

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H. Res. 1056, recognizing the importance of trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I start by thanking my good friend, Representative CONNOLLY, for his leadership on this bipartisan resolution to emphasize and recognize the importance of trilateral cooperation for U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

I also commend the Biden-Harris administration, which has successfully revitalized our allies and partnerships in the region through proactive and effective diplomacy. The administration has significantly advanced America's strategic interests by seizing the opportunity provided by the bold leadership of President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida.

The administration has not only strengthened our bilateral ties with Japan and South Korea, but its decision to elevate this trilateral relationship has also reshaped the geopolitical landscape in a way that supports a rules-based international order.

Our collaboration with Tokyo and Seoul is essential to addressing challenges, from global health crises and environmental threats to countering China's economic and military coercion and North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

I express my gratitude to the governments and people of Japan and South Korea. Their commitment to upholding shared values, enhancing mutual prosperity, and strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is a testament to the power of democratic alliances.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to join in supporting this important measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no speakers, and I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. CONNOLLY).

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend from North Carolina for her leadership, and I thank my friend from American Samoa for her support for this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, responding to aggression is important. The failure of the 1930s must always be in our minds. Democracies failed every test in the 1930s: the Spanish Civil War, the Ethiopian invasion by Mussolini, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the carving up of the Sudetenland that led up to the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Anschluss. All of that led directly to World War II.

If we want to prevent war, we have to be strong, and we need alliances. We need strong alliances.

The aggression of Xi Jinping and China in the Indo-Pacific region must be met by the United States and its allies. The trilateral agreement President Biden, Vice President HARRIS, and

this administration brokered between two not particularly friendly allies, Japan and South Korea, is an extraordinary achievement because they have history. It is built on the foundation of AUKUS, the reintroduction of U.S. military bases in the Philippines, rapprochement between the United States and Vietnam, and meeting Chinese aggression in the air and at sea to insist that the South China Sea is not a Chinese private lake. It is international territorial waters. The United States will insist on the rule of law throughout that region.

We, too, are a Pacific nation, and any nation that misjudges that or forgets that does so at its own peril, as history has taught us.

So this resolution, I think, is an important statement by this body in recognizing that we will meet aggression. We will deter aggression. We seek peaceful coexistence, but we are going to build strong alliances to insist peaceful coexistence is possible.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no additional speakers, and I reserve the right to close.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume for the purpose of closing.

Mr. Speaker, in the Indo-Pacific and around the world, the United States is more secure when we build partnerships and work with our allies.

H. Res. 1056 recognizes the importance of trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea to uphold regional security, strengthen our economies, and work toward a free, open, and peaceful Indo-Pacific region.

By passing this resolution, we send a clear bipartisan message that Congress supports trilateral cooperation and that the U.S., Japan, and South Korea are not only aligned behind a shared vision but that we have the resolve to uphold it.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge my colleagues to support H. Res. 1056, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. CONNOLLY as well as Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member MEEKS for this opportunity to recognize the importance of trilateral cooperation between the United States and our allies South Korea and Japan.

Our shared democratic values and strategic cooperation are critical to the peace and security of the Western Pacific, especially as we face challenges and provocations posed by the Chinese Communist Party and North Korea.

Mr. Speaker, I urge unanimous support for this resolution, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) that the House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 1056.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

SECURING GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 4741) to require the development of a strategy to promote the use of secure telecommunications infrastructure worldwide, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 4741

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Securing Global Telecommunications Act".

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress as follows:

(1) The United States Government should promote and take steps to ensure American leadership in strategic technology industries, including telecommunications infrastructure and other information and communications technologies.

(2) The expansive presence of companies linked to the Chinese Communist Party, such as Huawei, in global mobile networks and the national security implications thereof, such as the ability of the People's Republic of China to exfiltrate the information flowing through those networks and shut off countries' internet access, demonstrates the importance of the United States remaining at the technological frontier and the dire consequences of falling behind.

(3) The significant cost of countering Huawei's market leadership in telecommunications infrastructure around the world underscores the urgency of supporting the competitiveness of United States companies in next-generation information and communication technology.

(4) To remain a leader at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and preserve the ITU's technical integrity, the United States must work with emerging economies and developing nations to bolster global telecommunications security and protect American national security interests.

(5) Multilateral cooperation with like-minded partners and allies is critical to carry out the significant effort of financing and promoting secure networks around the world and to achieve market leadership of trusted vendors in this sector.

SEC. 3. STRATEGY FOR SECURING GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and Energy and Commerce and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Commerce, Science, and Transportation and of the Senate a strategy, to be known as the "Strategy to Secure Global Telecommunications Infrastructure" (referred to in this Act as the "Strategy"), to promote the use of secure telecommunication infrastructure in countries other than the United States.

(b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The Secretary of State shall consult with the President of the Export-Import Bank of the

United States, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Director of the Trade and Development Agency, the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, in developing the Strategy, which shall consist of an approach led by the Department of State using the policy tools, and informed by the technical expertise, of the other Federal entities so consulted to achieve the goal described in subsection (a).

(c) ELEMENTS.—The Strategy shall also include sections on each of the following:

(1) Mobile networks, including a description of efforts by countries other than the United States to—

(A) promote trusted Open RAN technologies while protecting against any security risks posed by untrusted vendors in Open RAN networks;

(B) use financing mechanisms to assist “rip-and-replace” projects and to incentivize countries to choose trusted equipment vendors;

(C) bolster multilateral cooperation, especially with developing countries and emerging economies, to promote the deployment of trusted wireless networks worldwide; and

(D) collaborate with trusted private sector companies to counter Chinese market leadership in the telecom equipment industry.

(2) Data centers, including a description of efforts to—

(A) utilize financing mechanisms to incentivize countries other than the United States to choose trusted data center providers; and

(B) bolster multilateral cooperation, especially with developing countries and emerging economies, to promote the deployment of trusted data centers worldwide.

(3) Sixth (and future) generation technologies (6G), including a description of efforts to—

(A) deepen cooperation with like-minded countries to promote United States and allied market leadership in 6G networks and technologies; and

(B) increase buy-in from developing countries and emerging countries on trusted technologies.

(4) Low-Earth orbit satellites, aerostats, and stratospheric balloons, including a description of efforts to work with trusted private sector companies to retain the ability to quickly provide internet connection in response to emergency situations.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON MALIGN INFLUENCE AT THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Commerce, Science, and Transportation in the Senate a report on Russian and Chinese strategies and efforts—

(1) to expand the mandate of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to cover internet governance policy; and

(2) to advance other actions favorable to authoritarian interests and/or hostile to fair, industry-led processes.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall also identify efforts by China and Russia—

(1) to increase the ITU's jurisdiction over internet governance and to propose internet governance standards at the ITU;

(2) to leverage their private sector actors to advance their national interests through the ITU, including—

(A) encouraging Chinese and Russian companies to leverage their market power to

pressure other member countries to deliver favorable decisions on ITU elections; and

(B) China's efforts to leverage Huawei's role as the primary telecommunications equipment and services provider for many developing countries to compel such countries to deliver favorable decisions on standards proposals, election victories, candidate selection, and other levers of power at the ITU; and

(3) to use the influence of Chinese and Russian nationals serving in the ITU to advantage the companies, standards decisions, and candidates that advance the CCP and Kremlin's interests.

(c) FORM.—The report required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 5. REPORT ON MULTILATERAL COORDINATION.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Administrator for the United States Agency on International Development, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce and of the House of Representatives and the Committees Foreign Relations and on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and of the Senate a report that identifies opportunities for greater collaboration with allies and partners to promote secure information and communications technology infrastructure in countries other than the United States, including through—

(1) joint financing efforts to help trusted vendors win bids to build out information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure;

(2) incorporating ICT focuses into allies' and partners' international development finance initiatives; and

(3) diplomatic coordination to emphasize the importance of secure telecommunications infrastructure to countries using untrusted providers.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) and the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. MANNING) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from American Samoa.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from American Samoa?

There was no objection.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 4741, the Securing Global Telecommunications Act, introduced by my colleague from North Carolina, Congresswoman MANNING, and the gentlewoman from California, Congresswoman YOUNG KIM.

Telecommunications, including 5G, are critical to U.S. national security.

The United States cannot let Chinese military companies, like Huawei, attempt to dominate this sector through unfair trading practices, including IP theft and illegal subsidies.

Because of the CCP military-civil fusion strategy, we know that any valuable information flowing through a Huawei network can and will be sent to the CCP and its military.

The United States and our partners and allies must lead in the development of this technology and set the rules of the road at multilateral bodies, such as the International Telecommunication Union. Cooperation among partner and allied countries is critical for ensuring that trusted vendors are the backbone for this infrastructure.

The Securing Global Telecommunications Act will help us outcompete the CCP in this foundational technology. This bill requires the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to promote secure telecommunication infrastructure globally, including mobile networks, data centers, and 6G and beyond.

It also requires reports on how the CCP and Russia are undermining the ITU and how we are coordinating with partners and allies to counteract their malign influence. The United States cannot sit back and allow a CCP military company to build the networks that carry the world's data.

For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to support the Securing Global Telecommunications Act, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4741, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the Securing Global Telecommunications Act, bipartisan legislation that I introduced with Representative YOUNG KIM of California, will preserve America's global leadership in tech and telecom and protect the safety and integrity of our networks.

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Mr. Speaker, the devices we use every day, cell phones, tablets, and computers, connect to increasingly advanced mobile networks that depend upon a nearly invisible set of internationally agreed-upon standards.

However, in recent years, our adversaries and competitors, Russia and China, have tried to maximize their influence over international bodies like the International Telecommunication Union, the ITU, to shape new technology standards to their liking. They are determined to dominate the future of critical technologies, like 5G and AI, by giving their companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, an unfair advantage. This effort goes beyond boosting their businesses. It is about controlling a strategic domain, which could threaten our own security.

Failing to secure our communications infrastructure and networks could open the door to data theft, surveillance, and malicious threats against Americans.

That is why the U.S. and our allies must remain alert to this pressing threat and work together to counter it. We must also make it easier to deploy more secure and reliable tech and telecom infrastructure.

That is exactly what my bipartisan bill would address. It would require a comprehensive strategy for securing global telecom infrastructure worldwide, crack down on Russian and Chinese malign influence at the ITU, and support greater cooperation with our allies to promote and finance secure networks and trusted vendors.

By taking these measures, we can shore up our critical vulnerabilities and counter our adversaries' strategic technology goals.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, our adversaries believe they can achieve undue influence over international telecom infrastructure and technical standards. This bill would help stop them.

I encourage all my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in voting to support it, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. I yield myself the balance of my time.

In closing, I thank Congresswoman MANNING and Congresswoman YOUNG KIM for leading this bipartisan effort to take on Huawei and other CCP companies. I urge all Members to support H.R. 4741, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from American Samoa (Mrs. RADEWAGEN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 4741.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ACT

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7159) to bolster United States engagement with the Pacific Islands region, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7159

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Pacific Partnership Act".

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress as follows:

(1) The United States has longstanding and enduring cultural, historic, economic, strategic, and people-to-people connections with the Pacific Islands, based on shared values, cultural histories, common interests, and a commitment to fostering mutual understanding and cooperation.

(2) Successive United States administrations have recognized the critical importance of the Pacific Islands, to the world in

high-level strategic documents, including the—

(A) 2015 National Security Strategy, which first declared the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, affirmed the United States as a Pacific nation, and paved the way for subsequent United States engagement with the Pacific Islands;

(B) 2017 National Security Strategy, which includes a commitment to "shore up fragile partner states in the Pacific Islands region to reduce their vulnerability to economic fluctuations and natural disasters";

(C) 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which identified the Pacific Islands as "critical to United States strategy because of our shared values, interests, and commitments";

(D) 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which recognized the need to engage further with the Pacific Islands on shared security goals; and

(E) 2022 Strategy for Pacific Partnership, which outlined goals and methods for deepening the United States partnerships with Pacific Island nations.

(3) The United States Government should further develop, expand, and support a comprehensive and multifaceted United States policy for the Pacific Islands that—

(A) promotes peace, security, and prosperity for all countries that respects the sovereignty and political independence of all nations;

(B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as a corridor for international maritime economic opportunities and growth and promotes sustainable development;

(C) supports regional efforts to address shared challenges, including by strengthening resilience to natural disasters and stewardship of natural resources; and

(D) strengthens democratic governance and the rule of law, and promotes human rights and the preservation of the region's cultural heritages.

(4) The United States should support the vision, values, and objectives of existing regional multilateral institutions and frameworks, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community.

(5) The United States should work closely with United States allies and partners with existing relationships and interests in the Pacific Islands, such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Taiwan, and regional institutions like the Pacific Islands Forum.

SEC. 3. STRATEGY FOR PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than January 1, 2026, and again not later than January 1, 2030, the President, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy entitled the "Strategy for Pacific Partnership" (in this section referred to as the "Strategy").

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The Strategy shall include each of the following:

(1) A description of overarching goals for United States engagement in the Pacific Islands region, including United States diplomatic posts, defense posture, and economic engagement.

(2) An assessment of threats and pressures to the Pacific Islands region including those caused by factors such as—

(A) natural disasters;

(B) illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing;

(C) non-United States military presence and activity;

(D) developmental challenges;

(E) economic coercion and corruption; and

(F) other factors assessed to be causing a direct risk to the United States national interests in the Pacific Islands.

(3) A plan to address the threats assessed pursuant to paragraph (2).

(4) An analysis of the needs and goals expressed by governments of the Pacific Islands region, including at or through multilateral institutions, evaluated in light of the United States national interests.

(5) A plan for the resources necessary for the United States to meet its goals in the Pacific Islands region.

(6) Mechanisms, including existing forums, for coordinating and cooperating on shared goals among the following, as appropriate:

(A) the governments of Pacific Island countries;

(B) regional partners in the Pacific Islands region, including multilateral forums and organizations, such as the Pacific Islands Forum;

(C) civil society in the Pacific Islands; and

(D) United States subnational governments in the Pacific.

(c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the Strategy, the President should consult, as appropriate, with—

(1) relevant United States governmental agencies;

(2) regional organizations, such as the Pacific Islands Forum, the Pacific Islands Development Program, the Pacific Community, the Forum Fisheries Agency, and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme;

(3) the governments of the countries in the Pacific Islands;

(4) civil society stakeholders;

(5) United States allies and partners; and

(6) United States Pacific territories and States.

SEC. 4. EXTENSION OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES TO THE PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM.

The provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288 et seq.) may be extended to the Pacific Islands Forum in the same manner, to the same extent, and subject to the same conditions as such provisions may be extended to a public international organization in which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under the authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation for such participation.

SEC. 5. REPORTS ON IMPLEMENTATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of submission of a strategy detailed in section 3(a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an implementation report—

(1) with a proposed timeline for implementation of the strategy described in section 3(a) of this Act;

(2) detailing the assessed number of full-time equivalent positions and contractors needed to achieve the goals laid out in the strategy described in section 3(a) of this Act;

(3) describing any institutional or structural re-organizations suggested to help carry out the strategy described in section 3(a) of this Act; and

(4) if necessary, identifying additional funding needed to support resource levels to carry out the strategy described in 3(a).

(b) CONSOLIDATION.—A report required by this subsection may be consolidated with any other report required to be submitted by the same Federal official on the same or similar date as the requirement under this subsection.

SEC. 6. ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President, in consultation with the Secretary of State, and the relevant heads of other Federal departments and agencies, should consult and coordinate with allies and partners in the Pacific Islands region, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and regional institutions, such as the Pacific Islands