

114TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# S. 2230

To require the Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress on the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 3, 2015

Mr. CRUZ introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## A BILL

To require the Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress on the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization, and for other purposes.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4       This Act may be cited as the “Muslim Brotherhood  
5       Terrorist Designation Act of 2015”.

6       **SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

7       (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1           (1) Multiple countries have declared the Society  
2 of the Muslim Brothers (commonly known as the  
3 “Muslim Brotherhood”) a terrorist organization or  
4 proscribed the group from operating in their coun-  
5 tries.

6           (2) In 1980, following a wave of assassinations  
7 targeting government officials and the June 16,  
8 1979, massacre of 83 military cadets in Aleppo, the  
9 Government of Syria—

10           (A) banned the Muslim Brotherhood from  
11 the country; and

12           (B) made membership in the organization  
13 punishable by death.

14           (3) In a February 14, 2003, court decision, the  
15 Russian Supreme Court—

16           (A) described the Muslim Brotherhood as  
17 a terrorist organization; and

18           (B) banned the organization from oper-  
19 ating in Russia.

20           (4) In 2013—

21           (A) an Egyptian court banned the Muslim  
22 Brotherhood from Egypt; and

23           (B) the Government of Egypt officially de-  
24 clared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist orga-  
25 nization.

1           (5) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia designated  
2 the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group on  
3 March 7, 2014.

4           (6) The Cabinet of the United Arab Emirates  
5 has published a list of terrorist organizations, which  
6 includes the Muslim Brotherhood and its local affili-  
7 ates.

8           (7) On March 21, 2014, the Foreign Minister  
9 of Bahrain backed the terrorist designations of the  
10 Muslim Brotherhood by the United Arab Emirates  
11 and Saudi Arabia.

12           (8) The Muslim Brotherhood, which was found-  
13 ed in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, remains  
14 headquartered in Egypt but operates throughout the  
15 world.

16           (9) The Muslim Brotherhood’s long-standing  
17 motto includes the following: “Allah is our objective.  
18 The Prophet is our leader. The Qur’an is our law.  
19 Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our  
20 highest hope. [Allah is greater!]”.

21           (10) Hassan al-Banna, in a book entitled “The  
22 Way of Jihad”, taught—

23           (A) “Jihad is an obligation from Allah on  
24 every Muslim and cannot be ignored nor  
25 evaded. Allah has ascribed great importance to

1           jihad and has made the reward of the martyrs  
2           and fighters in His way a splendid one. Only  
3           those who have acted similarly and who have  
4           modeled themselves upon the martyrs in their  
5           performance of jihad can join them in this re-  
6           ward.”; and

7                   (B) “Jihad [means] the fighting of the un-  
8           believers, and involves all possible efforts that  
9           are necessary to dismantle the power of the en-  
10          emies of Islam including beating them, plun-  
11          dering their wealth, destroying their places of  
12          worship and smashing their idols.”.

13           (11) Hassan al-Banna also taught that “it is  
14          the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be domi-  
15          nated”, and thus that the mission of Islam, as inter-  
16          preted and executed by the Muslim Brotherhood,  
17          must be “to impose [Islamic] law on nations and to  
18          extend its power to the entire planet”. While al-  
19          Banna’s plan for accomplishing this mission was  
20          multifaceted, it centrally incorporated training for  
21          and the execution of violent jihad–terrorist oper-  
22          ations.

23           (12) In Richard P. Mitchell’s 1969 book on the  
24          history of the Muslim Brotherhood, entitled “The  
25          Society of Muslim Brothers”, Professor Mitchell ex-

1 plained al-Banna’s teachings on violent jihad: The  
2 certainty that jihad had this physical connotation is  
3 evidenced by the relationship always implied between  
4 it and the possibility, even the necessity, of death  
5 and martyrdom. Death, as an important end of  
6 jihad, was extolled by al-Banna in a phrase which  
7 came to be a famous part of his legacy: “[T]he art  
8 of death”. “Death is art”. The Koran has com-  
9 manded people to love death more than life. Unless  
10 “the philosophy of the Koran on death” replaces  
11 “the love of life” which has consumed Muslims, then  
12 they will reach naught. Victory can only come with  
13 the mastery of “the art of death”. The movement  
14 cannot succeed, al-Banna insists, without this dedi-  
15 cated and unqualified kind of jihad.

16 (13) This philosophy pervaded the Muslim  
17 Brotherhood’s prioritization of training for combat.  
18 Professor Mitchell observed that it was “the tone of  
19 the training which gave [the Muslim Brotherhood]  
20 its distinctive qualities”, adding: “If the Muslim  
21 Brothers were more effectively violent than other  
22 groups on the Egyptian scene, it was because mili-  
23 tancy and martyrdom had been elevated to central  
24 virtues in the Society’s ethos.”. Its literature and  
25 speeches were permeated with references identifying

1 it and its purposes in military terms. Al-Banna told  
2 members again and again that they were “the army  
3 of liberation, carrying on your shoulders the message  
4 of liberation; you are the battalions of salvation for  
5 this nation afflicted by calamity”.

6 (14) Al-Banna’s blueprint for revolution antici-  
7 pated a final stage of “execution” at which point the  
8 battalions the Muslim Brotherhood had trained  
9 would “conquer . . . every obstinate tyrant”. This  
10 violent ideology continued to be part of the Brother-  
11 hood’s indoctrination in standard membership texts,  
12 such as Sayyid Qutb’s “Milestones” and Fathi  
13 Yakan’s “To Be a Muslim”.

14 (15) In Muslim Brotherhood organizations and  
15 chapters throughout the world, including in the  
16 United States, al-Banna’s originating philosophy  
17 continues to be taught.

18 (16) In its earliest days, the Egyptian Muslim  
19 Brotherhood established a terrorist wing, referred to  
20 as the “secret apparatus”, which conducted bomb-  
21 ings and assassinations targeting foreigners and gov-  
22 ernment officials. The assassinations by the Muslim  
23 Brotherhood of Judge Ahmed Al-Khazinder Bey in  
24 1947 and Prime Minister Mahmoud Al-Nuqrashi in

1 1948 prompted the first ban on the organization in  
2 Egypt.

3 (17) The United States has previously des-  
4 igned global elements of the Muslim Brotherhood  
5 as foreign terrorist organizations, including—

6 (A) the terrorist group Hamas, which self-  
7 identifies as “one of the wings of the Muslim  
8 Brotherhood in Palestine”, which was des-  
9 igned as a foreign terrorist organization by  
10 President William J. Clinton on January 23,  
11 1995, by Executive Order 12947, and by Sec-  
12 retary of State Madeline Albright on October 7,  
13 1997, under section 219(a) of the Immigration  
14 and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)); and

15 (B) the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood’s  
16 Lajnat al-Daawa al-Islamiya (“Islamic Call  
17 Committee”), which was designated as a foreign  
18 terrorist organization by President George W.  
19 Bush on September 23, 2001, by Executive  
20 Order 13224 and by Secretary of State Colin  
21 Powell on January 9, 2003, under such section  
22 219(a).

23 (18) Lajnat al-Daawa al-Islamiya was des-  
24 igned as a foreign terrorist organization for—

1 (A) being a financial conduit for Osama  
2 bin Laden and Al-Qaeda;

3 (B) funding terrorist groups in Chechnya  
4 and Libya; and

5 (C) including Al-Qaeda operations chief  
6 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and World Trade  
7 Center bomber Ramzi Yousef as leaders with  
8 the organization.

9 (19) Militias of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood  
10 recently joined forces with United States designated  
11 terrorist organizations, particularly Ansar al-Sharia,  
12 as part of the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries and Libya Dawn forces fighting against the  
13 military forces of the internationally recognized Lib-  
14 yan government.

15  
16 (20) Individual Muslim Brotherhood leaders  
17 have been designated by the United States as Spe-  
18 cially Designated Terrorists, as authorized under the  
19 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50  
20 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and initiated under Executive  
21 Order 13224 (September 23, 2001), including  
22 Shaykh Abd-al-Majid Al-Zindani, a leader of the  
23 Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood's Al-Islah political  
24 party, who was designated by the Secretary of the  
25 Treasury as a specially designated terrorist on Feb-



1       ruary 2, 2004. The designation states that al-  
2       Zindani has a “long history of working with Bin  
3       Laden, serving as one of his spiritual leaders”, in  
4       addition to his activities in support of Al-Qaeda, in-  
5       cluding recruiting and procuring weapons. Al-  
6       Zindani was also identified in a Federal lawsuit as  
7       a coordinator of the October 2000 suicide attack  
8       targeting the USS COLE in Aden, Yemen, that  
9       killed 17 United States Navy sailors, including per-  
10      sonally selecting the 2 suicide bombers. In Sep-  
11      tember 2012, al-Zindani reportedly called for his  
12      supporters to kill United States Marines stationed at  
13      the United States Embassy in Sana’a, Yemen.

14           (21) Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, a veteran of  
15      the Soviet-Afghan war, senior Muslim Brotherhood  
16      leader, and brother-in-law and close confidant of  
17      Osama bin Laden was arrested in California in De-  
18      cember 1994 on charges related to the 1993 bomb-  
19      ing of the World Trade Center. Evidence was found  
20      at that time that linked Khalifa to the planned al-  
21      Qaeda Operation Bojinka plot that included the  
22      bombing of 11 airplanes between Asia and the  
23      United States. He was deported to Jordan in May  
24      1995. Prior to that time he operated an Islamic  
25      charity in the Philippines that was accused of fun-

1       neling money to the Abu Sayyef terrorist group and  
2       laundering money for Bin Laden. He was sought  
3       again by United States authorities in 2007, and an  
4       Interpol bulletin was issued to several United States  
5       intelligence agencies. Khalifa was killed four days  
6       later in Madagascar.

7               (22) Sami Al-Hajj, an Al-Qaeda member and  
8       senior leader of the Muslim Brotherhood's Shura  
9       Council, was imprisoned as a detainee at the De-  
10      partment of Defense facility at Guantanamo Bay,  
11      Cuba. He was captured by Pakistani forces near the  
12      Afghanistan border in 2001 and transferred to  
13      United States custody. He was detained for his work  
14      as a money and weapons courier for Al-Qaeda. He  
15      reportedly worked directly with Taliban commander  
16      Mullah Mohammad Omar to procure weapons, and  
17      met with senior Afghan Muslim Brotherhood offi-  
18      cials in mid-2001 to discuss the transfer of Stinger  
19      missiles from Afghanistan to Chechnya.

20              (23) According to a May 1995 report by the  
21      United States House of Representatives Task Force  
22      on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, a series  
23      of conferences hosted by Sudanese Muslim Brother-  
24      hood leader Hassan al-Turabi in Khartoum, Sudan,  
25      during October 1994 and March to April 1995 fea-

1 tured representatives from virtually every Islamic  
2 terrorist organization in the world. The conferences  
3 included representatives from Iranian intelligence,  
4 Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian Is-  
5 lamic Jihad, and the Armed Islamic Group of Alge-  
6 ria, and leaders from the international Muslim  
7 Brotherhood, the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf  
8 Countries, Hamas (the Palestinian Muslim Brother-  
9 hood), the Islamic Action Front (Jordanian Muslim  
10 Brotherhood), and the Ennahda Movement (the Tu-  
11 nisian Muslim Brotherhood). Osama bin Laden was  
12 present at the conferences. The parties agreed to  
13 launch a terrorism offensive beginning in 1995, with  
14 targets including United States interests and per-  
15 sonnel in the Middle East and attacks inside the  
16 United States homeland.

17 (24) In October 2003, Richard Clarke, former  
18 National Coordinator for Security and Counterter-  
19 rorism for Presidents William J. Clinton and George  
20 W. Bush, testified before the Committee on Bank-  
21 ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate that  
22 terrorist organizations continued to operate inside  
23 the United States and their connection to the Mus-  
24 lim Brotherhood networks, stating “Dating back to  
25 the 1980’s, Islamist terrorist networks have devel-

1 oped a sophisticated and diversified financial infra-  
2 structure in the United States. In the post Sep-  
3 tember 11th environment, it is now widely known  
4 that every major Islamist terrorist organization,  
5 from Hamas to Islamic Jihad to al-Qaeda, has lever-  
6 aged the financial resources and institutions of the  
7 United States to build their capabilities. We face a  
8 highly developed enemy in our mission to stop ter-  
9 rorist financing. While the overseas operations of  
10 Islamist terrorist organizations are generally seg-  
11 regated and distinct, the opposite holds in the  
12 United States. The issue of terrorist financing in the  
13 United States is a fundamental example of the  
14 shared infrastructure levered by Hamas, Islamic  
15 Jihad and al-Qaeda, all of which enjoy a significant  
16 degree of cooperation and coordination within our  
17 borders. The common link here is the extremist  
18 Muslim Brotherhood—all of these organizations are  
19 descendants of the membership and ideology of the  
20 Muslim Brothers.”.

21 (25) One of the examples cited by Richard  
22 Clarke in his testimony before the Committee on  
23 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate  
24 was the case of Soliman Biheiri, who ran an invest-  
25 ment firm specializing in Islamically permissible in-

1 vestments, the Secaucus, New Jersey-based Baitul  
2 Mal, Incorporated, which offered a range of financial  
3 services for the Muslim community, and invested in  
4 businesses and real estate. According to Federal  
5 prosecutors, the shareholders of Baitul Mal included  
6 al-Qaeda financier Yassin al-Qadi and top Hamas  
7 leader Mousa abu Marzook, both of whom are spe-  
8 cially designated global terrorists and operated sepa-  
9 rate businesses out of the offices of Baitul Mal, In-  
10 corporated and also did business with Baitul Mal,  
11 Incorporated. Other Baitul Mal, Incorporated inves-  
12 tors included Abdullah bin Laden, nephew of Osama  
13 bin Laden, and Tarek Swaidan, a Kuwaiti Muslim  
14 Brotherhood leader. In a September 2003 detention  
15 hearing, Federal prosecutors described Biheiri as  
16 “the United States banker for the Muslim Brother-  
17 hood,” and stating that “the defendant came here as  
18 the Muslim Brotherhood’s financial toehold in the  
19 United States.”. Biheiri was convicted on Federal  
20 immigration charges on October 9, 2003.

21 (26) The fact that the international Muslim  
22 Brotherhood engages in terrorism financing inside  
23 the United States was attested to in February 2011  
24 by FBI Director Robert Mueller, who testified before  
25 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of

1 the House of Representatives about the Muslim  
2 Brotherhood's networks and agenda in the United  
3 States, stating: "I can say at the outset that ele-  
4 ments of the Muslim Brotherhood both here and  
5 overseas have supported terrorism. To the extent  
6 that I can provide information, I would be happy to  
7 do so in closed session. But it would be difficult to  
8 do in open session."

9 (27) In the Holy Land Foundation prosecu-  
10 tions—the largest terrorism financing trial in United  
11 States history—Department of Justice officials suc-  
12 cessfully argued in court that the international Mus-  
13 lim Brotherhood and its United States affiliates had  
14 engaged in a widespread conspiracy to raise money  
15 and materially support the terrorist group Hamas.  
16 HLF officials charged in the case were found guilty  
17 on all counts in November 2008, primarily related to  
18 millions of dollars that had been transferred to  
19 Hamas. During the trial and in court documents,  
20 Federal prosecutors implicated a number of promi-  
21 nent United States-Islamic organizations in this con-  
22 spiracy, including the Islamic Society of North  
23 America, the North American Islamic Trust, and the  
24 Council on American-Islamic Relations. These  
25 groups and their leaders, among others, were named

1 as unindicted co-conspirators in the case. The De-  
2 partment of Justice told the court that these United  
3 States-Muslim Brotherhood affiliates acted at the di-  
4 rection of the international Muslim Brotherhood to  
5 support terrorism in a July 2008 court filing:  
6 “ISNA and NAIT, in fact, shared more with HLF  
7 than just a parent organization. They were inti-  
8 mately connected with the Holy Land Foundation  
9 and its assigned task of providing financial support  
10 to HAMAS. Shortly after HAMAS was founded in  
11 1987, as an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood,  
12 the International Muslim Brotherhood ordered the  
13 Muslim Brotherhood chapters throughout the world  
14 to create Palestine Committees, who supported  
15 HAMAS with ‘media, money and men’. The U.S.-  
16 Muslim Brotherhood created the United States Pal-  
17 estine Committee, which documents reflect was ini-  
18 tially comprised of 3 organizations: the Holy Land  
19 Foundation, the Islamic Association for Palestine,  
20 and the United Association for Studies and Re-  
21 search. CAIR was later added to these organiza-  
22 tions. The mandate of these organizations, per the  
23 International Muslim Brotherhood, was to support  
24 HAMAS, and the HLF’s particular role was to raise

1 money to support HAMAS' organizations inside the  
2 Palestinian territories.”.

3 (28) In September 2010, the Supreme Guide of  
4 the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Badie, delivered  
5 a weekly sermon mirroring the ideological themes of  
6 Al-Qaeda's August 1996 declaration of war against  
7 the United States. Calling on Arab and Muslim re-  
8 gimes to confront not just Israel, but also the  
9 United States, he declared that “Resistance is the  
10 only solution against the Zio-American arrogance  
11 and tyranny.”. This “resistance” can only come  
12 from fighting and understanding “that the improve-  
13 ment and change that the [Muslim] nation seeks can  
14 only be attained through jihad and sacrifice and by  
15 raising a jihadi generation that pursues death just  
16 as the enemies pursue life”. He also predicted the  
17 imminent downfall of the United States, saying  
18 “The United States is now experiencing the begin-  
19 ning of its end, and is heading towards its demise.”.

20 (29) Since August 2013, Muslim Brotherhood  
21 members in Egypt have been killed in firefights dur-  
22 ing attacks on police and military targets, and dur-  
23 ing the manufacture and placement of explosives for  
24 acts of terrorism.



1           (30) The August 14, 2013, clearing of Muslim  
2           Brotherhood protests in Egypt resulted in attacks by  
3           Muslim Brotherhood supporters targeting the Coptic  
4           Christian community. Attacks included 70 churches  
5           and more than 1,000 homes and businesses of Cop-  
6           tic Christian families torched in the ensuing vio-  
7           lence. During the Muslim Brotherhood protests,  
8           there were repeated reports of direct incitement to-  
9           wards the Copts from leading Muslim Brotherhood  
10          figures, and since the protest dispersal this targeting  
11          of the Christian community continues in official  
12          statements on Muslim Brotherhood social media out-  
13          lets and from its leadership. As the United States  
14          Commission on International Religious Freedom has  
15          previously noted, this terror campaign by the Mus-  
16          lim Brotherhood is not a new development. Over the  
17          past decade violence by the Muslim Brotherhood has  
18          been directed at the Coptic community. As the  
19          USCIRF observed in its 2003 Annual Report: “Copt-  
20          tic Christians face ongoing violence from vigilante  
21          Muslim extremists, including members of the Mus-  
22          lim Brotherhood, many of whom act with impu-  
23          nity.”.

24           (31) On January 27, 2015, the Muslim Broth-  
25          erhood published on their official Ikhwanonline.com

1 website an announcement that the organization was  
2 entering a “new phase” and calling its followers to  
3 prepare for a “long, uncompromising jihad” against  
4 the Egyptian government. The statement also posi-  
5 tively recalled the Muslim Brotherhood’s terrorist  
6 past, including the operations of the “secret appa-  
7 ratus” terror wing active in the 1940s and 1950s,  
8 and the group’s battalions organized by Brotherhood  
9 founder Hassan al-Banna that fought against Israel  
10 during its War of Independence in 1948.

11 (32) On May 27, 2015, a group of 159 Muslim  
12 Brotherhood-associated scholars from 35 nations an-  
13 nounced the publication of a document endorsing vi-  
14 olence in Egypt in response to a “war against Is-  
15 lam’s principles.”. Specifically, Article 4 of the “Call  
16 to Egypt” calls for “retribution punishment” against  
17 government officials, judges, police, soldiers, reli-  
18 gious officials, and media personalities backing the  
19 government. The document was affirmed by the  
20 Muslim Brotherhood in an English-language state-  
21 ment published on their official website.

22 (33) A July 1, 2015, statement published on  
23 the Muslim Brotherhood’s official English-language  
24 website called for “rebellion” against the Egyptian  
25 government after a group of senior Muslim Brother-

1 hood leaders were killed in a shootout after opening  
2 fire on Egyptian anti-terror police who were raiding  
3 the secret meeting in 6th of October City. Docu-  
4 ments reportedly recovered at the scene showed that  
5 the leadership was planning acts of sabotage and at-  
6 tacks on police stations during the second anniver-  
7 sary of the removal of Mohamed Morsi on July 3rd.

8 (34) A senior Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood  
9 leader, Ashraf Abdel Ghaffar, gave a July 3, 2015,  
10 interview in which he defended the sabotage of  
11 power stations and high voltage pylons targeting  
12 Egyptian citizens by the Muslim Brotherhood as  
13 punishment for support of the Egyptian government.

14 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
15 gress that—

16 (1) the Muslim Brotherhood meets the criteria  
17 for designation as a foreign terrorist organization  
18 under section 219 of the Immigration and Nation-  
19 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189); and

20 (2) the Secretary of State, in consultation with  
21 the Attorney General and the Secretary of the  
22 Treasury, should exercise the Secretary of State's  
23 statutory authority by designating the Muslim  
24 Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization.

1 **SEC. 3. REPORT ON DESIGNATION OF THE MUSLIM BROTH-**  
2 **ERHOOD AS A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANI-**  
3 **ZATION.**

4 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

5 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
6 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
7 mittees” means—

8 (A) the Committee on Homeland Security  
9 and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;

10 (B) the Committee on Armed Services of  
11 the Senate;

12 (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of  
13 the Senate;

14 (D) the Select Committee on Intelligence  
15 of the Senate;

16 (E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the  
17 Senate;

18 (F) the Committee on Banking, Housing,  
19 and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

20 (G) the Committee on Homeland Security  
21 of the House of Representatives;

22 (H) the Committee on Armed Services of  
23 the House of Representatives;

24 (I) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of  
25 the House of Representatives;

1           (J) the Permanent Select Committee on  
2 Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

3           (K) the Committee on the Judiciary of the  
4 House of Representatives; and

5           (L) the Committee on Financial Services  
6 of the House of Representatives.

7           (2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term  
8 “intelligence community” has the meaning given  
9 that term in section 3(4) of the National Security  
10 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

11          (b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date  
12 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in  
13 consultation with the intelligence community, shall submit  
14 a detailed report to the appropriate congressional commit-  
15 tees that—

16           (1) indicates whether the Muslim Brotherhood  
17 meets the criteria for designation as a foreign ter-  
18 rorist organization under section 219 of the Immi-  
19 gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189); and

20           (2) if the Secretary of State determines that  
21 the Muslim Brotherhood does not meet the criteria  
22 referred to in paragraph (1), includes a detailed jus-  
23 tification as to which criteria have not been met.

- 1 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (b)
- 2 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
- 3 a classified annex, if appropriate.

○