

seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate conference on this legislation.

I will seek to place our letters on this bill into the Congressional Record during floor consideration. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work together as this measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL,
Chairman.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4681, and I thank my friend and colleague, Congressman FRENCH HILL, for introducing this measure.

For years, the Assad regime has fueled its brutal and oppressive campaign against the Syrian people through the revenue of a drug trafficking network estimated to be worth billions of dollars.

Syria remains the largest producer of captagon, a dangerous and highly addictive amphetamine popular in the Middle East, and Assad's regime, affiliates, and criminal networks have used that trade to enrich themselves and fuel their war machine.

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The Biden administration has taken significant steps to improve our coordination with allies and partners to interdict and disrupt the illicit network responsible for distributing captagon, but more can be done.

This measure builds on previous efforts to mandate sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for captagon trafficking as well as congressional reporting mandates to inform this body on what steps the United States is taking to counter these criminal efforts.

Disrupting Syria's narcotics trade is key to eliminating Assad's remaining financial lifeline, and this legislation is critical to that effort.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage all my colleagues to join me in supporting this measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. HILL), vice chairman of the Financial Services Committee, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and the author of this bill.

Mr. HILL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas, and I certainly thank my good friend from New York, the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, for his collaboration on this bill, H.R. 4681, the Illicit Captagon Trafficking Suppression Act.

I appreciate Mr. MOSKOWITZ, my partner and collaborator in drafting this measure. With the help of Mr. MCCAUL from Texas and Mr. MEEKS from New York, this bill passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee 44-0. It is a key follow-up to my CAPTAGON Act of 2022, which was enacted into law as a part of the National Defense Authorization Act of that year.

This measure would further press the Assad regime in Syria by imposing new sanctions to directly target individuals and networks associated with the production and trafficking of this dangerous drug, captagon, and the resulting illicit finance.

This illegal drug trafficking is being orchestrated by Assad's relatives, leaders in his security forces, and those affiliated with Iran-backed terror group Hezbollah. These sanctions and a successful U.S.-led captagon strategy are necessary in order to disrupt the illicit funds to the Assad regime and Hezbollah.

Mr. Speaker, this drug is exiting Syria by way of Lebanon and the Syrian ports to the Mediterranean. It has been found in Europe. It has been found manufactured in Europe. Most of it passes across the land border in Jordan and finds its way to the Gulf, where it is addicting citizens in Jordan, it is addicting citizens in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and that illicit money is fueling terrorism in the region.

For 12 years, Assad, with his terror partners, Iran and Russia, have murdered and imprisoned Syrians, bombed hospitals, and gassed his own citizens. Since 2018, narcotic production and trafficking in Syria have turned Syria and the Assad regime from simply a broken, failed state of mass murder to a narco-state, with Assad's crimes against his own citizens expanding to drug trafficking.

If we fail to stop captagon's trade, then the Assad regime will continue to drive the ongoing conflict in his country, provide a lifeline to extremist groups, and permit our adversaries such as Iran, Russia, and China to strengthen their engagement in Syria, posing a larger threat to Israel and other allies in the region.

To enhance greater stability in the Middle East, the U.S. Government must continue to work with our allies and partners in the region and in Europe to increase pressure on stopping the proliferation of this drug.

In 2023, following the State Department's initiation of the U.S. captagon strategy, I traveled to the region. I visited the area three times, and captagon was an essential topic on each trip. Everybody I visited with, from a diplomatic point of view, wanted to talk about the impact of captagon.

Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq directly have seen captagon trade infiltrate their borders. Egypt, Israel, and Turkey all express concern about the money fueling terrorism.

While I commend the Biden Treasury Department and the United Kingdom jointly for using Caesar sanctions last spring to sanction individuals for captagon, it is important we step up our efforts and add specific targeted sanctions like those contained in this bill for the production and trafficking of this drug.

This bill is an important component in pushing back against diplomatic normalization with the Assad regime,

pushing back on the intense terror leadership of Iran in every aspect and conflict in the region, and standing in full support of our ally Israel.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support this legislation. I thank my colleagues on the House Financial Services Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee for helping bring this bill to the House floor.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time for closing.

Under the Assad regime, Syria has turned into a narco-state, utilizing the proceeds from the illicit captagon drug network to fuel its brutal war on the Syrian people.

This legislation builds on the Biden administration's efforts to coordinate with our allies and partners to dismantle the captagon trade network, mandating additional sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for captagon trafficking, and requires reporting requirements to the United States Congress on the administration's efforts.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 4681, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time for closing.

Mr. Speaker, the captagon threat is new to many of us, but the speed at which this drug trade has grown in the last few years is alarming.

Creating new sanctions, specific to this drug trade, is necessary to stem this threat before it can grow even more dangerous. It is also essential to stopping the cash flow to the Assad regime.

This bipartisan legislation is a key tool in our efforts to counter the Assad regime and its Russian and Iranian backers.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MORAN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 4681, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Ms. Byrd, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate has passed a bill of the following title in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 3858. An act to establish within the Office of Land and Emergency Management of the Environmental Protection Agency the Office of Mountains, Deserts, and Plains, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Secretary of the Senate inform the House of Representatives that the Senate is ready to receive the Managers appointed by the House for the purpose of exhibiting articles of impeachment against Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, agreeably to the notice communicated to the Senate, and that the Senate stands ready to receive the honorable Managers on the part of the House of Representatives in order that they may present and exhibit the said articles of impeachment against the said Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security.

NO TECHNOLOGY FOR TERROR ACT

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6603) to apply foreign-direct product rules to Iran, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 6603

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “No Technology for Terror Act”.

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN-DIRECT PRODUCT RULES TO IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a foreign-produced item shall be subject to the Export Administration Regulations (pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.)) if the item—

(1) meets—

(A) the product scope requirements described in subsection (b); and

(B) the destination scope requirements described in subsection (c); and

(2) is exported, reexported, or in-country transferred to Iran from abroad or involves the Government of Iran.

(b) PRODUCT SCOPE REQUIREMENTS.—A foreign-produced item meets the product scope requirements of this subsection if the item—

(1) is a direct product of United States-origin technology or software subject to the Export Administration Regulations that is specified in a covered Export Control Classification Number or is identified in supplement no. 7 to part 746 of the Export Administration Regulations; or

(2) is produced by any plant or major component of a plant that is located outside the United States, if the plant or major component of a plant, whether made in the United States or a foreign country, itself is a direct product of United States-origin technology or software subject to the Export Administration Regulations that is specified in a covered Export Control Classification Number.

(c) DESTINATION SCOPE REQUIREMENTS.—A foreign-produced item meets the destination scope requirements of this subsection if there is knowledge that the foreign-produced item is destined to Iran or will be incorporated into or used in the production or development of any part, component, or equipment subject to the Export Administration Regulations and produced in or destined to Iran.

(d) LICENSE REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A license shall be required to export, reexport, or in-country transfer a

foreign-produced item from abroad that meets the product scope requirements described in subsection (b) and the destination scope requirements described in subsection (c) and is subject to the Export Administration Regulations pursuant to this section.

(2) EXCEPTIONS.—The license requirements of paragraph (1) shall not apply to—

(A) food, medicine, or medical devices that are—

(i) designated as EAR99; or

(ii) not designated under or listed on the Commerce Control List; or

(B) services, software, or hardware (other than services, software, or hardware for end-users owned or controlled by the Government of Iran) that are—

(i) necessarily and ordinarily incident to communications; or

(ii) designated as—

(I) EAR99; or

(II) Export Control Classification Number 5A992.c or 5D992.c, and classified in accordance with section 740.17 of title 15 Code of Federal Regulations; and

(iii) subject to a general license issued by the Department of Commerce or Department of Treasury.

(e) NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—The Secretary of Commerce may waive the requirements imposed under this section if the Secretary—

(1) determines that the waiver is in the national interests of the United States; and

(2) submits to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate a report explaining which requirements are being waived and the reasons for the waiver.

(f) SUNSET.—The authority provided under this section shall terminate on the date that is 7 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

(1) the term “Commerce Control List” means the list maintained pursuant to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations;

(2) the term “covered Export Control Classification Number” means an Export Control Classification Number in product group D or E of Category 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of the Commerce Control List;

(3) the terms “Export Administration Regulations”, “export”, “reexport”, and “in-country transfer” have the meanings given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801); and

(4) the terms “direct product”, “technology”, “software”, “major component”, “knowledge”, “production”, “development”, “part”, “component”, “equipment”, and “government end users” have the meanings given those terms in section 734.9 or part 772 of the Export Administration Regulations, as the case may be.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MORAN) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas.

There was no objection.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill, H.R. 6603, the No Technology for Terror Act, and thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MCCAUL) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MOSKOWITZ) for their support in co-leading this important bipartisan legislation.

This bill would codify recently expanded export control sanctions on Iran, restricting their ability to manufacture missiles and drones using U.S. material and technology.

This weekend, Iran unleashed an unprecedented direct attack on Israel, launching over 350 missiles and drones. Thankfully, 99 percent of these were intercepted by Israel, the United States, and other partners. Were it not for our incredible, capable militaries, this could have been an absolute catastrophe.

Iran has the largest missile arsenal in the Middle East, and it is increasingly supplying malign actors around the world with missiles and drones as a merchant of death. Iran's weapons are spreading death and destruction around the world.

The Iran-backed Houthis use drones to fuel their attacks on global ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Iran's proxies in Iraq and Syria have launched over 170 attacks on U.S. troops in the last 6 months. Iran-backed Hezbollah is aggressively firing on Israel's northern border.

Russia uses these weapons to target civilians and civilian infrastructure in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. In fact, reports have found that components recovered in the Iranian-made drones used against the people of Ukraine have included more than 50 American-made components.

Other reports have found that out of roughly 500 components identified in a recovered Iranian drone, 82 percent were manufactured by United States companies.

These reports are backed by a June 2023 report released by the State Department where they acknowledged that Iran relies on foreign procurement and that Iran even prefers American-made sourcing to manufacture its lethal weapons. This is unacceptable.

Urgent action is needed to combat Iran's longstanding missile and drone proliferation. That includes doing more to prevent them from accessing and benefiting from U.S. parts and technology.

In addition to robust sanctions enforcement to cut off its key sources of financial and military support to proxies like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas, we must make full use of our export controls to limit the export or re-export of U.S. goods and technology to Iran.

The No Technology for Terror Act will do just that. The limitations set forth in my bill would make it harder for Iran to produce missiles and drones