

country. Tell them, put country before party. Don't put China's economy before the United States'.

ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS

(Mr. DOLD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DOLD. Mr. Speaker, as a small business owner, I know that it's tough to get access to capital. If a company doesn't have the resources it needs to grow and expand, then it's virtually impossible to hire new workers.

Yesterday, the Financial Services Committee had a hearing where we examined a bipartisan bill, H.R. 3606, which would make it easier for companies to access capital markets and ease the overwhelming regulations that these young businesses encounter. This is exactly the type of bill that both sides can agree on, and I certainly urge my colleagues to support it.

Without a doubt, by allowing companies access to the markets, we give them the opportunity to succeed, and, in turn, they will have the opportunity to create additional jobs, which is what we desperately need.

Bill after bill has been passed out of this body and gone over to the Senate. Over two dozen bills wait on the Senate, of which each and every one of them are bipartisan and would create additional jobs. With an unemployment rate of over 8 percent for the past 34 months and at least 9 percent for 28 of those months, it's about time that we moved forward on the jobs package that we're trying to push in the House. We need to step up and get America back to work.

PAYROLL TAX HOLIDAY

(Mr. TONKO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TONKO. Mr. Speaker, as we come to the close of yet another calendar year, and as we move well into the Federal fiscal year, much work remains to be done for America's hardworking middle class families, the working families of this country that make our economy work. We need to make certain that we respond with the extension of a payroll tax holiday. This House knows that that is important business.

We know that the President presented a plan before Congress that would ask for a surcharge on the most upper income strata in our country to bring about fundamental fairness and to address social and economic justice. We know that the hardworking middle class has taken it on the chin with tax cuts of a decade and a half ago that have really caused hardship with the recession in this country where we lost 8.2 million jobs.

We could go forward and do the right thing. We can extend that payroll tax

holiday and pay for it in a meaningful way, in a balanced way. We can then go forward with investments that middle class America truly deserves and requires.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. DOLD). Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the Chair will postpone further proceedings today on motions to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the yeas and nays are ordered, or on which the vote incurs objection under clause 6 of rule XX.

Record votes on postponed questions will be taken later.

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 1892) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2012 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the Senate amendment is as follows:

Senate amendment:

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) *SHORT TITLE.*—This Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012".

(b) *TABLE OF CONTENTS.*—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; Table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

- Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

- Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

- Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Annual report on hiring of National Security Education Program participants.
Sec. 304. Enhancement of authority for flexible personnel management among the elements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 305. Preparation of nuclear proliferation assessment statements.
Sec. 306. Cost estimates.
Sec. 307. Updates of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 308. Notification of transfer of a detainee held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Sec. 309. Enhanced procurement authority to manage supply chain risk.

Sec. 310. Burial allowance.

Sec. 311. Modification of certain reporting requirements.

Sec. 312. Review of strategic and competitive analysis conducted by the intelligence community.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A—Office of the Director of National Intelligence

- Sec. 401. Intelligence community assistance to counter drug trafficking organizations using public lands.
Sec. 402. Application of certain financial reporting requirements to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 403. Public availability of information regarding the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 404. Clarification of status of Chief Information Officer in the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 405. Temporary appointment to fill vacancies within Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Subtitle B—Central Intelligence Agency

- Sec. 411. Acceptance of gifts.
Sec. 412. Foreign language proficiency requirements for Central Intelligence Agency officers.
Sec. 413. Public availability of information regarding the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 414. Creating an official record of the Osama bin Laden operation.
Sec. 415. Recruitment of personnel in the Office of the Inspector General.

Subtitle C—National Security Agency

- Sec. 421. Additional authorities for National Security Agency security personnel.

Subtitle D—Other Elements

- Sec. 431. Codification of Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security as element of the intelligence community.
Sec. 432. Federal Bureau of Investigation participation in the Department of Justice leave bank.
Sec. 433. Accounts and transfer authority for appropriations and other amounts for intelligence elements of the Department of Defense.
Sec. 434. Report on training standards of defense intelligence workforce.

TITLE V—OTHER MATTERS

- Sec. 501. Report on airspace restrictions for use of unmanned aerial vehicles along the border of the United States and Mexico.
Sec. 502. Sense of Congress regarding integration of fusion centers.
Sec. 503. Strategy to counter improvised explosive devices.
Sec. 504. Sense of Congress regarding the priority of railway transportation security.
Sec. 505. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 506. Technical amendments to title 18, United States Code.
Sec. 507. Budgetary effects.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

- (1) **CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.**—The term "congressional intelligence committees" means—
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) **INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.**—The term "intelligence community" has the meaning given

that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2012 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

- (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
- (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
- (3) The Department of Defense.
- (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
- (5) The National Security Agency.
- (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
- (7) The Coast Guard.
- (8) The Department of State.
- (9) The Department of the Treasury.
- (10) The Department of Energy.
- (11) The Department of Justice.
- (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
- (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
- (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
- (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS AND PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2012, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1892 of the One Hundred Twelfth Congress.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AVAILABILITY TO COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.

(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 415c)

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

(c) USE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN ACTIVITIES IN THE CLASSIFIED ANNEX.—In addition to any other purpose authorized by law, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may expend funds authorized in this Act as specified in the Federal Bureau of Investigation Policy Implementation section of the classified annex accompanying this Act.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) AUTHORITY FOR INCREASES.—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number of full-time equivalent positions for fiscal year 2012 authorized by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary for the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of

civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element.

(b) AUTHORITY FOR CONVERSION OF ACTIVITIES PERFORMED BY CONTRACT PERSONNEL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In addition to the authority in subsection (a) and subject to paragraph (2), if the head of an element of the intelligence community makes a determination that activities currently being performed by contract personnel should be performed by employees of such element, the Director of National Intelligence, in order to reduce a comparable number of contract personnel, may authorize for that purpose employment of additional full-time equivalent personnel in such element equal to the number of full-time equivalent contract personnel performing such activities.

(2) CONCURRENCE AND APPROVAL.—The authority described in paragraph (1) may not be exercised unless the Director of National Intelligence concurs with the determination described in such paragraph.

(c) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PERSONNEL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment—

(1) in a student program, trainee program, or similar program;

(2) in a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or

(3) in details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.

(d) NOTICE TO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to the initial exercise of an authority described in subsection (a) or (b).

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2012 the sum of \$576,393,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2013.

(b) AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 777 full-time or full-time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2012. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.

(c) CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2012 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2013.

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL.—In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2012, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Dis-

ability Fund for fiscal year 2012 the sum of \$514,000,000.

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 303. ANNUAL REPORT ON HIRING OF NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS.

Not later than 90 days after the end of each of fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report, which may be in classified form, containing the number of personnel hired by such element during such fiscal year that were at any time a recipient of a grant or scholarship under the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).

SEC. 304. ENHANCEMENT OF AUTHORITY FOR FLEXIBLE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AMONG THE ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(v) AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH POSITIONS IN EXCEPTED SERVICE.—(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence of the head of the covered department concerned and in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, may—

“(A) convert competitive service positions, and the incumbents of such positions, within an element of the intelligence community in such department, to excepted service positions as the Director of National Intelligence determines necessary to carry out the intelligence functions of such element; and

“(B) establish new positions in the excepted service within an element of the intelligence community in such department, if the Director of National Intelligence determines such positions are necessary to carry out the intelligence functions of such element.

“(2) An incumbent occupying a position on the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 selected to be converted to the excepted service under this section shall have the right to refuse such conversion. Once such individual no longer occupies the position, the position may be converted to the excepted service.

“(3) In this subsection, the term ‘covered department’ means the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, or the Department of the Treasury.”

SEC. 305. PREPARATION OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ASSESSMENT STATEMENTS.

Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by section 304 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(w) NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ASSESSMENT STATEMENTS INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ADDENDUM.—The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the appropriate elements of the intelligence community and the Secretary of State, shall provide to the President, the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an addendum to

each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement accompanying a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters, including interactions with other countries of proliferation concern and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or missile-related transfers to such countries.”

SEC. 306. COST ESTIMATES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 506A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a–1) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(2)—

(A) by inserting “(A)” after “(2)”;

(B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(B) For major system acquisitions requiring a service or capability from another acquisition or program to deliver the end-to-end functionality for the intelligence community end users, independent cost estimates shall include, to the maximum extent practicable, all estimated costs across all pertinent elements of the intelligence community. For collection programs, such cost estimates shall include the cost of new analyst training, new hardware and software for data exploitation and analysis, and any unique or additional costs for data processing, storing, and power, space, and cooling across the life cycle of the program. If such costs for processing, exploitation, dissemination, and storage are scheduled to be executed in other elements of the intelligence community, the independent cost estimate shall identify and annotate such costs for such other elements accordingly.”; and

(2) in subsection (e)(2)—

(A) by inserting “(A)” after “(2)”;

(B) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by striking “associated with the acquisition of a major system,” and inserting “associated with the development, acquisition, procurement, operation, and sustainment of a major system across its proposed life cycle.”; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(B) In accordance with subsection (a)(2)(B), each independent cost estimate shall include all costs required across elements of the intelligence community to develop, acquire, procure, operate, and sustain the system to provide the end-to-end intelligence functionality of the system, including—

(i) for collection programs, the cost of new analyst training, new hardware and software for data exploitation and analysis, and any unique or additional costs for data processing, storing, and power, space, and cooling across the life cycle of the program; and

(ii) costs for processing, exploitation, dissemination, and storage scheduled to be executed in other elements of the intelligence community.”

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 307. UPDATES OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO TERRORIST RECIDIVISM OF DETAINEES HELD AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

(a) UPDATES AND CONSOLIDATION OF LANGUAGE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506H the following new section:

“SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO TERRORIST RECIDIVISM OF DETAINEES HELD AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA

“SEC. 506I. (a) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of—

“(1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and

“(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.

“(b) UPDATES.—Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.”

(2) INITIAL UPDATE.—The initial update required by section 506I(b) of such Act, as added by paragraph (1) of this subsection, shall be made publicly available not later than 10 days after the date the first report following the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 is submitted to members and committees of Congress pursuant to section 319 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111–32; 10 U.S.C. 801 note).

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506H the following new item:

“Sec. 506I. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”

SEC. 308. NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFER OF A DETAINEE HELD AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

(a) REQUIREMENT FOR NOTIFICATION.—The President shall submit to Congress, in classified form, at least 30 days prior to the transfer or release of an individual detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of June 24, 2009, to the country of such individual's nationality or last habitual residence or to any other foreign country or to a freely associated State the following information:

(1) The name of the individual to be transferred or released.

(2) The country or the freely associated State to which such individual is to be transferred or released.

(3) The terms of any agreement with the country or the freely associated State for the acceptance of such individual, including the amount of any financial assistance related to such agreement.

(4) The agencies or departments of the United States responsible for ensuring that the agreement described in paragraph (3) is carried out.

(b) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “freely associated States” means the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau.

(c) CONSTRUCTION WITH OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede or otherwise affect the following provisions of law:

(1) Section 1028 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.

(2) Section 8120 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2012.

SEC. 309. ENHANCED PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY TO MANAGE SUPPLY CHAIN RISK.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) COVERED AGENCY.—The term “covered agency” means any element of the intelligence community other than an element within the Department of Defense.

(2) COVERED ITEM OF SUPPLY.—The term “covered item of supply” means an item of information technology (as that term is defined in sec-

tion 11101 of title 40, United States Code) that is purchased for inclusion in a covered system, and the loss of integrity of which could result in a supply chain risk for a covered system.

(3) COVERED PROCUREMENT.—The term “covered procurement” means—

(A) a source selection for a covered system or a covered item of supply involving either a performance specification, as provided in section 3306(a)(3)(B) of title 41, United States Code, or an evaluation factor, as provided in section 3306(b)(1) of such title, relating to supply chain risk;

(B) the consideration of proposals for and issuance of a task or delivery order for a covered system or a covered item of supply, as provided in section 4106(d)(3) of title 41, United States Code, where the task or delivery order contract concerned includes a contract clause establishing a requirement relating to supply chain risk; or

(C) any contract action involving a contract for a covered system or a covered item of supply where such contract includes a clause establishing requirements relating to supply chain risk.

(4) COVERED PROCUREMENT ACTION.—The term “covered procurement action” means any of the following actions, if the action takes place in the course of conducting a covered procurement:

(A) The exclusion of a source that fails to meet qualifications standards established in accordance with the requirements of section 3311 of title 41, United States Code, for the purpose of reducing supply chain risk in the acquisition of covered systems.

(B) The exclusion of a source that fails to achieve an acceptable rating with regard to an evaluation factor providing for the consideration of supply chain risk in the evaluation of proposals for the award of a contract or the issuance of a task or delivery order.

(C) The decision to withhold consent for a contractor to subcontract with a particular source or to direct a contractor for a covered system to exclude a particular source from consideration for a subcontract under the contract.

(5) COVERED SYSTEM.—The term “covered system” means a national security system, as that term is defined in section 3542(b) of title 44, United States Code.

(6) SUPPLY CHAIN RISK.—The term “supply chain risk” means the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of such system.

(b) AUTHORITY.—Subject to subsection (c) and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, the head of a covered agency may, in conducting intelligence and intelligence-related activities—

(1) carry out a covered procurement action; and

(2) limit, notwithstanding any other provision of law, in whole or in part, the disclosure of information relating to the basis for carrying out a covered procurement action.

(c) DETERMINATION AND NOTIFICATION.—The head of a covered agency may exercise the authority provided in subsection (b) only after—

(1) any appropriate consultation with procurement or other relevant officials of the covered agency;

(2) making a determination in writing, which may be in classified form, that—

(A) use of the authority in subsection (b)(1) is necessary to protect national security by reducing supply chain risk;

(B) less intrusive measures are not reasonably available to reduce such supply chain risk; and

(C) in a case where the head of the covered agency plans to limit disclosure of information under subsection (b)(2), the risk to national security due to the disclosure of such information

outweighs the risk due to not disclosing such information;

(3) notifying the Director of National Intelligence that there is a significant supply chain risk to the covered system concerned, unless the head of the covered agency making the determination is the Director of National Intelligence; and

(4) providing a notice, which may be in classified form, of the determination made under paragraph (2) to the congressional intelligence committees that includes a summary of the basis for the determination, including a discussion of less intrusive measures that were considered and why they were not reasonably available to reduce supply chain risk.

(d) DELEGATION.—The head of a covered agency may not delegate the authority provided in subsection (b) or the responsibility to make a determination under subsection (c) to an official below the level of the service acquisition executive for the agency concerned.

(e) SAVINGS.—The authority under this section is in addition to any other authority under any other provision of law. The authority under this section shall not be construed to alter or effect the exercise of any other provision of law.

(f) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The requirements of this section shall take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to contracts that are awarded on or after such date.

(g) SUNSET.—The authority provided in this section shall expire on the date that section 806 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383; 10 U.S.C. 2304 note) expires.

SEC. 310. BURIAL ALLOWANCE.

(a) AUTHORIZATION TO PROVIDE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The head of an agency or department containing an element of the intelligence community may pay to the estate of a decedent described in paragraph (2) a burial allowance at the request of a representative of such estate, as determined in accordance with the laws of a State.

(2) DESCRIPTION.—A decedent described in this paragraph is an individual—

(A) who served as a civilian officer or employee of such an agency or department;

(B) who died as a result of an injury incurred during such service; and

(C) whose death—

(i) resulted from hostile or terrorist activities; or

(ii) occurred in connection with an intelligence activity having a substantial element of risk.

(b) USE OF BURIAL ALLOWANCE.—A burial allowance paid under subsection (a) may be used to reimburse such estate for burial expenses, including recovery, mortuary, funeral, or memorial service, cremation, burial costs, and costs of transportation by common carrier to the place selected for final disposition of the decedent.

(c) AMOUNT OF BURIAL ALLOWANCE; RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER PROVISIONS.—A burial allowance paid under subsection (a) shall be—

(1) in an amount not greater than—

(A) the maximum reimbursable amount allowed under Department of Defense Instruction 1344.08 or successor instruction; plus

(B) the actual costs of transportation referred to in subsection (b); and

(2) in addition to any other benefit permitted under any other provision of law, including funds that may be expended as specified in the General Provisions section of the classified annex accompanying this Act.

(d) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to Congress a report on the feasibility of implementing legislation to provide for burial allowances at a level

which adequately addresses the cost of burial expenses and provides for equitable treatment when an officer or employee of a Federal agency or department dies as the result of an injury sustained in the performance of duty.

SEC. 311. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.—Section 1041(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 403-1b(b)) is amended by striking paragraphs (3) and (4).

(b) INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003.—Section 904(d)(1) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 402c(d)(1)) is amended by striking “on an annual basis”.

(c) INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995.—Section 809 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170b) is amended—

(1) by striking subsection (b); and

(2) in subsection (c), by striking “reports referred to in subsections (a) and (b)” and inserting “report referred to in subsection (a)”.

(d) REPORT ON TEMPORARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS FOR CRITICAL LANGUAGE TRAINING.—Paragraph (3)(D) of section 102A(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(e)), as amended by section 306 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259; 124 Stat. 2661), is amended by striking “The” and inserting “For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the”.

SEC. 312. REVIEW OF STRATEGIC AND COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS CONDUCTED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) REVIEW.—The Director of National Intelligence shall direct the Director’s Senior Advisory Group to conduct a comprehensive review of the strategic and competitive analysis of international terrorism and homegrown violent extremism conducted by elements of the intelligence community during the 12 month period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) RECOMMENDATIONS.—Not later than 15 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—

(1) a report on the results of the review conducted under subsection (a); and

(2) any actions taken by the Director to implement the recommendations, if any, of the Director’s Senior Advisory Group based on such results.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A—Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 401. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS USING PUBLIC LANDS.

(a) CONSULTATION.—The Director of National Intelligence shall consult with the heads of the Federal land management agencies on the appropriate actions the intelligence community can take to assist such agencies in responding to the threat from covered entities that are currently or have previously used public lands in the United States to further the operations of such entities.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report on the results of the consultation under subsection (a). Such report shall include—

(1) an assessment of the intelligence community collection efforts dedicated to covered entities, including any collection gaps or inefficiencies; and

(2) an assessment of the ability of the intelligence community to assist Federal land management agencies in identifying and protecting public lands from illegal drug grows and other activities and threats of covered entities, including through the sharing of intelligence information.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) COVERED ENTITY.—The term “covered entity” means an international drug trafficking organization or other actor involved in drug trafficking generally.

(2) FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT AGENCY.—The term “Federal land management agency” includes—

(A) the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture;

(B) the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior;

(C) the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior;

(D) the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior; and

(E) the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior.

(3) PUBLIC LANDS.—The term “public lands” means land under the management of a Federal land management agency.

SEC. 402. APPLICATION OF CERTAIN FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the requirements of section 3515 of title 31, United States Code, to submit an audited financial statement shall not apply to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence if the Director of National Intelligence determines and notifies Congress that audited financial statements for such years for such Office cannot be produced on a cost-effective basis.

SEC. 403. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3h) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(o) INFORMATION ON WEBSITE.—(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish and maintain on the homepage of the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence information relating to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community including methods to contact the Inspector General.

“(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.”.

SEC. 404. CLARIFICATION OF STATUS OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER IN THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to the Chief Information Officer, Small Business Administration the following new item:

“Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.”.

SEC. 405. TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT TO FILL VACANCIES WITHIN OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection:

“(e) TEMPORARY FILLING OF VACANCIES.—With respect to filling temporarily a vacancy in an office within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (other than that of the Director of National Intelligence), section 3345(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, may be applied—

“(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by substituting ‘an element of the intelligence community, as that term is defined in

section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)), for 'such Executive agency'; and

"(2) in subparagraph (A), by substituting 'the intelligence community' for 'such agency'."

Subtitle B—Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 411. ACCEPTANCE OF GIFTS.

Section 12 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 4031(a)) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by inserting "(1)" after "(a)"; and

(B) by striking the second and third sentences and inserting the following:

"(2) Any gift accepted under this section (and any income produced by any such gift)—

"(A) may be used only for—

"(i) artistic display;

"(ii) purposes relating to the general welfare, education, or recreation of employees or dependents of employees of the Agency or for similar purposes; or

"(iii) purposes relating to the welfare, education, or recreation of an individual described in paragraph (3); and

"(B) under no circumstances may such a gift (or any income produced by any such gift) be used for operational purposes.

"(3) An individual described in this paragraph is an individual who—

"(A) is an employee or a former employee of the Agency who suffered injury or illness while employed by the Agency that—

"(i) resulted from hostile or terrorist activities;

"(ii) occurred in connection with an intelligence activity having a significant element of risk; or

"(iii) occurred under other circumstances determined by the Director to be analogous to the circumstances described in clause (i) or (ii);

"(B) is a family member of such an employee or former employee; or

"(C) is a surviving family member of an employee of the Agency who died in circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A).

"(4) The Director may not accept any gift under this section that is expressly conditioned upon any expenditure not to be met from the gift itself or from income produced by the gift unless such expenditure has been authorized by law.

"(5) The Director may, in the Director's discretion, determine that an individual described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (3) may accept a gift for the purposes described in paragraph (2)(A)(iii)."; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(f) The Director, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations to carry out the authority provided in this section. Such regulations shall ensure that such authority is exercised consistent with all relevant ethical constraints and principles, including—

"(1) the avoidance of any prohibited conflict of interest or appearance of impropriety; and

"(2) a prohibition against the acceptance of a gift from a foreign government or an agent of a foreign government."

SEC. 412. FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 104A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a(g)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1)—

(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)—

(i) by inserting "in the Directorate of Intelligence career service or the National Clandestine Service career service" after "an individual";

(ii) by inserting "or promoted" after "appointed"; and

(iii) by striking "individual—" and inserting "individual has been certified as having a pro-

fessional speaking and reading proficiency in a foreign language, such proficiency being at least level 3 on the Interagency Language Roundtable Language Skills Level or commensurate proficiency level using such other indicator of proficiency as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate.";

(B) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B); and

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking "position or category of positions" both places that term appears and inserting "position, category of positions, or occupation".

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Section 611(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 50 U.S.C. 403-4a note) is amended—

(1) by inserting "or promotions" after "appointments"; and

(2) by striking "that is one year after the date".

(c) REPORT ON WAIVERS.—Section 611(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 118 Stat. 3955) is amended—

(1) in the first sentence—

(A) by striking "positions" and inserting "individual waivers"; and

(B) by striking "Directorate of Operations" and inserting "National Clandestine Service"; and

(2) in the second sentence, by striking "position or category of positions" and inserting "position, category of positions, or occupation".

(d) REPORT ON TRANSFERS.—Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and on an annual basis for each of the following 3 years, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the number of Senior Intelligence Service employees of the Agency who—

(1) were transferred during the reporting period to a Senior Intelligence Service position in the Directorate of Intelligence career service or the National Clandestine Service career service; and

(2) did not meet the foreign language requirements specified in section 104A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a(g)(1)) at the time of such transfer.

SEC. 413. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(h) INFORMATION ON WEBSITE.—(1) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall establish and maintain on the homepage of the Agency's publicly accessible website information relating to the Office of the Inspector General including methods to contact the Inspector General.

"(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related to the Office of the Inspector General."

SEC. 414. CREATING AN OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE OSAMA BIN LADEN OPERATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) On May 1, 2011, United States personnel killed terrorist leader Osama bin Laden during the course of a targeted strike against his secret compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

(2) Osama bin Laden was the leader of the al Qaeda terrorist organization, the most significant terrorism threat to the United States and the international community.

(3) Osama bin Laden was the architect of terrorist attacks which killed nearly 3,000 civilians on September 11, 2001, the most deadly terrorist attack against our Nation, in which al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four airplanes and crashed them into the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and, due to heroic efforts by civilian passengers to

disrupt the terrorists, near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

(4) Osama bin Laden planned or supported numerous other deadly terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies, including the 1998 bombings of United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and against innocent civilians in countries around the world, including the 2004 attack on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain and the 2005 bombings of the mass transit system in London, England.

(5) Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States, under President George W. Bush, led an international coalition into Afghanistan to dismantle al Qaeda, deny them a safe haven in Afghanistan and ungoverned areas along the Pakistani border, and bring Osama bin Laden to justice.

(6) President Barack Obama in 2009 committed additional forces and resources to efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan as "the central front in our enduring struggle against terrorism and extremism".

(7) The valiant members of the United States Armed Forces have courageously and vigorously pursued al Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and around the world.

(8) The anonymous, unsung heroes of the intelligence community have pursued al Qaeda and affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world with tremendous dedication, sacrifice, and professionalism.

(9) The close collaboration between the Armed Forces and the intelligence community prompted the Director of National Intelligence, General James Clapper, to state, "Never have I seen a more remarkable example of focused integration, seamless collaboration, and sheer professional magnificence as was demonstrated by the Intelligence Community in the ultimate demise of Osama bin Laden."

(10) While the death of Osama bin Laden represents a significant blow to the al Qaeda organization and its affiliates and to terrorist organizations around the world, terrorism remains a critical threat to United States national security.

(11) President Obama said, "For over two decades, bin Laden has been al Qaeda's leader and symbol, and has continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends and allies. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our Nation's effort to defeat al Qaeda."

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the raid that killed Osama bin Laden demonstrated the best of the intelligence community's capabilities and teamwork;

(2) for years to come, Americans will look back at this event as a defining point in the history of the United States;

(3) it is vitally important that the United States memorialize all the events that led to the raid so that future generations will have an official record of the events that transpired before, during, and as a result of the operation; and

(4) preserving this history now will allow the United States to have an accurate account of the events while those that participated in the events are still serving in the Government.

(c) REPORT ON THE OPERATION THAT KILLED OSAMA BIN LADEN.—Not later than 90 days after the completion of the report being prepared by the Center for the Study of Intelligence that documents the history of and lessons learned from the raid that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit such report to the congressional intelligence committees.

(d) PRESERVATION OF RECORDS.—The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall preserve any records, including intelligence information and assessments, used to generate the report described in subsection (c).

SEC. 415. RECRUITMENT OF PERSONNEL IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.

(a) *STUDY.*—The Inspector General of the Office of Personnel Management, in consultation with the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall carry out a study of the personnel authorities and available personnel benefits of the Office of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. Such study shall include—

(1) identification of any barriers or disincentives to the recruitment or retention of experienced investigators within the Office of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency; and

(2) a comparison of the personnel authorities of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency with personnel authorities of Inspectors General of other agencies and departments of the United States, including a comparison of the benefits available to experienced investigators within the Office of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency with similar benefits available within the offices of Inspectors General of such other agencies or departments.

(b) *RECOMMENDATIONS.*—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Office of Personnel Management shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives—

(1) a report on the results of the study conducted under subsection (a); and

(2) any recommendations for legislative action based on such results.

(c) *FUNDING.*—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall transfer to the Inspector General of the Office of Personnel Management such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.

Subtitle C—National Security Agency

SEC. 421. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SECURITY PERSONNEL.

(a) *AUTHORITY TO TRANSPORT APPREHENDED PERSONS.*—Paragraph (5) of section 11(a) of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended to read as follows:

“(5) Agency personnel authorized by the Director under paragraph (1) may transport an individual apprehended under the authority of this section from the premises at which the individual was apprehended, as described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), for the purpose of transferring such individual to the custody of law enforcement officials. Such transportation may be provided only to make a transfer of custody at a location within 30 miles of the premises described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).”

(b) *CONFORMING AMENDMENT RELATING TO TORT LIABILITY.*—Paragraph (1) of section 11(d) of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking “or” at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(D) transport an individual pursuant to subsection (a)(2).”

Subtitle D—Other Elements

SEC. 431. CODIFICATION OF OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AS ELEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 3(4)(K) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(K)) is amended to read as follows:

“(K) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.”

SEC. 432. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PARTICIPATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LEAVE BANK.

Subsection (b) of section 6372 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

“(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) and notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, neither an excepted agency nor any individual employed in or under an excepted agency may be included in a leave bank program established under any of the preceding provisions of this subchapter.

“(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may authorize an individual employed by the Bureau to participate in a leave bank program administered by the Department of Justice under this subchapter if in the Director’s judgment such participation will not adversely affect the protection of intelligence sources and methods.”

SEC. 433. ACCOUNTS AND TRANSFER AUTHORITY FOR APPROPRIATIONS AND OTHER AMOUNTS FOR INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

(a) *IN GENERAL.*—Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 428 the following new section:

“§ 429. Appropriations for Defense intelligence elements: accounts for transfers; transfer authority

“(a) *ACCOUNTS FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS.*—The Secretary of Defense may transfer appropriations of the Department of Defense which are available for the activities of Defense intelligence elements to an account or accounts established for receipt of such transfers. Each such account may also receive transfers from the Director of National Intelligence if made pursuant to Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), and transfers and reimbursements arising from transactions, as authorized by law, between a Defense intelligence element and another entity. Appropriation balances in each such account may be transferred back to the account or accounts from which such appropriations originated as appropriation refunds.

“(b) *RECORDATION OF TRANSFERS.*—Transfers made pursuant to subsection (a) shall be recorded as expenditure transfers.

“(c) *AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.*—Funds transferred pursuant to subsection (a) shall remain available for the same time period and for the same purpose as the appropriation from which transferred, and shall remain subject to the same limitations provided in the act making the appropriation.

“(d) *OBLIGATION AND EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS.*—Unless otherwise specifically authorized by law, funds transferred pursuant to subsection (a) shall only be obligated and expended in accordance with chapter 15 of title 31 and all other applicable provisions of law.

“(e) *DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ELEMENT DEFINED.*—In this section, the term ‘Defense intelligence element’ means any of the Department of Defense agencies, offices, and elements included within the definition of ‘intelligence community’ under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).”

(b) *CLERICAL AMENDMENT.*—The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

“429. Appropriations for Defense intelligence elements: accounts for transfers; transfer authority.”

SEC. 434. REPORT ON TRAINING STANDARDS OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE WORKFORCE.

(a) *REPORT.*—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Sec-

retary of Defense for Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on the training standards of the defense intelligence workforce. Such report shall include—

(1) a description of existing training, education, and professional development standards applied to personnel of defense intelligence components; and

(2) an assessment of the ability to implement a certification program for personnel of the defense intelligence components based on achievement of required training, education, and professional development standards.

(b) *DEFINITIONS.*—In this section:

(1) *DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS.*—The term “defense intelligence components” means—

(A) the National Security Agency;

(B) the Defense Intelligence Agency;

(C) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;

(D) the National Reconnaissance Office;

(E) the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps; and

(F) other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs.

(2) *DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE WORKFORCE.*—The term “defense intelligence workforce” means the personnel of the defense intelligence components.

TITLE V—OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 501. REPORT ON AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS FOR USE OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES ALONG THE BORDER OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on whether restrictions on the use of airspace are hampering the use of unmanned aerial vehicles by the Department of Homeland Security along the international border between the United States and Mexico.

SEC. 502. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INTEGRATION OF FUSION CENTERS.

It is the sense of Congress that ten years after the terrorist attacks upon the United States on September 11, 2001, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, should continue to integrate and utilize fusion centers to enlist all of the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security capabilities of the United States in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution to prevent acts of terrorism against the United States.

SEC. 503. STRATEGY TO COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

(a) *STRATEGY.*—

(1) *ESTABLISHMENT.*—The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall establish a coordinated strategy utilizing all available personnel and assets for intelligence collection and analysis to identify and counter network activity and operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan relating to the development and use of improvised explosive devices.

(2) *CONTENTS.*—The strategy established under paragraph (1) shall identify—

(A) the networks that design improvised explosive devices, provide training on improvised explosive device assembly and employment, and smuggle improvised explosive device components into Afghanistan;

(B) the persons and organizations not directly affiliated with insurgents in Afghanistan who knowingly enable the movement of commercial products and material used in improvised explosive device construction from factories and vendors in Pakistan into Afghanistan;

(C) the financiers, financial networks, institutions, and funding streams that provide resources to the insurgency in Afghanistan; and

(D) the links to military, intelligence services, and government officials who are complicit in allowing the insurgent networks in Afghanistan to operate.

(b) **REPORT AND IMPLEMENTATION.**—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall—

(1) submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report containing the strategy established under subsection (a); and

(2) implement such strategy.

SEC. 504. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRIORITY OF RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION SECURITY.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the nation's railway transportation (including subway transit) network is broad and technically complex, requiring robust communication between private sector stakeholders and the intelligence community to identify, monitor, and respond to threats;

(2) the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis maintains a constructive relationship with other Federal agencies, state and local governments, and private entities to safeguard our railways; and

(3) railway transportation security (including subway transit security) should continue to be prioritized in the critical infrastructure threat assessment developed by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and included in threat assessment budgets of the intelligence community.

SEC. 505. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in section 3(6) (50 U.S.C. 401a(6)), by striking “Director of Central Intelligence” and inserting “Director of National Intelligence”;

(2) in section 506(b) (50 U.S.C. 415a(b)), by striking “Director of Central Intelligence.” and inserting “Director of National Intelligence.”; and

(3) in section 506A(c)(2)(C) (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(c)(2)(C)), by striking “National Foreign Intelligence Program” both places that term appears and inserting “National Intelligence Program”.

SEC. 506. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE.

Section 351(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by inserting “the Director (or a person nominated to be Director during the pendency of such nomination) or Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence,” after “in such department,”; and

(2) by striking “Central Intelligence,” and inserting “the Central Intelligence Agency.”.

SEC. 507. BUDGETARY EFFECTS.

The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the latest statement titled “Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation” for this Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, provided that such statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. ROGERS) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. RUPPERSBERGER) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

This is a good day for the United States, certainly a good day for the

men and women who serve so proudly in our intelligence services that work tirelessly to keep America safe. This is a good day to bring the fiscal year 2012 intelligence authorization bill to the floor today. This will be our second intelligence authorization bill since January of this year, when I became chairman and my ranking member took his position as well for the House Intelligence Committee, and it will be the 29th bill in our committee's history.

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This bill is a vital tool for congressional oversight of the intelligence community's classified activities and is critical to ensuring that our intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities they need to do their important work.

Passing an annual intelligence authorization bill is vital to keeping the laws governing our intelligence operations up to date. The FY12 bill sustains our current intelligence capabilities and provides for the development of future capabilities, all while achieving significant savings.

The U.S. intelligence community plays a critical role in the war on terrorism and securing the country from many threats that we face today. Effective and aggressive congressional oversight is essential to ensuring continued success in the intelligence community.

The intelligence authorization bill funds U.S. intelligence activities spanning 17 separate agencies. This funding totaled roughly \$80 billion in fiscal year 2010. The current challenging fiscal environment demands the accountability and financial oversight of our classified intelligence programs that can only come with an intelligence authorization bill.

The bill's comprehensive classified annex provides detailed guidance on intelligence spending, including adjustments to costly programs. This bill funds the requirements of the men and women of the intelligence community, both military and civilian, many of whom directly support the war zones or are engaged in other dangerous operations to keep America and Americans safe.

It provides oversight and authorization for critical intelligence activities, including the global counterterrorism operations, such as the one that took out Osama bin Laden; cyberdefense by the National Security Agency; countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; global monitoring of foreign militaries and weapons tests; research and development of new technology to maintain our intelligence agencies' technological edge, including work on code breaking and spy satellites.

This has been a strategy for a tough fiscal climate. After passage of the Budget Control Act, the committee revamped the bill it reported out of committee back in May to double its budget savings. As a result, the bill is sig-

nificantly below the President's budget request for fiscal year 2012 and further still below the levels authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 2011. These savings—and this is important, Mr. Speaker—were achieved without impacting the intelligence community's important mission, as the cuts of the 1990s did.

The bottom line is that this bipartisan bill preserves and advances national security and is also fiscally responsible. The secrecy that is a necessary part of our country's intelligence work requires that the congressional intelligence committees conduct strong and effective oversight on behalf of the American people. That strong and effective oversight is impossible, however, without an annual intelligence authorization bill. And I want to thank both of the staffs for the Republicans and the Democrats, and the members from both the Republicans and Democrats on this committee for coming together in a bipartisan way on the important issue of national security. And I thank my friend, DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, the ranking member, for his leadership in getting us not to one, but to two authorization bills within just 10 months. And that's no small accomplishment, as you might know, Mr. Speaker.

With that, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise today in favor of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2012.

When Chairman ROGERS and I took over leadership of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, we made a commitment to work together to ensure the intelligence community has the authorities it needs to effectively protect America. This intelligence authorization bill achieves this purpose. It gives our intelligence professionals critical resources, capabilities, and authorities. We passed FY11 earlier this year, and now we can see the finish line for FY12.

For 5 years, there were no intelligence bills. There was a gap in oversight. When this bill is signed into law, it will be the third time in 3 years that the Intelligence Committee has passed an intel authorization act.

I strongly believe that passing the authorization bill is critical to national security. The Intelligence Committee wants to strengthen the intelligence community and give them the tools they need. However, it is also our job to conduct thorough, effective oversight and provide budgetary direction. This bill does that.

This bill makes smart choices. It trims and eliminates duplicative efforts wherever possible. We made careful decisions and were mindful to protect the current and future capabilities that protect our Nation. This bill aligns our resources with our current threats and makes important investments in space, satellites, and cyber.

This bill is even more important today with the 10th anniversary of 9/11 fresh in our minds. When it comes to terrorism, Osama bin Laden may be gone, but radical extremists still have the United States as a target.

Intelligence is clearly the best defense against terrorism, and this bill makes our defense even stronger. This act is bipartisan and bicameral. The members of our Intelligence Committee work not as Democrats or Republicans, or as the House or Senate, but as Americans protecting our country. This bill is proof that Congress can work together to do good things. I fully support this bill and urge my colleagues to do the same.

And I also want to acknowledge the leadership of Chairman ROGERS for helping put this bill together.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I continue to reserve my time, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished colleague from the State of California (Mr. THOMPSON).

Mr. THOMPSON of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1892, the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY12.

As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence, I am pleased that we were able to work together to bring a bipartisan, bicameral intelligence authorization bill to the House floor for the third year in a row. This is a testament to the hard work and leadership of our chairman, Mr. ROGERS, and ranking member, Mr. RUPPERSBERGER.

This bill will increase information sharing throughout the intelligence community. It includes a provision that is important to my home State of California, requiring the Director of National Intelligence to compile a threat assessment of foreign drug traffickers that are destroying our public lands here in the United States and causing unacceptable levels of violence because of their drug-growing operations in our public parks and forests. This bill requires the DNI to share this information with Federal land management agencies like the Forest Service so that we can take back our public lands.

The bill also includes a provision that I authored, working with my friend and former committee colleague, Representative ANNA ESHOO from California, requiring the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide a full report on the events surrounding the May 2011 Osama bin Laden raid. We are all very proud of the intelligence community's extraordinary efforts in carrying out this operation. We believe it's important that the intelligence community document this operation in our permanent record as to how the operation was conducted and its importance on our counterterrorism efforts.

Mr. Speaker, this legislation will improve our national security, will en-

hance the capabilities of the intelligence community, and will make our Nation stronger.

I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I think we really need to discuss the issue of cybersecurity. Cyberthreat is the one thing I think that keeps a lot of us on the Intelligence Committee up at night, how serious a threat it is to our country—we're being attacked on a regular basis. And we as a country need to do what we have to do to go forward and deal with the issue of cyber.

Cyber poses one of the greatest threats to Americans from both an economic and national security perspective. We are losing millions of dollars because of cyberattacks. Our intellectual property is being stolen daily just as we speak. Our Pentagon is being attacked as we speak. We have seen countless examples of cutting-edge U.S. ideas being stolen and used for foreign products.

Cyber is also a major national security concern. We only have to look at the attack on South Korea's banking system to realize the impact an attack can have on critical infrastructure. In South Korea, depositors lost access to their money and critical investment. Data was lost. An attack like this could happen in the United States if we do not prepare and focus on the issue of cybersecurity. This bill strengthens U.S. cyberdefenses, again, a very important part of this bill.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I appreciate the gentleman bringing up the issue of cybersecurity, an incredibly important issue, one that this committee spends a great deal of time on. And the ranking member and myself and many members of this committee have co-authored a bill—and many Members of this House—to give that first important step to protecting Americans' networks from both economic espionage and attack of those particular networks.

□ 0930

I can't think of anything that is more pressing than that particular issue, and I appreciate the gentleman's working with us on that particular issue and being a leading voice here in Congress on that particular issue.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I think another major issue that we've addressed in this bill is the issue of space. Years ago, when we went to the Moon, the whole country understood how important space was to the national defense of our country, and, in those days, everyone knew the names

of the astronauts the same as they know the names of NFL quarterbacks today.

And yet, because of the fact that there hasn't been as much in space, we as a country need to educate our constituents how important space is. We are the strongest country in the world, and one of the main reasons is because we are active and control the skies. Yet, right now, our space program has to be reinvigorated, and we have to refocus on that.

America, again, controls the world because we control the skies. Our investment in space keeps us safe. If we fail to make that investment, other countries will move ahead and edge us out. As an example, China is going to the Moon. They are spending time, research, and development to go to the Moon. Currently, we rely on the Russians to get to the international space station.

We must reinvest in the capabilities to give us the edge in space. We also need to think about different ways to get ahead. The bill breaks down barriers of our launch industry. All options need to be on the table as we talk about keeping America's edge in space.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The ranking member brings up an important point about how complex this bill is and the level of threats and the degree of threat that this great country faces every day and really the importance of our investment in the technology that we need to keep ahead of enemy nations who seek to do us harm.

This bill embodies the fact that there will be members of the intelligence community whose job it is to find those Russian spies—like the illegal alien Russian case that was here—that are attempting to do bad things to the United States. The same with Chinese spies and Iranian spies, and the list is very long. And, unfortunately, it's not a spy novel; it's not a movie. These things are real. They happen every day in the United States, and we are a target of those nation-states as they seek to steal our secrets.

This bill provides those protections, and that means that we have to invest in space. It means that we have to invest in our cybersecurity capability. It means that we have to invest in our HUMINT collection, meaning recruiting others who will help us identify and ferret out those who seek to do us harm.

It means that we have the challenges of trying to make sure that al Qaeda, who has expressed an interest in a radiological bomb, doesn't get their hands on those types of materials. It means that we have to be careful about nuclear weapons being proliferated around the world by either force security or, worse yet, nation-states who encourage that type of activity.

It is no simple job being an intelligence officer or being in the intelligence community here in the United States.

I think this bill is an accurate reflection on how we move to the next place, but also an important reminder of the important work that they do, often in the shadows. The men and women who conduct this important work certainly deserve our support and all of the resources that we can muster to make sure that they're successful in their endeavors.

With that, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I think it's extremely important that we look back where we've come from since 9/11.

During 9/11, or before 9/11, we had agencies, intelligence agencies that just were not working together. There was not a teamwork approach. And, as a result of not working together, the attack of 9/11 occurred. The 9/11 Commission made numerous recommendations, and a lot of those recommendations were very positive and were implemented.

As a result of the bin Laden raid and bringing him to justice, I think it showed the teamwork that is needed, especially in the intelligence community, to work together, whether or not it's NSA, the NRO, it's the military, all those different agencies coming together and working as a team. And we would not have had the success that we had with bin Laden if it weren't for that teamwork approach.

I think now we have to learn about the teamwork approach and working together in Congress, also. We as Members of Congress need to do our job and come together and do the people's work, and the partisan politics has to stop.

What I'm leading to is that I think that this bill, and the previous bills that we've passed, and the leadership of Chairman ROGERS and the open minds of every member, whether Democrat or Republican, on the Intelligence Committee has allowed us to come together and have a bipartisan bill. And we would hope that what is happening here today in the bills that we've passed will be looked at as an example for the future.

Again, Chairman ROGERS, thank you for that commitment. We made a commitment when we first came that the stakes are too high, national security is too high, and we must work together.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to a member of the Intelligence Committee, the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I want to thank the chair and ranking member for the ex-

traordinary job they have done on the Intelligence Committee.

This committee, I think, has been more productive than it's been in years, and owing largely to the efforts of these two gentlemen as well as all the members of the committee. I am greatly appreciative of the spirit of cooperation and nonpartisanship that prevails on the Intelligence Committee, and I want to thank both of these gentlemen.

I also enjoy working with JOE HECK, the chairman of the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee, and as ranking member I appreciate the opportunity to work on our overhead architecture issues. I remain concerned that we are largely investing in some inherited systems that are important but very expensive and can often crowd out new innovations and new technologies that are worthy of investment that provide potentially game-changing capabilities, but I look forward to continuing to work with the chair and ranking member to advance the science and technology that helps us stay one step ahead of our adversaries and helps us keep an eye on some of the bad actors around the world that pose a potentially great threat to the United States.

But, once again, I'm greatly appreciative of the efforts of the committee and our leadership. I think this is a superb bill and moves our intelligence capabilities forward.

I urge my colleagues to join in support.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I appreciate the gentleman and look forward to continuing to work with the gentleman from California on those activities when it comes to our overhead architecture. There are programs worthy of investment, and the technology that we apply to this particular effort is incredibly important.

We always need to stay ahead. America always needs to be number one, and this bill reflects that. I think the work of the gentleman certainly is reflected in this bill as well, and I look forward to continuing to work with you to make sure that we don't have crowd-out when it comes to future technology. I think it's incredibly important.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I do want to acknowledge the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee and the work done by Mr. HECK and also Mr. SCHIFF. I have served with Mr. SCHIFF for years on the Intelligence Committee, and he has been very focused on the technical area, which is extremely important to our national security.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, it took a long time for us to get to this point here today. We spent days in important hearings analyzing the intelligence

community, making sure that we focused on what the intelligence community needed. We knew, as this country has an issue with respect to the deficit, that we had to do some cutting.

It's not about cutting; it was what to cut. And we wanted to make sure that the cuts that we made in this intelligence bill, working as Republicans and Democrats, would not affect the mission for the national security of our country. We spent time before the bill passed, hours and hours, working, staff working, coming together. And what's very unique, also, about this committee is that both the Democrat and the Republican staff worked very closely together, and I hadn't seen that in the past as a member of this committee for over 9 years right now. And that's one of the main reasons that we have such a great, effective staff that work together as a team, to come together to make sure that we did what we had to do.

□ 0940

Now we are here today to finish the job. Republicans and Democrats have come together to make important choices and to do what is right for the intelligence community and our country. This bill makes America safer.

Again, I commend everyone who participated in this effort, especially the bipartisan leadership of Chairman ROGERS, the other members of the Intelligence Committee, and the leadership of Senators FEINSTEIN and CHAMBLISS in the Senate Intelligence Committee, again working together. We can do our work here, but we need the Senate to come together, and we did and we now have the product here today.

I would like to thank again both the Democrat and Republican staff for the countless hours they spent.

I fully support the fiscal year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act and urge my colleagues to do the same.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

I want to thank the members of the committee, both Republican and Democrat, for their fine bipartisan effort on this national security bill of real significance. Many, many hours on behalf of both the Democrat staff and the Republican staff to get this right. When we had to trim back some finances from the community without impacting the mission, that is no small challenge, and I think this product is a testament to all of the work on behalf of both staffs, and both members, Republican and Democrat, to get us here.

I want to take this time to thank Senator FEINSTEIN and Senator CHAMBLISS for their work as well on this particular bill. We wouldn't be here today if it weren't for that bicameral and bipartisan effort, again, on this national security bill.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that

all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 1892, as it will be adopted.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to support the 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act. In particular, this bill includes funding to accelerate implementation of an insider threat detection program and requires best practices implemented in the Army to be reviewed for inclusion across the Intelligence Community. In addition, the bill supports critical resources for cybersecurity, a threat which demands the attention of national security specialists.

As the successful operation against Osama bin Ladin demonstrated earlier this year, the Intelligence Community has made significant strides towards working together to counter the most complex threats facing our nation. Productive cooperation and intelligence integration embodies the intent of congressional reforms made after the tragic events of 9/11. I am encouraged to see this progress, especially in the area of information sharing.

While the sharing of classified information is imperative to keep our country safe, technological advances have also increased the risks of this cooperation. As we saw last year with the damage of Wikileaks the threat from a malicious insider, with the "keys to the kingdom," is real.

This bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to review improvements made to the Army's insider threat regulation and consider implementation across the Intelligence Community. The bill also accelerates other technical initiatives within the insider threat program. It is imperative that we ensure our security officers and network administrators have this capability in place to protect our most sensitive information.

Further, this bill helps secure our information and networks both from the insider and from outside actors by addressing the risks posed to our cyber networks. We must all work together to raise awareness of this threat and work with both public and private sector partners. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this bill.

Mr. HECK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1892.

As the Chairman of the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee, I was tasked with leading a comprehensive review of our Nation's satellite systems. This review was conducted, and I am confident that the systems proposed in the classified annex of this bill provide the best value approach to collecting the overhead imagery demanded by our Nation's senior policy makers, intelligence analysts and war fighters.

Two of the intelligence community's chief weapons against terrorism are information—and the ability to communicate that information swiftly. This reality places a significant demand on our imaging systems, and it brings into focus the cost associated with these systems.

As we're fighting the war on terror, we must not allocate resources without due process.

Former Secretary of Defense Gates and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral Mullen both identified America's growing debt as their number one national security concern.

This bill recognizes and selectively funds competition in areas where competitive pressure will help improve innovation, reduce risk and strengthen the industrial base. This bill also recognizes and encourages competition in space launch programs with an eye towards reducing the cost of spacecraft launch while maintaining reliability.

In addition to concern over the federal government's spending habits, another reason Nevadans elected me last fall is to restore government accountability and oversight.

The intelligence community is no exception: we must ensure they are accountable and receive proper oversight because most of their work occurs outside of the public's view.

Chairman ROGERS and Ranking Member RUPPERSBERGER are doing incredible work on this issue, and I applaud their dedication to restoring proper accountability and oversight to the intelligence community.

I am confident the intelligence authorization act provides the resources and latitude our intelligence community needs while removing excess and indolence.

That is why I urge my colleagues to vote "yes" on H.R. 1892.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. ROGERS) that the House suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill, H.R. 1892.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed.

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REFORM AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2011

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendments to the bill (H.R. 2867) to reauthorize the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the Senate amendments is as follows:

Senate amendments:

Beginning on page 2, strike line 6 and all that follows through "(3)" on page 4, line 18, and insert the following:

(a) *TERMS.—Section 201(c) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6431(c)) is amended—*

(1) *by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:*

"(1) *IN GENERAL.—The term of office of each member of the Commission shall be 2 years. An individual, including any member appointed to the Commission prior to the date of the enactment of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2011, shall not serve more*

than 2 terms as a member of the Commission under any circumstance. For any member serving on the Commission on such date who has completed at least 2 full terms on the Commission, such member's term shall expire 90 days after such date. A member of the Commission may not serve after the expiration of that member's term."; and

(2)

On page 5, line 3, strike "(c)" and insert "(b)".

On page 5, strike lines 9 through 19 and insert the following:

(c) *APPLICATION OF FEDERAL TRAVEL REGULATION AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE STANDARDIZED REGULATIONS TO THE COMMISSION.—Section 201(i) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6431(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following: "Members of the Commission are subject to the requirements set forth in chapters 300 through 304 of title 41, Code of Federal Regulations (commonly known as the 'Federal Travel Regulation') and the Department of State Standardized Regulations governing authorized travel at government expense, including regulations concerning the mode of travel, lodging and per diem expenditures, reimbursement payments, and expense reporting and documentation requirements."*

On page 5, strike line 21 and insert the following:

(a) *IN GENERAL.—Section 204 of the International Religious Freedom*

On page 6, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:

(b) *PENDING CLAIMS.—Any administrative or judicial claim or action pending on the date of the enactment of this Act may be maintained under section 204(g) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, as added by subsection (a).*

On page 6, line 21, strike "and 2013" and insert "through 2014".

On page 7, line 9, strike "2013" and insert "2014".

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) and the gentleman from California (Mr. BERMAN) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

GENERAL LEAVE

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The right to free religious belief and practice is a fundamental human right. But as Coptic Christians in Egypt and other religious minorities can attest, that right is frequently and tragically denied. It was for this reason that Congress established the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, an independent, bipartisan Federal Commission charged with monitoring and protecting and promoting religious freedom abroad.

Our State Department prioritizes an array of diplomatic, economic, and other issues that sometimes keep it from speaking and acting boldly against religious suppression. For this