human rights abuse, violations of internationally recognized human rights, and corruption in each country in which foreign persons with respect to which sanctions have been imposed under section 1263 are located.''.

(e) REPEAL OF SUNSET.—Section 1265 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is repealed.

SA 2117. Mr. CARDIN (for himself and Mr. WICKER) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 1782 submitted by Mr. CARDIN and intended to be proposed to the amendment SA 1502 proposed by Mr. SCHUMER to the bill S. 1260, to establish a new Directorate for Technology and Innovation in the National Science Foundation, to establish a regional technology hub program, to require a strategy and report on economic security, science, research, innovation, manufacturing, and job creation, to establish a critical supply chain resiliency program, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

Strike section 3313 and insert the following:

SEC. 3313. MODIFICATIONS TO AND REAUTHORIZATION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

(a) Definitions.—Section 1262 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:

''(2) IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBER.—The term 'immediate family member', with respect to a foreign person, means the spouse, parent, sibling, or adult child of the person.''.

(b) Sense of Congress.—The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by inserting after section 1262 the following new section:

''SEC. 1262A. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

''It is the sense of Congress that the President should establish and regularize information sharing and sanctions-related decision making with like-minded governments possessing human rights and anti-corruption sanctions programs similar in nature to those authorized under this subtitle.''.

(c) Imposition of Sanctions.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended to read as follows:

''(a) In General.—The President may impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to—

''(1) any foreign person that the President determines, based on credible information—

''(A) is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse;

''(B) is a current or former government official, or a person acting for or on behalf of such an official, who is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in—

''(i) corruption, including—

''(I) the misappropriation of state assets;

''(II) the expropriation of private assets for personal gain;

''(III) corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources; or

''(IV) bribery; or

''(ii) the transfer or facilitation of the transfer of the proceeds of corruption;

''(C) is or has been a leader or official of—

''(i) an entity, including a government entity, that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, any of the activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B) related to the tenure of the leader or official; or

''(ii) an entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section as a result of activities related to the tenure of the leader or official;

''(D) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of—

''(i) an activity described in subparagraph (A) or (B) that is conducted by a foreign person;

''(ii) a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section; or

''(iii) an entity, including a government entity, that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, an activity described in subparagraph (A) or (B) conducted by a foreign person; or

''(E) is owned or controlled by, or has acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section; and

''(2) any immediate family member of a person described in paragraph (1).''.

(2) CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.—Subsection (c)(2) of such section is amended by inserting ''corruption and'' after ''monitor''.

(3) REQUESTS BY CONGRESS.—Subsection (d) of such section is amended—

(A) in paragraph (1)—

(i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ''subsection (a)'' and inserting ''subsection (a)(1)''; and

(ii) in subparagraph (B)(i), by inserting ''or an immediate family member of the person''; and

(B) in paragraph (2)—

(i) in subparagraph (A)—

(I) in the subparagraph heading, by striking ''HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS'' and inserting ''SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE''; and

(II) by striking ''described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a)'' and inserting ''described in subsection (a)(1) relating to serious human rights abuse or any violation of internationally recognized human rights''; and

(ii) in subparagraph (B)—

(I) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ''described in paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (a)'' and inserting ''described in subsection (a)(1) relating to corruption or the transfer or facilitation of the transfer of the proceeds of corruption''; and

(II) by striking ''ranking member of'' and all that follows through the period at the end and inserting ''ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional committees''.

(4) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—Subsection (g) of such section is amended, in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting ''and the immediate family members of that person'' after ''a person''.

(d) Reports to Congress.—Section 1264(a) of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (5), by striking ''; and'' and inserting a semicolon;

(2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and inserting ''; and''; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

''(7) A description of additional steps taken by the President through diplomacy, international engagement, and assistance to foreign or security sectors to address persistent underlying causes of serious human rights abuse, violations of internationally recognized human rights, and corruption in each country in which foreign persons with respect to which sanctions have been imposed under section 1263 are located.''.

(e) Repeal of Sunset.—Section 1265 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is repealed.

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I have 9 requests for committees to meet during today's session of the Senate. They have the approval of the Majority and Minority leaders.

Pursuant to rule XXVI, paragraph 5(a), of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the following committees are authority to meet during today's session of the Senate:

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The Committee on Armed Services is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 08, 2021, at 9:30 a.m., to conduct a hearing.

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 08, 2021, at 2:30 p.m., to conduct a hearing.

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 08, 2021, at 10 a.m., to conduct a hearing on nominations.

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

The Committee on Finance is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 08, 2021, at 10 a.m., to conduct a hearing on nominations.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Committee on Foreign Relations is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 08, 2021, at 2:15 p.m., to conduct a hearing on nominations.

COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS

The Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 08, 2021, at 10 a.m., to conduct a hearing.

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 08, 2021, at 10 a.m., to conduct a hearing.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

The Select Committee on Intelligence is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 08, 2021, at 10 a.m., to conduct a closed briefing.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER

The Subcommittee on Seapower of the Committee on Armed Services is

authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 08, 2021, at 2:30 p.m., to conduct a hearing.

U.S. SUPREME COURT

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Madam President, in my opening speech about the rightwing scheme to capture the Court, the Supreme Court, I described the secret strategy memo that Lewis Powell wrote on the eve of his appointment to the Court about how to deploy corporate political power.

As a Justice of the Supreme Court, Powell had the chance to prove to the corporate world his secret memo's theory of what could be achieved by ''exploiting judicial action''—his phrase—particularly with, as he called it, ''an activist-minded Supreme Court.''

Second, Powell had the chance on the Court to start laying the legal groundwork for precisely the sort of corporate political activity that his secret memo had recommended to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Powell did both.

The first case that allowed Powell to implement recommendations from his secret report came in 1976, in a case about the Federal Election Campaign Act. The case was Buckley v. Valeo, and the decision was a beast—138 pages, with another 83 pages of dissent and concurrence cobbled together by the Court with what one observer called ''extraordinary speed.'' Five Justices in that case, including Powell, were described as First Amendment hawks who were wary of any portion of the Federal Election Campaign Act that could inhibit free speech and association.

Now, you have to understand that free speech and association were buzz words for corporate political activity precisely of the sort championed in Powell's secret chamber memo. Free speech meant corporate America having the right to be heard, even to, as the secret report said, ''equal time.'' Freedom of association provided corporations the ''organization,'' ''careful long-range planning and implementation,'' and well-financed ''joint effort''—all those quotes—that Powell had recommended be done in his report ''through united action and national organizations.''

The Court's decision in Valeo did two noncontroversial things. It accepted that campaign contributions could be limited because unlimited campaign contributions could give rise to corruption or at least the appearance of corruption. Unlimited donations to candidates would even ''undermine representative democracy,'' the Court said. No big deal. The Court also decided that candidates may spend as much of their own money as they want on their own campaigns. It considered unlimited spending on one's own campaign protected by the First Amendment, as there was little danger of corruption from spending one's own campaign money on oneself.

So both of those holdings are unremarkable. What was remarkable was where Powell and his hawks took the Court when other interests, like corporate interests, wanted to spend money on a candidate. Corporate political spending per se was not at issue in the case, but spending by special interests is precisely the kind of political influence which Powell had recommended in his secret report to the chamber.

Powell and his hawks said special interest political spending, so long as it was not in the form of a campaign contribution, was protected by the same principle that protected a candidate spending his own money on his own campaign.

Powell asserted that limiting these supposedly ''independent'' special interest expenditures '''perpetrates (the) grossest infringement' on First Amendment rights.'' He did acknowledge the interest in '''purity' of elections,'' but he used skeptical quotation marks around the word ''purity,'' just like he had used skeptical quotation marks in his report around the word ''environment.'' But Powell dismissed those purity concerns as likely ''illusory,'' to use his word.

Powell's Bench memo for the case critiqued the election law's ''attempt to lower barriers to political competition to increase the range of voter choice.'' It read: ''[T]he attempt to open access for the many necessarily involves limiting the power of the few to exercise rights of speech and association protected by the Constitution.''

This interest in protecting the ''power of the few'' aligns exactly with Powell's secret chamber memo about corporate power and aligns with Powell's own notes, which have more of his disparaging quotation marks questioning some of the briefs filed in the Valeo case that ''identify one of the 'evils' as the power of 'the wealthy few' (undefined but obviously unworthy people) to influence elections unduly.'' In tone and import, that comes right out of Powell's secret chamber report, which counted on the power of the corporate few.

Powell's Richmond history, his corporate law practice, his social position, his boardroom experience, and his anxiety about upheaval all align with a corporate worldview that society's decisions should be made by the sort of people in corporate boardrooms, so the power of those ''few'' had to be protected, to battle against what his report called the ''broad attack'' both on the ''American free enterprise system'' and the ''American political system of democracy under the rule of law.'' Particularly important it was to protect that power when, as he had written to the chamber, the trouble is ''deep'' and the ''hour is late.''

To accommodate that corporate perspective, the Court had to reach judgments about politics. It showed itself helpless. The amateurish political outlook of the Court in Valeo stood out in the late-added footnote 52, which, in the interest of drawing clear lines—''vagueness'' being a stated concern of the Justices—exempted from disclosure political advertisements that did not expressly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate using magic words like ''vote for,'' ''vote against,'' ''elect,'' or ''defeat.''

In the Court's amateur opinion, a hostile bombardment of TV advertising challenging a candidate's morals, decency, or integrity, or attacking the candidate's alignment with the community's values, and dropped on the candidate in the heat of election season with the intention of defeating the candidate, was not deemed advocacy in the election—unless it used those magic words. The idiocy of that premise is obvious to anyone in politics.

The Court's amateurish folly about political spending extended to presuming that spending by a powerful interest for a candidate would create no risk of corruption; that the spending and the resulting influence could be kept separate and independent. That is idiotic in real life.

When a powerful political interest starts signaling that it will spend enormous sums to support candidates, guess what—candidates will find a way to take advantage, perhaps by attracting the spending to their own side by the positions they take or perhaps by avoiding taking positions that would send the spending to their opponent's side. The Court presumed that some etiquette would separate interest from candidate, but that was folly. It is blindingly naive to think that politics would produce no workarounds, that no coordination or signaling or intermediaries would violate whatever etiquette of independence the Court had in mind.

As we know, information travels fast in politics, never mind the etiquette. Drop a rock in a stream, and the stream flows around it. Put eager candidates and enormous interested spenders together, and trouble will follow, as it has. Look no further than the corruption of American politics on climate change by the fossil fuel industry. Again, this was idiocy from amateurs.

But the Valeo folly accomplished one thing: It opened the lane for unlimited special interest spending to come into elections to support or oppose candidates, just as Powell's secret memo had recommended.

The next opportunity for Powell came 2 years later, and this, time it involved not just the type of political activity corporations would likely undertake but corporations directly.

Massachusetts had banned corporate campaign contributions from statewide political referenda. A Massachusetts bank, the First National Bank of Boston, objected and sued. Frank Bellotti was then the Commonwealth's attorney general and defendant.

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti wound its way up to the Supreme Court. Here, the question was the very right of corporations to influence popular elections—in this case, a