

The message also announced that the Secretary of the Senate inform the House of Representatives that the Senate is ready to receive the Managers appointed by the House for the purpose of exhibiting articles of impeachment against Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, agreeably to the notice communicated to the Senate, and that the Senate stands ready to receive the honorable Managers on the part of the House of Representatives in order that they may present and exhibit the said articles of impeachment against the said Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security.

## NO TECHNOLOGY FOR TERROR ACT

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6603) to apply foreign-direct product rules to Iran, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 6603

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “No Technology for Terror Act”.

### SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN-DIRECT PRODUCT RULES TO IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a foreign-produced item shall be subject to the Export Administration Regulations (pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.)) if the item—

(1) meets—

(A) the product scope requirements described in subsection (b); and

(B) the destination scope requirements described in subsection (c); and

(2) is exported, reexported, or in-country transferred to Iran from abroad or involves the Government of Iran.

(b) PRODUCT SCOPE REQUIREMENTS.—A foreign-produced item meets the product scope requirements of this subsection if the item—

(1) is a direct product of United States-origin technology or software subject to the Export Administration Regulations that is specified in a covered Export Control Classification Number or is identified in supplement no. 7 to part 746 of the Export Administration Regulations; or

(2) is produced by any plant or major component of a plant that is located outside the United States, if the plant or major component of a plant, whether made in the United States or a foreign country, itself is a direct product of United States-origin technology or software subject to the Export Administration Regulations that is specified in a covered Export Control Classification Number.

(c) DESTINATION SCOPE REQUIREMENTS.—A foreign-produced item meets the destination scope requirements of this subsection if there is knowledge that the foreign-produced item is destined to Iran or will be incorporated into or used in the production or development of any part, component, or equipment subject to the Export Administration Regulations and produced in or destined to Iran.

(d) LICENSE REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A license shall be required to export, reexport, or in-country transfer a

foreign-produced item from abroad that meets the product scope requirements described in subsection (b) and the destination scope requirements described in subsection (c) and is subject to the Export Administration Regulations pursuant to this section.

(2) EXCEPTIONS.—The license requirements of paragraph (1) shall not apply to—

(A) food, medicine, or medical devices that are—

(i) designated as EAR99; or

(ii) not designated under or listed on the Commerce Control List; or

(B) services, software, or hardware (other than services, software, or hardware for end-users owned or controlled by the Government of Iran) that are—

(i) necessarily and ordinarily incident to communications; or

(ii) designated as—

(I) EAR99; or

(II) Export Control Classification Number 5A992.c or 5D992.c, and classified in accordance with section 740.17 of title 15 Code of Federal Regulations; and

(iii) subject to a general license issued by the Department of Commerce or Department of Treasury.

(e) NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—The Secretary of Commerce may waive the requirements imposed under this section if the Secretary—

(1) determines that the waiver is in the national interests of the United States; and

(2) submits to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate a report explaining which requirements are being waived and the reasons for the waiver.

(f) SUNSET.—The authority provided under this section shall terminate on the date that is 7 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

(1) the term “Commerce Control List” means the list maintained pursuant to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations;

(2) the term “covered Export Control Classification Number” means an Export Control Classification Number in product group D or E of Category 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of the Commerce Control List;

(3) the terms “Export Administration Regulations”, “export”, “reexport”, and “in-country transfer” have the meanings given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801); and

(4) the terms “direct product”, “technology”, “software”, “major component”, “knowledge”, “production”, “development”, “part”, “component”, “equipment”, and “government end users” have the meanings given those terms in section 734.9 or part 772 of the Export Administration Regulations, as the case may be.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MORAN) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas.

There was no objection.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill, H.R. 6603, the No Technology for Terror Act, and thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MCCAUL) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MOSKOWITZ) for their support in co-leading this important bipartisan legislation.

This bill would codify recently expanded export control sanctions on Iran, restricting their ability to manufacture missiles and drones using U.S. material and technology.

This weekend, Iran unleashed an unprecedented direct attack on Israel, launching over 350 missiles and drones. Thankfully, 99 percent of these were intercepted by Israel, the United States, and other partners. Were it not for our incredible, capable militaries, this could have been an absolute catastrophe.

Iran has the largest missile arsenal in the Middle East, and it is increasingly supplying malign actors around the world with missiles and drones as a merchant of death. Iran's weapons are spreading death and destruction around the world.

The Iran-backed Houthis use drones to fuel their attacks on global ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Iran's proxies in Iraq and Syria have launched over 170 attacks on U.S. troops in the last 6 months. Iran-backed Hezbollah is aggressively firing on Israel's northern border.

Russia uses these weapons to target civilians and civilian infrastructure in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. In fact, reports have found that components recovered in the Iranian-made drones used against the people of Ukraine have included more than 50 American-made components.

Other reports have found that out of roughly 500 components identified in a recovered Iranian drone, 82 percent were manufactured by United States companies.

These reports are backed by a June 2023 report released by the State Department where they acknowledged that Iran relies on foreign procurement and that Iran even prefers American-made sourcing to manufacture its lethal weapons. This is unacceptable.

Urgent action is needed to combat Iran's longstanding missile and drone proliferation. That includes doing more to prevent them from accessing and benefiting from U.S. parts and technology.

In addition to robust sanctions enforcement to cut off its key sources of financial and military support to proxies like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas, we must make full use of our export controls to limit the export or re-export of U.S. goods and technology to Iran.

The No Technology for Terror Act will do just that. The limitations set forth in my bill would make it harder for Iran to produce missiles and drones

that are used against American troops and our allies and will make it more difficult to transfer these weapons to Russia and other proxies.

American equipment, technology, and other know-how under no circumstance should be transferred to Iran. The Iranian regime is relentlessly evil and seeks to become the superpower in the Middle East, which means eliminating America and its allies at all costs.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support this bill as it extends the foreign-direct product rule to Iran, which restricts the re-export or transfer of U.S.-originated items from one foreign country to Iran.

Iran and its terrorist proxies continue to sow instability on a global scale. We must take urgent action to restrict Iran's access to technology that it uses to manufacture lethal missiles and drones.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I rise in strong support of H.R. 6603.

This past weekend, Mr. Speaker, Iran launched more than 350 drones and ballistic missiles toward our ally Israel, an attack largely thwarted by the Israeli Defense Forces, alongside American, British, French, Jordanian, and other partner militaries. Nevertheless, the attack demonstrated Iran's airborne capacity and domestic drone and missile capabilities. Iran has not only launched its drones at Israel, but they have provided them to Russia for use in Putin's illegal war in Ukraine.

The administration has implemented numerous export controls to prevent American materials from being sent to Iran for use in their drone program. It has been an interagency priority to help ensure our technologies do not wind up in the hands of the enemy.

To that end, the Bureau of Industry and Security has imposed a foreign-direct product rule, BIS' most powerful tool, to prevent the production and proliferation of Iranian drones and missiles.

□ 1500

The legislation before us now, the No Technology for Terror Act introduced by my colleagues, Mr. MORAN and Mr. MCCAUL, makes permanent certain U.S. export control restrictions on American-made drones technology, and would be the first instance ever of codifying a foreign-direct product rule.

During markup of this bill, the bill was improved to include exceptions to ensure it does not unintentionally prevent the sale of humanitarian goods such as food and medicine. The bill also contains a national interest waiver to provide the executive branch greater flexibility in minimizing the export control's humanitarian impact and maximizing our leverage against Iran. A waiver also provides Iran an incentive to stop its malignant conduct,

cease its nuclear ambitions, and end its funding for terrorism.

While it is a big deal to codify a foreign-direct product rule, Iran's conduct and the flexibility built into the legislation warrant my support and the support of all the Members of this House.

So, Mr. Speaker, I thank Representatives MORAN and Chairman MCCAUL for their good-faith efforts to make this bill a bipartisan bill, and I encourage my colleagues to join with me in supporting this measure.

In closing, Mr. Speaker, Iran's weaponized drone program is a threat to our allies, Israel and Ukraine, and to United States national security. This legislation codifies the Biden administration's export control restrictions to prohibit United States-made technology and software from being transferred to Iran, preventing that technology from being used in the manufacturing of Iranian drones.

I thank Representative MORAN and Chairman MCCAUL for introducing this legislation and for working in the good-faith, bipartisan manner that we often do on this committee so that we can make this legislation as effective and flexible as it needs to be.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 6603, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, first, I thank the ranking member for his support and his work on this bill as well.

Mr. Speaker, we must continue to work together to do all that we can to address Iran's ongoing proliferation of lethal drones and missiles. From Israel to Ukraine, we see the devastating impacts of failing to do so.

In order to safeguard our national security and innocent civilians around the world, we need to make sure that U.S.-origin goods are not helping Iran manufacture deadly weapons. That is what this bill, the No Technology for Terror Act, does.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill, H.R. 6603, the No Technology for Terror Act, to stop supplying goods to Iran that are used against us.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MORAN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 6603, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

## NO PAYDAYS FOR HOSTAGE-TAKERS ACT

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 5826) to require a report on sanctions under the Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 5826

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "No Paydays for Hostage-Takers Act".

### SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of hostage-taking and wrongful detention of United States nationals, including its illegal detention of 52 American diplomats from 1979 to 1981.

(2) The Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 1741 et seq.), named in honor of Robert Levinson, the longest-held hostage in United States history who is presumed to have been killed by the regime while in Iranian custody, authorizes sanctions with respect to foreign persons who are responsible for or complicit in hostage-taking or unlawful or wrongful detention of United States nationals abroad.

### SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It shall be the policy of the United States to undertake additional actions and impose strict penalties to deter the Government of Iran and other hostile governments and non-state actors from hostage-taking or wrongfully detaining United States nationals.

### SEC. 4. REPORT AND CERTIFICATION ON RESTRICTED IRANIAN FUNDS RELEASED TO QATAR.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for 6 years, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate the following:

(1) A report on the \$6,000,000,000 in funds transferred from restricted Iranian accounts in the Republic of South Korea to restricted accounts in Qatar on or after August 9, 2023.

(2) A certification as to whether credible evidence or intelligence exists that any of the funds transferred have been used for any purpose other than humanitarian purposes.

(3) A certification as to whether credible evidence or intelligence exists that the funds transferred have enabled the Government of Iran to increase spending on defense, intelligence, or malign foreign activities.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by subsection (a)(1) shall include the following:

(1) An itemized list of all transactions involving the use of funds transferred, including the value of such transactions, the parties to such transactions, the financial institutions involved, the goods purchased in each transaction, the destinations and end user of such goods, the date on which the United States was notified of such transaction, and the date the transaction occurred.

(2) The quantity of funds described in subsection (a)(1) in restricted accounts in Qatar at the beginning and end of each reporting period.