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Chapter 4
Contents
Development
of the PLA's Ballistic Missile Forces
The
Soviet Union's Contribution to the PLA's Ballistic Missile
Force
The
Role of Qian Xuesen in the Development of the PRC's Ballisitc Missile
and Space Programs
Development
of the PLA's Intermediate- and Short-Range Ballistic
Missiles
The
PLA's Current 'East Wind' Intercontinental
Ballistic
Missiles
The
PLA's Future 'East Wind' Intercontinental
Ballistic
Missiles
The
PRC's Medium- and Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
Stolen
U.S. Technology Used on PRC Ballistic Missiles
The
PRC's Strategic Forces Doctrine
The
PRC's Opposition to U.S. Missile Defenses
The
PRC's Acquisition of Foreign Ballistic Missile Technology
The
PRC's Indigenous Ballistic Missile Design Capabilities
PRC
Missile Proliferation
Iran
Pakistan
Saudi
Arabia
The
PRC's Commercial Space Launch Program
The
PRC's Future Space Launch Capabilities
PRC
Space Weapons
The
PRC's Manned Space Program
The
PRC's Communications Satellite Programs
The
PRC's Use of Foreign Components on
Communications
Satellites
The
PRC's Reliance on Western Communications Satellites
PRC
Use of Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs)
The
PLA's Reconnaissance Satellite Program
The
PRC's Other Military Satellite Programs
The
Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications
(APMT) Satellite
The
Role of PLA General Shen Rongjun
and His Son in
APMT
Background
Propulsion
Systems
Airframes
Ballistic
Missile and Rocket Stages
Guidance
Systems
Ground
Support
Systems
Integration
Payload
Conclusion
Chapter 4
Summary
ince its beginning, the PRC's ballistic
missile and space program has received considerable foreign expertise and
technology. This support has helped the PRC become a major ballistic
missile and space power. The PRC has received considerable assistance
from Russia (and previously from the Soviet Union) and the United States,
as well as from other nations such as France and Germany.
From 1956 to 1960, the Soviet Union was the major supplier of
ballistic missile technology and knowledge to the PRC. The Sino-Soviet
split in 1960 ended this cooperation. Today, however, Russia is a major
supplier of space launch technology to the PRC. This assistance could
be expanded to help the PRC in its efforts to develop road-mobile ICBMs,
which would provide the PLA with more confidence in the survivability of
its retaliatory nuclear force.
Technology and knowledge acquired from the United States has also
assisted the PRC's missile and space programs, although this assistance
was never officially sanctioned. Qian Xuesen was a Chinese citizen who
was trained in the United States and who worked on classified programs
including the Titan ICBM program. After being accused of spying for the
PRC in the 1950s, Qian was permitted to return to the PRC, where he became
the "father" of the PRC's ballistic missile and space programs. The
illegal acquisition of U.S. technology for the PLA's ballistic missiles
and space programs has continued aggressively during the past two decades,
up to the present day.
The PRC has stolen design information on the United States' most
advanced thermonuclear weapons, elements of which could be emulated by the
PRC in its next generation ICBMs.
The PRC has stolen U.S. missile guidance technology that has direct
applicability to the PLA's ballistic missiles.
Assistance from U.S. companies has improved the reliability of the
PRC's military and civilian rockets, and the transfer of some of these
improvements to its ballistic missiles is possible.
Western nations, including the United States, Germany, and France,
have provided significant support to the PRC's satellite programs.
German companies provide the communications package for the PRC's
DFH-3 communications satellites. U.S.-manufactured radiation-hardened
chips are also used on the PRC's meteorological satellites, used for both
military and civilian purposes, to increase the on-orbit life of the
satellites.
The PRC is a major ballistic missile proliferator. While the PRC
agreed in 1991 to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime, the PRC
transferred complete ballistic missile systems to Pakistan in 1992, and
has provided other nations with ballistic missiles production-related
technologies. The PRC has not agreed to the MTCR's revised limits on
transfers of ballistic missile components.
The PRC has transferred ballistic missile technology to Iran,
Pakistan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and other countries.
Chapter 4
Text
PRC MISSILE
AND SPACE FORCES
Introduction
"By the next century, as high-tech space technology develops, the
deployment of space-based weapons systems will be bound to make 'mastery
of space' and 'mastery of outer space' prerequisites for naval
victory."
PLA Navy Senior Colonel
Shen
Zhongchang
n 1956, advisors from the Soviet Union convinced
the leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to include
ballistic missile development in the PRC's Twelve Year Plan for the
Development of Science and Technology (1956-1967). Having just fought a
war against the United States in Korea and having come face-to-face with
U.S. military supremacy, the PRC decided that combining long-range
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons offered its best chance to build
weapons capable of neutralizing the United States' and the Soviet Union's
formidable advantage.
Since that time, the PRC has embarked on an extensive ballistic missile
and space program.
From its beginning in the 1950s, the PRC has also adapted its ballistic
missile program into a major international space program. Since its first
space launch in 1971, the PRC has developed ten variations of rockets that
have allowed it to place 44 satellites into orbit.
Today, the PRC is embarked on a modernization plan for its ballistic
missile and space forces. This expansion includes the exploitation of
space-based military reconnaissance and communications satellites and
space-based weapons.1 In addition, the PRC has set for itself the goal of
putting men in space this year.
This chapter provides an analysis of the PRC's missile and space
forces, and the impact that Western technology has had on those forces. It
details the PRC's ballistic missile forces; its space forces, including
its rockets and satellites; and the interaction between the two
groups.
This chapter also serves as an introduction to the capabilities of the
PRC's missile and space programs, and the degree to which foreign
assistance and technology may affect the course of their future
development.
This chapter is derived from an extensive chapter in the Select
Committee's classified Report, much of which, due to national security
concerns, cannot be reproduced here.
The PLA's Ballistic Missile Forces
Development of
the PLA's Ballistic Missile Forces
The early development of the PLA's indigenous ballistic missile
programs was marked by Soviet assistance, and by the guidance of a Chinese
citizen who had returned to the PRC after working on the U.S. Titan
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program.2
The Soviet Union's Contribution to the
PLA's Ballistic Missile Force
The PRC received its first
ballistic missiles in 1956, with the acquisition of two Soviet R-1
missiles. These were copies of the German cryogenic liquid-propellant V-2
missiles used in World War II. The PRC quickly acquired more advanced
missiles in the form of the R-2 in 1957. The R-2 had considerable
technical improvements over the R-1, including a greater range and a
larger payload, as well as the use of storable liquid propellants.
In addition to the ballistic missiles themselves, the Soviet Union
provided the PRC with blueprints for the R-2 missiles, and with advisors
to assist in the PRC's development of a copy of the R-2. With this Soviet
technical assistance, the PRC was able to produce and deploy these
missiles.
During this period, PRC engineers and students received training at the
Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI). While at MAI, these students were trained
in aeronautical engineering, and acquired experience with more advanced
Soviet missiles such as the SS-3 and the SS-4. In many instances, the
information gained about more advanced Soviet missiles came when the
students made copies of restricted notes, and quizzed their professors
about the Soviet missiles.
In 1960, the Sino-Soviet split ended all cooperation, including missile
cooperation, between the PRC and the Soviet Union. This left the PRC to
continue its missile programs on its own, using the know-how it had gained
from the Soviet Union, and the expertise of its American-trained
scientists.
The Role of Qian Xuesen in the
Development Of the PRC's Ballistic Missile and Space Programs
The PRC's ballistic missile and space programs received
substantial assistance during their early development from Qian Xuesen
(also known as Tsien Hsue-Shen), a Chinese citizen who was trained in the
United States and had worked on classified U.S. missile programs,
including the Titan intercontinental ballistic missile program.
Qian Xuesen became instrumental in the PRC's ballistic missiles
program, where he is known as the "father of China's ballistic missile
force." A biography of Qian published in the PRC states that he "made
significant contributions to the rapid development of Chinese rockets
[and] missiles, as well as space flight." 3
Born in Shanghai in 1911, Qian left China in 1935 during the Japanese
occupation. He received his Masters degree from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) and his Ph.D. from the California Institute
of Technology (Cal Tech). At Cal Tech, Qian worked as a member of the
rocket research group of the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, and at
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL).
While at the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory he made "pioneering
contributions" to aviation engineering theory in the areas of supersonic
and transonic aerodynamics, as well as thin shell stability theory for
ballistic missile structures.4
At JPL, Qian was recognized as
one of the world's foremost experts on jet propulsion. During this
time, he worked on Private A, which was the first solid propellant missile
that performed successfully in the United States.5
Based on his rocket work at Cal Tech, Qian was recruited to join the
U.S. Army Air Force in the development of its long-range missile
programs.6 Commissioned a Colonel in the U.S. Army Air Force,7 he
eventually began working on the Titan intercontinental ballistic
missile.8
During the 1950s, allegations arose that Qian was spying for the PRC. 9
He lost his security clearances and was removed from work on U.S.
ballistic missiles. 10 The allegations that he was spying for the PRC are
presumed to be true.
Qian was invited back to the PRC and, after negotiations between the
U.S. Government and the PRC, Qian was allowed to return to the PRC in
1955. Four other Chinese members of Qian's Titan design team also returned
with him to the PRC.11 There were additional allegations that Qian
attempted to ship classified documents to the PRC before he left in
1955.12
Once back in the PRC, Qian became the leading figure in the PRC's
ballistic missile effort.13 Qian and his associates were able to apply the
knowledge they gained from working on U.S. ballistic missile programs to
the PRC's ballistic missile programs.
Qian became the chief project
manager in all of the PRC's ballistic missile programs, and was the lead
designer of the CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile. The CSS-4 is
the nuclear-armed ICBM currently targeted on the United States. (All but
two of the PRC's approximately 20 CSS-4 ICBMs have been deployed during
the 1990s.)
Qian was also the first director of the PRC's Fifth Academy, which was
responsible for aeronautics and missile development research.14 Today, the
Fifth Academy is known as the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC), and its
current Director is PRC Minister Liu Jiyuan.15
Qian was also instrumental in the development of the PRC's space
program. In 1958, he began presenting his concepts for a satellite to the
Communist Party leadership. In 1962, Qian began training PRC scientists in
the design and development of satellites. The satellite, which would
become known as the Dong Fang Hong-1, was launched on April 24, 1970. Qian
was personally commended by Mao Zedong and other PRC leaders for his
contributions to the design and launch of the satellite.16
The CCP leadership awarded Qian the honorary rank of Lieutenant General
in the People's Liberation Army. It is a rank commensurate with his place
as a senior scientist in the PRC's ballistic missile program.17
In 1991, President Jiang Zemin provided Qian with the "State Scientist
of Outstanding Contribution" award, which is the highest honor a scientist
in the PRC can achieve.18
Development of the PLA's Intermediate-
and Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
The PRC began developing
three ballistic missiles in the early 1960s. The first two, which would
become known in the West as the CSS-2 and CSS-3, showed strong Soviet
design influences, especially in the guidance and propulsion subsystems.
The third missile, which would become known as the CSS-4, uses advanced
gyroscopes for increased accuracy. The chart on the previous page
illustrates current and future PRC ballistic missile systems.
The CSS-2 mobile missile is designated by the PLA as the Deng
Feng 3 (that is, East Wind 3). It has evolved into a 1,700- to
1,900-mile range single-stage liquid-propellant ballistic missile. The PLA
deploys CSS-2 ballistic missiles on mobile launchers. The PRC sold several
dozen of these CSS-2 missiles, armed with conventional warheads, to Saudi
Arabia in 1988.
The CSS-3 (PLA designation DF-4, or East Wind 4) was the
PRC's first missile with "intercontinental" range. The CSS-3 is a
two-stage liquid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile. It has a
range of more than 3,400 miles,19 but is considered a "limited range" ICBM
because it cannot reach the United States. It uses the medium-range CSS-2
as its first stage. Targets for the PLA's CSS-3 missiles could
include:
� India
� Russia
� The U.S. Naval Facility at
Diego Garcia
� The U.S. Air Force Base at
Guam
The CSS-3 missiles are based in silos, and in mountainside tunnels
where they are rolled out and erected for launch.20 The CSS-3 missile has
been deployed by the PLA since 1980.21
The PLA's
Current "East Wind"
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
The CSS-4 (PLA designation DF-5, or East Wind 5) is
currently the PRC's main ICBM nuclear threat against the United
States.
The CSS-4 program began in the 1960s. It was originally envisioned that
the missile would use liquid oxygen and kerosene propellants, similar to
those used in the Soviet R-7 (SS-6) missile and in the U.S. Atlas. In the
early 1960s, however, the program transitioned into the use of storable
propellant.
Progress in the CSS-4 program was slowed by the Great Leap Forward in
1963 and the Cultural Revolution from 1966-1976, which compounded the
technical challenges of developing an ICBM. The CSS-4's development
program continued to progress over the next 20 years.
The PRC first attempted a flight test of the CSS-4 in the 1970s.
Following several flight test failures, the PRC continued its development
of the CSS-4 through its development of the Long March 2 rocket. Of the
next nine Long March 2 launches from 1973 through 1978, five were
successful.
The CSS-4 uses nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as the oxidizer and a
lightweight, aluminum-copper alloy airframe. It is equipped with four
YF-20 engines in its first stage, and a single YF-20 engine in its second
stage. Unlike previous PRC missiles that use jet vanes in the exhaust for
steering control, the CSS-4 uses steerable exhaust nozzles for control. It
has been reported to the Select Committee that the CSS-4 uses a gimbaled
guidance system for control.22
Starting in 1981, the PRC began deploying CSS-4 missiles in silos. Only
two operational missiles were deployed in the 1980s, on what the PRC
called "trial operational deployments."
During the 1990s, the PRC has
deployed a total of approximately 20 CSS-4 ICBMs in silos, most of which
are targeted on the United States. The Select Committee judges that
despite the 1998 announcement that the PRC and the U.S. would no longer
target each other with nuclear weapons, the PRC's missiles remain targeted
at the United States.
Today, the CSS-4 has a range in excess of 7,400 miles. The PRC has
begun deploying an improved version of the CSS-4, known as the CSS-4 Mod
2.23 The Mod 2 has improved range capabilities over the CSS-4. The
additional range may provide the PRC with greater confidence that the
missile will reach long distance targets such as Washington, D.C.,
although this and other U.S. cities are already within the range of the
CSS-4.
This improved range may also translate into an improved throw-weight
that could allow the PRC to deploy multiple warheads on the CSS-4 Mod 2,
rather than the single warheads that are currently carried on the
CSS-4.
The PLA's
Future "East Wind"
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Missiles in silos are vulnerable to attack because their precise
location can be known in advance. Concerns about the survivability of its
silo-based CSS-4 ballistic missile forces have led the PLA to begin a
modernization program that includes the development of road-mobile,
solid-propellant ballistic missiles.
The use of a solid-propellant missile in place of the liquid-fueled
CSS-4 will permit the PRC to launch its missiles with shorter notice. That
is because the liquid fuel for the current CSS-4 must be stored separately
from the missile until launch. Then, prior to launch, the CSS-4 missile
must be fueled.
Substitution of a mobile missile for the silo-based CSS-4 will make it
possible to hide the missile's location, thus protecting it from
attack.
The PLA is currently developing two road-mobile intercontinental
ballistic missile systems. It also has under development a
submarine-launched ballistic missile. The Select Committee judges that
within 15 years, this modernization program could result in the deployment
of a PLA intercontinental ballistic missile force consisting of up to 100
ICBMs.
The PRC's planned new mobile
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and its planned new
submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, require smaller
warheads than the large, heavy, 1950s-era warheads developed for the
PRC's current silo-based missiles. Because U.S. thermonuclear warheads are
significantly smaller, they are capable of use on mobile missiles and
submarine-launched missiles. The Select Committee judges that the PRC will
exploit elements of the stolen U.S. thermonuclear warhead design
information on these new ICBMs.
If any of the PRC's planned missiles were to carry multiple warheads,
or if the CSS-4 were modified to carry multiple warheads, then a fairing
(that is, a covering for the missiles in the nose cone) could be required.
See the chapter entitled Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes for
a discussion of the PRC's acquisition of fairing technology from the
United States.
The aggressive development of a MIRV system by the PRC could permit the
deployment of upwards of 1,000 thermonuclear warheads on ICBMs by 2015.
See the chapter entitled PRC Theft of Thermonuclear Warhead Design
Information for information on the PRC's development of nuclear
warheads that may exploit elements of U.S. thermonuclear weapons design
information.
The first of the three new intercontinental ballistic missiles that are
being developed by the PRC is the DF-31 (or East Wind 31).
It is estimated that the DF-31 will be a three-stage, mobile,
solid-propellant ballistic missile. It will be deployed on a mobile
erector-launcher.
The DF-31's 5,000-mile range will allow it to hit all of Hawaii and
Alaska and parts of the state of Washington, but not other parts of the
continental United States.24 Due to its limited intercontinental range,
the DF-31 is most likely intended as the replacement for the PRC's aging
CSS-3 force, rather than for the longer range CSS-4 ICBM.
The DF-31 missile may be tested this year. Given a successful flight
program, the DF-31 could be ready for deployment as early as 2002.
The collapse of the Soviet Union
has changed the PRC's strategic outlook, prompting the development of
extended range missiles. To this end, the PRC is planning an even
longer-range, mobile ICBM to add to its already deployed CSS-4 missiles.
This new missile is believed to have a range of more than 7,500 miles,
allowing the PRC to target almost all of the United States. These missiles
can be deployed anywhere within the PRC, making them significantly more
survivable.
The JL-2 (Julang 2, or Great Wave 2) is a
submarine-launched version of the DF-31. It is believed to have an even
longer range, and will be carried on the PLA Navy's Type 094-class
submarine. 16 JL-2 missiles will be carried on each
submarine.25
The JL-2's 7,500 mile range will allow it to be
launched from the PRC's territorial waters and to strike targets
throughout the United States.26
This range would allow a significant change in the operation and
tactics of the PRC's nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Instead
of venturing into the open ocean to attack the United States, the Type
094-class submarines could remain near PRC waters, protected by the PLA
Navy and Air Force.
Additionally, if the JL-2 were to employ a shroud to protect its
warhead as do the majority of submarine-launched ballistic missiles today,
this would be the first use of a shroud or fairing on a PRC missile.
The PRC's
Medium- and Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
The PRC is also deploying, or developing for future deployment, a
series of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, including both
liquid- and solid-propellant technologies. Some are armed with
conventional warheads and others with nuclear warheads. These missiles
present a threat to U.S. forces deployed in the region, and to U.S. allies
and friends in the region.
The PRC's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles include the CSS-6
short-range ballistic missile, the CSS-X-7 short-range ballistic missile,
and the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile. The PRC is also developing
new versions of its short-range ballistic missiles, and may produce these
systems in larger quantities than earlier-generation PRC ballistic
missiles.
The PLA's CSS-6 (DF-15 or East
Wind 15; also known as the M-9) is an advanced, solid-propellant,
short-range ballistic missile that uses 1990s technology. It has a
range of 375 miles. It is a road-mobile missile, launched from a
transporter-erector-launcher. The CSS-6 may be fitted with nuclear
warheads or with an enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb).
 According to published reports, the majority
of the PRC's CSS-6 missiles are deployed adjacent to Taiwan.
The PRC may attempt various means to improve the CSS-6's accuracy. The
PRC claims to be planning to use the Global Positioning System (GPS) on
its "M" missiles, which likely include the CSS-6, CSS-X-7, and other
short-range ballistic missiles.
On two recent occasions, the PRC has launched a number of CSS-6
missiles towards Taiwan as a means of political intimidation. In July
1995, the PRC fired CSS-6 missiles to a location north of Taiwan in an
attempt to influence Taiwan's parliamentary elections. In March 1996, the
PRC again launched CSS-6 missiles to areas north and south of Taiwan's two
major ports in an effort to influence its presidential elections.
The PRC is also developing the CSS-X-7 (DF-11 or East Wind
11; also known as the M-11) short-range ballistic missile. The CSS-X-7
is a mobile, 185-mile range solid-propellant ballistic missile that is
launched from a transporter-erector-launcher. This missile has been
exported to Pakistan. The main advantage of the CSS-X-7 over the CSS-6 is
its ability to carry a larger payload.
The CSS-5 (DF-21, or East Wind
21) medium-range ballistic missile is now deployed by the PRC. The
CSS-5 is a road-mobile, solid-propellant ballistic missile with a range of
1,100 miles. The CSS-5 is assessed to carry a nuclear warhead payload. An
improved version, known as the CSS-5 Mod 2, is under development in
the PRC. The range of these missiles, if fitted with a conventional
warhead, would be sufficient to hit targets in Japan.
The CSS-5 has also been developed in a submarine-launched ballistic
missile version. The Western designation of this missile is
CSS-NX-3; its PLA designation is JL-1 (Julang 1, or Great
Wave 1). This missile is assessed to have a range of 1,200 miles.
Missiles of this type will be launched from the PLA Navy Xia-class
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.
While the Xia submarines were completed in 1981, the PRC has yet
to deploy the CSS-NX-3 missile.27 Due to the missile's 1,000-mile range,
the CSS-NX-3 is best suited for theater targets, although it could
threaten the U.S. if the PRC chose to deploy it in open-ocean
operations.
The PRC has also developed the CSS-8 (8610) short-range
ballistic missile. The CSS-8 is derived from the Soviet SA-2
surface-to-air missile. The PRC has sold the missile to Iran.
Stolen U.S.
Technology Used on PRC Ballistic Missiles
The PRC has stolen U.S. missile guidance technology that has direct
applicability to the PLA's ballistic missiles and rockets. The stolen
guidance technology is used on a variety of U.S. missiles and military
aircraft:
� The 90-mile range U.S. Army
Tactical Missile System
� The U.S. Navy's Stand-off
Land Attack Missile-Extended Range (SLAM-ER)
� The U.S. Navy F-14 fighter
jet
� The U.S. Air Force F-15
fighter jet
� The U.S. Air Force F-16
fighter jet
� The U.S. Air Force F-117
fighter jet
The PRC's
Strategic Forces Doctrine
Following the detonation of its first nuclear weapon in 1964, the PRC
publicly declared that it would never use nuclear weapons first against
the homeland of a nuclear power or a non-nuclear nation. The PRC pointedly
does not include Taiwan in this formulation. The PRC's announced strategic
doctrine is based on the concept of "limited deterrence," which is defined
as the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy in a retaliatory
strike.28
The PRC's currently deployed ICBMs are so-called "city busters": that
is, they are useful for targeting entire cities or large military bases,
rather than smaller, hardened targets such as U.S. ICBM silos. The
intercontinental-range CSS-4s are deployed in their silos without warheads
and without propellants during day-to-day operations.29
Strategic doctrine, however, can
change, and the PRC's movement towards a nuclear missile force of several
kinds of mobile, long-range ballistic missiles will allow it to
include a range of options in its nuclear force doctrine. The acknowledged
high accuracy of U.S. ballistic missiles, as well as the large number of
increasingly accurate Russian missiles, may have left the PRC unsatisfied
with the vulnerability of its silo-based forces. The PRC's new mobile
missiles will be difficult to locate once they have been dispersed from
their garrisons, giving them far better protection from attack. These new,
mobile, long-range missiles can also be launched on much shorter notice
than the PRC's current force, due to their planned use of solid
propellants.
Because they will be much more difficult to locate and destroy than the
PRC's current silo-based ICBM force, these new mobile ICBMs will present a
more credible threat against the U. S. in the event a crisis develops over
a regional conflict in East Asia.
According to the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to
the United States:
In a crisis in which the U. S. confronts China's conventional and
nuclear forces at the regional level, China's modernized strategic
nuclear ballistic missile force would pose a credible threat against the
United States.
Deterring the U. S. can be important to China's ability to use
force to achieve its goal of being the preeminent power in East
Asia.
China demonstrated a willingness to use ballistic missiles in the
Taiwan crisis of 1995/96.
The question of a senior Chinese official - was the U. S. willing
to trade Los Angeles for Taiwan - suggests their understanding of the
linkage between China's regional and strategic ballistic missile
capabilities.30
The deployment of the PRC's new
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine could also lead to a shift in
PRC doctrine, as these submarines will likely be deployed with their
nuclear warheads already mated to the missiles. The long range of the
JL-2 submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile will allow the
PRC to conduct patrols close to its base, and under the protective cover
of the PLA Navy and Air Force. This would provide the PLA submarine fleet
with a more survivable nuclear force.
The fact that these new nuclear weapons will be far more survivable
than the PRC's current silo-based forces could signal a major shift in the
PRC's current nuclear strategy and doctrine.
The PRC might allow the first use of nuclear weapons on its own
territory, which the PRC views as including Taiwan.
The PRC has tested an enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb) that
minimizes blast effects, while maximizing human casualties. The PRC
probably originally developed the neutron bomb for use on its own
territory against invading Soviet forces. Similarly, the neutron bomb
would be useful in a conflict with Taiwan, since the PRC undoubtedly would
intend to occupy the territory it was attacking. The PRC may have plans to
deploy neutron bombs.
These enhancements to the PRC's
nuclear forces, together with its expanding economic capabilities, present
the PRC with additional options for changes in its strategic doctrine.
The PRC's growing economy, for instance, could allow it to produce and
deploy more missiles than earlier planned. Additionally, the Select
Committee judges that if the PRC made a decision to do so, it could build
multiple warheads for its ballistic missiles.
Moreover, the PRC's concerns about the vulnerability of its nuclear
weapons could lead the PRC to develop an early warning system in order to
support a launch-on-warning posture.
The secretive nature of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military
Commission, as well as the PLA's other decision-making bodies, means that
changes in PRC nuclear force doctrine may not be apparent.
Clearly, the PRC views its conventional ballistic missile forces as
potential weapons for use during regional conflicts. This strategy was
implied by the PRC in the course of its CSS-6 short-range ballistic
missile exercises during the March 1996 presidential elections in Taiwan.
During the exercise, the PRC launched four CSS-6 ballistic missiles
towards points north and south of Taiwan's major ports.
The PRC's
Opposition to U.S. Missile Defenses
Statements by PRC Government officials make it clear that the PRC is
opposed to the development of either theater or national missile defense
systems that could counter Beijing's nuclear forces.
If the PRC were intent upon overwhelming these defenses, there are
several options it could take in an attempt to preserve the offensive
capability of its missile forces.
One of the PRC's responses could be to expand the size of its ballistic
missile force, to increase the chances that some of its nuclear weapons
overcome a nation's defenses. This would be an expensive option requiring
the PRC to invest in the production of significant additional missiles and
infrastructure.
A cheaper response to U.S. missile defenses for the PRC could be the
development of penetration aids (PENAIDS) for its ballistic missiles.
These PENAIDS could include:
� Decoys that create
multiple radar targets, which must be tracked until discrimination of
the actual nuclear warhead can be accomplished. Simple decoys are
effective during exoatmospheric flight of the nuclear warhead, but burn
up during reentry into the atmosphere.
� Chaff consisting of
aluminum strips that are designed to reflect radar beams, thereby
confusing a radar as to the location of the PLA warhead.
� Jammers used to jam the
radar system during the flight of the PLA nuclear warhead.
� Radar absorbing
materials, which can also be used to reduce the radar cross section
of the PLA nuclear warhead.
� The PLA nuclear warhead
itself could be reoriented to present the lowest radar cross
section.31
The PRC is expected to pursue one or more PENAIDs in connection with
its new nuclear missiles.
Given the PRC's aggressive opposition to missile defenses, the Select
Committee judges that the PRC is collecting information about U.S. missile
defense systems in order to help its development of PENAIDS.
Another option for countering U.S. missile defenses would be the
development of a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MARV). The maneuvering
capability could be used to complicate hit-to-kill or conventional warhead
ballistic missile defense systems.
The PRC could also develop multiple independently-targetable reentry
vehicles (MIRVs) or multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) platforms. This would
effectively increase the size of the PLA's nuclear force without the full
expense required to deploy additional missiles. The PRC's theft from the
United States of design information for the W-88 miniaturized nuclear
warhead makes it possible that existing or future PLA missiles, which
might have been too small in diameter to carry multiple warheads, could
now do so.
Furthermore, existing PLA missiles, including the CSS-4 Mod 2, could be
capable of carrying the new, smaller warheads in a MIRV or MRV
configuration. Within a short period of time after a decision to proceed,
the PRC has the ability to deploy missiles with multiple reentry vehicles
(MIRVs or MRVs). The PRC has demonstrated similar concepts and
technologies in the Smart Dispenser that it developed to place multiple
Iridium satellites into orbit. The Select Committee did not, however,
review sufficient evidence to permit a judgment whether the PRC will in
the future decide to deploy a MIRV or MRV system.
THE IRIDIUM SMART DISPENSER
CONTROVERSY
In May 1998, allegations were made that Motorola had provided the PRC
with technology that would allow it to build a multiple, independently
targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) missile-dispensing platform. The
allegations were that the Smart Dispenser used by the PRC to place two
Iridium communications satellites into orbit would provide the PRC with
technology that would be directly applicable to MIRV dispensing.32
The Smart Dispenser is an on-orbit maneuvering stage with its own
independent guidance system. The Select Committee has determined that
Motorola did not provide the PRC with information on how to design the
Smart Dispenser; rather, the PRC built the Smart Dispenser indigenously to
Motorola's specifications. However, the Select Committee's independent
technical expert noted that the PRC has demonstrated all of the techniques
that are required for developing a MIRV bus, and that the PRC could
develop a MIRV dispensing platform within a short period of time after
making a decision to proceed.
The PRC's
Acquisition of Foreign Ballistic Missile Technology
The PRC constantly searches for technology for its ballistic missile
programs. Any technology or know-how that the PRC can acquire from foreign
sources will save the PRC time and money in the development of its future
weapons systems.
The prospect of ballistic missile and nuclear weapons cooperation
between Russia and the PRC would be especially troubling because of the
advanced technical capabilities of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.
Thus far, Russia has been the only nation to deploy a mobile
intercontinental ballistic missile force. These missiles include the
road-mobile solid-propellant SS-25 ICBM and the rail-mobile SS-24 ICBM.
Any cooperation in the area of solid-propellant mobile missiles would
clearly benefit the PRC's new road-mobile ICBM programs.
Additionally, the Russians have advanced guidance and control
capabilities. Assistance in the guidance and control field could help the
PRC improve the accuracy of its current and future missile forces.
Furthermore, the Russians have the ability to mass-produce large,
solid-propellant missiles. The manufacturing capabilities for these
missiles could help the PRC produce large numbers of its next generation
ICBMs. Russia's use of advanced solid-propellant materials could benefit
the PRC's ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile programs, allowing
them to build lightweight, longer-range ballistic missiles.
The Russian designer of the SS-X-27 has claimed that the missile's
advanced penetration capabilities will allow it to defeat any nation's
ballistic missile defenses.33 While the validity of such a statement
cannot be judged against a U.S. national missile defense system that is
not yet deployed, or even finally designed, Russia's provision of these
presumably advanced penetration technologies to the PRC could assist PRC
efforts to counter a U.S. national missile defense system.
While the Select Committee has no evidence that the Russians or any
other nation of the former Soviet Union have provided the PRC with
complete ballistic missiles or missile subsystems, there have been
reported instances of the PRC approaching Russia and Ukraine about
acquiring SS-18 and SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Reportedly,
the PRC was turned down.34
The PRC's
Indigenous Ballistic Missile Design Capabilities
The PRC is judged to have a fairly sophisticated capability to design
ballistic missiles and rockets. This assessment is based on the fact that
the PRC is able to develop missiles and rockets that are capable of
delivering large payloads to their intended destination with reasonable
accuracy and reliability. However, these design capabilities are not in
all cases as sophisticated as those of Western nations.
The Select Committee's independent technical expert noted that while
PRC scientists and engineers may have a textbook understanding of
problems, there is a difference between a textbook understanding and the
application of this knowledge to specific problems. Interactions with U.S.
and foreign scientists and engineers, therefor, could assist the PRC
engineers and scientists in overcoming these limitations.
PRC Missile
Proliferation
The PRC is one of the world's leading proliferators of complete
ballistic missile systems, as well as missile components.
Despite the fact that, in 1991, the PRC agreed to adhere to the April
1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines that call for
restraint on the sale of missiles capable of delivering a 225-pound
payload to 185 miles, the PRC has sold complete ballistic missile systems
or missile components to a number of countries, including but not limited
to Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.35
In 1993, the MTCR States issued new expanded guidelines that called for
a "strong presumption to deny" both sales of complete missile systems and
sales of components that could be used in ballistic missile systems.
Furthermore, the new guidelines call for restrictions on transfers of
missiles that can deliver a weapons of mass destruction payload to 185
miles.36 However, the PRC has accepted neither these revised guidelines,
nor the annex on the transfer of components and other commodities such as
propellants and test equipment.37
Notwithstanding the PRC's purported adherence to the MTCR Category I
restrictions, the PRC has provided, or is providing, assistance to the
missile and space programs of Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
and other countries. The PRC also continues to offer Category II missile
components for sale to international customers. In addition, the PRC has
provided assistance to the nuclear programs of Iran and Pakistan.
Iran
 During the 1990s, the PRC sold Iran significant
numbers of 90-mile range CSS-8 ballistic missiles, along with associated
support equipment. In addition, PRC companies provided Iran with ballistic
missile production technology. The PRC also reportedly sold Iran guidance
components,38 and more recently telemetry equipment, for ballistic
missiles.39 The PRC reportedly is currently providing Iran with
solid-propellant missile technology.40 During the 1980s and 1990s, the PRC
has transferred C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.41 The PRC has
also provided assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons programs.42
Pakistan
The PRC has
provided Pakistan with a wide range of weapons assistance. The PRC has
reportedly supplied Pakistan with CSS-X-7 (or M-11) ballistic missiles,
mobile missile launchers, and the facilities necessary to produce M-11
missiles. The PRC has also provided Pakistan with assistance on uranium
enrichment, ring magnets, and other technologies useful for Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program.43
Saudi Arabia
The PRC
provided complete CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1987. The
conventionally armed missile has a range of 1,500 to 1,800 miles.44
The Select Committee's classified Final Report contains additional
information on PRC proliferation that the Clinton administration has
determined cannot be made public without affecting national security.
The PRC's Military and Civil Space Program
The PRC's military and civilian space launch program began in the
1950s, concurrent with its development of long-range ballistic missiles.
At that time, a small research effort was begun at the Chinese Academy of
Sciences to develop indigenous space launch and satellite production
capabilities.
The PRC's early efforts were aided by technology and knowledge
transferred from the Soviet Union.
From that beginning, the PRC has developed a comprehensive space
program that includes a family of rockets, numerous satellites, and a
telemetry, tracking, and control network. These efforts have paid off, as
the PRC is now a major space power. It offers international launch
services and is working on placing men in space.
The PRC's first satellite launch occurred on April 24, 1970, using a
CSS-3 intercontinental ballistic missile. The ICBM was modified by adding
a third stage, which was used to place the satellite into orbit. This new
rocket was named the Long March 1.
The 380-pound satellite it carried was named Dong Fang Hong-1 (East Is
Red 1). The satellite orbited for approximately 26 days, transmitting to
Earth the song "The East is Red." 45
After the PRC's second successful launch of a satellite on March 3,
1971, again using the modified CSS-3 ICBM, the PRC set out to launch
heavier payloads into orbit. For this purpose, the PRC turned to the
longer-range, more powerful CSS-4 ICBM. This rocket was named the Long
March 2.
The first three launches of the Long March 2 rocket, from 1973 through
1974, were failures. Finally, on July 26, 1975, the PRC successfully
launched the Long March 2C and placed its third satellite into
orbit.
During the balance of the 1970s, the PRC launched nearly a dozen
satellites on the Long March 2, many of which undoubtedly were for
military purposes. Nearly half of these launches were unsuccessful,
however, resulting in the destruction of many payloads.
The Long March 2 and its
derivatives are the main rockets used by the PRC today, in both its
military and civilian space programs. Because the Long March 2 was
derived directly from the CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile, the
two share much in common. The Long March 2 rocket and the CSS-4 ICBM use
the same airframe structure, the same cluster of four YF-20 engines (known
as the YF-21) in the first stage, and the same single YF-22 engine
combined with the YF-23 vernier engines that form the YF-24 in the second
stage.46 However, unlike the CSS-4, the Long March 2 was modified to
deliver payloads to orbit rather than a nuclear weapon to a target.
In order to meet space launch requirements for heavier payloads and
higher orbits, the PRC improved the performance of the Long March rocket.
Among other changes, the PRC increased the amount of propellant the rocket
could carry, improved the performance of the first and second stage
engines, added new cryogenic liquid-propellant third stage engines, and
attached additional boosters that were strapped on to the basic rocket.
These changes led to the development of three new modifications to the
Long March rocket.
The Long March 3 was developed in 1977 to meet the requirements
for launching communications satellites into geosynchronous orbit. It was
the PRC's first rocket built for this purpose.47 The Long March 3 uses the
same first and second stages as the Long March 2C, except that aerodynamic
fins are added to the base of the first stage.48 It also uses the same
YF-21 and YF-24 engines.49 The main change from the Long March 2C is the
addition of a restartable, cryogenic liquid-propellant third stage.50 This
stage is designed to boost the payload into a geostationary transfer
orbit.
The Long March 4 was developed by the PRC in the late 1970s to
launch meteorological satellites for military and civilian purposes into
sun-synchronous orbits. The new rocket used improved first and second
stage engines, and a first stage that was 13 feet longer than the standard
Long March 2 first stage.51
When the PRC announced in 1986 that is was entering the commercial
satellite launch market, it decided to develop a rocket that could provide
heavy-lift capabilities to low earth orbit. However, the PRC's operational
rockets at the time were exceptionally limited in their ability to place
payloads in this orbit. The Long March 2C, for example, could only place a
1,350-pound payload into low earth orbit.52 In comparison, the U.S. Delta
3925 rocket could place 2,140 pounds into low earth orbit. The U.S. space
shuttle could transport 15,400 pounds into low earth orbit.53
Moreover, the majority of commercial payloads at the time were for
geosynchronous satellites.54 But to place heavy payloads into
geosynchronous orbit requires a third stage, which the Long March 2C still
lacked, or a satellite perigee kick motor.
To meet the geosynchronous
payload lift requirement, the PRC developed the Long March 2E
rocket, which was first launched successfully in 1992. The Long March 2E
uses a stretched version of the Long March 2C first and second stages,
increasing the amount of propellant carried, which increases the burn-time
of the engines. 55 The Long March 2E also uses improved versions of the
YF-20 engines used on the Long March 2C. Known as the YF-20B, these
engines offer improved thrust.56 The Long March 2E also uses four strap-on
liquid-propellant boosters. These boosters are attached to the rocket's
first stage. Each booster is fitted with a YF-20B engine.
To permit the Long March 2E to place a satellite into geosynchronous
orbit, the PRC mated the satellite payload with a perigee kick motor,
which acted as a third stage. Because there was no indigenous PRC kick
motor, however, foreign launch customers had to use Western-manufactured
kick motors. This required a separate export license. The PRC later
developed its own family of kick motors, allowing customers to choose
between Western- or PRC-manufactured versions.
Finally, the Long March 2E employs an enlarged "hammerhead" fairing to
protect the satellite payloads, which exceed the upper stage's diameter.
The Long March 2E can place 5,450 pounds into low earth orbit and 2,140
pounds into geosynchronous transfer orbit.57
The Long March 2E has suffered a series of in-flight failures (see
table overleaf). The December 1992 and January 1995 failures resulted in
the destruction of two Hughes-manufactured satellites. The results of the
failure analyses conducted by Hughes as a result of these launch failures
are discussed in the chapter entitled Satellite Launches in the PRC:
Hughes.
Two years after the first successful launch of the Long March 2E, the
PRC successfully launched the Long March 3A, a cheaper, higher
performance rocket that would better meet both its military and commercial
geosynchronous launch requirements. The Long March 3A was the first of a
family of Long March 3A, 3B and 3C rockets.
The Long March 3A family of rockets uses a strengthened Long March 3
first stage. In the case of the Long March 3B and 3C, this permits the
mounting of additional strap-on boosters. The Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C
rockets also use a new, lighter weight, and cheaper inertial measurement
unit. Furthermore, these rockets employ large "hammerhead" fairings to
protect their satellite payloads. The failure analysis of the Long March
3B launch, carrying the Intelsat 708 satellite manufactured by Loral, is
discussed in the chapter of this Report entitled Satellite Launches in the
PRC: Loral.
The PRC's
Commercial Space Launch Program
The PRC's entry into the commercial space launch market coincided with
a dark period for the U.S. launch industry that included the 1985 and 1986
launch failures of several Delta and Titan expendable rockets, and the
1986 explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger. At the time of the
Challenger accident, the U.S. space launch industry was in the
midst of a plan to phase out all expendable rockets in favor of the Space
Shuttle, which was projected to be more economical.60 But that plan was
cancelled with the Challenger explosion. Instead, the United States
imposed a hiatus in shuttle launches until September 1988, and a permanent
decision that the Space Shuttle would not be used to launch commercial
payloads.61
The lack of available U.S. commercial space launch capacity forced
satellite manufacturers to seek alternative launch providers. The Soviet
Union had the capacity to launch commercial satellites, but U.S. policy
would not support the launching of U.S.-manufactured satellites on Soviet
rockets. The European consortium of Arianespace had no extra capacity.
This left the PRC as the only alternative for launching geosynchronous
communications satellites.
In 1987, the United States viewed the PRC as a counterbalance to Soviet
military power in Asia. Accordingly, the "Green Line" policy had been
adopted to permit some technology transfers to the PRC, while limiting
transfers of technologies that could improve the PLA's ballistic missile
and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.62 In 1988, President Reagan
agreed to allow the PRC to launch U.S.-manufactured satellites on the
condition that the PRC sign three bilateral agreements with the U.S. on
competitive pricing, liability, and the protection of U.S. technology.
63
The PRC's first success in the commercial market occurred in 1987. In
that year, Matra of France contracted with the PRC to place a scientific
payload in orbit, using a Long March 2C rocket. These French scientific
experiments were launched on August 5, 1987 aboard a PLA military
photo-reconnaissance satellite. The recoverable capsules of the PLA's
reconnaissance satellites made them an ideal platform for microgravity
experiments.64
The PRC's first commercial launch of a U.S.-manufactured communications
satellite occurred on April 7, 1990. The Asiasat - a Hughes HS 376 model
satellite - was launched into orbit aboard a Long March 3 rocket.65
From that point, in addition to their military launch schedule, the PRC
has attempted 28 launches of Western-manufactured satellites.66 Of these
satellites, 27 were U.S-manufactured: only the French-manufactured
Sinosat, launched successfully on July 18, 1998, was produced by a
non-U.S. manufacturer. 67 Twenty-three of the PRC's attempts to launch
U.S. satellites were successful. Four have ended in failure.68 These four
failures are detailed below.
Recently, the PRC has made an effort to sell low-earth orbit satellite
launches:
� The PRC has entered into
contracts with Motorola for the launch of Iridium satellites,
including a contract to launch replacement satellites. Iridium
satellites have been successfully launched six times on the Long March
2C/SD (that is, the Long March 2C with a "Smart Dispenser" (SD) stage
added). The "Smart Dispenser" allows the PRC to launch two Iridium
satellites into orbit at a time.
� The PRC has pursued a
contract with Loral for the launch of Globalstar satellites. The PRC
offered a version of its Long March 2E equipped with a "Top Stage" (TS)
that would dispense twelve Globalstar satellites. While Loral had
originally contracted for a launch on the Long March 2E/TS, it cancelled
that contract following the crash of the Long March 3B in February
1996.
The PRC's
Future Space Launch Capabilities
The PRC also recognizes the importance of space in future conflicts,
for purposes that include both command and control, and military
reconnaissance. The PRC is believed to be developing a new, larger rocket
that will be able to carry larger payloads into orbit.
PRC papers have discussed the use of cryogenic liquid propellant
engines for this future rocket. One of the engines the PRC could use is
the RD-120. The PRC is known to have acquired at least one of these
engines from Russian during the 1990s.69 The RD-120 is a liquid
oxygen/kerosene engine that is used on the second stage of the Zenit
rocket, which is used on the multinational Sea Launch program.
Difficulties with the development of the new engines for this rocket
may have prompted the PRC to focus, in the nearer term, on the proposed
Long March 2E(A) and Long March 3B(A) versions of the Long March rocket
that will utilize improved strap-on boosters to achieve greater
payload-to-orbit capability. It should be noted that these are the two
systems that were the subject of the failure review investigations in
which Loral and Hughes participated. See the chapters Satellite Launches
in the PRC: Hughes and Loral for a detailed discussion of how these
failure reviews assisted the PRC.
PRC Space
Weapons
The PRC is believed to be developing space-based and ground-based
anti-satellite laser weapons. Such weapons would be of exceptional value
for the control of space and information. The Select Committee judges that
the PRC is moving toward the deployment of such weapons.
Based on the significant level of PRC-Russian cooperation on weapons
development, it is possible that the PRC will be able to use nuclear
reactors to pump lasers with pulse energies high enough to destroy
satellites.
In addition, Russian cooperation could help the PRC to develop an
advanced radar system using lasers to track and image satellites.
The Select Committee judges that the PRC has the technical capability
to develop direct ascent anti-satellite weapons. The CSS-2 could be
modified for use in this role. This would be similar to the approach taken
by the Soviets with their SS-9 ASAT system.
The PRC's
Manned Space Program
The PRC has conducted research since the 1950s, including biological
and life support research, on placing astronauts into orbit. Pursuant to
its 921 Project, the PRC's plans since the 1980s have included concepts
for Space Shuttle-like spacecraft, recoverable capsules, and a space
station.70
In 1996, two PRC astronauts began training at the Gagarin Cosmonaut
Training Center, Star City, Russia. The PRC appears set to launch these
two astronauts into space sometime this year to mark the fiftieth
anniversary of Communist rule in China.
For its manned space program, the PRC will use Soyuz capsules purchased
during Yeltsin's visit to the PRC in April 1996. A Soyuz capsule will be
carried on top of the Long March 2E, using a payload shroud (that is, a
fairing) equipped with a launch escape system. (See the chapter Satellite
Launches in the PRC: Hughes for a discussion of fairing improvements to
the Long March 2E.)
If the PRC is successful in placing men in orbit, it will be only the
third nation, after Russia and the United States, to have done this.
The PRC's
Communications Satellite Programs
Since the beginning of its domestic communications satellite programs,
the PRC has suffered a string of problems with the performance of its
communications satellites, as well as the rockets designed to place those
satellites into orbit.
During the mid-to-late 1980s, the PRC was able to place four of its
communications satellites into geosynchronous orbit. Today, however, the
PRC has only one active domestically-manufactured telecommunications
satellite on orbit. This satellite has reportedly suffered on-orbit
problems that may have reduced its capabilities.71
The PRC's inability to place reliable communications satellites
(COMSATs) into orbit has created serious gaps in the PRC's satellite
communications capabilities, both for civilian and military purposes. The
PRC has addressed the greatest part of its satellite communications
requirement by leasing communications channels on Western-manufactured
communications satellites.
The PRC first began developing its own communications satellites in the
early 1970s, based on Western technology. All of these satellites were
designed by the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) for military
purposes. They have all been operated by China Satellite Launch and
Tracking Control General (CLTC), which is subordinate to COSTIND.72
The PRC's inability to design and produce advanced communications
satellites has also led it to seek Western components and technology for
its domestic communications satellite industry. The Select Committee
judges that the use of Western technology cut in half the time required
for the PRC to progress from an experimental communications satellite to
the advanced DFH-3 satellites, which were first launched in 1994.
The following table shows a chronology of the PRC's history of
launching PRC communications satellites. 
The PRC's first generation
communications satellite was the DFH-2 (Dong Fang Hong-2, or
East Is Red 2). These satellites were designed to provide the PRC
with test experience. The satellite design was similar to that used on the
Hughes HS376 satellites, employing a spin-stabilized body and a de-spun
horn antenna.
The first attempt to launch a DFH-2 satellite, in January 1984, was not
successful due to the failure of the Long March 3 rocket that was to carry
it into orbit. The second launch attempt on April 8, 1984 successfully
placed a communications satellite into orbit. A third DFH-2 satellite was
launched on February 1, 1986. This satellite provided communications
services until it reached the end of its service life.
In 1988, the PRC launched an improved version of this satellite, known
as the DFH-2A. The new satellite used the same spin-stabilized
body, this time equipped with an improved antenna array that increased the
number of communications channels available.
These satellites were able to handle five television channels and 3,000
phone calls simultaneously. The first three of these satellites were named
"Chinasats" by the PRC, and were successfully launched twice in 1988 and
once in 1990. A fourth DFH-2A satellite launch in 1990 was unsuccessful,
when the failure of the rocket's third-stage engine left the satellite
stranded in an incorrect orbit.
The PRC's third generation communications satellites, known as the
DFH-3, are the PRC's most modern communication satellites. The
DFH-3 is useful for military communications. These satellites have
three-axis stabilized bodies, 24 C-band transponders and are designed to
have an 8-year on-orbit life. Due to the increased weight of these
satellites as compared to the DFH-2A, the DFH-3 satellites are launched on
the more capable Long March 3A rocket.
The first launch of the DFH-3 satellite on November 29, 1994 was
unsuccessful when the satellite failed to attain the proper orbit,
rendering it useless for its intended communications function.
The PRC's second attempt to launch a DFH-3 satellite on May 11, 1997
successfully placed the satellite into a geosynchronous orbit at 125
degrees east longitude.73 The PRC, however, reportedly may have suffered
problems with the satellite.74
The PRC's Use of Foreign Components on
Communications Satellites
The PRC's limited communications
satellite construction capabilities led it from the first to seek Western
manufacturers for reliable components. Even the PRC's most modern
communications satellite, the DFH-3, which was first successfully launched
in 1997, contains a large number of Western components:
� The DFH-3 is reported to use
a control processor built by Matra-Marconi75
� Messerschmitt Boelkow Blohm
(MBB) provided the DFH-3 solar panel substrates to the China Academy
of Space Technology (CAST), and CAST-produced solar cells were mounted
on them. The solar panel assemblies were then returned to MBB for
assembly into deployable solar arrays76
� Daimler Chrysler Aerospace
Group provided the DFH-3's antenna assembly, consisting of a
deployable dual gridded reflector, feed and interconnecting
structure77
� Officine Galileo provided the
Infrared Earth sensor to determine pitch/roll in geosynchronous
orbit78
� The DFH-3's payload test
equipment, according to 1993 reports, consisted of five racks and
consoles with 80% U.S. (Hewlett Packard) and German equipment
� The equipment racks for the
test equipment were provided by Germany's Ant
Corporation79
Several U.S. companies have also marketed their communications
satellite technologies to the PRC. Loral, for example, offered the PRC a
direct broadcast satellite (DBS) capability in 1996 using either a
Loral-produced satellite bus or the DFH-3 series satellite bus.80 A 1995
Memorandum of Agreement between Loral and China Aerospace Corporation
offered the PRC direct broadcast satellites, regional mobile satellite
services systems, and the joint development of an advanced high capacity
communications satellite. Under this agreement, Loral would provide design
and technical support, while the final integration of the satellite was to
have occurred in Germany or the PRC.81
Hughes and Loral competed for the Asia-Pacific Mobile
Telecommunications (APMT) satellite, and Hughes was awarded the contract.
APMT is a Singapore-based, PRC-controlled consortium. At least 51% of APMT
is owned by PRC Government agencies, including China Aerospace
Corporation, the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, China
Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, and Chinasat, a subsidiary
of the PRC Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.82 See the
Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications Satellite section of this
chapter, below.
The PRC's Reliance on Western
Communications Satellites
Due to the failures of the PRC's
rockets, and of its satellites, the PRC has become dependent on
Western-manufactured communications satellites.
The PRC's dependency began as the early DFH-2A satellites reached the
end of their on-orbit lives, while the fourth DFH-2A satellite failed to
reach orbit. This created a gap in the PRC's satellite communications
capabilities. As a result, the PRC was forced to look to foreign
communications satellite manufacturers for supplemental capacity.
In December 1992, the PRC purchased Spacenet 1 on-orbit from GTE to
replace its aging DFH-2A/1 and DFH-2A/2 satellites. The PRC renamed it
"ChinaSat-5." This satellite was to provide supplemental capabilities
until the PRC's first DFH-3 satellite was launched in 1994.
The failure of the PRC's first DFH-3 satellite to reach orbit, and the
imminent expiration of the useful life of ChinaSat-5, forced the PRC to
purchase a Hughes HS-376 satellite to provide additional communications
channels. But this satellite launch in August 1996, aboard a Long March 3
rocket, was also a failure. The third stage left the satellite stranded in
an unusable orbit.83
The second DFH-3 satellite that the PRC launched in May 1997 reportedly
has now developed on-orbit problems.84
These failures have left the PRC dependent on Western-manufactured
satellites, which it purchases through multinational consortia in which
the PRC maintains a controlling interest. These include the Asia Pacific
Satellite Telecommunications Co., and China Orient Telecomm Satellite Co,
Ltd. Satellites acquired by the PRC in this way include the Apstar-1,
Apstar-1A, Apstar-2R, and ChinaStar-1.
It is likely that these failures have made the PLA dependent on Western
communications satellites as well.
PRC Use of Very Small Aperture
Terminals (VSATs)
The PRC has acquired Western-manufactured
very small aperture terminals (VSATs) that could be used for military
satellite communications.
VSATs are small satellite communications antennas used to transmit
voice, data, video, fax, and computer-to-computer communications between
multiple users. One VSAT terminal can be used to transmit communications
from multiple users to different recipients via communications
satellites.
The small size of VSAT terminals allows easy transportation between
different locations and assembly in remote areas. These VSAT networks
could improve the PLA's military command and control capabilities, by
allowing mobile, reliable communications virtually anywhere.
The majority of VSAT terminals in use today in the PRC are U.S.
manufactured. Hughes is by far the largest provider of VSAT networks to
the PRC. The other significant U.S. supplier is Scientific Atlantic. Other
providers include NEC of Japan and Spar of Canada.85
The PLA's
Reconnaissance Satellite Program
The PLA has developed a photo reconnaissance satellite, known as the
FSW (for Fanhui Shi Weixing, or Recoverable Test Satellite).
The current version of the Recoverable Test Satellite uses a recoverable
capsule similar in concept to those used in the early U.S. Corona program.
This PLA reconnaissance satellite provides the PRC with the ability to
photograph U.S. military installations.
The first version of the satellite was successfully launched on
November 26, 1975, using a Long March 2C rocket. After three days in
orbit, the satellite capsule reentered and was successfully recovered by
the PRC. Subsequent redesigns of the FSW-1 satellites allowed the PRC to
increase its on-orbit life to five days before reentry. The PRC launched
fifteen FSW-1 satellites, the last occurring in October 1993.86
The PRC's current, enhanced version of this satellite is known as the
FSW-2. The FSW-2 is larger than the FSW-1 and has a longer on-orbit
life. The FSW-2 military reconnaissance satellite has been launched three
times since 1992.87 The most recent launch occurred in October 1996.
The PRC has also offered the FSW satellites as microgravity research
platforms - that is, scientific experiments are mounted on the military
reconnaissance satellite itself. The commercial proceeds from such "piggy
back" launches may in turn be used to subsidize the efforts of PRC
entities. Starting in 1987, several FSW satellites have carried
microgravity experiments for commercial customers, including France and
Germany.88
The PRC has also announced that it is going to deploy a new, more
capable military reconnaissance satellite.
CBERS: A PROTOTYPE OF THE PRC'S ACQUISITION
OF
WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
The CBERS-1 satellite program is an open program that has received
considerable publicity. The Select Committee judges that the PRC is
interested in promoting Western interest in this presumably civil
satellite because it offers a means of acquiring technology that could be
useful for future military reconnaissance satellites.
CBERS stands for the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite. The
CBERS-1 satellite is a joint venture with Brazil for the development of a
remote imaging satellite that will include a variety of Western
technologies.
The CBERS remote imagery satellite is designed to include wide field
imagery, a charge-coupled device (CCD) camera from the United States
manufactured by Fairchild, and an infrared multispectral camera. The
satellite is designed to provide global coverage at a variety of spatial
resolutions and spectral bands to meet a range of commercial needs.
The CBERS-1 satellite, if successfully completed and deployed, will be
able to image any location on the Earth within three days in the visible
region, and 26 days in the infrared region.
The PRC's
Other Military Satellite Programs
The PRC has developed and deployed a variety of other satellites for
military purposes since its first launches in the 1970s.
It has been reported that the PRC may have developed a series of
electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites in the early 1970s.89 These
satellites would have been useful for collecting data on Soviet defense,
among other purposes.
The PRC has also developed two different types of meteorological
satellites for military and civil purposes, known as Feng Yun (Wind and
Cloud).
� The FY-1 series of
satellites, first launched in 1988, are polar-orbiting. The FY-1
satellites have suffered a series of on-orbit failures. The first
satellite operated for only 39 days of its one-year planned design life;
the second satellite lost attitude control five months into its on-orbit
life, was recovered 50 days later, and was again lost due to radiation
damage.
� The FY-2 satellites were
designed to provide meteorological information from geosynchronous
orbit. The first satellite of this class, however, was lost due to an
explosion during ground processing.90 The second of this class was
launched on June 10, 1997 and was successfully placed into
orbit.91
While the PLA has, to date, relied on the U.S. Global Positioning
System (GPS) and the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS)
navigation satellites, the PRC has announced plans for its own navigation
satellite system, known as the Twin Star.
The GPS system of satellites, which provides three-dimensional
positioning and timing data throughout the globe, consists of 24
satellites with several on-orbit spares. The Russian GLONASS system is
intended to use 21 satellites with three on-orbit spares, but the
financial crisis in Russia has reduced the number of operational
satellites currently on orbit.
In comparison, the PRC's proposed Twin Star positioning system program,
as planned, would utilize two satellites in geosynchronous orbit for
positioning, messaging, and timing services.92 The Twin Star system
represents the PRC's attempt to become independent of the United States'
GPS and the Russian GLONASS navigation satellites.
The Asia-Pacific Mobile
Telecommunications (APMT) Satellite
Hughes is currently
designing a geosynchronous communications satellite for a PRC-controlled
consortium, Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications, Ltd. (APMT). The
stated purpose is to provide regional mobile communications throughout
Asia.93
Unlike previous communications satellites, however, this satellite uses
a very large antenna array, which has raised concerns that the satellite
could be used not simply for telecommunications, but also for space-based
signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection.
This would give the PRC the capability to eavesdrop electronically on
conversations not only in the PRC, but also in neighboring countries.
Since the APMT satellite's antenna array is significantly larger than any
that has been provided to the PRC by any nation, it is likely that the PRC
would seek to exploit the APMT design for a future PRC SIGINT
satellite.
Other concerns have been raised about the participation of the son of a
PLA general in the program's technical interchange meetings, as described
in greater detail later in this chapter.
When Hughes was awarded this contract, PRC entities had at least a 51
percent share in the international consortium that made up APMT. PRC
entities involved included China Aerospace Corporation, China Launch and
Tracking Control General, Chinasat, a subsidiary of the PRC Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications, and UNICOM, the PRC's second telephone
network. Originally, two Singaporean companies, Singapore
Telecommunications, Ltd. and Singapore Technologies Telemedia, owned
twenty-five percent of APMT.94 In 1998, however, Singapore
Telecommunications pulled out of the APMT project, stating that the
project no longer met its business requirements.95 Thailand is also listed
by Hughes as an "other" shareholder in APMT.96 In 1998, Hughes reported
that the shareholders for APMT included:
� China Aerospace
Corporation
� China Academy of Launch
Vehicle Technology
� China Satellite Launch &
Tracking Control General
� China Communications Systems
Co. Limited
� China Resources Holdings Co.
Ltd (PRC)
� Communications Authority of
Thailand
� Telephone Organization of
Thailand
� China Telecommunications
Broadcast Satellite Corporation
� China Asia-Pacific Mobile
Telecommunications Satellite Co. Ltd.
� Asia-Pacific Mobile
Telecommunications (Singapore)
Pte. Ltd.
� Sunburst Technologies
Investments Pte. Ltd. of Singapore
� Mitsubishi Corporation of
Japan
� NTT Mobilecommunications
Network Inc. of Japan
� Future Hi-Tech Co., Ltd. of
Thailand97
In the early 1990s, APMT held a competition among satellite
manufacturers for a regional mobile communications satellite system that
would use 50,000 small, portable handsets similar to cellular telephones.
The system called for a communications satellite in geosynchronous orbit,
which would transmit communications between handsets or rout them through
"gateways" into the local telephone network.98 Among the competitors were
Hughes and Loral.99
Hughes won the APMT contract. In 1996, Hughes requested an export
license from the Commerce Department for the APMT satellite.100 If
approved for export, the APMT satellite was to be launched on a Long March
3B rocket from the PRC.101 Hughes' design proposal, as originally
submitted to the Commerce Department, included two HS 601 satellite buses
with a 12-year design life. The satellites were to be equipped with a 40
foot L-band antenna.102 The license was originally approved by the
Commerce Department in 1996.103
In April 1998, Hughes submitted a second license request to the
Commerce Department due to changes in the satellite bus design.104 Hughes
wanted to use the more powerful HS-GEM bus, in place of the HS 601, which
would have permitted them to achieve design commonalities and hence
production efficiencies with another satellite sale to the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). The design change for the UAE satellite was the result of
a requirement by Hughes' Thuraya satellite customer, who wanted to reduce
the power used by the handsets when transmitting. This required an
increase in the sensitivity and power of the satellites and their
antenna.105 The original contract also called for two on-orbit satellites.
This was modified to one on-orbit satellite and one spare
satellite.106
The 40-foot antenna, which uses a
truss-like outer ring and mesh reflector surface, is the unique aspect of
the APMT satellite design. It has led to concerns that the PRC could
use the APMT satellite for signals intelligence collection against a wide
spectrum of communications.107
The satellite, however, is designed to collect and process only
communications in the same bandwidth as is allocated to the handsets.108
Communications satellite antennas are designed to receive their own
frequency and reject all others. To do otherwise would add unnecessary
expense and complexity to the satellite.
In an attempt to reduce interference from other satellites using the
same frequency bands, the APMT satellite antenna will use "left-hand
circular polarization" which gives its signals a unique signature. The
satellite will not collect other signals that use right, vertical,
horizontal, or no polarization. These factors thus limit the satellite's
ability to engage in signals intelligence to the collection of information
transmitted by APMT system users. That volume of information, however,
would be substantial.
When the handsets in the proposed APMT system are used, even for
handset-to-handset conversations that are not bounced off the satellite,
copies of the transmissions are downloaded to a central ground station.
This capability is typically required of most satellite communications
systems. Only Iridium, which uses inter-satellite cross-links, does not
downlink its communications to a ground station. This downlink would allow
the PRC to monitor the communications of APMT's users across the Asian
region.
APMT AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL
CRISIS
The APMT program is one of the few commercial communications satellite
programs that has remained strong despite the Asian financial crisis.
Projections of an oversupply problem for Asia, and an accompanying plunge
in transponder lease rates, appeared before the 1998 recession began.
Asian currencies fell, as did demand for new satellite capacity. This
oversupply was compounded when India did not pass legislation as expected
to open their nation to the direct-to-home satellite market. That failure
left some Asian satellites with empty beams aimed at India. Additional
questions arose during this time about whether there are sufficient
customers for these satellites to earn revenue. The Asian market is
flooded with transponder capacity, creating a buyers' market.109
At least ten Asia-Pacific region communications satellite programs have
been deferred due to the economic crisis.110 These include the Measat 3,
Agila 3, AsiaSat 4, Thaicom 4, LSTAR 1, LSTAR 2, and the M2A
communications satellites.111
Yet another concern with Hughes' proposed APMT sale is that it could
help the PRC learn about the deployment of large antenna structures. This
could assist the PRC in the development of future reconnaissance
satellites. Mechanisms used to deploy large antenna systems have been
protected from PRC scrutiny in the past. Visual access to the satellite,
as well as the risk of unauthorized discussion with engineers such as has
occurred in the past, could give the PRC access to this sensitive
technology for the first time.
The Role of PLA General Shen Rongjun
and His Son in APMT
The complex relationship between the Shen
family and the Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) satellite has
raised concerns about the possible use of the satellite for military
intelligence purposes, and the possibility that technology discussed in
the technical interchange meetings would be transferred to the People's
Liberation Army (PLA).112
In May 1994, PLA Lieutenant General Shen Rongjun, the Deputy Director
of the People's Republic of China Commission of Science, Technology and
Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), traveled to the United States and
attended several business meetings with Hughes. Gen. Shen's
responsibilities at COSTIND included the acquisition of satellite systems
for the PRC. During this visit to the United States, General Shen's son,
Shen Jun, who was living in Canada at the time, attended a business lunch
with his father where he was introduced to Frank Taormina of Hughes.
Taormina would later assist Shen Jun in obtaining a job at Hughes.113
Shen Jun is the older of two sons born to Gen. Shen. He spent 10 of his
early years living at the Taiyun Satellite Launch Center in Shanxi
province. Shen Jun received his Bachelor's and Master's degrees in
computer science from the Changsha Institute of Technology.114 The
Changsha Institute of Technology is also known as the National Defense
University of Science and Technology, and is run by the PLA.
For two years, Shen Jun received training and worked in the field of
missiles and satellites under PLA supervision.
Shen Jun began working in North America in 1989 as a research assistant
at the University of Waterloo, where he would later receive his Ph.D. in
computer science in 1993.115
During his lunch meeting with Taormina in 1994, Shen Jun remarked that
he was applying for a job with Hughes Canada. Taormina suggested to Shen
Jun that he submit his resume to Taormina at Hughes in Los Angeles, where
he could probably get a better job. While Shen Jun says he was not certain
whether Taormina had a relationship with his father, he assumes that this
was so, since Taormina was a Hughes vice president in charge of marketing
and commercial business.116
Shen Jun was hired at Hughes in August 1994 after interviewing with
Steve Hagers, who would become his boss.117 At the time, a division of
Space Systems/Loral was also considering hiring Shen for a position that
would have allowed him access to classified information.
Originally, Shen Jun was
hired at Hughes as a scientist in the information technology division. His
primary duty was to investigate new software systems that were available
in the commercial market for potential use by Hughes.118 However, by June
1995, Shen Jun was transferred into Hughes' business development unit,
where Hughes used him to conduct market research, general marketing of
satellites in Asia, and, specifically, marketing of the APMT
program.119
Another of Shen Jun's roles was to act as an interpreter for Hughes.
While Hughes acquired a license from the U.S. State Department for Shen
Jun to work as an interpreter in late 1996, Shen says he did not attend
any of the preliminary design review meetings for APMT.120 Shen Jun states
that he did translate for Hughes during at least one or two meetings in
the proposal stage. During this period, Shen Jun had a foreign national
badge and did not have access to certain Hughes facilities.121
Shen Jun also claims that he did not talk with his father, Gen. Shen
Rongjun, on a regular basis and had only discussed the APMT satellite with
him on a couple of occasions, and even then only at a very general level.
Shen Jun claims he talks infrequently with his father, and that he usually
talks with his mother when he talks with his family because his father is
busy. Furthermore, Shen Jun claims not to know his father's current
occupation since the reorganization of COSTIND. Shen Jun, acknowledges,
however, that he has had "very high level" discussions with his father on
APMT such as "how is the thing nothing deep, because it's a sensitive
issue."122
Gen. Shen Rongjun's interactions with the APMT program
are more obviously extensive. General Shen has been an advocate at COSTIND
for purchasing Western satellites for the PLA, especially since the PRC's
domestic satellites began failing in the early 1990s. Based on his
position and responsibilities, Gen. Shen was directly involved in the
decision to choose Hughes to work on the APMT program.
Similarities Between the PRC's
Ballistic
Missile and Rocket Technology
Background
The technologies used in rockets and ballistic missiles are essentially
the same, except in the areas of payload and flight profile.123 The common
elements of rockets and ballistic missiles include:
� Propulsion
� Structure
� Staging
� Guidance and control
� Ground support and launch
equipment
� Systems
integration124
These commonalities have led to considerable interaction between rocket
and ballistic missile programs. Nations that possess space launch
capabilities are considered to have all the essential elements to develop
a ballistic missile, and vice versa.
Historically, most rockets have been derived from ballistic missiles.
In the United States, for example, the current Titan, Atlas, and Delta
rockets were derived from ballistic missiles developed in the 1950s and
1960s. Russia's Start rocket is essentially an SS-25 intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) that has been modified with an additional upper
stage and a payload fairing in place of its reentry vehicle.125 Some
rockets were even launched from silos, such as the Soviet-era SL-7 and
SL-8. These Soviet rockets made use of the SS-4 and SS-5
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, respectively, as first
stages.126
Since their origin, the PRC
missile and space programs have been tied together. Like the space
programs in the United States and the Soviet Union, the PRC space program
got its early start by modifying ballistic missiles into rockets. These
early attempts set a pattern of cooperation that continues today. The
interaction can be seen in the overall design of the ballistic missiles
and the rockets and in certain subsystems, such as propulsion.
In some areas, however, there are divergences. These divergences will
increase in the future as the PRC's rockets and ballistic missiles employ
different technologies, such as solid-propellant motors for ICBMs and
cryogenic liquid-propellant engines for rockets.
The PRC's first rocket, known as the Long March 1, was a derivative of
its limited range CSS-3 ICBM. The PRC launched two satellites aboard the
Long March 1: one in 1970, and the second in 1971.
The PRC's CSS-4 ICBM has been the model for all PRC rockets since 1973.
The first, the Long March 2A, has evolved into a family of rockets,
including the Long March 2C, 2E, and 3; the Long March 3A family; and the
Long March 4. The Long March 2C rocket is the most closely related to the
CSS-4 ICBM. Indeed, it was derived directly from it. The two vehicles
share the same first stage engines, structure, and dimensions.127
The PRC has also modified the CSS-3 into a small satellite launch
vehicle known as the Long March 1D. The modifications include improvements
to the YF-2 engines, a new second stage engine utilizing the YF-40 engines
from the Long March 4, and a solid-propellant third stage similar to the
apogee kick motor used on the Long March 3. The PRC has yet to use this
new rocket for commercial space launches. The Long March 1D has, however,
been used for military purposes.
Propulsion
Systems
The propulsion system requirements for rockets and ballistic missiles
are the same. Liquid-propellant engines or solid-propellant motors can be
used on either. Both first and second stage engines are interchangeable
between ballistic missiles and rockets. The flight environments that
ballistic missiles and rockets pass through are the same, thus allowing
their engines to be designed similarly. Traditionally, however, rockets
use either additional stages or kick motors to place their payloads into
orbit. Strap-on boosters can also be used for both rockets and ballistic
missiles.
For its next generation ballistic missiles, the PRC is moving towards
solid propellants. This will offer faster reaction times compared to
liquid-propellant missiles. Moreover, solid-propellant missiles tend to be
lighter weight. Solid propellants are less commonly used for rocket
applications, since they provide less boosting power to place large
payloads into orbit. Furthermore, the challenge of restarting
solid-propellant motors once stopped makes them unattractive for upper
stage use. The light weight of solid propellants, however, does make them
useful for placing satellites into geosynchronous orbits, because they may
be employed as kick motors and also as strap-on boosters on rockets.
The PRC's space program is reported to be moving away from storable
liquid-propellant engines to cryogenic liquid-propellant engines. The PRC
is reported to be working on a rocket that would use cryogenic
liquid-propellant engines for its first and second stages. These engines
provide greater boosting power over storable liquid propellants and solid
propellants.128
Airframes
The airframe structure that forms the aerodynamic shell within which
all elements of the rocket and ballistic missile are integrated is the
same for both rockets and ballistic missiles.129
Ballistic missile and rocket structures must use materials that are
lightweight and strong.130 Lightweight materials are preferred because the
smaller the structural fraction of the weight of the missile or rocket,
the more weight can be dedicated to payload or range.131
The structure must also be strong enough to withstand the aerodynamic
loads that affect the missile or rocket during boost and ground handling
operations.132 Because these loads are similar during the boost phase of
flight, the structural requirements for ballistic missiles and rockets are
the same, placing the same premium on materials, design, and
fabrication.133
Ballistic Missile and Rocket Stages
The staging mechanisms on ballistic missiles and rockets are the same.
In both cases, the purpose of using stages is to carry aloft the smallest
amount of weight necessary to accelerate the payload to its target.
By discarding parts of the rocket or missiles that are no longer
necessary, including unused propellant, stage separation makes space
flight more efficient. For ballistic missiles with low accuracy (for
example, "city buster" nuclear weapons as opposed to those designed to hit
ICBM silos), the mechanisms for payload separation can be similar to those
used on rockets.
Guidance
Systems
The guidance and control subsystem of a rocket and of a ballistic
missile monitors the flight path and adjusts for the effects of high
altitude winds or gravitational attractions. The purpose, in both cases,
is to deliver a payload to preselected points, either in orbit or on the
earth, at preselected velocities.
The accuracy capabilities of a ballistic missile's guidance system may
exceed those required for placing satellites into orbit, but the guidance
system for a ballistic missile can be used on a rocket. A rocket guidance
system, on the other hand, is not usually designed for the same degree of
accuracy as is required for ballistic missiles, and therefore may not be
suitable for use in some ballistic missile missions where a high degree of
accuracy is required. In most cases, however, a rocket guidance system
would be sufficiently accurate for delivering nuclear weapons to large
targets such as cities.134
Many of the PRC's ballistic missiles and rockets share the same
guidance systems.
The Select Committee has learned
from Western scientists participating in the failure review following the
1996 Long March 3B crash that the guidance system used on the Long
March 2C, Long March 2E, and Long March 3 rockets is also used on the
CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile.135
The strap-down guidance system that is used on the PLA's M-series of
ballistic missiles, such as the CSS-6 (also known as the M-9) and CSS-X-7
(also known as the M-11), is also used on the PRC "Smart Dispenser." 136
The PRC has used the Smart Dispenser to dispense two Iridium
communications satellites on six different occasions.
The PRC had proposed to Loral to use this same guidance system on the
PRC's "Top Stage" dispenser to dispense twelve Globalstar communications
satellites from atop a Long March 2E rocket.137 The PRC marketed the Top
Stage to Loral as having a mature guidance system, since its inertial
measurement unit had been tested on more than 50 flights of the M-series
missiles.138 After the crash of the Long March 3B carrying Loral's
Intelsat 708 payload, however, Loral withdrew from its Globalstar contract
with the PRC, and the 12-satellite dispenser was never used.
The
Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C rockets use a different inertial measurement
unit than do the Long March 2 family of rockets, the Long March 3, and the
CSS-4 ICBM. The new guidance system for the Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C was
developed in 1985, and is cheaper and lighter than the Long March 2 and
Long March 3 guidance system.
The Long March 2 and 3 inertial measurement unit, for example, is so
heavy that a crane is required to place it into position in the rocket.
The Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C inertial measurement system is sufficiently
smaller that it can be manually installed in the rocket. 
Additionally, the Long March 2 guidance system and the guidance system
for the Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C share almost none of the same
components. The Long March 2 guidance system uses a double solder for
connectors, whereas the Long March 3B uses a single solder. The Long March
2 guidance system is also a three-axis stabilized platform, whereas the
Long March 3B is a four-axis stabilized platform.140
A relatively small and lightweight inertial measurement unit would be
required for the PRC's next generation of ICBMs. While the Long March 3B
inertial measurement unit is capable of being used for that purpose, it is
considered an unlikely choice. Nonetheless, the experience that the PRC
has gained with the Long March 3B in designing a small and lightweight
inertial measurement unit that works will almost certainly benefit its
designs of ICBM guidance systems in the future.
Ground
Support
Ground support and launch procedures can be the same for rockets and
ballistic missiles. The crews that launch ballistic missiles and rockets
can be the same (and, indeed, PLA personnel are involved in both rocket
and ICBM launches in the PRC).
The ground support equipment, such as the launch tower, the missile
stand, the propellant handling equipment, and the transportation trains,
can all be the same for rockets and ballistic missiles.
Payload preparation and handling is an area where procedures do differ,
since satellites often require a complex checkout sequence before launch
which ballistic missile warheads do not.141
The various institutes and academies in the PRC involved in the design
and production of ballistic missiles also share design and production
responsibilities for rockets. The China Academy of Launch Technology
(CALT) is responsible for research and development of ballistic missiles
and rockets. The Beijing Institute of Control Devices is responsible for
both ballistic missile and rocket design. Moreover, all of these academies
and institutes are managed within the same organizational hierarchy. These
common responsibilities will allow the PRC to gain experience for both
their ballistic missile and rocket programs through the launching of
Western communications satellites.
The PRC's launch sites are also used for both military and commercial
purposes. The Taiyun Satellite Launch Center was originally designed for
launches of the CSS-4 ICBM. Today it launches the Long March 2C/SD rocket
carrying Iridium satellites and the Long March 4 into polar orbits.142
Systems
Integration
The system for integrating the propulsion, guidance and control,
payload, and structure is the same for rockets and ballistic missiles.143
Analytical and diagnostic tools, such as structural analysis software, are
the same for both and are widely available.144
Payload
The payload is the area of most significant potential difference
between rockets and ballistic missiles.
Satellites are usually complex, fragile systems that are designed to
remain in orbit for fixed periods of time. Satellite payloads usually are
not required to withstand the aerodynamic stresses of reentry. Single
warheads, on the other hand - including nuclear, chemical, and biological
warheads, as well as conventional bombs - are designed to survive the
intense stresses of atmospheric reentry.
Rockets normally use a fairing to protect the satellite payload from
the aerodynamics stresses of launch (although a satellite can be designed,
in some instances, to withstand the aerodynamic stresses of launch and
therefore would not require a fairing). But in many cases, such as in the
deployment of multiple warheads, or submarine launched missiles, ballistic
missiles can include a shroud that is similar to a fairing. Both fairings
and shrouds are aerodynamic shells that are placed over the payload -
satellite or warhead - to reduce drag and aerodynamic stresses during
launch.
To place the desired payloads into orbit, rockets generally operate at
higher velocities than ballistic missiles. These higher velocities are
often attained by high performance third stages, or by kick motors. An
ICBM payload, on the other hand, is not intended to achieve orbit around
the earth. Rather, the nuclear warhead reentry vehicle is considered to be
a rocket whose orbit intersects the earth at the target.
Conclusion
Because of the many commonalities between rockets and ballistic
missiles, the PRC can apply the same system refinements and modifications
to both its rockets and ICBMs. It is likely that the failure rates of
CSS-4 ICBM test flights, and the remedies the PRC adopts to address
technical problems with the CSS-4 ICBM, are the same as or similar to
those of the Long March series of rockets.
Chapter 4
Notes
1 China's 'Project 921' Men In Space, Philip Clark,
Launchspace Publications, 1997.
2 The participation of this
individual, Qian Xuesen, in the PRC's ballistic missile programs is
presented in detail later in this Chapter.
3 Department of
Defense Briefing to Select Committee, December 11, 1998.
4 PRC
biography of Qian Xuesen.
5 Thread of the Silkworm, Iris Chang,
Basic Books, 1995.
6 Department of Defense briefing to Select
Committee, December 11, 1998.
7 Thread of the Silkworm, Iris
Chang, Basic Books, 1995.
8 Department of Defense briefing to
Select Committee, December 11, 1998.
9 Ibid.
10 Thread
of the Silkworm, Iris Chang, Basic Books, 1995.
11 Department of
Defense briefing to Select Committee, December 11, 1998.
12
Thread of the Silkworm, Iris Chang, Basic Books, 1995.
13
Department of Defense briefing to Select Committee, December 11,
1998.
14 Thread of the Silkworm, Iris Chang, Basic Books,
1995.
15 The Fifth Academy became the Seventh Ministry of
Machine Building in 1965.
16 Thread of the Silkworm, Iris
Chang, Basic Books, 1995.
17 Department of Defense briefing to
Select Committee, December 11, 1998.
18 Thread of the Silkworm,
Iris Chang, Basic Books, 1995. Department of Defense briefing to Select
Committee, December 11, 1998.
19 "Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat," Department of Defense, 1998.
20 "China: Ballistic and
Cruise Missiles," Shirley A. Kan, CRS, May 27, 1998.
21
Ibid.
22 Deposition of Robert Steinhauer, October 30,
1998.
23 "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," Department of
Defense, 1998.
24 "China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles,"
Shirley A. Kan, CRS, May 27, 1998.
25 Ibid.
26
Department of Defense, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,"
1998.
27 Ibid.
28 "China's New 'Old Thinking',"
Alastair Iain Johnston, International Security, Winter
1995/96.
29 Statement of Robert Walpole at Carnegie Endowment.
30 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States, July 15, 1998.
31 "Future
Challenges to Ballistic Missile Defenses," George Lewis and Theodore
Postol, Spectrum, September 1997.
32 "U.S. Technology Builds
'Bridge' for China Missile," Jeff Gertz, The Washington Times, July 14,
1998.
33 "Russian Rocket Called Invincible; Designer Says It Can
Penetrate Any 'Potential ABM System,'" David Hoffman, The Washington Post,
February 25, 1999.
34 "Russia, Ukraine Get Stern Missile
Warning," Bill Gertz, The Washington Times, May 21, 1996.
35
"Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and
Analysis," Shirley Kan, Congressional Research Service, September 13,
1996.
36 Ibid.
37 "April 1995 Export Controls: Some
Controls Over Missile-Related Technology Exports to China are Weak," F.
James Shafer, et al., General Accounting Office, April 17,
1995.
38 "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Background and Analysis," Shirley Kan, Congressional Research Service,
September 13, 1996.
39 "U.S. Protests China Arms Move; Shipment
of Missile Technology to Iran causes Concern," Bill Gertz, The Washington
Times, December 7, 1998.
40 "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis," Shirley Kan, Congressional
Research Service, September 13, 1996.
41 Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43 "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Current Policy Issues," Shirley Kan, Congressional Research Service, July
1, 1998.
44 "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Background and Analysis," Shirley Kan, Congressional Research
Service, September 13, 1996.
45 Thread of the Silkworm, Iris
Chang, Basic Books, 1995.
46 Jane's Space Directory, Ed. Phillip
Clark, Jane's Information Group Limited, 1997, Jane's Strategic Weapons
Systems, Jane's Information Group Limited, 1998.
47 Testimony of
Department of Defense, August 25, 1998.
48 Jane's Space
Directory, Ed. Phillip Clark, Jane's Information Group Limited,
1997.
49 Testimony of Department of Defense, August 25,
1998.
50 Jane's Space Directory, Ed. Phillip Clark, Jane's
Information Group Limited, 1997.
51 Ibid.
52 Jane's
Space Directory, Ed. Phillip Clark, Jane's Information Group Limited,
1997.
53 "Encyclopedia Astronautica," Mark Wade, Web page.
54 Testimony of Department of Defense, August 25,
1998.
55 Jane's Space Directory, Ed. Phillip Clark, Jane's
Information Group Limited, 1997.
56 Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58 "China's Space Program: A Brief Overview Including
Commercial Launches of U.S.-Built Satellites," Marcia S. Smith,
Congressional Research Service, June 23, 1998.
59 Ibid.
60 "Space Launch Vehicles: Government Requirements and
Commercial Competition," Marcia Smith, CRS, July 2, 1998.
61
Testimony of Ray Williamson, Space Policy Institute, November 13,
1998.
62 Testimony of Paul Wolfowitz before the Senate Committee
on Commerce Science and Transportation, September 17, 1998.
63
The Reagan Administration's decision to relax export control regulations
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, U.S. Export Policy Toward
the PRC. "China's Space Program: A Brief Overview Including Commercial
Launches of U.S.-Built Satellites," Marcia Smith, CRS, June 23,
1998.
64 Jane's Space Directory, Ed. Phillip Clark, Jane's
Information Group Limited, 1997.
65 "China's Space Program: A
Brief Overview Including Commercial Launches of U.S.-Built Satellites,"
Marcia Smith, CRS, June 23, 1998
66 "U.S. Manufactured
Satellites Launched by China," Mike Evans.
67 For additional
information on Western participation in PRC launch failure reviews, see
Chapter 5 of this Report, Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes, and
Chapter 6, Satellite Launches in the PRC: Loral. "U.S. Manufactured
Satellites Launched by China," Mike Evans.
68 For additional
information on Western participation in PRC launch failure reviews, see
Chapter 5 of this Report, Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes, and
Chapter 6, Satellite Launches in the PRC: Loral. "U.S. Manufactured
Satellites Launched by China," Mike Evans.
69 Jane's Space
Directory, Ed. Phillip Clark, Jane's Information Group Limited,
1997.
70 Ibid.
71 Potential and Risks, Lin Sun, ICOM
Publications, April 1998.
72 Jane's Space Directory, Ed.
Phillip Clark, Jane's Information Group Limited, 1997.
73
Ibid.
74 Potential and Risks, Lin Sun, ICOM Publications, April
1998.
75 Memorandum from D. McBrady to R. Berry, J. Reynolds,
and C. Hoeber, "Summary Report on a Trip to China Oct./Nov. 1993,"
November 30, 1993.
76 Ibid.
77 "C-Band: Shaped
Beam/Multifeed (PSR)," DaimlerChrysler Aerospace Group.
78
Jane's Space Directory, Ed. Phillip Clark, Jane's Information Group
Limited, 1997.
79 Memorandum from D. McBrady to R. Berry, J.
Reynolds, and C. Hoeber, "Summary Report on a Trip to China Oct./Nov.
1993," November 30,1993.
80 "Briefing for China Aerospace
Corporation," Space Systems/Loral, September 1996.
81
"Memorandum of Agreement between China Aerospace Corporation and Space
Systems/Loral regarding Long Term Cooperation," June 9, 1995.
82
"Asia Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) Program Briefing," Hughes
Corporation, February 1996, Memorandum for William Lowell, Department of
State, "Adding of Additional End Users," August 14, 1998.
83
Jane's Space Directory, Ed. Phillip Clark, Jane's Information Group
Limited, 1997.
84 Potential and Risks, Lin Sun, ICOM
Publications, April 1998.
85 Pyramid Research Asia, "VSAT
Networks Flourish in China," 1994.
86 Jane's Space Directory,
Ed. Phillip Clark, Jane's Information Group Limited, 1997.
87
Ibid.
88 "China's Recoverable Satellite Program," Phillip Clark,
Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1, 1993.
89 Jane's Space
Directory, Ed. Phillip Clark, Jane's Information Group Limited,
1997.
90 Ibid.
91 "China Space Program: A Brief
Overview Including Commercial Launches of U.S.-Built Satellites," Marcia
Smith, Congressional Research Service, June 23, 1998.
92 Jane's
Space Directory, Ed. Phillip Clark, Jane's Information Group Limited,
1997.
93 "Asia Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) Program
Briefing," Hughes Corporation, February 1996.
94
Ibid.
95 "Singapore Telecom Pull Out of APMT," China Space News,
May 1998.
96 "Asia Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT)
Program Briefing," Hughes Corporation, February 1996.
97 APMT
License Application 738807, 4 June 1998. Memorandum for William Lowell,
"Adding of Additional End User," August 14, 1998.
98 "Asia
Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) Program Briefing," Hughes
Corporation, February 1996.
99 "Asia-Pacific Mobile
Telecommunications (APMT) System," Space Systems/Loral.
100
"Understanding the APMT Satellite Agreement," Hughes Electronics
Corporation.
101 "Annex 16. Space Segment Technical
Specification," Hughes Corporation, February 5, 1996. "Asia Pacific Mobile
Telecommunications (APMT) Program Briefing," Hughes Corporation, February
1996.
102 "Asia Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) Program
Briefing," Hughes Corporation, February 1996. June 4, 1998, Memorandum for
William Lowell, "Adding of Additional End User," August 14,
1998.
103 "Understanding the APMT Satellite Agreement," Hughes
Electronics Corporation.
104 Ibid.
105 Department of
Defense briefing to Select Committee, October 20, 1998.
106
"Hughes Will Build APMT Satellites," China Space News, May 1998,
Deposition of Shen Jun, December 8, 1998.
107 "Asia Pacific
Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) Program Briefing," Hughes Corporation,
February 1996.
108 Memorandum for the Record: Claims that
proposed Hughes satellite sale poses SIGINT risk, October 20,
1998.
109 "Fiscal Uncertainty Continues," Steven Watkins, Space
News, December 7-13, 1998.
110 "Asian Economic Crisis Jolts
Pacific Space Sector," Craig Covault, Aviation Week & Space
Technology, October 5, 1998.
111 "Fiscal Uncertainty Continues,"
Steven Watkins, Space News, December 7-13, 1998.
112 See "U.S.
Rethinking a Satellite Deal Over Links to Chinese Military," Jeff Gerth,
New York Times, June 18, 1998.
113 Deposition of Shen Jun,
December 8, 1998.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119
Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122
Ibid.
123 Recognizing, of course, that the structural dynamics
of one system are different from another. For example, the acoustic
environment for a solid propellant missile is different than that for a
liquid-propellant missile and, therefore, a guidance system from a
liquid-propellant space launch vehicle may not function adequately in a
solid-propellant ballistic missile. Memorandum for the Record, "Summary of
Discussion with Michael Evans and Dr. Flax Regarding Acoustic Vibration in
Ballistic Missiles," December 16, 1998.
124 "Benefits of
Commercial Space Launch Assistance and Use for Foreign Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile Programs," Dr. William Graham, presentation to Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, May 20, 1998.
125 Mark Wade,
Encyclopedia Astronautica.
126 Report on the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Appendix I:
Technical Analyses.
127 See Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems
and Jane's Space Directory, Phillip Clark ed., Jane's Information Group,
1997.
128 Jane's Space Directory, Phillip Clark ed., Jane's
Information Group, 1997.
129 Report on the Commission to Assess
the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Appendix I: Technical
Analyses.
130 "Benefits of Commercial Space Launch Assistance
and Use for Foreign Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Programs," Dr.
William Graham, presentation to Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
May 20, 1998.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133
Ibid.
134 "Benefits of Commercial Space Launch Assistance and
Use for Foreign Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Programs," Dr. William
Graham, presentation to Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, May 20,
1998.
135 Deposition of Robert Steinhauer, October 30,
1998.
136 "Answers to Launch Services Questions," He Xing, May
9, 1994.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 LM-3
Mission & LM-3B Failure: APSTAR-1A Pre-flight briefing, April 15-16,
1996.
140 "Question/Answer derived from the IMU specific
splinter meeting," as part of the Meeting Minutes from the Second IRC
Meeting, Materials provided to the Select Committee by Space
Systems/Loral.
141 "Benefits of Commercial Space Launch
Assistance and Use for Foreign Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
Programs," Dr. William Graham, presentation to Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, May 20, 1998.
142 Jane's Space Directory,
Phillip Clark ed., Jane's Information Group, 1997.
143 "Benefits
of Commercial Space Launch Assistance and Use for Foreign Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile Programs," Dr. William Graham, presentation to Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, May 20, 1998.
144 Ibid.
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