

PRESERVING THE HEALTH OF THE GREAT LAKES

(Mr. WALBERG asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my concern about DNA from invasive silver carp found in the St. Joseph River, which runs through my district.

Silver carp have overtaken watersheds across the country and would pose a significant challenge to preserving the health of the Great Lakes and its tributaries.

This news increases the urgency to take commonsense steps to protect the Great Lakes from invasive species.

That is why I have continued to support bipartisan efforts that will maintain a healthy Great Lakes ecosystem through securing funding for the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative and why I continue to support efforts like the Brandon Road Lock and Dam to fight invasive species.

I will continue to closely monitor the additional testing conducted by the Fish and Wildlife Service and pursue long-term solutions to keep the Great Lakes healthy.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. WEBER of Texas) laid before the House the following communication from the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

OFFICE OF THE CLERK,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, September 11, 2023.

The Hon. KEVIN MCCARTHY,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Pursuant to the permission granted in Clause 2(h) of Rule II of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Clerk received the following message from the Secretary of the Senate on September 11, 2023, at 4:18 p.m.

That the Senate passed S. 294.

That the Senate passed S. 2747.

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely,

KEVIN F. MCCUMBER,
Acting Clerk.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 12(a) of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Accordingly (at 2 o'clock and 11 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess.

□ 1602

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. C. SCOTT FRANKLIN of Florida) at 4 o'clock and 2 minutes p.m.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the Chair

will postpone further proceedings today on motions to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the yeas and nays are ordered, or votes objected to under clause 6 of rule XX.

The House will resume proceedings on postponed questions at a later time.

FIGHT AND COMBAT RAMPANT IRANIAN MISSILE EXPORTS ACT

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 3152) to impose sanctions with respect to countries, individuals, and entities that engage in any effort to acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or deploy Iranian missiles and related goods and technology, including materials and equipment, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 3152

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports Act" or the "Fight CRIME Act".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) restricts certain missile-related activities and transfers to and from Iran, including all items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology set out in the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex, absent advance, case-by-case approval from the United Nations Security Council.

(2) Iran has transferred Shahed and Mohajer drones, covered under the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex, to the Russian Federation, the Government of Ethiopia, and other Iran-aligned entities, including the Houthis in Yemen and militia units in Iraq, without prior authorization from the United Nations Security Council, in violation of the restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

(3) Absent action by the United Nations Security Council, certain missile-related restrictions in Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 will expire in October 2023, removing international legal restrictions on missile-related activities and transfers to and from Iran.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to urgently seek the extension of missile-related restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

(2) to use all available authorities to constrain Iran's domestic ballistic missile production capabilities;

(3) to combat and deter the transfer of conventional and non-conventional arms, equipment, material, and technology to, or from Iran, or involving the Government of Iran; and

(4) to ensure countries, individuals, and entities engaged in, or attempting to engage in, the acquisition, facilitation, or development of arms and related components and technology subject to restrictions under Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 are held to account under United States and international law, including through the application and enforcement

of sanctions and use of export controls, regardless of whether the restrictions under Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 remain in effect following their anticipated expiration in October 2023.

SEC. 4. REPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for two years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassified report, with a classified annex if necessary, that includes the following:

(1) A diplomatic strategy to secure the renewal of international restrictions on certain missile-related activities, including transfers to and from Iran set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), prior to October 2023.

(2) An analysis of how the expiration of missile-related restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 would impact the Government of Iran's arms proliferation and malign activities, including as the restrictions relate to cooperation with, and support for, Iran-aligned entities and allied countries.

(3) An assessment of the revenue, or in-kind benefits, to be accrued by the Government of Iran, or Iran-aligned entities, as a result of a lapse in missile-related restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

(4) A detailed description of a United States strategy to deter, prevent, and disrupt the sale, purchase, or transfer of covered technology involving Iran absent restrictions pursuant to Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

(5) An identification of any foreign person engaging in, enabling, or otherwise facilitating any activity involving Iran restricted under Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, regardless of whether such restrictions remain in effect after October 2023.

(6) A description of actions by the United Nations and other multilateral organizations, including the European Union, to hold accountable foreign persons that have violated the restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, and efforts to prevent further violations of such restrictions.

(7) A description of actions by individual member states of the United Nations Security Council to hold accountable foreign persons that have violated restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 and efforts to prevent further violations of such restrictions.

(8) A description of actions by the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, or any other country to prevent, interfere with, or undermine efforts to hold accountable foreign persons that have violated the restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, including actions to restrict United Nations-led investigations into suspected violations of such restrictions, or limit funding to relevant United Nations offices or experts.

(9) An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains in Iran that directly or indirectly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid the Government of Iran's drone or missile program, including storage, transportation, or flight-testing of related goods, technology, or components.

(10) An identification of any foreign person, or network containing foreign persons, that enables, supports, or otherwise facilitates the operations or maintenance of any Iranian airline subject to United States sanctions or export control restrictions.

(11) An assessment of how the continued operation of Iranian airlines subject to United States sanctions or export control restrictions impacts the Government of Iran's ability to transport or develop arms, including covered technology.

(b) **SCOPE.**—The initial report required by subsection (a) shall address the period beginning on January 1, 2021, and ending on the date that is 90 days after date of the enactment of this Act, and each subsequent report shall address the one-year period following the conclusion of the prior report.

SEC. 5. SANCTIONS TO COMBAT THE PROLIFERATION OF IRANIAN MISSILES.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The sanctions described in subsection (b) shall apply to any foreign person the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(1) knowingly engages in any effort to acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or deploy covered technology to, from, or involving the Government of Iran or Iran-aligned entities, regardless of whether the restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) remain in effect after October 2023;

(2) knowingly provides entities owned or controlled by the Government of Iran or Iran-aligned entities with goods, technology, parts, or components, that may contribute to the development of covered technology;

(3) knowingly participates in joint missile or drone development, including development of covered technology, with the Government of Iran or Iran-aligned entities, including technical training, storage, and transport;

(4) knowingly imports, exports, or re-exports to, into, or from Iran, whether directly or indirectly, any significant arms or related materiel prohibited under paragraph (5) or (6) to Annex B of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) as of April 1, 2023;

(5) knowingly provides significant financial, material, or technological support to, or knowingly engages in a significant transaction with, a foreign person subject to sanctions for conduct described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4); or

(6) is an adult family member of a person subject to sanctions for conduct described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4).

(b) **SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(1) **BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.**—The President shall exercise all authorities granted under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) **INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.**—

(A) **VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.**—An alien described in subsection (a) shall be—

(i) inadmissible to the United States;

(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) **CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.**—

(i) **IN GENERAL.**—The visa or other entry documentation of any alien described in subsection (a) is subject to revocation regardless of the issue date of the visa or other entry documentation.

(ii) **IMMEDIATE EFFECT.**—A revocation under clause (i) shall, in accordance with

section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i))—

(I) take effect immediately; and

(II) cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien.

(c) **PENALTIES.**—Any person that violates, or attempts to violate, subsection (b) or any regulation, license, or order issued pursuant to that subsection, shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

(d) **WAIVER.**—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person only if, not later than 15 days prior to the date on which the waiver is to take effect, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a written determination and justification that the waiver is in the vital national security interests of the United States.

(e) **IMPLEMENTATION.**—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out any amendments made by this section.

(f) **REGULATIONS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall, not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, promulgate regulations as necessary for the implementation of this Act and the amendments made by this Act.

(2) **NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS.**—Not less than 10 days before the promulgation of regulations under subsection (a), the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the proposed regulations and the provisions of this Act and the amendments made by this Act that the regulations are implementing.

(g) **EXCEPTIONS.**—

(1) **EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.**—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(2) **EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.**—Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary—

(A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations; or

(B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States.

(h) **EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions authorized under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(2) **GOOD DEFINED.**—In this subsection, the term “good” means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.

(i) **TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.**—This section shall cease to be effective beginning on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(1) the Government of Iran no longer repeatedly provides support for international

terrorism as determined by the Secretary of State pursuant to—

(A) section 1754(c)(1)(A) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4318(c)(1)(A));

(B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);

(C) section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780); or

(D) any other provision of law; and

(2) Iran has ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and development of, and verifiably dismantled its, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

(2) **FOREIGN PERSON.**—The term “foreign person”—

(A) means an individual or entity that is not a United States person; and

(B) includes a foreign state (as such term is defined in section 1603 of title 28, United States Code).

(3) **GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.**—The term “Government of Iran” has the meaning given such term in section 560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, as such section was in effect on January 1, 2021.

(4) **UNITED STATES PERSON.**—The terms “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen;

(B) a permanent resident alien of the United States;

(C) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or

(D) a person in the United States.

(5) **IRAN-ALIGNED ENTITY.**—The term “Iran-aligned entity” means a foreign person that—

(A) is controlled or significantly influenced by the Government of Iran; and

(B) knowingly receives material or financial support from the Government of Iran, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, or any other proxy group that furthers Iran's national security objectives.

(6) **COVERED TECHNOLOGY.**—The term “covered technology” means—

(A) any goods, technology, software, or related material specified in the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex, as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(B) any additional goods, technology, software, or related material added to the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex after the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(7) **FAMILY MEMBER.**—The term “family member” means—

(A) a child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, sibling, or spouse; and

(B) any spouse, widow, or widower of an individual described in subparagraph (A).

(8) **KNOWINGLY.**—The term “knowingly” has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

(9) **MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.**—The term “Missile Technology Control Regime” means the policy statement, between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, announced on April 16, 1987, to restrict sensitive missile-relevant

transfers based on the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex, and any amendments thereto or expansions thereof, as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(10) MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME ANNEX.—The term “Missile Technology Control Regime Annex” means the Guidelines and Equipment and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and any amendments thereto or updates thereof, as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MCCAUL) and the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. DEAN) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, Iran poses an existential threat to the global balance of power, threatening our national security, as well as those of our allies, and regional stability.

General Kurilla, the commander of the U.S. Central Command, who I met with at the Munich Security Conference, testified to Congress this year that Iran possessed both the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East and the largest and most capable unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone, force in the region, which is why the passage of the Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports Act is so vital.

For years, we have seen Iran and its terrorist proxies use these weapons against the United States as well as our partners and allies throughout the Middle East.

In January 2020, Iran launched a missile attack on U.S. troops in Iraq. Iranian UAVs are frequently used to attack U.S. servicemembers and personnel in the Middle East. These UAVs are a deadly threat that have killed and wounded Americans.

Iranian UAVs have also been used in destructive strikes on Saudi- and Israeli-linked targets. Iran frequently provides these deadly weapons to its proxies, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militia groups.

Now, Iran's lethal drones are wreaking havoc outside the Middle East. Hundreds of these drones have been deployed by Vladimir Putin against civilian and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, becoming a key element in his unprovoked war of aggression and war crimes.

For years, Iran's missile and drone proliferation to its terror proxies and to Russia has taken place in outright

violation of the United Nations international embargo on Iran's missile and drone programs.

We note that the Ayatollah, Vladimir Putin, and Iran's terrorist proxies don't care about violating U.N. resolutions, but other countries do. Next month, these international restrictions on Iran's lethal missile and drone programs will expire after 15 years. I am deeply concerned that the marketplace for Iran's missiles and drones will expand. Dangerous autocrats, war criminals, and terrorists around the world will turn to Iran for missiles and drones, just as we saw them doing following the expiration of the U.N. arms embargo on Iran in 2020.

That is why it is urgent that the House pass my bipartisan bill, the Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports, or Fight CRIME, Act. The bill, which I was proud to introduce with Ranking Member MEEKS, imposes strict mandatory sanctions on Iran's missile and drone capability to fill the gap left by the expiration of the U.N. restrictions.

Everyone must know that if they purchase Iran's weapons of war, they will be frozen out of the U.S. financial system, denied use of the U.S. dollar, and denied access to the United States. For years, Iran and its proxies have rained hell on the Middle East from the sky with their attack UAVs. Now Iran's dangerous arsenal is enabling Russian war crimes and the devastation of Ukraine.

We cannot wait to act until the U.N. restrictions expire. We need to prevent these weapons sales now before these deadly missiles and drones are on the battlefield. In fact, Iran is working with Russia inside of Russia to make these very drones.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

SEPTEMBER 1, 2023.

Hon. MICHAEL MCCAUL,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN MCCAUL: I write regarding H.R. 3152, the Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports Act. Provisions of this bill fall within the Judiciary Committee's Rule X jurisdiction, and I appreciate that you consulted with us on those provisions. The Judiciary Committee agrees that it shall be discharged from further consideration of the bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

The Committee takes this action with the understanding that forgoing further consideration of this measure does not in any way alter the Committee's jurisdiction or waive any future jurisdictional claim over these provisions or their subject matter. We also reserve the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees in the event of a conference with the Senate involving this measure or similar legislation.

I ask that you please include this letter in your committee's report to accompany this legislation. I appreciate the cooperative manner in which our committees have worked on this matter, and I look forward to working collaboratively in the future on

matters of shared jurisdiction. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

JIM JORDAN,
Chairman.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2023.

Hon. JIM JORDAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN JORDAN: Thank you for consulting with the Foreign Affairs Committee and agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 3152, the “Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports Act,” so that the measure may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate conference on this legislation. I will seek to place our letters on this bill into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD during floor consideration. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work together as this measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL,
Chairman.

Ms. DEAN of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, for decades, the United States and our allies have harbored grave concerns regarding Iran's ballistic missile program. Leading among those concerns is the fear that they are being developed to one day deploy a nuclear warhead. However, we have also experienced Iran's short- and medium-range missiles that pose a direct and deadly threat to American forces in the region and the territories of numerous allies and partners.

Iran currently has more than 3,000 ballistic missiles in its stockpile. In recent years, despite international pressure, these missiles have achieved a much greater range and accuracy. Iran has also supplied precision-guided missiles and drones to proxies in Lebanon and Syria. Iran's growing missile capabilities could one day allow it to threaten Europe and the United States' mainland directly.

Without a doubt, it is in the interest of the United States to prevent Iran from further expanding its missile capabilities. Today, global sanctions are in place which aim to limit Iran's missile program. They are found in the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, and unfortunately, they are set to expire in October of 2023. Russia and China's presence on the Security Council has made it impossible to negotiate an extension of these multilateral sanctions.

Mr. Speaker, in October, when the U.N. regulations expire, Iran would be free in the eyes of the U.N. to develop nuclear weapon delivery systems, including ICBMs that could reach the United States homeland. Let's be clear. Iran has never abided by the missile restrictions outlined in the Security

Council resolution, but when the sanctions expire, it would open the door for Iran to advance its missile program by utilizing technologies more freely from around the world.

Upon expiration of the sanctions, Iranian leaders will immediately gain access to items it cannot easily acquire domestically, such as gyroscopes, sensors, and numerous other sophisticated components necessary for modern ballistic missiles. Upon securing these technologies from abroad, Iran could begin to reverse engineer them and begin domestic production as it has done in the past.

That is why, together with our allies, we must act. I applaud the European Union for telling Iran they plan to retain their own EU, European Union, ballistic missile sanctions set to expire in October. Today we want to send Iran the message that the United States intends to do the same.

That is why we are considering this bipartisan legislation introduced by Chairman MCCAUL that imposes mandatory property blocking and visa sanctions on anyone involved in the supply, sale, or transfer of or support for Iran's missiles and drones. The legislation also requires the executive branch to submit a report on the Iranian missiles and drones to Congress, specifically outlining their strategy to counter this menace.

Mr. Speaker, there is near-global consensus that Iran should not be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon or the missile that could help them carry one. I encourage all of my colleagues to support this important bipartisan legislation.

Therefore, I encourage my colleagues to join me in supporting this measure. I thank Mr. MCCAUL and Ranking Member MEEKS, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I thank Congresswoman DEAN for her strong support of this measure and her leadership.

Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers. I reserve the right to close, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. DEAN of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume for the purpose of closing.

The threat of Iranian missiles and drones is real. The clock is ticking, and Congress, the United States Government, and the world at large needs to act. This bill is an important measure to prevent Iran from being able to acquire more sophisticated technology as a result of the expiring sanctions.

I thank Chairman MCCAUL and Ranking Member MEEKS for introducing this legislation, and I strongly urge my colleagues to support this measure.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Despite what you may hear about partisan divides, our committee, I think, stands apart. This bill to impose

sanctions on those doing business with Iran's missile and drone program was introduced by myself and Ranking Member MEEKS of the Foreign Affairs Committee. It passed our committee unanimously. It has over 225 cosponsors, with a mix of Republicans and Democrats.

Congress and the American people are keenly aware of the destructive power of Iran's drones, and we are absolutely committed to reining in this threat. We are united in delivering a bipartisan message to countries around the world: Do not buy or acquire Iranian drones and missiles. Do not associate yourself with the IRGC, Vladimir Putin, or Iran's terrorist proxies.

Putin and the Ayatollah may try to ramp up their military cooperation, but we will do everything in our power to stop them, and in doing so, safeguard free democracies around the world.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan measure, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3152, the Fight CRIME Act.

This bill looks to impose sanctions with respect to countries, individuals, and entities that engage in any effort to acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or deploy Iranian missiles and related goods and technology.

For years, the Government of Iran has proven to be erratic and unpredictable.

With thousands of people being arbitrarily detained or unfairly prosecuted solely for peacefully exercising their human rights.

Women, people of the LGBTQ+ community, and people of ethnic and religious minority suffer intensified discrimination and violence in Iran.

We must impose visa- and property-blocking sanctions on foreign persons that are knowingly involved with Iran or Iran-aligned entities in certain missile-related activities.

This involves the acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring, or deploying missiles or related items and technology that are covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime, or developing missile or drone technologies.

We must also impose sanctions on certain adult family members of those who are subject to the sanctions previously mentioned.

Foreign persons who knowingly provide significant support to or engage in a significant transaction with those are also subject to the sanctions previously mentioned.

The bill also requires the Department of State to report to Congress on various topics, including a diplomatic strategy to renew international restrictions on certain missile-related activities.

The Government of Iran brought this upon themselves.

The many accounts of enforced disappearances, torture and other ill-treatment are just some of many atrocities committed by the Iranian Government.

Similarly, the usage of the death penalty increased, and public executions resumed.

The people of Iran are tired of the regime forcing its unjust will on them.

In 2022 alone, more than 500 people were killed by the violent crackdown on protesting in Iran.

Additionally, more than 14,000 people were arrested, including protesters, journalists, lawyers, activists, artists, and athletes who voiced support for the freedom movement.

There are countless more stories and recollections as to why the Government of Iran should face these sanctions.

I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 3152, the Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports Act, and the limiting of the Iranian Government.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MCCAUL) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3152, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

□ 1615

MAHSA AMINI HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 589) to impose sanctions on the Supreme Leader of Iran and the President of Iran and their respective offices for human rights abuses and support for terrorism, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 589

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Mahsa Amini Human rights and Security Accountability Act" or the "MAHSA Act".

SEC. 2. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON IRAN'S SUPREME LEADER'S OFFICE, ITS APPOINTEES, AND ANY AFFILIATED PERSONS.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The Supreme Leader is an institution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

(2) The Supreme Leader holds ultimate authority over Iran's judiciary and security apparatus, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, law enforcement forces under the Interior Ministry, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Basij, a nationwide volunteer paramilitary group subordinate to the IRGC, all of which have engaged in human rights abuses in Iran. Additionally the IRGC, a United States designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, which reports to the Supreme Leader, continues to perpetrate terrorism around the globe, including attempts to kill and kidnap American citizens on United States soil.

(3) The Supreme Leader appoints the head of Iran's judiciary. International observers continue to criticize the lack of independence of Iran's judicial system and maintained that trials disregarded international standards of fairness.

(4) The revolutionary courts, created by Iran's former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, within Iran's judiciary, are chiefly responsible