

lacks. This is, by far, the better path toward ceasing hostile Houthi actions.

The Biden administration's approach holds the Houthis responsible for their violent, destabilizing actions without deepening the crisis for innocent Yemeni citizens.

□ 1345

I am going to stand with a broad coalition of NGOs, humanitarian organizations, and those that understand the wealth and the need and the richness of human life, trying to save human beings, not turning our backs on them with a piece of legislation that will do nothing really to the Houthis or change their behavior.

All of these NGOs, all of these humanitarian organizations, oppose an FTO designation without humanitarian provisions.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to do the same. We should make sure that the NGOs and humanitarian organizations are able to help save innocent lives.

Mr. Speaker, I oppose this bill and ask my colleagues to oppose this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, let me just say I learned one thing in my 20 years here and as a history major, as well. It repeats itself.

If you message weakness, that invites aggression, conflict, and war. If you project strength, you have peace. Whether it be Israel, whether it be Ukraine, whether it be China and their ambitions with Taiwan, we are projecting weakness.

We are seeing around the world our global hot spots. The world is on fire now, Mr. Speaker, fires lit by a policy of appeasement.

When they lifted the FTO designation on the Houthi rebels, there is a direct cause and effect. I respect my good friend from the other side of the aisle, but messaging counts. Deterrence does count.

What happened after the Biden administration lifted the terrorist designation? We had crossed borders on Saudi Arabia that doubled to over 400 attacks, more than 180 on international shipping, and they are shutting down the Red Sea and commerce.

We are only emboldening, and unfortunately, the policy in the Middle East has always been to appease and accommodate Iran so that maybe Iran will one day sit down so we can break bread and have this glorious Iran deal.

I am an idealist and an optimist, but I am also a realist and pragmatic in my worldview. That was not going to happen.

What have we seen when the Biden administration lifted sanctions on energy? We have seen \$80 billion in energy sold to China; \$80 billion going to Iran to kill, for terror operations through their proxies; \$80 billion to send missiles, rockets, and drones to

Russia to kill Ukrainians. It is all connected. Those three are our adversaries and our enemies, all three of them.

This is not the time to be sending a message of weakness to the largest state sponsor of terror, for to do so will only invite more aggression.

We also have waived and let expire sanctions on the drones and missiles manufactured by Iran. Let's think about that. That just went away. So, guess what? Iran can now sell their drones and missiles wherever they want, putting more money into Iran for their terror operations.

I can go on and on. We know what is happening there. We saw what happened last Saturday, the reign of terror. Thank God the United States provided the moneys for the Iron Dome, David's Sling, and the Arrow, which brought down 99 percent of these attacks. Ninety-nine percent of these attacks were actually brought down, stopped, and intercepted because of this partnership against terror.

Mr. Speaker, to our servicemembers defending freedom of navigation right now in the Red Sea against the threat of Houthi rockets that they intercept every day, for the other side to say it is not connected to Iran just defies our U.S. intelligence community. We know exactly where it is coming from. They are the proxies. Iran, the Ayatollah, is the head of the snake and the proxies are the tentacles. It is time to deal with the tentacles, and it is also time to cut the head of the snake off.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1149, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended.

The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed.

IRAN SANCTIONS RELIEF REVIEW ACT OF 2023

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1149, I call up the bill (H.R. 4691) to provide for congressional review of actions to terminate or waive sanctions imposed with respect to Iran, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1149, an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules

Committee Print 118-30 is adopted and the bill, as amended, is considered read.

The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

H.R. 4691

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act of 2023".

SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATING TO SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.

(a) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF PROPOSED ACTION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report that describes the proposed action and the reasons for that action.

(2) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—An action described in this paragraph is—

(i) an action to terminate the application of any sanctions described in subparagraph (B);

(ii) with respect to sanctions described in subparagraph (B) imposed by the President with respect to a person, an action to waive the application of those sanctions with respect to that person; or

(iii) a licensing action that significantly alters United States foreign policy with respect to Iran.

(B) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subparagraph are sanctions with respect to Iran provided for under—

(i) the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note);

(ii) the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.);

(iii) section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a);

(iv) the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq.);

(v) the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.);

(vi) the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); or

(vii) any other statute or Executive order that requires or authorizes the imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran.

(3) DESCRIPTION OF TYPE OF ACTION.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the action—

(A) is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Iran; or

(B) is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Iran.

(4) INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL MATTER.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Iran shall include a description of—

(i) the significant alteration to United States foreign policy with respect to Iran;

(ii) the anticipated effect of the action on the national security interests of the United States; and

(iii) the policy objectives for which the sanctions affected by the action were initially imposed.

(B) REQUESTS FROM BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEES.—The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives may request the

submission to the Committee of the matter described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Iran.

(5) **CONFIDENTIALITY OF PROPRIETARY INFORMATION.**—Proprietary information that can be associated with a particular person with respect to an action described in paragraph (2) may be included in a report submitted under paragraph (1) only if the appropriate congressional committees and leadership provide assurances of confidentiality, unless that person otherwise consents in writing to such disclosure.

(6) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Paragraph (2)(A)(iii) shall not be construed to require the submission of a report under paragraph (1) with respect to the routine issuance of a license that does not significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Iran.

(b) **PERIOD FOR REVIEW BY CONGRESS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—During the period of 30 calendar days beginning on the date on which the President submits a report under subsection (a)(1)—

(A) in the case of a report that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Iran, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report; and

(B) in the case of a report that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Iran, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report.

(2) **EXCEPTION.**—The period for congressional review under paragraph (1) of a report required to be submitted under subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the report is submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in any calendar year.

(3) **LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING INITIAL CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PERIOD.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the period for congressional review provided for under paragraph (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), including any additional period for such review as applicable under the exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with respect to that action is enacted in accordance with subsection (c).

(4) **LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING PRESIDENTIAL CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action for a period of 12 calendar days after the date of passage of the joint resolution of disapproval.

(5) **LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING CONGRESSIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the joint resolution, the President may not take that action for a period of 10 calendar days after the date of the President's veto.

(6) **EFFECT OF ENACTMENT OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of

disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action.

(c) **JOINT RESOLUTIONS OF DISAPPROVAL OR APPROVAL.**—

(1) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this subsection:

(A) **JOINT RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL.**—The term “joint resolution of approval” means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress—

(i) the title of which is as follows: “A joint resolution approving the President's proposal to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect to Iran.”; and

(ii) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: “Congress approves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to Iran proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress under section 2(a)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act of 2023 on _____ relating to _____”, with the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with a short description of the proposed action.

(B) **JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.**—The term “joint resolution of disapproval” means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress—

(i) the title of which is as follows: “A joint resolution disapproving the President's proposal to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect to Iran.”; and

(ii) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: “Congress disapproves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to Iran proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress under section 2(a)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act of 2023 on _____ relating to _____”, with the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with a short description of the proposed action.

(2) **INTRODUCTION.**—During the period of 30 calendar days provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any additional period as applicable under the exception provided in subsection (b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval may be introduced—

(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader or the minority leader; and

(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority leader's designee) or the minority leader (or the minority leader's designee).

(3) **FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.**—If a committee of the House of Representatives to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has been referred has not reported the joint resolution within 10 legislative days after the date of referral, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution.

(4) **CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.**—

(A) **COMMITTEE REFERRAL.**—A joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate shall be—

(i) referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs if the joint resolution relates to a report under subsection (a)(3)(A) that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Iran; and

(ii) referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations if the joint resolution relates to a report under subsection (a)(3)(B) that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Iran.

(B) **REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.**—If the committee to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval was referred has not reported the joint resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral of the joint resolution, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution and the joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.

(C) **PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.**—Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Relations, as the case may be, reports a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been discharged from consideration of such a joint resolution (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order.

(D) **RULINGS OF THE CHAIR ON PROCEDURE.**—Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval shall be decided without debate.

(E) **CONSIDERATION OF VETO MESSAGES.**—Debate in the Senate of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, including all debatable motions and appeals in connection with the joint resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.

(5) **RULES RELATING TO SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.**—

(A) **TREATMENT OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION IN HOUSE.**—In the House of Representatives, the following procedures shall apply to a joint resolution of approval or a joint resolution of disapproval received from the Senate (unless the House has already passed a joint resolution relating to the same proposed action):

(i) The joint resolution shall be referred to the appropriate committees.

(ii) If a committee to which a joint resolution has been referred has not reported the joint resolution within 5 legislative days after the date of referral, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution.

(iii) Beginning on the third legislative day after each committee to which a joint resolution has been referred reports the joint resolution to the House or has been discharged from further consideration thereof, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider the joint resolution in the House. All points of order against the motion are waived. Such a motion shall not be in order after the House has disposed of a motion to proceed on the joint resolution. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.

(iv) The joint resolution shall be considered as read. All points of order against the joint resolution and against its consideration are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall not be in order.

(B) **TREATMENT OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION IN SENATE.**—

(i) **RECEIPT BEFORE PASSAGE.**—If, before the passage by the Senate of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the House of Representatives, the following procedures shall apply:

(I) That joint resolution shall not be referred to a committee.

(II) With respect to that joint resolution—

(aa) the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the House of Representatives; but

(bb) the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution from the House of Representatives.

(ii) RECEIPT AFTER PASSAGE.—If, following passage of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval in the Senate, the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the House of Representatives, that joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate Senate calendar.

(iii) NO COMPANION MEASURE.—If a joint resolution of approval or a joint resolution of disapproval is received from the House, and no companion joint resolution has been introduced in the Senate, the Senate procedures under this subsection shall apply to the House joint resolution.

(C) APPLICATION TO REVENUE MEASURES.—The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in the House of Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure.

(6) RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE.—This subsection is enacted by Congress—

(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and supercedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND LEADERSHIP DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees and leadership” means—

(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for 1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs or their respective designees.

The gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCAUL) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCAUL).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, even after the Trump administration rightfully withdrew from the dangerous Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, the Biden administration entered office committed to pursuing a new nuclear deal with Iran.

Throughout this administration's dealings with Iran, it was abundantly clear that Iran was taking advantage of the administration's blind commitment to negotiations just for the sake of negotiating.

A nuclear Iran is not acceptable—full stop. However, throughout 2021 and 2022, the Biden administration continued to push negotiations even as Iran escalated its nuclear provocations. Iran suspended compliance with the IAEA Additional Protocol. Iran installed new advanced centrifuges. Iran increased its uranium stockpile toward enrichment. Iran refused to cooperate with an IAEA investigation.

In fact, I met with the Director General of the IAEA at his office in Europe, and he said that the Iranians had a cyberattack on their office and stole all of their documents pertaining to their investigations dealing with compliance from Iran on the sites.

That is not a sign of good faith. You can't negotiate with somebody like that.

Still, they are intent on getting this nuclear deal done. It became very clear that they are desperate to reach a deal, even if it was a bad deal.

The irony, Mr. Speaker, is this: The very individual charged by Congress and the administration, the special envoy to Iran, Mr. Malley, is under FBI investigation for violations of his security clearance. That is our top negotiator to Iran.

My colleagues and I have been gravely concerned that this administration would lift Iranian sanctions in exchange for insufficient limitations on Iran's nuclear program. These concerns grew even more severe, again, after Rob Malley came under FBI investigation, which the State Department failed to notify Congress. When I invited him to testify about the Iran deal, I was told he was not available, and now we know why.

It is deeply disturbing that the United States Government no longer trusts the one who is spearheading our negotiations with an enemy regime. We can't afford any strategic miscalculations when it comes to Iran.

Again, as I said in the prior debate, deterrence is key, and you only deter and get peace through projecting strength, including strengthening our economic sanctions while they have eased them.

Every dollar that goes to the Iranian regime in any form has the potential to be deadly. The events of this past weekend demonstrate that. Iran launched over 350 missile and drone attacks on our ally, Israel—unprecedented in history. Israel, the United States, and other partners intercepted 99 percent of these weapons.

Iran is not 10 feet tall. That is why this legislation is so important. Congress and the American people need an opportunity to review any proposed plans to lift sanctions, especially the ones that Congress has mandated, on this rogue regime.

I thank my good friend, Mr. SELF, on the Foreign Affairs Committee, who is also from the great State of Texas, for this bill. This bill requires the President to report to Congress on any plans to terminate or waive sanctions on Iran. It codifies a process for Congress to conduct oversight of these proposed waivers and terminations.

We have that power under Article I of the Constitution. Yet, when they waive sanctions that Congress passed, they are not notifying us. We deserve that right. We have a responsibility to keep the American people safe, and that requires the executive branch and Congress to work together to determine the national security interests of the United States. Congress must have a say in any attempts to broker any kind of deal with Iran.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES,
Washington, DC, April 14, 2024.

Hon. MICHAEL McCAUL,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN McCAUL: Thank you for consulting with the Committee on Financial Services regarding H.R. 4691, the Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act of 2023. I agree that the Committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House Floor. The Committee takes this action with the mutual understanding that, by foregoing consideration of H.R. 4691 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, and that the Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved on this or similar legislation as it moves forward. The Committee also reserves the right to see appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any conference with the Senate involving this or similar legislation, and we request your support for any such request.

Finally, as you mentioned in your letter, I ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this bill be included in your Committee's report to accompany the legislation, as well as in the Congressional Record during floor consideration.

Sincerely,

PATRICK McHENRY,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, April 14, 2024.

Hon. PATRICK McHENRY,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN McHENRY: Thank you for consulting with the Foreign Affairs Committee and agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 4691, the Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act of 2023, so that the measure may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate conference on this legislation.

I will seek to place our letters on this bill into the Congressional Record during floor consideration. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward

to continuing to work together as this measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC, April 15, 2024.

Hon. MICHAEL MCCAUL,
Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN MCCAUL: I write regarding H.R. 4691, the Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act of 2023. Provisions of this bill fall within the Judiciary Committee's Rule X jurisdiction, and I appreciate that you consulted with us on those provisions. The Judiciary Committee agrees that it shall be discharged from further consideration of the bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

The Committee takes this action with the understanding that forgoing further consideration of this measure does not in any way alter the Committee's jurisdiction or waive any future jurisdictional claim over these provisions or their subject matter. We also reserve the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees in the event of a conference with the Senate involving this measure or similar legislation.

I ask that you please include this letter in your committee's report to accompany this legislation or insert this letter in the Congressional Record during consideration of H.R. 4691 on the House floor. I appreciate the cooperative manner in which our committees have worked on this matter, and I look forward to working collaboratively in the future on matters of shared jurisdiction. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

JIM JORDAN,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, April 15, 2024.

Hon. JIM JORDAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN JORDAN: Thank you for consulting with the Foreign Affairs Committee and agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 4691, the Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act, so that the measure may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate conference on this legislation.

I will seek to place our letters on this bill into the Congressional Record during floor consideration. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work together as this measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COM-
MITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND AC-
COUNTABILITY,
Washington, DC, April 15, 2024.

Hon. MICHAEL MCCAUL,
Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN MCCAUL: Thank you for consulting with the Committee on Oversight and Accountability. The Committee on Over-

sight and Accountability agrees to be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 4691, the Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act of 2023, so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

I agree that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 4691 at this time, the Committee on Oversight and Accountability does not waive any jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this or similar legislation. The Committee on Oversight and Accountability should be appropriately consulted and involved on this or similar legislation as it moves forward. I support your effort to represent the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability on the conference committee if a conference on the bill becomes necessary.

As discussed, I appreciate your inclusion of a copy of our exchange of letters on this bill in the bill report filed by the Foreign Affairs Committee and in the Congressional Record during House floor consideration thereof. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this bill and look forward to future opportunities to work together on matters of shared jurisdiction.

Sincerely,

JAMES COMER,
Chairman, Committee on Oversight
and Accountability.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, April 15, 2024.

Hon. JAMES COMER,
Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Ac-
countability, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN COMER: Thank you for consulting with the Foreign Affairs Committee and agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 4691, the Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act of 2023, so that the measure may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate conference on this legislation.

I will seek to place our letters on this bill into the Congressional Record during floor consideration. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work together as this measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL,
Chairman.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 4691.

As I have explained during committee consideration, I have serious concerns about what this bill means to the overall practice of American foreign policy and, therefore, must oppose it.

Some think that diplomacy is weak and that the only way you show strength is to go to war. We have heard from generals that if war was the only option that we had on the table, it would cost us much more in bullets and armor, and that diplomacy helps deter military.

In fact, I would say it is strength. Anybody can say I am going to fight. It is strength in trying to negotiate, in dealing with diplomacy. If that should

fail, going to war should be your last alternative.

Diplomacy and people in the State Department who exercise it are absolutely essential. It brings others with us so we are not out there by ourselves but working in a multilateral way.

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It is hard for any Member, particularly me as a ranking member, to be opposed to a bill that is meant to increase congressional oversight of sensitive foreign policy issues. However, in the specific case of this bill as drafted, were it to be signed into law, I believe it would damage America's ability to conduct effective diplomacy.

Here is why. When dealing with our enemies, a strong diplomatic corps and a strong military are both necessary to achieve our goals. In the specific case of Iran, they can clearly see from our consistent joint military exercises, regional deployments, and last weekend's missile defense that we mean business.

Our diplomatic efforts have also proven very effective. Case in point was the successful implementation of the JCPOA, which verifiably cut off all pathways to an Iranian bomb. The dangerous nuclear moment we now find ourselves in, where Iran has stockpiled highly enriched uranium and is limiting the access of inspectors is the direct result of the shortsighted cancellation of that diplomatic agreement. The Iranian nuclear threat has never been more dangerous than it is right now.

Again, when we had the JCPOA, working in a multilateral way with our other allies, and even at that point, two who are not allies, and when you speak to most individuals, IAEA included, who had eyes on what was taking place in Iran, once we pulled out and stopped using diplomacy, they have no eyes now, which is why Iran is more dangerous today than it was when they were in this agreement.

The United States must keep diplomacy on the table as a tool to address the Iranian threat. If this proposed bill is set into law, Iranian negotiators will know and allied negotiators will know that the executive branch officials in the negotiation room cannot independently make decisions. Our negotiators will be at an acute disadvantage. Other parties, friend or foe, will know any adjustment in sanctions implementation would become subject to a joint motion of disapproval. Carefully negotiated multilateral agreements risk becoming subject to partisanship right here in the United States House of Representatives, in Congress. Such an action is worrisome and also without precedent.

I also believe that this bill directly interferes with the INARA process, the bipartisan agreement currently in statute to provide Congress the ability to approve or disapprove a negotiated nuclear agreement.

Diplomatic agreements with Iran are already subject to congressional review as a whole. This bill goes far beyond

that statute. Even if the United States Congress cleared an Iran deal through a comprehensive INARA process, sanctions implementation would once again become subject to binding congressional review, risking the agreement itself.

This legislation could also harm efforts to deescalate tensions with Iran shy of a comprehensive agreement. If this or a future administration tried to negotiate a short-term diplomatic agreement on nuclear or other issues, such as regional troop protection, this legislation would interfere with that process.

I would also like to make a more general point about sanctions that I believe this Congress sometimes forgets—one I feel that I have to make over and over and over again nowadays in this Congress. Sanctions are meant to be lifted if they achieve our goals. You don't keep a sanction if the goal has been achieved. Our nuclear sanctions were not passed to foment regime change in Iran, no matter how much we hoped they were. They were designed to drive Iran to the table to negotiate an end to their nuclear weapons program. If we reach an agreement that clears INARA, one that verifiably cuts off pathways to a nuclear weapon, we have to live up to our end of the agreement.

Legislation like this one is designed to thwart our obligations, damaging our diplomatic flexibility and trustworthiness if we care about diplomacy. Now maybe we don't care about diplomacy; I think that is the wrong way to go. I think that we should very much care about diplomacy.

Finally, some will argue that there is precedent for such a policy vis-à-vis Russia. That is inaccurate. The scope of Russian sanctions in CAATSA is much smaller. For instance, national emergencies past and present are included in this proposed bill but not in CAATSA. The new Russia sanctions EOs aren't covered in CAATSA, and any new Iran EO would be. There are also many sanctions in CAATSA where there is no congressional review. This bill, however, would apply to the entire universe of Iran sanctions. Finally, CAATSA mechanisms were established specifically to deal with Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election. It wasn't about trying to prevent legitimate diplomacy, as this bill will do.

My friends and colleagues, we must look beyond Iran before going down this road. I have been around here 26 years, and I know that if passed into law, this type of policy will not stop with Iran. If this were to become law, it would only be a matter of time before the lifting of any sanction, no matter how small, would be subject to a congressional vote. It is our duty to provide the authority and the appropriations for effective foreign policy, not to undermine diplomacy in this manner.

We cannot have 535 Secretaries of State in a negotiating room. It never

happens that way. You do not negotiate that way. Diplomacy does not work that way. I say: Please think. Think carefully before steering us down this road. Think what it means if you think diplomacy is important. If you don't think diplomacy is important and the only thing that is important is going to war, then we have a difference of opinion.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MCCAUL. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. SELF), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the author of this bill.

Mr. SELF. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 4691, my bill. In response to the surprisingly bellicose comments by the ranking member, Madam Speaker, no one wants to go to war with Iran, but when the Iranian regime chants "Death to America" or "Death to Israel," America's response must be swift with immediate deterrence.

While I cannot compare to the chairman and the ranking member's years in this body, I did spend many years as a military planner, and I will tell you, I agree with President Reagan: "We know only too well that war comes not when the forces of freedom are strong, but when they are weak." Case in point, Iran's massive attack on Israel just days ago.

Make no mistake, the Biden administration has covertly fueled Iran's global sponsorship of terrorism. Three times in the last year, the administration signed off on a sanctions waiver to Iran, unlocking \$10 billion that were previously frozen.

Then, in September, the President agreed to give \$6 billion to Iran in exchange for hostages. Lifting sanctions freed up billions of dollars that Iran used to support terrorist proxies, such as Hezbollah, the Houthi rebels, and Hamas.

Shockingly, after Hamas terrorists savagely murdered 1,200 innocent Israelis on October 7, the White House refused to correct course.

Before President Biden was sworn into office, Iran had \$4 billion in foreign reserves. That number today is \$70 billion. Again, \$4 billion before, \$70 billion today. Congress was never involved in these decisions, and this is only the most recent tip of the iceberg.

Let's not forget Obama's Iran deal, which most agree was a disaster. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, otherwise known as the JCPOA, was a plan of action to benefit Iran. The JCPOA did not end Iran's nuclear weapon production but lifted sanctions, including access to at least \$50 billion in liquid assets.

Later, in 2017, Congress passed a sanctions bill against the areas overlooked in the Iran deal on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis. There is no reason to allow the White House to override Congress by providing sanctions relief to the number one donor to

Hezbollah, the Houthi rebels, and Hamas.

My bill, the Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act, will prevent just that. This legislation establishes a detailed procedure for Congress to review any action by the President to terminate, waive, or modify sanctions on Iran. Under the bill, the President must report to Congress on any proposed sanctions relief and the reasons for the change in policy.

Congress must not allow the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism to get a payday as it continues to spread its malign influence on a global scale.

Madam Speaker, Congress must rein in the actions of a lawless President. Congress must reassert Article I authority.

Mr. MEEKS. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MCCAUL. Madam Speaker, I have no further speakers, and I am prepared to close.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Madam Speaker, I think everyone has heard by now how important diplomacy is. I think that we should show it in our budget. I am a firm believer in diplomacy. The fact of the matter, the direct quote from General Mattis was: "If you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately."

I guess my friends and colleagues from the other side of the aisle just want to buy ammunition, and that is why the State Department is continually being cut, because they don't really focus on or put diplomacy on the same level, and that is what is happening here with this bill.

This bill would significantly impede America's ability to conduct effective diplomacy with Iran. By requiring that any adjustment in sanctions implementation be subject to a joint motion of disapproval, the bill would undermine diplomacy and U.S. negotiators, and makes that clear to anyone sitting across from them at the table. That is the negotiating table, not the battlefield, where we hope we don't have to go, but we are prepared and have shown that we are ready to do it if we must, and that is discussed first at a negotiating table.

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This would also let them know when we are at the table—those that are sitting across that table—that they have no authority to relax or adjust sanctions. It would subject any negotiations to undue congressional partisanship.

Can anyone deny that what we see happening on this floor—and what is happening in this 118th Congress—partisanship plays a huge role? In fact, we can't get anything done because of partisanship. Iran would know this. In fact, our allies would know this.

We are tied up in partisanship. This would only weaken our position. This only compromises the agility required

to address urgent international threats and opportunities.

Moreover, the stipulations of this bill undermine the very purpose of sanctions which are intended as tools to bring nations like Iran to the negotiating table—not as a permanent punitive measure. But if they do something where they are disregarding, and we are not working together and are aggressive at that negotiating table, we also are letting them know that we are ready or what we have the capability of doing.

This bill hurts diplomacy. It hurts trying to make sure that we are driving others to the negotiating table. As General Mattis said, he doesn't have to buy more bullets. Let's fund the State Department. Let's promote and speak good will of diplomacy. It is the best way to move forward in a multilateral way with our allies.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MCCAUL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

I agree with some of the things my good friend has said. Diplomacy is extremely important. We deal with it on the committee all the time. It is called soft power. Then we have hard power. We sign off on foreign military weapons sales. Diplomacy at all costs needs to be tried, but when the diplomats fail, often we go to war or we have conflict.

The question before us is twofold. One, has Iran negotiated in good faith such that we would both waive or not enforce or let expire sanctions, many of them passed by Congress?

The second question is, are Article I authorities under the Constitution?

All we are simply asking for is when we pass a sanction—or the administration does so—that they notify Congress.

And I will tell you why this is important.

For months I tried to get Robert Malley, our special envoy to Iran, into the committee to testify on this Iran deal, but guess what? He refused to come testify. Why? Because we then find out he was under investigation by the FBI for potential violation of his security clearance.

This great Iran deal that they talk about has only brought Iran closer to a nuclear bomb, closer to weapons-grade uranium. They can go to 90 percent in days. If they get a nuclear warhead from Russia or North Korea, they have full capability, and they will become a nuclear state. We cannot let that happen.

They failed to declare nuclear sites in Iran. They kicked out investigators from the IAEA. Then in one of the most horrific displays of bad faith in negotiations, Mr. Speaker, do you know what they did? They launched a cyberattack on the IAEA to steal their documents related to their investigations on the very sites that the JCPOA was supposed to allow them in to examine. Then they blocked the inspectors from having access to these sites.

Now, I am all for negotiating. I am all for diplomacy. I don't think the Ayatollah is a good faith partner here, and I don't think he has our best interests at heart. They chant "death to America," and "death to Israel" and call us "Great Satan," and they call Israel "Little Satan." They are closer to a bomb than they have ever been.

All we are saying, Mr. Speaker, is before you waive sanctions that Congress passed, or not enforce sanctions, just let us know. I don't think that is a big deal. I mean, Malley wouldn't testify before Congress. We didn't know why because they were hiding it from us. They didn't want us to know about the FBI investigation until the press reported it. We found out from the press—not from the administration, but from the press.

Let's look at some of the sanctions that they let expire and they have waived, and you tell me if that makes sense. The sanctions on energy, exporting energy to China, the majority going to China; we are allowing this axis of evil—the Ayatollah, Putin, and China—to work together with Iran exporting energy.

Mr. Speaker, \$80 billion from China went into Iran to fund the very missiles and rockets and drones that we saw last Saturday night. It was the first attack from Iran into Israel in history.

Then they let the U.N. sanctions on exports to other countries for their missiles and drones to expire. Now, we have a bill to reinstate those sanctions. The very same drones and missiles were used to attack Israel last Saturday night, the very same drones and missiles that have been bought by Russia to kill Ukrainians. It is all interconnected. China is in this, the Ayatollah is in it, Putin is in it, and they are all profiting from Iran, who they provide technical expertise. Iran makes the stuff and the energy that they then buy from them to put the money in Iran to reign terror.

I think it only fair that the American people through their Representatives under Article I have the opportunity to even know when they are doing this and not operate behind a veil of secrecy. When a Republican President gets into office, what will the Democrats say then if they are hiding things on sanctions and investigations? I think we will hear the same argument that we are making on this side.

That is why this is not a partisan issue. This is about this institution under Article I. We have every right to know this, especially the sanctions that we pass in Congress. We always put a Presidential waiver in these things. Remember Nord Stream 2, we put a Presidential waiver. Nobody thought that a President would waive sanctions on a pipeline to put Europe in a state of dependency on Russian energy. Look how that one worked out. Did we know about it in advance? No. That didn't work out so well, did it?

Right after Afghanistan, guess what happens? Putin, the Russian Federation went into Ukraine. Chairman Xi is watching it. He is looking at Taiwan.

No. We have tried. We have tried acting in good faith with them. They are not acting in good faith with us, and the American people through its Representatives and the Congress, I say, have a right to know.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GIMENEZ). All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 1149, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended.

The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed.

RESCISSION OF CERTAIN WAIVERS AND LICENSES RELATING TO IRAN

Mr. SELF. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1149, I call up the bill (H.R. 5947) to provide for the rescission of certain waivers and licenses relating to Iran, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1149, the bill is considered read.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 5947

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RESCISSION OF CERTAIN WAIVERS AND LICENSES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On the date of enactment of this Act, the following measures shall be terminated:

(1) The waiver exercised on the pursuant to section 1245(d)(5) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 and sections 1244(i) and 1247(f) of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 and transmitted to Congress on September 11, 2023, for the transfer of certain funds from the Republic of Korea to Qatar.

(2) Any general or specific license issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the Department of the Treasury directly or indirectly related to the funds cited in paragraph (1).

(b) LIMITATION.—The President may not re-issue any new waiver or license described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) for the same or similar purposes.

SEC. 2. LIMITATION OF APPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN LICENSES.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on and after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may not—