

the Secretary of Commerce through the Assistant Secretary of Communications and Information to study the national security risk posed by routers and modems produced by companies with ties to foreign adversaries. This study will help Congress understand the scope and risk of this threat and will inform whether we need to remove this equipment from our networks.

This legislation bolsters our bipartisan efforts to remove untrusted equipment from our communications ecosystem.

In the past 4 years, we passed the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act to remove Huawei and ZTE equipment from our networks, and we passed the Secure Equipment Act, which prohibits the Federal Communications Commission from authorizing equipment from untrusted vendors. Today's legislation builds on this work.

I thank our chair, the gentlewoman from Washington (Mrs. RODGERS), and the members of the Energy and Commerce Committee for a strong bipartisan vote for this legislation back in March. It is imperative we move forward with these efforts to mitigate the widespread availability of this equipment.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 7589, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 7589, the Removing Our Unsecure Technologies to Ensure Reliability and Security Act, or the ROUTERS Act.

This bill is an important step to provide Americans with the confidence to trust that the devices they use in their homes to connect to the internet are free from the influence of our foreign adversaries.

H.R. 7589 accomplishes this objective by requiring the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, to study the national security risk posed by routers and modems found in American homes that are manufactured or sold to entities with ties to foreign adversary countries. The Secretary must also deliver a report to Congress of this study within 1 year.

I think it is crucial that we understand the cybersecurity and national security risks that our networks face from equipment that originates from our foreign adversaries. This is especially true given that our Nation's communications networks are an integral component to nearly every facet of American life, which also makes them prime targets for attack.

This legislation will help us to better protect American families and our country from bad actors who want to carry out malicious attacks.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Representative PELTOLA and Chairman LATTA of the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology for their bipartisan work on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, this is another bill that is part of this effort to try to make sure that our foreign adversaries are not hurting us in many ways in the communications sector. It is an important bill, and I urge my colleagues to vote for it on a bipartisan basis. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, this legislation moved through the Energy and Commerce Committee 43-0, showing the absolute importance of moving this legislation through. I urge support of H.R. 7589 and yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MEUSER). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7589.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

DECOUPLING FROM FOREIGN ADVERSARIAL BATTERY DEPENDENCE ACT

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 8631) to prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security from procuring certain foreign-made batteries, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 8631

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act".

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PROCUREMENT OF CERTAIN BATTERIES.

(a) *IN GENERAL.*—Beginning on October 1, 2027, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of Homeland Security may be obligated to procure a battery produced by an entity specified in subsection (b).

(b) *ENTITIES SPECIFIED.*—The entities specified in this subsection are the following:

- (1) Contemporary Amperex Technology Company, Limited (also known as "CATL").
- (2) BYD Company, Limited.
- (3) Envision Energy, Limited.
- (4) EVE Energy Company, Limited.
- (5) Gotion High tech Company, Limited.
- (6) Hithium Energy Storage Technology company, Limited.

(7) *Any entity on any list required under clauses (i), (ii), (iv), or (v) of section 2(d)(2)(B) of Public Law 117-78 (commonly referred to as the "Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act").*

(8) *Any entity identified by the Secretary of Defense as a Chinese military company pursuant to section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note).*

(9) *Any entity included in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor regulation.*

(10) *Any subsidiary or successor to an entity specified in paragraphs (1) through (9).*

(c) *TREATMENT OF PRODUCTION.*—For purposes of this section, a battery shall be treated

as produced by an entity specified in subsection (b) if such entity—

- (1) assembles or manufactures the final product that uses such battery; or
- (2) creates or otherwise provides a majority of the components used in such battery.

(d) *WAIVERS.*—

(1) *RELATING TO ASSESSMENT.*—The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the limitation under subsection (a) if the Secretary assesses in the affirmative all of the following:

(A) *The batteries to be procured do not pose a national security, data, or infrastructure risk to the United States.*

(B) *There is no available alternative to procure batteries that are—*

- (i) of similar or better cost and quality; and
- (ii) produced by an entity not specified in subsection (b).

(2) *RELATING TO RESEARCH.*—The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the limitation under subsection (a) if the Secretary determines that the batteries to be procured are for the sole purpose of research, evaluation, training, testing, or analysis.

(3) *CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.*—Not later than 15 days after granting a waiver under this subsection, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a notification relating thereto.

(e) *REPORT.*—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the anticipated impacts on mission and costs on the Department of Homeland Security associated with carrying out this section, including with respect to following components of the Department:

- (1) U.S. Customs and Border Protection, including the U.S. Border Patrol.
- (2) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, including Homeland Security Investigations.
- (3) The United States Secret Service.
- (4) The Transportation Security Administration.
- (5) The United States Coast Guard.
- (6) The Federal Protective Service.
- (7) The Federal Emergency Management Agency.
- (8) The Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers.
- (9) The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GIMENEZ) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. IVEY) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 8631, the bill now under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill, H.R. 8631, the Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act.

Our world is increasingly reliant on battery technology, from the smartphones in our pockets to the energy storage systems that power our homes and businesses.

This dependence underscores a larger issue: Our Nation is becoming increasingly reliant on foreign adversarial entities for the materials and technologies that power these devices, which poses grave risk to our Nation's security and economic stability.

As it stands, Communist China produces approximately 80 percent of the world's batteries and roughly 70 percent of the world's lithium-ion batteries. These staggering numbers leave U.S. supply chains vulnerable and our Nation's security at risk.

Recently, the United States House Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, a committee that I am a member of, uncovered information that revealed that at least two of the world's top battery manufacturers, CATL and Gotion High-Tech, are affiliated with Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation, a paramilitary and CCP-owned entity that is expressly named in the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act statute due to its egregious forced labor practices.

Specifically, XPCC has been accused of assisting the CCP's policy in Xinjiang that implemented comprehensive surveillance, detention, and indoctrination that targeted Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minority groups that the CCP is attempting to eradicate. Furthermore, XPCC utilizes forced labor practices to manufacture their wide range of products.

In addition, dependence on batteries that are manufactured in the PRC presents incredible risks to our national security. There are legitimate concerns that PRC-aligned battery companies and other similar Chinese entities could install malware and other intelligence-gathering sensors on these products, which could result in gathering sensitive information or execute a shutdown on EV charging networks and battery-energy storage systems or even disable targeted vehicles through hardware infiltration.

Last year, reports indicated that the PRC-aligned CATL installed its batteries at facilities in Florida, Virginia, Nevada, and California, as well as a solar farm on leased land inside the U.S. Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. Energy-storage batteries produced by the PRC-aligned CATL at Camp Lejeune have been decommissioned, following increased pressure from Congress.

The Pentagon's decision to not only remove the PRC-aligned CATL batteries from Camp Lejeune but also to make it clear it will not buy CATL batteries because of concerns is more than adequate to demonstrate why we should not have these batteries in other parts of our critical infrastructure.

Our government should not be spending tax dollars to procure batteries from companies that profit from slave labor or provide another avenue for the CCP to expand their surveillance apparatus here in the United States homeland.

My legislation, H.R. 8631, the Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act, is a critical first step in addressing this issue. Modeled after previous provisions included in the fiscal year 2024 NDAA, my legislation builds off these efforts and prohibits the Department of Homeland Security from procuring battery technology companies that have deep ties to the CCP and engage in human rights abuses. In doing so, this bill helps our Nation take a step to advance efforts to decouple from the PRC and safeguard critical supply chains from exploitation.

I am proud to see this bill pass out of committee in a bipartisan nature and look forward to seeing it pass the full House with a bipartisan vote.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. IVEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, my fellow Democrats and I strongly support the intent of this bill, which is to reduce our reliance on global adversaries and build up an industrial manufacturing base in the United States by prohibiting DHS from procuring batteries from certain Chinese companies.

I am grateful the committee included Ranking Member THOMPSON's amendment to the original bill, which expands the number of companies subject to the prohibition. In addition to the six Chinese companies named in the original bill, Ranking Member THOMPSON's amendment expands the prohibition to include any companies using Uyghur forced labor identified by the Secretary of Defense as Chinese military companies and engaging in activities contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, according to the Department of Commerce.

I also thank the committee for including Representative SUOZZI's amendment, which requires DHS to produce a report on the potential impacts and costs associated with carrying out this bill before the prohibition goes into effect. The report will help DHS and Congress manage any unanticipated negative consequences from this bill.

While these amendments have made the bill better, there are lingering concerns, including how a ban on Chinese-made batteries will impact DHS' ability to buy American-made electric vehicles, since most American EV producers use Chinese-sourced batteries.

The bill could also further be improved by requiring DHS to identify ways to foster job creation and economic growth here at home and ensure the inclusion of economically disadvantaged individuals and small businesses when purchasing batteries.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

□ 1700

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. MOOLENAAR).

Mr. MOOLENAAR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support Representative GIMENEZ' Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act to protect taxpayer dollars from growing our dependence on CCP-controlled battery technology.

As Representative GIMENEZ noted, the House Select Committee on China has investigated the world's cutting-edge battery manufacturers in China. There is indisputable evidence that two CCP-aligned battery makers, Gotion and CATL, are deeply connected to forced labor and the ongoing genocide in China. Gotion and CATL plan to build factories in the United States and thereby grow our dependence on their slave labor-tainted supply chains.

For my colleagues who care deeply about embracing next-generation energy technologies, I would just say this: We need America to lead when it comes to new energy sources, not China. We cannot lead by following. Buying Chinese technology will only dig ourselves further into dependence on the CCP.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to vote in favor of this important legislation and to protect our critical supply chains.

Mr. IVEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Republicans and Democrats alike recognize the threat posed by China and stand unified in defense of our national and homeland security.

H.R. 8631 is imperfect, but it is a step in the right direction, and I urge my colleagues to support it. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, we cannot continue to surrender dominance over our critical supply chains to our geopolitical rivals. Communist China will exploit any economic or security vulnerabilities that could be created from the Department of Homeland Security's reliance on lithium-ion batteries.

To put an end to this dependence and to take important steps in decoupling from the CCP, I urge a "yes" vote on H.R. 8631.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GIMENEZ) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 8631, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

DETECTION EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION TO COUNTER THE THREAT OF FENTANYL AND XYLAZINE ACT OF 2024

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 8663) to require the Science and Technology Directorate in the Department of Homeland Security to develop greater capacity to detect, identify, and disrupt illicit substances in very low concentrations.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 8663

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.

This Act may be cited as the “Detection Equipment and Technology Evaluation to Counter the Threat of Fentanyl and Xylazine Act of 2024” or the “DETECT Fentanyl and Xylazine Act of 2024”.

SEC. 2. ENHANCING THE CAPACITY TO DETECT, IDENTIFY, AND DISRUPT DRUGS SUCH AS FENTANYL AND XYLAZINE.

Section 302 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 182) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (13), by striking “and” at the end;

(2) in paragraph (14), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(15) carrying out research, development, testing, evaluation, and cost-benefit analyses to improve the safety, effectiveness, and efficiency of equipment and reference libraries for use by Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies for the accurate detection of drugs or the disruption of drug trafficking for drugs such as fentanyl and xylazine, including, but not limited to—

“(A) portable equipment that can detect and identify drugs with minimal or no handling of the sample;

“(B) equipment that can separate complex mixtures containing low concentrations of drugs and high concentrations of cutting agents into their component parts to enable signature extraction for field identification and detection; and

“(C) technologies that use machine learning or artificial intelligence (as defined in section 5002 of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (15 U.S.C. 9401)) and other techniques to predict whether the substances in a sample are controlled substance analogues or other new psychoactive substances not yet included in available reference libraries.”.

SEC. 3. REQUIREMENTS.

In carrying out section 302(15) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by section 2, the Under Secretary for Science and Technology shall—

(1) follow the recommendations, guidelines, and best practices described in the Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (NIST AI 100-1) or any successor document published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology; and

(2) establish the Directorate of Science and Technology’s research, development, testing, evaluation, and cost-benefit analysis priorities under such section 302(15) based on the latest available information, including the latest State and Territory Report on Enduring and Emerging Threats published by the Drug Enforcement Administration or any successor document.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from

Florida (Mr. GIMENEZ) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. IVEY) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 8663, the bill now under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 8663, the DETECT Fentanyl and Xylazine Act of 2024.

As the catastrophe at our southern border has continued to spiral out of control, the trafficking of fentanyl and other drugs has reached critical levels, putting Americans and law enforcement officials at risk.

The unchecked drug flow has devastated families and communities across the country, and the Committee on Homeland Security has uncovered throughout the course of the past 2 years this devastating lack of enforcement at the southern border.

While our brave law enforcement and frontline border personnel do their best to interdict, they do not always have the tools and resources to effectively do so. H.R. 8663 will improve drug detection accuracy through DHS Science and Technology Directorate research and providing critical equipment for Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement dealing with fentanyl, xylazine, and other deadly drugs.

Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. LALOTA) for his work on this legislation. I urge all Members to support it, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. IVEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

H.R. 8663, the Detection Equipment and Technology Evaluation to Counter the Threat of Fentanyl and Xylazine Act is a critical piece of legislation that empowers the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to enhance the ability of all levels of law enforcement to detect and disrupt illicit substances.

This bipartisan bill, which is cosponsored in the House by my colleagues Congressmen LOU CORREA and DON DAVIS, was initially introduced by Senators CORNYN, OSSOFF, LANKFORD, and SINEMA this past spring.

The bill mandates the development of advanced technologies, such as portable drug detectors that require minimal sample handling, equipment capable of separating complex drug mixtures into identifiable components, and the use of artificial intelligence to identify emerging threats.

These innovations are designed to improve the efficiency and accuracy of drug detection efforts, providing law

enforcement with the tools they need to stay ahead of traffickers and safeguard our communities.

While this bipartisan bill is undeniably a step forward in combating the widespread issue of illicit substances like fentanyl and xylazine, it is essential to recognize that its impact goes far beyond the narrow scope of any nation’s involvement, including China’s. The challenges of detecting these dangerous drugs are global in nature, and the solutions proposed by this bill address a broad spectrum of threats that law enforcement faces across the United States.

This bill is primarily a response and provides comprehensive benefits in bolstering our national security and public health infrastructure. Therefore, while we strongly support the bill’s objectives, we resist the effort to politicize any aspect of this critical issue, especially given the complexity and widespread nature of this action.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York (Mr. LALOTA), the author of the legislation.

Mr. LALOTA. Mr. Speaker, the United States of America, the greatest nation the world has ever known, is facing an unprecedented crisis as deadly drugs like fentanyl and xylazine devastate our communities. It is imperative that our leaders here in Congress work together to confront this epidemic and save lives.

Last year, there were over 107,000 drug overdose deaths. Of those deaths, over 81,000 involved opioids. Based on prior years’ statistics, we estimate that fentanyl was responsible for nearly 90 percent of all synthetic opioid-related deaths. That is almost 73,000 fentanyl deaths in just 1 year.

These staggering statistics are not just numbers. They represent real lives lost, real families shattered, and real communities that are forever changed for the worse. It is the biggest cause of death of Americans ages 18-45, and it does not discriminate based on race or economic class. It kills in each of our districts—170 fentanyl deaths per congressional district per year on average.

Even more troubling is xylazine. Known on the streets as tranq, it is now being mixed with fentanyl, making the drug even more deadly and more difficult to detect.

We must do more, more to get these dangerous substances off our streets and ensure our law enforcement officers have every tool and resource necessary to combat this crisis effectively, which is why I was proud to introduce the DETECT Fentanyl and Xylazine Act, a bipartisan bill that will do just that.

This legislation is not just a response to the ever-growing threat of illicit narcotics like fentanyl and xylazine. It is a critical step in our fight to protect our communities and to save lives.