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118TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION**S. 1325**

To establish a partnership with nations in the Western Hemisphere to promote economic competitiveness, democratic governance, and security, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 26, 2023

Mr. RISCH (for himself, Mr. MENENDEZ, and Mr. RUBIO) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

MAY 4, 2023

Reported by Mr. MENENDEZ, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in *italic*]

A BILL

To establish a partnership with nations in the Western Hemisphere to promote economic competitiveness, democratic governance, and security, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “~~Western Hemisphere~~
5 ~~Partnership Act of 2023~~”.

1 **SEC. 2. UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE WESTERN HEMI-**
 2 **SPHERE.**

3 It is the policy of the United States to promote eco-
 4 nomic competitiveness, democratic governance, and secu-
 5 rity in the Western Hemisphere by—

6 (1) encouraging stronger economic relations, re-
 7 spect for property rights, the rule of law, and en-
 8 forceable investment rules and labor and environ-
 9 mental standards;

10 (2) advancing the principles and practices ex-
 11 pressed in the Charter of the Organization of Amer-
 12 ican States, the American Declaration on the Rights
 13 and Duties of Man, and the Inter-American Demo-
 14 cratic Charter; and

15 (3) enhancing the capacity and technical capa-
 16 bilities of democratic partner nation government in-
 17 stitutions, including civilian law enforcement, the ju-
 18 diciary, attorneys general, and security forces.

19 **SEC. 3. PROMOTING SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN**
 20 **THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

21 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
 22 gress that the United States should strengthen security
 23 cooperation with democratic partner nations in the West-
 24 ern Hemisphere to promote a secure hemisphere and to
 25 address the negative impacts of transnational criminal or-
 26 ganizations and malign external state actors.

1 (b) COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS.—The Secretary of
2 State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant
3 Federal agencies, should support the improvement of secu-
4 rity conditions and the rule of law in the Western Hemi-
5 sphere through collaborative efforts with democratic part-
6 ners that—

7 (1) enhance the institutional capacity and tech-
8 nical capabilities of defense and security institutions
9 in democratic partner nations to conduct national or
10 regional security missions, including through regular
11 bilateral and multilateral engagements, foreign mili-
12 tary sales and financing, international military edu-
13 cation, and training programs, and other means;

14 (2) provide technical assistance and material
15 support (including, as appropriate, radars, vessels,
16 and communications equipment) to relevant security
17 forces to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle organiza-
18 tions involved in illicit narcotics trafficking,
19 transnational criminal activities, illicit mining, and
20 illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and
21 other illicit activities;

22 (3) enhance the institutional capacity and tech-
23 nical capabilities of relevant civilian law enforce-
24 ment, attorneys general, and judicial institutions
25 to—

1 (A) strengthen the rule of law and trans-
2 parent governance; and

3 (B) improve regional cooperation to dis-
4 rupt, degrade, and dismantle transnational or-
5 ganized criminal networks and terrorist organi-
6 zations, including through training,
7 anticorruption initiatives, anti-money laun-
8 dering programs, and strengthening cyber capa-
9 bilities and resources;

10 (4) enhance port management and maritime se-
11 curity partnerships and airport management and
12 aviation security partnerships to disrupt, degrade,
13 and dismantle transnational criminal networks and
14 facilitate the legitimate flow of people, goods, and
15 services;

16 (5) strengthen cooperation to improve border
17 security across the Western Hemisphere, dismantle
18 human smuggling and trafficking networks, and in-
19 crease cooperation to demonstrably strengthen mi-
20 gration management systems;

21 (6) counter the malign influence of state and
22 non-state actors and misinformation and
23 disinformation campaigns;

24 (7) disrupt illicit domestic and transnational fi-
25 nancial networks;

(8) foster mechanisms for cooperation on emergency preparedness and rapid recovery from natural disasters, including by—

(A) supporting regional preparedness, recovery, and emergency management centers to facilitate rapid response to survey and help maintain planning on regional disaster anticipated needs and possible resources; and

(B) training disaster recovery officials on latest techniques and lessons learned from United States experiences; and

(9) foster regional mechanisms for early warning and response to pandemics in the Western Hemisphere, including through—

(A) improved cooperation with and research by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention through regional pandemic response centers;

(B) personnel exchanges for technology transfer and skills development; and

(C) surveying and mapping of health networks to build local health capacity.

(e) LIMITATIONS ON USE OF TECHNOLOGIES.—

Operational technologies transferred pursuant to subsection (b) to partner governments for intelligence, de-

1 fense, or law enforcement purposes shall be used solely
 2 for the purposes for which the technology was intended.
 3 The United States shall take all necessary steps to ensure
 4 that the use of such operational technologies is consistent
 5 with United States law, including protections of freedom
 6 of expression, freedom of movement, and freedom of asso-
 7 ciation.

8 **SEC. 4. PROMOTING DIGITALIZATION AND CYBERSECURITY**
 9 **IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

10 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
 11 gress that the United States should support digitalization
 12 and expand cybersecurity cooperation in the Western
 13 Hemisphere to promote regional economic prosperity and
 14 security.

15 (b) PROMOTION OF DIGITALIZATION AND CYBERSE-
 16 CURITY.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
 17 heads of other relevant Federal agencies, should promote
 18 digitalization and cybersecurity in the Western Hemi-
 19 sphere through collaborative efforts with democratic part-
 20 ners that—

21 (1) promote digital connectivity and facilitate e-
 22 commerce by expanding access to information and
 23 communications technology (ICT) supply chains that
 24 adhere to high-quality security and reliability stand-
 25 ards, including—

1 (A) to open market access on a national
2 treatment, nondiscriminatory basis; and

3 (B) to strengthen the cybersecurity and
4 cyber resilience of partner countries;

5 (2) advance the provision of digital government
6 services (e-government) that, to the greatest extent
7 possible, promote transparency, lower business costs,
8 and expand citizens' access to public services and
9 public information; and

10 (3) develop robust cybersecurity partnerships
11 to—

12 (A) promote the inclusion of components
13 and architectures in information and commu-
14 nications technology (ICT) supply chains from
15 participants in initiatives that adhere to high-
16 quality security and reliability standards;

17 (B) share best practices to mitigate cyber
18 threats to critical infrastructure from ICT ar-
19 chitectures by technology providers with close
20 ties to, or that are susceptible to pressure from,
21 governments or security services without reli-
22 able legal checks on governmental powers;

23 (C) effectively respond to cybersecurity
24 threats, including state-sponsored threats; and

1 (D) to strengthen resilience against
2 cyberattacks and cybercrime.

3 **SEC. 5. PROMOTING ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL PART-**
4 **NERSHIPS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that the United States should enhance economic and
7 commercial ties with democratic partners to promote pros-
8 perity in the Western Hemisphere by modernizing and
9 strengthening trade capacity-building and trade facilita-
10 tion initiatives; encouraging market-based economic re-
11 forms; strengthening labor and environmental standards;
12 and encouraging transparency and adherence to the rule
13 of law in investment dealings.

14 (b) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
15 nation with the United States Trade Representative, the
16 Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Cor-
17 poration, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies,
18 should support the improvement of economic conditions in
19 the Western Hemisphere through collaborative efforts with
20 democratic partners that—

21 (1) facilitate a more open, transparent, and
22 competitive environment for United States busi-
23 nesses and promote robust and comprehensive trade
24 capacity-building and trade facilitation by—

1 (A) reducing trade and nontariff barriers
2 between the countries in the region; establishing
3 a mechanism for pursuing Mutual Recognition
4 Agreements and Formalized Regulatory Co-
5 operation Agreements in priority sectors of the
6 economy;

7 (B) establishing a forum for discussing
8 and evaluating technical and other assistance
9 needs to help establish streamlined “single win-
10 dow” processes to facilitate movement of goods
11 and common customs arrangements and proce-
12 dures to lower costs of goods in transit and
13 speed to destination;

14 (C) building relationships and exchanges
15 between relevant regulatory bodies in the
16 United States and democratic partners in the
17 Western Hemisphere to promote best practices
18 and transparency in rulemaking, implementa-
19 tion, and enforcement, and provide training and
20 assistance to help improve supply chain man-
21 agement in the Western Hemisphere;

22 (D) establishing regional fora for identi-
23 fying, raising, and addressing supply chain
24 management issues, including infrastructure

1 needs and strengthening of investment rules
2 and regulatory frameworks;

3 (E) establishing a dedicated program of
4 trade missions and reverse trade missions to in-
5 crease commercial contacts and ties between the
6 United States and Western Hemisphere partner
7 countries; and

8 (F) strengthening labor and environmental
9 standards in the region;

10 (2) establish frameworks or mechanisms to re-
11 view and address the long-term financial sustain-
12 ability and national security implications of foreign
13 investments in strategic sectors or services;

14 (3) establish competitive and transparent infra-
15 structure project selection and procurement proc-
16 esses that promote transparency, open competition,
17 financial sustainability, and robust adherence to
18 global standards and norms; and

19 (4) advance robust and comprehensive energy
20 production and integration, including through a
21 more open, transparent, and competitive environ-
22 ment for United States companies competing in the
23 Western Hemisphere, including by—

24 (A) facilitating further development of in-
25 tegrated regional energy markets;

1 (B) improving management of grids, in-
2 cluding technical capability to ensure the
3 functionality, safe and responsible management,
4 and quality of service of electricity providers,
5 carriers, and management and distribution sys-
6 tems;

7 (C) facilitating private sector-led develop-
8 ment of reliable and affordable power genera-
9 tion capacity;

10 (D) establishing a process for surveying
11 grid capacity and management focused on iden-
12 tifying electricity service efficiencies and estab-
13 lishing cooperative mechanisms for providing
14 technical assistance for—

15 (i) grid management, power pricing,
16 and tariff issues;

17 (ii) establishing and maintaining ap-
18 propriate regulatory best practices; and

19 (iii) proposals to establish regional
20 power grids for the purpose of promoting
21 the sale of excess supply to consumers
22 across borders;

23 (E) assessing the viability and effectiveness
24 of decentralizing power production and trans-
25 mission and building micro-grid power networks

to improve, when feasible, access to electricity, particularly in rural and underserved communities where centralized power grid connections may not be feasible in the short to medium term; and

(F) exploring opportunities to partner with the private sector and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable and affordable electricity in the Western Hemisphere.

SEC. 6. PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should support efforts to strengthen the capacity of democratic institutions and processes in the Western Hemisphere to promote a more transparent, democratic, and prosperous region.

(b) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and heads of other relevant Federal agencies, should support transparent, accountable, and democratic governance in the Western

1 Hemisphere through collaborative efforts with democratic
2 partners that—

3 (1) strengthen the capacity of national electoral
4 institutions to ensure free, fair, and transparent
5 electoral processes, including through pre-election
6 assessment missions, technical assistance, and inde-
7 pendent local and international election monitoring
8 and observation missions;

9 (2) enhance the capabilities of democratically
10 elected national legislatures, parliamentary bodies,
11 and autonomous regulatory institutions to conduct
12 oversight;

13 (3) strengthen the capacity of subnational gov-
14 ernment institutions to govern in a transparent, ac-
15 countable, and democratic manner, including
16 through training and technical assistance;

17 (4) combat corruption at local and national lev-
18 els, including through trainings, cooperation agree-
19 ments, and bilateral or multilateral anticorruption
20 mechanisms that strengthen attorneys general and
21 prosecutors' offices; and

22 (5) strengthen the capacity of civil society to
23 conduct oversight of government institutions, build
24 the capacity of independent professional journalism,
25 facilitate substantive dialogue with government and

1 the private sector to generate issue-based policies,
 2 and mobilize local resources to carry out such activi-
 3 ties.

4 **SEC. 7. WESTERN HEMISPHERE DEFINED.**

5 In this Act, the term “Western Hemisphere” does not
 6 include Cuba, Nicaragua, or Venezuela, except for pur-
 7 poses of section 6.

8 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

9 *This Act may be cited as the “Western Hemisphere*
 10 *Partnership Act of 2023”.*

11 **SEC. 2. UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE WESTERN HEMI-**
 12 **SPHERE.**

13 *It is the policy of the United States to promote eco-*
 14 *nomics competitiveness, democratic governance, and security*
 15 *in the Western Hemisphere by—*

16 (1) *encouraging stronger economic relations, re-*
 17 *spect for property rights, the rule of law, and enforce-*
 18 *able investment rules and labor and environmental*
 19 *standards;*

20 (2) *advancing the principles and practices ex-*
 21 *pressed in the Charter of the Organization of Amer-*
 22 *ican States, the American Declaration on the Rights*
 23 *and Duties of Man, and the Inter-American Demo-*
 24 *cratic Charter; and*

1 (3) *enhancing the capacity and technical capa-*
 2 *bilities of democratic partner nation government in-*
 3 *stitutions, including civilian law enforcement, the ju-*
 4 *diary, attorneys general, and security forces.*

5 **SEC. 3. PROMOTING SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN**
 6 **THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

7 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
 8 *that the United States should strengthen security coopera-*
 9 *tion with democratic partner nations in the Western Hemi-*
 10 *sphere to promote a secure hemisphere and to address the*
 11 *negative impacts of transnational criminal organizations*
 12 *and malign external state actors.*

13 (b) *COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS.—The Secretary of*
 14 *State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Fed-*
 15 *eral agencies, should support the improvement of security*
 16 *conditions and the rule of law in the Western Hemisphere*
 17 *through collaborative efforts with democratic partners*
 18 *that—*

19 (1) *enhance the institutional capacity and tech-*
 20 *nical capabilities of defense and security institutions*
 21 *in democratic partner nations to conduct national or*
 22 *regional security missions, including through regular*
 23 *bilateral and multilateral engagements, foreign mili-*
 24 *tary sales and financing, international military edu-*
 25 *cation and training programs, expanding the Na-*

1 *tional Guard State Partnership Programs, and other*
2 *means;*

3 (2) *provide technical assistance and material*
4 *support (including, as appropriate, radars, vessels,*
5 *and communications equipment) to relevant security*
6 *forces to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle organiza-*
7 *tions involved in the illicit trafficking of narcotics*
8 *and precursor chemicals, transnational criminal ac-*
9 *tivities, illicit mining, and illegal, unreported, and*
10 *unregulated fishing, and other illicit activities;*

11 (3) *enhance the institutional capacity, legit-*
12 *imacy, and technical capabilities of relevant civilian*
13 *law enforcement, attorneys general, and judicial insti-*
14 *tutions to—*

15 (A) *strengthen the rule of law and trans-*
16 *parent governance;*

17 (B) *combat corruption and kleptocracy in*
18 *the region; and*

19 (C) *improve regional cooperation to disrupt,*
20 *degrade, and dismantle transnational organized*
21 *criminal networks and terrorist organizations,*
22 *including through training, anticorruption ini-*
23 *tiatives, anti-money laundering programs, and*
24 *strengthening cyber capabilities and resources;*

1 (4) *enhance port management and maritime se-*
2 *curity partnerships and airport management and*
3 *aviation security partnerships to disrupt, degrade,*
4 *and dismantle transnational criminal networks and*
5 *facilitate the legitimate flow of people, goods, and*
6 *services;*

7 (5) *strengthen cooperation to improve border se-*
8 *curity across the Western Hemisphere, dismantle*
9 *human smuggling and trafficking networks, and in-*
10 *crease cooperation to demonstrably strengthen migra-*
11 *tion management systems;*

12 (6) *counter the malign influence of state and*
13 *non-state actors and disinformation campaigns;*

14 (7) *disrupt illicit domestic and transnational fi-*
15 *nancial networks;*

16 (8) *foster mechanisms for cooperation on emer-*
17 *gency preparedness and rapid recovery from natural*
18 *disasters, including by—*

19 (A) *supporting regional preparedness, re-*
20 *covery, and emergency management centers to*
21 *facilitate rapid response to survey and help*
22 *maintain planning on regional disaster antici-*
23 *pated needs and possible resources;*

1 *(B) training disaster recovery officials on*
2 *latest techniques and lessons learned from United*
3 *States experiences;*

4 *(C) making available, preparing, and trans-*
5 *ferring on-hand nonlethal supplies, and pro-*
6 *viding training on the use of such supplies, for*
7 *humanitarian or health purposes to respond to*
8 *unforeseen emergencies; and*

9 *(D) conducting medical support operations*
10 *and medical humanitarian missions, such as*
11 *hospital ship deployments and base-operating*
12 *services, to the extent required by the operation;*

13 *(9) foster regional mechanisms for early warning*
14 *and response to pandemics in the Western Hemi-*
15 *sphere, including through—*

16 *(A) improved cooperation with and research*
17 *by the United States Centers for Disease Control*
18 *and Prevention through regional pandemic re-*
19 *sponse centers;*

20 *(B) personnel exchanges for technology*
21 *transfer and skills development; and*

22 *(C) surveying and mapping of health net-*
23 *works to build local health capacity;*

24 *(10) promote the meaningful participation of*
25 *women across all political processes, including con-*

1 *flit prevention and conflict resolution and post-con-*
 2 *flit relief and recovery efforts; and*

3 *(11) hold accountable actors that violate political*
 4 *and civil rights.*

5 *(c) LIMITATIONS ON USE OF TECHNOLOGIES.—Oper-*
 6 *ational technologies transferred pursuant to subsection (b)*
 7 *to partner governments for intelligence, defense, or law en-*
 8 *forcement purposes shall be used solely for the purposes for*
 9 *which the technology was intended. The United States shall*
 10 *take all necessary steps to ensure that the use of such oper-*
 11 *ational technologies is consistent with United States law,*
 12 *including protections of freedom of expression, freedom of*
 13 *movement, and freedom of association.*

14 *(d) STRATEGY.—*

15 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after*
 16 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
 17 *State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant*
 18 *Federal agencies, shall submit to the Committee on*
 19 *Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on*
 20 *Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a 5-*
 21 *year strategy to promote security and the rule of law*
 22 *in the Western Hemisphere in accordance to this Sec-*
 23 *tion.*

24 *(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under*
 25 *paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:*

1 (A) *A detailed assessment of the resources*
 2 *required to carry out such collaborative efforts.*

3 (B) *Annual benchmarks to track progress*
 4 *and obstacles in undertaking such collaborative*
 5 *efforts.*

6 (C) *A public diplomacy component to en-*
 7 *gage the people of the Western Hemisphere with*
 8 *the purpose of demonstrating that the security of*
 9 *their countries is enhanced to a greater extent*
 10 *through alignment with the United States and*
 11 *democratic values rather than with authori-*
 12 *tarian countries such as the People’s Republic of*
 13 *China, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic*
 14 *Republic of Iran.*

15 (3) *BRIEFING.*—*Not later than 1 year after sub-*
 16 *mission of the strategy required under paragraph (1),*
 17 *and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall*
 18 *provide to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*
 19 *Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
 20 *House of Representatives a briefing on the implemen-*
 21 *tation of the strategy.*

22 **SEC. 4. PROMOTING DIGITALIZATION AND CYBERSECURITY**
 23 **IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

24 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
 25 *that the United States should support digitalization and*

1 *expand cybersecurity cooperation in the Western Hemi-*
 2 *sphere to promote regional economic prosperity and secu-*
 3 *rity.*

4 *(b) PROMOTION OF DIGITALIZATION AND CYBERSECU-*
 5 *RITY.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the*
 6 *heads of other relevant Federal agencies, should promote*
 7 *digitalization and cybersecurity in the Western Hemisphere*
 8 *through collaborative efforts with democratic partners*
 9 *that—*

10 *(1) promote digital connectivity and facilitate e-*
 11 *commerce by expanding access to information and*
 12 *communications technology (ICT) supply chains that*
 13 *adhere to high-quality security and reliability stand-*
 14 *ards, including—*

15 *(A) to open market access on a national*
 16 *treatment, nondiscriminatory basis; and*

17 *(B) to strengthen the cybersecurity and*
 18 *cyber resilience of partner countries;*

19 *(2) advance the provision of digital government*
 20 *services (e-government) that, to the greatest extent*
 21 *possible, promote transparency, lower business costs,*
 22 *and expand citizens' access to public services and*
 23 *public information; and*

24 *(3) develop robust cybersecurity partnerships*
 25 *to—*

1 (A) promote the inclusion of components
 2 and architectures in information and commu-
 3 nications technology (ICT) supply chains from
 4 participants in initiatives that adhere to high-
 5 quality security and reliability standards;

6 (B) share best practices to mitigate cyber
 7 threats to critical infrastructure from ICT archi-
 8 tectures by technology providers that supply
 9 equipment and services covered under section 2
 10 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Net-
 11 works Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601);

12 (C) effectively respond to cybersecurity
 13 threats, including state-sponsored threats; and

14 (D) to strengthen resilience against
 15 cyberattacks and cybercrime.

16 **SEC. 5. PROMOTING ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL PART-**
 17 **NERSHIPS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

18 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—It is the sense of Congress
 19 that the United States should enhance economic and com-
 20 mercial ties with democratic partners to promote prosperity
 21 in the Western Hemisphere by modernizing and strength-
 22 ening trade capacity-building and trade facilitation initia-
 23 tives, encouraging market-based economic reforms that en-
 24 able inclusive economic growth, strengthening labor and en-
 25 vironmental standards, addressing economic disparities of

1 *women, and encouraging transparency and adherence to the*
 2 *rule of law in investment dealings.*

3 *(b) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-*
 4 *nation with the United States Trade Representative, the*
 5 *Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Cor-*
 6 *poration, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies,*
 7 *should support the improvement of economic conditions in*
 8 *the Western Hemisphere through collaborative efforts with*
 9 *democratic partners that—*

10 *(1) facilitate a more open, transparent, and com-*
 11 *petitive environment for United States businesses and*
 12 *promote robust and comprehensive trade capacity-*
 13 *building and trade facilitation by—*

14 *(A) reducing trade and nontariff barriers*
 15 *between the countries in the region, establishing*
 16 *a mechanism for pursuing Mutual Recognition*
 17 *Agreements and Formalized Regulatory Coopera-*
 18 *tion Agreements in priority sectors of the econ-*
 19 *omy;*

20 *(B) establishing a forum for discussing and*
 21 *evaluating technical and other assistance needs*
 22 *to help establish streamlined “single window”*
 23 *processes to facilitate movement of goods and*
 24 *common customs arrangements and procedures*

1 to lower costs of goods in transit and speed to
2 destination;

3 (C) building relationships and exchanges be-
4 tween relevant regulatory bodies in the United
5 States and democratic partners in the Western
6 Hemisphere to promote best practices and trans-
7 parency in rulemaking, implementation, and en-
8 forcement, and provide training and assistance
9 to help improve supply chain management in the
10 Western Hemisphere;

11 (D) establishing regional fora for identi-
12 fying, raising, and addressing supply chain
13 management issues, including infrastructure
14 needs and strengthening of investment rules and
15 regulatory frameworks;

16 (E) establishing a dedicated program of
17 trade missions and reverse trade missions to in-
18 crease commercial contacts and ties between the
19 United States and Western Hemisphere partner
20 countries; and

21 (F) strengthening labor and environmental
22 standards in the region;

23 (2) establish frameworks or mechanisms to re-
24 view and address the long-term financial sustain-

1 *ability and national security implications of foreign*
2 *investments in strategic sectors or services;*

3 *(3) establish competitive and transparent infra-*
4 *structure project selection and procurement processes*
5 *that promote transparency, open competition, finan-*
6 *cial sustainability, and robust adherence to global*
7 *standards and norms; and*

8 *(4) advance robust and comprehensive energy*
9 *production and integration, including through a more*
10 *open, transparent, and competitive environment for*
11 *United States companies competing in the Western*
12 *Hemisphere, including by—*

13 *(A) facilitating further development of inte-*
14 *grated regional energy markets;*

15 *(B) improving management of grids, in-*
16 *cluding technical capability to ensure the*
17 *functionality, safe and responsible management,*
18 *and quality of service of electricity providers,*
19 *carriers, and management and distribution sys-*
20 *tems;*

21 *(C) facilitating private sector-led develop-*
22 *ment of reliable and affordable power generation*
23 *capacity;*

24 *(D) establishing a process for surveying*
25 *grid capacity and management focused on iden-*

1 *tifying electricity service efficiencies and estab-*
 2 *lishing cooperative mechanisms for providing*
 3 *technical assistance for—*

4 *(i) grid management, power pricing,*
 5 *and tariff issues;*

6 *(ii) establishing and maintaining ap-*
 7 *propriate regulatory best practices; and*

8 *(iii) proposals to establish regional*
 9 *power grids for the purpose of promoting*
 10 *the sale of excess supply to consumers across*
 11 *borders;*

12 *(E) assessing the viability and effectiveness*
 13 *of decentralizing power production and trans-*
 14 *mission and building micro-grid power networks*
 15 *to improve, when feasible, access to electricity,*
 16 *particularly in rural and underserved commu-*
 17 *nities where centralized power grid connections*
 18 *may not be feasible in the short to medium term;*
 19 *and*

20 *(F) exploring opportunities to partner with*
 21 *the private sector and multilateral institutions,*
 22 *such as the World Bank and the Inter-American*
 23 *Development Bank, to promote universal access*
 24 *to reliable and affordable electricity in the West-*
 25 *ern Hemisphere.*

1 **SEC. 6. PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY AND DEMOCRATIC**
2 **GOVERNANCE IN THE WESTERN HEMI-**
3 **SPHERE.**

4 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
5 *that the United States should support efforts to strengthen*
6 *the capacity and legitimacy of democratic institutions and*
7 *inclusive processes in the Western Hemisphere to promote*
8 *a more transparent, democratic, and prosperous region.*

9 (b) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State, in coordi-*
10 *nation with the Administrator of the United States Agency*
11 *for International Development and heads of other relevant*
12 *Federal agencies, should support transparent, accountable,*
13 *and democratic governance in the Western Hemisphere*
14 *through collaborative efforts with democratic partners*
15 *that—*

16 (1) *strengthen the capacity of national electoral*
17 *institutions to ensure free, fair, and transparent elec-*
18 *toral processes, including through pre-election assess-*
19 *ment missions, technical assistance, and independent*
20 *local and international election monitoring and obser-*
21 *vation missions;*

22 (2) *enhance the capabilities of democratically*
23 *elected national legislatures, parliamentary bodies,*
24 *and autonomous regulatory institutions to conduct*
25 *oversight;*

1 (3) *strengthen the capacity of subnational gov-*
2 *ernment institutions to govern in a transparent, ac-*
3 *countable, and democratic manner, including through*
4 *training and technical assistance;*

5 (4) *combat corruption at local and national lev-*
6 *els, including through trainings, cooperation agree-*
7 *ments, initiatives aimed at dismantling corrupt net-*
8 *works, and political support for bilateral or multilat-*
9 *eral anticorruption mechanisms that strengthen attor-*
10 *neys general and prosecutors' offices;*

11 (5) *strengthen the capacity of civil society to*
12 *conduct oversight of government institutions, build*
13 *the capacity of independent professional journalism,*
14 *facilitate substantive dialogue with government and*
15 *the private sector to generate issue-based policies, and*
16 *mobilize local resources to carry out such activities;*

17 (6) *promote the meaningful and significant par-*
18 *ticipation of women in democratic processes, includ-*
19 *ing in national and subnational government and civil*
20 *society; and*

21 (7) *support the creation of procedures for the Or-*
22 *ganization of American States (OAS) to create an an-*
23 *nuual forum for democratically elected national legisla-*
24 *tures from OAS member States to discuss issues of*
25 *hemispheric importance, as expressed in section 4 of*

1 *the Organization of American States Legislative En-*
 2 *gagement Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–343).*

3 **SEC. 7. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRI-**
 4 **CA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIB-**
 5 **BEAN.**

6 *(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—*

7 *(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish*
 8 *a comprehensive United States strategy for public*
 9 *and private investment, trade, and development in*
 10 *Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.*

11 *(2) FOCUS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required*
 12 *by paragraph (1) shall focus on increasing exports of*
 13 *United States goods and services to Africa and Latin*
 14 *America and the Caribbean by 200 percent in real*
 15 *dollar value by the date that is 10 years after the date*
 16 *of the enactment of this Act.*

17 *(3) CONSULTATIONS.—In developing the strategy*
 18 *required by paragraph (1), the President shall consult*
 19 *with—*

20 *(A) Congress;*

21 *(B) each agency that is a member of the*
 22 *Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee;*

23 *(C) the relevant multilateral development*
 24 *banks, in coordination with the Secretary of the*

1 *Treasury and the respective United States Exec-*
 2 *utive Directors of such banks;*

3 *(D) each agency that participates in the*
 4 *Trade Policy Staff Committee established;*

5 *(E) the President's Export Council;*

6 *(F) each of the development agencies;*

7 *(G) any other Federal agencies with respon-*
 8 *sibility for export promotion or financing and*
 9 *development; and*

10 *(H) the private sector, including businesses,*
 11 *nongovernmental organizations, and African and*
 12 *Latin American and Caribbean diaspora groups.*

13 *(4) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—*

14 *(A) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days*
 15 *after the date of the enactment of this Act, the*
 16 *President shall submit to Congress the strategy*
 17 *required by subsection (a).*

18 *(B) PROGRESS REPORT.—Not later than 3*
 19 *years after the date of the enactment of this Act,*
 20 *the President shall submit to Congress a report*
 21 *on the implementation of the strategy required*
 22 *by paragraph (1).*

23 *(b) SPECIAL AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE*
 24 *CARIBBEAN EXPORT STRATEGY COORDINATORS.—The*
 25 *President shall designate an individual to serve as Special*

1 *Africa Export Strategy Coordinator and an individual to*
 2 *serve as Special Latin America and the Caribbean Export*
 3 *Strategy Coordinator—*

4 (1) *to oversee the development and implementa-*
 5 *tion of the strategy required by subsection (a); and*

6 (2) *to coordinate developing and implementing*
 7 *the strategy with—*

8 (A) *the Trade Promotion Coordinating*
 9 *Committee;*

10 (B) *the Assistant United States Trade Rep-*
 11 *resentative for African Affairs or the Assistant*
 12 *United States Trade Representative for the West-*
 13 *ern Hemisphere, as appropriate;*

14 (C) *the Assistant Secretary of State for Af-*
 15 *rican Affairs or the Assistant Secretary of State*
 16 *for Western Hemisphere Affairs, as appropriate;*

17 (D) *the Export-Import Bank of the United*
 18 *States;*

19 (E) *the United States International Devel-*
 20 *opment Finance Corporation; and*

21 (F) *the development agencies.*

22 (c) *TRADE MISSIONS TO AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA*
 23 *AND THE CARIBBEAN.—It is the sense of Congress that, not*
 24 *later than one year after the date of the enactment of this*
 25 *Act, the Secretary of Commerce and other high-level officials*

1 *of the United States Government with responsibility for ex-*
 2 *port promotion, financing, and development should conduct*
 3 *joint trade missions to Africa and to Latin America and*
 4 *the Caribbean.*

5 (d) *TRAINING.—The President shall develop a plan—*

6 (1) *to standardize the training received by*
 7 *United States and Foreign Commercial Service offi-*
 8 *cers, economic officers of the Department of State,*
 9 *and economic officers of the United States Agency for*
 10 *International Development with respect to the pro-*
 11 *grams and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of*
 12 *the United States, the United States International*
 13 *Development Finance Corporation, the Small Busi-*
 14 *ness Administration, and the United States Trade*
 15 *and Development Agency; and*

16 (2) *to ensure that, not later than one year after*
 17 *the date of the enactment of this Act—*

18 (A) *all United States and Foreign Commer-*
 19 *cial Service officers that are stationed overseas*
 20 *receive the training described in paragraph (1);*
 21 *and*

22 (B) *in the case of a country to which no*
 23 *United States and Foreign Commercial Service*
 24 *officer is assigned, any economic officer of the*

1 *Department of State stationed in that country*
 2 *receives that training.*

3 *(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

4 *(1) DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES.—The term “devel-*
 5 *opment agencies” means the United States Depart-*
 6 *ment of State, the United States Agency for Inter-*
 7 *national Development, the Millennium Challenge Cor-*
 8 *poration, the United States International Develop-*
 9 *ment Finance Corporation, the United States Trade*
 10 *and Development Agency, the United States Depart-*
 11 *ment of Agriculture, and relevant multilateral devel-*
 12 *opment banks.*

13 *(2) MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS.—The*
 14 *term “multilateral development banks” has the mean-*
 15 *ing given that term in section 1701(c)(4) of the Inter-*
 16 *national Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C.*
 17 *262r(c)(4)) and includes the African Development*
 18 *Foundation.*

19 *(3) TRADE POLICY STAFF COMMITTEE.—The*
 20 *term “Trade Policy Staff Committee” means the*
 21 *Trade Policy Staff Committee established pursuant to*
 22 *section 2002.2 of title 15, Code of Federal Regula-*
 23 *tions.*

24 *(4) TRADE PROMOTION COORDINATING COM-*
 25 *MITTEE.—The term “Trade Promotion Coordinating*

1 Committee” means the Trade Promotion Coordi-
 2 nating Committee established under section 2312 of
 3 the Export Enhancement Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C.
 4 4727).

5 (5) UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL
 6 SERVICE.—The term “United States and Foreign
 7 Commercial Service” means the United States and
 8 Foreign Commercial Service established by section
 9 2301 of the Export Enhancement Act of 1988 (15
 10 U.S.C. 4721).

11 **SEC. 8. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRIORITIZING NOMINA-**
 12 **TION AND CONFIRMATION OF QUALIFIED AM-**
 13 **BASSADORS.**

14 It is the sense of Congress that it is critically impor-
 15 tant that both the President and the Senate play their re-
 16 spective roles to nominate and confirm qualified ambas-
 17 sadors as quickly as possible, especially for countries in the
 18 Western Hemisphere.

19 **SEC. 9. WESTERN HEMISPHERE DEFINED.**

20 In this Act, the term “Western Hemisphere” does not
 21 include Cuba, Nicaragua, or Venezuela.

22 **SEC. 10. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO CAPTURE AND DETAIN**
 23 **UNITED STATES CITIZENS AS HOSTAGES.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the
 25 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State

1 *shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*
 2 *Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House*
 3 *of Representatives a report on efforts by the Maduro regime*
 4 *of Venezuela to detain United States citizens and lawful*
 5 *permanent residents.*

6 (b) *ELEMENTS.*—*The report required by subsection (a)*
 7 *shall include, regarding the arrest, capture, detainment,*
 8 *and imprisonment of United States citizens and lawful per-*
 9 *manent residents—*

10 (1) *the names, positions, and institutional affili-*
 11 *ation of Venezuelan individuals, or those acting on*
 12 *their behalf, who have engaged in such activities;*

13 (2) *a description of any role played by*
 14 *transnational criminal organizations, and an identi-*
 15 *fication of such organizations; and*

16 (3) *where relevant, an assessment of whether and*
 17 *how United States citizens and lawful permanent*
 18 *residents have been lured to Venezuela.*

19 (c) *FORM.*—*The report required under subsection (a)*
 20 *shall be submitted in unclassified form, but shall include*
 21 *a classified annex, which shall include a list of the total*
 22 *number of United States citizens and lawful permanent*
 23 *residents detained or imprisoned in Venezuela as of the date*
 24 *on which the report is submitted.*

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A BILL

To establish a partnership with nations in the Western Hemisphere to promote economic competitiveness, democratic governance, and security, and for other purposes.

MAY 4, 2023

Reported with an amendment