first amendment to the Constitution, and is necessary to promote the vigorous dialogue necessary to shape public policy in a representative democracy.

''(2) Some persons are obstructing the free expression rights of United States authors and publishers, and in turn chilling the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States interest of the citizenry in receiving information on matters of importance, by seeking out foreign jurisdictions that do not provide the full extent of free-speech protections to authors and publishers that are available in the United States, and suing a United States author or publisher in that foreign jurisdiction.

''(3) These foreign defamation lawsuits not only suppress the free speech rights of the defendants to the suit, but inhibit other written speech that might otherwise have been written or published but for the fear of a foreign lawsuit.

''(4) The threat of the libel laws of some foreign countries is so dramatic that the United Nations Human Rights Committee examined the issue and indicated that in some instances the law of libel has served to discourage critical media reporting on matters of serious public interest, adversely affecting the ability of scholars and journalists to publish their work. The advent of the internet and the international distribution of foreign media also create the danger that one country's unduly restrictive libel law will affect freedom of expression worldwide on matters of valid public interest.

''(5) Governments and courts of foreign countries scattered around the world have failed to curtail this practice of permitting libel lawsuits against United States persons within their courts, and foreign libel judgments inconsistent with United States first amendment protections are increasingly common.''

§ 4102. Recognition of foreign defamation judgments

(a) FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, a domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation unless the domestic court determines that—

(A) the defamation law applied in the foreign court's adjudication provided at least as much protection for freedom of speech and press in that case as would be provided by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by the constitution and law of the State in which the domestic court is located; or

(B) even if the defamation law applied in the foreign court's adjudication did not provide as much protection for freedom of speech and press as the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the constitution and law of the State, the party opposing recognition or enforcement of that foreign judgment would have been found liable for defamation by a domestic court applying the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the constitution and law of the State in which the domestic court is located.

(2) BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING APPLICATION OF DEFAMATION LAWS.—The party seeking recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment shall bear the burden of making the showings required under subparagraph (A) or (B).

(b) JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, a domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation unless the domestic court determines that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the foreign court comported with the due process requirements that are imposed on domestic courts by the Constitution of the United States.

(2) BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION.—The party seeking recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment shall bear the burden of making the showing that the foreign court's exercise of personal jurisdiction comported with the due process requirements that are imposed on domestic courts by the Constitution of the United States.

(c) JUDGMENT AGAINST PROVIDER OF INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SERVICE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, a domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation against the provider of an interactive computer service, as defined in section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230) unless the domestic court determines that the judgment would be consistent with section 230 if the information that is the subject of such judgment had been provided in the United States.

(2) BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING CONSISTENCY OF JUDGMENT.—The party seeking recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment shall bear the burden of establishing that the judgment is consistent with section 230.

(d) APPEARANCES NOT A BAR.—An appearance by a party in a foreign court rendering a foreign judgment to which this section applies shall not deprive such party of the right to oppose the recognition or enforcement of the judgment under this section, or represent a waiver of any jurisdictional claims.

(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to—

(1) affect the enforceability of any foreign judgment other than a foreign judgment for defamation; or

(2) limit the applicability of section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230) to causes of action for defamation.

(Added Pub. L. 111–223, §3(a), Aug. 10, 2010, 124 Stat. 2381.)

§ 4103. Removal

In addition to removal allowed under section 1441, any action brought in a State domestic

court to enforce a foreign judgment for defamation in which—

(1) any plaintiff is a citizen of a State different from any defendant;

(2) any plaintiff is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or

(3) any plaintiff is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or citizen or subject of a foreign state,

may be removed by any defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending without regard to the amount in controversy between the parties.

(Added Pub. L. 111–223, § 3(a), Aug. 10, 2010, 124 Stat. 2383.)

§ 4104. Declaratory judgments

(a) CAUSE OF ACTION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Any United States person against whom a foreign judgment is entered on the basis of the content of any writing, utterance, or other speech by that person that has been published, may bring an action in district court, under section 2201(a), for a declaration that the foreign judgment is repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States. For the purposes of this paragraph, a judgment is repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States if it would not be enforceable under section 4102(a), (b), or (c).

(2) BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING UNENFORCEABILITY OF JUDGMENT.—The party bringing an action under paragraph (1) shall bear the burden of establishing that the foreign judgment would not be enforceable under section 4102(a), (b), or (c).

(b) NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS.—Where an action under this section is brought in a district court of the United States, process may be served in the judicial district where the case is brought or any other judicial district of the United States where the defendant may be found, resides, has an agent, or transacts business.

(Added Pub. L. 111–223, § 3(a), Aug. 10, 2010, 124 Stat. 2383.)

§ 4105. Attorneys' fees

In any action brought in a domestic court to enforce a foreign judgment for defamation, including any such action removed from State court to Federal court, the domestic court shall, absent exceptional circumstances, allow the party opposing recognition or enforcement of the judgment a reasonable attorney's fee if such party prevails in the action on a ground specified in section 4102(a), (b), or (c).

(Added Pub. L. 111–223, § 3(a), Aug. 10, 2010, 124 Stat. 2383.)