

S. 2674

At the request of Mrs. BOXER, the names of the Senator from Michigan (Ms. STABENOW) and the Senator from Michigan (Mr. PETERS) were added as cosponsors of S. 2674, a bill to authorize the President to provide major disaster assistance for lead contamination of drinking water from public water systems.

S. 2690

At the request of Mr. RISCH, the name of the Senator from New Hampshire (Ms. AYOTTE) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2690, a bill to amend the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act to modernize the funding of wildlife conservation, and for other purposes.

S. 2725

At the request of Ms. AYOTTE, the names of the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. TILLIS), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. BURR), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. PERDUE) and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. INHOFE) were added as cosponsors of S. 2725, a bill to impose sanctions with respect to the ballistic missile program of Iran, and for other purposes.

S. 2726

At the request of Mr. KIRK, the name of the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. ROUNDS) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2726, a bill to hold Iran accountable for its state sponsorship of terrorism and other threatening activities and for its human rights abuses, and for other purposes.

S. 2736

At the request of Ms. HEITKAMP, the name of the Senator from Michigan (Ms. STABENOW) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2736, a bill to improve access to durable medical equipment for Medicare beneficiaries under the Medicare program, and for other purposes.

At the request of Mr. THUNE, the name of the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. LANKFORD) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2736, supra.

S. 2746

At the request of Ms. AYOTTE, the name of the Senator from Colorado (Mr. GARDNER) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2746, a bill to establish various prohibitions regarding the transfer or release of individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and with respect to United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, and for other purposes.

S. 2748

At the request of Ms. BALDWIN, the names of the Senator from Oregon (Mr. WYDEN) and the Senator from West Virginia (Mrs. CAPITO) were added as cosponsors of S. 2748, a bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to increase the number of permanent faculty in palliative care at accredited allopathic and osteopathic medical schools, nursing schools, social work schools, and other programs, including physician assistant education programs, to promote education and research in palliative care and hospice,

and to support the development of faculty careers in academic palliative medicine.

S. 2749

At the request of Ms. AYOTTE, the name of the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. TILLIS) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2749, a bill to provide an exception from the reduced flat rate per diem for long term temporary duty under Joint Travel Regulations for civilian employees of naval shipyards traveling for direct labor in support of off-yard work, and for other purposes.

S.J. RES. 5

At the request of Mr. UDALL, the name of the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. BOOKER) was added as a cosponsor of S.J. Res. 5, a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to contributions and expenditures intended to affect elections.

S. RES. 392

At the request of Mr. LEAHY, the name of the Senator from Ohio (Mr. BROWN) was added as a cosponsor of S. Res. 392, a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the prosecution and conviction of former President Mohamed Nasheed without due process and urging the Government of the Maldives to take all necessary steps to redress this injustice, to release all political prisoners, and to ensure due process and freedom from political prosecution for all the people of the Maldives.

AMENDMENT NO. 3458

At the request of Mr. CASEY, the name of the Senator from California (Mrs. FEINSTEIN) was added as a cosponsor of amendment No. 3458 intended to be proposed to H.R. 636, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently extend increased expensing limitations, and for other purposes.

SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

SENATE RESOLUTION 414—EX-PRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE ACTIONS, INCLUDING THE REAPPLICATION OF WAIVED NUCLEAR-RELATED SANCTIONS, THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD UNDERTAKE IN THE EVENT OF AN IRANIAN VIOLATION OF THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION

Mr. LANKFORD submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 414

Whereas national security is a fundamental and primary responsibility of both Congress and the President;

Whereas, on July 14, 2015, President Barack Obama reached an agreement with Iran known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a political agreement among the United States, France, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Germany (commonly

referred to as the "P5+1 countries") and Iran that does not carry the force or effect of United States law;

Whereas President Obama lifted nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Iran on January 16, 2016;

Whereas, on July 14, 2015, President Obama stated, "If Iran violates the deal, all of these sanctions will snap back into place.";

Whereas Congress intends to work with the President to ensure that the President's commitment to snapping back sanctions in response to any violation by Iran of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is fully enforced;

Whereas Iran has been the beneficiary of financial assets and international engagement while its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has yet to be proven; and

Whereas, given the historic and dramatic shift in longstanding United States foreign policy represented by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the obligations and commitments Iran agreed to as part the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action must be clarified by the Senate: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved,

SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON IRANIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of the Senate—

(1) that the United States should take the actions specified in subsection (b) if—

(A) Iran ever seeks, develops, manufactures, or acquires nuclear weapons;

(B) Iran ever engages in plutonium reprocessing or plutonium-related research and development;

(C) Iran violates—

(i) the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) (commonly referred to as the "Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty" or the "NPT");

(ii) the Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the "Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement");

(iii) its commitment to ratify by October 18, 2023, the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; or

(iv) the Iranian-ratified Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement;

(D) Iran installs a new natural uranium core or the original core in the Arak reactor;

(E) the power of Iran's redesigned heavy water reactor exceeds 20 MWth;

(F) Iran produces any amount of weapons grade uranium or plutonium;

(G) Iran pursues construction at the existing unfinished Arak heavy water reactor based on its original design;

(H) Iran produces or tests natural uranium pellets, fuel pins, or fuel assemblies that are specifically designed for the support of the originally designed Arak heavy water reactor, designated by the International Atomic Energy Agency as IR-40;

(I) Iran does not store all existing natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies under the continuous monitoring of the International Atomic Energy Agency until the modernized Arak reactor becomes operable;

(J) once the Arak reactor becomes operable, Iran does not take the IR-40 fuel assemblies and natural uranium pellets and convert them to uranyl nitrate or exchange

them with an equivalent quantity of natural uranium;

(K) Iran does not make the necessary technical modifications to the natural uranium fuel production process line that was intended to supply fuel for the IR-40 reactor design, such that it can be used for the fabrication of the fuel reloads for the modernized Arak reactor;

(L) all spent fuel from the redesigned Arak reactor, regardless of its origin, for the lifetime of the reactor, is not shipped out of Iran;

(M) Iran operates the Fuel Manufacturing Plant to produce anything other than fuel assemblies for light water reactors or reloads for the modernized Arak reactor;

(N) Iran does not inform the International Atomic Energy Agency about the inventory and production of the Heavy Water Production Plant or does not allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor the quantities of the heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced, including through visits by the International Atomic Energy Agency, as requested, to the Heavy Water Production Plant;

(O) Iran does not ship out all spent fuel for all future and present nuclear power and research reactors;

(P) Iran does not remove and keep stored at Natanz in Hall B of the fuel enrichment plant under continuous monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency—

(i) all excess centrifuge machines, including IR-2m centrifuges (during the 10-year prohibition period under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action); and

(ii) UF₆ pipework including sub headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters, and UF₆ withdrawal equipment from one of the withdrawal stations, which is currently not in service, including its vacuum pumps and chemical traps (during the 10-year prohibition period under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action);

(Q) the 164-machine IR-2m cascade does not remain stored at Natanz in Hall B of the fuel enrichment plan under the continuous monitoring of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(R) the 164-machine IR-4 cascade does not remain stored at Natanz in Hall B of the fuel enrichment plan under the continuous monitoring of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(S) Iran enriches, obtains, or otherwise stockpiles any uranium, including in oxide form, enriched to greater than 3.67 percent;

(T) all future uranium oxide, scrap oxide, or other material not in fuel plates enriched to between 5 and 20 percent is not transferred out of Iran or diluted to a level of 3.67 percent or less within 6 months of production;

(U) Iran does not abide by its voluntary commitments as expressed in its own long-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan submitted as part of the initial declaration described in Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement;

(V) Iran engages in production of centrifuges, including centrifuge rotors suitable for isotope separation or any other centrifuge components, which exceeds the enrichment and enrichment research and development requirements outlined in Annex I of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;

(W) Iran does not permit the International Atomic Energy Agency the use of online enrichment measurement and electronic seals, as well as other International Atomic Energy Agency-approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally accepted practices of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(X) Iran does not facilitate automated collection of International Atomic Energy Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sent to the International Atomic Energy Agency working space at individual nuclear sites;

(Y) Iran does not make the necessary arrangements to allow for a long-term presence of the International Atomic Energy Agency, including issuing long-term visas, as well as providing proper working space at nuclear sites and, with to the best of its effort, at locations near nuclear sites in Iran for the designated International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors for working and keeping necessary equipment;

(Z) Iran does not increase the number of designated International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to at least 130 by October 16, 2016, which is the date that is 9 months after implementation day, or does not allow the designation of inspectors from countries that have diplomatic relations with Iran;

(AA) Iran does not apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with the internationally established standards for the export of nuclear material, equipment, and technology;

(BB) Iran does not permit the International Atomic Energy Agency access to verify that uranium isotope separation production and research and development activities are consistent with Annex I of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;

(CC) Iran engages in—

(i) designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices;

(ii) designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring;

(iii) designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring;

(iv) designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources;

(DD) during the 10-year period beginning on implementation day and ending on January 16, 2026—

(i) Iran operates, for the purpose of enriching uranium, more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges;

(ii) Iran's enrichment capacity exceeds 5,060 IR-1 centrifuge machines in 30 cascades in their current configurations in currently operating units at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant;

(iii) consistent with Iran's enrichment research and development plan, Iran's enrichment research and development with uranium includes any centrifuges other than IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges;

(iv) Iran conducts testing of more than a single IR-4 centrifuge machine and IR-4 centrifuge cascade of up to 10 centrifuge machines;

(v) Iran tests more than a single IR-5 centrifuge machine;

(vi) Iran does not recombine the enriched and depleted streams from the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades through the use of welded pipe-work on withdrawal main headers in a manner that precludes the withdrawal of enriched and depleted uranium materials and verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(vii) research and development with uranium is not strictly limited to IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges;

(viii) Iran's uranium isotope separation-related research and development or production activities are not exclusively based on gaseous centrifuge technology;

(ix) Iran engages in nuclear direct-use or nuclear dual-use procurements of commodities without using the procurement channel mandated by the United Nations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

(x) research and development is carried out in the IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 centrifuges in a manner that accumulates enriched uranium, or Iran installs or tests those centrifuges beyond the enrichment and enrichment research and development requirements outlined in Annex I of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;

(xi) except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (LL), mechanical testing on up to 2 single centrifuges for each type is carried out on any centrifuge other than the IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7, or IR-8; or

(xii) Iran builds or tests any new centrifuge without approval of the Joint Commission;

(EE) during the 15-year period beginning on implementation day and ending on January 16, 2031—

(i) Iran conducts uranium enrichment-related activities at Fordow;

(ii) Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium hexafluoride, or the equivalent in other chemical forms, exceeds 300kg enriched to 3.67 percent;

(iii) Iran reprocesses spent fuel except for irradiated enriched uranium targets for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes;

(iv) Iran develops, acquires, or builds facilities capable of separation of plutonium, uranium, or neptunium from spent fuel or from fertile targets, other than for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes;

(v) Iran develops, acquires, builds, or operates hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells, or shielded glove boxes with dimensions not less than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, unless approved by the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;

(vi) Iran undertakes destructive post irradiation examination of fuel pins, fuel assembly prototypes, and structural materials, unless the P5+1 countries make available their facilities to conduct destructive testing with Iranian specialists, as agreed pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;

(vii) Iran engages in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys, or conducts research and development on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal;

(viii) Iran produces, seeks, or acquires separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium, uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for use for laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-237);

(ix) Iran installs gas centrifuge machines, or enrichment-related infrastructure, whether suitable for uranium enrichment, research and development, or stable isotope enrichment, at any location other than a location exclusively specified under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;

(x) Iran conducts all testing of centrifuges with uranium anywhere other than at the

Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant or Iran conducts mechanical testing of centrifuges anywhere other than at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Tehran Research Centre;

(xi) Iran maintains more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuge machines at one wing of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant;

(xii) Iran does not limit its stable isotope production activities with gas centrifuges to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant or uses more than 348 IR-1 centrifuges for such activities;

(xiii) Iran exceeds the limitations on its activities at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant as described in Annex I of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;

(xiv) Iran does not permit the International Atomic Energy Agency regular access, including daily as requested by the International Atomic Energy Agency, access to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant;

(xv) Iran builds or has a heavy water reactor;

(xvi) Iran does not permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage;

(xvii) Iran does not permit the International Atomic Energy Agency regular access, including daily access as requested by the International Atomic Energy Agency, to relevant buildings at Natanz, including parts of the fuel enrichment plant and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant;

(xviii) any uranium enrichment activity in Iran, including safeguarded research and development, occurs anywhere but the Natanz enrichment site;

(xix) Iran engages, including through export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment and technology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment or enrichment related activities, including related research and development activities, without approval by the Joint Commission;

(xx) the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant does not remain strictly a research facility, Iran conducts enrichment or research and development-related activities, or Iran holds nuclear material at that Plant;

(xxi) excess heavy water that is beyond Iran's needs for the modernized Arak research reactor or the zero power heavy water reactor, quantities needed for medical research and production of the deuterated solutions, and chemical compounds including, where appropriate, contingency stocks, is not made available for export to the international market based on international prices and delivered to an international buyer;

(xxii) all enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.57 percent enriched UF₆ (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) is not immediately down-blended to natural uranium level or sold on the international market and delivered to an international buyer;

(xxiii) Iran does not rely on only light water for its future nuclear power and research reactors;

(xxiv) Iran conducts enrichment research and development in a manner that accumulates enriched uranium; or

(xxv) Iran enriches uranium to a level exceeding 3.67 percent;

(FF) during the 25-year period beginning on implementation day and ending on January 16, 2041—

(i) Iran does not permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor that all uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source is transferred to the uranium conversion facility in

Esfahan or to any other future uranium conversion facility that Iran might decide to build in Iran within this period; or

(ii) Iran does not provide the International Atomic Energy Agency with all necessary information so that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be able to verify the production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source;

(GG) on or after January 16, 2024, which is the date that is 8 years after implementation day, Iran commences manufacturing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges with rotors, or commences manufacturing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges without rotors at a rate of more than 200 centrifuges per year for each type;

(HH) on or after January 16, 2026, which is the date that is 10 years after implementation day, Iran commences manufacturing on more than 200 complete centrifuges per year for each type;

(II) Iran does not present its plan to, and seek approval by, the Joint Commission if Iran seeks to initiate research and development on a uranium metal based fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor in small agreed quantities after January 16, 2026, and before January 15, 2031, which are 10 and 15 years after implementation day, respectively; or

(JJ) during the 8½ year period beginning on implementation day and ending on July 16, 2024—

(i) Iran conducts testing on more than a single IR-6 centrifuge machine and intermediate cascades for such machines and commences testing on more than 30 centrifuge machines; or

(ii) Iran conducts testing on more than a single IR-8 centrifuge machine and intermediate cascades for such machines or commences testing on more than 30 centrifuge machines; and

(2) that—

(A) Iran's uranium enrichment and research and development plans should be made public;

(B) the reports of the Joint Commission and procurement requests made to the United Nations Security Council and to the Joint Commission, and whether or not such requests were approved, should be made available to the public; and

(C) countries should verify the end-use of items, materials, equipment, goods, and technologies that require import authorization by the Joint Commission but are not verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(b) ACTIONS SPECIFIED.—The actions specified in this subsection are the following:

(1) Seeking immediate reinstatement and application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010), and 2224 (2015).

(2) Seeking the immediate adoption of a United Nations Security Council resolution that directs all United Nations member states to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of all items listed in subsection (a)(i) of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) in order to prevent Iran from arming itself while its commitment to international law is still in question.

(3) Working with international partners of the United States to seek the immediate reapplication of the regulations of the Council of the European Union concerning restrictive measures against Iran, as in effect on October 17, 2015.

(4) The immediate reapplication of the nuclear-related sanctions waived by the United States.

(5) Seeking the imposition of additional punitive sanctions with respect to Iran.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM.—The term “highly enriched uranium” means uranium with a 20 percent or higher concentration of the isotope uranium-235.

(2) IMPLEMENTATION DAY.—The term “implementation day” means January 16, 2016.

(3) JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION.—The term “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” means the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, agreed to at Vienna on July 14, 2015, by Iran and by the People's Republic of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and all implementing materials and agreements related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

(4) P5+1 COUNTRIES.—The term “P5+1 countries” means the United States, France, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

(5) SPENT FUEL.—The term “spent fuel” includes all types of irradiated fuel.

SENATE RESOLUTION 415—CONGRATULATING THE 2016 NATIONAL CHAMPIONS, THE VILLANOVA WILDCATS, FOR THEIR WIN IN THE 2016 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION DIVISION I MEN'S BASKETBALL TOURNAMENT

Mr. CASEY (for himself and Mr. TOOMEY) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to:

S. RES. 415

Whereas, on April 4, 2016, the Villanova Wildcats defeated the University of North Carolina Tar Heels by a score of 77 to 74 in the final game of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (referred to in this preamble as the “NCAA”) Division I Men's Basketball Tournament in Houston, Texas;

Whereas the Villanova Wildcats hold 2 national men's basketball titles for winning NCAA championships in 1985 and 2016;

Whereas junior forward Kris Jenkins scored the last-second, game-winning 3-point shot;

Whereas the Villanova Wildcats shot 58.2 percent from the field during the tournament, the highest percentage since the 64-team bracket was introduced in 1985;

Whereas the Villanova Wildcats had the largest margin of victory in any Final Four game, beating the Oklahoma Sooners by 44 points;

Whereas senior guard Ryan Arcidiacono was named the Most Outstanding Player of the 2016 Final Four, averaging 15.5 points on 73-percent shooting in the 2 final games in Houston and providing the game-winning assist in the championship game;

Whereas Jay Wright was named the Naismith Coach of the Year for the second time;

Whereas during the 2015–2016 season, the Villanova Wildcats finished with a record of 35–5; and

Whereas Villanova University is committed to the ideal of the student athlete and the education of the athletes of Villanova University, as evidenced by the presence of 5 seniors and 3 juniors on the roster of the Villanova Wildcats: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate—

(1) congratulates and honors the Villanova University men's basketball team and its loyal fans on the performance of the team in