

from exporting technology to DJI. It is time for Congress to do its part and to start winding down DJI's presence in the United States.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I simply urge support for this legislation on a bipartisan basis, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I further urge support of H.R. 2864. This bill, again, came out of the Energy and Commerce Committee 43-0, and I urge passage of the legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 2864, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the House by Ms. Avery M. Stringer, one of his secretaries.

FOREIGN ADVERSARY COMMUNICATIONS TRANSPARENCY ACT

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 820) to direct the Federal Communications Commission to publish a list of entities that hold authorizations, licenses, or other grants of authority issued by the Commission and that have certain foreign ownership, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 820

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act".

SEC. 2. LIST OF ENTITIES HOLDING FCC AUTHORIZATIONS, LICENSES, OR OTHER GRANTS OF AUTHORITY AND HAVING CERTAIN FOREIGN OWNERSHIP.

(a) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall publish on the internet website of the Commission a list of each entity—

(1) that holds a license issued by the Commission pursuant to—

(A) section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)); or

(B) the Act of May 27, 1921 (47 U.S.C. 34 et seq.; commonly known as the "Cable Landing Licensing Act") and Executive Order 10530 (3 U.S.C. 301 note; relating to the performance of certain functions vested in or subject to the approval of the President); and

(2) with respect to which—

(A) a covered entity holds an equity or voting interest that is required to be reported to the Commission under the ownership rules of the Commission; or

(B) an appropriate national security agency has determined that a covered entity exerts control, regardless of whether such covered entity

holds an equity or voting interest as described in subparagraph (A).

(b) *RULEMAKING.*—

(1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall issue rules to obtain information to identify each entity—

(A) that holds any authorization, license, or other grant of authority issued by the Commission (other than a license described in subsection (a)(1)); and

(B) with respect to which a covered entity holds an equity or voting interest that is required to be reported to the Commission under the ownership rules of the Commission.

(2) *PLACEMENT ON LIST.*—Not later than 1 year after the Commission issues the rules required by paragraph (1), the Commission shall place each entity described in such paragraph on the list published under subsection (a).

(c) *PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT EXEMPTION.*—A collection of information conducted or sponsored by the Commission to implement this section does not constitute a collection of information for the purposes of subchapter I of chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code (commonly referred to as the "Paperwork Reduction Act").

(d) *ANNUAL UPDATES.*—The Commission shall, not less frequently than annually, update the list published under subsection (a), including with respect to any entity required to be placed on such list by subsection (b)(2).

(e) *DEFINITIONS.*—In this collection:

(1) *APPROPRIATE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.*—The term "appropriate national security agency" has the meaning given such term in section 9 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1608).

(2) *COMMISSION.*—The term "Commission" means the Federal Communications Commission.

(3) *COVERED COUNTRY.*—The term "covered country" means a country specified in section 4872(d)(2) of title 10, United States Code.

(4) *COVERED ENTITY.*—The term "covered entity" means—

(A) the government of a covered country;

(B) an entity organized under the laws of a covered country; and

(C) a subsidiary or affiliate of an entity described in subparagraph (B), regardless of whether the subsidiary or affiliate is organized under the laws of a covered country.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PALLONE) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous material in the record on the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 820, the Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act, led by the gentlewoman from New York's 21st District.

The Chinese Communist Party and other foreign adversaries present security threats to our critical infrastructure. Entities with ties to these countries could be called upon to support and assist their national intelligence

work, jeopardizing the security of American data and communications networks. As a result, the presence of their equipment in our networks pose a significant threat to our national security.

Over the years, Congress has worked to address these threats from passing legislation to rip-and-replace Huawei and ZTE equipment from our networks by encouraging TikTok to divest from its CCP-controlled parent company, ByteDance. We must build on this work by bringing transparency into the ways our foreign adversaries operate in our networks.

This legislation requires the FCC to annually publish a list of entities with ties to our adversaries, Communist China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, that hold a license, authorization, or other authority granted by the FCC.

Understanding which adversaries are present in our communications networks as well as the threat they pose is necessary to strengthen our networks.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from New York's 21st District for her leadership on this bill and the chair of the Energy and Commerce Committee for her leadership moving this bill to the floor.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 820, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 820, the Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act.

Last week, the Department of Justice indicted two Russian nationals over payments made to several extreme rightwing American influencers in an attempt to tip the scales in our Nation's upcoming elections. This is an extremely disturbing and stark reminder of the length that foreign adversary countries will go to use our media and communications networks to disrupt and divide us, weakening our country for their own benefit.

Whether it is through social media, equipment, or the communications networks itself, we have seen these operations time and time again, which is why we must stay vigilant to minimize these risks or avoid them all together.

Today, we are taking additional action to stay ahead of these risks. H.R. 820 will shed some light on the investments of foreign adversaries in our country's communications networks.

Every day these networks carry Americans' most sensitive personal data. We must have a clear understanding if any foreign adversary countries, or the companies operating within those countries, are investors in our communications networks.

This is critically important because, unfortunately, we have too often seen foreign adversary governments or those beholden to them target these networks and the devices and applications running on top of them as a way to disrupt our daily lives or to conduct espionage campaigns.

Any communications network with ties to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran magnifies this target and endangers our national security interests.

H.R. 820 helps address these concerns. This bipartisan bill would require the Federal Communications Commission to publish a list within 4 months indicating any entities with ties to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran that hold wireless and undersea cable licenses that power our country's mobile and fixed communications networks.

The bill would also require the FCC to issue rules in 18 months to help it attain foreign ownership information for the remaining authorization, licenses, and grants that the agency issues. The FCC would then publish on its list any additional entities with ties to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran no later than 1 year after the new rules are adopted. The FCC would also need to update this entity list annually.

With this bill, we continue to secure our communications networks and protect Americans from rogue nation-states seeking to use our networks against us. This bill will also help us better protect our allies as they too rely on our global undersea cable network for broadband services.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 820, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. STEFANIK), the bill's sponsor.

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Speaker, once again, I rise today in support of bipartisan legislation, the Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency or FACT Act.

I will thank again our Energy and Commerce Chairwoman CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Chairman LATTA, Ranking Member PALLONE, and the entire committee for their support.

Additionally, I will take the time to thank the previous chair of the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, MIKE GALLAGHER; the current chair, Chairman JOHN MOOLENAAR; and Ranking Member RAJA KRISHNAMOORTHY for their work this Congress in advancing public awareness of the dire threat that Communist China poses to America's prosperity and passing critical legislation to counter that critical threat.

Communist China is using every tool at its disposal to conduct a coordinated campaign to surveil and collect information on Americans. One of the ways that the CCP is doing this is through infiltrating our telecommunications and technology markets.

Despite this clear and present threat posed by Communist Chinese-controlled telecommunications company, many still maintain authorities to operate in the United States. Even worse, while some CCP-controlled companies like Huawei and ZTE have been publicly identified, there are other Com-

munist Chinese telecom and tech companies that have not yet drawn public scrutiny.

My bipartisan FACT Act will provide much-needed transparency into the level of Communist China's infiltration into our technology sector.

The FACT Act will require the Federal Communications Commission to publish a list of companies who both hold FCC authorizations and have any ownership by foreign adversarial governments, including China, Russia, Iran, and others.

This public disclosure will help to shine a light on the malign access and influence Communist Chinese companies have inside our tech and telecom markets. We cannot allow companies controlled by the CCP or other foreign adversaries to have unfettered and unknown access to our telecommunications infrastructure.

This legislation will give Americans much-needed transparency and will pave the way for future action to counter these adversarial-owned listed companies.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this bipartisan bill to counter the influence of Communist China and other foreign adversaries on America's telecommunications infrastructure.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I, again, urge support for this important legislation to protect us on a bipartisan basis, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, this legislation came out of the Energy and Commerce Committee 44-0. It shows how important this legislation is, and I urge support of H.R. 820.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 820, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

□ 1645

REMOVING OUR UNSECURE TECHNOLOGIES TO ENSURE RELIABILITY AND SECURITY ACT

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7589) to direct the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, to conduct a study of the national security risks posed by consumer routers, modems, and devices that combine a modem and router, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7589

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Removing Our Unsecure Technologies to Ensure Reliability and Security Act" or the "ROUTERS Act".

SEC. 2. STUDY OF NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS POSED BY CERTAIN ROUTERS AND MODEMS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall conduct a study of the national security risks posed by consumer routers, modems, and devices that combine a modem and router that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the influence of a covered country.

(b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report on the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) COVERED COUNTRY.—The term "covered country" means a country specified in section 4872(d)(2) of title 10, United States Code.

(2) SECRETARY.—The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PALLONE) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material in the RECORD on the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of my legislation, H.R. 7589, the ROUTERS Act.

Routers and modems play a key role in communications networks. They are the entry point through which the public accesses the internet. Thus, we must make sure that they are secure.

Bad actors can exploit vulnerabilities in routers to infect users' computers, access their information, or disrupt their networks.

National security agencies, including the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security, have reported on the threat posed by the vulnerability in routers and how some Communist Chinese Party-sponsored hackers have used these vulnerabilities to launch attacks. We should take these matters and reports seriously.

Further, we know that companies with ties to the CCP could be forced to support China's intelligence activities. We can imagine how they could use vulnerabilities in their equipment to aid these efforts.

That is why I am pleased to sponsor the ROUTERS Act, which would direct