faith to raise legitimate public health concerns, and for other purposes.

S. 163

At the request of Mr. MARSHALL, the names of the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. BUDD) and the Senator from Alabama (Mrs. BRITT) were added as cosponsors of S. 163, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to remove short-barreled rifles, short-barreled shotguns, and certain other weapons from the definition of firearms for purposes of the National Firearms Act, and for other purposes.

S. 173

At the request of Mr. BLUMENTHAL, the names of the Senator from Colorado (Mr. BENNET) and the Senator from Colorado (Mr. HICKENLOOPER) were added as cosponsors of S. 173, a bill to amend chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, to require the safe storage of firearms, and for other purposes.

S. 184

At the request of Mr. PAUL, the names of the Senator from Tennessee (Mrs. BLACKBURN) and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. LANKFORD) were added as cosponsors of S. 184, a bill to amend chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, to provide that major rules of the executive branch shall have no force or effect unless a joint resolution of approval is enacted into law.

S.J. RES. 5

At the request of Mr. COTTON, the name of the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. GRAHAM) was added as a cosponsor of S.J. Res. 5, a joint resolution disapproving the action of the District of Columbia Council in approving the Local Resident Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2022.

S. CON. RES. 2

At the request of Mr. MENENDEZ, the names of the Senator from New Hampshire (Ms. HASSAN) and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. DURBIN) were added as cosponsors of S. Con. Res. 2, a concurrent resolution commending the bravery, courage, and resolve of the women and men of Iran demonstrating in more than 133 cities and risking their safety to speak out against the Iranian regime's human rights abuses.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. WHITEHOUSE, and Mrs. GILLIBRAND):

S. 203. A bill to amend section 923 of title 18, United States Code, to require an electronic, searchable database of the importation, production, shipment, receipt, sale, or other disposition of firearms; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, today I rise to introduce the Crime Gun Tracing Modernization Act.

This bill would bring ATF into the 21st century by allowing the Agency to electronically search for the records of guns used in crimes across the country. It is hard to believe that ATF still must store paper records and search them by hand in order to identify the guns used for criminal activity. These archaic rules prevent the people responsible for enforcing our laws from doing their jobs effectively.

The National Tracing Center at ATF is responsible for quickly placing crime gun ownership information into the hands of law enforcement officials so they can solve crimes and save lives. In 2021, National Tracing Center receive over 540,000 trace requests.

Unfortunately, the timely completion of these trace requests has been made nearly impossible because ATF cannot search these records electronically.

To make matters worse, these millions of records are stored in thousands of boxes that are overflowing the hallways of the National Tracing Center in Martinsburg, WV. The records that agents must search through are so massive, ATF has been told that if it places more boxes inside the facility, the floor may collapse.

Every moment after a crime is committed matters dearly to our law enforcement agencies. Prohibiting the efficient search of these records puts our communities at risk.

I thank my former colleague Senator Leahy for championing this bill last Congress. I am committed to continuing the fight for this important fix.

By Mr. THUNE (for himself, Mr. LANKFORD, Mr. COTTON, Mrs. HYDE-SMITH, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. SULLIVAN, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. BARRASSO, Mr. RISCH, Mr. MARSHALL, and Mr. MORAN):

S. 204. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit a health care practitioner from failing to exercise the proper degree of care in the case of a child who survives an abortion or attempted abortion; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. THUNE. Madam President, later today, I will introduce the Born-Alive Abortion Survivors Protection Act, along with my colleague Senator LANKFORD. It is a simple bill. It simply states that a baby born alive after an attempted abortion is entitled to the same protection and medical care that any other newborn baby is entitled to. And you would think that it would be a simple ''yes'' vote from every Member of this body, but unfortunately, that is not where we are.

Four years ago and then three years ago, the U.S. Senate took up this bill, and almost every single Democrat in this body voted against it. Just 3 weeks ago, the House of Representatives took up this bill, and almost every single Democrat over there voted against it. Apparently banning infanticide is now controversial because—let's be clear—that is what we are talking about here.

Some Democrats have tried to cloak their opposition to this bill in meaningless phrases about a private decision between a woman and her doctor, but what is the decision we are talking about? We are talking about whether or not a living baby, born after an attempted abortion, should be provided with medical care or be left to die or, I suppose, be killed outright by the abortionist. That is what we are talking about. That is the ''decision'' Democrats are referring to. And that is apparently the decision they think should be left up to patients and their doctors—whether or not to let a living, breathing baby die.

The Senate voted on a previous version of this bill introduced by my former colleague Senator Sasse 4 years ago when the Democratic Governor of Virginia came right out and said you could keep a newly born baby comfortable while you decided what to do with it—in other words, while you decided whether to let the child die or, I guess, kill it or whether to let it live. That chilling statement made it abundantly clear that we needed to state explicitly that any baby, wherever he or she is born, including in an abortion clinic, is entitled to medical care. It is staggering that we have gotten to the point where we need to debate this in Congress, staggering that this wouldn't be an automatic ''yes'' vote from every Member of this body, but that is where we are.

If anyone thinks that abortion isn't a slippery slope, that we can somehow devalue unborn babies' lives while maintaining respect for everyone else's, then I am here to tell them differently because the Democratic Party has gotten to the point where its members not only oppose legislation to protect unborn babies; they oppose legislation to protect born ones as well. In Democrats' world, there are now apparently two classes of born babies: the wanted ones born alive in delivery rooms and the unwanted ones born alive in abortion clinics. Apparently, only one of those classes of babies is entitled to the equal protection of the laws.

Democrats talk a lot about abortion when they are talking about this bill, but this bill, of course, would do absolutely nothing to restrict abortion. It is not a bill protecting unborn babies; it is a bill protecting born babies.

I do understand why Democrats are so worked up, though, because while this bill may not do anything to restrict abortion, there is always the chance that drawing attention to the humanity and dignity of the child who has just been born will draw attention to the humanity and dignity of the child who is about to be born—the child Democrats are determined our laws should not protect. And Democrats are apparently so determined to preserve the so-called right to kill unborn babies that they are fully comfortable opposing a law that would protect born—born—babies.

These are hard things to talk about, but they have to be said because that is the reality of where we are right now.

Roughly 50 percent of the U.S. Congress opposes giving the equal protection of the law to born human beings if they happen to be born alive following an attempted abortion.

Now, I think we are at a real inflection point as to where we want to be as a nation. Do we want to be a country where the circumstances of your birth determine whether or not your right to life is protected? Do we want to be a country that endorses leaving living, breathing babies to die, that discards born babies because they are, for a moment at their birth, unwanted? I don't know. I think we are better than that. We have to be better than that.

If we truly want to be a nation that protects human rights, that stands for justice, that defends the vulnerable, then we cannot be a nation that says it is acceptable to leave living, breathing, born human beings to die in abortion clinics, that says there are two classes of newborn babies and that only one of them deserves to be protected. Every human being deserves to be protected, no matter the circumstances of his or her birth.

I want to thank Senator LANKFORD for his leadership on this issue. We will be working together to advance this legislation, and I pray that sooner rather than later, we will get to the day when this bill will be an automatic ''yes'' vote from every Member of this body.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 204

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Born-Alive Abortion Survivors Protection Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) If an abortion results in the live birth of an infant, the infant is a legal person for all purposes under the laws of the United States, and entitled to all the protections of such laws.

(2) Any infant born alive after an abortion or within a hospital, clinic, or other facility has the same claim to the protection of the law that would arise for any newborn, or for any person who comes to a hospital, clinic, or other facility for screening and treatment or otherwise becomes a patient within its care.

SEC. 3. BORN-ALIVE INFANTS PROTECTION.

(a) REQUIREMENTS PERTAINING TO BORN-ALIVE ABORTION SURVIVORS.—Chapter 74 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1531 the following:

''§ 1532. Requirements pertaining to born-alive abortion survivors

''(a) REQUIREMENTS FOR HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONERS.—In the case of an abortion or attempted abortion that results in a child born alive:

''(1) DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED; IMMEDIATE ADMISSION TO A HOSPITAL.—Any health care practitioner present at the time the child is born alive shall—

''(A) exercise the same degree of professional skill, care, and diligence to preserve the life and health of the child as a reasonably diligent and conscientious health care practitioner would render to any other child born alive at the same gestational age; and

''(B) following the exercise of skill, care, and diligence required under subparagraph (A), ensure that the child born alive is immediately transported and admitted to a hospital.

''(2) MANDATORY REPORTING OF VIOLATIONS.—A health care practitioner or any employee of a hospital, a physician's office, or an abortion clinic who has knowledge of a failure to comply with the requirements of paragraph (1) shall immediately report the failure to an appropriate State or Federal law enforcement agency, or to both.

''(b) PENALTIES.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—Whoever violates subsection (a) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.

''(2) INTENTIONAL KILLING OF CHILD BORN ALIVE.—Whoever intentionally performs or attempts to perform an overt act that kills a child born alive described under subsection (a), shall be punished as under section 1111 of this title for intentionally killing or attempting to kill a human being.

''(c) BAR TO PROSECUTION.—The mother of a child born alive described under subsection (a) may not be prosecuted for a violation of this section, an attempt to violate this section, a conspiracy to violate this section, or an offense under section 3 or 4 of this title based on such a violation.

''(d) CIVIL REMEDIES.—

''(1) CIVIL ACTION BY A WOMAN ON WHOM AN ABORTION IS PERFORMED.—If a child is born alive and there is a violation of subsection (a), the woman upon whom the abortion was performed or attempted may, in a civil action against any person who committed the violation, obtain appropriate relief.

''(2) APPROPRIATE RELIEF.—Appropriate relief in a civil action under this subsection includes—

''(A) objectively verifiable money damage for all injuries, psychological and physical, occasioned by the violation of subsection (a);

''(B) statutory damages equal to 3 times the cost of the abortion or attempted abortion; and

''(C) punitive damages.

''(3) ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR PLAINTIFF.—The court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee to a prevailing plaintiff in a civil action under this subsection.

''(4) ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR DEFENDANT.—If a defendant in a civil action under this subsection prevails and the court finds that the plaintiff's suit was frivolous, the court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff.

''(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section the following definitions apply:

''(1) ABORTION.—The term 'abortion' means the use or prescription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other substance or device—

''(A) to intentionally kill the unborn child of a woman known to be pregnant; or

''(B) to intentionally terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant, with an intention other than—

''(i) after viability, to produce a live birth and preserve the life and health of the child born alive; or

''(ii) to remove a dead unborn child.

''(2) ATTEMPT.—The term 'attempt', with respect to an abortion, means conduct that, under the circumstances as the actor believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in performing an abortion.

''(3) BORN ALIVE.—The term 'born alive' has the meaning given that term in section 8 of title 1, United States Code (commonly known as the 'Born-Alive Infants Protection Act').''.

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

(1) The table of sections for chapter 74 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

''1532. Requirements pertaining to born-alive abortion survivors.''.

(2) The chapter heading for chapter 74 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ''**PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS**'' and inserting ''**ABORTIONS**''.

(3) The table of chapters for part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to chapter 74 and inserting the following:

''74. Abortion ..... 1531''.

SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Act shall take effect one day after the date of enactment.

By Mr. DURBIN:

S. 205. A bill to promote minimum State requirements for the prevention and treatment of concussions caused by participation in school sports, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 205

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Protecting Student Athletes from Concussions Act of 2023''.

SEC. 2. MINIMUM STATE REQUIREMENTS.

(a) MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS.—Each State that receives funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.) and does not meet the requirements described in this section, as of the date of enactment of this Act, shall, not later than the last day of the fifth full fiscal year after the date of enactment of this Act (referred to in this Act as the ''compliance deadline''), enact legislation or issue regulations establishing the following minimum requirements:

(1) LOCAL EDUCATIONAL AGENCY CONCUSSION SAFETY AND MANAGEMENT PLAN.—Each local educational agency in the State, in consultation with members of the community in which such agency is located, shall develop and implement a standard plan for concussion safety and management that—

(A) educates students, parents, and school personnel about concussions, through activities such as—

(i) training school personnel, including coaches, teachers, athletic trainers, related services personnel, and school nurses, on concussion safety and management, including training on the prevention, recognition, and academic consequences of concussions and response to concussions; and

(ii) using, maintaining, and disseminating to students and parents—

(I) release forms and other appropriate forms for reporting and record keeping;

(II) treatment plans; and

(III) prevention and post-injury observation and monitoring fact sheets about concussion;

(B) encourages supports, where feasible, for a student recovering from a concussion (regardless of whether or not the concussion occurred during school-sponsored activities,

during school hours, on school property, or during an athletic activity), such as—

(i) guiding the student in resuming participation in athletic activity and academic activities with the help of a multi-disciplinary concussion management team, which may include—

(I) a health care professional, the parents of such student, a school nurse, relevant related services personnel, and other relevant school personnel; and

(II) an individual who is assigned by a public school to oversee and manage the recovery of such student; and

(ii) providing appropriate academic accommodations aimed at progressively reintroducing cognitive demands on the student; and

(C) encourages the use of best practices designed to ensure, with respect to concussions, the uniformity of safety standards, treatment, and management, such as—

(i) disseminating information on concussion safety and management to the public; and

(ii) applying uniform best practice standards for concussion safety and management to all students enrolled in public schools.

(2) POSTING OF INFORMATION ON CONCUSSIONS.—Each public elementary school and each public secondary school shall post on school grounds, in a manner that is visible to students and school personnel, and make publicly available on the school website, information on concussions that—

(A) is based on peer-reviewed scientific evidence (such as information made available by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention);

(B) shall include information on—

(i) the risks posed by sustaining a concussion;

(ii) the actions a student should take in response to sustaining a concussion, including the notification of school personnel; and

(iii) the signs and symptoms of a concussion; and

(C) may include information on—

(i) the definition of a concussion;

(ii) the means available to the student to reduce the incidence or recurrence of a concussion; and

(iii) the effects of a concussion on academic learning and performance.

(3) RESPONSE TO CONCUSSION.—If an individual designated from among school personnel for purposes of this Act, one of whom must be in attendance at every school-sponsored activity, suspects that a student has sustained a concussion (regardless of whether or not the concussion occurred during school-sponsored activities, during school hours, on school property, or during an athletic activity)—

(A) the student shall be—

(i) immediately removed from participation in a school-sponsored athletic activity; and

(ii) prohibited from returning to participate in a school-sponsored athletic activity on the day that student is removed from such participation; and

(B) the designated individual shall report to the parent or guardian of such student—

(i) any information that the designated school employee is aware of regarding the date, time, and type of the injury suffered by such student (regardless of where, when, or how a concussion may have occurred); and

(ii) any actions taken to treat such student.

(4) RETURN TO ATHLETICS.—If a student has sustained a concussion (regardless of whether or not the concussion occurred during school-sponsored activities, during school hours, on school property, or during an athletic activity), before such student resumes participation in school-sponsored athletic activities, the school shall receive a written release from a health care professional, that—

(A) states that the student is capable of resuming participation in such activities; and

(B) may require the student to follow a plan designed to aid the student in recovering and resuming participation in such activities in a manner that—

(i) is coordinated, as appropriate, with periods of cognitive and physical rest while symptoms of a concussion persist; and

(ii) reintroduces cognitive and physical demands on such student on a progressive basis only as such increases in exertion do not cause the reemergence or worsening of symptoms of a concussion.

(b) NONCOMPLIANCE.—

(1) FIRST YEAR.—If a State described in subsection (a) fails to comply with subsection (a) by the compliance deadline, the Secretary of Education shall reduce by 5 percent the amount of funds the State receives under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.) for the first fiscal year following the compliance deadline.

(2) SUCCEEDING YEARS.—If the State fails to so comply by the last day of any fiscal year following the compliance deadline, the Secretary of Education shall reduce by 10 percent the amount of funds the State receives under that Act for the following fiscal year.

(3) NOTIFICATION OF NONCOMPLIANCE.—Prior to reducing any funds that a State receives under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.) in accordance with this subsection, the Secretary of Education shall provide a written notification of the intended reduction of funds to the State and to the appropriate committees of Congress.

SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect civil or criminal liability under Federal or State law.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) CONCUSSION.—The term ''concussion'' means a type of mild traumatic brain injury that—

(A) is caused by a blow, jolt, or motion to the head or body that causes the brain to move rapidly in the skull;

(B) disrupts normal brain functioning and alters the mental state of the individual, causing the individual to experience—

(i) any period of observed or self-reported—

(I) transient confusion, disorientation, or impaired consciousness;

(II) dysfunction of memory around the time of injury; or

(III) loss of consciousness lasting less than 30 minutes; or

(ii) any 1 of 4 types of symptoms, including—

(I) physical symptoms, such as headache, fatigue, or dizziness;

(II) cognitive symptoms, such as memory disturbance or slowed thinking;

(III) emotional symptoms, such as irritability or sadness; or

(IV) difficulty sleeping; and

(C) can occur—

(i) with or without the loss of consciousness; and

(ii) during participation in any organized sport or recreational activity.

(2) HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL.—The term ''health care professional''—

(A) means an individual who has been trained in diagnosis and management of concussion in a pediatric population; and

(B) is registered, licensed, certified, or otherwise statutorily recognized by the State to provide such diagnosis and management.

(3) LOCAL EDUCATIONAL AGENCY; STATE.—The terms ''local educational agency'' and ''State'' have the meanings given such terms in section 8101 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801).

(4) RELATED SERVICES PERSONNEL.—The term ''related services personnel'' means individuals who provide related services, as defined under section 602 of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. 1401).

(5) SCHOOL-SPONSORED ATHLETIC ACTIVITY.—The term ''school-sponsored athletic activity'' means—

(A) any physical education class or program of a school;

(B) any athletic activity authorized during the school day on school grounds that is not an instructional activity;

(C) any extra-curricular sports team, club, or league organized by a school on or off school grounds; and

(D) any recess activity.

By Mr. MURPHY (for himself, Mr. YOUNG, Mr. KAINE, and Mr. CRAMER):

S. 220. A bill to prohibit certain noncompete agreements, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

Mr. MURPHY. Madam President, if you were working for the sandwich shop Jimmy John's—I don't know if the Presiding Officer has ever had a Jimmy John's sandwich. It is a pretty good sandwich. If you were working for Jimmy John's sandwich shop in the middle of the last decade, around 2014, 2015, 2016, you might have been required to sign a contract with Jimmy John's to make sandwiches. Buried in that contract, as a fast food worker at Jimmy John's in 2014, 2015, 2016, was something called a noncompete clause.

A lot of Americans have heard of noncompete clauses. They think of them as applying to executives, individuals who make a lot of money, who possess really intricate, detailed information about a product. But Jimmy John's made everybody who came to work in many of their sandwich shops sign a noncompete agreement. The noncompete agreement for Jimmy John's sandwich makers said that if you ever left Jimmy John's, you would not be able to work at any business within 2 to 3 miles of any Jimmy John's for any company that made over 10 percent of its revenue from selling ''submarine, hero-type, deli-style, pita, and/or wrapped or rolled sandwiches'' for 2 years. Low-income, minimum-wage workers at Jimmy John's, if they tried to leave that job, were prohibited from going to work for Subway or going to work for D'Angelo's or maybe even, according to this definition, McDonald's or Burger King.

Of course, that sounds patently ridiculous. Why would you need to protect the intellectual secrets of sandwich making at Jimmy John's by applying noncompete agreements for these low-income workers? But this wasn't and isn't an anomaly. In fact, one out of six hospitality restaurant workers, by some studies, has a noncompete agreement. Today, noncompete agreements apply to one in five American workers. That is 30 million workers.

Amazon warehouse workers were required for a long time to sign noncompete agreements. I read a story the other day of a company called Camp Bow Wow that pays people to pet-sit. They required their pet sitters to sign noncompete agreements.

The reason that noncompete agreements are being used at industrial-level scale today is not to protect the trade secrets of sandwich making or pet sitting; it is to keep wages down. It is to prevent low-income workers from being able to go out and get a better job and thus pressure their existing employer to increase wages. This practice has become pervasive throughout our economy, and it is just a fundamental restraint on free trade.

Now, many of these noncompete agreements end up being nonenforceable. A lot of State laws don't allow you to have a noncompete agreement for a low-wage worker. But in practice, it doesn't really matter because when that individual tries to leave and they get told they can't because of a noncompete agreement, they don't know that it is nonenforceable in State law or if they do know, they don't have the resources to contest the cause in a court of law. So what do they do? They just end up staying.

The FTC filed a complaint in January of this year against two Michigan-based companies that required their security guards to sign noncompete agreements prohibiting them from working for a competing business within a 100-mile radius. Despite the fact that these security guards were making very low wages, the company's noncompete included a restriction that required the employee to pay a $100,000 penalty for any alleged violation of the clause. The intention here is simply to bind the employee to the company, to give them no ability to bargain for a higher wage because they might be able to get a better wage somewhere else. There is no proprietary information that those security guards possess.

What is equally interesting is that there is increasingly great data to show that there is actually no reason to have noncompete agreements even for higher income workers. The imposition of noncompete agreements on low-wage workers is primarily about just trying to restrain wages, but the imposition of noncompete agreements on higher income workers is about impeding innovation. It is about a company that doesn't want competitors, so they bind their executives to noncompete agreements such that their executives can't go work for a competing company or can't go out and start a company that may compete.

What is so maddening is that there are plenty of protections in our existing law that protect companies from intellectual property theft or patent theft. If what you worry about is your trade secrets being appropriated by a competitor, well, the law already protects you from that. You don't have to deny your employees or your executives the ability to go work for another company.

California rightly has the reputation as probably the world's center of innovation, right? More startups, more world-changing companies have come out of California than any other State and probably than any other part of the world. California was the first or one of the first in this country to ban noncompete agreements. California decided it didn't need noncompete agreements to protect intellectual property in a State that probably has a greater interest in protecting intellectual property than any other State. In fact, California's economic engine is dependent on their prohibition of noncompete agreements because by prohibiting noncompete agreements, California has a culture in which startups are encouraged, in which executives can leave one company and start another.

Eric Yuan was an executive at Cisco Webex. If he wasn't working in California, he might have had a noncompete agreement applied to him, but he didn't, and so he could leave and start a company that was arguably competing with Cisco Webex—a company called Zoom.

To many economists on the right and the left, this is becoming a no-brainer. Noncompete agreements are bad for wage growth. Noncompete agreements are bad for innovation. Noncompete agreements are bad for low-income workers. Noncompete agreements are bad for high-income workers.

So today I am on the floor to talk about what the data tells us about noncompete agreements as a means to encourage my colleagues to take a look at a piece of legislation that we are introducing today, the Workforce Mobility Act, a pretty simple piece of legislation that would ban the use of noncompete agreements for both high-income and low-income workers.

It is a bipartisan piece of legislation. Senator TODD YOUNG, Senator KEVIN CRAMER, Senator TIM KAINE, and I are introducing this bill today. I don't know that there is another policy that the four of us can find common ground on, but we find common ground on this issue because maybe if you are a progressive, you come to this issue through the rights of workers and boosting their wages. If you are a conservative, you come to this issue through the restraint on free trade that exists through the perpetuation of noncompete agreements. But all across America, this is a pretty bipartisan issue, and here in the Senate, it is bipartisan as well.

I am glad that the FTC, just a week or so ago, announced that they were going to undertake a rule to ban noncompete agreements. I congratulate the Biden administration and the FTC for taking a leadership role. It may be that that rule, once it is adopted and in place, will do the work of this legislation, but we know that rules are only as good as the commitment of one particular administration.

So my hope and my recommendation is that no matter what the FTC does when it comes to restrictions on noncompete agreements, that we pass the Workforce Mobility Act so that we provide a guarantee in the law that noncompete agreements are not going to stand in the way of wages rising or small businesses starting.

There is a lot of public support out there as 92 percent of voters think that it is way too hard today to start or grow a new business and as 80 percent of voters—again, across party lines—support policies that allow people who want to start a new business more freedom by reducing the restrictions that come when you try to venture out on your own. Increasingly, one of the primary restrictions that exists for people who want to start a new business, who want to become entrepreneurs, are these noncompete agreements.

So I am coming to the floor today to recommend this bipartisan piece of legislation to my colleagues, to point to the States that have already adopted these restrictions, and to show how not only does the sky not fall when you get rid of noncompete agreements but that startups flourish and that wages increase.

Finally, I come to recommend to my colleagues that, in an environment where it is going to be a little harder to find agreement between Republicans and Democrats, this is a place where we can find that common ground. In one piece of policy, we can stick up for low-income workers and the free market. This is something that we can do together to help raise wages and to help power our economy.

SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

SENATE RESOLUTION 21—SUPPORTING THE OBSERVATION OF NATIONAL TRAFFICKING AND MODERN SLAVERY PREVENTION MONTH DURING THE PERIOD BEGINNING ON JANUARY 1, 2023, AND ENDING ON FEBRUARY 1, 2023, TO RAISE AWARENESS OF, AND OPPOSITION TO, HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND MODERN SLAVERY

Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. GRASSLEY, Ms. CORTEZ MASTO, Ms. MURKOWSKI, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Mrs. CAPITO, Mr. BROWN, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. DURBIN, Ms. KLOBUCHAR, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. WYDEN, and Mr. PADILLA) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to:

S. RES. 21

Whereas the United States abolished the transatlantic slave trade in 1808 and abolished chattel slavery and prohibited involuntary servitude in 1865;

Whereas, because the people of the United States remain committed to protecting individual freedom, there is a national imperative to eliminate human trafficking and modern slavery, which is commonly considered to mean—