

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the Chair will postpone further proceedings today on motions to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the yeas and nays are ordered, or votes objected to under clause 6 of rule XX.

The House will resume proceedings on postponed questions at a later time.

EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION INTEGRITY ACT OF 2023

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6306) to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to prohibit the acquisition or lease of a consular or diplomatic post built or owned by an entity beneficially owned by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 6306

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Embassy Construction Integrity Act of 2023".

SEC. 2. RESTRICTIONS ON CONSULAR AND DIPLOMATIC POSTS BUILT OR OWNED BY CERTAIN ENTITIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State (in this section referred to as the "Secretary") shall take such steps as may be necessary to avoid or minimize—

(1) acquiring or leasing a covered building—

(A) with respect to which a covered entity performed covered construction on or after January 1, 1949; or

(B) in which a covered entity has an ownership interest; or

(2) entering into or renewing a contract or other agreement with a covered entity to perform covered construction with respect to a covered building.

(b) NOTIFICATION OF INCONSISTENT ACTION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall notify the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate—

(A) not later than 7 days before entering into an acquisition, lease, or agreement after the date of enactment of this Act that the Secretary is aware is inconsistent with the restriction under subsection (a); and

(B) not later than 7 days after becoming aware of an acquisition, lease, or agreement occurring after the date of enactment of this Act that is inconsistent with the restriction under subsection (a).

(2) DETERMINATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST.—The notification required under paragraph (1) shall also include, to the extent applicable—

(A) a determination of whether the inconsistent acquisition, lease, or agreement is in the national security interest of the United States;

(B) an identification of the interest advanced by such inconsistent action;

(C) a detailed explanation for such determination; and

(D) any action the Secretary has taken or intends to take to mitigate national security vulnerabilities that may be posed by such inconsistent action.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) COVERED BUILDING.—The term "covered building" means a building that is used or intended to be used by personnel, or for a function, of a consular or diplomatic post located outside of the United States.

(2) COVERED CONSTRUCTION.—The term "covered construction"—

(A) means any construction, development, conversion, extension, alteration, repair, or maintenance performed with respect to a building; and

(B) includes the installation or maintenance of electrical, plumbing, heating, ventilation, air conditioning, communication, fire protection, and energy management systems with respect to such building.

(3) COVERED ENTITY.—The term "covered entity" means an entity with respect to which the Government of the People's Republic of China, or an agent or instrumentality of the Government of the People's Republic of China, directly or indirectly, including through any contract, arrangement, understanding, or relationship—

(A) owns or controls a significant percent of the ownership interest; or

(B) otherwise exercises substantial control.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. WAGNER) and the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. WILD) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Missouri.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MILLS), the author of this bill.

Mr. MILLS. Mr. Speaker, the Embassy Construction Integrity Act is very simple: America's adversaries must not be involved in building our diplomatic and consular posts.

This, in my opinion, is a common-sense bill, or at least it should be. Last year, Congress was made aware that a Chinese state-owned enterprise was involved in the construction of a post in south Asia.

Despite all of the bureaucratic red tape the State Department goes through to establish these posts, somehow checking whether the Chinese Government controls the companies constructing the building didn't quite make the list.

The Chinese Government has established a pattern of leveraging its state-owned enterprise to serve dual functions during and after construction to spy on sensitive facilities.

Chinese-owned companies built the African Union headquarters. Like many things, they can't just build something, they have to build it with Chinese characteristics. In this case, those Chinese characteristics were spyware that was utilized to quietly siphon enormous amounts of data every night for the Chinese Government.

According to a study by Joshua Meservey, an expert in African geo-

politics, Chinese companies have built nearly 200 government facilities in Africa, a number that is sure to have only increased since the study was published.

I am not telling other countries who they can or cannot employ to construct their buildings. My bill is simple, however, that when our adversaries show us how they operate, that we should believe them and take steps to mitigate those risks.

Specifically, this bill requires the State Department, before establishing a new diplomatic or consular post, to identify the beneficial owners of the companies involved in the construction and maintenance of those buildings.

Further, this bill prohibits the State Department from entering into contracts or agreements if the beneficial owners of the companies are affiliated with the Chinese Government.

Finally, if inconsistent actions are discovered, the Secretary of State would be required to report it to Congress within 7 days.

Briefly, it is important to address the fact that it would be impossible for the State Department to operate in China if they weren't allowed to contract with some of these companies. The bill is carefully crafted to avoid stifling the important work of the State Department in China or the limited other locations where inconsistent measures may be the only option. However, even in these cases, Congress should be notified so that we do our job and have proper oversight for all of these activities.

Aside from those extraordinarily limited circumstances, the State Department must conduct greater due diligence to secure the integrity of our embassies and other consular posts around the world.

I express my sincere gratitude to Chairman MCCAUL, Ranking Member MEEKS, my bipartisan colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee who unanimously voted in favor of this bill during its markup, and each of their staffs who worked with me to secure it.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support passage of H.R. 6306.

Ms. WILD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 6306. Over the past 3 years, our country has made critical headway in expanding the United States' diplomatic footprint, including opening new, strategically located facilities in the Indo-Pacific region. Our Nation has always been at its best when we engage intensely in diplomatic efforts to defend and advance both interests and ideals around the world, and that is why it is so critical that we equip our diplomats with the resources they need.

As part of this work, the State Department works regularly to open, renew, or modernize its facilities around the world so that U.S. diplomats can effectively advance our interests around the world. I am proud

that this work has included reestablishing our embassy operations in Kyiv to stand with Ukraine after Russia's unprovoked, full-scale invasion in 2022.

When we raise the U.S. flag on a new or updated diplomatic facility abroad, it is a powerful signal of our commitment to democracy and peaceful, productive engagement between nations.

In maintaining its facilities around the world, the State Department mitigates security and counterintelligence risks through tailored, site-specific measures that address the particular challenges of a specific locale. The Department has deep expertise in this area, informed by decades of experience to harden our security posture, counter our adversaries, and open our doors to those who wish to learn about and engage with the United States.

Congress has played a role in developing this expertise, too, as evidenced in bipartisan reforms to the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act that we passed into law last Congress. We must continue to ensure the State Department has the flexibility to balance bold, expeditionary diplomacy, while mitigating operational risks.

With this bill before us today, the House Foreign Affairs Committee worked in a bipartisan fashion to ensure the Department has the needed flexibility to advance the Department's ongoing efforts to maintain and open new facilities, even as we seek to minimize risks in embassy construction or maintenance that our competitors could exploit.

I am pleased to support this measure, and I invite my colleagues to do the same. I encourage my colleagues to join me in supporting this measure.

In closing, the State Department's efforts to expand our diplomatic footprint and enhance its existing facilities worldwide showcase America's dedication to effective diplomacy and international cooperation.

The operational security and effectiveness of these facilities is paramount, and the State Department has demonstrable success in building facilities tailored to mitigate country-specific risks. Our congressional reforms have supported this mission, providing the necessary framework for safe and dynamic diplomacy while ensuring that State has the flexibility it needs to build and maintain its facilities around the world.

I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting H.R. 6306, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I again thank Congressman MILLS for his leadership in fixing this national security vulnerability. I also thank Chairman MCCAUL, Ranking Member MEEKS, and our Committee on Foreign Affairs colleagues for bringing this critical, bipartisan bill to the floor.

This legislation will ensure that our diplomatic buildings overseas do not

fall victim to the active, ongoing surveillance and espionage efforts of the Chinese Communist Party.

Mr. Speaker, I urge unanimous support for H.R. 6306, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. WAGNER) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 6306, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

The title of the bill was amended so as to read: "A bill to direct the Secretary of State to avoid or minimize the acquisition or lease of a consular or diplomatic post built or owned by an entity owned or controlled by the Government of the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes."

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

UPHOLDING THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT THROUGH SANCTIONS ACT

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 4723) to provide for the imposition of sanctions with respect to foreign persons undermining the Dayton Peace Agreement or threatening the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 4723

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Upholding the Dayton Peace Agreement Through Sanctions Act".

SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to support Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty, territorial integrity, multi-ethnic character and the prosperity of the Republika Srpska entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity, and the Brcko District within one Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(2) to support Bosnia and Herzegovina's progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration;

(3) to encourage officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina to resume institutional participation at all levels of government to advance functionality and common-sense reforms for greater prosperity;

(4) to call on Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights;

(5) to support the robust use of targeted sanctions against persons who undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement, as well as the democratic institutions and Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support peace and stability in that country;

(6) to urge the European Union to join the United States and United Kingdom in sanctioning Milorad Dodik, a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for his actions that undermine the stability and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(7) to expose and condemn the Government of Russia for its role in fueling instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and undermining the Dayton Peace Agreement, the role of the Office of the High Representative, and the European Union Force in BiH's Operation Althea;

(8) to work with other regional states, including Serbia and Croatia, to support the territorial integrity and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and

(9) to encourage the United States to use its voice and vote at the United Nations, the Peace Implementation Council and its Steering Board, and other relevant international bodies to support the Office of the High Representative.

SEC. 3. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PERSONS UNDERMINING THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT OR THREATENING THE SECURITY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

(a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

(1) LIST REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of foreign persons that are determined—

(A) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, any action or policy that threatens the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including actions that seek to undermine the authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina's state-level institutions, such as forming illegal parallel institutions or actions that threaten the Office of the High Representative;

(B) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, any action or policy that undermines democratic processes or institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(C) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, or to have attempted, a violation of, or an act that has obstructed or threatened the implementation of, the Dayton Peace Agreement or the Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference Council held in London in December 1995, including the decisions or conclusions of the Office of the High Representative, the Peace Implementation Council, or its Steering Board;

(D) to be a member, official, or senior leader of an illegal parallel institution or any other institution that engages in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B) or (C), as determined by the Secretary of State;

(E) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, corruption related to Bosnia and Herzegovina, including corruption by, on behalf of, or otherwise related to the government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or a current or former government official at any level of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as the misappropriation of public assets, expropriation of private assets for personal gain or political purposes, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources or bribery;

(F) to be an adult family member of any foreign person described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E), unless the President determines that the adult family member—

(i) has condemned the activity or activities of the foreign person described in any such subparagraph; and

(ii) has taken tangible steps to oppose the activity or activities;

(G) to have knowingly facilitated a significant transaction or transactions for or on behalf of a foreign person described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E);