

Joyce (PA)	Moran	Sherman
Kaptur	Morelle	Sherrill
Kean (NJ)	Moskowitz	Simpson
Kelly (MS)	Moulton	Slotkin
Kelly (PA)	Mrvan	Smith (MO)
Kennedy	Mullin	Smith (NE)
Khanna	Murphy	Smith (NJ)
Kiggans (VA)	Napolitano	Smith (WA)
Kildee	Neguse	Smucker
Kiley	Nehls	Sorensen
Kilmer	Newhouse	Soto
Kim (CA)	Nickel	Spanberger
Krishnamoorthi	Norcross	Spartz
Kuster	Norman	Stanton
LaHood	Nunn (IA)	Staubert
LaLota	Obenrolte	Steel
LaMalfa	Owens	Stefanik
Lamborn	Palmer	Steil
Landsman	Panetta	Steube
Langworthy	Pappas	Strickland
Larsen (WA)	Pelosi	Strong
Larson (CT)	Pence	Suozi
Latta	Perez	Swalwell
LaTurner	Perry	Sykes
Lawler	Peters	Tenney
Lee (FL)	Pettersen	Thandekar
Lee (NV)	Pfluger	Thompson (CA)
Lesko	Phillips	Thompson (MS)
Letlow	Porter	Thompson (PA)
Levin	Posey	Timmons
Lofgren	Quigley	Titus
Lopez	Reschenthaler	Turner
Loudermilk	Rodgers (WA)	Van Drew
Lucas	Rogers (AL)	Van Dyne
Luttrell	Rogers (KY)	Van Orden
Lynch	Rose	Vargas
Mace	Rosendale	Vasquez
Malliotakis	Ross	Veasey
Mann	Rouzer	Wagner
Manning	Roy	Walberg
Mast	Ruiz	Waltz
Matsui	Rulli	Wasserman
McBath	Ruppersberger	Schultz
McClain	Rutherford	Watson Coleman
McClintock	Ryan	Weber (TX)
McCormick	Salinas	Webster (FL)
McGarvey	Schiff	Wenstrup
Meuser	Schneider	Westerman
Miller (IL)	Scholten	Wild
Miller (OH)	Schrier	Williams (NY)
Miller (WV)	Schweikert	Williams (TX)
Miller-Meeks	Scott, Austin	Wilson (SC)
Mills	Scott, David	Wittman
Molinaro	Self	Womack
Moolenaar	Sessions	Yakym
Moore (AL)	Sewell	Zinke

NAYS—81

Amo	Fletcher	Meeks
Auchincloss	Foster	Menendez
Balint	Foushee	Mfume
Barragán	Frost	Moore (WI)
Beatty	Garcia (IL)	Neal
Beyer	Garcia (TX)	Ocasio-Cortez
Blumenauer	Gomez	Omar
Bonamici	Gosar	Pallone
Bush	Himes	Pingree
Cárdenas	Hoyle (OR)	Pocan
Casas	Huffman	Pressley
Casten	Ivey	Ramirez
Chu	Jackson (IL)	Raskin
Clark (MA)	Jacobs	Sánchez
Clarke (NY)	Jeffries	Sarbanes
Cleaver	Kamlager-Dove	Scott (VA)
Clyburn	Keating	Stansbury
Cohen	Kelly (IL)	Stevens
Connolly	Lee (CA)	Takano
Correa	Lee (PA)	Tlaib
Crockett	Leger Fernandez	Tokuda
Davis (IL)	Lieu	Tonko
Dean (PA)	Magaziner	Torres (CA)
DeGette	Massie	Trahan
DeLauro	McClellan	Underwood
Doggett	McCollum	Velázquez
Escobar	McGovern	Williams (GA)

NOT VOTING—44

Aguilar	Ferguson	Maloy
Alford	Gaetz	McCaul
Blunt Rochester	Garamendi	McHenry
Bowman	Goldman (NY)	Meng
Boyle (PA)	Granger	Mooney
Brownley	Grijalva	Moore (UT)
Bucshon	Hageman	Nadler
Curtis	Jayapal	Ogles
D'Esposito	Kim (NJ)	Peltola
Dunn (FL)	Kustoff	Salazar
Evans	Luetkemeyer	Scalise
Fallon	Luna	Scanlon

Schakowsky	Trone	Wexton
Tiffany	Valadao	Wilson (FL)
Torres (NY)	Waters	

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MORAN) (during the vote). There are 2 minutes remaining.

□ 1907

Mr. DOGGETT changed his vote from “yea” to “nay.”

So (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. VALADAO. Mr. Speaker, I missed tonight's vote due to travel complications. Had I been present, I would have voted YEA on Roll Call No. 401 and YEA on Roll Call No. 402.

CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TERRORIST ATTACKS—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 118-164)

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1622(d), provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the *Federal Register* and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. Consistent with this provision, I have sent to the *Federal Register* the enclosed notice, stating that the emergency declared in Proclamation 7463 with respect to the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, is to continue in effect for an additional year.

The terrorist threat that led to the declaration on September 14, 2001, of a national emergency continues. For this reason, I have determined that it is necessary to continue in effect after September 14, 2024, the national emergency with respect to the terrorist threat.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE, September 9, 2024.

CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN OR UNDERMINING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN UNITED STATES ELECTIONS—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 118-165)

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message

from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, the Judiciary, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and House Administration, and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the *Federal Register* and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. In accordance with this provision, I have sent to the *Federal Register* for publication the enclosed notice stating that the national emergency with respect to the threat of foreign interference in or undermining public confidence in United States elections declared in Executive Order 13848 of September 12, 2018, is to continue in effect beyond September 12, 2024.

Although there has been no evidence of a foreign power altering the outcomes or vote tabulation in any United States election, foreign powers have historically sought to exploit America's free and open political system. In recent years, the proliferation of digital devices and internet-based communications has created significant vulnerabilities and magnified the scope and intensity of the threat of foreign interference. The ability of persons located, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States to interfere in or undermine public confidence in United States elections, including through the unauthorized accessing of election and campaign infrastructure or the covert distribution of propaganda and disinformation, continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. Therefore, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13848 with respect to the threat of foreign interference in or undermining public confidence in United States elections.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE, September 9, 2024.

□ 1915

EXPRESSING THE PROFOUND SORROW OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE DEATH OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PASCARELL, JR.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged resolution and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 1427

Resolved, That the House has heard with profound sorrow of the death of the Honorable William J. Pascarell, Jr., a Representative from the State of New Jersey.

Resolved, That the Clerk communicate these resolutions to the Senate and transmit a copy thereof to the family of the deceased.

Resolved, That when the House adjourns today, it adjourn as a further mark of respect to the memory of the deceased.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

EXPORT CONTROL ENFORCEMENT AND ENHANCEMENT ACT

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7151) to amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to provide for expedited consideration of proposals for additions to, removals from, or other modifications with respect to entities on the Entity List, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7151

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Export Control Enforcement and Enhancement Act”.

SEC. 2. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONS TO, REMOVALS FROM, OR OTHER MODIFICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ENTITIES ON THE ENTITY LIST.

Section 1754 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4813) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(g) EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONS TO, REMOVALS FROM, OR OTHER MODIFICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ENTITIES ON THE ENTITY LIST.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Any member of the End-User Review Committee may submit a proposal directly to the Committee requesting a vote of all members of the Committee for additions to, removals from, or other modifications with respect to the Entity List. A proposal to add an entity to the Entity List shall be made in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (3).

“(2) CONSIDERATION.—Subject to paragraph (4)(B), the End-User Review Committee shall vote to approve or disapprove a proposal submitted under paragraph (1) not later than 30 days after the date on which the proposal is submitted to the Committee.

“(3) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.—The Chair of the End-User Review Committee, with the concurrence of the member of the Committee that submitted a proposal under paragraph (1), may suspend for an additional 15 days the time period specified in paragraph (2) with respect to consideration of the proposal if the Chair and the member determine that additional information is required in order make a determination with respect to the proposal, including the impact and effect of the proposal.

“(4) ADDITIONS TO THE ENTITY LIST.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—An entity may be added to the Entity List if the End-User Review Committee by majority vote of its members has determined that the entity has engaged, is engaged, or is at risk of engaging in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.

“(B) LICENSING POLICY.—

“(i) IN GENERAL.—Subject to clause (ii), there shall be in effect a policy of presump-

tion of denial for all applications for a license to export, reexport, or in-country transfer any item subject to the Export Administration Regulations if an entity added to the Entity List under this subsection is or would be a party to a transaction with respect to which the application applies.

“(ii) EXCEPTION.—The licensing policy required by clause (i) shall not apply with respect to an entity described in such clause if the members of the End-User Review Committee that voted to add the entity to the Entity List under this subsection agree by majority vote of such members to apply a different policy with respect to the entity for all or specific types of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations that would be in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

“(C) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to limit or otherwise affect the escalation procedures described in part 750 of the Export Administration Regulations.

“(5) ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Each member of the End-User Review Committee shall have 1 vote with respect to matters described in this subsection. The chairperson of the Committee shall not have the authority to make determinations or override any voting decision with respect to such matters.

“(B) SUSPENSION OF VOTING PERIOD.—The chairperson of the End-User Review Committee may suspend the 30-day voting period described in paragraph (2) if the members of the Committee unanimously agree to postpone the vote.

“(C) NOTICE; IMPLEMENTING AUTHORITY.—The chairperson of the End-User Review Committee shall notify the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration of all final decisions of the Committee with respect to additions to, removals from, or other modifications with respect to the Entity List under this subsection so that the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration may implement all such modifications.

“(6) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection—

“(A) the terms ‘End-User Review Committee’ and ‘Committee’ mean—

“(i) the End-User Review Committee established under section 744.16(d) of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; and

“(ii) any successor committee; and

“(B) the term ‘Entity List’ means the list maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations, or successor regulations.”.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

(2) END-USER REVIEW COMMITTEE.—The term “End-User Review Committee” means—

(A) the End-User Review Committee established under section 744.16(d) of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; or

(B) any successor committee.

(3) EXPORT, REEXPORT, AND IN-COUNTRY TRANSFER.—The terms “export”, “reexport”, and “in-country transfer” have the meanings given such terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).

(4) ENTITY LIST.—The term “Entity List” means the list maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4

to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations, or successor regulations.

(5) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS.—The term “Export Administration Regulations” means the regulations set forth in subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor regulations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. WAGNER) and the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. MANNING) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Missouri.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. STRONG). Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of my bill, H.R. 7151, the Export Control Enforcement and Enhancement Act.

The People’s Republic of China is bent on supplanting the U.S. economically and militarily. To do so, it seeks to turn our strengths against us, using American ingenuity to fuel its own dangerous and nefarious ambitions.

The U.S. export control regime is an important tool that helps us guard against China’s outright theft of the achievements of America’s brilliant entrepreneurs, inventors, and thinkers. Export controls are also a powerful tool against adversaries like Iran and Russia, adversaries that rely on access to ill-gotten foreign technology to support their violent and destabilizing agendas.

China, Iran, and Russia have formed a new axis of evil to attack our national security interests and help each other circumvent U.S. export controls. They have created a massive network designed to maintain the flow of controlled Western technologies to dictatorships like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, with China at the center.

To disrupt and destroy this web of evasion, vigilantly updating and enforcing our export controls is more important today, Mr. Speaker, than ever before.

However, America is losing the fight to keep our most sensitive technologies out of enemy hands.

Advanced American tech is being used to advance China’s hypersonic weapons program. It was found in the spy balloon that China sent over the continental U.S. last year, including directly over my home in St. Louis, Missouri, that collected data on our most sensitive military installations. It is turning up in Iranian drones and Russian military equipment.

In short, wherever our national security interests are at greatest risk, whether in People’s Liberation Army