

(A) encouraging Chinese and Russian companies to leverage their market power to pressure other member countries to deliver favorable decisions on ITU elections; and

(B) China's efforts to leverage Huawei's role as the primary telecommunications equipment and services provider for many developing countries to compel such countries to deliver favorable decisions on standards proposals, election victories, candidate selection, and other levers of power at the ITU; and

(3) to use the influence of Chinese and Russian nationals serving in the ITU to advantage the companies, standards decisions, and candidates that advance the CCP and Kremlin's interests.

(c) FORM.—The report required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 5. REPORT ON MULTILATERAL COORDINATION.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Administrator for the United States Agency on International Development, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce and of the House of Representatives and the Committees Foreign Relations and on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and of the Senate a report that identifies opportunities for greater collaboration with allies and partners to promote secure information and communications technology infrastructure in countries other than the United States, including through—

(1) joint financing efforts to help trusted vendors win bids to build out information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure;

(2) incorporating ICT focuses into allies' and partners' international development finance initiatives; and

(3) diplomatic coordination to emphasize the importance of secure telecommunications infrastructure to countries using untrusted providers.

COUNTERING UNTRUSTED TELECOMMUNICATIONS ABROAD ACT

H.R. 8520

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Countering Untrusted Telecommunications Abroad Act".

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the national security of the United States is affected by the telecommunications security of United States allies, partners, and other countries around the globe;

(2) the importance of mobile and internet services makes such services tempting and effective tools for malign influence and economic coercion;

(3) Huawei Technologies Company and ZTE Corporation (and any subsidiary or affiliate of either such entity) should not serve as a vendor of telecommunications equipment or services given the close ties to, and control over, such entities by the People's Republic of China; and

(4) it is in the economic and national security interests of the United States to ensure that countries around the globe use trusted telecommunications equipment or services.

SEC. 3. REPORT ON UNTRUSTED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES IN COUNTRIES WITH COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AGREEMENT WITH UNITED STATES.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for two years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report on the prevalence of untrusted telecommunications equipment or services in the networks of United States allies and partners.

(b) MATTERS.—The report under subsection (a) shall enumerate each United States ally or partner with respect to which the United States has entered into a collective defense agreement and include, for each such country, the following:

(1) A description of the presence, or lack thereof, of untrusted telecommunications equipment or services in any 5G network of the country.

(2) If any untrusted telecommunications equipment or service is present in such a network—

(A) an enumeration of any mobile carriers that are using the untrusted telecommunications equipment or service present, and any mobile carriers that are not;

(B) a determination of whether the untrusted telecommunications equipment or service present is in the core or periphery of the network; and

(C) any plans by the United States ally or partner, or the individual mobile carrier, to rip and replace the untrusted telecommunications equipment or service present with a trusted telecommunications equipment or service.

(3) A description of any plans by network operators to use untrusted telecommunications equipment or services in the deployment of Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN) technology, or any successor to such technology, or in future 6G networks.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON COVERED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES IN UNITED STATES EMBASSIES.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The Comptroller General of the United States has reported that 23 percent of all telecommunications device manufacturers of the Department of State have at least one supplier reported to be headquartered in the People's Republic of China or the Russian Federation.

(2) The Comptroller General has reported that four percent of all telecommunications contractors of the Department of State have at least one supplier reported to be headquartered in the People's Republic of China.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of such other departments and agencies as the Secretary determines necessary, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report containing an assessment of the use of covered telecommunications equipment or services in United States embassies and by United States embassy staff and personnel.

(2) MATTERS.—The report under paragraph (1) shall include information on the following:

(A) The status of the implementation by the Secretary of State of the prohibition under subsection (a)(1) of section 889 of the

John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 132 Stat. 1917; 41 U.S.C. 3901 note prec.) with respect to equipment, systems, and services used at United States embassies, including—

(i) an identification of the United States embassies with respect to which the Secretary has implemented such prohibition, and an identification of those with respect to which the Secretary has not implemented such prohibition, if any;

(ii) an identification of any difficulties that have delayed the implementation of such prohibition by the Secretary with respect to United States embassies, such as visibility into supply chains, costs of equipment replacement, and plans for timely remediation;

(iii) information on any waivers that have been granted to an entity under subsection (d) of such section 889 for equipment, systems, or services used at United States embassies, including a justification of why each waiver was granted and any other information required pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) of such subsection; and

(iv) for any entity that has sought a waiver specified in clause (iii), the implementation status of the phase-out plan of the entity submitted by the entity pursuant to subsection (d) of such section 889.

(B) Information regarding the extent to which the digital devices of United States embassy staff and personnel are serviced by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation (or any subsidiary or affiliate of either such entity), or any other entity headquartered in the People's Republic of China, and an assessment of the likelihood of the intelligence services of the People's Republic of China gaining access to the contents and data of the digital devices used by United States embassy personnel as a result of any such servicing.

(C) Any other information regarding ongoing efforts to safeguard the communications security of United States embassies.

(3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 5. SUPPORTING TRUSTED TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, shall select for the provision of support under this section telecommunications infrastructure projects that have the potential, as determined by the Secretary, to promote the national security of the United States and meet such other requirements as the Secretary may prescribe.

(b) DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT.—The Secretary of State shall provide to each project selected under subsection (a), as appropriate, diplomatic and political support, including by using the diplomatic and political influence and expertise of the Department of State to build the capacity of countries to resolve any impediments to the development of the project.

(c) EARLY STAGE PROJECT SUPPORT.—The Director of the United States Trade and Development Agency should provide, as appropriate, early-stage project support with respect to projects selected under subsection (a).

SEC. 6. DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY OF UNTRUSTED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(s) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATED TO UNTRUSTED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Each issuer required to file an annual or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall disclose in that report the information required in paragraph (2) if, during the period covered by the report, the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer used or contracted to use covered telecommunications equipment or services.

“(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—If an issuer or affiliate of the issuer has engaged in an activity described in paragraph (1), the issuer shall disclose such activity, including a detailed description of—

“(A) whether the covered telecommunications equipment or services are being used in a mobile network run by the issuer, and whether those equipment or services were used in the core or periphery of the network;

“(B) whether the covered telecommunications equipment or services were used for cloud computing or data storage;

“(C) whether any covered telecommunications equipment or services were replaced with other vendors; and

“(D) whether the issuer is currently engaging in negotiations or planning to contract to use additional covered telecommunications equipment or services.

“(3) NOTICE OF DISCLOSURES.—If an issuer reports under paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has knowingly engaged in any activity described in that paragraph, the issuer shall separately file with the Commission, concurrently with the annual or quarterly report under subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity has been included in that annual or quarterly report that identifies the issuer and contains the information required by paragraph (2).

“(4) PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.—Upon receiving a notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1), the Commission shall promptly—

“(A) transmit the report to—

“(i) the President;

“(ii) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Energy and Commerce, and Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

“(iii) the Committees on Foreign Relations, Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

“(B) make the information provided in the disclosure and the notice available to the public by posting the information on the Internet website of the Commission.

“(5) COVERED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR SERVICE DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘covered telecommunications equipment or service’ has the meaning given to the term ‘covered communications equipment or service’ in section 9 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1608).”

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to reports required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) COVERED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR SERVICE; UNTRUSTED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR SERVICE.—The terms “covered telecommunications equipment or service” and “untrusted telecommunications equipment or service” have the meaning given to the term “covered communications equipment or service” in section 9 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1608).

(2) TRUSTED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR SERVICE.—The term “trusted telecommunications equipment or service”

means any telecommunications equipment or service that is not a covered telecommunications equipment or service.

URGING THE EUROPEAN UNION TO DESIGNATE HIZBALLAH IN ITS ENTIRETY AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

H. RES. 558

Whereas, in April 1983, a Hizballah terror attack against the United States Embassy in Beirut killed 63 people;

Whereas, in October 1983, a Hizballah terror attack against the United States Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, killed 241 American and 58 French servicemembers supporting the Multinational Force peace-keeping mission;

Whereas, in July 2012, a Hizballah terror attack, carried out by an operative with dual Lebanese-French citizenship, in Burgas, Bulgaria, killed 5 Israeli tourists and 1 Bulgarian;

Whereas, in March 2013, a Swedish-Lebanese Hizballah operative in Cyprus was convicted of planning terror attacks against Israeli tourists;

Whereas, in June 2015, a Hizballah operative was sentenced to 6 years in prison after he stockpiled more than 8 tons of ammonium nitrate in Cyprus;

Whereas the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-102) and the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-272) broadened financial sector sanctions against Hizballah to compel foreign financial institutions to refrain from supporting the terrorist group;

Whereas, in May 2018, the Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Abdullah Saffi-Al-Din, Hizballah's representative to Iran, Mohammad Ibrahim Bazzi, a Hizballah financier, and blacklisted 5 of Bazzi's companies, including Belgian energy services conglomerate Global Trading Group NV;

Whereas, in October 2018, French police raided the Islamic Zahra Centre on suspicion of supporting Hizballah, freezing the organization's funds, and seizing illegal weapons;

Whereas, in September 2020, 4 former leaders of the Zahra Centre France were arrested on suspicion of continuing to run the association;

Whereas, in July 2019, the Department of the Treasury designated 2 Hizballah-backed members of Lebanese Parliament, Amin Sherri and Muhammad Hasan Ra'd, and Hizballah security official Wafiq Safa, stating that Hizballah uses its operatives in parliament to advance its violent activities;

Whereas, as of April 2020, Germany believed there to be 1,050 people with suspected links to Hizballah in the country;

Whereas Europol's June 2020 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report outlined that Hizballah is “suspected of trafficking diamonds and drugs and of money laundering via the trade in second-hand cars”, and the report also stated that “investigations face the difficulty of demonstrating that the funds collected are channeled to the military wing of the organization”;

Whereas United States-led Project Cassandra and Operation Cedar exposed the criminal-business wing of Hizballah, the Business Affairs Component (BAC) of Hezbollah's External Security Organization;

Whereas, during Project Cassandra, Hizballah elements involved in drug trafficking were arrested in the United States, South America, and several European countries, including France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy;

Whereas Hizballah's criminal activity in Europe is run by the BAC, which reports to the External Security Organisation, also known as Unit 910, or the Islamic Jihad Or-

ganization, and Abdallah Safieddine, Hizballah's representative in Iran, is also involved in this activity;

Whereas, in August 2020, United Nations Secretary General Guterres called on Lebanon to disarm Hizballah, citing the terror group's persistent violation of Resolution 1701 (2006);

Whereas Iran is the prime sponsor of Hizballah, harboring, financing, training, and arming the group;

Whereas the Department of the Treasury and Department of State estimate that Iran provides as much as \$700,000,000 per year to Hizballah in the form of financial and logistical support, weapons, and training;

Whereas Hizballah now has an arsenal of approximately 150,000 missiles and rockets, many of which can reach deep into Israel;

Whereas Hizballah fighters have been supporting the Assad regime in Syria, often leading operations in the conflict which has left more than 500,000 dead;

Whereas Hizballah's destabilizing actions in Syria have contributed to a migrant crisis that has brought over 700,000 refugees to Europe;

Whereas Hizballah trains and provides weapons for militias in Iraq and Yemen, further destabilizing the region and perpetuating violence in those countries;

Whereas Hizballah activities continue to plague Lebanon with profound economic and political instability and violence;

Whereas, in August 2020, at least 220 people died and thousands more were injured when a massive stockpile of ammonium nitrate exploded in Beirut's port;

Whereas Hizballah's cross border illicit arms and drugs trafficking undermines the Lebanese Armed Forces, the legitimate security establishment of the country as outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006);

Whereas, in October 2012, Hizballah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem stated that “[Hizballah does not] have a military wing and a political one . . . Every element of Hizballah, from commanders to members as well as our various capabilities, are in the service of the resistance”;

Whereas the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Serbia, and Kosovo, among others, have designated Hizballah in its entirety as a terror organization;

Whereas, in March 2016, the Gulf Cooperation Council formally branded Hizballah, in its entirety, a terrorist organization, and the League of Arab States shortly thereafter adopted the same designation;

Whereas the Department of the Treasury has diligently added persons and entities to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists who have provided material support to the Hizballah terrorist organization, thereby hampering its financing and logistical capabilities;

Whereas the European Union, in July 2013, designated Hizballah's so-called “military wing”, but not the organization as a whole, as a terrorist organization;

Whereas, despite restrictions put on Hizballah since the designation of its military wing, the group continues to conduct illicit narcotrafficking, money laundering, and weapons trafficking throughout Europe and the world; and

Whereas the House of Representatives has previously called on the European Union to fully designate Hizballah as a terrorist organization, passing House Resolution 359 in October 2017; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives—

(1) applauds and expresses support for the continued, increased cooperation between

the United States and the European Union (EU) in thwarting Hizballah's criminal and terrorist activities;

(2) supports transcontinental efforts within Europe to share intelligence information among police and security services to facilitate greater cooperation in tracking, apprehending, and prosecuting terrorists, foreign fighters, and potential offenders;

(3) encourages the European Union to implement sanctions against Hizballah-affiliated terrorists in tandem with the United States;

(4) recommends greater civil society engagement in both the United States and Europe to underscore Hizballah's malign regional influence; and

(5) urges the European Union to designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist organization and increase pressure on the group, including through—

(A) facilitating better cross-border cooperation between European Union members in combating Hizballah;

(B) issuing arrest warrants against members and active supporters of Hizballah;

(C) freezing Hizballah's assets in Europe, including those masquerading as charities; and

(D) prohibiting fundraising activities in support of Hizballah.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution 1361, the ordering of the yeas and nays on postponed motions to suspend the rules with respect to such measures is vacated to the end that all such motions are considered as withdrawn.

The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bills and agree to the resolution.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the yeas have it.

Mr. ROSENDALE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

This is a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 361, nays 69, not voting 2, as follows:

[Roll No. 443]

YEAS—361

Adams	Boyle, Brendan	Cicilline
Aderholt	F.	Clark (MA)
Aguilar	Brady	Clarke (NY)
Allen	Brown (MD)	Cleaver
Allred	Brown (OH)	Clyburn
Amodei	Brownley	Cohen
Armstrong	Buchanan	Cole
Arrington	Bucshon	Comer
Auchincloss	Burgess	Connolly
Axne	Bush	Conway
Bacon	Bustos	Cooper
Baird	Butterfield	Correa
Balderson	Calvert	Costa
Banks	Carbajal	Courtney
Barr	Cárdenas	Craig
Barragán	Carey	Crenshaw
Bass	Carl	Crow
Beatty	Carson	Cuellar
Bentz	Carter (GA)	Curtis
Bera	Carter (LA)	Davids (KS)
Bergman	Carter (TX)	Davis, Danny K.
Beyer	Cartwright	Davis, Rodney
Bice (OK)	Case	Dean
Bilirakis	Casten	DeFazio
Bishop (GA)	Castor (FL)	DeGette
Blumenauer	Castro (TX)	DeLauro
Blunt	Rochester	DelBene
Bonamici	Cheney	Demings
Bost	Cherfilus-	DeSaulnier
Bourdeaux	McCormick	DesJarlais
Bowman	Chu	Deutch

Diaz-Balart	Kirkpatrick	Reschenthaler
Dingell	Krishnamoorthi	Rice (NY)
Doggett	Kuster	Rodgers (WA)
Doyle, Michael F.	Kustoff	Rogers (AL)
Duncan	LaHood	Rogers (KY)
Dunn	LaMalfa	Ross
Ellzey	Lamb	Rouzer
Escobar	Langevin	Roybal-Allard
Eshoo	Larsen (WA)	Ruiz
Españolat	Larson (CT)	Ruppersberger
Evans	Latta	Rush
Feenstra	LaTurner	Rutherford
Ferguson	Lawrence	Ryan (NY)
Finstad	Lawson (FL)	Ryan (OH)
Fischbach	Lee (CA)	Salazar
Fitzpatrick	Lee (NV)	Sánchez
Fleischmann	Leger Fernandez	Sarbanes
Fletcher	Letlow	Scalise
Flood	Levin (CA)	Scanlon
Flores	Levin (MI)	Schakowsky
Foster	Lieu	Schiff
Fox	Lofgren	Schneider
Fox	Long	Schrader
Frankel, Lois	Lowenthal	Schrier
Fulcher	Lucas	Scott (VA)
Gallagher	Luetkemeyer	Scott, David
Gallego	Luria	Sempolinski
Garamendi	Lynch	Sewell
Garbarino	Mace	Sherman
Garcia (CA)	Malinowski	Sherrill
Garcia (IL)	Malliotakis	Simpson
Garcia (TX)	Maloney,	Sires
Gimenez	Carolyn B.	Slotkin
Golden	Maloney, Sean	Smith (MO)
Gomez	Manning	Smith (NE)
Gonzales, Tony	Mast	Smith (NJ)
Gonzalez (OH)	Matsui	Smith (WA)
Gonzalez,	McBath	Smucker
Vicente	McCarthy	Soto
Gottheimer	McCaul	Spanberger
Granger	McClain	Spartz
Graves (LA)	McClintock	Speier
Graves (MO)	McCollum	Stansbury
Green, Al (TX)	McEachin	Stanton
Grijalva	McGovern	Staubert
Guest	McKinley	Steel
Guthrie	McNerney	Stefanik
Harder (CA)	Meeks	Steil
Harshbarger	Meijer	Stevens
Hartzler	Meng	Stewart
Hayes	Meuser	Strickland
Herrell	Mfume	Suozzi
Herrera Beutler	Miller (WV)	Swalwell
Higgins (NY)	Miller-Meeks	Takano
Hill	Mooney	Taylor
Himes	Moore (UT)	Thompson (CA)
Hinson	Moore (WI)	Thompson (MS)
Hollingsworth	Morelle	Thompson (PA)
Horsford	Moulton	Titus
Houlahan	Mrvan	Tlaib
Hoyer	Murphy (FL)	Tonko
Hudson	Murphy (NC)	Torres (CA)
Huffman	Nadler	Torres (NY)
Huizenga	Napolitano	Neal
Issa	Neguse	Trahan
Jackson	Newhouse	Trone
Jackson Lee	Newman	Turner
Jacobs (CA)	Norcross	Underwood
Jacobs (NY)	O'Halleran	Upton
Jayapal	Obermole	Valadao
Jeffries	Ocasio-Cortez	Van Dyne
Johnson (GA)	Omar	Vargas
Johnson (LA)	Owens	Veasey
Johnson (OH)	Palazzo	Velázquez
Johnson (SD)	Pallone	Wagner
Johnson (TX)	Panetta	Walberg
Jones	Pappas	Walt
Joyce (OH)	Pascrell	Wasserman
Joyce (PA)	Payne	Schultz
Kahele	Peltola	Waters
Kaptur	Perlmutter	Watson Coleman
Katko	Peters	Welch
Keating	Pfleger	Wenstrup
Keller	Phillips	Westerman
Kelly (IL)	Pingree	Wexton
Kelly (PA)	Pocan	Wild
Khanna	Porter	Williams (GA)
Kildee	Pressley	Wilson (FL)
Kilmer	Price (NC)	Wittman
Kim (CA)	Quigley	Womack
Kim (NJ)	Raskin	Yarmuth
Kind		

NAYS—69

Babin	Buck	Cline
Biggs	Budd	Cloud
Bishop (NC)	Burchett	Clyde
Boebert	Cammack	Crawford
Brooks	Cawthorn	Davidson

Donalds	Hice (GA)	Posey
Emmer	Higgins (LA)	Rice (SC)
Estes	Jordan	Rose
Fallon	Kelly (MS)	Rosendale
Fitzgerald	Lamborn	Roy
Franklin, C.	Lesko	Schweikert
Scott	Loudermilk	Scott, Austin
Gaetz	Mann	Sessions
Gibbs	Massie	Steube
Gohmert	McHenry	Tenney
Good (VA)	Miller (IL)	Tiffany
Gooden (TX)	Moolenaar	Timmons
Gosar	Moore (AL)	Van Drew
Green (TN)	Mullin	Weber (TX)
Greene (GA)	Nehls	Webster (FL)
Griffith	Norman	Williams (TX)
Grothman	Palmer	Wilson (SC)
Harris	Pence	
Hern	Perry	

NOT VOTING—2

Kinzinger Zeldin

□ 1416

So (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended, the bills were passed, and the resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The title of H.R. 7338 was amended so as to read: "A bill to require congressional notification prior to payments of Department of State rewards using cryptocurrencies, and for other purposes."

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated for:

Mr. BUDD. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 443, I mistakenly voted "nay" when I intended to vote "yea."

MEMBERS RECORDED PURSUANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTION 8, 117TH CONGRESS

Baird (Bucshon)	Kirkpatrick	Palazzo
Bass (Correa)	(Pallone)	(Fleischmann)
Boebert (Gaetz)	Lamb (Pallone)	Ruiz (Correa)
Chu (Beyer)	Lawrence	Rush (Bowman)
Conway	(Stevens)	Ryan (OH)
(Valadao)	McEachin	(Correa)
Garcia (IL)	(Beyer)	Sánchez
(Correa)	McHenry	(Pallone)
Gomez (Evans)	(Donalds)	Soto (Wasserman)
Gottheimer	Meng (Escobar)	Schultz
(Neguse)	Napolitano	Swalwell
Johnson (TX)	(Correa)	(Correa)
(Jeffries)	Newman (Beyer)	Vargas (Correa)
Jones (Beyer)		Waltz (Gimenez)

BLACKWELL SCHOOL NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the unfinished business is the vote on the motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill (S. 2490) to establish the Blackwell School National Historic Site in Marfa, Texas, and for other purposes, on which the yeas and nays were ordered.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. GRIJALVA) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill.

This is a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 414, nays 12, not voting 6, as follows:

[Roll No. 444]

YEAS—414

Adams	Allen	Armstrong
Aderholt	Allred	Arrington
Aguilar	Amodei	Auchincloss