

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1201

To restore the United States international leadership on climate change and clean energy, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 19, 2021

Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Ms. HIRONO, Mr. CARDIN, Mrs. SHAHEEN, Mr. MERKLEY, Mr. SCHATZ, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. KAINE, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. BOOKER, and Mr. VAN HOLLEN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To restore the United States international leadership on climate change and clean energy, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “United States Climate Leadership in International Miti-
6 gation, Adaptation, and Technology Enhancement Act of
7 2021”.

8 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
9 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings; sense of Congress.
- Sec. 3. Purpose.
- Sec. 4. Definitions.

TITLE I—CLIMATE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

- Sec. 101. Climate diplomacy.
- Sec. 102. Enhancing United States security considerations for global climate disruptions.
- Sec. 103. Arctic diplomacy.

TITLE II—INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS

- Sec. 201. Sense of Congress in support of the United States returning to the Paris Agreement.
- Sec. 202. Enhanced United States commitment to the Paris Agreement.
- Sec. 203. Sense of Congress regarding ratification of the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.
- Sec. 204. Compliance with the carbon offset and reduction scheme for international aviation.
- Sec. 205. Short-lived climate pollutants.
- Sec. 206. International cooperation regarding clean transportation and sustainable land use and community development.
- Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on United States reengagement with the Group of Seven and the Group of Twenty on climate action.

TITLE III—CLIMATE CHANGE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND SUPPORT

- Sec. 301. International Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program.
- Sec. 302. United States contributions to the Green Climate Fund.
- Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on United States engagements at the World Economic Forum.
- Sec. 304. Clean energy and the United States International Development Finance Corporation.
- Sec. 305. Consistency in United States policy on development finance and climate change.

TITLE IV—CLEAN ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

- Sec. 401. Energy diplomacy and security within the Department of State.
- Sec. 402. Department of State primacy for energy diplomacy.
- Sec. 403. Reports on United States participation in Mission Innovation and the Clean Energy Ministerial.
- Sec. 404. Reduced deforestation.

TITLE V—BILATERAL AND REGIONAL MULTILATERAL CLIMATE DIPLOMACY AND COOPERATION

- Sec. 501. North American Strategy.
- Sec. 502. Accountability and cooperation with China.
- Sec. 503. United States and European Union cooperation on climate finance for developing countries.
- Sec. 504. Sense of Congress on clean energy cooperation with India.

- Sec. 505. Power Africa.
- Sec. 506. Caribbean Energy Initiative.
- Sec. 507. Sense of Congress on conservation of the Amazon River basin.
- Sec. 508. Sense of Congress regarding renewable energy in Indonesia.

TITLE VI—WOMEN AND CLIMATE CHANGE ACT

- Sec. 601. Short title.
- Sec. 602. Findings.
- Sec. 603. Definitions.
- Sec. 604. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 605. Federal Interagency Working Group on Women and Climate Change.
- Sec. 606. Development and implementation of strategy and policies to prevent and respond to the effects of climate change on women globally.
- Sec. 607. Climate change within the Office of Global Women's Issues.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

2 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

3 (1) The Special Report: Global Warming of
 4 1.5°C, published by the Intergovernmental Panel on
 5 Climate Change on October 8, 2018, and the Fourth
 6 National Climate Assessment, first published by the
 7 United States Global Change Research Program in
 8 2018, concluded that—

9 (A) the release of greenhouse gas emis-
 10 sions, most notably the combustion of fossil
 11 fuels and the degradation of natural resources
 12 that absorb atmospheric carbon from human
 13 activity, are the dominant causes of climate
 14 change during the past century; and

15 (B) changes in the Earth's climate are—

16 (i) causing sea levels to rise;

17 (ii) increasing the global average tem-
 18 perature of the Earth;

1 (iii) increasing the incidence and se-
 2 verity of wildfires; and

3 (iv) intensifying the severity of ex-
 4 treme weather, including hurricanes, cy-
 5 clones, typhoons, flooding, droughts, and
 6 other disasters that threaten human life,
 7 healthy communities, and critical infra-
 8 structure.

9 (2) An increase in the global average tempera-
 10 ture of 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industri-
 11 alized levels would cause—

12 (A)(i) the displacement, and the forced in-
 13 ternal migration, of an estimated 143,000,000
 14 people in Latin America, South Asia, and Sub-
 15 Saharan Africa by 2050 if insufficient action is
 16 taken (according to the World Bank); and

17 (ii) the displacement of an average of
 18 17,800,000 people worldwide by floods every
 19 year (according to the Internal Displacement
 20 Monitoring Centre) because of the exacerbating
 21 effects of climate change;

22 (B)(i) more than \$500,000,000,000 in lost
 23 annual economic output in the United States (a
 24 10 percent contraction from 2018 levels) by

1 2100 (according to the Fourth National Cli-
2 mate Assessment); and

3 (ii) an additional 100,000,000 people
4 worldwide to be driven into poverty by 2030
5 (according to the World Bank);

6 (C)(i) greater food insecurity and de-
7 creased agricultural production due to climate
8 change's effects on the increased frequency and
9 intensity of extreme weather events; and

10 (ii) the proliferation of agricultural pests
11 and crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrad-
12 ing ecosystems, and water scarcity (according
13 to the United Nations Food and Agriculture
14 Organization); and

15 (D) more than 350,000,000 additional peo-
16 ple worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat
17 stress by 2050.

18 (3) According to the International Monetary
19 Fund, a persistent annual increase in average global
20 temperature of .04 degrees Celsius would reduce
21 global real gross domestic product per capita by 7.22
22 percent by 2100.

23 (4) According to the United Nations Environ-
24 ment Programme, climate change is exacerbating
25 unusual regional weather conditions, which is driving

1 the current and prolonged desert locust outbreak
 2 that is threatening food security across East Africa
 3 and Southeast Asia.

4 (5) According to the Intergovernmental Science-
 5 Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
 6 Services—

7 (A) an increase in the global average tem-
 8 perature of between 1.5 and 2 degrees Celsius
 9 will result in a significant reduction in the
 10 worldwide number of land species;

11 (B) an increase in the global average tem-
 12 perature of 2 degrees Celsius—

13 (i) will place 5 percent of world's spe-
 14 cies at risk of extinction; and

15 (ii) will result in the destruction of
 16 more than 99 percent of all coral reefs
 17 worldwide; and

18 (C) an increase in the global average tem-
 19 perature of 4.3 degrees Celsius will place 16
 20 percent of world's terrestrial species at risk of
 21 extinction.

22 (6) According to the International Energy
 23 Agency, the United States, China, India, and the
 24 European Union (including the United Kingdom) ac-

1 count for more than 58 percent of global greenhouse
2 gas emissions.

3 (7) China, which is the world's top greenhouse
4 gases emitter and has an outsized impact on the
5 United States core interest in climate stability—

6 (A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions
7 mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, con-
8 tained in its 2015 nationally determined con-
9 tribution, to “peak” emissions around 2030
10 ahead of schedule;

11 (B) announced, on September 22, 2020, a
12 pledge to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060;
13 and

14 (C) has yet to announce an updated na-
15 tionally determined contribution.

16 (8) On October 26, 2020, Japan, the world's
17 third largest economy and fifth greatest carbon
18 emitter, announced a pledge to achieve carbon neu-
19 trality by 2050. Despite apprehension about growing
20 nuclear energy sources, Japan aims to increase its
21 share of renewable and nuclear energy following new
22 targets unveiled next year.

23 (9) India has met its growing energy demands
24 by becoming a global leader in renewable energy
25 generation. Despite significant investments in renew-

1 able energy, and the implementation of strong na-
 2 tional greenhouse gas mitigation policies, India con-
 3 tinues to operate some of the world's dirtiest fossil
 4 fuel power plants and has high emissions generated
 5 from its transportation sector. India is a critical
 6 market for foreign investment and will be a major
 7 competitor in international clean energy development
 8 futures.

9 (10) India's leadership within the Clean Energy
 10 Ministerial, the Mission Innovation initiative, and
 11 the International Solar Alliance has put India at the
 12 forefront of renewable energy development and
 13 helped India achieve a top 5 global rank among
 14 clean energy producers. Installed electricity capacity
 15 from renewables in India grew by 144 percent be-
 16 tween 2014 and 2020. Approximately
 17 \$42,000,000,000 was invested into India's renewable
 18 energy sector between 2014 and 2019.

19 (11) The European Union demonstrated its
 20 strong commitment to climate action by making the
 21 ambitious pledge to reduce the collective greenhouse
 22 gas emissions of its 27 member nations by at least
 23 55 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels) and
 24 to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. The European
 25 Parliament went even further, voting to reduce its

1 collective economy wide greenhouse gas emissions by
2 60 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels).
3 These commitments represent substantial improve-
4 ments from the previous goal of a 40 percent reduc-
5 tion in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030.

6 (12) The European Union’s member nations
7 have also provided the equivalent of approximately
8 \$120,000,000,000 between 2014 and 2020 in sup-
9 port and financing to build climate change resilience
10 and develop low carbon energy capacity throughout
11 the developing world.

12 (13) The European Union has traditionally
13 been a steadfast partner with United States in the
14 United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate
15 Change by pushing for improved accountability,
16 transparency, and shared responsibility among par-
17 ties in mitigating global greenhouse gas emissions.
18 As the United States Government’s executive branch
19 has pulled away from climate action commitments,
20 the European Union has increased its cooperation
21 with coalitions of States through partnerships such
22 as the United States Climate Alliance.

23 (14) Among the world’s top greenhouse gas
24 emitters, the United States is the only country
25 that—

1 (A) has rescinded national policies to re-
 2 duce greenhouse gas emissions;

3 (B) has advanced policies aimed at bol-
 4 stering fossil fuel consumption and extraction,
 5 including through the removal of Federal pro-
 6 tections of public lands that are critical wilder-
 7 ness areas vital to maintaining healthy natural
 8 ecosystems; and

9 (C) has abstained or withdrawn itself from
 10 several global cooperative efforts acknowledging
 11 and addressing the climate crisis.

12 (15) United States leadership during delibera-
 13 tions over the Paris Agreement—

14 (A) was exemplified by—

15 (i) its commitment to reduce national
 16 emissions by 26 to 28 percent below 2005
 17 levels;

18 (ii) its leadership in the “Umbrella
 19 Group” and its role as cofounder of the
 20 “High Ambition Coalition”;

21 (iii) its co-facilitation of the
 22 UNFCCC;

23 (iv) its work with the Ad Hoc Work-
 24 ing Group on the Paris Agreement on
 25 agenda item 5: Modalities, procedures and

1 guidelines for the transparency framework
 2 for action;

3 (v) its support for the enhanced trans-
 4 parency framework for action and support
 5 referred to in Article 13 of the Paris
 6 Agreement;

7 (vi) its pledge of \$3,000,000,000 to
 8 the Green Climate Fund (of which the
 9 United States still owed \$2,000,000,000)
 10 in support of developing countries' efforts
 11 to adapt to climate change and to mitigate
 12 greenhouse gas emissions; and

13 (vii) the development of critical bilat-
 14 eral climate action cooperation initiatives
 15 with China and India; and

16 (B) established the United States as essen-
 17 tial to uniting the world in climate action co-
 18 operation.

19 (16) The United States reversal on nearly all
 20 climate action policies since 2017, including repeal-
 21 ing the Clean Power Plan (announced by President
 22 Obama in August 2015), canceling contributions to
 23 the United Nation's Green Climate Fund, abstaining
 24 from all G7 and G20 climate action communiques,

1 and withdrawing the United States from the Paris
2 Agreement—

3 (A) undermines the viability of the Paris
4 Agreement;

5 (B) harms American diplomacy;

6 (C) disadvantages the ability of the United
7 States private sector to compete in a clean en-
8 ergy global economy, for which the Inter-
9 national Finance Corporation estimates that in-
10 vestments spurred by the Paris Agreement will
11 creates up to \$23,000,000,000,000 in new in-
12 vestment opportunities;

13 (D) erodes the United States leadership,
14 standing, and trust within the international
15 community; and

16 (E) concedes leadership and economic op-
17 portunity to foreign governments keen on tak-
18 ing advantage of the United States absence
19 from international climate action initiatives.

20 (17) The Paris Agreement's central aim is—

21 (A) to strengthen the global response to
22 the threat of climate change by maintaining the
23 global temperature rise well below 2 degrees
24 Celsius above pre-industrial levels; and

1 (B) to pursue efforts to further limit the
2 temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

3 (18) The Paris Agreement—

4 (A) specifies the need for a strong global
5 response to climate change;

6 (B) acknowledges that all “[p]arties
7 should, when taking action to address climate
8 change, respect, promote and consider their re-
9 spective obligations on human rights, the right
10 to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local
11 communities, migrants, children, persons with
12 disabilities and people in vulnerable situations
13 and the right to development, as well as gender
14 equality, empowerment of women and intergen-
15 erational equity”;

16 (C) notes the importance of “climate jus-
17 tice” when mitigating and adapting to climate
18 change;

19 (D) recognizes “the need for an effective
20 and progressive response to the urgent threat of
21 climate change”;

22 (E) requires all parties to put forward
23 their best efforts through nationally determined
24 contributions and to strengthen these efforts in
25 the future;

1 (F) requires each party to update its na-
2 tionally determined contribution every 5 years,
3 with each successive nationally determined con-
4 tribution representing a progression beyond the
5 previous nationally determined contribution,
6 and reflecting the party's highest possible ambi-
7 tion;

8 (G) recognizes that marine ecosystems cov-
9 ering more than 70 percent of the Earth's sur-
10 face have an integral role in climate balance;
11 and

12 (H) was developed under the UNFCCC, an
13 international environmental treaty which the
14 United States ratified, with the advice and con-
15 sent of the Senate on October 15, 1992.

16 (19) Seventy percent of the Paris Agreement
17 signatories' nationally determined contributions in
18 support of the goals of the Paris Agreement are
19 ocean-inclusive, and 39 Paris Agreement signatories
20 are focused on the inclusion of ocean action in na-
21 tionally determined contributions through the Be-
22 cause the Ocean initiative.

23 (20) The United States communicated its na-
24 tionally determined contribution—

1 (A) to achieve, by 2025, an economy-wide
2 target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions
3 by 26 to 28 percent below its 2005 level; and

4 (B) to make best efforts to reduce its emis-
5 sions by 28 percent.

6 (21) A thriving clean energy industry in the
7 United States, which employs more than 500,000
8 Americans, is essential in achieving these targets.

9 (22) A number of existing laws and regulations
10 in the United States also are relevant to achieving
11 this target, including—

12 (A) the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et
13 seq.);

14 (B) the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Public
15 Law 102–486); and

16 (C) the Energy Independence and Security
17 Act of 2007 (Public Law 110–140).

18 (23) On November 4, 2020, the United States
19 withdrawal from the Paris Agreement became effec-
20 tive, which at the time resulted in the United States
21 being the only state party (out of 197 parties) to the
22 UNFCCC that is not a party to the Paris Agree-
23 ment.

24 (24) On January 20, 2021, President Biden
25 initiated the process for reentering the United States

1 into the Paris Agreement. On February 19, 2021,
2 the United States officially rejoined the Paris Agree-
3 ment.

4 (25) Article 8 of the Paris Agreement states,
5 “Parties recognize the importance of averting, mini-
6 mizing and addressing loss and damage associated
7 with the adverse effects of climate change, including
8 extreme weather events and slow onset events, and
9 the role of sustainable development in reducing the
10 risk of loss and damage.”. Such adverse effects in-
11 clude strong winds from hurricanes and tropical
12 storms, and flooding from storm surges and heavy
13 rain, that inflict losses on various sectors of the
14 United States economy.

15 (26) The Paris Agreement requires that parties
16 “should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing
17 action on adaptation, taking into account the
18 Cancun Adaptation Framework”, which includes
19 measures to enhance understanding, coordination
20 and cooperation with regard to climate change in-
21 duced displacement, migration and planned reloca-
22 tion, where appropriate, at the national, regional
23 and international levels.

24 (27) The Paris Agreement is an example of the
25 multilateral, international cooperation needed to

1 overcome climate change-related challenges facing
 2 the global community, such as reducing emissions,
 3 promoting economic growth, and deploying clean en-
 4 ergy technologies.

5 (28) The Paris Agreement recognizes “the fun-
 6 damental priority of safeguarding food security and
 7 ending hunger, and the particular vulnerabilities of
 8 food production systems to the adverse impacts of
 9 climate change.”.

10 (29) The Paris Agreement recognizes that—

11 (A) adaptation is a global challenge facing
 12 all countries, with local, subnational, national,
 13 regional, and international dimensions; and

14 (B) adapting to the effects of climate
 15 change is a key component of the long-term
 16 global response to climate change to protect
 17 people, livelihoods, and ecosystems.

18 (30) American leadership during the Paris
 19 Agreement negotiations encouraged widespread
 20 international participation in the Paris Agreement.

21 (31) American States, cities, and businesses are
 22 stepping up and pledging to meet the Paris Agree-
 23 ment goals in the wake of absent and uncertain
 24 leadership by the President.

25 (32) The Paris Agreement—

1 (A) has driven innovation in developing
2 cleaner, more reliable, and more affordable
3 forms of energy;

4 (B) has demonstrated that addressing cli-
5 mate change and providing affordable energy to
6 American consumers are not mutually exclusive;
7 and

8 (C) has encouraged the United States to
9 develop the Mid-Century Strategy for Deep
10 Decarbonization, which—

11 (i) was released on November 16,
12 2016; and

13 (ii) states, “Energy efficiency im-
14 provements enable the energy system to
15 provide the services we need with fewer re-
16 sources and emissions. Over the past sev-
17 eral years, the United States has dem-
18 onstrated that programs and standards to
19 improve the energy efficiency of buildings,
20 appliances and vehicles can cost-effectively
21 cut carbon pollution and lower energy bills,
22 while maintaining significant support from
23 U.S. industry and consumers.”.

24 (33) Global temperatures must be kept below
25 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrialized levels to

1 avoid the most severe impacts of a changing climate,
2 which will require—

3 (A) global reductions in greenhouse gas
4 emissions from human sources of 40 to 60 per-
5 cent from 2010 levels by 2030; and

6 (B) net-zero global emissions by 2050.

7 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
8 gress that—

9 (1) when the United States proffers a strong
10 commitment and focused leadership on climate ac-
11 tion, the rest of the world will likely follow its exam-
12 ple;

13 (2) when the United States abdicates leadership
14 on such matters, other countries are likely to waiver
15 on their commitments to action and retract to insu-
16 lar posturing on matters that require cooperation;
17 and

18 (3) in order to avert the worst impacts of cli-
19 mate change, which is in the core national interest
20 of the United States, the United States should—

21 (A) prioritize climate change in its foreign
22 policy, and ensure that climate change is taken
23 into account in all foreign policy decision mak-
24 ing;

1 (B) set the standard for ambition on cli-
2 mate action;

3 (C) use its diplomatic leverage to create in-
4 centives for other countries to take strong ac-
5 tion on climate change;

6 (D) broker, with other world powers, bilat-
7 eral commitments on emissions reductions and
8 climate finance and support for developing
9 countries, which are critical for—

10 (i) building trust and consensus
11 around global cooperation on climate ac-
12 tion; and

13 (ii) sending important investment sig-
14 nals to private finance and private industry
15 on investment and development trends;

16 (E) be transparent in how the United
17 States is delivering on its commitments;

18 (F) ensure it is adopting and implementing
19 consistent policies and practices with respect to
20 climate change across bilateral and multilateral
21 development finance institutions;

22 (G) hold other world powers accountable
23 for making and meeting strong commitments;

24 (H) call for reciprocal standards of trans-
25 parency; and

1 (I) support developing countries, in an in-
2 clusive manner—

3 (i) to expand deployment and access
4 to clean energy;

5 (ii) to plan and invest in climate
6 change adaptation solutions;

7 (iii) to improve climate change resil-
8 ience capacities; and

9 (iv) to promote—

10 (I) sustainable agriculture prac-
11 tices;

12 (II) food security; and

13 (III) natural resource conserva-
14 tion.

15 **SEC. 3. PURPOSE.**

16 The purpose of this Act is to provide authorities, re-
17 sources, policies, and recommended administrative ac-
18 tions—

19 (1) to restore United States global leadership
20 on addressing the climate crisis and make United
21 States climate action and climate diplomacy a more
22 central tenet of United States foreign policy;

23 (2) to improve the United States commitment
24 to taking more ambitious action to help mitigate
25 global greenhouse gas emission and improve devel-

1 oping countries’ resilience and adaptation capacities
2 to the effects of climate change;

3 (3) to reclaim, accept, and fully engage diplo-
4 macy within a variety of current and outstanding
5 multilateral institutions that the United States has
6 withdrawn, withheld support, or diminished mean-
7 ingful engagement from in recent years;

8 (4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral co-
9 operation agreements with other world powers on
10 initiatives to advance global clean energy innovation
11 and deployment and other measures to mitigate
12 global greenhouse gas emissions and improve climate
13 change adaptation capacities;

14 (5) to ensure that the United States national
15 security apparatus integrates critically important
16 data on the compounding effects that climate change
17 is having on global security risks by enhancing our
18 understanding of how, where, and when such effects
19 are destabilizing countries and regions in ways that
20 may motivate conflict, displacement, and other driv-
21 ers of insecurity; and

22 (6) to authorize funding and programs to sup-
23 port a reaffirmation of the United States commit-
24 ments to international cooperation and support for

1 developing and vulnerable countries to take climate
2 action.

3 **SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.**

4 In this Act:

5 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
6 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
7 mittees” means—

8 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
9 the Senate;

10 (B) the Committee on Appropriations of
11 the Senate;

12 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
13 the House of Representatives; and

14 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of
15 the House of Representatives.

16 (2) CLEAN ENERGY.—The term “clean energy”
17 means—

18 (A) renewable energy and energy from sys-
19 tems;

20 (B) energy production processes that emit
21 zero greenhouse gas emissions, including nu-
22 clear power;

23 (C) systems and processes that capture
24 and permanently store greenhouse gas emis-

sions from fossil fuel production and electricity generation units;

(D) products, processes, facilities, or systems designed to retrofit and improve the energy efficiency and electricity generated from electrical generation units, while using less fuel, less or fewer power production resources, or less feedstocks; and

(E) zero emission vehicles.

(3) CLIMATE ACTION.—The term “climate action” means enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-induced impacts, including—

(A) climate-related hazards in all countries;

(B) integrating climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning; and

(C) improving education, awareness-raising, and human and institutional capacity with respect to climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction, and early warning.

(4) CLIMATE CRISIS.—The term “climate crisis” means the social, economic, health, safety, and security impacts on people, and the threats to bio-

1 diversity and natural ecosystem health, which are at-
2 tributable to the wide-variety of effects on global en-
3 vironmental and atmospheric conditions as a result
4 of disruptions to the Earth’s climate from anthropo-
5 genic activities that generate greenhouse gas emis-
6 sions or reduce natural resource capacities to absorb
7 and regulate atmospheric carbon.

8 (5) CLIMATE DIPLOMACY.—The term “climate
9 diplomacy” means methods of influencing the deci-
10 sions and behavior of foreign governments and peo-
11 ples through dialogue, negotiation, cooperation and
12 other measures short of war or violence around
13 issues related to addressing global climate change,
14 including—

15 (A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas
16 emissions;

17 (B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of
18 scientific data and information on the cause
19 and effects of climate change;

20 (C) the security, social, economic, and po-
21 litical instability risks associated with the ef-
22 fects of climate change;

23 (D) economic cooperation efforts and trade
24 matters that are related to or associated with

1 climate change and greenhouse gas mitigation
 2 from the global economy;

3 (E) building resilience capacities and
 4 adapting to the effects of change;

5 (F) sustainable land use and natural re-
 6 source conservation;

7 (G) accounting for loss and damage attrib-
 8 uted to the effects of climate change;

9 (H) just transition of carbon intense
 10 economies to low or zero carbon economies and
 11 accounting for laborers within affected econo-
 12 mies; and

13 (I) technological innovations that reduce or
 14 eliminate carbon emissions.

15 (6) CLIMATE SECURITY.—The term “climate
 16 security” means the effects of climate change on—

17 (A) United States national security con-
 18 cerns and subnational, national, and regional
 19 political stability; and

20 (B) overseas security and conflict situa-
 21 tions that are potentially exacerbated by dy-
 22 namic environmental factors and events, includ-
 23 ing—

1 (i) the intensification and frequency of
 2 droughts, floods, wildfires, tropical storms,
 3 and other extreme weather events;

4 (ii) changes in historical severe weath-
 5 er, drought, and wildfire patterns;

6 (iii) the expansion of geographical
 7 ranges of droughts, floods, and wildfires
 8 into regions that had not regularly experi-
 9 enced such phenomena;

10 (iv) global sea level rise patterns and
 11 the expansion of geographical ranges af-
 12 fected by drought; and

13 (v) changes in marine environments
 14 that effect critical geostrategic waterways,
 15 such as the Arctic Ocean, the South China
 16 Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, the Barents
 17 Sea, and the Beaufort Sea.

18 (7) NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBU-
 19 TION.—The term “nationally determined contribu-
 20 tion” means a country’s pledged efforts to reduce
 21 national greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the
 22 effects of climate change, which may include a finan-
 23 cial pledge of support or financing to assist devel-
 24 oping countries achieve their climate action goals, in

1 accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the
2 Paris Agreement, which requires each Party—

3 (A) to “prepare, communicate and main-
4 tain successive nationally determined contribu-
5 tions that it intends to achieve”; and

6 (B) to “pursue domestic mitigation meas-
7 ures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of
8 such contributions”.

9 (8) NATURAL CLIMATE SOLUTIONS.—The term
10 “natural climate solutions” mean actions to protect,
11 sustainably manage, and restore natural or modified
12 ecosystems that—

13 (A) address climate change effectively and
14 adaptively; and

15 (B) simultaneously provide human well-
16 being and environmental benefits.

17 (9) NATURAL RESOURCES.—The term “natural
18 resources” means the terrestrial, freshwater, estua-
19 rine, and marine fish, wildlife, plants, land, air,
20 water, habitats, and ecosystems.

21 (10) NET ZERO GREENHOUSE GAS EMIS-
22 SIONS.—The term “net zero greenhouse gas emis-
23 sions” means that any anthropogenic greenhouse gas
24 emissions are balanced or offset by deliberate activi-
25 ties that absorb or capture and permanently store

1 equivalent amounts of greenhouse gases from the at-
2 mosphere.

3 (11) PARIS AGREEMENT.—The term “Paris
4 Agreement” means the international agreement
5 adopted by parties to the United Nations Frame-
6 work Convention on Climate Change’s 21st Con-
7 ference of Parties in Paris, France on December 12,
8 2015.

9 (12) RENEWABLE ENERGY.—The term “renew-
10 able energy” means all forms of energy produced
11 from sources that naturally occur or are replenished
12 in nature in a sustainable manner, including bio-
13 energy, geothermal energy, hydropower, ocean en-
14 ergy, solar energy, and wind energy.

15 (13) RESILIENCE.—The term “resilience”
16 means the ability of human made and natural sys-
17 tems (including their component parts) to anticipate,
18 absorb, cope, accommodate, or recover from the ef-
19 fects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient
20 manner, including through ensuring the preserva-
21 tion, restoration, or improvement of its essential
22 basic structures and functions.

23 (14) UNFCCC.—The term “UNFCCC” means
24 the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-

mate Change, done at New York May 9, 1992, and entered into force March 21, 1994.

(15) UNITED STATES-MEXICO-CANADA AGREEMENT; USMCA.—The terms “United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement” and “USMCA” mean the Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada, done at Buenos Aires November 30, 2018.

TITLE I—CLIMATE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

SEC. 101. CLIMATE DIPLOMACY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President and the Secretary of State shall prioritize climate action and climate diplomacy in United States foreign policy by—

(1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and inter-agency coordination for bilateral and multilateral actions to address the climate crisis; and

(2) improving coordination and integration of climate action across all bureaus and United States missions abroad.

(b) CLIMATE ACTION INTEGRATION.—The Secretary of State, through the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and any other designees, shall—

1 (1) prioritize climate action and clean energy
2 within the bureaus and offices under the leadership
3 of the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, En-
4 ergy, and the Environment;

5 (2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are co-
6 ordinating with other bureaus of the Department of
7 State regarding the integration of climate action and
8 climate diplomacy as a cross-cutting imperative
9 across the Department of State;

10 (3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State—

11 (A) to assess how issues related to climate
12 change and United States climate action are in-
13 tegrated into their operations and programs;

14 (B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and
15 diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action;
16 and

17 (C) to make available the technical assist-
18 ance and resources of the bureaus and offices
19 with relevant expertise to provide technical as-
20 sistance and expert support to other bureaus
21 within the Department of State regarding cli-
22 mate action, clean energy development, and cli-
23 mate diplomacy;

24 (4) manage the integration of scientific data on
25 the current and anticipated effects of climate change

1 into applied strategies and diplomatic engagements
2 across programmatic and regional bureaus of the
3 Department of State and into the Department of
4 State’s decision-making processes;

5 (5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices
6 provide appropriate technical support and re-
7 sources—

8 (A) to the President, the Secretary of
9 State, and their respective designees charged
10 with addressing climate change and associated
11 issues;

12 (B) to United States diplomats advancing
13 United States foreign policy related to climate
14 action; and

15 (C) for the appropriate engagement and
16 integration of relevant domestic agencies in
17 international climate change affairs, including
18 United States participation in multilateral fora;
19 and

20 (6) carry out other activities, as directed by the
21 Secretary of State, that advance United States cli-
22 mate-related foreign policy objectives, including glob-
23 al greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change adapta-
24 tion activities, and global climate security.

1 (c) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
2 OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS.—The Under Sec-
3 retary of State for Political Affairs shall ensure that all
4 foreign missions are—

5 (1) advancing United States bilateral climate
6 diplomacy;

7 (2) engaging strategically on opportunities for
8 bilateral climate action cooperation with foreign gov-
9 ernments; and

10 (3) utilizing the technical resources and coordi-
11 nating adequately with the bureaus reporting to the
12 Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, En-
13 ergy and the Environment.

14 (d) REPORT.—Not later than 200 days after the date
15 of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State
16 for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in
17 cooperation with the Under Secretary of State for Political
18 Affairs, shall submit a report to the appropriate congres-
19 sional committees that—

20 (1) assesses how climate action and United
21 States climate diplomacy is integrated across the
22 Bureaus of the Department of State; and

23 (2) includes recommendations on strategies to
24 improve cross bureau coordination and under-

1 standing of United States climate action and climate
2 diplomacy.

3 (e) EFFECT OF ELIMINATION OF POSITIONS.—If the
4 positions of Under Secretary of State for Economic
5 Growth, Energy, and the Environment and the Under Sec-
6 retary of State for Political Affairs are eliminated or un-
7 dergo name changes, the responsibilities of such Under
8 Secretaries under this section shall be reassigned to other
9 Under Secretaries of State, as appropriate.

10 (f) CLIMATE CHANGE EXPERTS IN KEY EMBAS-
11 SIES.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the en-
12 actment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit
13 a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
14 Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
15 House of Representatives that—

16 (1) identifies the number of personnel of the
17 Department of State and the United States Agency
18 for International Development who—

19 (A) dedicate a significant portion of their
20 work to climate change mitigation, climate
21 change adaptation, food security, or clean en-
22 ergy matters; and

23 (B) are stationed at United States mis-
24 sions in countries that are highly vulnerable to
25 the effects or major greenhouse gas emitters;

1 (2) analyzes the need for Federal climate
2 change policy specialist personnel in United States
3 embassies, United States Agency for International
4 Development missions, and other United States dip-
5 lomatic and international development missions; and

6 (3) includes—

7 (A) recommendations for increasing cli-
8 mate change expertise within United States
9 missions abroad among foreign service officers;
10 and

11 (B) options for assigning to such missions
12 climate change attachés from the Environ-
13 mental Protection Agency, the Department of
14 Energy, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
15 Administration, the National Aeronautics and
16 Space Administration, the Department of Agri-
17 culture, the Department of the Interior, or
18 other relevant Federal agencies.

19 (g) CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORS.—The Secretary of
20 State, or the Secretary’s designee, shall have primary re-
21 sponsibility for the management and execution of United
22 States climate diplomacy and related foreign policy and
23 shall make appropriate arrangements with the Adminis-
24 trator of the United States Agency for International De-
25 velopment, the Administrator of the Environmental Pro-

1 tection Agency, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of
2 Agriculture, the Administrator of the National Oceanic
3 and Atmospheric Administration, the Administrator of the
4 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and
5 other relevant Federal agencies and departments to assign
6 personnel from such agencies and departments to serve
7 as dedicated advisors on climate change matters in embas-
8 sies of the United States or in other United States diplo-
9 matic or international development missions.

10 (h) CLIMATE CHANGE SUPPORT AND FINANCING.—

11 The Secretary of State shall facilitate the coordination
12 among the Department of State and other relevant depart-
13 ments and agencies, including the United States Agency
14 for International Development, the Department of the
15 Treasury, the United States Trade and Development
16 Agency, and the United States International Development
17 Finance Corporation, of contributing development finance
18 or foreign assistance relevant to United States inter-
19 national climate action and in support of United States
20 climate diplomacy.

21 (i) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
22 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
23 necessary to carry out this section.

1 **SEC. 102. ENHANCING UNITED STATES SECURITY CONSID-**
 2 **ERATIONS FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE DISRUP-**
 3 **TIONS.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in con-
 5 sultation with other relevant agencies, shall conduct bien-
 6 nial comprehensive evaluations of present and ongoing dis-
 7 ruptions to the global climate system, including—

8 (1) the intensity, frequency, and range of nat-
 9 ural disasters;

10 (2) the scarcity of global natural resources, in-
 11 cluding fresh water;

12 (3) global food, health, and energy insecurities;

13 (4) conditions that contribute to—

14 (A) intrastate and interstate conflicts;

15 (B) foreign political and economic insta-
 16 bility;

17 (C) international migration of vulnerable
 18 and underserved populations;

19 (D) the failure of national governments;

20 and

21 (E) gender-based violence; and

22 (5) United States and allied military readiness,
 23 operations, and strategy.

24 (b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the evaluations con-
 25 ducted under subsection (a) are—

1 (1) to support the practical application of sci-
2 entific data and research on climate change’s dy-
3 namic effects around the world to improve resilience,
4 adaptability, security, and stability despite growing
5 global environmental risks and changes;

6 (2) to ensure that the strategic planning and
7 mission execution of United States international de-
8 velopment and diplomatic missions adequately ac-
9 count for heightened and dynamic risks and chal-
10 lenges associated with the effects of climate change;

11 (3) to improve coordination between United
12 States science agencies conducting research and
13 forecasts on the causes and effects of climate change
14 and United States national security agencies;

15 (4) to better understand the disproportionate
16 effects of global climate disruptions on women, girls,
17 indigenous communities, and other historically
18 marginalized populations; and

19 (5) to inform the development of the climate se-
20 curity strategy described in subsection (d).

21 (c) SCOPE.—The evaluations conducted under sub-
22 section (a) shall—

23 (1) examine developing countries’ vulnerabilities
24 and risks associated with global, regional, and local-
25 ized effects of climate change; and

(2) assess and make recommendations on necessary measures to mitigate risks and reduce vulnerabilities associated with effects, including—

(A) sea level rise;

(B) freshwater resource scarcity;

(C) wildfires; and

(D) increased intensity and frequency of extreme weather conditions and events, such as flooding, drought, and extreme storm events, including tropical cyclones.

(d) CLIMATE SECURITY STRATEGY.—The Secretary shall use the evaluations required under subsection (a)—

(1) to inform the development and implementation of a climate security strategy for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, embassies, consulates, regional bureaus, and other offices and programs operating chief of mission authority, including those with roles in conflict avoidance, prevention and security assistance, or humanitarian disaster response, prevention, and assistance; and

(2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, develop, budget for, and (upon approval) implement plans, policies, and actions—

1 (A) to account for the impacts of climate
2 change to global human health, safety, govern-
3 ance, oceans, food production, fresh water and
4 other critical natural resources, settlements, in-
5 frastructure, marginalized groups, and eco-
6 nomic activity;

7 (B) to evaluate the climate change vulner-
8 ability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of
9 United States interests and non-defense assets
10 abroad;

11 (C) to coordinate the integration of climate
12 change risk and vulnerability assessments into
13 all foreign policy and security decision-making
14 processes, including awarding foreign assist-
15 ance;

16 (D) to evaluate specific risks to certain re-
17 gions and countries that are—

18 (i) vulnerable to the effects of climate
19 change; and

20 (ii) strategically significant to the
21 United States;

22 (E) to enhance the resilience capacities of
23 foreign countries to the effects of climate
24 change as a means of reducing the risks of con-
25 flict and instability;

1 (F) to advance principles of good govern-
2 ance by encouraging foreign governments, par-
3 ticularly nations that are least capable of cop-
4 ing with the effects of climate change—

5 (i) to conduct climate security evalua-
6 tions; and

7 (ii) to facilitate the development of cli-
8 mate security action plans to ensure sta-
9 bility and public safety in disaster situa-
10 tions in a humane and responsible fashion;

11 (G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security,
12 susceptibility, and resiliency of United States
13 interests and nondefense assets abroad;

14 (H) to build international institutional ca-
15 pacity to address climate security implications
16 and to advance United States interests, regional
17 stability, and global security; and

18 (I) other activities that advance—

19 (i) the utilization and integration of
20 climate science in national security plan-
21 ning; and

22 (ii) the clear understanding of how
23 the effects of climate change can exacer-
24 bate security risks and threats.

1 **SEC. 103. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.**

2 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
3 gress that—

4 (1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment—

5 (A) creates new national and regional secu-
6 rity challenges due to increased military activity
7 in the Arctic;

8 (B) heightens the risks of potential con-
9 flicts spilling over into the Arctic region from
10 interventions and theaters of tension in other
11 regions of the world;

12 (C) threatens maritime safety due to inad-
13 equate regional resource capacity to patrol the
14 increase in vessel traffic this remote region is
15 experiencing from the growing expanses of open
16 Arctic water from diminished annual levels of
17 sea ice;

18 (D) impacts public safety due to increased
19 human activity in the Arctic region where
20 search and rescue capacity remains very lim-
21 ited; and

22 (E) threatens the health of the Arctic's
23 fragile and historically pristine environment and
24 the unique and highly sensitive species found in
25 the Arctic's marine and terrestrial ecosystems;
26 and

1 (2) the United States should reduce the con-
2 sequences outlined in paragraph (1) by—

3 (A) carefully evaluating the wide variety
4 and extremely dynamic set of security and safe-
5 ty risks unfolding in the Arctic;

6 (B) developing policies and making prep-
7 arations for mitigating and responding to
8 threats and risks in the Arctic;

9 (C) adequately funding the National Earth
10 System Prediction Capability to substantively
11 improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on
12 time scales necessary for ensuring regional se-
13 curity and trans-Arctic shipping;

14 (D) investing in resources, including a sig-
15 nificantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure
16 that the United States has adequate capacity to
17 prevent and respond to security threats in the
18 Arctic region; and

19 (E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with
20 all nations in the Arctic region to reach an
21 agreement for—

22 (i) maintaining peace and stability in
23 the Arctic region; and

1 (ii) fostering cooperation on steward-
2 ship and safety initiatives in the Arctic re-
3 gion.

4 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

5 (1) ARCTIC NATIONS.—The term “Arctic Na-
6 tions” means the 8 nations with territory or exclu-
7 sive economic zones that extend north of the
8 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator,
9 namely Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway,
10 Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden,
11 and Iceland.

12 (2) ARCTIC REGION.—The term “Arctic Re-
13 gion” means the geographic region north of the
14 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator.

15 (c) DESIGNATION.—The Assistant Secretary of State
16 for Oceans and International Environmental and Sci-
17 entific Affairs shall designate a deputy assistant secretary
18 serving within the Bureau of Oceans and International
19 Environmental and Scientific Affairs as “Deputy Assist-
20 ant Secretary for Arctic Affairs”, who shall be responsible
21 for affairs in the Arctic Region.

22 (d) DUTIES.— The Deputy Assistant Secretary for
23 Arctic Affairs shall—

1 (1) facilitate the development and coordination
2 of United States foreign policy in the Arctic Region
3 relating to—

4 (A) meeting national security needs;

5 (B) protecting the Arctic environment and
6 conserving its biological resources;

7 (C) promoting environmentally sustainable
8 natural resource management and economic de-
9 velopment;

10 (D) strengthening institutions for coopera-
11 tion among the Arctic Nations;

12 (E) involving Arctic indigenous people in
13 decisions that affect them; and

14 (F) enhancing scientific monitoring and re-
15 search on local, regional, and global environ-
16 mental issues;

17 (2) coordinate the diplomatic objectives, and, as
18 appropriate, represent the United States within mul-
19 tilateral fora that address international cooperation
20 and foreign policy matters in the Arctic Region;

21 (3) help inform transnational commerce and
22 commercial maritime transit in the Arctic Region;

23 (4) coordinate the integration of scientific data
24 on the current and projected effects of climate
25 change on the Arctic Region and ensure that such

1 data is applied to the development of security strate-
2 gies for the Arctic Region;

3 (5) make available the methods and approaches
4 on the integration of climate science to other re-
5 gional security planning programs in the Depart-
6 ment of State to better ensure that broader decision-
7 making processes may more adequately account for
8 the effects of climate change;

9 (6) serve as a key point of contact for other
10 Federal agencies, including the Department of De-
11 fense, the Department of the Interior, the Depart-
12 ment of Homeland Security, and the Intelligence
13 Community, on Arctic Region security issues;

14 (7) develop and facilitate the implementation of
15 an Arctic Region Security Policy in accordance with
16 subsection (f);

17 (8) use the voice, vote, and influence of the
18 United States to encourage other countries and
19 international multilateral organizations to support
20 the principles of the Arctic Region Security Policy
21 implemented pursuant to subsection (f); and

22 (9) perform such other duties and exercise such
23 powers as the Assistant Secretary of State for
24 Oceans and International Environmental and Sci-

1 entific Affairs and the Secretary of State shall pre-
2 scribe.

3 (e) RANK AND STATUS.—The Secretary of State may
4 change the title of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arc-
5 tic Affairs designated under subsection (c) to Special Rep-
6 resentative or Special Envoy with the rank of Ambassador
7 if—

8 (1) the President nominates the person so des-
9 ignated to that rank and status; and

10 (2) the Senate confirms such person to such
11 rank and status.

12 (f) ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY.—The Arctic
13 Region Security Policy shall include requirements for the
14 Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Bu-
15 reau of Political-Military Affairs, embassies, regional bu-
16 reaus, and other offices with a role in conflict avoidance,
17 prevention and security assistance, or humanitarian dis-
18 aster response, prevention, and assistance to assess, de-
19 velop, budget for, and implement plans, policies, and ac-
20 tions—

21 (1) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic
22 Nations to the effects of climate change and in-
23 creased civilian and military activity from Arctic Na-
24 tions and other nations that may result from in-
25 creased accessibility of the Arctic Region due to de-

1 creased sea ice, warmer ambient air temperatures
2 and other effects of climate change, as a means of
3 reducing the risk of conflict and instability;

4 (2) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic
5 Region and Arctic Nations that—

6 (A) are vulnerable to the effects of climate
7 change; and

8 (B) are strategically significant to the
9 United States;

10 (3) to account for the impacts on human
11 health, safety, stresses, reliability, food production,
12 fresh water and other critical natural resources, and
13 economic activity;

14 (4) to coordinate the integration of climate
15 change risk and vulnerability assessments into the
16 decision-making process on foreign assistance
17 awards to Arctic Nations;

18 (5) to advance principles of good governance by
19 encouraging and cooperating with Arctic Nations on
20 collaborative approaches—

21 (A) to sustainably manage natural re-
22 sources in the Arctic Region;

23 (B) to share the burden of ensuring mari-
24 time safety in the Arctic Region;

1 (C) to prevent the escalation of security
 2 tensions by mitigating against the militarization
 3 of the Arctic Region;

4 (D) to develop mutually agreed upon mul-
 5 tilateral policies among Arctic Nations on the
 6 management of maritime transit routes through
 7 the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the
 8 transit policies for access to and transit in the
 9 Arctic Region by non-Arctic Nations; and

10 (E) to facilitate the development of Arctic
 11 Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability
 12 and public safety in disaster situations in a hu-
 13 mane and responsible fashion; and

14 (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, sus-
 15 ceptibility, and resiliency of United States interests
 16 and nondefense assets in the Arctic Region.

17 **TITLE II—INTERNATIONAL**
 18 **AGREEMENTS AND CONVEN-**
 19 **TIONS**

20 **SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF THE**
 21 **UNITED STATES RETURNING TO THE PARIS**
 22 **AGREEMENT.**

23 It is the sense of Congress that—

24 (1) President Trump’s decision to withdraw the
 25 United States from the Paris Agreement was a mis-

1 take that harmed the leadership, economic, national
2 security, and diplomatic interests of the United
3 States;

4 (2) the United States expeditious return to the
5 Paris Agreement is a critical first step to restoring
6 United States leadership among, and in cooperation
7 with, the international community;

8 (3) resuming United States global leadership in
9 the Paris Agreement's implementation process is
10 critical to ensuring that the rules and procedures for
11 implementing the Paris Agreement achieve max-
12 imum benefits for the United States;

13 (4) prioritizing the immediate preparation and
14 communication of an updated United States nation-
15 ally determined contribution in support of the Paris
16 Agreement will demonstrate a renewed and increas-
17 ingly ambitious United States commitment to cli-
18 mate action, which should incorporate—

19 (A) strategies for achieving domestic
20 greenhouse gas emissions reductions that
21 achieve the United States 2015 national deter-
22 mined contribution to the Paris Agreement;

23 (B) an ambitious 2030 mitigation target
24 representing a mid-term goal that signifies the
25 emission reductions trajectory the United

1 States needs to be on to achieve net-zero green-
2 house gas emissions by 2050;

3 (C) commitments to engage constructively
4 with parties to the Paris Agreement regarding
5 the development of strategies to secure ambi-
6 tious commitments from all parties and to en-
7 sure adequate progress on mitigating green-
8 houses sufficiently to prevent 1.5 degree Celsius
9 increase of warming;

10 (D) announced intentions of the United
11 States to accept and fulfill United States obli-
12 gations to other international agreements to re-
13 duce global greenhouse gas emissions, including
14 the International Civil Aviation Organization's
15 Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme for Inter-
16 national Aviation and the Kigali Amendment to
17 the Montreal Protocol;

18 (E) an intention to resume the United
19 States cooperation and support for cooperative
20 climate action detailed and announced in var-
21 ious climate change communiques produced by
22 the G7, the G20, the Arctic Council, the United
23 Nations, and others for which the United States
24 has recently abstained;

1 (F) a platform and policy incentives for
2 the United States private sector, and State and
3 local governments to accurately account for
4 their contributions to reduce greenhouse gas
5 emissions;

6 (G) a new, increased contribution pledge to
7 the Green Climate Fund, and contributions to
8 other complementary multilateral funds;

9 (H) a commitment to resume a leadership
10 role within the Green Climate Fund to achieve
11 accountability, transparency, and management
12 reforms; and

13 (I) other activities that advance United
14 States climate-related foreign policy objectives,
15 including global greenhouse gas mitigation, cli-
16 mate change adaptation activities, and global
17 climate security;

18 (5) United States collaboration with other na-
19 tions, especially developing countries most impacted
20 by the need to transition carbon intensive industrial
21 sectors, and the workforces of these affected indus-
22 tries, on the global transition to environmentally sus-
23 tainable economies and societies to ensure workers
24 benefit from opportunities that arise in a transition

1 to economies powered by clean energy, including en-
2 gagements on—

3 (A) realizing the potential to create signifi-
4 cant net gains in employment opportunities
5 through increases in the number of decent jobs
6 through investments in environmentally sustain-
7 able production and consumption and manage-
8 ment of natural resources;

9 (B) improving the quality of jobs and in-
10 creased incomes on a large scale from more
11 productive processes, and environmentally sus-
12 tainable products and services in sectors such
13 as agriculture, renewable energy, transport,
14 construction, recycling, and tourism;

15 (C) social inclusion through improved ac-
16 cess to affordable, environmentally sustainable
17 energy and payments for environmental serv-
18 ices, which are of particular relevance to women
19 and residents in rural areas who face more eco-
20 nomic challenges;

21 (D) protections from the effects of eco-
22 nomic restructuring that would otherwise result
23 in the displacement of workers and possible job
24 losses;

1 (E) training and access to new job oppor-
 2 tunities attributable to new environmentally
 3 sustainable and clean energy powered enter-
 4 prises and workplaces;

5 (F) attracting new environmentally sus-
 6 tainable and clean energy powered enterprises
 7 and workplaces to communities transitioning to
 8 low carbon economies and assist with adapting
 9 to climate change to avoid loss of assets and
 10 livelihoods and involuntary migration; and

11 (G) avoiding adverse effects on the incomes
 12 of poor households from higher energy and
 13 commodity prices; and

14 (6) the United States should communicate its
 15 intention to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emis-
 16 sions by 2050.

17 **SEC. 202. ENHANCED UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO**
 18 **THE PARIS AGREEMENT.**

19 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING NEED FOR UP-
 20 DATED UNITED STATES NATIONALLY DETERMINED CON-
 21 TRIBUTION.—It is the sense of Congress that—

22 (1) all parties determine their voluntary con-
 23 tributions to the Paris Agreement, in accordance
 24 with Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement;

1 (2) the development and submission of a new
 2 United States nationally determined contribution
 3 should be prioritized, in accordance with Article 4.9
 4 of the Paris Agreement;

5 (3) the new United States nationally deter-
 6 mined contribution should—

7 (A) represent an ambitious 2030 target, in
 8 accordance with Articles 4.2 and 4.3 of the
 9 Paris Agreement; and

10 (B) put the United States on an appro-
 11 prium trajectory towards achieving net zero
 12 greenhouse gas emissions by 2050; and

13 (4) the plan required under subsection (b)
 14 should—

15 (A) be developed in accordance with Article
 16 4.13 of the Paris Agreement;

17 (B) inform United States obligations under
 18 Article 13.7 of the Paris Agreement; and

19 (C) clearly demonstrate how the United
 20 States will achieve the target referred to in
 21 paragraph (3).

22 (b) PLAN FOR DEVELOPING THE UNITED STATES
 23 NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION.—At least 20
 24 days before the United States submits a new or provisional
 25 nationally determined contribution, the President shall

1 consult with, and provide embargoed drafts of the nation-
2 ally determined contribution to, the appropriate congres-
3 sional committees.

4 (c) PUBLIC TRANSPARENCY.—The President shall
5 make available to the public a plan for the United States
6 to meet its nationally determined contribution, which shall
7 include—

8 (1) ambitious, economy-wide, short-term green-
9 house gas emissions reductions targets for 2025 and
10 2030, with relevant addenda to the plan following its
11 initial submission;

12 (2) considerations made for populations, re-
13 gions, industries, and constituencies that could be
14 affected by actions to meet the targets described in
15 paragraph (1) and the failure to meet such targets,
16 including the effect of such actions on—

17 (A) United States jobs, wages, and pay;

18 (B) the cost of energy (such as electricity
19 and gasoline) for consumers; and

20 (C) the ability to develop and deploy new,
21 innovative, domestically produced technologies;

22 (3) a description of how the United States may
23 use—

24 (A) multilateral and bilateral diplomatic
25 tools, in addition to the expert committee estab-

1 lished under Article 15 of the Paris Agreement,
 2 to encourage and assist other parties to the
 3 Paris Agreement to fulfill their announced con-
 4 tributions; and

5 (B) the mechanisms under Articles 12 and
 6 13 of the Paris Agreement to urge enhanced ac-
 7 tions from other parties to achieve the overall
 8 objectives of the Paris Agreement;

9 (4) a description of how the Paris Agreement’s
 10 loss and damage provisions would affect infrastruc-
 11 ture resiliency in the United States;

12 (5) a coherent and stable policy framework for
 13 sustainable enterprise development and decent work
 14 opportunities for all United States residents that—

15 (A) is developed through engagement in
 16 social dialogue, particularly in—

17 (i) communities that have historically
 18 experienced environmental injustice; and

19 (ii) communities with economies that
 20 are heavily dependent on fossil fuel produc-
 21 tion or consumption; and

22 (B) maintains such social dialogue, in line
 23 with international labor standards—

24 (i) at all stages, from policy design to
 25 implementation and evaluation; and

1 (ii) at all levels, from the national
2 level to the enterprise; and

3 (6) an accounting of other relevant activities
4 that advance United States foreign policy objectives
5 of—

6 (A) advancing global greenhouse gas miti-
7 gation;

8 (B) supporting climate change adaptation
9 activities; and

10 (C) improving global climate security.

11 (d) EDUCATION AND PUBLIC AWARENESS.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The plan developed under
13 subsection (c) shall be consistent with Article 12 of
14 the Paris Agreement, which states “Parties shall co-
15 operate in taking measures, as appropriate, to en-
16 hance climate change education, training, public
17 awareness, public participation and public access to
18 information, recognizing the importance of these
19 steps with respect to enhancing actions under this
20 Agreement.”.

21 (2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this
22 Act may be construed to require or prohibit the
23 President from including in the plan developed
24 under subsection (b), consistent with the prohibition
25 described in section 438 of the General Education

1 Provisions Act (20 U.S.C. 1232a), recommendations
2 to support State and local educational agencies, in
3 integrating instruction on human-caused climate
4 change and the societal, environmental, and eco-
5 nomic effects of such climate change into curricula
6 taught in elementary and secondary schools under
7 the control of such State and local educational agen-
8 cies, in order to meet the goals and ambitions of the
9 Paris Agreement to ensure climate education and
10 awareness in schools.

11 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE ACCOUNT-
12 ABILITY OF PARTIES TO THE PARIS AGREEMENT.—It is
13 the sense of Congress that the United States shall use its
14 diplomatic leverage and the mechanisms of the Paris
15 Agreement that promote transparency, reporting, and ac-
16 countability among parties to seek to play critical leader-
17 ship roles on the Paris Agreement’s critical working
18 groups, subsidiary bodies, and constituted bodies—

19 (1) to maximize the United States ability to
20 hold other parties accountable for meeting the com-
21 mitments to the Paris Agreement; and

22 (2) to ensure that all parties commit to and
23 meet ambitious greenhouse gas emissions reductions
24 targets.

1 **SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING RATIFICATION**
2 **OF THE KIGALI AMENDMENT TO THE MON-**
3 **TREAL PROTOCOL.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

5 (1) The chemical refrigerant alternative,
6 hydrofluorocarbon (HFC), and its chemical deriva-
7 tives identified in Annex F of the Montreal Protocol
8 on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done
9 at Montreal September 16, 1987, which replaced
10 hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC) and
11 chlorofluorocarbon (CFC), are short-lived and highly
12 potent greenhouse gases.

13 (2) Some HFCs are 4,000 times more potent
14 greenhouse gases than carbon dioxide. The expan-
15 sion of mass production and worldwide use of HFCs
16 have significantly contributed to the recent wors-
17 ening of the global climate crisis.

18 (3) In October 15, 2016, the parties at the
19 28th Meeting of Parties to the Montreal Protocol,
20 with the support of the United States, adopted an
21 amendment (referred to in the Act as the “Kigali
22 Amendment”) to the Montreal Protocol to globally
23 phase down the production and application of
24 hydrofluorocarbons, most commonly used as refrig-
25 erants in air conditioners and for cold storage.

1 (4) The Kigali Amendment calls for parties to
2 cut the production and consumption of HFCs by
3 more than 80 percent during a 30-year period—

4 (A) to eliminate an estimated
5 80,000,000,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide
6 equivalent emissions by 2050; and

7 (B) to avoid up to 0.5 degree Celsius
8 warming by the end of the century, while con-
9 tinuing to protect the ozone layer.

10 (5) United States ratification of the Kigali
11 Amendment will require the advice and consent of
12 the Senate. There is broad bipartisan support for
13 the Kigali Amendment in the Senate, as evidenced
14 by a letter sent by 13 Republican senators to the
15 President on June 4, 2018, urging the President to
16 submit the Kigali Amendment to the Senate for ad-
17 vice and consent.

18 (6) The Environmental Protection Agency re-
19 ceived sufficient domestic legal authority to comply
20 with the international obligations of the Kigali
21 Amendment under title II of the Department of the
22 Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appro-
23 priations Act, 2021 (division G of Public Law 116–
24 260), which was enacted on December 27, 2020.

1 (7) As of the date of the introduction of the
2 Act, the President has not submitted the Kigali
3 Amendment to the Senate for advice and consent
4 and the United States Government has neither rati-
5 fied nor implemented policies to comply with the
6 Kigali Amendment.

7 (8) The Kigali Amendment, which has been
8 ratified by 100 parties, entered into force on Janu-
9 ary 1, 2019.

10 (9) Adoption of the Kigali Amendment and
11 United States ratification of and compliance with
12 the Kigali Amendment is supported broadly by af-
13 fected industry stakeholders and environmental pub-
14 lic interest organizations.

15 (10) Industries in the United States that use
16 and produce fluorocarbons—

17 (A) contribute more than
18 \$158,000,000,000 annually in goods and serv-
19 ices to the economy of the United States; and

20 (B) employ more than 700,000 individuals,
21 with an annual industry-wide payroll of more
22 than \$32,000,000,000.

23 (11) Foreign competitors to United States
24 chemical refrigerant and refrigeration equipment
25 based and operating in countries that have ratified

1 the Kigali Amendment and are implementing policies
2 in compliance with the Kigali Amendment are gain-
3 ing an advantage on United States based industries
4 in the manufacturing and used of next-generation
5 chemicals and equipment.

6 (12) The United States ratification of the
7 Kigali Amendment—

8 (A) would support and promote the techno-
9 logical leadership of the United States indus-
10 tries to lead global production and marketing of
11 replacement refrigerants and equipment in com-
12 pliance with the Kigali Amendment; and

13 (B) according to industry analysis, would
14 potentially create approximately 33,000 new
15 manufacturing jobs in the United States and
16 add approximately \$12,500,000,000 per year to
17 the economy of the United States.

18 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that—

20 (1) the President should immediately submit
21 the Kigali Amendment to the Senate for advice and
22 consent; and

23 (2) the Senate should promptly provide its ad-
24 vice and consent on the Kigali Amendment.

1 **SEC. 204. COMPLIANCE WITH THE CARBON OFFSET AND**
2 **REDUCTION SCHEME FOR INTERNATIONAL**
3 **AVIATION.**

4 The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Adminis-
5 tration shall promulgate regulations establishing uniform
6 policies and take other necessary actions to implement the
7 terms of the Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme for
8 International Aviation (commonly known as “CORSIA”),
9 which was adopted by International Civil Aviation Organi-
10 zation in October 2016 as Assembly Resolution A39–3,
11 and any amendments to such Resolution with which the
12 United States concurs, as means to secure a single global
13 carbon emissions market-based mechanism to facilitate
14 the participation of operators of civil aircraft of the United
15 States in international aviation.

16 **SEC. 205. SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS.**

17 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

18 (1) HIGH-GWP HFC.—The term “high-GWP
19 HFC” means newly manufactured
20 hydrofluorocarbons with a global warming potential
21 calculated over a 100-year period of greater than
22 150, as described in the Fifth Assessment Report of
23 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

24 (2) SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS.—The
25 term “short-lived climate pollutants” means—

26 (A) black carbon;

1 (B) methane; and

2 (C) high-GWP HFC.

3 (b) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the
4 United States representatives to appropriate international
5 bodies and conferences (including the United Nations En-
6 vironment Programme, the UNFCCC, the Montreal Pro-
7 tocol, the Arctic Council, the Group of 7, the Group of
8 20, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and De-
9 velopment (OECD), the Association of Southeast Asian
10 Nations, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Arc-
11 tic Council, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition on Short-
12 Lived Climate Pollutants, and the Global Alliance for Cli-
13 mate-Smart Agriculture) to use the voice, vote, and influ-
14 ence of the United States, consistent with the broad for-
15 eign policy goals of the United States, to advocate that
16 each such body or conference—

17 (1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to
18 reduce short-lived climate pollutants;

19 (2) invest in and develop alternative energy
20 sources, industrial and agricultural processes, appli-
21 ances, and products to replace sources of short-lived
22 climate pollutants;

23 (3) enhance coordination with the private sec-
24 tor—

1 (A) to increase production and distribution
2 of clean energy alternatives, industrial proc-
3 esses, and products that will replace sources of
4 short-lived climate pollutants;

5 (B) to develop action plans to mitigate
6 short-lived climate pollutants from various pri-
7 vate sector operations;

8 (C) to encourage best technology, methods,
9 and management practices for reducing short-
10 lived climate pollutants;

11 (D) to craft specific financing mechanisms
12 for the incremental costs associated with miti-
13 gating short-live climate pollutants; and

14 (E) to grow economic opportunities and
15 develop markets, as appropriate, for short-lived
16 climate pollutants trading, capture, and other
17 efforts that support economic growth using low
18 and zero carbon energy sources;

19 (4) provide technical assistance to foreign regu-
20 latory authorities and governments to remove unnec-
21 essary barriers to investment in short-lived climate
22 mitigation solutions, including—

23 (A) the use of safe and affordable clean
24 energy;

1 (B) the implementation of policies requir-
2 ing industrial and agricultural best practices for
3 capturing or mitigating the release of methane
4 from extractive, agricultural, and industrial
5 processes; and

6 (C) climate assessment, scientific research,
7 monitoring, and technological development ac-
8 tivities;

9 (5) develop and implement clear, accountable,
10 and metric-based targets to measure the effective-
11 ness of projects described in paragraph (4); and

12 (6) engage international partners in an existing
13 multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish
14 through an international agreement a new multilat-
15 eral forum) to improve global cooperation for—

16 (A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating
17 efforts to reduce short-lived climate pollutants;

18 (B) developing and implementing best
19 practices for phasing out sources of short-lived
20 climate pollutants, including expanding capacity
21 for innovative instruments to mitigate short-
22 lived climate pollutants at the national and sub-
23 national levels of foreign countries, particularly
24 countries with little capacity to reduce green-
25 house gas emissions and deploy clean energy fa-

ilities, and countries that lack sufficient policies to advance such development;

(C) encouraging the development of standards and practices, and increasing transparency and accountability efforts for the reduction of short-lived climate pollutants;

(D) integrating tracking and monitoring systems into industrial processes;

(E) fostering research to improve scientific understanding of—

(i) how high concentrations of short-lived climate pollutants affect human health, safety, and our climate;

(ii) changes in the amount and regional concentrations of black carbon and methane emissions, based on scientific modeling and forecasting;

(iii) effective means to sequester short-lived climate pollutants; and

(iv) other related areas of research the United States representatives deem necessary;

(F) encouraging the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international finance organizations—

1 (i) to prioritize efforts to combat
2 short-lived climate pollutants; and

3 (ii) to enhance transparency by pro-
4 viding sufficient and adequate information
5 to facilitate independent verification of
6 their climate finance reporting;

7 (G) encouraging observers of the Arctic
8 Council (including India and China) to adopt
9 mitigation plans consistent with the findings
10 and recommendations of the Arctic Council's
11 Framework for Action on Black Carbon and
12 Methane;

13 (H) collaborating on technological ad-
14 vances in short-lived climate pollutant mitiga-
15 tion, sequestration and reduction technologies;
16 and

17 (I) advising foreign countries, at both the
18 national and subnational levels, regarding the
19 development and execution of regulatory poli-
20 cies, services, and laws pertaining to reducing
21 the creation and the collection and safe man-
22 agement of short-lived climate pollutants.

23 (c) ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND
24 PARTNERSHIP OF UNITED STATES AGENCIES INVOLVED
25 IN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS.—

1 (1) FINDING.—Congress recognizes the success
2 of the United States Climate Alliance and the green-
3 house gas reduction programs and strategies estab-
4 lished by the Environmental Protection Agency’s
5 Center for Corporate Climate Leadership.

6 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF EFFORTS TO BUILD
7 FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS.—The Secretary of State
8 shall work with the Administrator of the Environ-
9 mental Protection Agency to build partnerships, as
10 appropriate, with the governments of foreign coun-
11 tries and to support international efforts to reduce
12 short-lived climate pollutants and combat climate
13 change.

14 (d) NEGOTIATION OF NEW INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
15 MENTS AND REASSERTION OF TARGETS IN EXISTING
16 AGREEMENTS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of
17 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall sub-
18 mit a report to Congress that—

19 (1) assesses the potential for negotiating new
20 international agreements, new targets within existing
21 international agreements or cooperative bodies, and
22 the creation of a new international forum to mitigate
23 globally short-lived climate pollutants to support the
24 efforts described in subsection (b);

1 (2) describes the provisions that could be in-
2 cluded in such agreements;

3 (3) assesses potential parties to such agree-
4 ments;

5 (4) describes a process for reengaging with
6 Canada and Mexico regarding the methane targets
7 agreed to at the 2016 North American Leaders'
8 Summit; and

9 (5) describes a process for reengaging with the
10 countries of the Arctic Council regarding the meth-
11 ane and black carbon targets that were negotiated in
12 2015 through the Framework for Action.

13 (e) CONSIDERATION OF SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POL-
14 LUTANTS IN NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
15 MENTS.—In negotiating any relevant international agree-
16 ment with any country or countries after the date of the
17 enactment of this Act, the President shall—

18 (1) consider the impact short-lived climate pol-
19 lutants are having on the increase in global average
20 temperatures and the resulting global climate
21 change;

22 (2) consider the effects that climate change is
23 having on the environment; and

1 (3) ensure that the agreement strengthens ef-
 2 forts to eliminate short-lived climate pollutants from
 3 such country or countries.

4 **SEC. 206. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION REGARDING**
 5 **CLEAN TRANSPORTATION AND SUSTAINABLE**
 6 **LAND USE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

8 (1) Agriculture, forestry, and other land use ac-
 9 counted for 24 percent of global greenhouse gas
 10 emissions during 2010, which—

11 (A) is caused primarily from agriculture
 12 (cultivation of crops and livestock) and defor-
 13 estation; and

14 (B) does not take into account the carbon
 15 dioxide that ecosystems remove from the atmos-
 16 phere by sequestering carbon in biomass, dead
 17 organic matter, and soils, which offset approxi-
 18 mately 20 percent of emissions from this sector.

19 (2) The transportation sector accounts for 14
 20 percent of global gas emissions and 28 percent of
 21 the United States greenhouse gas emissions.

22 (3) According to the National Center for Bio-
 23 technology Information’s report, “National Mitiga-
 24 tion Potential from Natural Climate Solutions in the
 25 Tropics”—

1 (A) better land stewardship is needed to
 2 achieve the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal
 3 of holding the increase of global average tem-
 4 peratures well below 2 degrees Celsius, particu-
 5 larly in the tropics;

6 (B) as countries enhance their nationally
 7 determined contributions, confusion persists
 8 about the potential contribution of better land
 9 stewardship to meeting such goal;

10 (C) in 50 percent of the tropical countries,
 11 cost-effective natural climate solutions could
 12 mitigate more than 50 percent of national emis-
 13 sions;

14 (D) in more than 25 percent of the trop-
 15 ical countries, cost effective natural climate so-
 16 lutions potential is greater than national emis-
 17 sions; and

18 (E) natural climate solutions can trans-
 19 form national economies and contribute to sus-
 20 tainable development goals.

21 (4) According to the International Energy
 22 Agency—

23 (A) global transport emissions increased by
 24 less than 0.5 percent in 2019 (compared with
 25 an average annual increase of 1.9 percent since

1 2000), owing to efficiency improvements, elec-
2 trification, and greater use of biofuels;

3 (B) transportation is responsible for 24
4 percent of direct carbon dioxide emissions from
5 fossil fuel combustion;

6 (C) electric car deployment has grown rap-
7 idly since 2010, with the global stock of electric
8 passenger cars passing 5,000,000 in 2018 (an
9 increase of 63 percent from the previous year);

10 (D) in 2018—

11 (i) approximately 45 percent of all
12 electric cars on the road were in China;

13 (ii) approximately 24 percent of such
14 cars were in Europe; and

15 (iii) approximately 22 percent of such
16 cars were in the United States;

17 (E) existing measures to increase efficiency
18 and reduce energy demand must be deepened
19 and extended for compliance with the Sustain-
20 able Development Scenario of the International
21 Energy Agency’s World Energy Model;

22 (F) prior to the COVID–19 pandemic,
23 emissions from aviation and shipping were in-
24 creasing faster than all other transportation
25 modes; and

1 (G) energy demand and emissions have
2 continued to rise in all modes of road transport
3 (cars, trucks, buses, and 2- and 3-wheelers),
4 particularly in heavy-duty road freight trans-
5 port, which account for 75 percent of global
6 transportation sector emissions.

7 (5) The worldwide market share of sport utility
8 vehicles rose 15 percentage points between 2014 and
9 2019, and now comprises 40 percent of the global
10 light-duty vehicle market.

11 (6) China is the world's largest automobile mar-
12 ket, with more than 23,700,000 light vehicles sold in
13 China in 2018. As China's road network rapidly con-
14 tinues to expand, the number of vehicle miles trav-
15 eled per capita will most likely lead to growth in
16 China's transportation sector carbon dioxide emis-
17 sions.

18 (7) Even with India's advancement of policies
19 to promote electric vehicles and biofuels—

20 (A) India relies heavily on oil, and com-
21 prises 29 percent of India's total energy con-
22 sumption;

23 (B) prior to the COVID-19 pandemic,
24 India was the world's fastest growing aviation

1 market, with passenger numbers for domestic
2 and international flights doubling since 2010;

3 (C) India is planning to build 100 new air-
4 ports between 2020 and 2035, and industry an-
5 alysts have projected up to 520,000,000 Indian
6 air travelers annually by 2037; and

7 (D) the World Health Organization reports
8 that 15 of the cities worldwide with the worst
9 air pollution are in India, largely due to urban
10 vehicle emissions.

11 (8) In 2013, Mexico became the first vehicle
12 market in Latin America to establish fuel economy
13 or carbon dioxide emissions standards.

14 (9) The Department of State, the National
15 Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the En-
16 vironmental Protection Agency do not have a pro-
17 gram in place to encourage other countries to adopt
18 standards that are compatible with United States
19 fuel economy and emissions standards.

20 (10) Many countries adopt European emissions
21 standards rather than United States standards, in
22 part because of European diplomatic engagement,
23 disadvantaging United States automakers in inter-
24 national markets.

1 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
2 United States to partner, consult, and coordinate with for-
3 eign governments, civil society, international financial in-
4 stitutions, subnational communities, agribusiness and
5 automobile industry leaders, and the private sector in a
6 concerted effort—

7 (1) to raise awareness of—

8 (A) the greenhouse gas emission contribu-
9 tions from agriculture, forestry, other land uses,
10 and the transportation sector to the annual
11 total of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions
12 globally; and

13 (B) the importance of working coopera-
14 tively on the development of multi-faceted and
15 country specific policies and strategies—

16 (i) to effectively reduce greenhouse
17 gas emissions from agriculture, forestry,
18 other land uses, and the transportation
19 sector; and

20 (ii) to promote economic growth, op-
21 portunities, sustainable land management,
22 and equitable access to mobility, transpor-
23 tation services, and resources among all
24 populations;

1 (2) to mitigate land use sector emissions
2 through enhanced land use planning, sustainable ag-
3 riculture practices, sustainable forest management,
4 and community-led conservation and development
5 and other natural climate solutions;

6 (3) to use the voice and vote of the United
7 States in multilateral institutions to advance inter-
8 national efforts to advance sustainable land-use
9 planning, climate-smart agriculture, sustainable for-
10 est management, and community-led conservation
11 and development;

12 (4) to improve the reliability and sustainability
13 of transportation systems, particularly in developing
14 countries, through a focus on mitigating carbon
15 emissions, improving health and safety outcomes
16 through improved land use and community design,
17 and improved mobility for all populations;

18 (5) to promote collaboration regarding inter-
19 national research and development in—

20 (A) zero-emission vehicles;

21 (B) sustainable urban development and
22 smart growth; and

23 (C) advanced low carbon biofuels for trans-
24 portation;

1 (6) to facilitate and support the ability of par-
2 ties to the Paris Agreement to more accurately mon-
3 itor, record, and report transportation sector emis-
4 sions;

5 (7) to develop greater cooperation among par-
6 ties for strengthening the rules and ambition of the
7 Paris Agreement’s mitigation targets for transpor-
8 tation sector emissions;

9 (8) to improve the structural integrity of crit-
10 ical transportation infrastructure to withstand cur-
11 rent and forecasted effects of climate change and
12 support community resilience, improved access to
13 jobs, and adaptability to the effects of climate
14 change; and

15 (9) to explore new opportunities or seek en-
16 hanced initiatives within existing multilateral and bi-
17 lateral agreements to develop mechanisms and poli-
18 cies for reducing transportation sector greenhouse
19 gas emissions.

20 (c) INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.—In imple-
21 menting the policy described in subsection (b), the Presi-
22 dent should direct the United States representatives to ap-
23 propriate international bodies to use the influence of the
24 United States, consistent with the broad foreign policy

1 goals of the United States, to advocate that each such
2 body—

3 (1) promote transportation sector investment
4 in—

5 (A) electric vehicles and other low and zero
6 carbon transportation technologies; and

7 (B) sustainable land use development that
8 incorporates—

9 (i) multi-modal transportation designs
10 aimed at reducing—

11 (I) traffic congestion;

12 (II) carbon emissions from motor
13 vehicles;

14 (III) travel times between high
15 volume destinations within a commu-
16 nity;

17 (IV) vehicle crashes and other
18 threats to motorist and pedestrian
19 safety; and

20 (V) stormwater runoff from im-
21 pervious road surfaces, vehicle con-
22 flicts with wildlife, habitat destruc-
23 tion, and other forms of environ-
24 mental degradation commonly associ-
25 ated with roads and motor vehicles;

1 (ii) multi-use community designs and
 2 dense development that accounts for locat-
 3 ing residential development near essential
 4 goods, services, and job opportunities (to
 5 reduce individual reliance of motorized per-
 6 sonal transportation); and

7 (iii) transportation systems de-
 8 signed—

9 (I) to maximize the safety of all
 10 users; and

11 (II) to reduce the probability of
 12 motorized vehicle crashes, including
 13 motorized vehicle crashes that injure
 14 or kill pedestrians and bicyclists;

15 (2) strive to improve mobility by advancing eq-
 16 uitable access to transportation services among all
 17 populations, particularly historically underserved or
 18 marginalized populations and communities;

19 (3) improve environmental quality and commu-
 20 nity health outcomes through—

21 (A) safer and more efficient multi-modal
 22 transportation systems that reduce vehicle pol-
 23 lution and congestion;

24 (B) reductions in the amount of imper-
 25 vious surfaces; and

1 (C) integration of safe pedestrian and bicy-
 2 cling infrastructure;

3 (4) addresses unique transportation and eco-
 4 nomic needs of countries' diverse populations and
 5 communities in ways that also support a country's
 6 achievement of ambitious greenhouse gas mitigation
 7 commitments;

8 (5) enhance coordination and engagement with
 9 private sector stakeholders;

10 (6) provide technical assistance to foreign regu-
 11 latory authorities and governments to remove bar-
 12 riers to investment in transportation systems, infra-
 13 structure and electric vehicles and low and zero car-
 14 bon fuels; and

15 (7) use clear, accountable, and metric-based
 16 targets to measure the effectiveness of such projects.

17 (d) VEHICLE FUEL ECONOMY AND CO₂ EMISSIONS
 18 DIPLOMACY INITIATIVE.—

19 (1) DEVELOPMENT.—The Secretary of State, in
 20 consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the
 21 Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of the
 22 Treasury, and the Administrator of the Environ-
 23 mental Protection Agency, shall develop a Vehicle
 24 Fuel Economy and CO₂ Emissions Diplomacy Initia-
 25 tive to promote the worldwide adoption of vehicle

1 fuel economy and vehicle carbon dioxide emissions
2 standards that are compatible with United States
3 standards.

4 (2) RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES.—

5 (A) DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.—The Sec-
6 retary of State shall lead diplomatic efforts to
7 encourage foreign governments to adopt vehicle
8 fuel economy standards and vehicle carbon diox-
9 ide emissions standards.

10 (B) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—The Ad-
11 ministrator of the National Highway Traffic
12 Safety Administration and the Administrator of
13 the Environmental Protection Agency shall pro-
14 vide technical assistance to other countries to
15 help such countries to develop new standards,
16 testing regimes, and compliance strategies.

17 (3) PROGRAM SCOPE.—The Vehicle Fuel Econ-
18 omy and CO₂ Emissions Diplomacy Initiative
19 should—

20 (A) have the goal of reducing oil consump-
21 tion by at least 2,000,000 barrels per day by
22 2030, in addition to the reduction anticipated
23 by the implementation of standards in existence
24 as of the date of the enactment of this Act;

1 (B) include input in developing the pro-
 2 gram from leaders in United States industry;
 3 and

4 (C) focus special attention on Latin Amer-
 5 ica.

6 **SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES RE-**
 7 **ENGAGEMENT WITH THE GROUP OF SEVEN**
 8 **AND THE GROUP OF TWENTY ON CLIMATE**
 9 **ACTION.**

10 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

11 (1) President Trump has abstained from sev-
 12 eral heads of state meetings on climate action and
 13 cooperation with the heads of state from countries
 14 comprising the Group of Seven (referred to in this
 15 section as the “G7”) and the Group of Twenty (re-
 16 ferred to in this section as the “G20”).

17 (2) The G7 summit held in Charlevoix, Quebec
 18 in June 2018 produced a climate action communique
 19 that was signed by the heads of state from Canada,
 20 France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United
 21 Kingdom, but was not signed by the United States.

22 (3) The G7 climate action communique states,
 23 “Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
 24 United Kingdom, and the European Union reaffirm
 25 their strong commitment to implement the Paris

1 Agreement, through ambitious climate action, in
2 particular through reducing emissions while stimu-
3 lating innovation, enhancing adaptive capacity,
4 strengthening and financing resilience and reducing
5 vulnerability; as well as ensuring a just transition,
6 including increasing efforts to mobilize climate fi-
7 nance from a wide variety of sources.”.

8 (4) In 2019, the United States blocked the G7
9 from making any new or additional commitments on
10 climate change, to the expressed disappointment and
11 frustration of the other six heads of state.

12 (5) The G7, without the active participation of
13 the United States, continues to work together to ful-
14 fill clean energy commitments on initiatives such as
15 the 2014 Rome Initiative for Energy Security, the
16 2015 Hamburg Initiative for Sustainable Energy Se-
17 curity, the 2016 Kitakyushu Initiative on Energy
18 Security for Global Growth, and the Africa Renew-
19 able Energy Initiative. However, United States ob-
20 jections to global cooperative climate action have
21 prevented the G7 from undertaking new clean en-
22 ergy and climate action initiatives in recent years.

23 (6) The 2018 Buenos Aires Leaders Declara-
24 tion by the G20—

1 (A) recognizes the risks that climate
2 change poses to global security, global health,
3 and economic development; and

4 (B) affirms the significance of the Paris
5 Agreement.

6 (7) The United States insisted on the inclusion
7 of a statement in the G20 Buenos Aires Leaders
8 Declaration, for which the United States was the
9 only subscriber, expressing dissenting opinions on
10 international climate action cooperation and equivo-
11 cation on “utilizing all energy sources and tech-
12 nologies, while protecting the environment”.

13 (8) In 2019, the G20 narrowly avoided con-
14 cluding without a leaders’ declaration, when the
15 President unsuccessfully tried to pressure the other
16 19 heads of state to weaken commitments on com-
17 bating climate change in the 2019 G20 Osaka Lead-
18 ers Declaration, leaving the United States to provide
19 a dissenting provision articulating its outlier position
20 on climate action in the Declaration.

21 (b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the
22 date of the enactment of this Act, the President, acting
23 through the Secretary of State, shall initiate a China-fo-
24 cused agenda at the G7, with respect to—

1 (1) trade and investment issues and enforce-
2 ment;

3 (2) establishing and promulgating international
4 infrastructure standards;

5 (3) the erosion of democracy in Hong Kong;

6 (4) human rights concerns in Xinjiang, Tibet,
7 and other areas in the People's Republic of China;

8 (5) the security of 5G telecommunications;

9 (6) anti-competitive behavior;

10 (7) coercive and indentured international fi-
11 nance and conditional provision of foreign assist-
12 ance;

13 (8) international influence campaigns;

14 (9) climate change;

15 (10) China's domestic and international invest-
16 ments in new coal power plants;

17 (11) environmental standards; and

18 (12) coordination with like-minded regional
19 partners, including the Republic of Korea and Aus-
20 tralia.

21 (c) BRIEFING ON PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.—

22 Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of
23 this Act, the President shall provide a briefing to the Com-
24 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Com-
25 mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives

1 regarding the progress of any negotiations described in
2 subsection (b).

3 (d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that the United States should—

5 (1) in the next G7 communique and G20 Lead-
6 ers' Declaration—

7 (A) renounce the United States contrarian
8 positions on climate change expressed in the
9 2018 and 2019 official documents of the G7
10 and G20 summits;

11 (B) renew its commitment to climate co-
12 operation and support for fulfilling the goals of
13 the Paris Agreement in the context of the G7
14 and the G20;

15 (C) lead efforts to formalize new mecha-
16 nisms and commitments to climate action co-
17 operation between the heads of state of the G7
18 and of the G20, which are aimed at—

19 (i) increasing ambition on greenhouse
20 gas mitigation; and

21 (ii) strengthening support for climate
22 finance in developing countries, particu-
23 larly countries that are most vulnerable to
24 the effects of climate change; and

1 (D) challenge the heads of state of the G7
 2 and the G20 to leverage private financing and
 3 increase grants and official development assist-
 4 ance in clean energy and sustainable develop-
 5 ment projects in their own countries and in de-
 6 veloping countries, especially countries that are
 7 most vulnerable to the effects of climate
 8 change; and

9 (2) initiate the China-focused agenda described
 10 in subsection (b) at the G7.

11 **TITLE III—CLIMATE CHANGE DE-** 12 **VELOPMENT FINANCE AND** 13 **SUPPORT**

14 **SEC. 301. INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION,** 15 **MITIGATION, AND SECURITY PROGRAM.**

16 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

17 (1) CONVENTION.—The term “Convention”
 18 means the United Nations Framework Convention
 19 on Climate Change, done at New York May 9, 1992,
 20 and entered into force March 21, 1994.

21 (2) MOST VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES AND
 22 POPULATIONS.—The term “most vulnerable commu-
 23 nities and populations” means communities and pop-
 24 ulations that are at risk of substantial adverse ef-
 25 fects of climate change and have limited capacity to

1 respond to such effects, including women, impover-
2 ished communities, children, indigenous peoples, and
3 formal and informal workers.

4 (3) MOST VULNERABLE DEVELOPING COUN-
5 TRIES.—The term “most vulnerable developing
6 countries” means, as determined by the Adminis-
7 trator of the United States Agency for International
8 Development, developing countries that are at risk
9 of substantial adverse effects of climate change and
10 have limited capacity to respond to such effects, con-
11 sidering the approaches included in any international
12 treaties and agreements.

13 (4) PROGRAM.—The term “Program” means
14 the International Climate Change Adaptation, Miti-
15 gation, and Security Program established pursuant
16 to subsection (c).

17 (b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to pro-
18 vide authorities for additional, new, current, and ongoing
19 bilateral and regional international development assist-
20 ance, and, as appropriate, to leverage private resources,
21 in support of host country driven projects, planning, poli-
22 cies, and initiatives designed to improve the ability of host
23 countries—

24 (1) to primarily produce reliable renewable en-
25 ergy and reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from

1 the power sector while facilitating the transition in
2 key global markets from electricity generated from
3 fossil fuel power to low-cost clean energy sources, in
4 a manner that is equitable for workers and commu-
5 nities;

6 (2) to adapt and become more resilient to cur-
7 rent and forecasted effects of climate change; and

8 (3) to employ—

9 (A) sustainable land use practices that
10 mitigate desertification and reduce greenhouse
11 gas emissions from deforestation and forest
12 degradation; and

13 (B) agricultural production practices that
14 reduce poverty while improving soil health, pro-
15 tecting water quality, and increasing food secu-
16 rity and nutrition.

17 (c) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.—The Secretary
18 of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treas-
19 ury and the Administrator of the United States Agency
20 for International Development, shall establish a program,
21 to be known as the “International Climate Change Adap-
22 tation, Mitigation, and Security Program”, to provide bi-
23 lateral and regional assistance to developing countries for
24 programs, projects, and activities described in subsection
25 (e).

1 (d) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.—Assistance pro-
2 vided under this section shall be used to supplement, and
3 not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local re-
4 sources available to carry out activities that fit the charac-
5 teristics of the Program.

6 (e) POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United
7 States to ensure that the Program provides resources to
8 developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable
9 communities and populations in such countries, to support
10 the development and implementation of programs,
11 projects, and activities that—

12 (1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through
13 the integration and deployment of clean energy,
14 which may include transmission, distribution, and
15 interconnections to renewable energy, while facili-
16 tating the transition in key global markets from
17 electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-
18 cost renewable energy sources, in a manner that is
19 equitable for workers and communities;

20 (2) advance the use of clean energy technologies
21 facing financial or other barriers to widespread de-
22 ployment that could be addressed through support
23 under the Program to reduce, sequester, or avoid
24 greenhouse gas emissions;

1 (3) improve the availability, viability, and acces-
2 sibility of zero emission vehicles, including support
3 for design and development of transportation net-
4 works and land use practices that mitigate carbon
5 emissions in the transportation sector;

6 (4) support building capacities that may in-
7 clude—

8 (A) developing and implementing meth-
9 odologies and programs for measuring and
10 quantifying greenhouse gas emissions and
11 verifying emissions mitigation, including build-
12 ing capacities to conduct emissions inventories
13 and meet reporting requirements under the
14 Paris Agreement;

15 (B) assessing, developing, and imple-
16 menting technology and policy options for
17 greenhouse gas emissions mitigation and avoid-
18 ance of future emissions, including sector-based
19 and cross-sector mitigation strategies;

20 (C) enhancing the technical capacity of
21 regulatory authorities, planning agencies, and
22 related institutions in developing countries to
23 improve the deployment of clean energy tech-
24 nologies and practices, including through in-
25 creased transparency;

1 (D) training and instruction regarding the
 2 installation and maintenance of renewable en-
 3 ergy technologies; and

4 (E) activities that support the development
 5 and implementation of frameworks for intellec-
 6 tual property rights in developing countries;

7 (5) improve resilience, sustainable economic
 8 growth, and adaptation capacities in response to and
 9 in spite of the effects of climate change;

10 (6) promote appropriate job training and access
 11 to new job opportunities in new economic sectors
 12 and industries that emerge due to the transition
 13 from fossil fuel energy to clean energy, with full
 14 labor protections in accordance with international
 15 labor standards;

16 (7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the re-
 17 silience capacities of communities to the effects of
 18 climate change, including effects on—

19 (A) water availability;

20 (B) agricultural productivity and food se-
 21 curity;

22 (C) flood risk;

23 (D) coastal resources;

24 (E) biodiversity;

25 (F) economic livelihoods;

1 (G) health and diseases;

2 (H) housing and shelter; and

3 (I) human migration;

4 (8) help countries and communities adapt to
5 changes in the environment through enhanced com-
6 munity planning, preparedness, and growth strate-
7 gies that take into account current and forecasted
8 regional and localized effects of climate change;

9 (9) conserve and restore natural resources, eco-
10 systems, and biodiversity threatened by the effects of
11 climate change to ensure such resources, ecosystems,
12 and biodiversity are healthy and continue to provide
13 natural protections from the effects of climate
14 change such as extreme weather;

15 (10) provide resources, information, scientific
16 data and modeling, innovative best practices, and
17 technical assistance to support vulnerable developing
18 countries and communities adapt their economies,
19 communities, and security planning efforts to the ef-
20 fects of climate change;

21 (11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient
22 societies, including through improvements to make
23 critical infrastructure less vulnerable to the effects
24 of climate change;

1 (12) encourage the adoption of policies and
 2 measures, including sector-based and cross-sector
 3 policies and measures, that substantially reduce, se-
 4 quester, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions from the
 5 domestic energy and transportation sectors of devel-
 6 oping countries;

7 (13) reduce deforestation and land degradation
 8 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement
 9 sustainable forestry practices;

10 (14) promote sustainable land use activities, in-
 11 cluding supporting development planning, design,
 12 and construction with respect to transportation sys-
 13 tems and land use that incorporates—

14 (A) multi-modal transportation designs
 15 aimed at reducing—

16 (i) traffic congestion;

17 (ii) carbon emissions from motor vehi-
 18 cles;

19 (iii) travel times between high volume
 20 destinations within a community;

21 (iv) motor vehicle crashes and other
 22 threats to motorist and pedestrian safety;
 23 and

24 (v) stormwater runoff from imper-
 25 vious road surfaces, motor vehicle conflicts

1 with wildlife, habitat destruction, and other
 2 forms of environmental degradation com-
 3 monly associated with roads and motor ve-
 4 hicles;

5 (B) multi-use community designs and
 6 dense development that account for locating
 7 residential development near essential goods,
 8 services, and job opportunities to reduce indi-
 9 vidual reliance on motorized personal transpor-
 10 tation; and

11 (C) transportation systems designed to—

12 (i) maximize the safety of all users;

13 (ii) improve mobility by advancing eq-
 14 uitable access to transportation services
 15 among all populations, particularly histori-
 16 cally underserved or marginalized popu-
 17 lations and communities; and

18 (iii) reduce the probability of vehicle
 19 crashes and pedestrian and bicyclist inju-
 20 ries and mortalities;

21 (15) promote sustainable agricultural practices
 22 that mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and
 23 improve food and water security of communities;

24 (16) foster partnerships with private sector en-
 25 tities and nongovernmental international develop-

ment organizations to assist with developing solutions and economic opportunities that support projects, planning, policies, and initiatives described in subsection (b);

(17) provide technical assistance and strengthen capacities of developing countries to meet the goals of the conditional nationally determined contributions of those countries;

(18) establish investment channels designed to leverage private sector financing in—

(A) clean energy;

(B) sustainable agriculture and natural resource management; and

(C) the transportation sector as described in paragraph (3); and

(19) provide technical assistance and support for non-extractive activities that provide alternative economic growth opportunities while preserving critical habitats and natural carbon sinks.

(f) PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, under the direction of the Secretary of State, and in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and, as appropriate, the Administrator of the

1 Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of
 2 Energy, and the Secretary of Agriculture, shall pro-
 3 vide assistance under the Program—

4 (A) in the form of bilateral assistance pur-
 5 suant to the requirements under subsection (g);

6 (B) to multilateral funds or international
 7 institutions with programs for climate mitiga-
 8 tion or adaptation in developing countries con-
 9 sistent with the policy described in subsection
 10 (e); or

11 (C) through a combination of the mecha-
 12 nisms specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).

13 (2) LIMITATION.—

14 (A) CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION TO MUL-
 15 TILATERAL FUNDS OR INTERNATIONAL INSTI-
 16 TUTIONS.—In any fiscal year, the Adminis-
 17 trator of the United States Agency for Inter-
 18 national Development, under the direction of
 19 the Secretary of State, may provide up to 40
 20 percent of the assistance available to carry out
 21 the Program to 1 or more multilateral funds or
 22 international institutions that meet the require-
 23 ments of subparagraph (B).

24 (B) MULTILATERAL FUND OR INTER-
 25 NATIONAL INSTITUTION ELIGIBILITY.—A multi-

1 lateral fund or international institution is eligi-
2 ble to receive assistance under subparagraph
3 (A)—

4 (i) if—

5 (I) such fund or institution is es-
6 tablished pursuant to—

7 (aa) the Convention; or

8 (bb) an agreement nego-
9 tiated under the Convention; or

10 (II) the assistance is directed to
11 1 or more multilateral funds or inter-
12 national development institutions,
13 pursuant to an agreement negotiated
14 under the Convention; and

15 (ii) if such fund or institution—

16 (I) specifies the terms and condi-
17 tions under which the United States is
18 to provide assistance to the fund or
19 institution, and under which the fund
20 or institution is to provide assistance
21 to recipient countries; and

22 (II) ensures that assistance from
23 the United States to the fund or insti-
24 tution and the principal and income of

1 the fund or institution are disbursed
 2 only—

3 (aa) to support projects,
 4 planning, policies, and initiatives
 5 described in subsection (b);

6 (bb) consistent with the pol-
 7 icy described in subsection (e);
 8 and

9 (cc) in regular consultation
 10 with relevant governing bodies of
 11 the fund or institution that—

12 (AA) include represen-
 13 tation from countries among
 14 the most vulnerable devel-
 15 oping countries; and

16 (BB) provide public ac-
 17 cess.

18 (C) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—The
 19 Secretary of State, the Administrator of the
 20 United States Agency for International Devel-
 21 opment, or the Secretary of the Treasury shall
 22 notify the appropriate congressional committees
 23 not later than 15 days before providing assist-
 24 ance to a multilateral fund or international in-
 25 stitution under this subsection.

1 (3) LOCAL CONSULTATIONS.—Programs,
 2 projects, and activities supported by assistance pro-
 3 vided under this subsection shall require consulta-
 4 tions with local communities, particularly the most
 5 vulnerable communities and populations in such
 6 communities, and indigenous peoples in areas in
 7 which any programs, projects, or activities are
 8 planned to engage such communities and peoples
 9 through adequate disclosure of information, public
 10 participation, consultation, and the free prior and in-
 11 formed consent of such peoples, including full con-
 12 sideration of the interdependence of vulnerable com-
 13 munities and ecosystems to promote the resilience of
 14 local communities.

15 (g) BILATERAL ASSISTANCE.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—Except to the extent incon-
 17 sistent with this subsection, the administrative au-
 18 thorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
 19 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall apply to the imple-
 20 mentation of this subsection to the same extent and
 21 in the same manner as such authorities apply to the
 22 implementation of such Act in order to provide the
 23 Administrator of the United States Agency for
 24 International Development with the authority to pro-
 25 vide assistance to countries, including the most vul-

1 nerable developing countries, for programs, projects,
2 and activities consistent with the purposes described
3 in subsection (b) and the policy described in sub-
4 section (e).

5 (2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out this
6 subsection, the Administrator shall ensure that—

7 (A) the environmental impact of proposed
8 programs, projects, and activities is assessed
9 through adequate consultation, public participa-
10 tion, and disclosure of information; and

11 (B) programs, projects, and activities
12 under this subsection—

13 (i) avoid environmental degradation,
14 to the maximum extent practicable; and

15 (ii) are aligned, to the maximum ex-
16 tent practicable, with broader development,
17 poverty alleviation, or natural resource
18 management objectives and initiatives in
19 the recipient country.

20 (3) COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT.—The Adminis-
21 trator shall seek to ensure that—

22 (A) local communities, particularly the
23 most vulnerable communities and populations in
24 areas in which any programs, projects, or ac-
25 tivities are carried out under this subsection,

1 are engaged in the design, implementation,
 2 monitoring, and evaluation of such programs,
 3 projects, and activities through disclosure of in-
 4 formation, public participation, and consulta-
 5 tion; and

6 (B) the needs and interests of the most
 7 vulnerable communities and populations are ad-
 8 dressed in national or regional climate change
 9 adaptation plans.

10 (4) CONSULTATION AND DISCLOSURE.—For
 11 each country receiving assistance under this sub-
 12 section, the Administrator shall establish a process
 13 for consultation with, and disclosure of information
 14 to, local, national, and international stakeholders re-
 15 garding any programs, projects, or activities carried
 16 out under this subsection.

17 (h) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
 18 authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section
 19 \$2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year
 20 thereafter.

21 **SEC. 302. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GREEN**
 22 **CLIMATE FUND.**

23 (a) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.—On behalf of
 24 the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury and the
 25 Secretary of State—

1 (1) shall jointly coordinate contributions to the
2 Green Climate Fund; and

3 (2) may contribute to the Green Climate Fund,
4 in addition to the amounts authorized under sub-
5 section (d), additional amounts from other relevant
6 foreign assistance accounts.

7 (b) LIMITS ON COUNTRY ACCESS.—The Secretary of
8 the Treasury shall use the voice, vote, and influence of
9 the United States to ensure that—

10 (1) the Fund does not provide more than ap-
11 proximately 15 percent of the resources of the Fund
12 to any one country;

13 (2) each country that receives amounts from
14 the Fund submits to the governing body of the Fund
15 an investment plan that describes how—

16 (A) energy efficiency or production projects
17 will achieve significant and lasting reductions in
18 national-level greenhouse gas emissions; and

19 (B) adaptation projects will—

20 (i) provide long-term enhancements to
21 national and food security;

22 (ii) protect lives and livelihoods;

23 (iii) ensure lasting access to fresh-
24 water resources; or

1 (iv) advance public health outcomes;
2 and

3 (3) in the case of a country that is not classi-
4 fied by the World Bank as having a low-income
5 economy, provides for not less than 15 percent of
6 the total cost of the plan to be contributed from the
7 public funds of the country.

8 (c) PROJECT AND PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—The
9 Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Sec-
10 retary of State, shall use the voice, vote, and influence of
11 the United States to ensure that support from the Fund
12 is used exclusively to support the deployment by devel-
13 oping countries of clean energy technologies and the devel-
14 opment of projects that improve the resilience capacities
15 and ability of countries to adapt to the effects of climate
16 change, including, as appropriate, through the provision
17 of technical support or support for policy or institutional
18 reforms.

19 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addi-
20 tion to the amounts authorized to be appropriated under
21 section 301(h), there are authorized to be appropriated for
22 contributions to the Green Climate Fund—

- 23 (1) \$4,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
24 (2) \$4,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
25 (3) \$2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2024; and

1 (4) \$2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2025.

2 (e) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 240 days
3 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
4 thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to
5 the appropriate congressional committees a report describ-
6 ing—

7 (1) the purpose of and progress on each project
8 supported by the Fund; and

9 (2) how each such project furthers the invest-
10 ment plan described in subsection (b)(2) of each
11 country in which the project is implemented.

12 **SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES EN-**
13 **GAGEMENTS AT THE WORLD ECONOMIC**
14 **FORUM.**

15 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

16 (1) In 2020, the World Economic Forum (re-
17 ferred to in this section as the “WEF”) in Davos,
18 Switzerland, put addressing the climate crisis at the
19 top of its agenda. World and business leaders rein-
20 forced the need for urgent action to avoid human de-
21 struction from the clear and present climate crisis.

22 (2) At the 2020 annual meeting of the WEF,
23 the President, accompanied by the Secretary of the
24 Treasury, delivered a contrarian message, claiming,
25 “To embrace the possibilities of tomorrow, we must

1 reject the perennial prophets of doom and their pre-
2 dictions of the apocalypse.”.

3 (3) Nevertheless, the WEF, without support
4 from the United States, announced climate initia-
5 tives on sustainable markets, reaching carbon neu-
6 trality on insurance investment portfolios,
7 decarbonizing the automotive sector through circular
8 economies, and transitioning to healthier, more sus-
9 tainable food systems.

10 (4) The one initiative the United States did
11 agree to join is the Trillion Tree Campaign, which
12 aims to grow, restore, and conserve 1 trillion trees
13 by 2030.

14 (5) The President’s dismissal of the threat cli-
15 mate change poses to economic growth and global
16 security has isolated the United States from the 117
17 represented countries at the WEF that support its
18 climate agenda and are accelerating their national
19 commitments in other international fora to address
20 climate change.

21 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
22 gress that at the 2021 WEF, or at an appropriate time
23 and venue as early as possible in 2021—

24 (1) the Secretary of State should commit to re-
25 storing diplomatic engagement and cooperation on

1 mobilizing investment and support for growing the
2 global economy while achieving net zero global
3 greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;

4 (2) the Secretary of the Treasury should an-
5 nounce—

6 (A) the intention of the United States Gov-
7 ernment to divest from future investment and
8 support for fossil fuel energy and extraction
9 projects in developing countries; and

10 (B) the establishment of an international
11 clean energy private finance fund to support the
12 development of large-scale renewable energy
13 projects in middle income countries;

14 (3) the Chief Executive Officer of the United
15 States International Development Finance Corpora-
16 tion should commit to—

17 (A) divesting the United States Inter-
18 national Development Finance Corporation
19 from future fossil fuel energy development and
20 extraction projects; and

21 (B) investing a significant portion of the
22 annual portfolio of the United States Inter-
23 national Development Finance Corporation in
24 clean energy development projects; and

1 (4) the Administrator of the United States
 2 Agency for International Development should com-
 3 mit to prioritizing building resilience and adaption
 4 capacities in the most climate-vulnerable countries.

5 **SEC. 304. CLEAN ENERGY AND THE UNITED STATES INTER-**
 6 **NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE COR-**
 7 **PORATION.**

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1451 of the Better Utili-
 9 zation of Investments Leading to Development Act of
 10 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9671) is amended by adding at the end
 11 the following:

12 “(j) CLEAN ENERGY.—

13 “(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180
 14 days after the date of the enactment of this sub-
 15 section, the Chief Executive Officer of the Corpora-
 16 tion shall submit to the appropriate congressional
 17 committees a report—

18 “(A) highlighting the substantial commit-
 19 ment of the Corporation to invest in renewable
 20 and other clean energy technologies;

21 “(B) setting forth—

22 “(i) a plan to significantly reduce
 23 greenhouse gas emissions associated with
 24 projects and subprojects within the Cor-

poration’s portfolio, as required by paragraph (2); and

“(ii) a plan for facilitating the transition in key global markets from electricity generated from fossil fuel power to clean, low-cost renewable energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and communities, as required by paragraph (3); and

“(C) detailing the efforts of the Corporation to reduce all greenhouse gas emissions associated with projects and subprojects within the Corporation’s portfolio, including a full accounting of the reductions, achieved in accordance with the plan described in paragraph (2).

“(2) PLAN TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Corporation shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a climate change mitigation plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated with projects and subprojects within the Corporation’s portfolio by, relative to October 1, 2020—

1 “(i) not less than 60 percent by 2025;

2 and

3 “(ii) 100 percent by 2028.

4 “(B) IMPLEMENTATION.—The Corporation
5 shall begin implementation of the plan required
6 by subparagraph (A) not later than 20 days
7 after submitting the plan to the appropriate
8 congressional committees.

9 “(C) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than
10 one year after the date on which the Corpora-
11 tion begins implementation under subparagraph
12 (B) of the plan required by subparagraph (A),
13 and every 2 years thereafter until the Corpora-
14 tion achieves the goal of reducing greenhouse
15 gas emissions associated with projects and sub-
16 projects within the Corporation’s portfolio by
17 100 percent, the Corporation shall submit a re-
18 port to the appropriate congressional commit-
19 tees on the Corporation’s progress and efforts
20 to achieve the greenhouse gas emissions reduc-
21 tions goals of the plan.

22 “(3) CLEAN ELECTRICITY TRANSITION.—The
23 Corporation shall seek, in providing support for
24 projects under title II, to facilitate the transition in
25 key global markets from electricity generated from

1 fossil fuel power to clean, low-cost renewable energy
2 sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers
3 and communities, by—

4 “(A) enabling the phase-out of uneconomic
5 coal-fired power plants that are shielded from
6 competition from renewable energy sources by
7 noncompetitive market structures such as long-
8 term contracts and regulated tariffs;

9 “(B) using low-cost capital—

10 “(i) to refinance existing debt on un-
11 economic coal-fired power plants;

12 “(ii) to reinvest in renewable energy
13 sources to replace such plants;

14 “(iii) to support a just transition to
15 renewable energy for affected workers and
16 communities by generating decent jobs
17 that adhere to international labor stand-
18 ards all along the renewable energy supply
19 chain; and

20 “(iv) to support the upgrading of jobs
21 and skills as well as job creation and im-
22 proved productivity in more labor-intensive
23 industries that offer employment opportu-
24 nities on a wide scale; and

25 “(C) considering—

1 “(i) competitive approaches, like re-
 2 verse auctions, to ensure the best value in
 3 investing in renewable energy sources; and
 4 “(ii) partnering, as appropriate,
 5 with—

6 “(I) the United States Agency
 7 for International Development; and

8 “(II) the Department of the
 9 Treasury with respect to efforts by
 10 multilateral development banks (as
 11 defined in section 1701(c) of the
 12 International Financial Institutions
 13 Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c))).”.

14 (b) CONFORMING REPEAL.—Section 7079(b) of the
 15 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (Public Law 111–
 16 117; 123 Stat. 3396) is amended by striking “comment:”
 17 and all that follows and inserting “comment.”.

18 **SEC. 305. CONSISTENCY IN UNITED STATES POLICY ON DE-**
 19 **VELOPMENT FINANCE AND CLIMATE**
 20 **CHANGE.**

21 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
 22 gress that the strength and credibility of United States
 23 climate policy is undermined when there is a lack of con-
 24 sistency between the policies and practices implemented
 25 at the United States International Development Finance

1 Corporation and the policies and practices the Corporation
2 promotes at the international financial institutions.

3 (b) ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY AT MULTILATERAL
4 DEVELOPMENT BANKS.—The Secretary of the Treasury
5 shall instruct the United States executive director of each
6 international financial institution to use the voice and vote
7 of the United States to advocate for enhancing trans-
8 parency by providing sufficient and adequate information
9 to facilitate independent verification of the climate finance
10 reporting of the institution.

11 (c) POLICY ALIGNMENT.—The Secretary of the
12 Treasury shall instruct the United States executive direc-
13 tor of each international financial institution to use the
14 voice and vote of the United States—

15 (1) to challenge policy-based loans or lending
16 through financial intermediaries that directly or in-
17 directly supports fossil fuels; and

18 (2) to seek to ensure that all loans, grants, poli-
19 cies, and strategies of the institution are aligned
20 with the objectives of the Paris Agreement.

21 (d) PROHIBITION.—Section 1451 of the Better Utili-
22 zation of Investments Leading to Development Act of
23 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9671), as amended by section 304, is
24 further amended by adding at the end the following:

1 “(k) CONSISTENCY IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL
 2 POLICIES.—The Corporation may not adopt any environ-
 3 mental or social policy that provides less protection for
 4 communities and the environment than the level of protec-
 5 tion required under title XIII of the International Finan-
 6 cial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262m et seq.).”.

7 (e) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DE-
 8 FINED.—In this section, the term “international financial
 9 institution” has the meaning given that term in section
 10 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act
 11 (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)).

12 **TITLE IV—CLEAN ENERGY DI-** 13 **PLOMACY AND INTER-** 14 **NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

15 **SEC. 401. ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY WITHIN THE** 16 **DEPARTMENT OF STATE.**

17 (a) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY
 18 RESOURCES.—Section 1(c) of the State Department Basic
 19 Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(c)) is amend-
 20 ed—

21 (1) by redesignating paragraph (4) as para-
 22 graph (5); and

23 (2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the fol-
 24 lowing:

1 “(4) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EN-
2 ERGY RESOURCES.—

3 “(A) AUTHORIZATION FOR ASSISTANT SEC-
4 RETARY.—Subject to the numerical limitation
5 specified in paragraph (1), there is authorized
6 to be established in the Department of State an
7 Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Re-
8 sources.

9 “(B) PERSONNEL.—The Secretary of
10 State, in collaboration with the Assistant Sec-
11 retary of State for Energy Resources, and in
12 accordance with the authorization under sub-
13 paragraph (A), shall ensure that sufficient per-
14 sonnel are dedicated to energy matters within
15 the Bureau of Energy Resources in order—

16 “(i) to formulate and implement inter-
17 national policies, in coordination with the
18 Secretary of Energy, as appropriate, aimed
19 at protecting and advancing United States
20 energy security interests and international
21 energy development and access to elec-
22 tricity, in accordance with the United Na-
23 tion’s sustainable development goals in
24 ways that ensure responsible development
25 of global energy resources by effectively

1 managing United States bilateral and mul-
2 tilateral relations;

3 “(ii) to ensure that analyses of public
4 health and national security implications of
5 global energy and environmental develop-
6 ments are reflected in the decision-making
7 process within the Department of State;

8 “(iii) to incorporate energy security
9 and clean energy development priorities
10 into the activities of the Department re-
11 lated to matters involving global energy de-
12 velopment, accounting for the effects global
13 energy development has on—

14 “(I) United States national secu-
15 rity;

16 “(II) quality of life and public
17 health of people, households, and com-
18 munities, particularly vulnerable and
19 underserved populations affected by,
20 or proximate to, energy development,
21 transmission, and distribution
22 projects;

23 “(III) United States economic in-
24 terests;

1 “(IV) emissions of greenhouse
2 gases that contribute to global climate
3 change; and

4 “(V) local and regional land use,
5 air and water quality, and risks to
6 public health of communities de-
7 scribed in subclause (II);

8 “(iv) to coordinate energy activities
9 within the Department of State and with
10 relevant Federal departments and agen-
11 cies;

12 “(v) to work internationally—

13 “(I) to support socially and envi-
14 ronmentally responsible development
15 of energy resources that mitigate car-
16 bon emissions, and the distribution of
17 such resources for the benefit of the
18 United States and United States allies
19 and trading partners for their energy
20 security, climate security, and eco-
21 nomic development needs;

22 “(II) to promote—

23 “(aa) the availability of
24 clean energy technologies, includ-
25 ing carbon capture and storage;

1 “(bb) energy sector innova-
2 tion;

3 “(cc) well-functioning global
4 markets for clean energy re-
5 sources and technologies; and

6 “(dd) expertise for the ben-
7 efit of the United States and
8 United States allies and trading
9 partners;

10 “(III) to resolve international
11 disputes regarding the exploration, de-
12 velopment, production, or distribution
13 of energy resources;

14 “(IV) to support the economic,
15 security, and commercial interests of
16 United States persons operating in
17 the energy markets of foreign coun-
18 tries; and

19 “(V) to support and coordinate
20 international efforts—

21 “(aa) to alleviate energy
22 poverty;

23 “(bb) to protect vulnerable,
24 exploited, and underserved popu-
25 lations that are affected or dis-

1 placed by energy development
2 projects;

3 “(cc) to account for and
4 mitigate greenhouse gas emis-
5 sions from energy development
6 projects;

7 “(dd) to promote fair labor
8 practices, labor protections for
9 workers, and training for and ac-
10 cess to good-paying jobs within
11 the clean energy sector; and

12 “(ee) to increase access to
13 clean energy for vulnerable and
14 underserved communities;

15 “(vi) to lead the United States com-
16 mitment to the Extractive Industries
17 Transparency Initiative; and

18 “(vii) to coordinate energy security
19 and climate security and other relevant
20 functions within the Department of State
21 undertaken as of the date of the enactment
22 of this paragraph by—

23 “(I) the Bureau of Economic and
24 Business Affairs;

1 “(II) the Bureau of Oceans and
2 International Environmental and Sci-
3 entific Affairs; and

4 “(III) other offices within the
5 Department of State.”.

6 (b) ELIMINATION OF AUTHORITY FOR COORDINATOR
7 FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AFFAIRS.—Section 931 of
8 the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (42
9 U.S.C. 17371) is amended—

10 (1) by striking subsections (a) and (b); and

11 (2) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as
12 subsections (a) and (b), respectively.

13 **SEC. 402. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRIMACY FOR ENERGY**
14 **DIPLOMACY.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Department of State shall
16 have primacy for all United States diplomatic engage-
17 ments with regard to international energy affairs.

18 (b) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The Secretary
19 of State, as appropriate, shall coordinate with and use the
20 technical expertise and resources of the Department of
21 Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the De-
22 partment of the Interior, and other relevant Federal agen-
23 cies and departments in the planning and execution of
24 United States foreign policy goals and objectives related
25 to international energy affairs.

1 **SEC. 403. REPORTS ON UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN**
2 **MISSION INNOVATION AND THE CLEAN EN-**
3 **ERGY MINISTERIAL.**

4 (a) MISSION INNOVATION.—Not later than 90 days
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
6 shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
7 a report that details the scope and nature of United States
8 participation in Mission Innovation, including—

9 (1) who in the United States Government
10 serves as the lead for Mission Innovation;

11 (2) what objectives the United States has used
12 Mission Innovation to advance;

13 (3) what partnerships the United States has es-
14 tablished through Mission Innovation and the date
15 on which any partnerships the United States bro-
16 kered were announced;

17 (4) how the United States has leveraged Mis-
18 sion Innovation to engage in technology transfer ar-
19 rangements with foreign governments;

20 (5) how the United States has attracted private
21 sector entities to contribute to and participate in
22 Mission Innovation;

23 (6) the total amount of funding provided by the
24 United States Government to Mission Innovation
25 each year since the establishment of Mission Innova-
26 tion; and

1 (7) the outline of a strategic engagement plan
2 and objectives for delivering new energy technology
3 innovation outcomes through Mission Innovation.

4 (b) CLEAN ENERGY MINISTERIAL.—Not later than
5 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
6 Secretary of Energy shall submit to the appropriate com-
7 mittees of Congress a report that details the scope and
8 nature of United States participation in the Clean Energy
9 Ministerial, including—

10 (1) the number of Clean Energy Ministerial
11 meetings that the Secretary of Energy has partici-
12 pated in;

13 (2) the diplomatic objectives, including with re-
14 spect to energy technologies and private sector enti-
15 ties, that the United States has aimed to promote
16 within the Clean Energy Ministerial;

17 (3) the consensus initiatives, if any, among the
18 chiefs of party to the Clean Energy Ministerial that
19 the United States objected to, refused to join, or re-
20 frained from contributing to the development of; and

21 (4) a plan for restoring United States leader-
22 ship in using the Clean Energy Ministerial to pro-
23 mote the development and deployment of renewable
24 energy and carbon mitigation technologies from the
25 energy and transportation sectors.

1 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In
 2 this section, the term “appropriate committees of Con-
 3 gress” means—

4 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
 5 Senate;

6 (2) the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
 7 sources of the Senate;

8 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
 9 House of Representatives; and

10 (4) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of
 11 the House of Representatives.

12 **SEC. 404. REDUCED DEFORESTATION.**

13 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

14 (1) ADMINISTRATOR.—Except as otherwise ex-
 15 pressly provided, the term “Administrator” means
 16 the Administrator of the United States Agency for
 17 International Development.

18 (2) DEFORESTATION.—The term “deforest-
 19 ation” means a change in land use from a forest (in-
 20 cluding peatlands) to any other land use.

21 (3) DEVELOPING COUNTRY.—The term “devel-
 22 oping country” means a country eligible to receive
 23 official development assistance according to the in-
 24 come guidelines of the Development Assistance Com-

1 mittee of the Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
2 ation and Development.

3 (4) EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS.—The term “emis-
4 sions reductions” means greenhouse gas emissions
5 reductions achieved from reduced or avoided defor-
6 estation under this section.

7 (5) FOREST.—

8 (A) IN GENERAL.—The term “forest”
9 means a terrestrial ecosystem, including wet-
10 land forests, comprised of native tree species
11 generated and maintained primarily through
12 natural ecological and evolutionary processes.

13 (B) EXCLUSION.—The term “forest” does
14 not include plantations, such as crops of trees
15 planted by humans primarily for the purposes
16 of harvesting.

17 (6) FOREST DEGRADATION.—The term “forest
18 degradation” is any reduction in the carbon stock of
19 a forest due to the effects of human land-use activi-
20 ties, including such land-use activities on peatlands.

21 (7) HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER.—The term
22 “human rights defender” means an individual,
23 group, or association that peacefully contributes to
24 the effective elimination of all violations of human
25 rights and fundamental freedoms of peoples and in-

dividuals, including in relation to mass, flagrant, or systematic such violations, such as those resulting from apartheid, all forms of racial discrimination, colonialism, foreign domination or occupation, aggression or threats to national sovereignty, national unity, or territorial integrity, and the refusal to recognize the right of peoples to self-determination and the right of every people to exercise full sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources.

(8) INTACT FOREST.—The term “intact forest” means an unbroken expanse of natural ecosystems within the global extent of forest cover that—

(A) covers an area of at least 500 square kilometers and is at least 10 kilometers in each direction; and

(B) contains forest and non-forest ecosystems minimally influenced by human economic activity and large enough that all native biodiversity, including viable populations of wide-ranging species, could be maintained.

(9) LEAKAGE.—The term “leakage” means the unexpected loss of anticipated carbon benefits due to the displacement of activities in a project area to areas outside the project, resulting in carbon emissions.

1 (10) LEAKAGE PREVENTION ACTIVITIES.—The
2 term “leakage prevention activities” means activities
3 in developing countries that are directed at pre-
4 serving existing forest carbon stocks, including for-
5 ested wetlands and peatlands that might, absent
6 such activities, be lost through leakage.

7 (11) NATIONAL DEFORESTATION REDUCTION
8 ACTIVITIES.—The term “national deforestation re-
9 duction activities” means activities in developing
10 countries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse gas
11 emissions from deforestation that is calculated by
12 measuring actual emissions against a national defor-
13 estation baseline established pursuant to subpara-
14 graphs (B) and (C) of subsection (d)(4).

15 (12) SUBNATIONAL DEFORESTATION AND FOR-
16 EST DEGRADATION REDUCTION ACTIVITIES.—The
17 term “subnational deforestation and forest degrada-
18 tion reduction activities” means activities in devel-
19 oping countries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse
20 gas emissions from deforestation and forest degrada-
21 tion that is calculated by measuring actual emissions
22 using an appropriate baseline, or an alternative de-
23 termined under subsection (d)(4)(B)(ii), established
24 by the Administrator at the State or provincial level.

1 (b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section are to
2 provide United States assistance to developing countries
3 to develop, implement, and improve actions that reduce
4 deforestation and forest degradation or conserve or restore
5 forest ecosystems—

6 (1) to protect the value of forest ecosystems
7 with respect to permanent carbon capture and se-
8 questration in a manner in which such value is
9 measurable, reportable, and verifiable; and

10 (2) in a manner that—

11 (A) is consistent with and enhances the
12 implementation of complementary United
13 States policies that support the good govern-
14 ance of forests, biodiversity conservation, and
15 environmentally sustainable development;

16 (B) takes into consideration the views and
17 participation of local communities and most vul-
18 nerable communities and populations (as de-
19 fined in section 301(a)), particularly forest-de-
20 pendent communities; and

21 (C) incorporates the right to free prior and
22 informed consent of indigenous peoples.

23 (c) EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS THROUGH REDUCED
24 DEFORESTATION.—

1 (1) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.—Not later
2 than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this
3 Act, the Administrator, in consultation with the Ad-
4 ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
5 the Secretary of Agriculture, and the head of any
6 other appropriate agency, shall establish a program
7 to provide assistance to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
8 sions from deforestation in developing countries, in
9 accordance with this section.

10 (2) OBJECTIVES.—The objectives of the pro-
11 gram established under paragraph (1) shall be—

12 (A) to achieve—

13 (i) emissions reductions of at least
14 7,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide
15 equivalent in 2025;

16 (ii) cumulative emissions reductions of
17 at least 11,000,000,000 tons of carbon di-
18 oxide equivalent by December 31, 2030;
19 and

20 (iii) additional emissions reductions in
21 subsequent years;

22 (B) to build capacity to reduce deforest-
23 ation at a national level in developing countries
24 experiencing deforestation, which may include—

1 (i) preparing developing countries to
 2 participate in international markets for
 3 international offset credits for reduced
 4 emissions from deforestation; and

5 (ii) supporting the development of do-
 6 mestic policy frameworks to ensure effec-
 7 tive, efficient, and equitable benefit-sharing
 8 of the proceeds of such credits issued by
 9 national and subnational governments;

10 (C) to preserve forest carbon stocks in
 11 countries where such forest carbon may be vul-
 12 nerable to leakage, particularly in developing
 13 countries with largely intact native forests;

14 (D) to build the scientific knowledge and
 15 institutional capacity to help developing coun-
 16 tries—

17 (i) monitor the effects of climate
 18 change on their forests;

19 (ii) develop and implement strategies
 20 to conserve their forests; and

21 (iii) support forest-dependent commu-
 22 nities adapt to climate change; and

23 (E) to the extent practicable, to reduce de-
 24 forestation in ways that reduce the vulnerability

1 and increase the resilience to climate effects for
2 forests and forest-dependent communities.

3 (d) REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEFOR-
4 ESTATION REDUCTION PROGRAM.—

5 (1) ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.—

6 (A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in
7 subparagraph (B), the Administrator may pro-
8 vide assistance under this section only with re-
9 spect to a developing country that—

10 (i) the Administrator, in consultation
11 with the Administrator of the Environ-
12 mental Protection Agency and the Sec-
13 retary of Agriculture, determines—

14 (I) is experiencing deforestation
15 or forest degradation; or

16 (II) has standing forest carbon
17 stocks that may be at risk of deforest-
18 ation or degradation;

19 (ii) has the legal regimes, standards,
20 and safeguards to ensure that the rights
21 and interests of indigenous peoples and
22 forest-dependent communities are pro-
23 tected in accordance with the standards es-
24 tablished under paragraph (4); and

1 (iii) has entered into a bilateral or
 2 multilateral agreement or arrangement
 3 with the United States, or is part of an
 4 international program supported by the
 5 United States to prevent deforestation,
 6 that establishes the conditions of participa-
 7 tion by the country in the program estab-
 8 lished under this section, which shall in-
 9 clude an agreement to meet the standards
 10 established under paragraph (4) for the ac-
 11 tivities to which such standards apply.

12 (B) EXCEPTION.—A developing country
 13 that does not meet the requirement described in
 14 paragraph (1)(A)(ii) may receive assistance
 15 under this section for the purpose of building
 16 capacity to meet such requirement.

17 (2) AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES.—Subject to the
 18 requirements of this section, in providing assistance
 19 under this section, the Administrator may support
 20 activities to achieve the objectives described in sub-
 21 section (c)(2), including activities such as—

22 (A) national deforestation reduction activi-
 23 ties;

24 (B) subnational deforestation and forest
 25 degradation reduction activities, including pilot

1 activities, policies, and measures that reduce
2 greenhouse gas emissions and are subject to
3 significant uncertainty;

4 (C) activities to measure, monitor, and
5 verify deforestation, avoided deforestation, and
6 rates of deforestation, including, if applicable,
7 spatially explicit land use plans that identify in-
8 tact and primary forest areas and managed for-
9 est areas;

10 (D) leakage prevention activities;

11 (E) the development and implementation
12 of measurement, monitoring, reporting, and
13 verification capacities and governance struc-
14 tures, including legal regimes, standards, proc-
15 esses, and safeguards, as established under
16 paragraph (4), to enable a country to quantify
17 emissions reductions for purposes of purchasing
18 or trading subnational emissions reduction cred-
19 its in carbon markets;

20 (F) the identification of, and actions to ad-
21 dress, the drivers of land use emissions;

22 (G) programs that would exclude from the
23 United States illegally harvested timber or
24 products made from illegally harvested timber,
25 in accordance with and consistent with the ob-

1 jectives of the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981
2 (16 U.S.C. 3371 et seq.);

3 (H) the development and strengthening of
4 governance capacities to reduce deforestation
5 and other land use emissions and to combat il-
6 legal logging and associated trade, including the
7 development of systems for independent moni-
8 toring of the efficacy of forest law enforcement
9 and increased enforcement cooperation, includ-
10 ing joint efforts with Federal agencies, to en-
11 force the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16
12 U.S.C. 3371 et seq.);

13 (I) the provision of incentives for policy re-
14 forms to achieve the objectives described in sub-
15 section (c)(2);

16 (J) the development of pilot projects—

17 (i) to examine where mitigation and
18 adaptation activities in forest ecosystems
19 coincide; and

20 (ii) to explore means for enhancing
21 the resilience of forest ecosystems and for-
22 est-dependent communities;

23 (K) the promotion of mechanisms to de-
24 liver resources for local action and to address

1 the needs, rights, interests, and participation of
2 local and indigenous communities; and

3 (L) monitoring and evaluation of the re-
4 sults of the activities conducted under this sec-
5 tion.

6 (3) MECHANISMS.—The Administrator shall
7 apply the administrative authorities under the For-
8 eign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et
9 seq.), except to the extent inconsistent with the pro-
10 visions of this section, to the same extent and in the
11 same manner as such authorities apply to the imple-
12 mentation of such Act in order to support activities
13 to achieve the objectives described in subsection
14 (c)(2) by—

15 (A) developing and implementing programs
16 and project-level activities that achieve such ob-
17 jectives;

18 (B) to the extent practicable, giving pri-
19 ority in any review process to activities under
20 paragraph (2)(A); and

21 (C) as appropriate, considering multi-year
22 funding arrangements in carrying out the pur-
23 poses of this section.

24 (4) STANDARDS.—The Administrator, in con-
25 sultation with the Administrator of the Environ-

1 mental Protection Agency and the Secretary of Agri-
2 culture, shall establish program standards that—

3 (A) ensure that emissions reductions
4 achieved through supported activities—

5 (i) are additional, measurable,
6 verifiable, and monitored;

7 (ii) account for leakage, uncertainty,
8 and permanence; and

9 (iii) at a minimum, meet the stand-
10 ards established under the emissions unit
11 criteria of the Carbon Offsetting and Re-
12 duction Scheme for International Aviation
13 (CORSIA) developed by the International
14 Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO);

15 (B) require—

16 (i) the establishment of a national de-
17 forestation baseline for each country with
18 national deforestation reduction activities
19 that is used to account for reductions
20 achieved from such activities; or

21 (ii) if a developing country has estab-
22 lished policies and taken measures to re-
23 duce emissions from disturbed peatlands,
24 deforestation, or forest degradation, but
25 has not established a national baseline, the

1 provision of a credible, transparent, accu-
2 rate, and conservative alternative for quan-
3 tifying emissions;

4 (C) provide that each national deforest-
5 ation baseline established under subparagraph
6 (B)(i)—

7 (i) is national, or subnational on an
8 interim basis, in scope;

9 (ii) is consistent with nationally ap-
10 propriate mitigation commitments or ac-
11 tions with respect to deforestation, taking
12 into consideration—

13 (I) the average annual historical
14 deforestation rates of the country dur-
15 ing a period of at least 5 years; and

16 (II) the applicable drivers of de-
17 forestation and other factors to ensure
18 additionality;

19 (iii) establishes a trajectory that
20 would result in zero net deforestation by
21 not later than 20 years after the date on
22 which the baseline is established;

23 (iv) is adjusted over time to account
24 for changing national circumstances; and

1 (v) is designed to account for all sig-
 2 nificant sources of greenhouse gas emis-
 3 sions from deforestation in the country;

4 (D) with respect to assistance provided for
 5 activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B)
 6 of paragraph (2), require emissions reductions
 7 to be achieved and verified before the provision
 8 of any assistance under this section;

9 (E) with respect to accounting for sub-
 10 national deforestation and forest degradation
 11 reduction activities that lack the standardized
 12 or precise measurement and monitoring tech-
 13 niques needed for a full accounting of changes
 14 in emissions or baselines, or are subject to
 15 other sources of uncertainty, apply a conserv-
 16 ative discount factor to reflect the uncertainty
 17 regarding the levels of reductions achieved;

18 (F) ensure that activities under this sec-
 19 tion are designed, carried out, and managed—

20 (i) using forest management practices
 21 that, in an open and transparent process—

22 (I) improve the livelihoods of for-
 23 est communities in a manner that
 24 promotes the maintenance of intact
 25 forests, protects associated biodiver-

1 sity, and restores native forest species
2 and ecosystems while avoiding the in-
3 troduction of invasive nonnative spe-
4 cies;

5 (II) maintain natural biodiver-
6 sity, resilience, and carbon storage ca-
7 pacity of forests;

8 (III) to the extent practicable, do
9 not adversely affect the permanence of
10 forest carbon stocks or emissions re-
11 ductions;

12 (IV) include broad stakeholder
13 participation and the free prior and
14 informed consent of affected indige-
15 nous peoples; and

16 (V) take into account the needs
17 and interests of local communities,
18 forest-dependent communities, indige-
19 nous peoples, and vulnerable social
20 groups;

21 (ii) in consultation with, and with the
22 full and effective participation of, local
23 communities, indigenous peoples, and for-
24 est-dependent communities in affected
25 areas, as partners and primary stake-

holders, before and during the design,
 planning, implementation, monitoring, and
 evaluation of activities; and

(iii) with equitable sharing of profits
 and benefits derived from the activities
 with local communities, indigenous peoples,
 and forest-dependent communities; and

(G) with respect to assistance for all activi-
 ties under this section, seek to ensure the estab-
 lishment and enforcement of legal regimes,
 standards, processes, and safeguards by the
 country in which the activities are conducted, as
 a condition of such assistance or as a proposed
 activity for which such assistance may be pro-
 vided, which—

(i) protect the rights and interests of
 local communities, indigenous peoples, for-
 est-dependent communities, human rights
 defenders, and vulnerable social groups;

(ii) promote consultations with local
 communities, indigenous peoples, and for-
 est-dependent communities in affected
 areas, as partners and primary stake-
 holders, before and during the design,
 planning, implementation, monitoring, and

1 evaluation of activities under this section;

2 and

3 (iii) ensure equitable sharing of prof-
4 its and benefits from incentives for emis-
5 sions reductions or leakage prevention with
6 local communities, indigenous peoples, and
7 forest-dependent communities.

8 (5) SCOPE.—

9 (A) REDUCED EMISSIONS.—The Adminis-
10 trator shall include reduced emissions from for-
11 est degradation and disturbance of peatlands
12 within the scope of activities under this section.

13 (B) EXPANSION OF AUTHORIZED ACTIVI-
14 TIES.—If the Administrator determines, in con-
15 sultation with the Administrator of the Envi-
16 ronmental Protection Agency and the Secretary
17 of Agriculture, that sufficient methodologies
18 and technical capacities exist to measure, mon-
19 itor, and account for the emissions referred to
20 in subparagraph (A), the Administrator may
21 expand the authorized activities under this sec-
22 tion, as appropriate, to include reduced soil car-
23 bon-derived emissions associated with deforest-
24 ation and degradation of forested wetlands and
25 peatlands, consistent with a comprehensive ap-

1 proach to maintaining and enhancing forests,
2 increasing climate resiliency, reducing emis-
3 sions, and increasing removals of greenhouse
4 gases.

5 (6) ACCOUNTING.—The Administrator shall use
6 a publicly accessible registry to account for and reg-
7 ister the emissions reductions achieved through as-
8 sistance provided under this section each year, after
9 appropriately discounting for uncertainty and other
10 relevant factors as required by the standards estab-
11 lished under paragraph (4).

12 (7) INTERNATIONAL DEFORESTATION REDUC-
13 TION PROGRAM INSURANCE ACCOUNT FOR NON-
14 COMPLETION OR REVERSAL.—In furtherance of the
15 objectives described in subsection (c)(2), the Admin-
16 istrator shall develop and implement a program
17 that—

18 (A) addresses noncompletion or reversal
19 with respect to any greenhouse gas emissions
20 that were not, or are no longer, sequestered;
21 and

22 (B) may include a mechanism to hold in
23 reserve a portion of the amount allocated for
24 projects to support the program.

25 (8) EXTENSION OF ASSISTANCE.—

1 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator may
2 extend, for an additional 5 years, the period
3 during which assistance is authorized for activi-
4 ties supported by assistance under this section,
5 if the Administrator determines that—

6 (i) the country in which the activities
7 are conducted is making substantial
8 progress toward adopting and imple-
9 menting a program to achieve reductions
10 in deforestation measured against a na-
11 tional baseline;

12 (ii) the greenhouse gas emissions re-
13 ductions achieved as a result of the activi-
14 ties are not resulting in significant leakage;

15 (iii) such greenhouse gas emissions re-
16 ductions are being appropriately dis-
17 counted to account for any leakage that is
18 occurring; and

19 (iv) such extension would further ad-
20 vance or ensure achievement of the objec-
21 tives of the activities.

22 (B) ASSISTANCE FOR SUBNATIONAL DE-
23 FORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION RE-
24 Duction ACTIVITIES.—

1 (i) IN GENERAL.—If the Adminis-
2 trator extends the period during which as-
3 sistance is authorized for activities under
4 subparagraph (A), the Administrator shall
5 determine, based on the criteria specified
6 that subparagraph, whether such assist-
7 ance should include assistance for sub-
8 national deforestation and forest degrada-
9 tion reduction activities.

10 (ii) CONTINUED ASSISTANCE.—The
11 Administrator may extend the period dur-
12 ing which assistance is authorized for sub-
13 national deforestation and forest degrada-
14 tion reduction activities beyond the 5-year
15 period described in subparagraph (A) in
16 order to further the objectives described in
17 subparagraph (B) or (C) of subsection
18 (c)(2).

19 (9) COORDINATION WITH FOREIGN ASSIST-
20 ANCE.—Subject to the direction of the President, the
21 Administrator shall, to the extent practicable and
22 consistent with the objectives described in subsection
23 (c)(2), seek to align activities under this section with
24 broader development, poverty alleviation, or natural

1 resource management objectives and initiatives in
2 countries receiving assistance under this section.

3 (10) ASSISTANCE AS SUPPLEMENT.—The provi-
4 sion of assistance for activities under this section
5 shall be used to supplement, and not to supplant,
6 any other Federal, State, or local support available
7 to carry out activities under this section.

8 (11) FUNDING LIMITATION.—Of the funds
9 made available to carry out this section in any fiscal
10 year, not more than 7 percent may be used for the
11 administrative expenses of the United States Agency
12 for International Development in support of activi-
13 ties described in paragraph (2). Such amount shall
14 be in addition to other amounts otherwise available
15 for such purposes.

16 (12) INDONESIA.—Not less than 10 percent of
17 the funds made available in any fiscal year to carry
18 out this section shall be used for activities described
19 in paragraph (2) in Indonesia.

20 (e) LEGAL EFFECT.—

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this section may
22 be construed to supersede, limit, or otherwise affect
23 any restriction imposed by Federal law (including
24 regulations) on any interaction between an entity lo-

1 cated in the United States and an entity located in
2 a foreign country.

3 (2) ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE.—

4 Nothing in this section may be construed to affect
5 the role of the Secretary of State or the responsibil-
6 ities of the Secretary under section 622(c) of the
7 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
8 2382(c)).

9 (f) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The
10 President shall direct the United States representatives to
11 the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
12 other international financial institutions (as defined in
13 section 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions
14 Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c))) to prioritize efforts to combat
15 deforestation.

16 **TITLE V—BILATERAL AND RE-** 17 **GIONAL MULTILATERAL CLI-** 18 **MATE DIPLOMACY AND CO-** 19 **OPERATION**

20 **SEC. 501. NORTH AMERICAN STRATEGY.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall develop a
22 strategy to seek opportunities for trilateral cooperation be-
23 tween the United States, Mexico, and Canada—

1 (1) to support increased ambition on reducing
2 greenhouse gas emissions among these countries;
3 and

4 (2) to advance collaboration on the development
5 and promotion of shared climate action goals and in-
6 terests within multilateral bodies and conferences,
7 including aligning, to the extent possible, the voices,
8 votes, and influence, consistent with the broad for-
9 eign policy goals of the United States, to address
10 issues related to climate change and clean energy de-
11 velopment.

12 (b) ELEMENTS AND PRIORITIES.—The strategy de-
13 scribed in subsection (a) shall include efforts—

14 (1) to ensure that potential projects and invest-
15 ments pursued under the United States-Mexico-Can-
16 ada Agreement—

17 (A) are compatible with long-term climate
18 goals and the collective targets established
19 under the Paris Agreement; and

20 (B) meet all environmental and social re-
21 sponsibility standards required under the
22 USMCA;

23 (2) to explore shared and common interests and
24 cooperative actions to promote clean energy develop-
25 ment, climate security, and climate change mitiga-

tion strategies within institutions (such as the UNFCCC, the Montreal Protocol, the Green Climate Fund, the Group of Twenty and the United Nations) with programs, initiatives and actions to address the climate crisis that may include—

(A) providing support in developing mid-century low-carbon strategies;

(B) extending coal finance restrictions to coal mining operations; and

(C) strengthening and expanding carbon pricing by—

(i) considering the cost of carbon in long-term decision making;

(ii) supporting the development of national or subnational systems;

(iii) sharing technical expertise; and

(iv) making efforts to align pricing instruments where feasible;

(3) to commit to a methane reduction goal and cooperate to reduce black carbon and to recommit to the formal agreement reached at the June 2016 North American Leaders Summit in Ottawa to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas sector by 40 to 45 percent by 2025, and to work to develop a new, more ambitious target for 2030;

1 (4) to develop and implement a North American
2 strategy for sustainable transportation—

3 (A) to encourage State and provincial lead-
4 ers to negotiate interstate and interprovincial
5 sustainable transportation agreements between
6 Mexican, American, and Canadian jurisdictions;

7 (B) to expand the West Coast Electric
8 Highway between Canada, the United States,
9 and Mexico; and

10 (C) to work with automakers to stand-
11 ardize charging infrastructure;

12 (5) to develop and implement coordinated forest
13 and land use strategies to further contribute to
14 emissions mitigation through the adoption of prac-
15 tices and policies that increase carbon sequestration
16 in new and existing forests and reduce emissions
17 from forest conversion to other land uses;

18 (6) to strengthen resilience and equity among
19 low-income and indigenous communities; and

20 (7) to engage international partners in an exist-
21 ing multilateral forum or, if necessary, establish a
22 new multilateral forum to improve global cooperation
23 by—

(A) encouraging the adoption of an emissions reduction target by the International Maritime Organization; and

(B) collaborating with the International Civil Aviation Organization to establish a market-based measure to reduce aviation emissions.

SEC. 502. ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERATION WITH CHINA.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions to sufficiently avoid the worst forecasted effects of climate change requires global cooperation and coordination of efforts;

(2) all other countries look towards the United States and China, as the world's largest emitters and largest economies, for leadership by example to effectively mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, develop and deploy energy generation technologies, and integrate sustainable adaptation solutions to the inevitable effects of climate change;

(3) given the volume of China's greenhouse gas emissions and the scientific imperative to swiftly reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero emissions around 2050, China should—

(A) revise its long-term pledge;

1 (B) seek to immediately peak its emissions;

2 (C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas
3 emissions significantly to meet a more ambi-
4 tious long-term 2050 reductions target; and

5 (D) update its nationally determined con-
6 tribution along a trajectory that aligns with
7 achieving a more ambitious net-zero by 2050
8 emissions target;

9 (4) it is in the United States national interest
10 to prioritize climate change in its bilateral engage-
11 ment with China, as global climate risks cannot be
12 mitigated without a significant reduction in Chinese
13 domestic and overseas emissions;

14 (5) the United States and China, to the extent
15 practicable, should coordinate on making and deliv-
16 ering ambitious pledges to reduce greenhouse gas
17 emissions, with aspirations towards achieving net
18 zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;

19 (6) the United States and its allies should work
20 together, using diplomatic and economic tools, to
21 hold China accountable for any failure by China—

22 (A) to increase ambition in its 2030 na-
23 tionally determined contribution, in line with
24 net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 be-
25 fore the 26th Conference of the Parties to the

1 UNFCCC scheduled for November 2021 and
2 meeting a more ambitious nationally determined
3 contribution;

4 (B) to work faithfully to uphold the prin-
5 ciples, goals, and rules of the Paris Agreement;

6 (C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to under-
7 mine or devolve the Paris Agreement’s rule or
8 underlying framework, particularly within areas
9 of accountability transparency, and shared re-
10 sponsibility among all parties;

11 (D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive
12 projects from China’s Belt and Road Initiative
13 and other overseas investments, including—

14 (i) working with allies and partners of
15 the United States to eliminate support for
16 coal power production projects in China’s
17 Belt and Road Initiative;

18 (ii) providing financing and project
19 support for cleaner and less risky alter-
20 natives; and

21 (iii) undertaking “parallel initiatives”
22 to enhance capacity building programs and
23 overseas sustainable investment criteria,
24 including in areas such as integrated en-
25 ergy planning, power sector reform, just

1 transition, distributed generation, procure-
2 ment, transparency, and standards to sup-
3 port low-emissions growth in developing
4 countries; and

5 (E) to phase out existing coal power plants
6 and reduce net coal power production;

7 (7) the United States should pursue confidence-
8 building opportunities for the United States and
9 China to undertake “parallel initiatives” on clean
10 energy research, development, finance, and deploy-
11 ment, including through economic and stimulus
12 measures with clear, mutually agreed upon rules and
13 policies to protect intellectual property, ensure equi-
14 table, nonpunitive provision of support, and verify
15 implementation, which would provide catalytic
16 progress towards delivering a global clean energy
17 transformation that benefits all people; and

18 (8) the United States should pursue cooperative
19 initiatives to shift toward the import and consumma-
20 tion of forest and agricultural commodities that are
21 produced in a manner that does not contribute to
22 deforestation.

1 **SEC. 503. UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION CO-**
2 **OPERATION ON CLIMATE FINANCE FOR DE-**
3 **VELOPING COUNTRIES.**

4 (a) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is—

5 (1) to restore the historic alliance between the
6 United States and countries of the European Union
7 on climate action; and

8 (2) to renew the United States commitment to
9 advancing global cooperation on addressing climate
10 change and achieving the goals of the Paris Agree-
11 ment.

12 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE UNITED
13 STATES-EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY AND DEVELOP-
14 MENT DIALOGUE.—It is the sense of Congress that the
15 United States should restart the United States-European
16 Union Security and Development Dialogue to focus spe-
17 cifically on climate action, climate security, and clean en-
18 ergy cooperation, including—

19 (1) partnering and formulating strategies to
20 counter efforts to weaken or change critical elements
21 of the implementation of the Paris Agreement that
22 would disadvantage the United States or the Euro-
23 pean Union;

24 (2) building coalitions of like-minded parties
25 committed to achieving large reductions in green-

1 house gas emissions under the Paris Agreement and
2 putting pressure on all parties to do the same;

3 (3) coordination on joint strategies to promote
4 climate action by the People's Republic of China,
5 and deter Chinese domestic and international invest-
6 ment in high carbon infrastructure;

7 (4) finding opportunities to engage and facili-
8 tate private sector collaboration regarding clean en-
9 ergy and innovations on greenhouse gas emissions
10 reductions;

11 (5) exploring the creation of United States-Eu-
12 ropean Union clean energy and climate adaptation,
13 development, and finance mechanisms to support
14 and leverage private sector investment in projects
15 and activities to improve developing countries' resil-
16 ience capacities, ability to adapt and thrive in the
17 face of the effects of climate change and clean en-
18 ergy development;

19 (6) scientific research, modeling, forecasting,
20 and data collaboration to improve global under-
21 standing and preparation for the compounding ef-
22 fects of climate change; and

23 (7) intelligence sharing.

24 (c) DEVELOPMENT FINANCE COOPERATION.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President should seek
2 opportunities to partner with European Development
3 Finance Institutions to develop financing tools based
4 on shared development finance criteria and mecha-
5 nisms to support investments in developing countries
6 that support low carbon economic development and
7 promote climate change resiliency and adaptation.

8 (2) PARTNERSHIP FUND.—The Chief Executive
9 Officer of the United States International Develop-
10 ment Finance Corporation should partner with the
11 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
12 to create a fund or multilateral financing mechanism
13 to support clean energy development and climate
14 change adaptation and resilience activities in devel-
15 oping countries.

16 (3) RESPONSE TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
17 CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.—The Presi-
18 dent shall work with European counterparts to es-
19 tablish a formal United States-European Commis-
20 sion Working Group to develop a comprehensive
21 strategy to respond to the Belt and Road Initiative
22 established by the Government of the People’s Re-
23 public of China. United States participants in this
24 proposed working group shall seek to integrate exist-
25 ing efforts into the strategy, including—

1 (A) the European Union Strategy on Con-
 2 necting Europe and Asia;

3 (B) the Three Seas Initiative;

4 (C) the Blue Dot Network among the
 5 United States, Japan, and Australia;

6 (D) a European Union-Japan initiative
 7 that has leveraged \$65,000,000,000 for infra-
 8 structure projects and emphasizes transparency
 9 standards; and

10 (E) efforts to address the Government of
 11 the People's Republic of China's use of the
 12 United Nations to advance the Belt and Road
 13 Initiative, including the proliferation of memo-
 14 randa of understanding between the People's
 15 Republic of China and United Nations funds
 16 and programs on the implementation of the
 17 Belt and Road Initiative.

18 (4) CO-FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE
 19 PROJECTS.—

20 (A) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
 21 TIONS.—Subject to subparagraph (B), there are
 22 authorized to be appropriated such sums as
 23 may be necessary to co-finance infrastructure
 24 projects that could otherwise be included within
 25 China's Belt and Road Initiative.

1 (B) CONDITIONS.—Amounts appropriated
 2 pursuant to subparagraph (A) may not be ex-
 3 pended unless—

4 (i) the United States can leverage ex-
 5 isting and future projects that have en-
 6 tered into contracts with the Belt and
 7 Road Initiative to further promote trans-
 8 parency and debt sustainability; and

9 (ii) the projects to be financed—

10 (I) promote the public good;

11 (II) will not promote the use of
 12 fossil fuels; and

13 (III) will have substantially lower
 14 greenhouse gas intensity than the pro-
 15 posed Belt and Road Initiative alter-
 16 native.

17 (d) SUPPORT FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY
 18 ACT.—Section 2 of the Support for Eastern European De-
 19 mocracy Act (22 U.S.C. 5401) is amended—

20 (1) in subsection (b)(2)—

21 (A) in subparagraph (H), by striking
 22 “and” at the end;

23 (B) in subparagraph (I), by adding “and”
 24 at the end; and

25 (C) by adding at the end the following:

1 “(J) helping workers and communities in
 2 countries most dependent on fossil fuel energy
 3 that may be vulnerable to socioeconomic
 4 changes due to the European Union’s transition
 5 to net zero greenhouse gas emissions.”; and

6 (2) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the
 7 following:

8 “(26) **JUST TRANSITION ASSISTANCE.**—Assist-
 9 ance to support workers and communities in coun-
 10 tries most dependent on fossil fuel energy and most
 11 vulnerable to socioeconomic changes due to the Eu-
 12 ropean Union’s transition to net zero greenhouse gas
 13 emissions.”.

14 **SEC. 504. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CLEAN ENERGY CO-**
 15 **OPERATION WITH INDIA.**

16 It is the sense of Congress that—

17 (1) the United States should support efforts to
 18 strengthen India’s resilience capacities that ensure
 19 people, households, communities, institutions, and
 20 systems can assess, anticipate, prevent, adapt to,
 21 cope with, and recover from shocks and stresses as-
 22 sociated with the effects of climate change;

23 (2) the United States, through the Bureau of
 24 Energy Resources of the Department of State, the
 25 United States Agency for International Develop-

1 ment, the United States International Development
2 Finance Corporation, the Department of Energy, the
3 Export-Import Bank of the United States, and the
4 International Trade Administration, should encour-
5 age private sector investment in, and financing for,
6 the development and deployment of clean energy and
7 climate mitigation technologies in India;

8 (3) robust cooperation between the United
9 States and India to develop and deploy clean energy
10 technologies, including private sector cooperation,
11 should be a top bilateral energy diplomacy priority
12 and the top priority in the countries' energy diplo-
13 macy and should include—

14 (A) clean energy;

15 (B) electric vehicles and expansive charg-
16 ing station networks;

17 (C) next-generation refrigeration equip-
18 ment and refrigerants; and

19 (D) other technologies and chemicals that
20 are in the interest of United States industry
21 leaders in the refrigeration and chemical cool-
22 ant industries that are compliant with the
23 Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol;

24 (4) the collaboration between the United States
25 and India on the development and deployment of

clean energy technologies has resulted in innovative new technologies that have helped significantly lower the carbon emissions of the power sector in India; and

(5) since demand for energy in India will increase with the expansion of the economy and middle class of India, it is in the interest of United States national security and global security for the United States to support India in growing the energy sector of India in environmentally and socially responsible ways that mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and improve the climate security of India.

SEC. 505. POWER AFRICA.

The Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–121; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note) is amended—

(1) in section 3—

(A) in paragraph (2), by inserting “mitigate and lower carbon emissions from energy production,” after “development,”;

(B) in paragraph (7), by adding “and” at the end;

(C) by striking paragraph (8); and

(D) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (8);

(2) in section 4—

1 (A) in subsection (a)—

2 (i) in paragraph (1), by striking “an
3 appropriate mix of power solutions to pro-
4 vide access to sufficient reliable, affordable,
5 and sustainable power in order to reduce
6 poverty” and inserting “power solutions to
7 provide access to sufficient, reliable, af-
8 fordable, and sustainable power in order to
9 reduce poverty and energy sector carbon
10 emissions”; and

11 (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking “and
12 technological” and inserting “, advances a
13 country’s mitigation commitments (or con-
14 ditional mitigation commitments) in ac-
15 cordance with a country’s nationally deter-
16 mined contribution, and supports techno-
17 logical”; and

18 (B) in subsection (b)—

19 (i) in paragraph (2)—

20 (I) in subparagraph (F), by strik-
21 ing “and” at the end;

22 (II) in subparagraph (G), by
23 striking the period at the end and in-
24 serting “; and”; and

1 (III) by adding at the end the
2 following:

3 “(H) reduce carbon emissions from the en-
4 ergy sector.”; and

5 (ii) in paragraph (4), by striking “the
6 use of a broad power mix, including fossil
7 fuel and”;

8 (3) in section 5—

9 (A) in subsection (a)—

10 (i) in paragraph (6), by striking
11 “and” at the end;

12 (ii) by redesignating paragraph (7) as
13 paragraph (8); and

14 (iii) by inserting after paragraph (6)
15 the following:

16 “(7) deploying renewable energy; and”; and

17 (B) by amending subsection (d) to read as
18 follows:

19 “(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
20 is authorized to be appropriated \$750,000,000 for each
21 of the fiscal years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 to
22 provide assistance in accordance with subsection (a) and
23 section 3.”;

24 (4) in section 7(a)—

1 (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1),
2 by inserting “and every 2 years thereafter,”
3 after “Act,”; and

4 (B) in paragraph (1), by striking “power
5 generation” each place such term appears and
6 inserting “renewable energy generation”; and

7 (5) by adding at the end the following:

8 **“SEC. 8. COORDINATOR FOR POWER AFRICA.**

9 “(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after
10 the date of the enactment of the United States Climate
11 Leadership in International Mitigation, Adaptation, and
12 Technology Enhancement Act of 2021, the Administrator
13 for the United States Agency for International Develop-
14 ment, under the direction of the Secretary of State, shall
15 appoint a Coordinator for Power Africa, who shall serve
16 in the Bureau Economic Growth, Education, and the En-
17 vironment of the United States Agency for International
18 Development.

19 “(b) DUTIES.—The Coordinator for Power Africa
20 shall—

21 “(1) be primarily located at a mission in sub-
22 Saharan Africa;

23 “(2) lead—

1 “(A) the execution of the Power Africa Ini-
2 tiative in accordance with the purpose and poli-
3 cies set forth in sections 2 and 3; and

4 “(B) the development and execution of the
5 strategy established under section 4;

6 “(3) coordinate the Interagency Working Group
7 established under section 4(c);

8 “(4) manage the funding appropriated for the
9 Power Africa Initiative by Congress; and

10 “(5) execute the directives described in sections
11 5 and 6.”.

12 **SEC. 506. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE.**

13 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
14 ings:

15 (1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily
16 reliant upon imported oil to provide for approxi-
17 mately 90 percent of their energy production.

18 (2) The level of dependence is even higher in-
19 cluding—

20 (A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9
21 percent of its electricity;

22 (B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96
23 percent of its electricity;

24 (C) The Virgin Islands, which relies on oil
25 for nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and

1 (D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100
2 percent of its electricity.

3 (3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has
4 had a detrimental effect on economic development,
5 growth, and competitiveness in the Caribbean.

6 (4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Carib-
7 bean coral reefs have been lost due to coastal devel-
8 opment and pollution. Soot particulates and climate
9 change caused by burning fossil fuels have seriously
10 damaged coral reefs, which are a significant source
11 of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, and natural
12 beauty.

13 (5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for elec-
14 tricity—

15 (A) has serious health impacts in the form
16 of higher rates of asthma and other lung ail-
17 ments; and

18 (B) can also exacerbate climate change.

19 (6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulner-
20 able to sea level rise and stronger storms.

21 (7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of
22 the countries of the Caribbean on oil was perpet-
23 uated by the Venezuelan-led Petrocaribe oil alliance,
24 which—

1 (A) offered preferential terms for oil sales;
2 and

3 (B) supplies some countries with up to 40
4 percent of their energy production needs.

5 (8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and
6 political turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Govern-
7 ment of Venezuela to retract its commitments to the
8 Petrocaribe oil alliance and step away as a regional
9 power. Only Cuba still receives preferential
10 Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from Venezuela,
11 while other Petrocaribe member countries are experi-
12 encing a destabilized flow of oil.

13 (9) China has spent more than
14 \$244,000,000,000 on energy projects worldwide
15 since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in Latin
16 America and the Caribbean. Although the majority
17 of this spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has
18 also been the largest investor in clean energy glob-
19 ally for almost a decade.

20 (10) The World Bank estimates that the Carib-
21 bean will need \$12,000,000,000 in power invest-
22 ments through 2035.

23 (11) Renewable energy technology costs have
24 decreased dramatically in recent years, offering a
25 more viable economic alternative for energy produc-

1 tion. Solar energy prices have fallen by 80 percent
2 since 2008, causing significant market growth, and
3 according to data released by the International Re-
4 newable Energy Agency, $\frac{1}{3}$ of global power capacity
5 is based in renewable energy.

6 (12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund
7 estimated that transportation accounted for 36 per-
8 cent of the total primary energy consumed in the
9 Caribbean subregion.

10 (13) According to the United Nations Environ-
11 ment Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean
12 could achieve annual savings of \$621,000,000,000
13 and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO₂ by
14 2050 if the region's energy and transport sectors
15 reach net zero emissions.

16 (14) The Caribbean has an abundance of on-
17 shore and offshore resources needed for renewable
18 energy, including sun, wind, geothermal, and some
19 hydropower production capacity.

20 (15) The United States Government is deeply
21 engaged in providing technical and policy assistance
22 to countries of the Caribbean on energy issues
23 through—

24 (A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of
25 the Americas;

1 (B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and
2 (C) bilateral assistance programs.

3 (16) On February 19, 2014, at the North
4 American Leaders' Summit, President Barack
5 Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada,
6 and President Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico re-
7 affirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reli-
8 able, and increasingly renewable power to the Carib-
9 bean, while opening wider markets for clean energy
10 and green technology.

11 (17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack
12 Obama announced the Caribbean Energy Security
13 Initiative, which would partner with individual coun-
14 tries—

15 (A) to transform its energy sector;

16 (B) to work to increase access to finance,
17 good governance, and diversification; and

18 (C) to maximize the impact of existing
19 donor effects.

20 (18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-
21 Caribbean-Central American Energy Summit, the
22 energy security task force formally launched the
23 Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strat-
24 egy (C-SERMS) as a mechanism to manage re-
25 gional coordination and action on energy security

1 and agreed to expand the regional market and trans-
2 mission system.

3 (19) The United States has an important op-
4 portunity—

5 (A) to deepen this engagement;

6 (B) to work as a partner with Caribbean
7 countries on a more regional and coordinated
8 basis;

9 (C) to help ease the region’s dependence
10 on imported oil; and

11 (D) to promote affordable alternative
12 sources of energy.

13 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

14 (1) CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.—The term “Carib-
15 bean countries” means countries in the Caribbean
16 region, but does not including Cuba or Venezuela.

17 (2) CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS.—The term
18 “Caribbean governments” means the national gov-
19 ernments of the Caribbean countries.

20 (c) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to
21 help Caribbean countries—

22 (1) achieve greater energy security and improve
23 domestic energy resource mobilization;

24 (2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;

1 (3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil,
2 other petroleum products, and coal for the genera-
3 tion of electricity;

4 (4) increase production of renewable energy;
5 and

6 (5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of
7 their national determined contributions to the Paris
8 Agreement.

9 (d) STRATEGY.—

10 (1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days
11 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
12 retary of State shall submit a multi-year strategy to
13 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
14 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
15 of Representatives that describes how the Depart-
16 ment of State will promote regional cooperation with
17 Caribbean countries—

18 (A) to lower dependence on imported fuels,
19 grow domestic clean energy production in the
20 region, strengthen regional energy security, and
21 lower energy sector greenhouse gas emissions;

22 (B) to decrease dependence on oil in the
23 transportation sector;

1 (C) to increase energy efficiency, energy
2 conservation, and investment in alternatives to
3 imported fuels;

4 (D) to improve grid reliability and mod-
5 ernize electricity transmission networks;

6 (E) to advance deployment of innovative
7 solutions to expand community and individuals'
8 access to electricity;

9 (F) to help reform energy markets to en-
10 courage good regulatory governance and to pro-
11 mote a climate of private sector investment; and

12 (G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions
13 from the energy and transportation sector.

14 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under
15 subsection (a) shall include—

16 (A) a thorough review and inventory of
17 United States Government activities that are
18 being carried out bilaterally, regionally, and in
19 coordination with multilateral institutions—

20 (i) to promote energy and climate se-
21 curity in the Caribbean region; and

22 (ii) to reduce the region's reliance on
23 oil for electricity generation;

24 (B) opportunities for marshaling regional
25 cooperation—

1 (i) to overcome market barriers result-
2 ing from the small size of Caribbean en-
3 ergy markets;

4 (ii) to address the high transportation
5 and infrastructure costs faced by Carib-
6 bean countries;

7 (iii) to ensure greater donor coordina-
8 tion between governments, multilateral in-
9 stitutions, multilateral banks, and private
10 investors; and

11 (iv) to expand regional financing op-
12 portunities to allow for lower cost energy
13 entrepreneurship;

14 (C) measures to ensure that each Carib-
15 bean government has—

16 (i) an independent utility regulator or
17 equivalent;

18 (ii) affordable access by third-party
19 investors to its electrical grid with minimal
20 regulatory interference;

21 (iii) effective energy efficiency and en-
22 ergy conservation;

23 (iv) programs to address technical and
24 nontechnical issues;

1 (v) a plan to eliminate major market
2 distortions;

3 (vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and

4 (vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean
5 energy solutions; and

6 (D) recommendations for how United
7 States policy, technical, and economic assist-
8 ance can be used in the Caribbean region—

9 (i) to advance renewable energy devel-
10 opment and the incorporation of renewable
11 technologies into existing energy grids and
12 the development and deployment of micro-
13 grids where appropriate and feasible to
14 boost energy security and reliability, par-
15 ticularly to underserved communities;

16 (ii) to increase the generation of clean
17 energy sufficiently to replace and allow for
18 the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy
19 generation units in Caribbean countries;

20 (iii) to create regional financing op-
21 portunities to allow for lower cost energy
22 entrepreneurship;

23 (iv) to deploy transaction advisors in
24 the region to help attract private invest-

1 ment and break down any market or regu-
2 latory barriers; and

3 (v) to establish a mechanism for each
4 host government to have access to inde-
5 pendent legal advice—

6 (I) to speed the development of
7 energy-related contracts; and

8 (II) to better protect the inter-
9 ests of Caribbean governments and
10 citizens.

11 (3) CONSULTATION.—In devising the strategy
12 under this subsection, the Secretary of State shall
13 work with the Secretary of Energy and shall consult
14 with—

15 (A) the Secretary of the Interior;

16 (B) the Secretary of Commerce;

17 (C) the Secretary of the Treasury;

18 (D) the Board of Directors of the Export-
19 Import Bank of the United States;

20 (E) the Board of Directors of the Develop-
21 ment Finance Corporation;

22 (F) the Administrator of the United States
23 Agency for International Development;

24 (G) the Caribbean governments;

1 (H) the Inter-American Development
2 Bank;

3 (I) the World Bank Group; and

4 (J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services
5 Corporation.

6 **SEC. 507. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONSERVATION OF THE**
7 **AMAZON RIVER BASIN.**

8 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
9 ings:

10 (1) The Amazon River basin and the Amazon
11 rainforest, often referred to as Amazonia—

12 (A) covers more than 2,670,000 square
13 miles in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
14 French Guiana, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and
15 Venezuela; and

16 (B) is home to more species of plants and
17 animals than any other terrestrial ecosystem on
18 the planet, housing nearly 30 percent of the
19 world's species, which apart from their intrinsic
20 value as living organisms, have potential value
21 in the form of medicine, research, textiles, food,
22 and other products for the region's population.

23 (2) Tens of millions of people depend on serv-
24 ices afforded by the Amazon forest, including—

25 (A) the use of rivers for transportation;

1 (B) reliance on logging and collection of
2 non-timber forest products as major industries
3 for employment; and

4 (C) the cultivation of nutrients in flood-
5 plain areas for agriculture and areas for which
6 the Amazon Basin is a watershed.

7 (3) The Amazon River has long been recognized
8 as an important repository of biodiversity and nat-
9 ural resources, not only for local peoples and indige-
10 nous communities, but also for the rest of the world
11 due to—

12 (A) its fresh water, which provides count-
13 less services for humans in the form of water
14 agriculture, transportation, and food and serves
15 as an important habitat for countless species,
16 including over 2,500 species of fish and river
17 dolphins;

18 (B) its medicinal plants, which are contin-
19 ually used by local peoples to treat traditional
20 diseases, including malaria (one of the most le-
21 thal diseases in the tropics), and which con-
22 stitute 70 percent of the plant species in the
23 world found to have anti-cancer properties;

24 (C) its important role as an oxygen source,
25 producing 20 percent of the Earth's oxygen and

1 earning the Amazon forest the nickname “lungs
2 of our Earth” for its role in taking in enormous
3 amounts of the carbon dioxide emitted by
4 human activity and the burning of fossil fuels
5 and replacing it with the oxygen we breathe
6 through the process of photosynthesis;

7 (D) its food supply, which is associated
8 with rainforests, including coffee, rice, choco-
9 late, tomatoes, potatoes, bananas, black pepper,
10 pineapples, and corn;

11 (E) its role in climate control caused by its
12 exchange of enormous quantities of water and
13 energy with the surrounding atmosphere, which
14 is estimated as being responsible for creating
15 75 percent of its own rainfall, which feeds the
16 nearby rivers through evapotranspiration before
17 flowing directly into the ocean and influencing
18 the currents that impact the climate; and

19 (F) ecotourism, which produces annual
20 profits of more than \$11,600,000, which bene-
21 fits the local economy, enhances the quality of
22 living through securing more jobs, and educates
23 global citizens regarding the importance of
24 maintaining the world’s natural spaces.

1 (4) Public opinion research, conducted by the
2 Brazilian polling firm Datafolha in 2020, found
3 that—

4 (A) 87 percent of the respondents felt
5 strongly that conservation of the Amazon is
6 very important;

7 (B) 73 percent of the respondents are con-
8 cerned with the rate of increased deforestation
9 in the Amazon basin;

10 (C) 77 percent of the respondents believed
11 strongly that the conduct and policies of the
12 ministries responsible for management and con-
13 servation of the Amazon have contributed to de-
14 forestation in the Amazon;

15 (D) 92.5 percent of the respondents believe
16 Brazil should prioritize the pursuit of economic
17 activities in the Amazon basin that do not con-
18 tribute to deforestation; and

19 (E) only 5.6 percent of the respondents
20 think that forests need to be cut down to pro-
21 mote economic growth in the region.

22 (5) The recent 8,850 square kilometer reduc-
23 tion of the Amazon forest, exacerbated by climate
24 change, has resulted in a significant decrease in the
25 ample benefits described in paragraph (3), in addi-

1 tion to the displacement of many indigenous peoples
2 due to the lessened economic opportunity.

3 (6) Clear cutting has disrupted the habitat for
4 plants and animals in the region, fracturing the
5 fragile forest ecology by causing species to migrate
6 and sometimes disappear.

7 (7) As of September 2020, Brazil's National In-
8 stitute for Space Research reported that 45,067
9 fires have burned in the Amazon River basin and
10 more than 63,000 fires have burned in all of Brazil
11 in 2020.

12 (8) The removal of trees from the Amazon
13 River basin has decreased water and nutrient up-
14 take, while increasing runoff with greater loads of
15 both nitrogen and phosphorus concentrations, dete-
16 riorating the quality of fresh water, and putting the
17 environment at greater risk for disasters like flood-
18 ing and landslides.

19 (9) The Government of Brazil has historically
20 recognized the negative repercussions of deforest-
21 ation via processes like clear cutting, which had fa-
22 cilitated Brazil's establishment and maintenance of
23 numerous successful conservation policies and pay-
24 ments for environmental service programs, such
25 as—

1 (A) Reducing Emissions from Deforest-
2 ation and Forest Degradation projects, such as
3 the Juma project in Amazonas and the Surui
4 project in Acre and subnational-scale program
5 in Acre and Mato Grosso, which seek to reduce
6 global warming by stopping emissions related to
7 deforestation;

8 (B) jurisdictional programs involving the
9 collaboration of several groups, including farm-
10 ers, government officials, businesses, and non-
11 governmental organizations, to achieve con-
12 sensus on sustainability milestones;

13 (C) the Amazon Fund, which is primarily
14 funded by the Government of Norway to imple-
15 ment payments for forest conservation activi-
16 ties; and

17 (D) the Bolsa Floresta program in the
18 Brazilian state of Amazonas, which pays land-
19 owners and communities to help protect forest
20 areas.

21 (10) United States and multilateral cooperation
22 efforts to protect and restore the Amazon have yield-
23 ed significant beneficial impacts, such as—

24 (A) the reduction of deforestation by more
25 than 80 percent; and

1 (B) the World Bank's establishment of
2 more than 25 percent of the areas protected
3 from correspondence.

4 (11) The UNESCO World Heritage site verifies
5 the importance of the Amazon River basin being one
6 of the richest areas in the planet in terms of bio-
7 diversity, ecological and biological processes. Defor-
8 estation and potential new policies could harmfully
9 limit its natural resources if their benefits are not
10 taken into serious consideration.

11 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
12 gress that—

13 (1) the President should—

14 (A) engage with the Government of Brazil,
15 through bilateral and multilateral efforts, on its
16 Amazon development and deforestation policies,
17 in support of the Brazilian people's and the pri-
18 vate sector's interest in conserving the Amazon
19 rainforest;

20 (B) promote stewardship and conservation
21 policies that support sustainable economic
22 growth activities in the Amazon River basin;

23 (C) consider the Government of Brazil's
24 management and land use conversion of the
25 Amazon River basin policies when assessing, ne-

1 gotiating, or developing new bilateral agree-
2 ments with Brazil, including trade agreements,
3 or engaging in relevant international forums;

4 (D) in the spirit of Brazil's leadership
5 hosting the 1992 Rio Summit, which led to the
6 establishment of the UNFCCC, urge the Gov-
7 ernment of Brazil to enhance the ambition of
8 Brazil's efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas
9 emissions; and

10 (E) encourage the Government of Brazil,
11 through bilateral and multilateral efforts, to im-
12 mediately work proactively to address climate
13 change and to promote low carbon and sustain-
14 able economic development;

15 (2) the United States Ambassador to Brazil
16 should immediately engage with the Government of
17 Brazil to support improvements to stewardship ef-
18 forts of the Amazon rainforest and to assist with ur-
19 gent efforts to combat fires burning across the Ama-
20 zon River basin by—

21 (A) amplifying the Brazilian people's con-
22 cerns—

23 (i) about climate change and seeking
24 opportunities for cooperative climate action

1 through the United States-Brazil bilateral
2 relationship; and

3 (ii) with Brazil's management and
4 land use conversion policies affecting the
5 Amazon River basin;

6 (B) reinforcing United States support for
7 the important role civil society is playing to
8 keep the public informed about the importance
9 of Amazon conservation, particularly as it re-
10 lates to regulating carbon in the Earth's atmos-
11 phere; and

12 (C) offering support for efforts to combat
13 fires in the Amazon River basin that are exac-
14 erbating Brazil's environmental crisis; and

15 (3) the Secretary of the Treasury should pro-
16 vide financial and technical assistance to combat
17 wildfires burning across the Brazil, including in the
18 Amazon River basin.

19 (c) POLICY STATEMENT.—The Secretary of State
20 shall elevate bilateral engagements around cooperation
21 and peer-to-peer accountability on Brazil's climate action
22 commitments by—

23 (1) supporting the efforts of the Government of
24 Brazil to increase sustainable development of the

1 Amazon region, including by strengthening environ-
2 mental enforcement and ending illegal deforestation;

3 (2) encouraging the Government of Brazil to
4 enforce its conservation laws, which include—

5 (A) restoring the responsibility of man-
6 aging indigenous reserves and the demarcation
7 of lands back to indigenous peoples;

8 (B) deescalating violence against indige-
9 nous peoples, prosecuting individuals and enti-
10 ties that threaten or harm indigenous peoples
11 or communities, and maintain the National In-
12 dian Foundation;

13 (C) addressing activities that increase de-
14 forestation rates in the Amazon basin, which in-
15 clude—

16 (i) curtailing indigenous people's land
17 rights; and

18 (ii) unsustainable cattle ranching, soy
19 bean farming, mining, hydropower dam
20 construction, and highway construction ac-
21 tivities;

22 (D) threatening to degrade Brazil's carbon
23 emissions reductions commitments that are
24 heavily based upon the conservation of Brazil's
25 rainforests; and

1 (E) addressing challenges for civil society
 2 to operate, oversee, and advocate for the contin-
 3 ued conservation and restoration of the Amazon
 4 River basin;

5 (3) encouraging, to the maximum extent prac-
 6 ticable, the Government of Brazil to develop and de-
 7 liver ambitious pledges to reduce greenhouse gas
 8 emissions under the Paris Agreement, while holding
 9 Brazil accountable for delivering on its commit-
 10 ments;

11 (4) supporting the voice of Brazilian civil soci-
 12 ety and the role civil society plays in advancing civil
 13 society's efforts to protect Brazil's natural resources
 14 and helping ensure civil society's abilities to operate,
 15 oversee, and advocate for the continued conservation
 16 and restoration of the Amazon River basin;

17 (5) advancing the rights and protections of in-
 18 digenous peoples whose communities, well-being, and
 19 opportunities for economic growth are frequently put
 20 at risk by deforestation, extractive industries, com-
 21 mercial scale agriculture, and hydropower dam con-
 22 struction;

23 (6) listening to and engaging with the people of
 24 Brazil on their country's commitments to advancing
 25 conservation efforts in the Amazon River basin that

allow for sustainable economic growth, while protecting the Amazon rainforest and Amazon River basin's important and unique resources despite the proposed changes;

(7) renewing support for programs that support Amazonian nations, civil society, and local leaders, including indigenous communities, in maintaining critically important conservation efforts to protect and restore the Amazon River basin ecosystem; and

(8) supporting efforts by subnational governments and the private sector to advance sustainable development and reduce deforestation in the Amazon region.

**SEC. 508. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING RENEWABLE
ENERGY IN INDONESIA.**

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) cooperation on the development and deployment of renewable energy technologies should be a priority in relations between the United States and Indonesia and the top priority in the countries' energy diplomacy;

(2) it is in the interest of United States to support the growth of Indonesia's renewable energy sector in environmentally and socially responsible ways that—

1 (A) reduce reliance on fossil fuels in ways
 2 that do not increase pressure on the land sector
 3 or increase land-based emissions;

4 (B) mitigate greenhouse gas emissions;

5 (C) provide economic opportunities; and

6 (D) improve the climate security of Indo-
 7 nesia;

8 (3) the United States, through the Bureau of
 9 Energy Resources of the Department of State, the
 10 United States International Development Finance
 11 Corporation, the Department of Energy, the Export-
 12 Import Bank of the United States, the International
 13 Trade Administration, and the United States Agency
 14 for International Development, should encourage
 15 private sector investment in and financing for the
 16 development and deployment of renewable power
 17 sources in Indonesia;

18 (4) the United States should—

19 (A) support and encourage Indonesia to
 20 pursue ambitious growth from solar and wind
 21 sources of energy generation; and

22 (B) provide technical assistance to the
 23 Government of Indonesia and subnational au-
 24 thorities on regulatory reforms and addressing

1 other barriers to deployment of renewable en-
2 ergy; and

3 (5) it is in the interest of United States refrig-
4 eration and refrigerant production industries to help
5 serve Indonesia’s increased demand for refrigeration
6 and air conditioning, and the adoption of the Kigali
7 Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, is driving in-
8 novation and investments in next-generation refrig-
9 eration equipment and refrigerants in Indonesia.

10 **TITLE VI—WOMEN AND CLIMATE** 11 **CHANGE ACT**

12 **SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.**

13 This title may be cited as the “Women and Climate
14 Change Act”.

15 **SEC. 602. FINDINGS.**

16 Congress makes the following findings:

17 (1) Women in the United States and around
18 the world are—

19 (A) the linchpin of families and commu-
20 nities; and

21 (B) often the first to feel the immediate
22 and adverse effects of social, environmental,
23 and economic stresses on their families and
24 communities.

1 (2) The United Nations has recognized, as a
 2 central organizing principle for its work, that “no
 3 enduring solution to society’s most threatening so-
 4 cial, economic and political problems can be found
 5 without the full participation, and the full empower-
 6 ment, of the world’s women.”.

7 (3) The United Nations Development Pro-
 8 gramme’s Human Development Report 2013 pre-
 9 dicted that the number of people living in extreme
 10 poverty could increase by up to 3,000,000,000 by
 11 2050 unless environmental disasters are averted by
 12 coordinated global action.

13 (4) Climate change is already forcing the most
 14 vulnerable communities and populations in devel-
 15 oping countries to face unprecedented climate stress,
 16 including—

17 (A) slow onset effects of climate change,
 18 such as sea level rise, increasing temperatures,
 19 water scarcity, and drought; and

20 (B) severe weather events and floods,
 21 which can lead to reduced agricultural produc-
 22 tivity, food insecurity, and increased disease.

23 (5) Climate change—

24 (A) exacerbates issues of resource scarcity
 25 and lack of accessibility to primary natural re-

1 sources, forest resources, and arable land for
2 food production;

3 (B) contributes to increased tension and
4 instability, particularly in countries and regions
5 with poor or weak governance systems; and

6 (C) increases the workload and stresses on
7 women farmers, who are estimated to produce
8 nearly 50 percent of the food consumed in most
9 developing countries, which exacerbates food in-
10 security.

11 (6) Women will disproportionately face harmful
12 impacts from climate change, particularly in poor
13 and developing countries in which women regularly
14 assume increased responsibility for—

15 (A) growing the family's food;

16 (B) collecting water, fuel, and other re-
17 sources;

18 (C) earning money; and

19 (D) sending remittances.

20 (7) Epidemics, such as malaria and Zika, are
21 expected to worsen and spread due to variations in
22 climate, putting women and girls (especially those
23 who are pregnant, who are lactating, or who hope to
24 become pregnant) and children without access to
25 prevention and medical services at risk.

1 (8) The direct and indirect effects of climate
 2 change have a disproportionate impact on
 3 marginalized women, including refugees, displaced
 4 persons, migrants, religious, racial, or ethnic minori-
 5 ties, adolescent girls, lesbian and trans women,
 6 women living in poverty, and women and girls with
 7 disabilities and those infected with HIV.

8 (9) Conflict has a disproportionate impact on
 9 the most vulnerable communities and populations,
 10 including women, and can be exacerbated in regions
 11 of the world with changing or harsher climates, lead-
 12 ing to migration, forced displacement, and conflicts
 13 over scarce natural resources, including land and
 14 water.

15 (10) Internally displaced, refugee, and stateless
 16 women and girls face extreme violence and threats,
 17 including—

18 (A) being forced to exchange sex for food
 19 and humanitarian supplies;

20 (B) being at increased risk of gender-based
 21 violence, sexual exploitation, and abuse;

22 (C) reduced access to services and care;
 23 and

24 (D) increased risk for contracting HIV or
 25 sexually transmitted infections, having an un-

1 planned pregnancy, and experiencing poor re-
2 productive health.

3 (11) Climate change is predicted to lead to in-
4 creasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather
5 conditions, precipitating the occurrence of natural
6 disasters around the globe.

7 (12) The relocation and death of women as a
8 result of climate change-related disasters often has
9 devastating impacts on social support networks,
10 family ties, and the coping capacity of families and
11 communities.

12 (13) The ability of women to adapt to climate
13 change is constrained by underlying gender inequal-
14 ity, including a lack of—

15 (A) economic freedoms;

16 (B) property, land tenure, and inheritance
17 rights;

18 (C) access to financial resources, edu-
19 cation, family planning, and reproductive
20 healthcare services; and

21 (D) quality tools, equipment, and tech-
22 nology that support economic opportunity and
23 independence.

24 (14) Despite having unique capabilities and
25 knowledge to promote, plan, and execute activities to

1 enhance communities' climate change adaption and
2 resilience capacities, women often have insufficient
3 resources, are not empowered to take such actions,
4 and are often excluded from leadership and decision-
5 making processes.

6 (15) Women have a multiplier effect because
7 women use their income and resources, when given
8 the necessary tools, to increase the well-being of
9 their children and families, playing a critical role in
10 reducing food insecurity, poverty, and socioeconomic
11 effects of climate change.

12 (16) Women are often underrepresented in the
13 development and formulation of policy regarding
14 mitigation and adaptation to climate change, even
15 though women are often in the best position to pro-
16 vide and consult on adaptive strategies.

17 **SEC. 603. DEFINITIONS.**

18 In this title:

19 (1) **AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE.**—The term “Am-
20 bassador-at-Large” means the Ambassador-at-Large
21 for the Office of Global Women’s Issues of the De-
22 partment of State.

23 (2) **CLIMATE-DISPLACED PERSON.**—The term
24 “climate-displaced person” means any person who,
25 for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the

1 environment that adversely affects his or her life or
 2 living conditions—

3 (A) is obliged to leave his or her habitual
 4 home, either within his or her country of na-
 5 tionality or in another country;

6 (B) is in need of a durable resettlement so-
 7 lution; and

8 (C) whose government cannot or will not
 9 provide such durable resettlement solution.

10 (3) DISPARATE IMPACT.—The term “disparate
 11 impact” refers to the historical and ongoing impacts
 12 of the pattern and practice of discrimination in em-
 13 ployment, education, housing, banking, health, and
 14 nearly every other aspect of life in the economy, so-
 15 ciety, or culture that have an adverse impact on mi-
 16 norities, women, or other protected groups, regard-
 17 less of whether such practices were motivated by dis-
 18 criminatory intent.

19 (4) ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS.—The term
 20 “environmental disasters” means specific events
 21 caused by human activity that result in seriously
 22 negative effects on the environment.

23 (5) SPECIAL COORDINATOR.—The term “Spe-
 24 cial Coordinator” means the senior coordinator ap-
 25 pointed pursuant to section 607(c).

1 (6) WORKING GROUP.—The term “Working
2 Group” means the Federal Interagency Working
3 Group on Women and Climate Change established
4 under section 605.

5 **SEC. 604. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United
7 States, in partnership with affected countries, donor coun-
8 try governments, international financial institutions, inter-
9 national nongovernmental organizations, multilateral or-
10 ganizations, and civil society groups, especially those led
11 by women—

12 (1) to combat the leading causes of climate
13 change;

14 (2) to mitigate the effects of climate change on
15 women and girls; and

16 (3) to elevate the participation of women in pol-
17 icy, program, and community decision-making proc-
18 esses with respect to climate change.

19 (b) IMPLEMENTATION.—The policy described in sub-
20 section (a) shall be carried out by—

21 (1) establishing the Federal Interagency Work-
22 ing Group on Women and Climate Change to pre-
23 vent and respond to the effects of climate change on
24 women globally; and

1 (2) implementing a coordinated, integrated, evi-
2 dence-based, and comprehensive strategy on women
3 and climate change through United States policies.

4 **SEC. 605. FEDERAL INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON**
5 **WOMEN AND CLIMATE CHANGE.**

6 (a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—There is established in the
7 Department of State the Federal Interagency Working
8 Group on Women and Climate Change.

9 (b) **CHAIRPERSON.**—The Ambassador-at-Large, or
10 the Special Coordinator, shall serve as the chairperson of
11 the Working Group.

12 (c) **MEMBERSHIP.**—

13 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Working Group shall be
14 composed of a senior-level representative from each
15 of the Federal agencies and bureaus and offices of
16 the Department of State described in paragraph (2),
17 as selected by the head of the respective agency or
18 subagency.

19 (2) **FEDERAL AGENCIES.**—The Federal agen-
20 cies and bureaus and offices of the Department of
21 State described in this paragraph are—

22 (A) the Department of State, including—

23 (i) the Office of Global Women’s
24 Issues;

25 (ii) the Office of Civil Rights;

1 (iii) the Bureau of Oceans and Inter-
 2 national Environmental and Scientific Af-
 3 fairs;

4 (iv) the Bureau of Population, Refu-
 5 gees, and Migration;

6 (v) the Bureau of Democracy, Human
 7 Rights, and Labor; and

8 (vi) the Bureau of International Orga-
 9 nization Affairs;

10 (B) the United States Agency for Inter-
 11 national Development;

12 (C) the Centers for Disease Control and
 13 Prevention;

14 (D) the Environmental Protection Agency;

15 (E) the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
 16 Administration;

17 (F) the National Institutes of Health;

18 (G) the National Science Foundation;

19 (H) the Council on Environmental Quality;

20 and

21 (I) the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

22 (3) REPRESENTATIVES OF ADDITIONAL AGEN-
 23 CIES.—The Ambassador-at-Large, or the Special Co-
 24 ordinator, may request the participation of rep-

1 representatives of other relevant agencies or depart-
2 ments on a limited-time basis.

3 (d) FUNCTIONS.—The Working Group shall—

4 (1) coordinate and integrate the development of
5 all policies and activities of the Federal Government
6 relating to—

7 (A) combating the effects of climate
8 change on women in the national and inter-
9 national sphere; and

10 (B) improving the response and strategy of
11 the Federal Government to fight climate change
12 for the security of the United States and the
13 international community;

14 (2) allow each member of the Working Group
15 to act as a representative for the Working Group
16 within the Federal department or agency of such
17 member to facilitate implementation of the Working
18 Group policies within such department or agency;

19 (3) ensure that all relevant Federal depart-
20 ments and agencies comply with appropriate guide-
21 lines, policies, and directives from the Working
22 Group pertaining to issues and responsibilities re-
23 lated to climate change and women;

24 (4) ensure that Federal departments or agen-
25 cies, State governments, and relevant congressional

1 committees, in consultation with nongovernmental
2 organizations and policy experts in the field and
3 State and local government officials who administer
4 or direct policy for programs relating to climate
5 change and women—

6 (A) have access to, receive, and appro-
7 priately disseminate best practices in the ad-
8 ministration of such programs;

9 (B) have adequate resources to maximize
10 the public awareness of such programs;

11 (C) increase the reach of such programs;

12 (D) collect and share relevant data, includ-
13 ing sex and age disaggregated data; and

14 (E) issue relevant guidance; and

15 (5) identify and disseminate best practices to
16 each relevant Federal department and agency re-
17 garding how to improve the collection of data rel-
18 evant to the disparate impact of climate change on
19 women (especially marginalized women), including—

20 (A) unpaid and paid care work;

21 (B) access to decent work opportunities;

22 (C) community advocacy, activism, and
23 representation;

24 (D) access to education for women and
25 girls;

1 (E) access to comprehensive health care,
 2 including reproductive health and rights;

3 (F) participation in professional trades, in-
 4 cluding agriculture;

5 (G) rights and access to resources, such as
 6 land, financial services and credit, training, and
 7 tools and equipment;

8 (H) abilities to achieve durable solutions to
 9 displacement, including integration, return, or
 10 resettlement;

11 (I) food insecurity and desertification;

12 (J) community infrastructure, multilevel
 13 government adaptability, and climate resilience;

14 (K) climate and weather-related crisis re-
 15 sponse, including safety from gender-based vio-
 16 lence; and

17 (L) women's involvement and leadership in
 18 the development of frameworks and policies for
 19 climate resilience.

20 (e) CONSULTATION.—The Working Group may con-
 21 sult and obtain recommendations from such independent
 22 nongovernmental policy experts, State and local govern-
 23 ment officials, independent groups and organizations, or
 24 other groups or organizations as the Ambassador-at-

1 Large, or the Special Coordinator, determines will assist
 2 in carrying out the mission of the Working Group.

3 (f) FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS.—The Working Group
 4 shall meet not less frequently than quarterly to discuss
 5 and develop policies, projects, and programs referred to
 6 in subsection (d).

7 **SEC. 606. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF**
 8 **STRATEGY AND POLICIES TO PREVENT AND**
 9 **RESPOND TO THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE**
 10 **CHANGE ON WOMEN GLOBALLY.**

11 (a) INITIAL STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than
 12 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
 13 Ambassador-at-Large, or the Special Coordinator, in con-
 14 sultation with the Working Group, shall develop and sub-
 15 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a United
 16 States National and International Strategy to prevent and
 17 respond to the effects of climate change on women.

18 (b) CONTENTS.—The strategy submitted under sub-
 19 section (a) shall include—

- 20 (1) recognizing the disparate impacts of climate
 21 change on women and the efforts of women globally
 22 to address climate change;
 23 (2) taking effective action—

1 (A) to prevent and respond to climate
2 change and mitigate the effects of climate
3 change on women around the world; and

4 (B) to promote gender equality, economic
5 growth, public health, racial justice, principled
6 humanitarian access, and human rights;

7 (3) implementing the United Nations Sustain-
8 able Development Goals listed in subsection (f)
9 through and beyond 2030 to prevent and respond to
10 the effects of climate change on women globally;

11 (4) implementing balanced gender participation
12 to avoid reinforcing binary roles, especially among
13 individuals from the communities most impacted, in
14 climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts, in-
15 cluding in governance and diplomatic positions with-
16 in the United States Government;

17 (5) working at the local, national, and inter-
18 national levels, including with individuals, families,
19 and communities, to prevent and respond to the ef-
20 fects of climate change on women;

21 (6) systematically integrating and coordinating
22 efforts to prevent and respond to the effects of cli-
23 mate change on women internationally into United
24 States foreign policy and foreign assistance pro-
25 grams;

1 (7) investing in research on climate change
2 through appropriate Federal departments or agen-
3 cies and funding of university and independent re-
4 search groups on the various causes and effects of
5 climate change;

6 (8) developing and implementing gender-sen-
7 sitive frameworks in policies to address climate
8 change that account for the specific impacts of cli-
9 mate change on women;

10 (9) developing policies to support women who
11 are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate
12 change to prepare for, build their resilience to, and
13 adapt to such impacts, including a commitment to
14 increase education and training opportunities for
15 women to develop local resilience plans to address
16 the effects of climate change;

17 (10) developing and investing in programs, in
18 coordination with the diplomatic missions of other
19 countries, that—

20 (A) educate and empower women and girls
21 in the United States and around the world;

22 (B) gather information on how climate
23 change is affecting their lives; and

1 (C) provide guidance on the needs of their
2 families and communities in the face of climate
3 change;

4 (11) consulting with representatives of civil so-
5 ciety, including nongovernmental organizations, com-
6 munity and faith-based organizations, multilateral
7 organizations, local and international civil society
8 groups, and local climate change organizations and
9 their beneficiaries, that have demonstrated experi-
10 ence in preventing and responding to the effects of
11 climate change on women;

12 (12) supporting and building local capacity in
13 developing countries, including in governments at all
14 levels and in nongovernmental organizations (espe-
15 cially women-led organizations), to prevent and re-
16 spond to the effects of climate change on women;

17 (13) developing programs to empower women in
18 communities to meaningfully engage in the planning,
19 design, implementation, and evaluation of strategies
20 to address climate change while taking into account
21 their roles and resources;

22 (14) including women in economic development
23 planning, policies, and practices that directly im-
24 prove conditions that result from climate change;

1 (15) integrating gender analysis in all policies
2 and programs in the United States that are globally
3 related to climate change; and

4 (16) ensuring that such policies and programs
5 support women globally to prepare for, build resili-
6 ence for, and adapt to, climate change.

7 (c) UPDATES.—The Ambassador-at-Large, or the
8 Special Coordinator, shall—

9 (1) consult with the Working Group to collect
10 information and feedback; and

11 (2) update the strategy and programs to pre-
12 vent and respond to the effects of climate change on
13 women globally, as the Ambassador-at-Large, or the
14 Special Coordinator, considers appropriate.

15 (d) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND BUDGET RE-
16 QUIRED.—Not later than 60 days after the submission of
17 the strategy under subsection (a), the Senior Coordinator
18 shall submit an implementation plan and budget for the
19 strategy to the appropriate congressional committees.

20 (e) ASSISTANCE AND CONSULTATION.—The Senior
21 Coordinator shall assist and provide consultation to the
22 Secretary of State in preventing and responding to the ef-
23 fects of climate change on women globally.

24 (f) UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
25 GOALS THROUGH AND BEYOND 2030.—The United Na-

1 tions Sustainable Development Goals listed in this sub-
2 section are—

3 (1) ending poverty in all its forms everywhere;

4 (2) ending hunger, achieving food security and
5 improved nutrition, and promoting sustainable agri-
6 culture;

7 (3) ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-
8 being for all and at all ages;

9 (4) ensuring inclusive, equitable, and quality
10 education and promoting lifelong learning opportuni-
11 ties for all;

12 (5) achieving gender equality and empowering
13 all women and girls;

14 (6) ensuring the availability and sustainable
15 management of water and sanitation for all;

16 (7) ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sus-
17 tainable, and modern energy for all;

18 (8) promoting sustained, inclusive, and sustain-
19 able economic growth, full and productive employ-
20 ment, and decent work for all;

21 (9) building resilient infrastructure, promoting
22 inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and fos-
23 tering innovation;

24 (10) reducing inequality within and among
25 countries;

1 (11) making cities and human settlements in-
2 clusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable;

3 (12) ensuring sustainable consumption and pro-
4 duction patterns;

5 (13) taking urgent action to combat climate
6 change and its impacts;

7 (14) conserving and sustainably using the
8 oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable
9 development;

10 (15) protecting, restoring, and promoting sus-
11 tainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably
12 managing forests, combating desertification, and
13 halting and reversing land degradation and biodiver-
14 sity loss;

15 (16) promoting peaceful and inclusive societies
16 for sustainable development, providing access to jus-
17 tice for all, and building effective, accountable and
18 inclusive institutions at all levels; and

19 (17) strengthening the means of policy imple-
20 mentation and revitalizing the global partnership for
21 sustainable development.

22 **SEC. 607. CLIMATE CHANGE WITHIN THE OFFICE OF GLOB-**
23 **AL WOMEN'S ISSUES.**

24 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Ambassador-at-Large
25 for the Office of Global Women's Issues of the Depart-

1 ment of State shall chair the Federal Interagency Working
2 Group on Women and Climate Change.

3 (b) FUNCTIONS.—The Ambassador-at-Large shall—

4 (1) direct the activities, policies, programs, and
5 funding of the Department of State relating to the
6 effects of climate change on women, including with
7 respect to efforts to prevent and respond to those ef-
8 fects;

9 (2) coordinate closely with the Climate Security
10 Coordinator appointed pursuant to section 1(g) of
11 the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
12 1956, as added by section 102, regarding matters
13 related to climate change’s effects on women and re-
14 lated security and diplomatic matters and engage-
15 ments;

16 (3) advise the Secretary of State, the relevant
17 heads of other Federal departments and independent
18 agencies, and other entities within the Executive Of-
19 fice of the President, regarding the establishment
20 of—

21 (A) policies, goals, objectives, and priorities
22 for addressing and combating the effects of cli-
23 mate change on women; and

24 (B) mechanisms to improve the effective-
25 ness, coordination, impact, and outcomes of

1 programs relating to addressing and combating
2 the effects of climate change on women, in co-
3 ordination with experts in the field, nongovern-
4 mental organizations, and foreign governments;
5 and

6 (4) identify and assist in the resolution of any
7 disputes that arise between Federal agencies relating
8 to policies and programs to address and combat the
9 effects of climate change on women or other matters
10 within the responsibility of the Office of Global
11 Women's Issues.

12 (c) SPECIAL COORDINATOR.—The Ambassador-at-
13 Large may appoint a senior coordinator as the designee
14 responsible for carrying out the functions described in sub-
15 section (b).

16 (d) BRIEFING AND REPORT.—Not later than 180
17 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annu-
18 ally thereafter, the Ambassador-at-Large shall—

19 (1) brief the appropriate congressional commit-
20 tees regarding—

21 (A) the effects of climate change on
22 women; and

23 (B) the prevention and response strategies,
24 programming, and associated outcomes with re-
25 spect to climate change; and

- 1 (2) submit an assessment of the human and fi-
- 2 nancial resources necessary to carry out this title to
- 3 the appropriate congressional committees.

