agreed to and the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 33) was agreed to.

(The concurrent resolution is printed in today's RECORD under ''Submitted Resolutions.'')

REFORMING INTELLIGENCE AND SECURING AMERICA ACT—MOTION TO PROCEED—Continued

Mr. SCHUMER. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECOGNITION OF THE MINORITY LEADER

The Republican leader is recognized.

H.R. 7888

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, as I discussed earlier this week, critical national security authorities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act are set to expire in 2 days. Today, I would like to briefly address the newest red herring being raised in opposition to reauthorizing section 702.

The reauthorization that passed the House contains scores of important reforms to the FISA process that will enhance accountability at the FBI and protect the rights of American citizens. It also included a necessary fix to the way we authorize the government to lawfully collect communications from foreigners located overseas for a specific intelligence purpose.

As part of the standard judicial oversight of the 702 process, the intelligence community has been restricted in what kinds of technology counts as ''electronic communications service providers'' under the statute. When section 702 was written, the internet was in the Dark Ages compared to how it exists today. Clearly, social media and internet communications usage has changed dramatically since the earliest days of Twitter and so have the technical mechanisms by which massive packets of data transit the internet.

As the internet evolved, the FISA Court did not allow the DOJ, on its own, to expand the definition of a provider to meet the new realities of contemporary technology. This created a critical, unintended gap in our collection ability against overseas foreign targets.

Here is the good news: The House did on a strong bipartisan basis what legislatures should do. In fact, a majority of the majority and a majority of the minority voted to change the statute to make sure that our collection ability on foreigners overseas reflects the reality of modern communication. It was a simple fix to update the law to respond to technological change.

But to listen to the Chicken Littles on the left, the sky is falling. The ACLU says this will expand warrantless surveillance and strongly implies that it will do so against Americans as they go about their daily lives.

Demand Progress—an activist arm of Arabella Advisors—says ''everyone is a spy'' under this provision.

Well, excuse me if I don't take my cues from liberal court-packers. This could not be further from the truth. The House bill's simple fix does nothing—nothing—to change who gets targeted by section 702: foreigners overseas whose communications are likely to return important intelligence.

The FISA appellate court affirmed this in a decision that predated the legislative fix, saying:

> Under section 702 the Government is prohibited from intentionally targeting any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States.

Even foreigners located in the United States. Even foreigners operating illegally in the United States.

The court went on, saying:

> Customers using WiFi access provided by a cafe or library, for example, would not be targeted under Section 702, regardless of whether the Internet connectivity being provided is considered an ''electronic communications service.''

Let me say that again. They ''would not be targeted under Section 702,'' nor, contrary to the fears of some of our colleagues, would U.S. persons be at risk of drone strikes as they surfed the internet on public internet networks.

Nothing has been expanded. Section 702 still rightly only applies to foreigners overseas. All that the House did was fix a dangerous loophole that would have allowed our foreign adversaries to escape the reach of our intelligence services.

Trust but verify, right? Well, this bill helps us do precisely that. It includes significant reforms that dramatically enhance transparency into how section 702 is used by the intelligence community. It includes important reforms to prevent misuse of the authority and require accountability for any such misuse, including new civil and criminal penalties.

I would urge my colleagues to look at the facts of this latest fearmongering crusade, to soberly examine the same classified material our House colleagues read that explains this provision in detail, to reject hyperbole and lies, and to take action to secure the homeland.

BORDER SECURITY

Mr. President, now on a different matter, ''[W]e do have a plan to address migration at the southern border. We're executing it . . . and we're starting to see the results.'' Well, those were the words of the Secretary of Homeland Security after the Biden administration had been in office for 8 months, but in the past 3 years, they have taken on an altogether greater significance.

The administration's ''plan to address migration''? It turns out their plan was exactly what then-Candidate Biden pledged on the debate stage: to surge migrants to the border.

How they did execute it? By slashing the previous administration's commonsense border security policies. No more ''Remain in Mexico.'' No more border wall construction.

As Secretary Mayorkas bragged back in 2021, the Biden administration had repealed so many border enforcement tools that ''it would take so much time to list them.''

How about that last part: ''[W]e're starting to see the results.'' Since this administration took office, the surge in illegal arrivals at the southern border has set and broken new alltime records several times over.

CBP personnel have worked overtime to contend with a humanitarian and security crisis. Yet, for years, the Biden administration's top concern about the border was not calling it a crisis.

Again: ''[W]e do have a plan to address migration at the southern border. We're executing it . . . and we're starting to see the results''—results, indeed, in the form of a tragic, painful, and unnecessary crisis.

Today, it falls to the Senate to determine whether and to what extent Secretary Mayorkas enabled and inflamed this crisis.

Under the Constitution and the rules of impeachment, it is the job of this body to consider the Articles of Impeachment brought before us and to render judgment.

The question right now should be how best to ensure that the charges on the table receive thorough consideration, but instead, the more pressing question is whether our Democratic colleagues intend to let the Senate work its will at all.

Tabling Articles of Impeachment would be unprecedented in the history of the Senate. It is as simple as that. Tabling would mean declining to discharge our duties as jurors. It would mean running both from our fundamental responsibility and from the glaring truth of the recordbreaking crisis at our southern border.

I, for one, intend to take my role as a juror in this case seriously, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MAYORKAS IMPEACHMENT

Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, 7,633,650, that is the number of migrant encounters at our southern border since President Biden took office—7,633,650. The situation at our southern border is out of control. We have had three—three now—successive years of record-breaking illegal immigration under President Biden, and we are on track for a fourth.

There have been more than 1.3 million migrant encounters at our southern border since October 1 of last year, which was the start of this fiscal year. That is 1.3 million, just since October 1 of last year. And that number just refers to individuals who are actually apprehended. There have been almost 150,000 known ''got-aways'' so far this fiscal year, and those are individuals the Border Patrol saw but were unable to apprehend. Often, we see migrants turning themselves in to authorities, so it is especially concerning to know that so many individuals have purposely evaded interdiction. And of course, we don't know how many unknown ''got-aways'' there have been.

U.S. Border Patrol Chief Jason Owens, in a March interview with CBS News, said the number of known ''got-aways'' is keeping him up at night. That is ''a national security threat,'' he noted. That is a quote. ''Border security is a big piece of national security,'' he goes on to say. ''And if we don't know who is coming into our country, and we don't know what their intent is, that is a threat and they're exploiting a vulnerability that's on our border right now.''

That, again, from Jason Owens, U.S. Border Patrol Chief.

Well, the situation at our southern border right now is a national security threat. There is no question that the kinds of numbers we are seeing smooth the way for dangerous individuals to enter our country. During fiscal year 2023, 169 individuals on the Terrorist Watchlist were apprehended trying to cross our southern border—more, I might add, than the previous 6 years combined—and that is just the individuals, again, who were actually apprehended. With somewhere around 1.8 million known ''got-aways'' since President Biden took office and an untold number of unknown ''got-aways,'' I think we can safely assume that there are plenty of dangerous individuals making their way into our country without being stopped.

While there are always various factors that affect the flow of illegal immigration, we are on track for a fourth recordbreaking year of illegal immigration under the Biden administration because of the actions that President Biden has taken or failed to take. From the day he took office, when he rescinded the declaration of a national emergency at our southern border, President Biden made it clear that border security was at the bottom of his priority list. And over the 3 years since, he has turned our southern border into a magnet for illegal migration from repealing effective border security policies of the Trump administration to abusing our asylum and parole systems, which are now providing temporary amnesty to hundreds of thousands of individuals here illegally, which brings me, Mr. President, to today.

In just a few minutes, the Senate will be sworn in to consider the Articles of Impeachment against Homeland Security Secretary Mayorkas, one of the chief architects of the Biden administration's lax border security regime. And we expect that the Democrat leader will move almost immediately to dismiss the charges. At most, we expect a few hours of process with no examination of the evidence the House has collected and essentially no consideration of the serious charges before us.

Whether or not Senators ultimately decide that Secretary Mayorkas's actions warrant a conviction, they should be given the time to actually examine the charges. In a courtroom, a case is not dismissed without the court taking the time to examine the facts, and the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, should be no different. The Senate should be having a full trial and taking the time to examine the evidence that the House has collected, and then Senators should be able to vote guilty or not guilty. Instead, the Senate leader is set to sweep these charges under the rug. It is just more evidence of the fundamental unseriousness Democrats have shown when it comes to the raging—raging—national security crisis at our southern border.

By the end of the day, the Democrat leader may well have effectively made these charges disappear, but there is nothing that the Democrat leader can do to obscure the failures of Secretary Mayorkas and President Biden. Thanks to their refusal to secure the border, we have experienced three now successive years of recordbreaking illegal immigration, and, unfortunately, there is no end in sight.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

H.R. 7888

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today as a Senator from Virginia and, more importantly, as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, in support of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, H.R. 7888, which passed the House earlier this week, with a 273-to-147 broad, bipartisan support.

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, which a lot of this debate is focused on, is a critical source of foreign intelligence. It is indispensable to the work that the men and women of our intelligence community, and many others, do every day to protect our national security.

Section 702 authorities have enabled the IC to thwart terrorist attacks, track foreign spies, uncover economic espionage, impede weapons proliferation, protect U.S. troops, expose human and drug trafficking, prevent sanctions evasion, and disrupt foreign cyber attacks—a whole litany of the responsibilities of the IC.

Just to demonstrate how important these capabilities are to our national security: 60 percent—60 percent—of the items that appear in the President's daily intelligence brief actually are sourced to information obtained pursuant to section 702.

In the public domain, there are many examples of the value of section 702. These include when section 702 contributed to a successful operation against one of the last remaining 9/11 architects, Zawahiri; section 702 coverage that identified evidence of an al-Qaida courier in Pakistan with imminent plans to detonate explosives on subway tracks in Manhattan and, through that surveillance, was able to prevent the attack; section 702 identified the hackers responsible for the 2021 ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline that crippled fuel supplies across the east coast and enabled the United States to recover 2.3 million in paid ransom.

Secretaries of Defense, Directors of National Intelligence, and many other Cabinet officials from both the current and the former administration have spoken out on the vital importance of ensuring that section 702 does not lapse.

To quote the President's intelligence advisory board:

> If Congress fails to reauthorize Section 702, history may judge the lapse of . . . 702 authorities as one of the worst intelligence failures of our time.

Quite honestly, that is what we are looking at if we don't get this done.

Nonetheless, as we indicated, we just find ourselves just hours away from a possible sunset of this critical authority, which sunsets Friday night at midnight.

Now, some Members have argued that because the FISA Court recently approved new certifications, there is no urgency to reauthorize the law. Those claims are both misguided and dangerous.

In the event of a statutory lapse, some providers—American companies who are working with us—are likely to stop or reduce cooperation, perhaps with existing targets of collection but especially with new ones.

We know this can happen because it is exactly what happened when a similar lapse occurred following the expiration of section 702's predecessor statute: the Protect America Act.

Now, to be fair, it is also true that section 702 is in need of some reforms.

And myself, Senator RUBIO, 16 Members, bipartisan, have sponsored the Senate version of this bill, have pressed for additional reforms to protect the civil liberties of Americans while still preserving the core values of the program and protecting American national security.

In recent years, a key oversight focus has been on the number of queries of section 702 information. Section 702 is a database. There are a series of databases. You can sometimes query that database within certain protections.

Now, the focus is focused on particularly those queries performed by the FBI and involving U.S. persons. There is no dispute that, for too long, the FBI query practices were sloppy.

For a time, as recently as 2019, more than 3 in 10 of the FBI queries were noncompliant. That means, literally, 30 percent of the time, the FBI was not even following their own procedures. The FBI took too much time to implement needed reforms. But, finally, in 2022 and 2023, it implemented comprehensive reforms that have proven effective and dramatically improved the query compliance rate from 70 percent to over 90 percent. That means less than 1 percent of these queries fall outside of the reform practices the FBI has put in place.

What do these reforms include? Maybe one of the most important ones is that rather than, by default, FBI agents query a series of databases. In the past, they would have to opt out of querying the 702 database. Now they have to opt in and make the case that they need that for national security purposes.

Another reform that has been put in place is there was a series of actions in the past called ''batch queries.'' A group of people might be arrested and suddenly you are querying a whole batch of them. Those batch queries have been dramatically diminished. At the same time, there are new reforms that require the FBI leadership to improve sensitive queries of politicians, journalists, and religious leaders. Literally, it has to be the Director of the FBI, the Deputy Director, or the head of the National Security Agency.

The bill before us—which, again, we had preconferenced most of this with the House—this is the House bill we will be taking up later this week. The bill before us now codifies these reforms, ensuring that a future President, Attorney General, or FBI Director cannot simply walk them back. When we pass this legislation and it is signed, these reforms will become the law of the land.

In addition to the reforms I already talked about, the bill we are debating goes even further. It also includes significant new protections for U.S. person queries, including a complete prohibition on queries solely used to find evidence of a crime, as was unanimously recommended by the President's Intelligence Advisory Board.

The bill also increases transparency of FISA Court proceedings, going so far—this was added in the House—as to allow Members of Congress and their staffs to attend court hearings. We have heard on this floor and before and the House many times: We don't know what is going on in the FISA Court hearing. Now, if a Member of Congress wants to sit in or send their staff, they will be able to do that.

This legislation also enhances reporting requirements from both the Bureau and the intelligence community and creates an ongoing reform commission to recommend further FISA reforms. The truth is, section 702 is already the most regulated and closely overseen intelligence authority of any we have in this country and, frankly, in countries around the world. If enacted, the reforms included in this bill would be the most comprehensive set of reforms ever enacted in the statute's history. We often reform this every 5 years or it had to be reauthorized. This set of reforms are much more sensitive than actions in the past.

I would like to speak briefly on two issues that have been the subject of considerable debate. First, some have suggested that we should impose a warrant requirement on U.S. person queries. Let me again be clear. A warrant requirement for U.S. person queries would do grave damage to national security. The FBI and other Agencies have relied on U.S. person queries of section 702, as I enumerated earlier, to prevent terrorist attacks, investigate cyber attacks, prevent assassination plots, and to disrupt narcotics trafficking.

Many of these successes would not have been possible if the government was required to obtain a warrant for U.S. person queries, and significant intelligence would be lost. Why is that so hard to put in place? Think about this for a moment. A warrant requirement requires a ''probable cause'' that the subject of the query is an ''agent of a foreign power.'' The truth is—I remember talking with the Presiding Officer about this—the majority of times that an American person is queried is not because we suspect them to be an agent of a foreign power but because they have been a victim, oftentimes, of a cyber attack. Even the most fervent advocate of a warrant has not been able to explain if you are trying to contact the person who has been a victim of a cyber attack, there is no way you could get a probable cause showing that that person is an agent of a foreign power. That agent is a victim of a foreign power. The warrant requirement could not meet the notification requirements put in place. The idea that we could simply contact the person—well, that does not pass the smell test.

Sometimes this gets complicated. I spent a lot of time trying to get this. Let me give you a couple of theoretical ways that this warrant requirement, I believe, falls short.

Let's say that the intelligence community is aware that Iran is planning a cyber attack against a U.S. victim—maybe even a victim that would sit in this Chamber. In that case, the intelligence community may want to query whether it has intelligence collected against Iran for when Iran or their agents are talking about that American so that we could actually get the full exposure to make sure that we both do victim notification and also preclude future attacks. These queries would serve to protect the victim, not investigate them. But it would never be possible to establish, as any warrant application would require, probable cause that the victim is an ''agent of a foreign power'' because they are not; they are a victim.

Let me give you another example. Assume the United States apprehends a known foreign terrorist overseas. On that person—I point this out to the Presiding Officer—there is a phone number, and it is a 303 area code. We don't know whether that phone number is a real number, whether it is a number of an American, or whether it is a number of a foreigner because as the Presiding Officer knows, somebody might have been a foreigner, gone to Colorado, gone to Denver, bought a phone and carries that phone with him forever. The idea that you could get a warrant of probable cause on the basis of that phone number alone, again, does not pass the smell test. It cannot happen.

The truth is, as well, someone said we will give you an exemption for exigent circumstances. The process will not work or will work in such a slow fashion that the use of this critical tool—60 percent of the intel the President reads every day comes from 702 intelligence. The truth is, it would take weeks or months to obtain an order from the FISA Court during the time which that guy—let's go back to the example. We arrested a terrorist with a 303 area code. You are going to wait weeks before you can even query that phone number to see if it is a real number, an American, a foreign person.

Then, some say: Why don't you make the query, but we won't let you look at the results? Again, either one of those circumstances basically neuters the whole ability of 702 to work.

Second issue. The House-passed bill includes an important amendment to the definition of electronic communications service providers, ECSPs, that address collection gaps caused by developments in internet and telecommunications technology since 702 was first written in 2008.

Let me say, as somebody who spent a career in telecom, the world has dramatically changed in the telecom domain from 2008. This amendment, in terms of the definition, is, again, focused on this current intelligence gap. It still requires that the targeting that goes on in 702 focuses on overseas non-U.S. persons. And contrary to what some Members literally said on the floor of the Senate, this technical amendment that was added in the

House specifically excludes coffee shops, bars, restaurants, residences, hotels, libraries, recreational facilities, and a whole litany of similar establishments.

It would not, as some critics have maintained, allow the U.S. Government to compel, for example, a janitor working in an office building in Northern Virginia to somehow spy for the intelligence community. Nor would it allow, as some have absurdly claimed, States to use 702 to target women seeking abortions.

First of all, State and local authorities don't even have access to all 702 data. Secondly, the law is and remains crystal clear on this point: 702 cannot be used to target U.S. persons domestically—period, full stop, no exceptions.

The amendment, the ECSP amendment, was required because, as I pointed out earlier, the world of telecom changed dramatically since the law was first put in place 16 years ago. Keep in mind, back in 2008, when section 702 was first passed, we had pay phones on most corners, and the cloud was actually something that might cause rain rather than be a place where communication is often stored.

In short, what happens here is that the government served a 702 directive. And this is why this came about. And that American company said: We think your old definition of a service provider doesn't apply to us. And you know what? In litigation, that claim won, and the FISA Court specifically said we need to make sure that we update the definition. The House added that updated definition. I don't believe we should roll that back.

This is not, as some have claimed, some broad expansion of 702 powers of jurisdictions. Again, I could get into the complexities of how there are some data centers, as has been reported in the press, that at certain times activity will take place in the data center that don't fall into the old definition of 2008. Do we really want that data to pass through the data center to be allowed to be lawfully collected? I think we do.

Let me be the first to say that the House bill is not perfect. I think we should have gone for a 5-year reauthorization. The House-passed was a 2-year reauthorization. I accept that. I think the reforms that were put in place will further protect. I go back to the earlier comments I made. We have gone from a 30-percent noncompliance of the FBI to less than 1 percent.

(Ms. CORTEZ MASTO assumed the Chair.)

Madam President, in terms of the warrant requirement, you are never going to get a probable cause warrant if the individual who is being queried is actually the victim of a crime. We sure as heck are not going to be able to get a warrant requirement met if you capture a terrorist—I will go from the 303 area code to, I think, Las Vegas is 702. If you have to show, based upon that number alone, you have probable cause, you don't know who or what that number is until you do the query.

And as I mentioned these last couple of moments, this new definition, this technical definition the House adopted—again, with an overwhelming bipartisan majority—is not an expansion that simply brings up the terminology around telecom providers up to 2024, which was different than 2008. The notion that we would allow this incredibly—in a sense, the crown jewel of our intelligence collection abilities to go dark as we simultaneously try to debate aid for Ukraine and Israel and humanitarian relief to Palestinians and Gaza, the idea we would suddenly go dark at this moment in time would be the height of irresponsibility.

I know we have to get through this afternoon's proceedings, but I would strongly urge Members to join me in voting to pass H.R. 7888, without amendment, to make sure that we don't have a lapse.

I know we made documents and individuals available in the SCIF, but if Members have questions, if Members have concerns, if Members here come to the floor and make other charges, please talk to me, talk to Senator RUBIO, talk to anybody in law enforcement or the intelligence community. So many of the claims being made here just are not accurate in terms of what this bill is doing.

I think this is a strong reform bill. I think it needs to get passed, and we need to not let this critical authority lapse.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll, and the following Senators entered the Chamber and answered to their names:

[Quorum No. 4]

Baldwin	Gillibrand	Ossoff
Barrasso	Graham	Padilla
Bennet	Grassley	Paul
Blackburn	Hagerty	Peters
Blumenthal	Hassan	Reed
Booker	Hawley	Ricketts
Boozman	Heinrich	Risch
Braun	Hickenlooper	Romney
Britt	Hirono	Rosen
Brown	Hoeven	Rounds
Budd	Hyde-Smith	Rubio
Butler	Johnson	Sanders
Cantwell	Kaine	Schatz
Capito	Kelly	Schmitt
Cardin	Kennedy	Schumer
Carper	King	Scott (FL)
Casey	Klobuchar	Scott (SC)
Cassidy	Lankford	Shaheen
Collins	Lee	Sinema
Coons	Luján	Smith
Cornyn	Lummis	Stabenow
Cortez Masto	Manchin	Sullivan
Cotton	Markey	Tester
Cramer	Marshall	Thune
Crapo	McConnell	Tillis
Cruz	Menendez	Tuberville
Daines	Merkley	Van Hollen
Duckworth	Moran	Vance
Durbin	Mullin	Warner
Ernst	Murkowski	Warnock
Fetterman	Murphy	Warren
Fischer	Murray	Welch
Whitehouse	Wyden	
Wicker	Young	

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. A quorum is present.

TRIAL OF ALEJANDRO NICHOLAS MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Pursuant to rule III of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials, the hour of 1 p.m. having arrived and a quorum having been established, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of the Articles of Impeachment against Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security.

The majority leader is recognized.

Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, at this time, pursuant to rule III of the Senate rules on impeachment and the United States Constitution, the President pro tempore emeritus, the Senator from Iowa, will now administer the oath to the President pro tempore, PATTY MURRAY:

Mr. GRASSLEY: Will you place your left hand on the Bible and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that, in all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, now pending, you will do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws, so help you God?

Mrs. MURRAY. I do.

At this time, I will administer the oath to all Senators in the Chamber in conformance with article I, section 3, clause 6 of the Constitution and the Senate's impeachment rules.

Will all Senators now stand and raise their right hands.

Do you solemnly swear that in all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, now pending, you will do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws, so help you God?

SENATORS. I do.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will now call the names in groups of four. The Senators will present themselves at the desk to sign the Oath Book.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the Senators present answered ''I do'' and signed the Official Oath Book.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The majority leader is recognized.

Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, any Senator who was not in the Senate Chamber at the time the oath was administered to the other Senators will make that fact known to the Chair so that the oath may be administered as soon as possible to the Senator.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Sergeant at Arms will make the proclamation.

The Sergeant at Arms, Karen Gibson, made proclamation as follows:

Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep silence, under pain of