

Van Duyn (TX) Weber (TX) Williams (TX)
Wagner Webster (FL) Wilson (SC)
Walberg Wenstrup Wittman
Waltz Westerman Womack

NOT VOTING—7

Budd Katko Zeldin
Gibbs Kinzinger
Grothman Takano

□ 1346

Mr. TORRES of New York changed his vote from “nay” to “yea.”

So the previous question was ordered.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Stated against:

Mr. GROTHMAN. Mr. Speaker, I arrived 20 seconds late in a meeting. Had I been present, I would have voted “nay” on rollcall No. 441.

MEMBERS RECORDED PURSUANT TO HOUSE
RESOLUTION 8, 117TH CONGRESS

Baird (Bucshon)	Kirkpatrick (Pallone)	Palazzo (Fleischmann)
Bass (Correa)	Lamb (Pallone)	Ruiz (Correa)
Boebert (Gaetz)	Lawrence (Stevens)	Rush (Bowman)
Chu (Beyer)	McEachin (Beyer)	Ryan (OH) (Correa)
Conway (Valadao)	McHenry (Donalds)	Sánchez (Pallone)
Garcia (IL) (Correa)	Meng (Escobar)	Soto (Wasserman Schultz)
Gomez (Evans)	Napolitano (Correa)	Swalwell (Correa)
Gottheimer (Neguse)	Johnson (TX) (Jeffries)	Vargas (Correa)
Johnson (TX) (Jeffries)	Jones (Beyer)	Waltz (Gimenez)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mrs. FISCHBACH. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

This is a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 220, nays 205, not voting 7, as follows:

[Roll No. 442]

YEAS—220

Adams	Clarke (NY)	Gomez
Aguilar	Cleaver	Gonzalez,
Allred	Clyburn	Vicente
Auchincloss	Cohen	Gottheimer
Axne	Connolly	Green, Al (TX)
Barragán	Cooper	Grijalva
Bass	Correa	Harder (CA)
Beatty	Costa	Hayes
Bera	Courtney	Higgins (NY)
Beyer	Craig	Himes
Bishop (GA)	Crow	Horsford
Blumenauer	Cuellar	Houlahan
Blunt Rochester	Dauids (KS)	Hoyer
Bonamici	Davis, Danny K.	Huffman
Bourdeaux	Dean	Jackson Lee
Bowman	DeFazio	Jacobs (CA)
Boyle, Brendan F.	DeGette	Jayapal
Brown (MD)	DeLauro	Jeffries
Brown (OH)	DelBene	Johnson (GA)
Brownley	Demings	Johnson (TX)
Bush	DeSaulnier	Jones
Bustos	Deutch	Kahele
Butterfield	Dingell	Kaptur
Carbajal	Doggett	Keating
Cardenas	Doyle, Michael F.	Kelly (IL)
Carson	Escobar	Khanna
Carter (LA)	Eshoo	Kildee
Cartwright	Espallat	Kilmer
Case	Evans	Kim (NJ)
Casten	Fletcher	Kind
Castor (FL)	Foster	Kirkpatrick
Castro (TX)	Frankel, Lois	Krishnamoorthi
Cherfilus-McCormick	Galleo	Kuster
Chu	Garamendi	Lamb
Ciilline	Garcia (IL)	Langevin
Clark (MA)	Garcia (TX)	Larsen (WA)
	Golden	Larson (CT)
		Lawrence

Lawson (FL)	Omar	Sires
Lee (CA)	Pallone	Slotkin
Lee (NV)	Panetta	Smith (WA)
Leger Fernandez	Pappas	Soto
Levin (CA)	Pascarell	Spanberger
Levin (MI)	Payne	Speier
Lieu	Peltola	Stansbury
Lofgren	Perlmutter	Stanton
Lowenthal	Peters	Stevens
Luria	Phillips	Strickland
Lynch	Pingree	Suozzi
Malinowski	Pocan	Swalwell
Maloney,	Porter	Takano
Carolyn B.	Pressley	Thompson (CA)
Maloney, Sean	Price (NC)	Thompson (MS)
Manning	Quigley	Titus
Matsui	Raskin	Tlaib
McBath	Rice (NY)	Tonko
McCollum	Ross	Torres (CA)
McEachin	Roybal-Allard	Torres (NY)
McGovern	Ruiz	Trahan
McNerney	Ruppersberger	Trone
Meeks	Rush	Underwood
Meng	Ryan (NY)	Vargas
Mfume	Ryan (OH)	Veasey
Moore (WI)	Sanchez	Velázquez
Morelle	Sarbanes	Wasserman
Moulton	Scanlon	Schultz
Mrvan	Schakowsky	Waters
Murphy (FL)	Schiff	Watson Coleman
Nadler	Schneider	Welch
Napolitano	Schrader	Wexton
Neal	Schrier	Wild
Neguse	Scott (VA)	Williams (GA)
Newman	Scott, David	Wilson (FL)
Norcross	Sewell	Yarmuth
O'Halleran	Sherman	
Ocasio-Cortez	Sherrill	

NAYS—205

Aderholt	Fitzpatrick	LaTurner
Allen	Fleischmann	Lesko
Amodei	Flood	Letlow
Armstrong	Flores	Long
Arrington	Fox	Loudermilk
Babin	Franklin, C.	Lucas
Bacon	Scott	Luetkemeyer
Baird	Fulcher	Mace
Balderson	Gaetz	Malliotakis
Banks	Gallagher	Mann
Barr	Garbarino	Massie
Bentz	Garcia (CA)	Mast
Bergman	Gimenez	McCarthy
Bice (OK)	Gohmert	McCauley
Biggs	Gonzales, Tony	McClain
Bilirakis	Gonzalez (OH)	McIntock
Bishop (NC)	Good (VA)	McHenry
Boebert	Gooden (TX)	McKinley
Bost	Gosar	Meijer
Brady	Granger	Meuser
Brooks	Graves (LA)	Miller (IL)
Buchanan	Graves (MO)	Miller (WV)
Buck	Green (TN)	Miller-Meeks
Bucshon	Greene (GA)	Moolenaar
Burchett	Griffith	Mooney
Burgess	Grothman	Moore (AL)
Calvert	Guest	Moore (UT)
Cammack	Guthrie	Mullin
Carey	Harris	Murphy (NC)
Carl	Harshbarger	Nehls
Carter (GA)	Hartzler	Newhouse
Carter (TX)	Hern	Norman
Cawthorn	Herrell	Obernolte
Chabot	Herrera Beutler	Owens
Cheney	Hice (GA)	Palazzo
Cline	Higgins (LA)	Palmer
Cloud	Hill	Pence
Clyde	Hinson	Perry
Cole	Hollingsworth	Pfluger
Comer	Hudson	Posey
Conway	Huizenga	Reschenthaler
Crawford	Issa	Rice (SC)
Crenshaw	Jackson	Rodgers (WA)
Davidson	Jacobs (NY)	Rogers (AL)
Davis, Rodney	Johnson (LA)	Rogers (KY)
DesJarlais	Johnson (OH)	Rose
Diaz-Balart	Johnson (SD)	Rosendale
Donalds	Jordan	Rouzer
Duncan	Joyce (OH)	Roy
Dunn	Joyce (PA)	Rutherford
Elizy	Keller	Salazar
Emmer	Kelly (MS)	Scalise
Estes	Kelly (PA)	Schweikert
Fallon	Kim (CA)	Scott, Austin
Feenstra	Kustoff	Sempolinski
Ferguson	LaHood	Sessions
Fischbach	LaMalfa	Simpson
Fitzgerald	Lamborn	Smith (MO)
	Latta	Smith (NE)

Smith (NJ)	Tenney	Walberg
Smucker	Thompson (PA)	Waltz
Spartz	Tiffany	Weber (TX)
Stauber	Timmons	Wenstrup
Steel	Turner	Westerman
Stefanik	Upton	Williams (TX)
Steil	Valadao	Wilson (SC)
Steube	Van Drew	Wittman
Stewart	Van Duyn	Womack
Taylor	Wagner	

NOT VOTING—7

Budd	Katko	Zeldin
Curtis	Kinzinger	
Gibbs	Webster (FL)	

□ 1401

Mr. CARTER of Texas changed his vote from “yea” to “nay.”

So the resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. BUDD. Mr. Speaker, I was unable to attend some votes in this series due to my flight's schedule. Had I been present, I would have voted “nay” on rollcall No. 441 and “nay” on rollcall No. 442.

MEMBERS RECORDED PURSUANT TO HOUSE
RESOLUTION 8, 117TH CONGRESS

Baird (Bucshon)	Kirkpatrick (Pallone)	Palazzo (Fleischmann)
Bass (Correa)	Lamb (Pallone)	Ruiz (Correa)
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Johnson (TX) (Jeffries)	Jones (Beyer)	Waltz (Gimenez)

MOTION TO SUSPEND THE RULES
AND PASS CERTAIN BILLS

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution 1361, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bills: H.R. 1433, H.R. 4009, H.R. 4358, H.R. 6265, H.R. 6846, H.R. 7240, H.R. 7338, H.R. 8453, H.R. 8503, and H.R. 8520; and agree to H. Res. 558.

The Clerk read the title of the bills and the resolution.

The text of the bills and the resolution are as follows:

HELEN KELLER NATIONAL CENTER
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2022

H.R. 1433

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Helen Keller National Center Reauthorization Act of 2022”.

SEC. 2. HELEN KELLER NATIONAL CENTER REAUTHORIZATION.

The first sentence of section 205(a) of the Helen Keller National Center Act (29 U.S.C. 1904(a)) is amended by striking “1999 through 2003” and inserting “2023 through 2027”.

ENSLAVED VOYAGES MEMORIAL ACT

H.R. 4009

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Enslaved Voyages Memorial Act”.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION TO ESTABLISH COMMEMORATIVE WORK.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Georgetown African American Historic Landmark Project and Tour may establish a commemorative work on Federal land in the District of Columbia and its environs to commemorate the enslaved individuals, whose identities may be known or unknown, who endured the Middle Passage.

(b) COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS FOR COMMEMORATIVE WORKS.—The establishment of the commemorative work under this section shall be in accordance with chapter 89 of title 40, United States Code (commonly known as the “Commemorative Works Act”).

(c) PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Federal funds may not be used to pay any expense of the establishment of the commemorative work under this section.

(2) RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GEORGETOWN AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORIC LANDMARK PROJECT AND TOUR.—The Georgetown African American Historic Landmark Project and Tour shall be solely responsible for acceptance of contributions for, and payment of the expenses of, the establishment of the commemorative work under this section.

(d) DEPOSIT OF EXCESS FUNDS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—If upon payment of all expenses for the establishment of the memorial (including the maintenance and preservation amount required by section 8906(b)(1) of title 40, United States Code), there remains a balance of funds received for the establishment of the commemorative work, the Georgetown African American Historic Landmark Project and Tour shall transmit the amount of the balance to the Secretary of the Interior for deposit in the account provided for in section 8906(b)(3) of title 40, United States Code.

(2) ON EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY.—If upon expiration of the authority for the commemorative work under section 8903(e) of title 40, United States Code, there remains a balance of funds received for the establishment of the commemorative work, the Georgetown African American Historic Landmark Project and Tour shall transmit the amount of the balance to a separate account with the National Park Foundation for memorials, to be available to the Secretary of the Interior or Administrator (as appropriate) following the process provided in section 8906(b)(4) of title 40, United States Code, for accounts established under section 8906(b)(2) or (3) of title 40, United States Code.

SEC. 3. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.

The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the latest statement titled “Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation” for this Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, provided that such statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.

LITTLE MANATEE WILD AND SCENIC RIVER ACT
H.R. 4358

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Little Manatee Wild and Scenic River Act”.

SEC. 2. DESIGNATION FOR STUDY OF WILD AND SCENIC RIVER SEGMENTS, LITTLE MANATEE RIVER, FLORIDA.

Section 5(a) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1276(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(____) *LITTLE MANATEE RIVER, FLORIDA.—The approximately 50-mile segment beginning at the source in southeastern Hillsborough County, Florida, downstream to the point at which the river enters Tampa Bay, including appropriate tributaries, but shall not include—*

“(A) those portions lying within Manatee County, Florida, and being more particularly described as Parcel ID 247800059, Parcel ID 248200008 and Parcel ID 248100000; and

“(B) South Fork.”.

SEC. 3. STUDY AND REPORT.

Section 5(b) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1276(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(____) *LITTLE MANATEE RIVER, FLORIDA.—Not later than 3 years after the date on which funds are made available to carry out this paragraph, the Secretary of the Interior shall—*

“(A) complete the study of the Little Manatee River, Florida named in subsection (a)(____); and

“(B) submit to the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate a report that describes the results of the study.”.

SEC. 4. EFFECT ON MANAGEMENT.

This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not interfere with the current management of the area of the Little Manatee River described in section 5(a)(____) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, nor shall the fact that such area is listed for study under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1271 et seq.) be used as justification for more restrictive management until Congress acts on the study recommendations.

COUNTERING ASSAD’S PROLIFERATION TRAFFICKING AND GARNERING OF NARCOTICS ACT
H.R. 6265

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Countering Assad’s Proliferation Trafficking And Garnering Of Narcotics Act” or the “CAPTAGON Act”.

SEC. 2. INTERAGENCY STRATEGY TO DISRUPT AND DISMANTLE NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING AND AFFILIATED NETWORKS LINKED TO THE REGIME OF BASHAR AL-ASSAD IN SYRIA.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Captagon trade linked to the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria is a transnational security threat; and

(2) the United States should develop and implement an interagency strategy to deny, degrade, and dismantle Assad-linked narcotics production and trafficking networks.

(b) REPORT AND STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a written strategy to disrupt and dismantle narcotics production and trafficking and affiliated networks linked to the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Such strategy shall include each of the following:

(1) A strategy to target, disrupt, and degrade networks that directly or indirectly support the narcotics infrastructure of the Assad regime, particularly through diplomatic and intelligence support to law enforcement investigations and to build counter-narcotics capacity to partner countries through assistance and training to law enforcement services in countries, other than Syria, that are receiving or transiting large quantities of Captagon.

(2) Information relating to the use of statutory authorities, including the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 8791 note), the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (popularly referred to as the “Kingpin Act”), section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act (relating to the international narcotics control strategy report), and associated actions to target individuals and entities directly or indirectly associated with the narcotics infrastructure of the Assad regime.

(3) Information relating to the use of global diplomatic engagements associated with the economic pressure campaign against the Assad regime to target its narcotics infrastructure.

(4) A strategy for leveraging multilateral institutions and cooperation with international partners to disrupt the narcotics infrastructure of the Assad regime.

(5) A strategy for mobilizing a public communications campaign to increase awareness of the extent of the connection of the Assad regime to illicit narcotics trade.

(6) A description of the countries receiving or transiting large shipments of Captagon, and an assessment of the counter-narcotics capacity of such countries to interdict or disrupt the smuggling of Captagon, including an assessment of current United States assistance and training programs to build such capacity in such countries.

(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

CORRUPTION, OVERTHROWING RULE OF LAW, AND RUINING UKRAINE: PUTIN’S TRIFECTA ACT
H.R. 6846

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Corruption, Overthrowing Rule of Law, and Ruining Ukraine: Putin’s Trifecta Act” or “CORRUPT ACT”.

SEC. 2. REVIEW OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN KLEPTOCRATS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS.

(a) DETERMINATION WITH RESPECT TO IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a determination, including a detailed justification, of whether any person listed in subsection (b) meets the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under provisions of law that authorize the imposition of sanctions relating to corruption or human rights violations.

(b) PERSONS LISTED.—The persons listed in this subsection, which include Russian persons and current and former Russian government officials, are the following:

- (1) Roman Arkadyevich Abramovich.
- (2) Konstantin Lvovich Ernst.
- (3) Victor Evdokimovich Gavrillov.

(4) Dmitry Ivanov.
 (5) Pavel Vladimirovich Krashenninnikov.
 (6) Elena Evgenievna Morozova.
 (7) Mikhail Albertovich Murashko.
 (8) Ella Alexandrovna Pamfilova.
 (9) Dmitry Nikolaevich Patrushev.
 (10) Denis Gennadievich Popov.
 (11) Margarita Simonovna Simonyan.
 (12) Vladimir Roudolfovich Solov'yev.
 (13) Andrey Yuryevich Vorobyev.
 (14) Igor Vladimirovich Yanchuk.
 (15) Victoria Valerievna Abramchenko.
 (16) Maxim Alekseevich Akimov.
 (17) Igor Olegovich Aleshin.
 (18) Sergey Vladimirovich Aleksandrovsky.
 (19) Anton Andreyevich Alikhanov.
 (20) Igor Alekseevich Altushkin.
 (21) Ekaterina Sergeevna Andreeva.
 (22) Dmitry Vasilievich Aristov.
 (23) Roman Evgenievich Artyukhin.
 (24) Zaur Asevovich Askenderov.
 (25) Pavel Alekseevich Astakhov.
 (26) Ludmila Valentinovna Babushkina.
 (27) Igor Vyacheslavovich Barinov.
 (28) Victor Fedorovich Basargin.
 (29) Marat Alimzhanovich Basharov.
 (30) Nikolai Viktorovich Baskov.
 (31) Andrey Removich Belousov.
 (32) Yuri Ivanovich Borisov.
 (33) Larisa Igorevna Brycheva.
 (34) Igor Yurievich Brytsalov.
 (35) Petr Pavlovich Biryukov.
 (36) Yury Alexandrovich Burlachko.
 (37) Igor Yurievich Chaika.
 (38) Alexey Olegovich Cherkunov.
 (39) Elena Evgenievna Chernyakova.
 (40) Yulia Dmitrievna Chicherina.
 (41) Yuri Anatolyevich Chikhanchin.
 (42) Artur Nikolaevich Chilingarov.
 (43) Vladimir Viktorovich Chistyukhin.
 (44) Sergey Alekseevich Dankvert.
 (45) Adam Sultanovich Delimkhanov.
 (46) Evgeny Ivanovich Ditrikh.
 (47) Zarina Valeryevna Doguzova.
 (48) Alexey Alexandrovich Druzhinin.
 (49) Dmitry Petrovich Dyuzhev.
 (50) Daniil Vyacheslavovich Egorov.
 (51) Ilya Vladimirovich Eliseev.
 (52) Alexander Vladimirovich Emelianenko.
 (53) Marina Valentinovna Entaltseva.
 (54) Ksenia Valentinovna Yudaeva.
 (55) Valery Alexandrovich Fadeev.
 (56) Valery Nikolaevich Falkov.
 (57) Valery Valerievich Fedorov.
 (58) Aram Ashotovich Gabrelyanov.
 (59) Oleg Mikhailovich Gazmanov.
 (60) Valery Abisalovich Gergieyev.
 (61) Dmitry Yurievich Gogin.
 (62) Tatiana Alexeyevna Golikova.
 (63) Olga Yurievna Golodets.
 (64) Vasily Yuryevich Golubev.
 (65) Alexander Nikolaevich Gorbenko.
 (66) Dmitry Vladimirovich Gorelov.
 (67) Viktor Petrovich Goremkin.
 (68) Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundayev.
 (69) Oleg Vladimirovich Ilyinikh.
 (70) Yuri Olegovich Isaev.
 (71) Alexander Valentinovich Ishchenko.
 (72) Mikhail Yuryevich Ivankov.
 (73) Alexander Sergeevich Kalinin.
 (74) Natalya Ivanovna Kasperskaya.
 (75) Evgeny Valentinovich Kaspersky.
 (76) Sergey Alexandrovich Karaganov.
 (77) Alexander Gennadievich Khloponin.
 (78) Viktor Borisovich Khristenko.
 (79) Eduard Yuryevich Khudainatov.
 (80) Andrey Stepanovich Kigim.
 (81) Sergey Georgievich Kireev.
 (82) Dmitry Mikhailovich Kirillov.
 (83) Philip Bedrosovich Kirkorov.
 (84) Vladislav Nikolaevich Kitaev.
 (85) German Sergeevich Klimenko.
 (86) Franz Adamovich Klintsevich.
 (87) Anton Anatolyevich Kobayakov.
 (88) Dmitry Viktorovich Kochnev.
 (89) Victor Anatolievich Koksharov.
 (90) Petr Viktorovich Kolbin.

(91) Ekaterina Vladimirovna Kolokoltseva.
 (92) Alexander Sergeevich Kolpakov.
 (93) Veniamin Ivanovich Kondratyev.
 (94) Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kononov.
 (95) Alexander Nikolaevich Kononov.
 (96) Boris Nikolaevich Korobets.
 (97) Anton Olegovich Kotykov.
 (98) Alexander Alexandrovich Kozlov.
 (99) Sergey Sergeevich Kravtsov.
 (100) Svetlana Aleksandrovna Krivonogih.
 (101) Nikolai Mikhailovich Kropachev.
 (102) Alexey Leonidovich Kudrin.
 (103) Andrey Vasilievich Lavrishchev.
 (104) Alexander Vladimirovich Lazarev.
 (105) Artemy Andreyevich Lebedev.
 (106) Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Lebedev.
 (107) Igor Evgenievich Levitin.
 (108) Alexandra Yuryevna Levitskaya.
 (109) Alexey Evgenievich Likhachev.
 (110) Maxim Stanislavovich Liksutov.
 (111) Andrei Yurievich Lipov.
 (112) Olga Borisovna Lyubimova.
 (113) Magomedsalim Magomedalieovich Magomedov.
 (114) Iskander Kakhramonovich Makhmudov.
 (115) Pavel Viktorovich Malkov.
 (116) Ziyad Manasir.
 (117) Denis Valentinovich Manturov.
 (118) Vladimir Lvovich Mashkov.
 (119) Oleg Vasilievich Matytsin.
 (120) Vladimir Rostislavovich Medinsky.
 (121) Sergey Alimovich Melikov.
 (122) Andrey Nikolaevich Metelsky.
 (123) Nikita Sergeevich Mikhalkov.
 (124) Garry Vladimirovich Minkh.
 (125) Rustam Nurgaliyevich Minnikhanov.
 (126) Dmitry Yuryevich Mironov.
 (127) Yekaterina Mikhailovna Mizulina.
 (128) Artur Alekseevich Muravyov.
 (129) Anzor Akhmedovich Muzaev.
 (130) Elvira Sakhipzadovna Nabiullina.
 (131) Alexander Vasilievich Neudko.
 (132) Alexander Valentinovich Novak.
 (133) Roman Vitalyevich Novikov.
 (134) Ivan Ivanovich Okhlobystin.
 (135) Vladimir Evgenievich Ostrovenko.
 (136) Ella Alexandrovna Pamfilova.
 (137) Evgeny Ignatievich Petrov.
 (138) Andrey Andreevich Pisarev.
 (139) Oleg Anatolyevich Plokhoi.
 (140) Nikolay Radievich Podguzov.
 (141) Alexey Petrovich Polikashin.
 (142) Georgy Sergeyevich Poltavchenko.
 (143) Yana Evgenyevna Poplavskaya.
 (144) Denis Gennadievich Popov.
 (145) Anna Yuryevna Popova.
 (146) Mikhail Evgenievich Porechenkov.
 (147) Kristina Andreevna Potupchik.
 (148) Alexander Valerievich Potapov.
 (149) Iosif Igorevich Prigozhin.
 (150) Evgeny Alexandrovich Primakov.
 (151) Svetlana Gennadievna Radionova.
 (152) Anastasia Vladimirovna Rakova.
 (153) Nikolay Vyacheslavovich Rastorguev.
 (154) Ksenia Denisovna Razuvaeva.
 (155) Alexey Evgenievich Repik.
 (156) Maxim Valeryevich Rumyantsev.
 (157) Konstantin Igorevich Rykov.
 (158) Dmitry Vadimovich Sablin.
 (159) Victor Antonovich Sadovnichy.
 (160) Alla Vladimirovna Samoilova.
 (161) Vladimir Viktorovich Selin.
 (162) Natalya Alexeevna Sergunina.
 (163) Maksut Igorevich Shadaev.
 (164) Anton Pavlovich Shalaev.
 (165) Alexey Valerievich Shaposhnikov.
 (166) Maxim Alekseevich Shaskolsky.
 (167) Karen Georgievich Shakhnazarov.
 (168) Ilya Vasilievich Shestakov.
 (169) Inna Konstantinovna Shevchenko.
 (170) Mikhail Viktorovich Shmakov.
 (171) Nikolay Grigoryevich Shulginov.
 (172) Igor Anatolyevich Shumakov.
 (173) Olga Nikolaevna Skorobogatova.
 (174) Konstantin Evgenyevich Skrypnik.
 (175) Oleg Aleksandrovich Skufinsky.
 (176) Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Skvortsov.

(177) Veronika Igorevna Skvortsova.
 (178) Ivan Vasilyevich Sovetnikov.
 (179) Dmitry Albertovich Tayursky.
 (180) Valentina Vladimirovna Tereshkova.
 (181) Valery Vladimirovich Tikhonov.
 (182) Boris Yurievich Titov.
 (183) Konstantin Borisovich Tolkachev.
 (184) Vladimir Ilyich Tolstoy.
 (185) Igor Vasilyevich Tonkovidov.
 (186) Alexander Vyacheslavovich Trembitsky.
 (187) Nikolai Nikolaevich Tsukanov.
 (188) Dmitry Vladislavovich Tulin.
 (189) Alexander Evgenyevich Udodov.
 (190) Yury Viktorovich Ushakov.
 (191) Ruben Karlenovich Vardanyan.
 (192) Irina Alexandrovna Viner-Usmanova.
 (193) Vadim Vladimirovich Yakovenko.
 (194) Igor Khanukovich Yusufov.
 (195) Valery Dmitrievich Zorkin.
 (196) Roman Viktorovich Zolotov.
 (197) Yuri Sergeevich Zubov.
 (198) Viktor Alexeevich Zubkov.
 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

READ ACT REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2022

H.R. 7240

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “READ Act Reauthorization Act of 2022”.

SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION.

Section 4(a) of the Reinforcing Education Accountability in Development Act (division A of Public Law 115–56; 22 U.S.C. 2151c note) is amended by striking “during the following five fiscal years” and inserting “during the following ten fiscal years”.

RUSSIA CRYPTOCURRENCY TRANSPARENCY ACT
H.R. 7338

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Russia Cryptocurrency Transparency Act”.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) On February 24, 2022, the Government of the Russian Federation, led by Vladimir Putin, launched an unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

(2) This unprovoked act of aggression violates Ukraine’s right to independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and constitutes an emergency in international relations.

(3) The invasion by the Government of the Russian Federation of Ukraine caused significant displacement in Ukraine and triggered a broader humanitarian crisis in Europe.

(4) On March 23, 2022, the Department of State released a statement assessing that the Russian Armed Forces committed war crimes by launching indiscriminate attacks on civilians and non-military infrastructure, including apartment buildings, schools, and hospitals, leaving thousands of innocent civilians killed or wounded.

(5) The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has projected that, over the next three months, 12,000,000 people living in Ukraine will need humanitarian assistance, 6,700,000 people will be internally displaced, and 4,000,000 people will flee Ukraine.

(6) Rapid humanitarian assistance is necessary across sectors to address the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons from Ukraine.

(7) Cryptocurrency has been used as an effective cross-border payment tool to send millions to the Ukrainian Government, Ukrainian army, and Ukrainian refugees with limited access to financial services.

(8) In response to the war of aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation, the United States has imposed an array of sanctions, cutting off major Russian financial institutions from Western markets and freezing the assets of numerous Russian oligarchs.

(9) Given that regimes sanctioned by the United States have used cryptocurrencies to evade sanctions, there are increasing concerns that these digital assets may be used to circumvent the sanctions now imposed on Russia and Belarus by the United States and other foreign countries.

SEC. 3. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATIONS FOR STATE DEPARTMENT CRYPTO CURRENCY REWARDS.

(a) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Subsection (e) of section 36 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(7) The Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before paying out a reward in cryptocurrency.”

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the use of cryptocurrency as a part of the Department of State Rewards program that—

(1) explains why the Department of State made the determination to pay out rewards in cryptocurrency;

(2) lists each cryptocurrency payment already provided by the State Department;

(3) provides evidence as to why cryptocurrency payments would be more likely to induce whistleblowers to come forward with information than rewards paid out in United States dollars or other prizes;

(4) analyzes how the State Department's use of cryptocurrency could undermine the dollar's status as the global reserve currency; and

(5) examines if the State Department's use of cryptocurrency could provide bad actors with additional hard-to-trace funds that could be used for criminal or illicit purposes.

(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON BLOCKCHAIN USAGE FOR UKRAINIAN HUMANITARIAN NEEDS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the most effective avenues to promote economic development and provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine, including possible uses of cryptocurrencies or other technologies incorporating blockchains. Such report shall—

(1) review and analyze the advantages offered by cross-border transactions involving digital assets relative to other traditional avenues for cross-border humanitarian relief payments and the reasons for those advantages, including structural barriers which

may impact the cost, efficiency, and reliability of traditional payment channels; and

(2) also review and analyze ways in which technologies incorporating blockchains can—

(A) assist in the care, support, or resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons from Ukraine;

(B) address humanitarian access challenges and ensure the effective delivery of such assistance to persons from Ukraine;

(C) increase efficiency, accountability, and transparency in the administration of humanitarian aid provided by the United States to persons from Ukraine;

(D) prevent corruption through the use of “web3” technologies;

(E) improve access to capital; and

(F) bolster the efficiency and reliability of cross-border remittances.

(b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and may include a classified annex.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

SEC. 5. EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) on March 9, 2022, President Biden issued an Executive Order outlining a national policy to mitigate the risks, and harness the potential benefits of, digital assets and distributed ledger technology;

(2) the growing development and adoption of digital assets have created an urgent need for the United States to play a leading role in the global financial system and facilitate technological innovation;

(3) these developments have had significant implications that pose risks to the financial stability and national security interest of the United States, including issues relating to privacy and surveillance;

(1) the United States Government must—

(A) ensure the efficacy and enforcement of the United States' sanctions regime by preventing the misuse of digital assets, which can facilitate transactions by Russian persons subject to sanctions;

(B) mitigate national security liabilities and systemic financial risks posed by the misuse of digital assets by developing policy recommendations and addressing existing regulatory gaps; and

(C) maintain technological leadership to promote United States global competitiveness and play a leading role in the global governance of digital assets.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that provides an assessment on how digital currencies affect the effectiveness and enforcement of United States sanctions against the Russian Federation and actors subject to sanctions related to the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) describe any efforts by the Russian Federation or persons subject to sanctions related to the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine to utilize digital assets to evade the sanctions regimes of the United States and its international allies and partners;

(B) describe any efforts by persons subject to sanctions related to the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine to use decentralized finance technology or other similar technology to effect transactions, including digital wallets, digital asset trading platforms, and digital asset exchanges;

(C) assess how the use or adoption of digital currencies could undermine the national security interests of the United States and impact the efficacy and enforcement of sanctions, and the enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions;

(D) detail actions taken by the United States government to work with private sector actors to combat the evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States; and

(E) include recommendations for new legislative and regulatory measures needed to strengthen the United States Government's ability to prevent any states, state-sponsored actors, and non-state-sponsored actors from using digital currencies to evade sanctions imposed by the United States Government.

(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(2) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

(d) REPORT FORM.—The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex, if necessary.

UPHOLDING THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT THROUGH SANCTIONS ACT

H.R. 8453

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Upholding the Dayton Peace Agreement Through Sanctions Act”.

SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to support Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and multi-ethnic character;

(2) to back and bolster Bosnia and Herzegovina's progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration;

(3) to encourage officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina to resume institutional participation at all levels of government to advance functionality and common-sense reforms for greater prosperity and for Bosnia and Herzegovina to obtain European Union candidate status;

(4) to push Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights;

(5) to advocate for robust participation in the October 2, 2022, general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(6) to utilize targeted sanctions against persons who undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement and democratic institutions, including by blocking, boycotting or not recognizing the results of elections, in Bosnia and Herzegovina to support peace and stability in that country;

(7) to urge the European Union to join the United States and United Kingdom in sanctioning Milorad Dodik, a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for his actions that undermine the stability and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(8) to expose and condemn the Government of Russia for its role in fueling instability in

Bosnia and Herzegovina and undermining the Dayton Peace Agreement, the role of the Office of the High Representative, and the European Union Force in BiH's Operation Althea;

(9) to work with other regional States, including Serbia and Croatia, to support the territorial integrity and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and

(10) to use its voice and vote at the United Nations, the Peace Implementation Council and its Steering Board, and other relevant international bodies to support the Office of the High Representative.

SEC. 3. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PERSONS UNDERMINING THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT OR THREATENING THE SECURITY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

(a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

(1) LIST REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of foreign persons that are determined—

(A) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, any action or policy that threatens the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including actions that seek to undermine the authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina's state-level institutions, such as forming illegal parallel institutions or actions that threaten the Office of the High Representative;

(B) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, any action or policy that undermines democratic processes or institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(C) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, or to have attempted, a violation of, or an act that has obstructed or threatened the implementation of, the Dayton Peace Agreement or the Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference Council held in London in December 1995, including the decisions or conclusions of the Office of the High Representative, the Peace Implementation Council, or its Steering Board;

(D) to be a member, official, or senior leader of an illegal parallel institution or any other institution that engages in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B) or (C), as determined by the Secretary of State;

(E) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, corruption related to Bosnia and Herzegovina, including corruption by, on behalf of, or otherwise related to the government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or a current or former government official at any level of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as the misappropriation of public assets, expropriation of private assets for personal gain or political purposes, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources or bribery;

(F) to be an adult family member of any foreign person described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E) unless they have condemned the sanctionable activity and taken tangible steps to oppose the activity;

(G) to have knowingly facilitated a significant transaction or transactions for or on behalf of a foreign person described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E);

(H) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a foreign person described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E); or

(I) to have knowingly materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or

technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, a foreign person described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E).

(2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Upon the submission of each list required by paragraph (1), the President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to each foreign person identified on the list.

(b) ADDITIONAL MEASURE RELATING TO FACILITATION OF TRANSACTIONS.—The Secretary of the Treasury may, in consultation with the Secretary of State, prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines has, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly conducted or facilitated a significant transaction or transactions on behalf of a foreign person on the list required by subsection (a)(1).

(c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(1) PROPERTY BLOCKING.—Notwithstanding the requirements of section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701), the President may exercise of all powers granted to the President by that Act to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) ALIENS INADMISSIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—An alien on the list required by subsection (a)(1) is—

(i) inadmissible to the United States;

(ii) ineligible for a visa or travel to the United States; and

(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The issuing consular officer, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a designee of one of such Secretaries) shall, in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), revoke any visa or other entry documentation issued to an alien on the list required by subsection (a)(1) regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is issued.

(ii) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—A visa or other entry documentation revoked under clause (i) shall—

(I) take effect immediately; and

(II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's possession.

(d) EXCEPTIONS.—

(1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any authorized intelligence, law enforcement, or national security activities of the United States.

(2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to the admission of an alien to the United States if the admission of the alien is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, the Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into force

March 19, 1967, or other applicable international obligations.

(3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—Sanctions under this section may not be imposed with respect to transactions or the facilitation of transactions for—

(A) the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices;

(B) the provision of humanitarian assistance;

(C) financial transactions relating to humanitarian assistance or for humanitarian purposes; and

(D) transporting goods or services that are necessary to carry out operations relating to humanitarian assistance or humanitarian purposes.

(e) WAIVER.—The President may, on a case-by-case basis and for periods not to exceed 180 days each, waive the application of sanctions or restrictions imposed with respect to a foreign person under this section if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before such waiver is to take effect that the waiver is vital to the national interest of the United States.

(f) REGULATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, prescribe regulations as necessary for the implementation of this Act.

(2) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 10 days before the prescription of regulations under paragraph (1), the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees regarding the proposed regulations and the provisions of this Act that the regulations are implementing.

(g) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this Act.

(h) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations prescribed to carry out this Act to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section 206.

(i) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—The President may terminate the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person if the President determines and reports to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before the termination of the sanctions that—

(1) credible information exists that the foreign person did not engage in the activity for which sanctions were imposed;

(2) the foreign person has been prosecuted appropriately for the activity for which sanctions were imposed; or

(3) the foreign person has credibly demonstrated a significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate consequence for the activity for which sanctions were imposed, and has credibly committed to not engage in an activity described in subsection (a)(1) in the future.

(j) SUNSET.—The authority to impose sanctions under this section shall terminate on the date that is five years after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 4. CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after receiving a request from the chairman and ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional committees with respect to whether a person, foreign person, or foreign financial institution, as the case may

be, meets the criteria described in this Act, Executive Order 14033 (86 Fed. Reg. 31079; relating to blocking property and suspending entry into the United States of certain persons contributing to the destabilizing situation in the Western Balkans), or any Executive order issued pursuant to this Act or under the Balkans regulatory regime, the President shall—

(1) determine if the person, foreign person, or foreign financial institution, as the case may be, meets such criteria; and

(2) submit a classified or unclassified report to such chairman and ranking member with respect to such determination that includes a statement of whether or not the President imposed or intends to impose sanctions with respect to such person, foreign person, or foreign financial institution.

(b) **SUNSET.**—This section shall terminate on the date that is five years after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 5. EXCEPTION FOR IMPORTATION OF GOODS.

(a) **EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.**—The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions under this Act shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(b) **GOOD DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “good” means any article, natural or man-made substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) **ADMITTED; ALIEN.**—The terms “admitted” and “alien” have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

(2) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

(3) **CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT.**—The terms “correspondent account” and “payable-through account” have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.

(4) **DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT.**—The term “Dayton Peace Agreement”, also known as the “Dayton Accords”, means the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initiated by the parties in Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, 1995, and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.

(5) **FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.**—The term “foreign financial institution” has the meaning of that term as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury by regulation.

(6) **FOREIGN PERSON.**—The term “foreign person” means a person that is not a United States person.

(7) **ILLEGAL PARALLEL INSTITUTION.**—The term “illegal parallel institution” means an agency, structure, or instrumentality at the Republika Srpska entity level that disrupts the authority of the state-level institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and undermines its constitutional order.

(8) **KNOWINGLY.**—The term “knowingly”, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(9) **PERSON.**—The term “person” means an individual or entity.

(10) **UNITED STATES PERSON.**—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence;

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or

(C) any person in the United States.

SEC. 7. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.

The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the latest statement titled “Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation” for this Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, provided that such statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.

SECURING GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT

H.R. 8503

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Securing Global Telecommunications Act”.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress as follows:

(1) The United States Government should promote and take steps to ensure American leadership in strategic technology industries, including telecommunications infrastructure and other information and communications technologies.

(2) The expansive presence of companies linked to the Chinese Communist Party, such as Huawei, in global mobile networks and the national security implications thereof, such as the ability of the People's Republic of China to exfiltrate the information flowing through those networks and shut off countries' internet access, demonstrates the importance of the United States remaining at the technological frontier and the dire consequences of falling behind.

(3) The significant cost of countering Huawei's market leadership in telecommunications infrastructure around the world underscores the urgency of supporting the competitiveness of United States companies in next-generation information and communication technology.

(4) To remain a leader at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and preserve the ITU's technical integrity, the United States must work with emerging economies and developing nations to bolster global telecommunications security and protect American national security interests.

(5) Multilateral cooperation with like-minded partners and allies is critical to carry out the significant effort of financing and promoting secure networks around the world and to achieve market leadership of trusted vendors in this sector.

SEC. 3. STRATEGY FOR SECURING GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) **STRATEGY REQUIRED.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and Energy and Commerce and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Commerce, Science, and Transportation and of the Senate a strategy, to be known as the “Strategy to Secure Global Telecommunications Infrastructure” (referred to in this Act as the “Strategy”), to promote the use of secure telecommunication infrastructure in countries other than the United States.

(b) **CONSULTATION REQUIRED.**—The Secretary of State shall consult with the Presi-

dent of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Director of the Trade and Development Agency, the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, in developing the Strategy, which shall consist of an approach led by the Department of State using the policy tools, and informed by the technical expertise, of the other Federal entities so consulted to achieve the goal described in subsection (a).

(c) **ELEMENTS.**—The Strategy shall also include sections on each of the following:

(1) Mobile networks, including a description of efforts by countries other than the United States to—

(A) promote trusted Open RAN technologies while protecting against any security risks posed by untrusted vendors in Open RAN networks;

(B) use financing mechanisms to assist “rip-and-replace” projects and to incentivize countries to choose trusted equipment vendors;

(C) bolster multilateral cooperation, especially with developing countries and emerging economies, to promote the deployment of trusted wireless networks worldwide; and

(D) collaborate with trusted private sector companies to counter Chinese market leadership in the telecom equipment industry.

(2) Data centers, including a description of efforts to—

(A) utilize financing mechanisms to incentivize countries other than the United States to choose trusted data center providers; and

(B) bolster multilateral cooperation, especially with developing countries and emerging economies, to promote the deployment of trusted data centers worldwide.

(3) Sixth (and future) generation technologies (6G), including a description of efforts to—

(A) deepen cooperation with like-minded countries to promote United States and allied market leadership in 6G networks and technologies; and

(B) increase buy-in from developing countries and emerging countries on trusted technologies.

(4) Low-Earth orbit satellites, aerostats, and stratospheric balloons, including a description of efforts to work with trusted private sector companies to retain the ability to quickly provide internet connection in response to emergency situations.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON MALIN INFLUENCE AT THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION.

(a) **REPORT.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Commerce, Science, and Transportation the Senate a report on Russian and Chinese strategies and efforts—

(1) to expand the mandate of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to cover internet governance policy; and

(2) to advance other actions favorable to authoritarian interests and/or hostile to fair, industry-led processes.

(b) **ELEMENTS.**—The report required by subsection (a) shall also identify efforts by China and Russia—

(1) to increase the ITU's jurisdiction over internet governance and to propose internet governance standards at the ITU;

(2) to leverage their private sector actors to advance their national interests through the ITU, including—

(A) encouraging Chinese and Russian companies to leverage their market power to pressure other member countries to deliver favorable decisions on ITU elections; and

(B) China's efforts to leverage Huawei's role as the primary telecommunications equipment and services provider for many developing countries to compel such countries to deliver favorable decisions on standards proposals, election victories, candidate selection, and other levers of power at the ITU; and

(3) to use the influence of Chinese and Russian nationals serving in the ITU to advantage the companies, standards decisions, and candidates that advance the CCP and Kremlin's interests.

(c) FORM.—The report required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 5. REPORT ON MULTILATERAL COORDINATION.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Administrator for the United States Agency on International Development, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce and of the House of Representatives and the Committees Foreign Relations and on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and of the Senate a report that identifies opportunities for greater collaboration with allies and partners to promote secure information and communications technology infrastructure in countries other than the United States, including through—

(1) joint financing efforts to help trusted vendors win bids to build out information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure;

(2) incorporating ICT focuses into allies' and partners' international development finance initiatives; and

(3) diplomatic coordination to emphasize the importance of secure telecommunications infrastructure to countries using untrusted providers.

COUNTERING UNTRUSTED TELECOMMUNICATIONS ABROAD ACT

H.R. 8520

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Countering Untrusted Telecommunications Abroad Act".

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the national security of the United States is affected by the telecommunications security of United States allies, partners, and other countries around the globe;

(2) the importance of mobile and internet services makes such services tempting and effective tools for malign influence and economic coercion;

(3) Huawei Technologies Company and ZTE Corporation (and any subsidiary or affiliate of either such entity) should not serve as a vendor of telecommunications equipment or services given the close ties to, and control over, such entities by the People's Republic of China; and

(4) it is in the economic and national security interests of the United States to ensure that countries around the globe use trusted telecommunications equipment or services.

SEC. 3. REPORT ON UNTRUSTED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES IN COUNTRIES WITH COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AGREEMENT WITH UNITED STATES.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for two years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report on the prevalence of untrusted telecommunications equipment or services in the networks of United States allies and partners.

(b) MATTERS.—The report under subsection (a) shall enumerate each United States ally or partner with respect to which the United States has entered into a collective defense agreement and include, for each such country, the following:

(1) A description of the presence, or lack thereof, of untrusted telecommunications equipment or services in any 5G network of the country.

(2) If any untrusted telecommunications equipment or service is present in such a network—

(A) an enumeration of any mobile carriers that are using the untrusted telecommunications equipment or service present, and any mobile carriers that are not;

(B) a determination of whether the untrusted telecommunications equipment or service present is in the core or periphery of the network; and

(C) any plans by the United States ally or partner, or the individual mobile carrier, to rip and replace the untrusted telecommunications equipment or service present with a trusted telecommunications equipment or service.

(3) A description of any plans by network operators to use untrusted telecommunications equipment or services in the deployment of Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN) technology, or any successor to such technology, or in future 6G networks.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON COVERED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES IN UNITED STATES EMBASSIES.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The Comptroller General of the United States has reported that 23 percent of all telecommunications device manufacturers of the Department of State have at least one supplier reported to be headquartered in the People's Republic of China or the Russian Federation.

(2) The Comptroller General has reported that four percent of all telecommunications contractors of the Department of State have at least one supplier reported to be headquartered in the People's Republic of China.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of such other departments and agencies as the Secretary determines necessary, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report containing an assessment of the use of covered telecommunications equipment or services in United States embassies and by United States embassy staff and personnel.

(2) MATTERS.—The report under paragraph (1) shall include information on the following:

(A) The status of the implementation by the Secretary of State of the prohibition under subsection (a)(1) of section 889 of the

John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 132 Stat. 1917; 41 U.S.C. 3901 note prec.) with respect to equipment, systems, and services used at United States embassies, including—

(i) an identification of the United States embassies with respect to which the Secretary has implemented such prohibition, and an identification of those with respect to which the Secretary has not implemented such prohibition, if any;

(ii) an identification of any difficulties that have delayed the implementation of such prohibition by the Secretary with respect to United States embassies, such as visibility into supply chains, costs of equipment replacement, and plans for timely remediation;

(iii) information on any waivers that have been granted to an entity under subsection (d) of such section 889 for equipment, systems, or services used at United States embassies, including a justification of why each waiver was granted and any other information required pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) of such subsection; and

(iv) for any entity that has sought a waiver specified in clause (iii), the implementation status of the phase-out plan of the entity submitted by the entity pursuant to subsection (d) of such section 889.

(B) Information regarding the extent to which the digital devices of United States embassy staff and personnel are serviced by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation (or any subsidiary or affiliate of either such entity), or any other entity headquartered in the People's Republic of China, and an assessment of the likelihood of the intelligence services of the People's Republic of China gaining access to the contents and data of the digital devices used by United States embassy personnel as a result of any such servicing.

(C) Any other information regarding ongoing efforts to safeguard the communications security of United States embassies.

(3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 5. SUPPORTING TRUSTED TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, shall select for the provision of support under this section telecommunications infrastructure projects that have the potential, as determined by the Secretary, to promote the national security of the United States and meet such other requirements as the Secretary may prescribe.

(b) DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT.—The Secretary of State shall provide to each project selected under subsection (a), as appropriate, diplomatic and political support, including by using the diplomatic and political influence and expertise of the Department of State to build the capacity of countries to resolve any impediments to the development of the project.

(c) EARLY STAGE PROJECT SUPPORT.—The Director of the United States Trade and Development Agency should provide, as appropriate, early-stage project support with respect to projects selected under subsection (a).

SEC. 6. DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY OF UNTRUSTED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(s) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATED TO UNTRUSTED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.—