

when placing a foreign entity on certain sanctions lists, whether it is with the Office of Foreign Asset Control, OFAC, BIS, or somewhere else.

From there, these other agencies would then have to determine whether that entity that is sanctioned should be added to their own sanctions list.

It is required, Mr. Speaker. It is not optional. It is not when the agency gets around to it, if ever. It is required.

Subsequently, each agency will be required to submit a report to Congress specifying which entities they chose to include on their list and explaining their process.

Let me be clear: This bill does not mandate inclusion of any entity on any list. It doesn't tie the hand of the executive branch, but it does require the executive branch agencies to communicate with each other.

I view this as a simple way for the interagency to coordinate, maximize penalties on foreign bad actors, close loopholes they may take advantage of, and it also creates the bureaucratic incentive to better coordinate our sanctions process.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman MCCAUL for his leadership and Ranking Member MEEKS for working with us to get this language to a bipartisan agreement in the Foreign Affairs Committee. I urge its swift passage on the floor.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to close, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 5613, as amended.

The U.S. Government operates many lists of foreign companies run by different departments with different departments. This is entirely appropriate. A North Korean nuclear proliferation agency is not the same as an unverified South Korean company.

While we may want to place restrictions on both, at least temporarily, the penalties and consequences should differ accordingly. The purpose of this bill is straightforward.

When one agency, like the Department of Commerce, lists a foreign entity, it ensures that other agencies, such as the Department of Defense, are formally notified. The right hand simply needs to know what the left hand is doing.

We need smart and effective policies, not a one-size-fits-all approach, particularly when it comes to economic statecraft and especially in our competition with China.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support this bill. Also, since the gentleman said that he was prepared to close, that is my closing. It is my opening and my closing.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Well done, my friend, from New York for opening and closing.

Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend and colleague, Congressman WALTZ, for his leadership on this. This is a good bill. This is something we need to do. We need to force harmonization, coordination on the interagency. We have a lot of different lists. We have got the Treasury's Chinese Military-Industrial Complex List. We have the entity list at Commerce BIS. We have the Military End User List at Commerce. We have the 1260H list at DOD. We need this bill. We need better coordination.

I thank Chairman MCCAUL and Armed Services Committee Chairman ROGERS for their leadership in moving this bill to the floor today. I hope that all of our colleagues will join us in ensuring that U.S. sanctions remain a powerful tool for defending our interests and values against those who seek to undermine democracy, security, and human rights around the world. Until we get outbound sanctions legislation, this is a good placeholder.

Mr. Speaker, I urge unanimous support for H.R. 5613, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 5613, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

REMOTE ACCESS SECURITY ACT

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 8152) to amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to provide for control of remote access of items, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 8152

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Remote Access Security Act".

SEC. 2. CONTROL OF REMOTE ACCESS OF ITEMS UNDER THE EXPORT CONTROL REFORM ACT OF 2018.

The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 is amended—

(1) in section 1742 (50 U.S.C. 4801), by adding at the end the following:

"(15) REMOTE ACCESS.—The term 'remote access' means access to an item that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (without regard to the physical location of the item) and included on the Commerce Control List set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations, by a foreign person through a network connection, including the internet or a cloud computing service, from a location other than where the item is physically located, to use the functions of the item if the use of those functions may pose a serious risk to the national security or foreign policy of the United States, such as by—

"(A) training an artificial intelligence model that could—

"(i) substantially lower the barrier of entry for experts or non-experts to design, synthesize, acquire, or use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction;

"(ii) enable offensive cyber operations through automated vulnerability discovery and exploitation against a wide range of potential targets of cyber attacks; or

"(iii) permit the evasion of human control or oversight of automated systems through means of deception or obfuscation; or

"(B) accessing a quantum computer that could enable offensive cyber operations or other risks to national security; or

"(C) accessing hacking tools.";

(2) in section 1752 (50 U.S.C. 4811)—

(A) in paragraph (1)—

(i) in subparagraph (A), by inserting "or remote access" after "export"; and

(ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting "or remote access" after "export"; and

(B) in paragraph (2)—

(i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking "and in-country transfer of items" and inserting "in-country transfer, and remote access of items"; and

(ii) in subparagraph (A)—

(I) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking "release" and inserting "release or remote access";

(II) in clause (iv), by striking "or" and inserting a semicolon;

(III) in clause (v), by striking the period at the end and inserting "or"; and

(IV) by adding at the end the following:

"(vi) offensive cyber operations.";

(3) in section 1753 (50 U.S.C. 4812)—

(A) in subsection (a)—

(i) in paragraph (1), by striking "and" at the end;

(ii) in paragraph (2)(F), by striking the period at the end and inserting "and"; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following:

"(3) the remote access to—

"(A) items subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (without regard to the physical location of the items) that are determined by the President to warrant controls with respect to access by foreign persons or countries of concern; and

"(B) the functions of such items.";

(B) in subsection (b)—

(i) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (7) as paragraphs (4) through (8), respectively; and

(ii) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

"(3) regulate the remote access by foreign persons of items as described in subsection (a)(3); and

(C) in subsection (c)—

(i) by striking "or in-country transfer" each place it appears and inserting "in-country transfer, or remote access"; and

(ii) by striking "subsections (b)(1) or (b)(2)" and inserting "subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3)";

(4) in section 1754 (50 U.S.C. 4813)—

(A) in subsection (a)—

(i) in paragraph (3), by striking "and in-country transfers" and inserting "in-country transfers, and remote access";

(ii) in paragraph (4), by striking "and in-country transfers" and inserting "in-country transfers, and remote access";

(iii) in paragraph (5), by striking "and in-country transfers" and inserting "in-country transfers, and remote access";

(iv) in paragraph (10), by striking "or in-country transferred" and inserting "in-country transferred, or remotely accessed";

(v) in paragraph (11), by adding at the end before the semicolon the following: "or remote access"; and

(vi) in paragraph (15), by adding at the end before “; and” the following: “or remotely access (including the provision thereof);”;

(B) in subsection (b), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remote access”; and

(C) in subsection (d)(1), by amending subparagraph (A) to read as follows:

“(A) the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of, or remote access to, items described in paragraph (2), or remote access to items described in section 1742(15), including, in both cases, items that are not subject to control under this part; and”.

(5) in section 1755(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 4814(b)(2))—

(A) in subparagraph (C), by striking “and in-country transfers” and inserting “in-country transfers, and remote access”; and

(B) in subparagraph (E), by striking “and in-country transfers” and inserting “in-country transfers, and remote access”; and

(6) in section 1756 (50 U.S.C. 4815)—

(A) in subsection (a), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “and in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, and remote access”; and

(B) in subsection (b), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remote access”; and

(7) in section 1757(a) (50 U.S.C. 4816(a)), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remote access”; and

(8) in section 1760 (50 U.S.C. 4819)—

(A) in subsection (a)(2)(F)(iii), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remote access”; and

(B) in subsection (c)(1)(C), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remotely access (including the provision thereof);” and

(C) in subsection (e)(1)(A)—

(i) in clause (i), by striking “or in-country transfer outside the United States any item” and inserting “in-country transfer outside the United States any item, or remotely access any item”; and

(ii) in clause (ii), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remote access”; and

(9) in section 1761 (50 U.S.C. 4820)—

(A) in subsection (a)(5), by striking “or in-country transferred” and inserting “in-country transferred, or remotely accessed”; and

(B) in subsection (d)(2), by striking “export” each place it appears and inserting “export control”; and

(C) in subsection (h)(1)(B), by striking “or in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, or remotely access”; and

(10) in section 1767 (50 U.S.C. 4825)—

(A) in subsection (a), by striking “or reexport” and inserting “reexport, or remote access”; and

(B) in subsection (b)(2)—

(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking “and in-country transfer” and inserting “in-country transfer, and remote access”; and

(ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking “or in-country transferred” and inserting “in-country transferred, or remotely accessed”.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 8152, the Remote Access Security Act.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. LAWLER), the author of the bill.

Mr. LAWLER. Mr. Speaker, today, I rise to urge the House to pass my bill, the Remote Access Security Act.

The U.S. export control regime exists to limit American critical technology and goods from falling into the hands of adversarial regimes and those who answer to them. Export controls are immensely important to ensure countries like China can't access U.S. advanced semi-conductor chips to enhance their own chip development, which has implications for their military capacity building, as well.

Unfortunately, there is a loophole in the current export control regime. Chinese companies have been remotely accessing tech covered by export controls, enabling the CCP to continue using U.S. chips to develop AI and modernize their military forces.

This must end.

My bill allows the Commerce Department's export controls authority to recover remote access of technology. That way, once my bill is signed into law, all exports of chips, including through the cloud, will be prohibited effectively closing the loophole.

The framework to combat China's growing tech developments already exist, but it is imperative that Commerce has the tools to make this effective.

I thank Chairman MCCAUL and all my Foreign Affairs Committee colleagues for passing this bipartisan bill through committee, and I thank the Speaker for bringing it to the floor today.

I urge all my colleagues to vote for this commonsense bill.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to close, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, over the past 3½ years, the Biden administration has imposed unprecedented export controls against China and Russia. These measures have been highly effective in restricting Beijing and Moscow's access to critical U.S. technologies that could be used to enhance their military capabilities. We know these controls are working because both nations are now seeking ways to circumvent them through various loopholes, diversion tactics, and deceptive practices.

One such loophole could involve PRC companies accessing U.S. chips remotely. Right now, our export control laws do not explicitly cover the remote access of controlled technologies through a network connection, including the internet or cloud computing services. H.R. 8152 would close that loophole.

I thank the majority for working with me to reach a bipartisan agreement on this bill. Since the markup, we have incorporated additional feedback from the administration to appropriately scope the bill and specify that offensive cyber operations against the United States are another end use that our export controls should be addressing.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to vote in favor of 8152, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 8152, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

NO RUSSIAN TUNNEL TO CRIMEA ACT

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7701) to require the imposition of sanctions with respect to any foreign person that knowingly participates in the construction, maintenance, or repair of a tunnel or bridge that connects the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7701

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “No Russian Tunnel to Crimea Act”.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In February and March 2014, the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean peninsula and annexed Crimea, international recognized as Ukrainian territory.

(2) Following its annexation of Crimea, the Russian Federation constructed the Kerch Strait Bridge to connect the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula.

(3) On February 24, 2022, the Government of the Russian Federation, led by Vladimir Putin, launched an unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

(4) The Russian Federation has used Crimea as an integral part of its full scale invasion of Ukraine, including to house Russian troops, store ammunition and weapons, and host the Black Sea Fleet.

(5) In October 2023, it was publicly reported that Russian and Chinese business officials met and exchanged emails to discuss building a tunnel from the Russian mainland to illegally occupied Crimea.

SEC. 3. SANCTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any foreign person that knowingly participates in the construction, maintenance, or repair of a tunnel or bridge that connects the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula.