

□ 0915

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER
PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. TIFANY). Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the Chair will postpone further proceedings today on motions to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the yeas and nays are ordered, or votes objected to under clause 6 of rule XX.

The House will resume proceedings on postponed questions at a later time.

PROTECTING AMERICANS FROM
FOREIGN ADVERSARY CON-
TROLLED APPLICATIONS ACT

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7521) to protect the national security of the United States from the threat posed by foreign adversary controlled applications, such as TikTok and any successor application or service and any other application or service developed or provided by ByteDance Ltd. or an entity under the control of ByteDance Ltd., as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7521

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act”.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF FOREIGN ADVERSARY
CONTROLLED APPLICATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—

(1) PROHIBITION OF FOREIGN ADVERSARY CONTROLLED APPLICATIONS.—It shall be unlawful for an entity to distribute, maintain, or update (or enable the distribution, maintenance, or updating of) a foreign adversary controlled application by carrying out, within the land or maritime borders of the United States, any of the following:

(A) Providing services to distribute, maintain, or update such foreign adversary controlled application (including any source code of such application) by means of a marketplace (including an online mobile application store) through which users within the land or maritime borders of the United States may access, maintain, or update such application.

(B) Providing internet hosting services to enable the distribution, maintenance, or updating of such foreign adversary controlled application for users within the land or maritime borders of the United States.

(2) APPLICABILITY.—Subsection (a) shall apply—

(A) in the case of an application that satisfies the definition of a foreign adversary controlled application pursuant to subsection (g)(3)(A), beginning on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(B) in the case of an application that satisfies the definition of a foreign adversary controlled application pursuant to subsection (g)(3)(B), beginning on the date that is 180 days after the date of the relevant determination of the President under such subsection.

(b) DATA AND INFORMATION PORTABILITY TO ALTERNATIVE APPLICATIONS.—Before the date on which a prohibition under subsection (a)

applies to a foreign adversary controlled application, the entity that owns or controls such application shall provide, upon request by a user of such application within the land or maritime borders of United States, to such user all the available data related to the account of such user with respect to such application. Such data shall be provided in a machine readable format and shall include any data maintained by such application with respect to the account of such user, including content (including posts, photos, and videos) and all other account information.

(c) EXEMPTIONS.—

(1) EXEMPTIONS FOR QUALIFIED DIVESTITURES.—Subsection (a)—

(A) does not apply to a foreign adversary controlled application with respect to which a qualified divestiture is executed before the date on which a prohibition under subsection (a) would begin to apply to such application; and

(B) shall cease to apply in the case of a foreign adversary controlled application with respect to which a qualified divestiture is executed after the date on which a prohibition under subsection (a) applies to such application.

(2) EXEMPTIONS FOR CERTAIN NECESSARY SERVICES.—Subsections (a) and (b) do not apply to services provided with respect to a foreign adversary controlled application that are necessary for an entity to attain compliance with such subsections.

(d) ENFORCEMENT.—

(1) CIVIL PENALTIES.—

(A) FOREIGN ADVERSARY CONTROLLED APPLICATION VIOLATIONS.—An entity that violates subsection (a) shall be subject to pay a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed the amount that results from multiplying \$5,000 by the number of users within the land or maritime borders of the United States determined to have accessed, maintained, or updated a foreign adversary controlled application as a result of such violation.

(B) DATA AND INFORMATION VIOLATIONS.—An entity that violates subsection (b) shall be subject to pay a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed the amount that results from multiplying \$500 by the number of users within the land or maritime borders of the United States affected by such violation.

(2) ACTIONS BY ATTORNEY GENERAL.—The Attorney General—

(A) shall conduct investigations related to potential violations of subsection (a) or (b), and, if such an investigation results in a determination that a violation has occurred, the Attorney General shall pursue enforcement under paragraph (1); and

(B) may bring an action in an appropriate district court of the United States for appropriate relief, including civil penalties under paragraph (1) or declaratory and injunctive relief.

(e) SEVERABILITY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—If any provision of this section or the application of this section to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect the other provisions or applications of this section that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

(2) SUBSEQUENT DETERMINATIONS.—If the application of any provision of this section is held invalid with respect to a foreign adversary controlled application that satisfies the definition of such term pursuant to subsection (g)(3)(A), such invalidity shall not affect or preclude the application of the same provision of this section to such foreign adversary controlled application by means of a subsequent determination pursuant to subsection (g)(3)(B).

(f) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act may be construed—

(1) to authorize the Attorney General to pursue enforcement, under this section, other than enforcement of subsection (a) or (b);

(2) to authorize the Attorney General to pursue enforcement, under this section, against an individual user of a foreign adversary controlled application; or

(3) except as expressly provided herein, to alter or affect any other authority provided by or established under another provision of Federal law.

(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN ADVERSARY.—The term “controlled by a foreign adversary” means, with respect to a covered company or other entity, that such company or other entity is—

(A) a foreign person that is domiciled in, headquartered in, has its principal place of business in, or is organized under the laws of a foreign adversary country;

(B) an entity with respect to which a foreign person or combination of foreign persons described in subparagraph (A) directly or indirectly own at least a 20 percent stake; or

(C) a person subject to the direction or control of a foreign person or entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

(2) COVERED COMPANY.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The term “covered company” means an entity that operates, directly or indirectly (including through a parent company, subsidiary, or affiliate), a website, desktop application, mobile application, or augmented or immersive technology application that—

(i) permits a user to create an account or profile to generate, share, and view text, images, videos, real-time communications, or similar content;

(ii) has more than 1,000,000 monthly active users with respect to at least 2 of the 3 months preceding the date on which a relevant determination of the President is made pursuant to paragraph (3)(B);

(iii) enables 1 or more users to generate or distribute content that can be viewed by other users of the website, desktop application, mobile application, or augmented or immersive technology application; and

(iv) enables 1 or more users to view content generated by other users of the website, desktop application, mobile application, or augmented or immersive technology application.

(B) EXCLUSION.—The term “covered company” does not include an entity that operates a website, desktop application, mobile application, or augmented or immersive technology application whose primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews, business reviews, or travel information and reviews.

(3) FOREIGN ADVERSARY CONTROLLED APPLICATION.—The term “foreign adversary controlled application” means a website, desktop application, mobile application, or augmented or immersive technology application that is operated, directly or indirectly (including through a parent company, subsidiary, or affiliate), by—

(A) any of—

(i) ByteDance, Ltd.;

(ii) TikTok;

(iii) a subsidiary of or a successor to an entity identified in clause (i) or (ii) that is controlled by a foreign adversary; or

(iv) an entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an entity identified in clause (i), (ii), or (iii); or

(B) a covered company that—

(i) is controlled by a foreign adversary; and

(ii) that is determined by the President to present a significant threat to the national security of the United States following the issuance of—

(I) a public notice proposing such determination; and

(II) a public report to Congress, submitted not less than 30 days before such determination, describing the specific national security concern involved and containing a classified annex and a description of what assets would need to be divested to execute a qualified divestiture.

(4) **FOREIGN ADVERSARY COUNTRY.**—The term “foreign adversary country” means a country specified in section 4872(d)(2) of title 10, United States Code.

(5) **INTERNET HOSTING SERVICE.**—The term “internet hosting service” means a service through which storage and computing resources are provided to an individual or organization for the accommodation and maintenance of 1 or more websites or online services, and which may include file hosting, domain name server hosting, cloud hosting, and virtual private server hosting.

(6) **QUALIFIED DIVESTITURE.**—The term “qualified divestiture” means a divestiture or similar transaction that—

(A) the President determines, through an interagency process, would result in the relevant foreign adversary controlled application no longer being controlled by a foreign adversary; and

(B) the President determines, through an interagency process, precludes the establishment or maintenance of any operational relationship between the United States operations of the relevant foreign adversary controlled application and any formerly affiliated entities that are controlled by a foreign adversary, including any cooperation with respect to the operation of a content recommendation algorithm or an agreement with respect to data sharing.

(7) **SOURCE CODE.**—The term “source code” means the combination of text and other characters comprising the content, both viewable and nonviewable, of a software application, including any publishing language, programming language, protocol, or functional content, as well as any successor languages or protocols.

(8) **UNITED STATES.**—The term “United States” includes the territories of the United States.

SEC. 3. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

(a) **RIGHT OF ACTION.**—A petition for review challenging this Act or any action, finding, or determination under this Act may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

(b) **EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.**—The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any challenge to this Act or any action, finding, or determination under this Act.

(c) **STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.**—A challenge may only be brought—

(1) in the case of a challenge to this Act, not later than 165 days after the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(2) in the case of a challenge to any action, finding, or determination under this Act, not later than 90 days after the date of such action, finding, or determination.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from Washington (Mrs. RODGERS) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PALLONE) each will control 20 minutes.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in actual opposition to the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from New Jersey opposed to the motion?

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, no.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New Jersey is not opposed to the motion.

The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. MASSIE) will control 20 minutes in opposition.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Washington (Mrs. RODGERS).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material in the RECORD on the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Washington?

There was no objection.

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 7521, the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act.

Foreign adversaries, like the Chinese Communist Party, pose the greatest national security threat of our time. TikTok's access to 177 million American users makes it a valuable propaganda tool for the CCP to exploit.

Over the past week, we saw in real time how CCP-controlled TikTok used its influence and power to force users to contact their Representatives if they even wanted to continue using the app. This is just a small taste of how the CCP weaponizes applications it controls to manipulate tens of millions of people to further its agenda.

Today's legislation will end this abuse by preventing apps controlled by foreign adversaries from targeting, surveilling, and manipulating the American people. We have given TikTok a clear choice: Separate from your parent company, ByteDance, which is beholden to the CCP, and remain operational in the United States, or side with the CCP and face the consequences. The choice is TikTok's.

Companies controlled by a foreign adversary, like the CCP, will never embrace American values like the freedom of speech, human rights, the rule of law, and a free press. If given the choice, they will always choose the path of more control, more surveillance, and more manipulation. In the case of TikTok, we wouldn't even know it.

Today, we send a clear message that we will not tolerate our adversaries weaponizing our freedoms against us.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I know the sponsors of this bill are sincere in their concerns and in their effort to protect Americans. They have described the TikTok application as a Trojan horse, but there are some of us who feel that, either intentionally or unintentionally, this legislation to ban TikTok is actually a Trojan horse. Some of us are concerned that there are First Amendment implications here.

Americans have the right to view information. We don't need to be protected by the government from information. Some of us just don't want the President picking which apps we can put on our phones or which websites we can visit. We don't think that is appropriate.

We also think it is dangerous to give the President that kind of power, to give him the power to decide what Americans can see on their phones and on their computers. To give him that sort of discretion, we also think, is dangerous.

People say that this TikTok ban will only apply to TikTok or maybe another company that pops up just like TikTok, but the bill is written so broadly that the President could abuse that discretion and include other companies that aren't just social media companies and that aren't, as some people would believe, controlled by foreign adversaries. Again, we are giving the President that discretion to decide whether it is controlled by a foreign adversary.

There were some people who were legitimately concerned that this was an overly broad bill, and they got an exclusion written into the bill that I want to read. It says: “The term ‘covered company’ does not include an entity that operates a website . . . or . . . application whose primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews, business reviews, or travel information and reviews.”

Why is this exception in the bill? Why did somebody feel like they needed this exception if the bill itself only covers social media applications that foreign adversaries are running? These and other questions we hope to answer in the course of this debate, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PALLONE) and ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to control that time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Washington?

There was no objection.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 7521, the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act.

Big Tech has transformed social media platforms into modern-day media companies. Unfortunately, these networks engage in invasive surveillance practices by collecting Americans' most sensitive personal data.

Foreign adversaries also see access to Americans' data communication networks, devices, and applications as the entry points to disrupt our daily lives and conduct espionage activities. All of this endangers our national security interests.

We have a long history of restricting our television and radio airwaves from ownership by foreign governments and

individuals due to the national security concerns that these arrangements pose. Social media companies should also face similar scrutiny. After all, while technology has evolved, the threats are very much the same.

I also take the concerns raised by the intelligence community very seriously. They have asked Congress to give them more authority to act in narrowly defined situations. I believe this bill would do just that by addressing the national security risks posed by applications operated by companies controlled by foreign adversaries.

While this bill establishes a national security framework that could apply to other applications, much of the public attention has focused on TikTok. The combination of TikTok's Beijing Communist-based ownership and the fact that over 170 million Americans use it exacerbates its dangers to our country and our privacy.

Laws in China allow the Chinese Communist Party to compel companies like TikTok to share data with them whether the companies want to or not. This means the CCP has the ability with TikTok to compromise device security, maliciously access Americans' data, promote pro-Communist propaganda, and undermine our Nation's interests.

This is extremely troubling. Beijing, China, should not have the control over Americans that TikTok gives them. It is my hope that, if enacted, this legislation will force divestment of TikTok so that Americans will be able to continue to use this platform without the risk that it is being operated and controlled by Beijing, China.

However, even if TikTok is divested, China and other foreign adversaries will still be able to acquire vast amounts of Americans' data. That is because we place no restrictions on who data brokers can sell data to, and that must stop as well. I look forward to the House considering next week legislation that I introduced with Chair RODGERS that would stop this from happening.

We must begin to hold Big Tech accountable for transforming the information superhighway into a super-spreader of harmful content, invasive surveillance practices, and addictive and damaging design features, all with the goal of collecting more data. We must enact a comprehensive data privacy bill so that we finally give Americans control over how their data is used and collected.

I thank Representatives KRISHNAMOORTHY and GALLAGHER for their bipartisan work on this bill, which unanimously passed out of the Energy and Commerce Committee last week, and I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 7521.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gen-

tleman from Wisconsin (Mr. GALLAGHER).

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, TikTok is a threat to our national security because it is owned by ByteDance, which does the bidding of the Chinese Communist Party. We know this because ByteDance leadership says so and because Chinese law requires it.

This bill, therefore, would force TikTok to break up with the Chinese Communist Party. It does not apply to American companies. It only applies to companies subject to the control of foreign adversaries defined by Congress. It says nothing about election interference and cannot be turned against any American social media platform.

It does not impact websites in general. The only impacted sites are those associated with foreign adversary apps, such as TikTok.com.

It can never be used to penalize individuals. The text explicitly prohibits that.

It cannot be used to censor speech. It takes no position at all on the content of speech, only foreign adversary control, foreign adversary control of what is becoming the dominant news platform for Americans under 30.

Mr. Speaker, this is a commonsense measure to protect our national security, and I urge my colleagues to support this critical bipartisan legislation.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY), who is the Democratic sponsor of the bill.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY. Mr. Speaker, I thank Ranking Member PALLONE; Mr. GALLAGHER, my partner on this bill; Chairwoman McMORRIS RODGERS; and all the members of the select committee.

First, this bill is not a ban, and it is not about TikTok. It is about ByteDance. Let me tell you about ByteDance. ByteDance is a 100-percent owner of TikTok. ByteDance is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.

In fact, the editor in chief of ByteDance is the secretary of the Chinese Communist Party cell embedded at the very highest ranks of the company. He has been charged with making sure that TikTok and all products of ByteDance adhere to "correct political direction."

This particular bill ensures that ByteDance divests itself of the vast majority of the ownership of TikTok. Our intention is for TikTok to continue to operate but not under the control of the Chinese Communist Party.

Secondly, this divestment requirement is not new. It is not without precedent. When the app Grindr, a popular LGBTQ app, was acquired by a Chinese company and the United States Government determined that sensitive data of LGBTQ members of the military and U.S. Government officials got into the hands of the Chinese

Communist Party, they required divestment.

This happened quickly. Why? Because Grindr was a very valuable social media company. The same is true with regard to TikTok. There will be no disruption to users, just as there was with Grindr.

The third point, unfortunately, when TikTok has appeared before Congress, whether it is before the House Energy and Commerce Committee or otherwise, it has not been candid.

First, TikTok has said its data is not accessible to China-based ByteDance employees. False. China-based employees routinely access this data, even unbeknownst to employees of TikTok USA.

In addition, TikTok said its data will not be weaponized and has not been weaponized against American citizens. Again, false. Published reports have shown that TikTok data, geolocation data, has been used to surveil American journalists who reported on problems with Chinese-based employees having access to American user data.

Finally, last week, under the leadership of the chairwoman and the ranking member, they brought up for consideration our bill before the House Energy and Commerce Committee. On the morning of that vote, TikTok delivered a push notification and a popup to thousands of user across the country. They used geolocation data targeting minor children to then force them to call congressional offices in order to continue using the app. In doing so, these children called and asked the question: What is Congress, and what is a Congressman? This influence campaign illustrates the need for this bill.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. DAVIDSON), a data privacy champion.

Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time.

Mr. Speaker, I think it is important we solve the right problem. The gentleman from New Jersey, who isn't actually opposed to the bill, seems to have identified the real issue, which is data privacy. I think it is important that we solve the correct problem.

Our problem with all these companies, social media and otherwise—your car, your phone, you name it—is surveillance. The spying that goes on of American citizens does need to be addressed, and it should be addressed by the Energy and Commerce Committee.

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I have long pleaded with Members of both sides of the aisle to pass H.R. 4639 to reclaim the privacy rights that are so deeply infringed in our country, and by avoiding that problem, we take away the energy and momentum to address the root issue.

Frankly, the people sponsoring this bill today claim that the real issue is ownership.

Nonetheless, who owns this company?

It is not 100 percent owned by ByteDance. Mr. Speaker, 60 percent of it is owned by investors, including American investors; 20 percent is owned by the founders; and 20 percent is owned by employees, over 7,000 employees. The company's headquarters is not in China, it is in Singapore. The American user data isn't housed in China, it is housed in Texas controlled by a database owned by Oracle.

The administration seems to believe that they can ban the export of Americans' sensitive data not just on TikTok but on all platforms because they just issued an executive order banning the export.

Now, I wish this were the bill that PRAMILA JAYAPAL and I have sponsored that we were moving, the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act. It passed Judiciary, but its complement to prevent foreigners from buying it would also address the privacy concerns.

So if we think we can address the privacy concerns, then what is left to address?

Frankly, it is content moderation.

Mr. Speaker, do you remember before Elon Musk bought the crime scene at Twitter? It was all a conspiracy theory that these algorithms were silencing and canceling people. You guys are crazy.

No. When Elon Musk bought Twitter he did keep it operating with 80 percent fewer employees, but what we found is a lot of the employees were trying to do content moderation, shape who sees what and how they see it, which algorithms are used, and how does it promote certain people and filter others.

So, really, Mr. Speaker, what you are saying here is that if you are not fully engaged with America's three-letter agencies in content moderation, we plan to TikTok you.

Moreover, this bill isn't just limited to TikTok. It is a coercive power that can be applied to others, apps like Telegram and TUR. Things that provide privacy would be targeted by this bill—perhaps Tether, one of the things that they can't control as a monetary system.

When you look at companies, Mr. Speaker, if it enables one user to see content that isn't approved, it is subject to a \$500 million fine per user.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Speaker, this is meant to be able to take out anything, including email where its one user sees it. So it could target an infinite number of companies, but not an infinite number of places.

So, for that, I do applaud the work that was done to back off from the dystopian RESTRICT Act, but this is essentially a downpayment on the RESTRICT Act. I encourage everyone to look up the RESTRICT Act.

This is what the administration really wanted to do. What Members of Con-

gress on both sides of the aisle wanted to do is to create a bigger surveillance state, and that is what the Intel Committee wants to do with FISA, is to make it bigger. We have to shrink it and protect our Fourth Amendment right to privacy.

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, it is not true that this is a downpayment on the RESTRICT Act—not interested in the RESTRICT Act.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA).

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, the CEO of TikTok appeared before the Energy and Commerce Committee and admitted to me during questioning that ByteDance has access to U.S. user data.

This should be an alarm to every TikTok user. There is no reason why the Chinese Communist Party should be in control of an app that can access information on a user's phone. Moreover, because companies who are owned or linked to the Chinese Communist Party are forced to comply with their laws, ByteDance and its employees are taking orders from this Communist regime.

This is not a ban, but it provides Communist China-controlled ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, a choice. If ByteDance divests their ownership of TikTok, then TikTok would be available to its U.S. users.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. PELOSI), the Speaker Emerita.

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and for his leadership on this very important issue. I thank the distinguished chairwoman of the Energy and Commerce Committee and associate myself with her remarks as well as with Mr. PALLONE. I thank Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY and Chairman GALLAGHER of the Select Committee on China for their great leadership bringing this legislation forward to the committee of legislative jurisdiction.

Mr. Speaker, I have a few points to make, and it is interesting to hear this respectful debate.

First of all, this is not a ban on TikTok. I am a grandmother of teenagers. I understand the entertainment value, the educational value, the communication value, and the business value for some businesses on this. This is not an attempt to ban TikTok. It is an attempt to make TikTok better, tic-tac-toe, a winner.

Here is what I have to say: The people of China have come forth. The Tibetans have come forth and said on TikTok that in China they are suppressed. They cannot put their message out. Not only that, but the Chinese Government misrepresents the situation in Tibet.

Let me just tell you about Hong Kong, Mr. Speaker. During the Hong

Kong election, TikTok TikToked into Taiwan that the Uyghurs on whom there is a genocide exercised by the Chinese Government, they have told the people in Taiwan that the Uyghurs like that genocide, and they told them that the people of Hong Kong liked the destruction of their democracy. They don't frame it that way, but that is their message. Again, they are suppressing the communications from Tibet.

Then, just yesterday on the steps, we heard from the Taiwan people, we heard from the Tibetans, we heard from Hong Kong, and we heard from a woman whose husband was arrested because of his communications with somebody with a shared view.

So this is controlled by the Chinese Communist Government. I can't forget this.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from California.

Ms. PELOSI. Forgetting that, if you can—Mr. Speaker, I can't—think of this: The Chinese Government will control the algorithm, and they can change it any time in the United States.

Mr. Speaker, I urge a "yes" vote.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. BISHOP), who is my friend and fellow colleague on the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, this is not the first time that restricting speech has been pursued in the interests of national security. In fact, in 5 days' time, next Monday, I will go to the Supreme Court for the first time where I will attend an oral argument in the case of *Murphy v. Missouri*.

It is a case where agents from the White House, the Department of Justice, and other Federal agencies embedded themselves with American social media companies to manipulate what could appear on social media: expression by the American people.

It has been described by the lower court as the most massive attack on free speech in U.S. history.

Even as that pends for a decision by the Supreme Court, Congress would in this legislation say, in effect: Hold my beer.

I don't use TikTok. I think it is ill-advised to do so. Members of this body are famous on TikTok, and I think that is unwise. Be that as it may, I respect the choices of 170 million users in the United States.

The Trump administration attempted to ban TikTok in 2020. It was held that it couldn't do so in two court decisions because under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, he is subject to the Berman amendment, passed in 1988 by this body, to provide that in the interest of dealing with hostile foreign powers, the President can do all sorts of things

with respect to commerce, but he cannot ban the free flow of information across international boundaries.

I have heard that described as a gap in the law, but it is a feature. It is not a bug.

This legislation cannot be described as other than receding from the Berman amendment. That principle in American law—which did not, by the way, emerge from the brow of Representative Berman in 1988—was predicated on a much earlier principle of First Amendment law established in 1965 by the United States Supreme Court in the case *Lamont v. Postmaster General* which said the American people have a First Amendment right of access to foreign propaganda.

At first, it may be remarkable or strike one as odd to hear that. However, it is because the proper relationship between government and citizen in the United States is that the citizen decides what to be exposed to and what ideologies to embrace and consider and is always free to engage in expression including across international boundaries. That remains the prevailing constitutional law today.

It begs this question: How could it be that Congress should be working hard to devise a means to circumvent that prevailing principle of the First Amendment against the use of a particular means of expression by 170 million Americans?

Isn't it ironic that the technical advisers in the construction of this legislation to design it so that it can get around legislation challenges, including isolating litigation challenges to 180 days and only in the court of appeals in the District of Columbia, those technical advisers are the same folks at the Department of Justice who devised that plan to embed agents of the Department of Justice and other Federal agencies with social media platforms in the United States to restrict what Americans could say online.

Mr. Speaker, America confronts a grave challenge in China, and it will not prevail by becoming more like them.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. GUTHRIE).

Mr. GUTHRIE. Mr. Speaker, I want to emphasize this bill does not ban TikTok. It simply would require the Chinese Communist Party-affiliated ByteDance to sell TikTok and divest their interest.

I was asked: Does this affect TikTok? No. It is any foreign adversary or any app that is owned, controlled, or unduly influenced by any foreign adversary.

We must protect our national security and help keep America's private data out of the hands of our foreign adversaries.

Mr. Speaker, I urge support of this bill.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Cali-

fornia (Ms. ESHOO), who is a member of the committee.

Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member of the Energy and Commerce Committee for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 7521, the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act.

This bill will ensure the divestiture of TikTok from its People's Republic of China-controlled parent company, ByteDance.

Why is it essential for Congress to do this?

It is because the PRC controls ByteDance, and this presents a serious national security threat to our country.

TikTok has 170 million-plus U.S. users, and it collects tremendous amounts of sensitive data. They also collect substantial background data that may be proprietary which may only be available to TikTok.

The national security law of the PRC requires all Chinese organizations to "support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts." Under this law, ByteDance could be compelled by the Chinese Government to provide data on every American TikTok user. They can weaponize this data to exploit and manipulate Americans through surveillance and disinformation.

This legislation separates TikTok's data, algorithms, and source code from ByteDance.

Importantly, this bill does not ban TikTok, something I do not support.

I support divestiture because our first and most important responsibility as Members of Congress is to defend our Constitution and protect and defend the United States of America. The bill would also give Americans secure ownership of their data, including posts, photos, and videos, and give this administration and future administrations the authority to respond to future national security threats.

For all these reasons, I urge all my colleagues to vote for this legislation in the name of our national security.

□ 0945

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New Jersey's time has expired.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Georgia (Ms. GREENE).

Ms. GREENE of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as the only Member of Congress that has ever been banned by social media.

On January 2, 2022, Twitter banned me, banned my personal account on which I was campaigning for Congress, raising money, and using my free speech to inform the voters in my district they can vote for me.

This was not done by a company owned by China. That was done by American-owned Twitter. This came on the heels of our own United States Government working with Big Tech

and working with social media companies to censor and ban Americans' free speech.

I believe that this bill can cause future problems. It is opening Pandora's box, and I am opposed to this bill.

Most Americans don't trust the United States Government because of our experience dealing with it. Never forget that the United States Government also was the one that provided the Russia hoax to Americans. It also worked to ban Americans' free speech. It also has worked in so many ways to illegally spy on Americans through FISA without a warrant.

If we wanted to be serious about stopping a foreign adversary, if we wanted to be serious about stopping China, we would stop China from buying our U.S. farmland. We would raise up our American energy independence. We would also stop the Green New Deal and not rely on China who owns and operates 85 percent of the battery market worldwide.

There are dangers that lie ahead in this. This is really about controlling Americans' data. If we cared about Americans' data, then we would stop the sale of Americans' data universally, not just with China.

There is some further issues. This is a Pandora's box. What is to stop Congress or the United States Government in the future from forcing the sale of another social media company claiming that it is protecting Americans' data from foreign adversaries.

I think we can see in the future another Russia, Russia, Russia, and possibly force the sale of X as many Members in this body claim that Elon Musk is altering the algorithms of X.

By the way, it was Elon Musk's purchase of X that restored my social media account on Twitter and allowed me to have my free speech back on Twitter.

There are also Democrat Members of this body claiming that election meddling can happen on social media.

Well, we can never forget Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook. We can never forget the election meddling that happened there. By the way, American-owned Facebook and Instagram is where most of the garbage like the gender lies and the woke lies exist.

Many Americans and many teenagers believe awful things and they don't just see them on TikTok, they see them on Facebook and Instagram, too. I don't think this will accomplish what the goal is to accomplish.

The other concern is that when the government moves in to force the sale of TikTok, who is going to buy it? That is the question that we should be asking. Who is going to buy it? Who will be the next to control the data of over 170 million Americans? Are we going to trust Mark Zuckerberg to control their data? I certainly don't.

By the way, most of the time, my posts on Facebook are shadow banned, and I certainly don't have the reach on that social media account.

I think that there are many other ways to protect data, and I think this body is capable of it if we choose to do it.

Mr. Speaker, I oppose the bill.

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ROY).

Mr. ROY. Mr. Speaker, we are in a cold war with China and some of my colleagues want to ignore this fact. We have legislation before us that is 12 pages long.

The bill is not a ban. It forces foreign adversaries, including Chinese Communists, to divest. The bill is not a bill of attainder; it is prospective, not retrospective.

The bill does not violate the First Amendment. It focuses on conduct, not content. It requires both being controlled by a foreign adversary and conduct that itself is espionage. If you just had one alone, it might be debatable, as the gentleman from North Carolina or Senator PAUL notes, in that it might protect Americans' rights to seek out and obtain foreign propaganda. However, again, that is not this case because we have, and have as a trigger in the bill, demonstrated national security conduct harm.

To be clear, we have properly taken action at the device layer by banning Huawei and ZTE spy gear. We have taken action at the carrier level, prohibiting China Mobile and China Telecom from connecting to our networks based on a determination they are controlled by the CCP and a national security threat.

We now need to take action at the application level when malign CCP control has been demonstrated lest we render meaningless our past actions to protect the United States of America.

We should ban Chicom ownership of our farmland or drug manufacturing, but we should fight them here and ban the foreign ownership and control of American data and stop apologizing for the Chinese Communists.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROBERT GARCIA), my friend on the other side of the aisle.

Mr. ROBERT GARCIA of California. Mr. Speaker, I have enormous respect for the efforts of my colleagues to focus on security and data protection and I share many of their concerns; however, I disagree with this approach and this bill that could impact 170 million Americans who use TikTok.

One-third of all U.S. adults use the app and millions of entrepreneurs and small business owners use the platform to support their family.

Yes, just like every other social media platform, there is misinformation and privacy concerns on TikTok, and I share those; however, it is important that we don't treat TikTok differently than other platforms.

If we are going to address this issue, we have to take the same approach to all social media platforms. We can't just single out one.

I join many of my colleagues and the ACLU in voicing concern over the freedom of expression. I am a strong supporter of ensuring that TikTok remains an open marketplace. There is no guarantee in this bill that there won't be an interruption of service that could lead to an end of this app. I don't think we fully appreciate the impact this is going to have. Mr. Speaker, I am a strong "no."

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BUCSHON).

Mr. BUCSHON. Mr. Speaker, one of the most important duties the Constitution assigns to Congress is to protect the American people and to safeguard our national security.

After hearing from national security experts last week, it is clear the prolific use of media platforms controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and other foreign adversaries poses a danger to our country.

I am grateful to my bipartisan colleagues for moving this legislation, showing we will take action to protect the American people by protecting their personal data and security from foreign interference and manipulation. We took an oath to do so.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. KAMLAGER-DOVE), my friend on the other side of the aisle.

Ms. KAMLAGER-DOVE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to oppose H.R. 7521.

Banning TikTok is an insufficient Band-Aid solution to the genuine national security concerns the app raises and exposes. The bill seriously undermines civil liberties by essentially banning a platform that 150 million Americans use to engage in free speech and expression. A statewide TikTok ban has already been paused by a Federal judge on First Amendment grounds.

Even without TikTok, the PRC could still be able to conduct influence operations on other social media platforms and obtain sensitive U.S. user data through hacking or data brokers.

Finally, this bill would greatly expand the executive's authority to ban tech companies with zero congressional oversight. I cannot sign a blank check to some future President who would easily and dangerously weaponize this legislation to profit and silence.

The creatives, artists, content creators, and businesses in my district will get caught in the cross fire of this bill, and deserve better than Federal overreach as a substitute for a thoughtful and incisive solution to this complicated national security challenge.

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 40 seconds to the gentlewoman from Iowa (Mrs. HINSON).

Mrs. HINSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this simple bill. It forces TikTok to cut ties with the CCP or lose American users.

The day after we introduced our bill, TikTok went into panic mode. They lied to their users saying Congress was

going to ban TikTok, using young kids as political pawns.

TikTok's gross stunt proved our point. What if on election day, TikTok sent out an alert saying our elections were canceled. We must act now.

Today, we are sending a message to the CCP that we are going to deflate the 140 million spy balloons that they have installed on American phones. We must act and pass this bill today.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. CAMMACK).

Mrs. CAMMACK. Mr. Speaker, today, we take a stand against the Chinese Communist Party and their efforts to turn content creators in America into foot soldiers for the CCP.

We aren't banning a company, as the highest paid lobbyist for ByteDance, which is owned by China, would lead you to believe. We aren't infringing on constitutionally protected speech or growing the size of government.

All we are saying is break up with the Chinese Communist Party. As a constitutional conservative, I don't want my government or Big Tech to have unfettered access to my private data, so why in the hell would we want and allow the Chinese Communist Party to have access to our private data?

The CCP is an adversary of the United States, and this legislation narrowly, thoughtfully, and directly addresses the national security threat and protects Americans' data and, by extension, their First Amendment rights, because let us not pretend for one second that TikTok is not infringing on our First Amendment rights.

I would say, as Representative ROY from Texas said, this bill is about conduct, not content.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

Mrs. CAMMACK. There is no restriction mentioned on content in this bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

Mrs. CAMMACK. But I will mention, Mr. Speaker, that the espionage is not covered or protected as one of the five tenets of the First Amendment.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman is no longer recognized.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to my good friend from Arizona (Mr. SCHWEIKERT).

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Speaker, I actually am about to try to make everyone mad. I actually believe data is a private property right. It belongs to you as an American citizen. The problem with our design here, it is really well-meaning, but it doesn't get at the structural problem.

Let's say you have an entity over here that divests. What makes them not then take the data, sell it to a data broker, and it gets washed and ends up still in the bad actors' hands?

You have to understand, there is even articles out this week of even our

own three-letter agencies buying their data now from data brokers instead of doing the tracking.

We need to think dramatically more globally. Your data is a private property right. That will be the only way we end up protecting ourselves from bad actors and sometimes even our own selves.

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. WALBERG).

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, last March when I asked about Americans' data being stored and accessed by China, TikTok CEO stated under oath that it was not accessible by the CCP. However, this statement was a lie. As their own internal recording said, "everything is seen in China."

H.R. 7521 gives TikTok and similar apps 6 months to divest from their parent company ByteDance. It is their choice. TikTok needs to decide whether they value their users or their ties to the Chinese Communist Party more. It is as simple as that. I urge a vote for this bill.

□ 1000

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

Mr. Speaker, I know the other side is sincere. We have not questioned that here today, and I won't question their sincerity.

In fact, I think they have identified at least three problems that we have in America: moral decay of our society, invasion of Americans' privacy, and our competitiveness with China. However, in this case, their cure is worse than the diseases.

There are ways to get at these root problems. We just haven't taken it upon ourselves to address those root problems with actual legislative solutions that have been put forth here in Congress.

For instance, Mr. WARREN DAVIDSON's Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act would put a strong stake in the ground to protect Americans' privacy, whether it is from our own government or some foreign governments. That is the kind of thing we need.

We need warrants in the FISA program. Our government shouldn't be able to spy on Americans without a warrant, yet they are. Let's bring that to the floor and vote on it.

These are the kinds of cures we need, not the bill that is offered here today.

The bill that is offered here today, even though I know it is offered genuinely, could also be named the Facebook protection and enhancement act because it is not the American people who are going to benefit most from this. It will be Facebook. Their stock is going to go up if this bill should pass the Senate.

What are some ways that we could improve this bill? It should at least have a sunset. That is the only reason we are able to debate whether FISA should have warrants in it, because it sunsets. What have we observed? FISA has been abused.

That is my concern with this TikTok ban. It will be abused. If it is just banning TikTok and ByteDance and copies of that, why does it need to be 13 pages long?

I know they say it doesn't ban it, but it forces divestiture of the company. This sounds like when American companies try to do business in Third World countries and a dictator says: You can do business here. You just have to give me your company, and now you can continue to do business.

We wouldn't let another country take over Ford Motor Company for selling Ford cars in their country, yet that is what we are wanting to do here.

Again, this is a cure that is worse than the disease. Who is going to be prosecuted by this bill? Is it ByteDance or TikTok? Will they be taken to court? No. They are the target of this, but how do you elicit or effect a ban on them? By prosecuting Americans.

The only way my colleagues can ban TikTok and the other companies from being here is to say what this bill says, which is the government will bring a civil action suit against you if you so much as host them here. If you have an app store that allows them to be here, and you are an American or an American company, you will be the target of this bill. Those are the only people who can be pursued under this bill. I know it is in order to go after TikTok, or so they say.

I close by saying that we are sitting here with phones made in China. We are wearing suits made in China. We drove cars here with chips that are made in China.

They are a foreign adversary, and, by golly, we are going to do something about it. What are we going to do? My colleagues are going to tell Americans they can't put a piece of software on their computer and can't go to certain websites that the President designates.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose this well-intentioned bill because it will have bad consequences, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of my time to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. CRENSHAW).

Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Speaker, I want to address all of my colleagues who I think are confused about the First Amendment, confused about the nature of TikTok, and confused about the intentions of the Chinese Communist Party.

Let me explain this very simply. TikTok is owned by ByteDance. ByteDance is in China, and when you are in China, you have to do whatever the Chinese Communist Party says you have to do. That is according to the National Intelligence Law passed in 2017. If they want you to spy for them, you will spy for them. That is how that works.

They have a board member from the Chinese Communist Party on ByteDance. My colleagues wouldn't

allow a radio tower owned by the Chinese to be put up right in the middle of Washington, D.C., and then allow it to put out Chinese propaganda. My colleagues would probably complain about that.

That is exactly what TikTok can be used for because millions of Americans are addicted to it. They see it, and the Chinese can absolutely manipulate those algorithms.

The First Amendment does not give the Chinese Communist Party the right to American data or the right to manipulate the minds of Americans. That would be a really weird interpretation of the First Amendment.

The primary counterarguments to this bill seem to be as shallow as it doesn't do everything I want, and Facebook is really mean, and I don't want them to make money. Does that mean we owe the Chinese access to all of our data and access to manipulate the minds of Americans? I don't think so.

This is a very specific bill, very specifically tailored. It does not harm American companies or American individuals. You know it. You have to read it. Pass this bill.

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 7521, the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, a bipartisan bill introduced by our colleagues MIKE GALLAGHER and RAJA KRISHNAMOORTHY.

It is aimed at countering the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to sway public opinion in its favor—especially that of the younger generation—through the use of the social media app TikTok, as well as to counter the use of the app to collect data on Americans.

Indeed, just this last week we saw a real time demonstration of the insidious use of TikTok: the targeting of American children with Communist Party propaganda—during school hours—and the recruiting of minors to act unwittingly as foreign agents of the Chinese Communist Party.

On March 7, members of Congress—including me—were inundated with a phone call advocacy campaign that utilized children while we were debating the efforts of the CCP to sabotage the American economy. And the CCP connection with TikTok and its Chinese parent is something that is very tangible.

TikTok's parent ByteDance, headquartered in Beijing, is compelled to participate in a strategic partnership with the Chinese Ministry of Public Security.

Indeed, under China's Cybersecurity Law, companies are required to provide any information asked for to police or intelligence agencies. One former ByteDance official, Yintao Yu, has said that the CCP has access to all the company's data—including data stored in the U.S.

Indeed TikTok has conceded as much—just look at the company's privacy policy, which says it can share user data with ByteDance and various governments around the world if required: "We may disclose any of the Information we collect to respond to . . . government inquiries," as well as to "comply with any applicable law."

We also know that the CCP has punished executives and companies that do not tow the Party line—just ask Jack Ma, one of the richest men in the world, what happens when you buck the Party.

Indeed, ByteDance, like many Chinese companies, has an internal Communist Party Committee within its corporate structure, which is led by ByteDance Vice President Zhang Fuping.

So what is TikTok's response to all this?

After being deluged with phone calls in my office, that very day, I wrote to TikTok, at their American headquarters in Culver City, California, asking them to provide all internal documentation relating to the “genesis, approval and execution of the advocacy campaign initiated by TikTok on March 7,” so that Congress may determine the role of the CCP in recruiting children to lobby Congress on its behalf. Four days later, TikTok Vice President for Public Policy Michael Beckerman responded, with piratical defiance, claiming that congressional interest in this issue was “offensive” and “patently false.”

Really? You don't think that this is an issue that is in the national interest?

We shall see about that.

I will vote in favor of H.R. 7521 and urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. DUNN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, a year ago, I asked TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew point blank if ByteDance, its parent company, has spied on Americans on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party.

He told me: “I don't think spying is the right way to describe it.”

Congress has overwhelming evidence that TikTok collects search and browsing histories, keystroke patterns, biometric identifiers, draft messages, metadata, geolocation data, and more.

We're talking an overwhelming amount of sensitive user-data.

This is not just data on adults, but the personal information of our children.

That is the very definition of spying.

TikTok and ByteDance present a serious national security threat.

TikTok functions as a sophisticated surveillance tool—an organization that is bound to the Chinese Communist Party and required by their National Intelligence Law to support Chinese intelligence services.

My esteemed colleagues and I are trying to protect Americans from this dangerous, destructive spyware masked as a simple social media app.

The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act will incentivize the divestment of TikTok so that it is no longer controlled by a China-based entity.

This bill does not punish individual social media users, censor speech, or impact apps or websites that sever ties with companies controlled by foreign adversaries.

The First Amendment does not protect espionage.

I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak on H.R. 7521, the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act.

This bill would prohibit the distribution, maintenance, or provision of internet hosting services for any foreign adversary controlled application unless they execute a qualified divestiture as determined by the President.

More specifically, under this bill, ByteDance would be required to divest itself from TikTok in order for the application to remain in operation.

As one of the most dominant social media platforms in recent history, it currently has over 150 million active users in the United States alone.

Much of this success could be attributed to the application's algorithms being used to generate specifically curated content for each user on their respective “For You” pages in a short-form, infinite scroll format.

Upon the rapid success of this content format, other social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, and Youtube have all followed suit.

This has only further entrenched the massive success of the company among its users.

This success is not without caveat, however.

Recent studies conducted by researchers at Rutgers University found a disturbing underrepresentation of certain topics on the platform.

Though pop culture and political terms were represented roughly proportional to other platforms, topics involving Uyghurs, Tibet, Tiananmen Square, and the Hong Kong protests were severely underrepresented.

In addition, many valid concerns have been raised regarding the issue of national security and foreign government interference.

Many stakeholders argue that the vast amount of data harvested from American users poses a threat to our data security and democracy.

With the vast amount of American users on the platform, particularly individuals under the age of 24, I recognize the need to ensure security in our national democracy.

I hope, moving forward, that we can join together in taking action to protect our youth from harmful actors while also safeguarding their freedom of thought.

More investigation must happen to decide the next steps for TikTok. I will pursue the next steps before finalizing a complete ban. What company will be the purchaser? All must be answered before the best decision can be made.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from Washington (Mrs. RODGERS) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7521, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 352, nays 65, answered “present” 1, not voting 14, as follows:

[Roll No. 86]

YEAS—352

Adams
Aderholt
Aguilar
Alford
Allen
Allred
Amo
Amodei
Armstrong

Arrington
Auchincloss
Babin
Bacon
Baird
Balderson
Balint
Banks
Barr

Barragán
Bean (FL)
Beatty
Bentz
Bera
Bergman
Beyer
Bice
Bilirakis

Bishop (GA)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Boebert
Bost
Brecheen
Brown
Brownley
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Budzinski
Burchett
Burgess
Burlison
Calvert
Cammack
Caraveo
Carbajal
Cárdenas
Carey
Carl
Carson
Carter (GA)
Carter (LA)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Case
Casten
Castor (FL)
Chavez-DeRemer
Cherfilus-
McCormick
Chu
Ciscomani
Clarke (NY)
Cleaver
Cline
Cloud
Clyde
Cohen
Cole
Collins
Comer
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Craig
Crane
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crow
Cuellar
Curtis
D'Esposito
Davids (KS)
Davis (NC)
De La Cruz
Dean (PA)
DeGette
DeLauro
DelBene
Deluzio
DeSaulnier
Diaz-Balart
Dingell
Doggett
Donalds
Duncan
Dunn (FL)
Edwards
Ellzey
Emmer
Escobar
Eshoo
Estes
Evans
Ezell
Fallon
Feenstra
Ferguson
Finstad
Fischbach
Fitzgerald
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fletcher
Flood
Foster
Foushee
Foxy
Franklin, Scott
Fry
Fulcher
Gallagher
Garamendi
Garbarino
Garcia (TX)
Garcia, Mike

Jimenez
Golden (ME)
Goldman (NY)
Gonzales, Tony
Gonzalez,
Vicente
Good (VA)
Gooden (TX)
Gottheimer
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Green (TN)
Green, Al (TX)
Griffith
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Hageman
Harris
Harshbarger
Hern
Hill
Hinson
Houchin
Houlahan
Hoyer
Hudson
Huffman
Huizenga
Hunt
Issa
Ivey
Jackson (NC)
Jackson (TX)
James
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (SD)
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Joyce (PA)
Kaptur
Kean (NJ)
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kiggans (VA)
Kildee
Kiley
Kilmer
Kim (CA)
Krishnamoorthi
Kuster
Kustoff
LaHood
LaLota
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Landman
Langworthy
Latta
LaTurner
Lawler
Lee (FL)
Lee (NV)
Leger Fernandez
Lesko
Letlow
Levin
Lieu
Loudermilk
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Luna
Luttrell
Lynch
Magaziner
Malliotakis
Maloy
Mann
Manning
Mast
Matsui
McBath
McCaul
McClain
McClellan
McCollum
McCormick
McHenry
Menendez
Meuser
Mfume
Miller (IL)
Miller (OH)
Miller (WV)
Miller-Meeks

Mills
Molinaro
Moolenaar
Moore (UT)
Moran
Morelle
Moskowitz
Moulton
Mrvan
Murphy
Napolitano
Neguse
Nehls
Newhouse
Nickel
Norcross
Norman
Nunn (IA)
Oberholte
Owens
Pallone
Palmer
Panetta
Pappas
Pascarell
Payne
Pelosi
Peltola
Pence
Perez
Peters
Petterson
Pfluger
Pingree
Posey
Quigley
Raskin
Reschenthaler
Rodgers (WA)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rose
Rosendale
Ross
Rouzer
Roy
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rutherford
Ryan
Salazar
Salinas
Sánchez
Sarbanes
Scalise
Scanlon
Schiff
Schneider
Scholten
Schrier
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Self
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Sherrill
Slotkin
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Smucker
Sorensen
Soto
Spanberger
Spartz
Stansbury
Stanton
Staubert
Steel
Stefanik
Steil
Stevens
Strickland
Strong
Suozi
Sykes
Takano
Tenney
Thanedar
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Tiffany
Timmons
Titus
Tokuda

Tonko	Veasey	Wexton
Torres (NY)	Walberg	Wild
Trahan	Waltz	Williams (NY)
Trone	Wasserman	Wilson (FL)
Turner	Schultz	Wilson (SC)
Underwood	Waters	Wittman
Valadao	Watson Coleman	Womack
Van Drew	Weber (TX)	Yakym
Van Duyne	Webster (FL)	Zinke
Van Orden	Wenstrup	
Vasquez	Westerman	

NAYS—65

Biggs	Himes	Moore (AL)
Bishop (NC)	Horsford	Moore (WI)
Bonamici	Hoyle (OR)	Mullin
Bowman	Jackson (IL)	Nadler
Boyle (PA)	Jackson Lee	Neal
Bush	Jacobs	Ocasio-Cortez
Caspar	Jayapal	Omar
Castro (TX)	Kamlager-Dove	Perry
Clark (MA)	Khanna	Phillips
Clyburn	Larsen (WA)	Pocan
Davidson	Larson (CT)	Porter
Duarte	Lee (CA)	Pressley
Espallat	Lee (PA)	Ramirez
Frost	Lofgren	Schakowsky
Gaetz	Mace	Schweikert
Gallego	Massie	Steube
Garcia (IL)	McClintock	Swalwell
Garcia, Robert	McGarvey	Torres (CA)
Gomez	McGovern	Vargas
Greene (GA)	Meeks	Velázquez
Hayes	Meng	Williams (GA)
Higgins (LA)	Mooney	

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—1

Crockett

NOT VOTING—14

Connolly	Granger	Simpson
Davis (IL)	Grijalva	Tlaib
DesJarlais	Harder (CA)	Wagner
Frankel, Lois	Kim (NJ)	Williams (TX)
Gosar	Ogles	

□ 1033

Mr. LARSON of Connecticut changed his vote from "yea" to "nay."

Messrs. WENSTRUP, CLEAVER, Ms. BALINT, Mr. CARSON, Ms. BOEBERT, and BROWNLEY changed their vote from "nay" to "yea."

Ms. CROCKETT changed her vote from "yea" to "present."

So (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated for:

Ms. GRANGER. Madam Speaker, I missed today's votes due to circumstances beyond my control. Had I been present, I would have voted "yea" on rollcall no. 86.

Mr. OGLES. Madam Speaker, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted "yea" on rollcall No. 86.

Stated against:

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Speaker, I was absent from the vote today due to illness. Had I been present, I would have voted "nay" on rollcall No. 86.

ROSA PARKS FEDERAL BUILDING

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. VAN DUYNE). Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the unfinished business is the question on suspending the rules and passing the bill (S. 1278) to designate the Federal building located at 985 Michigan Avenue in Detroit, Michigan, as the "Rosa Parks Federal Building", and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. MOLINARO) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

ADJOURNMENT FROM WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 2024, TO FRIDAY, MARCH 15, 2024; AND ADJOURNMENT FROM FRIDAY, MARCH 15, 2024, TO TUESDAY, MARCH 19, 2024

Mr. MOLINARO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today, it adjourn to meet at 11 a.m. on Friday, March 15, 2024; and further, when the House adjourns on that day, it adjourn to meet on Tuesday, March 19, 2024, when it shall convene at noon for morning-hour debate and 2 p.m. for legislative business.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BURLISON). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

RECOGNIZING WARREN PETERSEN

(Mrs. LESKO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mrs. LESKO. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize someone whose service will be felt by future generations of Arizonans—Arizona Senate President Warren Petersen.

Senator Petersen's service to the people of Arizona began in 2012 when he was elected to the Arizona House of Representatives.

Throughout his time in the House, he served as chairman of the Judiciary Committee and majority leader. Once his time in the House came to an end, Senator Petersen was elected to the Arizona Senate where he became President in 2023.

Under his leadership, Arizona has accomplished school choice, passed tax cuts for families across the State, and worked hard to enforce border security in the face of opposition from the left.

During my own time in the Arizona House of Representatives, I was lucky enough to serve alongside President Petersen where he was a respected colleague and a friend.

Petersen's service to Arizona could not be overstated, and his leadership is appreciated by all Arizonans.

RECOGNIZING MICHAEL COSTEIRA

(Mr. PAYNE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to celebrate the Eagle Scout project of Michael Costeira.

Michael Costeira is a Boy Scout from Union, New Jersey, and he wanted to upgrade the almost 300-year-old Caldwell Parsonage.

The Caldwell Parsonage was the home of the Reverend James Caldwell, a strong patriot supporter during the American Revolution.

The original Caldwell Parsonage was burned by loyalist mobs in 1780. Later that year, Caldwell's wife, Hannah, was killed by British soldiers during the Battle of Connecticut Farms.

The current Caldwell Parsonage was built in 1782 and added to the National Registry of Historic Places in 1982.

Michael Costeira wanted to preserve that history for his Eagle Scout project, so he researched various artifacts in the parsonage and he created more accurate exhibit labels for each of the items found.

I congratulate Michael. He has made a valuable contribution to an historic location in this country's great fight in the Revolution.

□ 1045

BIDENFLATION

(Mr. ROSE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROSE. Mr. Speaker, prices for everyday goods continue to climb due to the economic policies of the Biden administration. The latest Consumer Price Index report was up 3.2 percent from last year.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of hardworking families I represent in Tennessee who are making hard choices to stay afloat. If they are having to tighten their belts, the Federal Government should do the same.

President Biden's answer is to raise taxes even more, but we don't have a revenue problem, in Washington we have a spending problem.

In fiscal year 2022, the Federal Government collected \$850 billion more in tax revenue than the year before. Yet, the Federal Government spent \$1.4 trillion more than we brought in.

Last year, the Federal Government spent \$1.7 trillion more than it collected. That is just one of many reasons why I am opposed to the President's \$7.3 trillion budget.

We cannot continue spending more money that we don't have.

ROTARY CLUB OF BARBERTON CHAMPION OF THE WEEK

(Mrs. SYKES asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. SYKES. Mr. Speaker, today, I rise to recognize the Rotary Club of Barberton as Ohio's 13th Congressional District Champion of the Week.

The Rotary Club of Barberton has been a staple in the City of Barberton for over 100 years, providing life-changing services and investing in the community and its members.